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THE  
PHILOLOGICAL  
MUSEUM.

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SECOND VOLUME.

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CAMBRIDGE:

PRINTED BY J. SMITH, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY;

FOR DEIGHTONS, CAMBRIDGE;

RIVINGTONS, LONDON;

AND PARKER, OXFORD.

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M.DCCC.XXXIII.



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## IMAGINARY CONVERSATION.

P. SCIPIO EMILIANUS, POLYBIUS, PANETIUS.

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SCIPIO.

POLYBIUS, if you have found me slow in rising to you, if I lifted not up my eyes to salute you on your entrance, do not hold me ungrateful..proud there is no danger that you will ever call me: this day of all days would least make me so: it shews me the power of the immortal gods, the mutability of fortune, the instability of empire, the feebleness, the nothingness, of man. The earth stands motionless; the grass upon it bends and returns, the same today as yesterday, the same in this age as in a thousand past; the sky darkens and is serene again; the clouds melt away, but they are clouds another time, and float like triumphal pageants along the heavens. Carthage is fallen! to rise no more! the funereal horns have this hour announced to us that, after eighteen days and eighteen nights of conflagration, her last embers are extinguished.

POLYBIUS.

Perhaps, O Emilianus, I ought not to have come in.

SCIPIO.

Welcome, my friend.

POLYBIUS.

While you were speaking I would by no means interrupt you so idly, as to ask you to whom have you been proud, or to whom could you be ungrateful.

SCIPIO.

To him, if to any, whose hand is on my heart; to him on whose shoulder I rest my head, weary with presages and vigils. Collect my thoughts for me, O my friend! the fall



of Carthage hath shaken and scattered them. There are moments when, if we are quite contented with ourselves, we never can remount to what we were before.

POLYBIUS.

Panetius is absent.

SCIPIO.

Feeling the necessity, at the moment, of utter loneliness, I despatched him toward the city. There may be (yes, even there) some sufferings which the Senate would not censure us for assuaging. But here he returns. Come, tell me, Polybius, on what are you reflecting and meditating?

POLYBIUS.

After the burning of some village, or the overleaping of some garden-wall, to exterminate a few pirates or highway-men, I have seen the commander's tent thronged with officers; I have heard as many trumpets around him as would have shaken down the places of themselves; I have seen the horses start from the pretorium, as if they would fly from under their trappings, and spurred as if they were to reach the east and west before sunset, that nations might hear of the exploit, and sleep soundly. And now do I behold in solitude, almost in gloom, and in such silence that, unless my voice prevents it, the grasshopper is audible, him who has levelled to the earth the strongest and most populous of cities, the wealthiest and most formidable of empires. I had seen Rome; I had seen (what those who never saw never *will* see) Carthage; I thought I had seen Scipio: it was but the image of him: here I find him.

SCIPIO.

There are many hearts that ache this day: there are many that never will ache more: hath one man done it? one man's breath? What air, upon the earth, or upon the waters, or in the void of heaven, is lost so quickly! It flies away at the point of an arrow, and returns no more! the sea-foam stifles it! the tooth of a reptile stops it! a noxious leaf suppresses it! What are we in our greatness? whence rises it? whither tends it?



Merciful gods ! may not Rome be what Carthage is ? may not those who love her devotedly, those who will look on her with fondness and affection after life, see her in such condition as to wish she were so ?

POLYBIUS.

One of the heaviest groans over fallen Carthage burst from the breast of Scipio : who would believe this tale ?

SCIPIO.

Men like my Polybius : others must never hear it.

POLYBIUS.

You have not ridden forth, Emilianus, to survey the ruins.

SCIPIO.

No, Polybius : since I removed my tent, to avoid the heat from the conflagration, I never have ridden nor walked nor looked toward them. At this elevation, and three miles off, the temperature of the season is altered. I do not believe, as those about me would have persuaded me, that the gods were visible in the clouds ; that thrones of ebony and gold were scattered in all directions ; that broken chariots, and flaming steeds, and brazen bridges, had cast their fragments upon the earth ; that eagles and lions, dolphins and tridents, and other emblems of power and empire, were visible at one moment, and at the next had vanished ; that purple and scarlet overspread the mansions of the gods ; that their voices were heard at first confusedly and discordantly ; and that the apparition closed with their high festivals. I could not keep my eyes on the heavens : a crash of arch or of theatre or of tower, a column of flame rising higher than they were, or a universal cry, as if none until then had perished, drew them thitherward. Such were the dismal sights and sounds, a fresh city seemed to have been taken every hour, for seventeen days. This is the eighteenth since the smoke arose from the level roofs and from the lofty temples, and thousands died, and tens of thousands ran in search of death.

Calamity moves me ; heroism moves me more. That a nation whose avarice we have so often reprehended, should have cast into the furnace gold and silver, from the insuffi-



ciency of brass and iron for arms ; that palaces the most magnificent should have been demolished by the proprietor for their beams and rafters, in order to build a fleet against us ; that the ropes whereby the slaves hawled them down to the new harbour, should in part be composed of hair, for one lock of which the neighbouring kings would have laid down their diadems ; that Asdrubal should have found equals, his wife none . . my mind, my very limbs, are unsteddy with admiration.

O Liberty ! what art thou to the valiant and brave, when thou art thus to the weak and timid ! dearer than life, stronger than death, higher than purest love. Never will I call upon thee where thy name can be profaned ; and never shall my soul acknowledge a more exalted power than thee.

#### PANETIUS.

The Carthaginians and Moors have beyond other nations a delicate feeling on female chastity. Rather than that their women should become slaves and concubines, they slay them : is it certain that Asdrubal did not observe or cause to be observed the custom of his country ?

#### POLYBIUS.

Certain : on the surrender of his army his wife threw herself and her two infants into the flames. Not only memorable acts, of what the dastardly will call desperation, were performed, but some also of deliberate and signal justice. Avaricious as we called the people, and unjustly, as you have proved, Emilianus, I will relate what I myself was witness to.

In a part of the city where the fire had subsided, we were excited by loud cries, rather of indignation, we thought, than of such as fear or lament or threaten or exhort ; and we pressed forward to disperse the multitude. Our horses often plunged in the soft dust, and in the holes whence the pavement had been removed for missiles, and often reared up and snorted violently at smells which we could not perceive, but which we discovered to rise from bodies, mutilate and half-burnt, of soldiers and horses, laid bare, some partly, some wholly, by the march of the troop. Altho the distance from the place whence we parted to that where we heard the cries, was very short, yet from the incumbrances in that street, and



from the dust and smoke issuing out of others, we were some time before we reached it. On our near approach, two old men threw themselves on the ground before us, and the elder spake thus. *Our age, O Romans, neither will nor ought to be our protection: we are, or rather we have been, judges of this land; and to the utmost of our power we have invited our countrymen to resist you. The laws are now yours.*

The expectation of the people was intense and silent: we had heard some groans; and now the last words of the old man were taken up by others, by men in agony.

*Yes, O Romans!* said the elder who had accompanied him that had addrest us, *the laws are yours; and none punish more severely than you do treason and parricide. Let your horses turn this corner, and you will see before you traitors and parricides.*

We entered a small square: it had been a marketplace: the roofs of the stalls were demolished, and the stones of several columns, not one of which was standing, thrown down to supply the cramps of iron and the lead that fastened them, served for the spectators, male and female, to mount on. Five men were nailed on crosses; two others were nailed against a wall, from scarcity (as we were told) of wood.

*Can seven men have murdered their parents in the same year?* cried I.

*No, nor had any of the seven,* replied the first who had spoken. *But when heavy impositions were laid upon those who were backward in voluntary contributions, these men, among the richest in our city, protested by the gods that they had no gold or silver left. They protested truly.*

*And they die for this! inhuman, insatiable, inexorable wretch.*

*Their books,* added he, *unmoved at my reproaches, were seized by public authority and examined. It was discovered that, instead of employing their riches in external or internal commerce, or in manufactories, or in agriculture, instead of reserving it for the embellishment of the city, or the utility of the citizens, instead of lending it on interest to the industrious and the needy, they had lent it to foren kings and tyrants, some of whom were waging unjust wars against*



*their neighbours by these very means, and others were enslaving their own country. For so heinous a crime the laws had appointed no specific punishment. On such occasions the people and elders vote in what manner the delinquent shall be prosecuted, lest any offender should escape with impunity, from their humanity or their improvidence. Some voted that these wretches should be cast amid the panthers; the majority decreed them (I think wisely) a more lingering and more ignominious death.*

The men upon the crosses held down their heads, whether from shame or pain or feebleness. The sunbeams were striking them fiercely; sweat ran from them, liquefying the blood that, within a few instants, had blackened and hardened on their hands and feet. A soldier stood by the side of each, lowering the point of his spear to the ground; but no one of them gave it up to us. A centurion asked the nearest of them how he dared to stand armed before him.

*Because the city is in ruins, and the laws still live, said he. At the first order of the conqueror or of the elders I surrender my spear.*

*What is your pleasure, O commander?* said the elder.

*That an act of justice be the last public act performed by the citizens of Carthage, and that the sufferings of these wretches be not abridged.* Such was my reply. The soldiers piled their spears, for the points of which the hearts of the crucified men thirsted; and the people hailed us as they would have hailed deliverers.

#### SCIPIO.

It is wonderful that a city, in which private men are so wealthy as to furnish the armories of tyrants, should have existed so long, and flourishing in power and freedom.

#### PANETIUS.

It survived but shortly this flagrant crime in its richer citizens. An admirable form of government, spacious and safe harbours, a fertile soil, a healthy climate, industry and science in agriculture, in which no nation is equal to the Moorish, were the causes of its prosperity: there are many of its decline.



SCIPIO.

Enumerate them, Panetius, with your wonted clearness.

PANETIUS.

We are fond, O my friends ! of likening power and greatness to the luminaries of heaven ; and we think ourselves quite moderate when we compare the agitations of elevated souls to whatever is highest and strongest on the earth, liable alike to shocks and sufferings, and able alike to survive and overcome them. And truly thus to reason, as if all things around and above us sympathized, is good both for heart and intellect. I have little or nothing of the poetical in my character ; and yet from reading over and considering these similitudes, I am fain to look upon nations with somewhat of the same feeling ; and, dropping from the mountains and disentangling myself from the woods and forests, to fancy I see in states what I have seen in cornfields. The green blades rise up vigorously in an inclement season, and the wind itself makes them shine against the sun. There is room enough for all of them ; none wounds another by collision or weakens by overtopping it ; but, rising and bending simultaneously, they seem equally and mutually supported. No sooner do the ears of corn upon them lie close together in their full maturity, than a slight inundation is enough to cast them down, or a faint blast of wind to shed and scatter them. In Carthage we have seen the powerful families, however discordant among themselves, unite against the popular ; and it was only when their lives and families were at stake that the people cooperated with the senate.

A mercantile democracy may govern long and widely ; a mercantile aristocracy cannot stand. What people will endure the supremacy of those, uneducated and presumptuous, from whom they buy their mats and faggots, and who receive their money for the most ordinary and vile utensils ? If no conqueror enslaves them from abroad, they would, under such disgrace, welcome as their deliverer, and acknowledge as their master, the citizen most distinguished for his military achievements. The rich men who were crucified in the weltering wilderness beneath us, would not have employed such criminal means of growing richer, had they never been



persuaded to the contrary, and that enormous wealth would enable them to committ another and a more flagitious act of treason against their country, in raising them above the people, and enabling them to become its taxers and oppressors.

O Emilianus! what a costly beacon here hath Rome before her in this awful conflagration: the greatest (I hope) ever to be, until that wherin the world must perish.

#### POLYBIUS.

How many Sibylline books are legible in yonder embers!

The causes, O Panetius, which you have stated, of Carthages former most flourishing condition, are also those why a hostile senate hath seen the necessity of her destruction, necessary not only to the dominion, but to the security, of Rome. Italy has the fewest and the worst harbours of any country known to us: a third of her soil is sterile, a third of the remainder is pestiferous: and her inhabitants are more addicted to war and rapine than to industry and commerce. To make room for her few merchants on the Adriatic and Ionian seas, she burns Corinth: to leave no rival in traffic or in power, she burns Carthage.

#### PANETIUS.

If the Carthaginians had extended their laws and language over the surrounding states of Africa, which they might have done by moderation and equity, this ruin could not have been effected. Rome has been victorious by having been the first to adopt a liberal policy, which even in war itself is a wise one. The parricides who lent their money to the petty tyrants of other countries, would have found it greatly more advantageous to employ it in cultivation nearer home, and in feeding those as husbandmen whom else they must fear as enemies. So little is the Carthaginian language known, that I doubt whether we shall in our lifetime see any one translate their annals into Latin or Greek: and within these few days what treasures of antiquity have been irreparably lost! The Romans will repose at *citrean*<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I dare not translate the *trabs citrea*, *citron wood*, to which (as we understand the *citron*) it has no resemblance. It was often of great dimensions: it appears from the description of its colour to have been mahogany. The trade



tables for ages, and never know at last perhaps whence the Carthaginians brought the wood.

SCIPIO.

It is an awful thing to close as we have done the history of a people. If the intelligence brought this morning to Polybius be true<sup>2</sup>, in one year the two most flourishing and most beautiful cities in the world have perished, in comparison with which our Rome presents but the pent-houses of artisans or the sheds of shepherds. With whatever celerity the messenger fled from the neighbourhood of Corinth and arrived here, the particulars must have been known at Rome as early, and I shall receive them ere many days are past.

PANETIUS.

I hardly know whether we are not less affected at the occurrence of two or three momentous and terrible events, than at one; and whether the gods do not usually place them together in the order of things, that we may be awe-stricken by the former and reconciled to their decrees by the latter, from an impression of their power. I know not what Babylon may have been; but I presume that, as in the case of all other great Asiatic capitals, the habitations of the people (who are slaves) were wretched, and that the magnificence of the place consisted in the property of the king and priesthood, and in the walls erected for the defense of it. Many streets probably were hardly worth a little bronze cow of Myron, such as a stripling could steal and carry off. The case of Corinth and of Carthage was very different. Wealth overspread the greater part of them, competence and content the whole. Wherever there are despotical governments, poverty and industry dwell together; shame dogs them in the public walks; humiliation is among their household gods.

to the Atlantic continent and islands must have been possessed by a company, bound to secrecy by oath and interest. The prodigious price of this wood proves that it had ceased to be imported, or perhaps found, in the time of Cicero.

<sup>2</sup> Corinth in fact was not burnt until some months after Carthage: but as one success is always followed by the rumour of another, the relation is not improbable.



SCIPIO.

I do not remember the overthrow of any two other great cities within so short an interval.

PANETIUS.

I was not thinking so much of cities or their inhabitants, when I began to speak of what a breath of the gods removes at once from earth. I was recollecting, O Emilianus, that in one Olympiad the three greatest men that ever appeared together were swept off. What is Babylon, or Corinth, or Carthage, in comparison with these! what would their destruction be, if every hair on the head of every inhabitant had become a man, such as most men are! First in order of removal was, he whose steps you have followed and whose labours you have completed, Africanus: then Philopemen, whose task was more difficult, more complex, more perfect: and lastly Hannibal. What he was you know better than any.

SCIPIO.

Had he been supported by his country, had only his losses been filled up, and skilful engineers sent out to him with machinery and implements for sieges, we should not be discoursing here on what he was: the Roman name had been extinguished.

POLYBIUS.

Since Emilianus is as unwilling to blame an enemy as a friend, I take it on myself to censure Hannibal for two things, subject however to the decision of him who has conquered Carthage.

SCIPIO.

The first I anticipate: now what is the second?

PANETIUS.

I would hear both stated and discoursed on, altho the knowledge will be of little use to me.

POLYBIUS.

I condemn, as every one does, his inaction after the battle of Cannæ; and, in his last engagement with Africanus,



I condemn no less his bringing into the front of the center, as became some showy tetrarch rather than Hannibal, his eighty elephants, by the refractoriness of which he lost the battle.

SCIPIO.

What would you have done with 'em, Polybius?

POLYBIUS.

Scipio, I think it unwise and unmilitary to employ any force on which we can by no means calculate.

SCIPIO.

Gravely said, and worthily of Polybius. In the first book of your history, which leaves me no other wish or desire than that you should continue as you begin it, we have, in three different engagements, three different effects produced by the employment of elephants. The first, when our soldiers in Sicily, under Lucius Postumius and Quinctus Mamilius, drove the Carthaginians into Heraclea; in which battle the advanced guard of the enemy, being repulsed, propelled these animals before it upon the main body of the army, causing an irreparable disaster: the second, in the ill-conducted engagement of Atilius Regulus, who, fearing the shock of them, condensed his center, and was outflanked. He should have opened the lines to them and have suffered them to pass thro, as the enemy's cavalry was in the wings, and the infantry not enough in advance to profit by such an evolution. The third was evinced at Panormus, when Metellus gave orders to the light-armed troops to harass them and retreat into the trenches, which wounded and confounded them, and, finding no way open, they rushed back (as many as could) against the Carthaginian army, and accelerated its discomfiture.

POLYBIUS.

If I had employed the elephants at all, it should rather have been in the rear or on the flank; and even there not at the beginning of the engagement, unless I knew that the horses or the soldiers were unused to encounter them. Hannibal must have well remembered (being equally great in memory and invention) that the Romans had been accustomed



to them in the war with Pyrrhus, and must have expected more service from them against the barbarians of the two Gauls, against the Insubres and Taurini, than against our legions. He knew that the Romans had on more than one occasion made them detrimental to their masters. Having with him a large body of troops collected by force from various nations, and kept together with difficulty, he should have placed the elephants where they would have been a terror to these soldiers, not without a threat that they were to trample down such of them as attempted to fly or declined to fight.

SCIPIO.

Now what think you, Panetius?

PANETIUS.

It is well, O Emilianus, when soldiers would be philosophers; but it is ill when philosophers would be soldiers. Do you and Polybius agree on the point? if you do, the question need be asked of none other.

SCIPIO.

Truly, O Panetius, I would rather hear the thing from him than that Hannibal should have heard it: for a wise man will say many things which even a wiser may not have thought of. Let me tell you both however, what Polybius may perhaps know already, that combustibles were placed by Africanus both in flank and rear, at equal distances, with archers from among the light horsemen, whose arrows had liquid fire attached to them, and whose movements would have irritated, distracted, and wearied down the elephants, even if the wounds and scorchings had been ineffectual. But come, Polybius, you must talk now as others talk; we all do sometimes.

POLYBIUS.

I am the last to admitt the authority of the vulgar; but here we all meet and unite. Without asserting or believing that the general opinion is of any weight against a captain like Hannibal; agreeing on the contrary with Panetius, and firmly persuaded that myriads of little men can no more compensate a great one than they can make him; you will listen to me if I adduce the authority of Lelius.



SCIPIO.

Great authority! and perhaps, as living and conversing with those who remembered the action of Cannæ, preferable even to your own.

POLYBIUS.

It was his opinion that, from the consternation of Rome, the city might have been taken.

SCIPIO.

It suited not the wisdom or the experience of Hannibal to rely on the consternation of the Roman people. I too, that we may be on equal terms, have some authority to bring forward. The son of Africanus, he who adopted me into the family of the Scipios, was, as you both remember, a man of delicate health and sedentary habits, learned, elegant, and retired. He related to me, as having heard it from his father, that Hannibal after the battle sent home the rings of the Roman knights, and said in his letter, *If you will instantly give me a soldier for each ring, together with such machines as are already in the arsenal, I will replace them surmounted by a statue of Capitoline Jupiter, and our supplications to the gods of our country shall be made along the streets and in the temples on the robes of the Roman senate.* Could he doubt of so moderate a supply? he waited for it in vain.

And now I will relate to you another thing, which I am persuaded you will accept as a sufficient reason of itself why Hannibal did not besiege our city after the battle of Cannæ. His own loss was so severe, that, in his whole army, he could not muster ten thousand men<sup>3</sup>.

But, my friends, as I am certain that neither of you will ever think me invidious, and as the greatness of Hannibal does not diminish the reputation of Africanus, but augment it, I will venture to remark that he had little skill or practice in sieges; that, after the battle of Thrasymene, he attacked (you remember) Spoletum unsuccessfully; and that, a short time before the unhappy day at Cannæ, a much smaller town than Spoletum had resisted and repulsed him.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch says, and undoubtedly upon some ancient authority, that *both* armies did not contain that number.



Perhaps he rejoiced in his heart that he was not supplied with materials requisite for the capture of strong places; since in Rome, he well knew, he would have found a body of men, partly citizens who had formerly borne arms, partly the wealthier of our allies who had taken refuge there, together with their slaves and clients, exceeding his army in number, not inferior in valour, compensating the want of generalship by the advantage of position and by the desperation of their fortunes, and possessing the abundant means of a vigorous and long defense. Unnecessary is it to speak of its duration. When a garrison can hold our city six months, or even less, the besieger must retire. Such is the humidity of the air in its vicinity, that the Carthaginians, who enjoyed here at home a very dry and salubrious climate, would have perished utterly. The Gauls, I imagine, left us on a former occasion from the same necessity. Besides, they are impatient of inaction, and would have been most so under a general to whom, without any cause in common, they were but hired auxiliaries. None in any age hath performed such wonderful exploits as Hannibal; and we ought not to censure him for deficiency in an art which we ourselves have acquired but lately. Is there, Polybius, any proof or record that Alexander of Macedon was master of it?

POLYBIUS.

I have found none. We know that he exposed his person, and had nearly lost his life, by leaping from the walls of a city; which a commander in chief ought never to do, unless he would rather hear the *huzzas* of children, than the approbation of military men, or any men of discretion or sense. Alexander was without an excuse for his temerity, since he was attended by the generals who had taken Thebes, and who therefor, he might well know, would take the weaker and less bravely defended towns of Asia.

SCIPIO.

Here again you must observe the superiority of Hannibal. He was accompanied by no general of extraordinary talents, resolute as were many of them, and indeed all. His irruption into and thro Gaul, with so inconsiderable a force; his formation of allies out of enemies, in so brief a space of time;



and then his holding them together so long, are such miracles, that, cutting thro eternal snows, and marching thro paths which seem to us suspended loosely and hardly poised in the heavens, are less. And these too were his device and work. Drawing of parallels, captain against captain, is the occupation of a trifling and scholastic mind, and seldom is commenced, and never conducted impartially. Yet, my friends, who of these idlers in parallelograms is so idle, as to compare the invasion of Persia with the invasion of Gaul, the Alps, and Italy; Moors and Carthaginians with Macedonians and Greeks; Darius and his hordes and satraps with Roman legions under Roman consuls?

While Hannibal lived, O Polybius and Panetius! altho his city lay before us smouldering in its ashes, ours would be ever insecure.

PANETIUS.

You said, O Scipio, that the Romans had learnt but recently the business of sieges; and yet many cities in Italy appear to me very strong, which your armies took long ago.

SCIPIO.

By force and patience. If Pyrrhus had never invaded us, we should scarcely have excelled the Carthaginians, or even the Nomades, in castrametation, and have been inferior to both in cavalry. Whatever we know, we have learnt from your country, whether it be useful in peace or war. . . I say your country; for the Macedonians were instructed by the Greeks. The father of Alexander, the first of his family who was not as barbarous and ignorant as a Carian or Armenian slave, received his rudiments in the house of Epaminondas.

PANETIUS.

Permitt me now to return, O Scipio, to a question not unconnected with philosophy. Whether it was prudent or not in Hannibal to invest the city of Rome after his victory, he might somewhere have employed his army, where it should not waste away with luxury.

SCIPIO.

Philosophers, O Panetius, seem to know more about luxury than we military men do. I cannot say upon what



their apprehensions of it are founded, but certainly they sadly fear it.

### POLYBIUS.

For us. I wish I could as easily make you smile today, O Emilianus, as I shall our good-tempered and liberal Panetius; a philosopher, as we have experienced, less inclined to speak ill or ludicrously of others, be the sect what it may, than any other I know or have heard of.

In my early days, one of a different kind, and whose alarms at luxury were (as we discovered) subdued in some degree, in some places, was invited by Critolaus to dine with a party of us, all then young officers, on our march from Achaia into Elis. His florid and open countenance made his company very acceptable; and the more so, as we were informed by Critolaus that he never was importunate with his morality at dinner-time.

Philosophers, if they deserve the name, are by no means indifferent as to the places in which it is their intention to sow the seeds of virtue. They choose the ingenuous, the modest, the sensible, the obedient. We thought rather of where we should place our table.

The cistus, the pomegranate, the myrtle, the serpolet, bloomed over our heads and beside us; for we had chosen a platform where a projecting rock, formerly a stone-quarry, shaded us, and where a little rill, of which the spring was there, bedimmed our goblets with the purest water. The awnings we had brought with us to protect us from the sun, were unnecessary for that purpose: we rolled them therefor into two long seats, filling them with moss, which grew profusely a few paces below. *When our guest arrives*, said Critolaus, *every one of these flowers will serve him for some moral illustration; every shrub will be the rod of Mercury in his hands.* We were impatient for the time of his coming. Thelymnia, the beloved of Critolaus, had been instructed by him in a stratagem, to subvert, or shake at least and stagger, the philosophy of Euthymedes. Has the name escaped me! no matter... perhaps he is dead... if living, he would smile at a recoverable lapse, as easily as we did.



Thelymnia wore a dress like ours, and acceded to every advice of Critolaus, excepting that she would not consent so readily to entwine her head with ivy. At first she objected that there was not enough of it for all. Instantly two or three of us pulled down (for nothing is more brittle) a vast quantity from the rock, which loosened some stones, and brought down together with them a bird's nest of the last year. Then she said, *I dare not use this ivy: the omen is a bad one.*

*Do you mean the nest, Thelymnia?* said Critolaus.

*No, not the nest so much as the stones,* replied she, faltering.

*Ah! those signify the dogmas of Euthymedes, which you, my lovely Thelymnia, are to loosen and throw down.*

At this she smiled faintly and briefly, and began to break off some of the more glossy leaves; and we who stood around her were ready to take them and place them in her hair; when suddenly she held them tighter, and lett her hand drop. On her lover's asking her why she hesitated, she blushed deeply, and said, *Phoroneus told me I look best in myrtle.*

Innocent and simple and most sweet (I remember) was her voice, and when she had spoken the traces of it were remaining on her lips. Her beautiful throat itself changed colour; it seemed to undulate; and the roseate predominated in its pearly hue. Phoroneus had been her admirer: she gave the preference to Critolaus: yet the name of Phoroneus at that moment had greater effect upon him than the recollection of his defeat.

Thelymnia recovered herself sooner. We ran wherever we saw myrtles, and there were many about, and she took a part of her coronal from every one of us, smiling on each; but it was only of Critolaus that she asked if he thought that myrtle became her best. *Phoroneus*, answered he, not without melancholy, *is infallible as Paris.* There was something in the tint of the tender sprays resembling that of the hair they encircled: the blossoms too were white as her forehead. She reminded me of those ancient fables which represent the favorites of the gods as turning into plants; so accordant and identified was her beauty with the flowers and foliage she had chosen to adorn it.



In the midst of our felicitations to her we heard the approach of horses, for the ground was dry and solid, and Euthymedes was presently with us. The mounted slave who led off his master's charger, for such he appeared to be in all points, suddenly disappeared; I presume lest the sight of luxury should corrupt him. I know not where the groom rested, nor where the two animals (no neglected ones certainly, for they were plump and stately) found provender.

Euthymedes was of lofty stature, had somewhat passed the middle age, but the Graces had not left his person, as they usually do when it begins to bear an impression of authority. He was placed by the side of Thelymnia. Gladness and expectation sparkled from every eye: the beauty of Thelymnia seemed to be a light sent from heaven for the festival; a light the pure radiance of which cheered and replenished the whole heart. Desire of her was chastened, I may rather say was removed, by the confidence of Critolaus in our friendship.

PANETIUS.

Well said! The story begins to please and interest me. Where Love finds the soul he neglects the body, and only turns to it in his idleness as to an afterthought. Its best allurements are but the nuts and figs of the divine repast.

POLYBIUS.

We exulted in the felicity of our friend, and wished for nothing which even he would not have granted. Happy still was the man from whom the glancing eye of Thelymnia seemed to ask some advice, how she should act or answer! Happy he who, offering her an apple in the midst of her discourse, fixed his keen survey upon the next, anxious to mark where she had touched it! For it was a calamity to doubt upon what streak or speck, while she was inattentive to the basket, she had placed her finger.

PANETIUS.

I wish, Emilianus, you would look rather more severely than you do . . . upon my life! I cannot . . . and put an end to these dithyrambics. The ivy runs about us, and may infuriate us.



SCIPIO.

The dithyrambics, I do assure you, Panetius, are not of my composing. We are both in danger from the same thyrsus: we will parry it as well as we can, or bend our heads before it.

PANETIUS.

Come, Polybius, we must follow you then, I see, or fly you.

POLYBIUS.

Would you rather hear the remainder another time?

PANETIUS.

By Hercules! I have more curiosity than becomes me.

POLYBIUS.

No doubt, in the course of the conversation, Euthymedes had made the discovery we hoped to obviate. Never was his philosophy more amiable or more impressive. Pleasure was treated as a friend, not as a master: many things were found innocent that had long been doubtful: excesses alone were condemned. Thelymnia was enchanted by the frankness and liberality of her philosopher, altho, when it was her he addressed, more purity and perhaps more rigour were discernible. His delicacy was exquisite. When his eyes met hers, they did not retire with rapidity and confusion, but softly and complacently, and as tho it were the proper time and season of reposing, from the splendours they had encountered. Hers from the beginning were less governable: when she found that they were so, she contrived scheme after scheme for diverting them from the table, and entertaining his unobservedly.

The higher part of the quarry, which had protected us always from the western sun, was covered with birch and hazel, the lower with innumerable shrubs, principally the arbutus and myrtle.

*Look at those goats above us, said Thelymnia. What has tangled their hair so? they seem wet.*

*They have been lying on the cistus in the plain, replied Euthymedes; many of its broken flowers are sticking upon*



them yet, resisting all the efforts, as you see, of hoof and tongue.

*How beauteous*, said she, *are the flexible and crimson branches of this arbutus*, taking it in one hand and beating with it the back of the other. *It seems only to have come out of its crevice to pat my shoulder at dinner, and twitch my myrtle when my head leant back. I wonder how it can grow in such a rock.*

*The arbutus*, answered he, *clings to the earth with the most fondness where it finds her in the worst poverty, and covers her bewintered bosom with leaves, berries, and flowers. On the same branch is unripe fruit of the most vivid green; ripening, of the richest orange; ripened, of perfect scarlet. The maidens of Tyre could never give so brilliant and sweet a lustre to the fleeces of Miletus; nor did they ever string such even and graceful pearls as the blossoms are, for the brides of Assyrian or Persian kings.*

*And yet the myrtle is preferred to the arbutus*, said Thelymnia, with some slight uneasiness.

*I know why*, replied he . . *may I tell it?* She bowed and smiled, perhaps not without the expectation of some compliment. He continued . . *The myrtle has done what the arbutus comes too late for. The myrtle has covered with her starry crown the beloved of the reaper and vintager: the myrtle was around the head of many a maiden celebrated in song, when the breezes of autumn scattered the first leaves and rustled amongst them on the ground, and when she cried timidly, Rise, rise! people are coming! here! there! many!*

Thelymnia said, *That now is not true. Where did you hear it?* and in a softer and lower voice, if I may trust Androcles, *O Euthymedes, do not believe it!*

Either he did not hear her, or dissembled it; and went on . . *This deserves preference; this deserves immortality; this deserves a place in the temple of Venus; in her hand, in her hair, in her breast: Thelymnia herself wears it.*

We laughed and applauded: she blushed and looked grave and sighed . . for she had never heard any one, I imagine, talk so long at once. However it was, she sighed: I saw and heard her. Critolaus gave her some glances: she did not catch them. One of the party clapped his hands



longer than the rest, whether in approbation or derision of this rhapsody, delivered with glee and melody, and entreated the philosopher to indulge us with a few of his adventures.

*You deserve, young man, said Euthymedes gravely, to have as few as I have had, you whose idle curiosity would thus intemperately reveal the most sacred mysteries. Poets and philosophers may reason on love, and dream about it, but rarely do they possess the object, and, whenever they do, that object is the invisible deity of a silent worshiper.*

*Reason then or dream, replied the other, breathing an air of scorn to soothe the soreness of the reproof.*

*When we reason on love, said Euthymedes, we often talk as if we were dreaming: let me try whether the recital of my dream can make you think I talk as if I were reasoning. You may call it a dream, a vision, or what you will.*

*I was in a place not very unlike this, my head lying back against a rock, where its crevices were tufted with soft and odoriferous herbs, and where vineleaves protected my face from the sun, and from the bees, which however were less likely to molest me, being busy in their first hours of honey-making among the blossoms. Sleep soon fell upon me; for of all philosophers I am certainly the drowsiest, tho perhaps there are many quite of equal ability in communicating the gift of drowsiness. Presently I saw three figures, two of which were beautiful, very differently, but in the same degree: the other was much less so. The least of the three, at the first glance, I recognised to be Love, altho I saw no wings, nor arrows, nor quiver, nor torch, nor emblem of any kind designating his attributes. The next was not Venus, nor a Grace, nor a Nymph, nor Goddess of whom in worship or meditation I had ever conceived an idea; and yet my heart persuaded me she was a Goddess, and from the manner in which she spoke to Love, and he again to her, I was convinced she must be. Quietly and unmovedly as she was standing, her figure I perceived was adapted to the perfection of activity. With all the succulence and suppleness of early youth, scarcely beyond puberty, it however gave me the idea, from its graceful and easy languor, of its being possessed by a fondness for repose. Her eyes were large and*



serene, not of a quality to exhibit the intensity of thought, or even the habitude of reflexion, nor capable of expressing the plenitude of joy; and her countenance was tinged with so delicate a colour, that it appeared an effluence from an irradiated cloud, passing over it in the heavens. The third figure, who sometimes stood in one place and sometimes in another, and of whose countenance I could only distinguish that it was pale anxious and mistrustful, interrupted her perpetually. I listened attentively and with curiosity to the conversation, and by degrees I caught the appellations they interchanged. The one I found was *Hope*; and I wondered I did not find it out sooner: the other was *Fear*; which I should not have found out at all; for she did not look terrible nor aghast, but more like *Sorrow* or *Despondency*. The first words I could collect of *Hope* were these, spoken very mildly, and rather with a look of appeal than of accusation. Too surely you have forgotten, for never was child more forgetful or more ungrateful, how many times I have carried you in my bosom, when even your mother drove you from her, and when you could find no other resting-place in heaven or earth.

O unsteddy unruly *Love*! cried the pale Goddess with much energy, it has often been by my intervention that thy wavering authority was fixt. For this I have thrown alarm after alarm into the heedless breast that *Hope* had once beguiled, and that was growing insensible and torpid under her feebler influence. I do not upbraid thee; and it never was my nature to caress thee; but I claim from thee my portion of the human heart, mine, ever mine, abhorrent as it may be of me. Let *Hope* stand on one side of thy altars, but let my place be on the other; or I swear by all the gods! not any altar shalt thou possess upon the globe.

She ceased . . and *Love* trembled. He turned his eyes upon *Hope*, as if in his turn appealing to her. She said, It must be so; it was so from the beginning of the world: only let me never lose you from my sight. She clasped her hands upon her breast, as she said it, and he looked on her with a smile, and was going up (I thought) to kiss her, when he was recalled and stopped.

Where *Love* is, there will I be also, said *Fear*, and even thou, O *Hope*! never shalt be beyond my power.



*At these words I saw them both depart. I then looked toward Love: I did not see him go; but he was gone.*

The narration being ended, there were some who remarked what very odd things dreams are: but Thelymnia looked almost as if she herself was dreaming; and Alcimus, who sat opposite, and fancied she was pondering on what the vision could mean, said it appeared to him a thing next to certainty, that it signified how love cannot exist without hope or without fear. Euthymedes nodded assent, and assured him that a soothsayer in great repute had given the same interpretation. Upon which the younger friends of Alcimus immediately took the ivy from his forehead, and crowned him with laurel, as being worthy to serve Apollo. But they did it with so much noise and festivity, that, before the operation was completed, he began to suspect they were in jest. Thelymnia had listened to many stories in her lifetime, yet never had she heard one from any man before who had been favoured by the deities with a vision. Hope and Love, as her excited imagination represented them to her, seemed still to be with Euthymedes. She thought the tale would have been better without the mention of Fear: but perhaps this part was only a dream, all the rest a really true vision. She had many things to ask him: she did not know when, nor exactly what, for she was afraid of putting too hard a question to him in the presence of so many, lest it might abash him if he could not answer it: but she wished to ask him something, anything. She soon did it, not without faltering, and was enchanted by the frankness and liberality of her philosopher.

*Did you ever love any one?* said she smiling, tho not inclined to smile, but doing it to conceal (as in her simplicity she thought it would) her blushes, and looking a little aside, at the only cloud in the heavens, which crossed the moon, as if adorning her for a festival, with a fillet of pale sapphire and interlucient gold.

*I thought I did,* replied he, lowering his eyes that she might lower hers to rest upon him.

*Do then people ever doubt this?* she asked in wonder, looking full in his face with earnest curiosity.

*Alas!* said he softly, *until few hours ago, until*



*Thelymnia* was placed beside me, until an ungenerous heart exposed the treasure that should have dwelt within it, to the tarnish of a stranger, if that stranger had the baseness to employ the sophistry that was in part expected from him, never should I have known that I had not loved before. We may be uncertain if a vase or an image be of the richest metal, until the richest metal be set right-against it. *Thelymnia*! if I thought it possible, at any time hereafter, that you should love me as I love you, I would exert to the uttermost my humble powers of persuasion to avert it.

O! there is no danger, said she, disconcerted; I do not love any one: I thought I did, like you; but indeed, indeed, *Euthymedes*, I was equally in an error. Women have dropt into the grave from it, and have declared to the last moment that they never loved: men have sworn they should die with desperation, and have lived merrily, and have dared to run into the peril fifty times. They have hard cold hearts, incommunicative and distrustful.

Have I too, *Thelymnia*? gently he expostulated.

No, not you, said she; you may believe I was not thinking of you when I was speaking. But the idea does really make me smile and almost laugh, that you should fear me, supposing it possible, if you could suppose any such thing. Love does not kill men, take my word for it.

He looked rather in sorrow than in doubt, and answered: Unpropitious love may not kill us always, may not deprive us at once of what at their festivals the idle and inconsiderate call life; but, O *Thelymnia*! our lives are truly at an end when we are beloved no longer. Existence may be continued or rather may be renewed, yet the agonies of death and the chilliness of the grave have been past thro; nor are there *Elysian* fields, nor the sports that delighted in former times, awaiting us, nor pleasant converse, nor walks with linked hands, nor intermitted songs, nor vengeful kisses for leaving them off abruptly, nor looks that shake us to assure us afterward, nor that bland inquietude, as gently tremulous as the expansion of buds into blossoms, which hurries us from repose to exercise and from exercise to repose.

O! I have been very near loving! cried *Thelymnia*. Where in the world can a philosopher have learnt all this about it!



The beauty of Thelymnia, her blushes, first at the deceit, afterward at the encouragement she received in her replies, and lastly from some other things which we could not penetrate, highly gratified Critolaus. Soon however (for wine always brings back to us our last strong feeling) he thought again of Phoroneus, as young, as handsome, and once (is that the word?) as dear to her. He saddened at the myrtle on the head of his beloved; it threw shadows and gloom upon his soul: her smiles, her spirits, her wit, above all her nods of approbation wounded him. He sighed when she covered her face with her hand; when she disclosed it he sighed again. Every glance of pleasure, every turn of surprise, every movement of her body, pained and oppressed him. He cursed in his heart whoever it was who had stuffed that portion of the couch; there was so little moss, thought he, between Thelymnia and Euthymedes. He might have seen Athos part them, and would have murmured still.

The rest of us were in admiration at the facility and grace with which Thelymnia sustained her part, and observing less Critolaus than we did in the commencement, when he acknowledged and enjoyed our transports, indifferently and contentedly saw him rise from the table and go away, thinking his departure a preconcerted section of the stratagem. He retired, as he told us afterward, into a grot. So totally was his mind abstracted from the entertainment, he left the table athirst, covered as it was with fruit and wine, and abundant as ran beside us the clearest and sweetest and most refreshing rill. He related to me that, at the extremity of the cavern, he applied his parched tongue to the dripping rock, shunning the light of day, the voice of friendship, so violent was his desire of solitude and concealment, and he held his forehead and his palms against it when his lips had closed. We knew not and suspected not his feelings at the time, and rejoiced at the anticipation of the silly things a philosopher should have whispered, which Thelymnia in the morning of the festival had promised us to detail the next day.

After the lesson he had been giving her, which amused her in the dictation, she stood composed and thoughtful, and then said hesitatingly, *But would it be quite right?*



would there be nothing of insincerity and falsehood in it, my Critolaus? He caught her up in his arms, and, as in his enthusiasm he had raised her head above his, he kissed her bosom. She reproved and pardoned him, making him first declare and protest he would never do the like again. *O soul of truth and delicacy!* cried he aloud; and Thelymnia, no doubt, trembled lest her lover should in a moment be forsworn; so imminent and inevitable seemed the repetition of his offense. But he observed on her eyelashes, what had arisen from his precipitation in our presence,

A hesitating long-suspended tear,  
Like that which hangs upon the vine fresh-pruned,  
Until the morning kisses it away.

The Nymphs, who often drive men wild, they tell us, have led me astray: I must return with you to the grot. We gave every facility to the stratagem. One slipt away in one direction, another in another; but, at a certain distance, each was desirous of joining some comrade, and of laughing together; yet each reproved the laughter, even when far off, lest it should do harm, reserving it for the morrow. Panetius, you have seen the mountains on the left hand, eastward, when you are in Olympia, and perhaps the little stream that runs from the nearest of them into the Alpheus. Could you have seen them that evening! the moon never shone so calmly, so brightly, upon Latmos, nor the torch of Love before her. And yet many of the stars were visible; the most beautiful amongst them; and as Euthymedes taught Thelymnia their names, their radiance seemed more joyous, more effulgent, more beneficent. If you have ever walked forth into the wilds and open plains upon such moonlight nights, cautious as you are, I will venture to say, Panetius, you have often tript, even tho the stars were not your study. There was an arm to support or to catch Thelymnia; yet she seemed incorrigible. Euthymedes was patient: at last he did I know not what, which was followed by a reproof, and a wonder how he could have done so, and another how he could answer it. He looked ingenuously and apologetically, forgetting to correct his fault in the meanwhile. She listened to him attentively, pushing his hand away at intervals, yet less frequently and less resolutely in



the course of his remonstrance, particularly when he complained to her that the finer and more delicate part of us, the eye, may wander at leisure over what is in its way; yet that its dependents in the corporeal system must not follow it; that they must hunger and faint in the service of a power so rich and absolute. *This being hard, unjust, and cruel*, said he, *never can be the ordinance of the gods. Love alone feeds the famishing; Love alone places all things, both of matter and of mind, in perfect harmony; Love hath less to learn from Wisdom than Wisdom hath to learn from Love.*

*Modest man!* said she to herself, *there is a great deal of truth in what he says, considering he is a philosopher.* She then asked him, after a pause, why he had not spoken so in the conversation on love, which appeared to give animation, mirth, and wit to the dullest of the company, and even to make the wines of Chios, Crete, and Lesbos, sparkle with fresh vivacity in their goblets.

*I who was placed by the fountain-head*, replied he, *had no inclination to follow the shallow and slender stream, taking its course toward streets and lanes, and dipt into and muddied by unhallowed and uncleanly hands. After dinner such topics are usually introduced, when the objects that ought to inspire our juster sentiments are gone away. An indelicacy worse than Thracian! The purest gales of heaven, in the most perfect solitudes, should alone lift up the aspiration of our souls to the divinities all men worship.*

*Sensible creature!* sighed Thelymnia in her bosom, *how rightly he does think!*

*Come, fairest of wanderers*, whispered he softly and persuasively, *such will I call you, tho the stars hear me, and tho the gods too in a night like this pursue their loves upon earth . . the moon has no little pools filled with her light, under the rock yonder; she deceives us in the depth of these hollows, like the limpid sea. Besides, we are here among the pinks and sand-roses: do they never prick your ancles with their dry stems and thorns? Even their leaves at this late season are enough to hurt you.*

*I think they do*, replied she, and thanked him, with a tender timid glance, for some fresh security his arm or hand



had given her in escaping from them. *O now we are quite out of them all! How cool is the saxifrage! how cool the ivy-leaves!*

*I fancy, my sweet scholar! or shall I rather say (for you have been so oftener) my sweet teacher! they are not ivy-leaves: to me they appear to be periwincles.*

*I will gather some and see,* said Thelymnia.

Periwincles cover wide and deep hollows: of what are they incapable when the convolvulus is in league with them! She slipt from the arm of Euthymedes, and in an instant had disappeared. In an instant too he had followed.

#### PANETIUS.

These are mad pranks, and always end ill. Moonlights! cannot we see them quietly from the tops of our houses, or from the plain pavement? Must we give challenges to mastiffs, make appointments with wolves, run after asps, and languish for stonequarries? Unwary philosopher and simple girl! Were they found again?

#### POLYBIUS.

Yea, by Castor! and most unwillingly.

#### SCIPIO.

I do not wonder. When the bones are broken, without the consolation of some great service rendered in such misfortune, and when beauty must become deformity, I can well believe that they both would rather have perished.

#### POLYBIUS.

Amaranth on the couch of Jove and Hebe was never softer than the bed they fell on. Critolaus had advanced to the opening of his cavern: he had heard the exclamation of Thelymnia as she was falling . . he forgave her . . he ran to her for her forgiveness . . he heard some low sounds . . he smote his heart, or it had fainted in him . . he stopt.

Euthymedes was raising up Thelymnia, forgetful (as was too apparent) of himself. *Traitor!* exclaimed the fiery Critolaus, *thy blood shall pay for this. Impostor! whose lesson this very day was, that luxury is the worst of poisons!*

Critolaus, answered he calmly, drawing his robe about him, *we will not talk of blood. As for my lesson of today,*



*I must defend it. In few words then, since I think we are none of us disposed for many, hemlock does not hurt goats, nor luxury philosophers.*

Thelymnia had risen more beautiful from her confusion ; but her colour soon went away, and, if any slight trace of it were remaining on her cheeks, the modest moonlight and the severer stars would let none shew itself. She looked as the statue of Pygmalion would have looked, had she been destined the hour after animation to return into her inanimate state. Offering no excuse, she was the worthier of pardon : but there is one hour in which pardon never entered the human heart, and that hour was this. Critolaus, who always had ridiculed the philosophers, now hated them from the bottom of his heart. Every sect was detestable to him ; the Stoic, the Platonic, the Epicurean, the Eclectic ; all equally ; but one above the rest, which he would not designate to his most intimate friend, and this sect is denominated, not from portico or grove or garden, but from a single plant, and we know it by the name of the Robust.

PANETIUS.

We do not desire to hear what such foolish men think of philosophers, true or false, but pray tell us how he acted on his own notable discovery ; for I opine he was the unlikeliest of the three to grow quite calm on a sudden.

POLYBIUS.

He went away ; not without some fierce glances at the stars, some reproaches to the gods themselves, and serious and sad reflexions upon destiny. Being however a pious man, by constitution and education, he thought he had spoken of the omens unadvisedly, and found other interpretations for the stones we had thrown down with the ivy. *And ah !* said he sighing, *the bird's nest of last year too ! I now know what that is !*

PANETIUS.

Polybius, I considered you too grave a man to report such idle stories. The manner is not yours : I rather think you have torn out a page or two from some love-feast (not generally known) of Plato.



POLYBIUS.

Your judgement has for once deserted you, my friend. If Plato had been present, he might then indeed have described what he saw, and elegantly ; but if he had feigned the story, the name that most interests us would not have ended with a vowel.

SCIPIO.

You convince me, Polybius.

PANETIUS.

I join my hands, and give them to you.

POLYBIUS.

My usual manner is without variety. I endeavour to collect as much sound sense and as many solid facts as I can, to distribute them as commodiously, and to keep them as clear of ornament. If any one thought of me or my style in reading my history, I should condemn myself as a defeated man.

SCIPIO.

Polybius, you are by far the wisest that ever wrote history, tho many wise have written it, and if your facts are sufficiently abundant, your work will be the most interesting and important.

POLYBIUS.

Live then, Scipio.

PANETIUS.

The gods grant it !

POLYBIUS.

I know what I can do and what I cannot (the proudest words perhaps that ever man uttered) I say it plainly to you, my sincere and kind monitor ; but you must also let me say that, doubtful whether I could amuse our Emilianus in his present mood, I would borrow a tale, unaccustomed as I am to such, from the library of Miletus, or snatch it from the bosom of Elefantis.



SCIPIO.

Your friendship comes under various forms to me, my dear Polybius, but it is always warm, and always welcome. Nothing can be kinder or more judicious in you, than to diversify as much as possible our conversation this day. Panetius would be more argumentative on luxury than I: even Euthymedes (it appears) was unanswerable.

PANETIUS.

O the knave! such men bring reproaches upon philosophy.

SCIPIO.

I see no more reason why they should, than why a wench who empties a chamber-pot on your head in the street, should make you cry, *O Jupiter! what a curse is water.*

PANETIUS.

I am ready to propose almost such an exchange with you, Emilianus, as Diomedesis with Glaucus . . my robe for yours.

SCIPIO.

Panetius, could it be done, you would wish it undone. The warfare you undertake is the more difficult: we have not enemies on both sides, as you have.

PANETIUS.

If you had seen strait, you would have seen that the offer was, to exchange my philosophy for yours. You need less meditation, and employ more, than any man. Now if you have aught to say on luxury, let me hear it.

SCIPIO.

It would be idle to run into the parts of it, and to make a definition of that which we agree on; but it is not so to remind you that we were talking of it in soldiers; for the pleasant tale of Thelymnia is enough to make us forget them, even while the trumpet is sounding. Believe me, my friend (or ask Polybius) a good general will turn this formidable thing, luxury, to some account. He will take care that, like the strong vinegar the legionaries carry with 'em, it shall be diluted, and thus be useful.



PANETIUS.

Then it is luxury no longer.

SCIPIO.

True ; and now tell me, Panetius, or you Polybius, what city was ever so exuberant in riches, as to maintain a great army long together in sheer luxury ? I am not speaking of cities that have been sacked, but of the allied and friendly, whose interests are to be observed, whose affection to be conciliated and retained. Hannibal knew this, and minded it.

POLYBIUS.

You might also have added to the interrogation, if you had thought proper, those cities which have been sacked ; for there plenty is soon wasted, and not soon supplied again.

SCIPIO.

Let us look closer at the soldier's board, and see what is on it in the rich Capua. Is plentiful and wholesome food luxury ? or do soldiers run into the market-place for a pheasant ? or do those on whom they are quartered pray and press them to eat it ? Suppose they went hunting quails, hares, partridges ; would it render them less active ? There are no wild boars in that neighbourhood, or we might expect from a boar-hunt a visitation of the gout. Suppose the men drew their idea of pleasure from the school or from the practices of Euthymedes. One vice is corrected by another, where a higher principle does not act, and where a man does not exert the proudest of dominion over the most turbulent of states . . his self. Hannibal, we may be sure, never allowed his army to repose in utter inactivity ; no, nor to remain a single day without its exercise . . a battle, a march, a foraging, a conveyance of wood or water, a survey of the banks of rivers, a fathoming of their depth, a certification of their soundness or their unsoundness at bottom, a measurement of the greater or less extent of their fords, a review, or a castrametation. The plenty of his camp at Capua (for you hardly can imagine, Panetius, that the soldiers had in a military sense the freedom of the city, and took what they pleased without pay and without restriction) attached to him the various



nations of which it was composed, and kept together the heterogeneous and discordant mass. It was time that he should think of this : for probably there was not a soldier left, who had not lost in battle or by fatigue his dearest friend and comrade.

Dry bread and hard blows are excellent things in themselves, and military requisites . . to those who converse on them over their cups, turning their heads for the approbation of others on whose bosom they recline, and yawning from sad disquieted at the degeneracy and effeminacy of the age. But there is finally a day when the cement of power begins to lose its strength and coherency, and when the fabric must be kept together by pointing it anew, and by protecting it a little from that rigour of the seasons which at first compacted it.

The story of Hannibal and his army wasting away in luxury, is common, general, universal : its absurdity is remarked by few, or rather by none.

#### POLYBIUS.

The wisest of us are slow to disbelieve what we have learnt early : yet this story has always been to me incredible.

#### SCIPIO.

Beside the reasons I have adduced, is it necessary to remind you that Campania is subject to diseases which incapacitate the soldier? Those of Hannibal were afflicted by them ; few indeed perished : but they were debilitated by their malady, and while they were waiting for the machinery which (even if they had had the artificers amongst them) could not have been constructed in double the time requisite for importing it, the period of dismay at Rome, if ever it existed, had elapsed. The wonder is less that Hannibal did not take Rome, than that he was able to remain in Italy, not having taken it. Considering how he held together, how he disciplined, how he provisioned (the most difficult thing of all, in the face of such enemies) an army in great part, as one would imagine, so intractable and wasteful ; what commanders, what soldiers, what rivers, and what mountains, opposed him ; I think, Polybius, you will hardly admit to a parity or comparison with him, in the rare union of political and military



science, the most distinguished of your own countrymen; not Philopemen nor Timoleon (the man who approaches more nearly to the gods than any) nor Philip of Macedon . . if indeed you can hear me without anger and indignation name a barbarian king with Greeks.

POLYBIUS.

When kings are docile, and pay due respect to those who are wiser and more virtuous than themselves, I would not point at them as objects of scorn or contumely, even among the free. There is little danger that men educated as we have been should value them too highly, or that men educated as they have been should eclipse the glory of Timoleon and Philopemen. People in a republic know that their power and existence must depend on the zeal and assiduity, the courage and integrity, of those they employ in their first offices of state: kings on the contrary lay the foundations of their power on abject hearts and prostituted intellects, and fear and abominate those whom the breath of God hath raised higher than the breath of man. Hence, from being the dependents of their own slaves, both they and their slaves become at last the dependents of free nations, and alight from their cars to be tied by the neck to the cars of better men.

SCIPIO.

Deplorable condition! if their education had allowed any sense of honour to abide in them. But we must consider them as the tulips and anemones and other gaudy flowers, that shoot from the earth to be looked upon in idleness, and to be snapt by the stick or broken by the wind, without our interest, care, or notice. We cannot thus calmly contemplate the utter subversion of a mighty capital; we cannot thus indifferently stand over the strong agony of an expiring nation, after a gasp of years in a battle of ages, to win a world or be for ever fallen.

PANETIUS.

You estimate, O Emilianus, the abilities of a general, not by the number of battles he has won, nor of enemies he hath slain or led captive, but by the combinations he has formed, the blows of fortune he has parried or avoided, the prejudices



he has removed, and the difficulties of every kind he has overcome. In like manner we should consider kings. Educated still more barbarously than other barbarians, sucking their milk alternately from Vice and Folly, guided in their first steps by Duplicity and Flattery, whatever they do but decently is worthy of applause ; whatever they do virtuously, of admiration. I would say it even to Caius Gracchus ; I would tell him it even in the presence of his mother ; unappalled by her majestic mien, her truly Roman sanctity, her brow, that cannot frown, but that reproves with pity ; for I am not so hostile to royalty as other philosophers are . . perhaps because I have been willing to see less of it.

#### POLYBIUS.

Eternal thanks to the Romans ! who, whatever reason they may have had to treat the Greeks as enemies, to traverse and persecute such men as Lycortas my father, and as Philopemen my early friend, to consume our cities with fire, and to furrow our streets with torrents (as we have read lately) issuing from the remolten images of gods and heroes, have however so far respected the mother of Civilization and of Law, as never to permit the cruel mockery, of erecting Barbarism and Royalty on their vacant bases.

#### PANETIUS.

Our ancient institutions in part exist : we lost the rest when we lost the simplicity of our forefathers. Let it be our glory that we have resisted the most populous and wealthy nations, and that, having been conquered, we have been conquered by the most virtuous ; that every one of our cities hath produced a greater number of illustrious men than all the remainder of the earth around us ; that no man can anywhere enter his hall or portico, and see the countenances of his ancestors from their marble columels, without a commemorative and grateful sense of obligation to us ; that neither his solemn feasts nor his cultivated fields are silent on it ; that not the lamp which shews him the glad faces of his children, and prolongs his studies, and watches by his rest ; that not the ceremonies whereby he hopes to avert the vengeance of the gods, nor the tenderer ones wheron are founded the affinities



of domestic life, nor finally those which lead toward another, would have existed in his country, if Greece had not conveyed them. Bethink thee, Scipio, how little hath been done by any other nation, to promote the moral dignity or enlarge the social pleasures of the human race. What parties ever met, in their most populous cities, for the enjoyment of liberal and speculative conversation? What Alcibiades, elated with war and glory, turned his youthful mind from general admiration and from the cheers and caresses of coeval friends, to strengthen and purify it under the cold reproofs of the aged? What Aspasia led Philosophy to smile on Love, or taught Love to reverence Philosophy? These, as thou knowest, are not the safest guides for either sex to follow; yet in these were united the gravity and the graces of wisdom, never seen, never imagined, out of Athens.

I would not offend thee by comparing the genius of the Roman people with ours: the offence is removable, and in part removed already, by thy hand. The little of sound learning, the little of pure wit, that hath appeared in Rome from her foundation, hath been concentrated under thy roof: one tile would cover it. Have we not walked together, O Scipio, by starlight, on the shores of Surrentum and Baiæ, of Ischia and Caprea, and hath it not occurred to thee that the heavens themselves, both what we see of them and what lieth above our vision, are peopled with our heroes and heroines? The ocean, that roars so heavily in the ears of other men, hath for us its tuneful shells, its placid nymphs, and its beneficent ruler. The trees of the forest, the flowers, the plants, are passed indiscriminately elsewhere: they waken and warm our affections; they mingle with the objects of our worship; they breathe the spirit of our ancestors; they lived in our form; they spoke in our language; they suffered as our daughters may suffer; the deities revisit them with pity; and some (we think) dwell among them.

SCIPIO.

Poetry! poetry!

PANETIUS.

Yes; I own it. The spirit of Greece, passing thro and ascending above the world, hath so animated universal nature,



that the very rocks and woods, the very torrents and wilds burst forth with it . . and it falls, Emilianus ! even from me.

SCIPIO.

It is from Greece I have received my friends, Panetius and Polybius.

PANETIUS.

Say more, Emilianus ! You have indeed said it here already ; but say it again at Rome : it is Greece who taught the Romans all beyond the rudiments of war : it is Greece who placed in your hand the sword that conquered Carthage.

W. S. L.

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## DR ARNOLD ON THE SPARTAN CONSTITUTION.

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THERE are few subjects connected with the history and antiquities of Greece on which the researches of modern scholars have thrown a greater light, than on the structure of the Lacedæmonian constitution. The learned compilations of Cragius and Meursius were little more than compilations; and although these laborious writers left only scanty gleanings of information to be collected by their successors, yet they were unable to arrange into an uniform whole, and to present in a succinct and intelligible form, the materials which their diligence had raked together. It was reserved for the acuteness and learning of Müller, aided by a comprehensive view of the political relations of the ancient Greek and Italian states, to read in the traditions and accounts of the Spartan government its true form and condition; and even if there are some places in which his enquiries may be amended or enlarged, and if his judgement is sometimes warped by his predilection for the dominant Spartans, yet his discussion has left little to be done by succeeding writers.

Assisted by the researches of Müller, and other late writers on the same subject, Dr Arnold has written a dissertation on the history and nature of the Spartan constitution, which he has appended to the first volume of his *Thucydides*. The account in *Thuc.* i. 87. of the popular assembly of Sparta induced him to offer an explanation of the seeming paradox of a democratical assembly in an aristocratical state. In the development of his reasons he has undoubtedly described with perfect accuracy and great ability the characteristic features of the Lacedæmonian state: nevertheless as it appears to me that his solution of the difficulty proposed



by him proceeds on a ground fundamentally wrong, and as there are some points in his historical statements which seem to be inaccurate either in substance or expression, I shall take the liberty of following him through the chief part of his discussion, and attempt to suggest an explanation free from the objections to which his is liable.

After giving the well-known account of the Doric conquest of Laconia, Dr Arnold adopts the statement of Ephorus, that the Achæans were not at first reduced to complete subjection. “The conquered people, although dispossessed of a considerable portion of their lands, and although their throne was filled by strangers, were still in law equal to the conquerors, and not only enjoyed the private rights of citizenship, such as the right of intermarriage with the Dorians, but were also eligible to all offices of state except the crown.” (p. 642). This account of Ephorus, which had been rejected by Müller, Dr Arnold follows also in another place, where he attempts to answer the objections made to it: and in order to ascertain how far he has been successful in reestablishing the credit of Ephorus, it will be necessary to examine the matter in detail.

Ephorus (ap. Strab. viii. p. 364.) says that Eurysthenes and Procles, the Heraclidæ, who conquered Laconia, divided it into six parts, and fortified the country: that they gave the province which contained Amyclæ as a reward to the person who betrayed the country into their hands, and persuaded the former governor to go away with the Achæans. Müller objects to these statements of Ephorus chiefly for the following reasons. (Dorians, b. i. c. 5. § 11—14.)

1. It appears that according to the national tradition of Sparta, Eurysthenes and Procles were *not* the conquerors or founders of Sparta, but Aristodemus. (Herod. vi. 52.) This tradition has been followed by Xenophon, who says that “the house of Agesilaus appeared to have the very doors which had been put up by Aristodemus.” Whence Plutarch Agesil. 19. It was also adopted by Alcæus, as Niebuhr has remarked, (vol. i. n. 1007.) *ὡς γὰρ δὴ ποτέ φασιν Ἀριστόδαμον | ἐν Σπάρτᾳ λόγον οὐκ ἀπάλαμνον εἶπεῖν.* Consequently, Eurysthenes and Procles cannot have been reported in the national tradition of Sparta to have been the conquerors of



Laconia (οἱ κατασχόντες τὴν Λακωνικὴν), nor to have divided the Laconian territory into provinces, if that division took place at or immediately after the conquest, which seems to be the meaning of Ephorus. Or, if it be objected that the division was not made at the conquest, but soon after, it may be answered that the interval must have been considerable, as Theras is distinctly stated in the story of the Minyæ to have been guardian of the twins, when children, and consequently their minority must have been of some duration. The fact of this story of the Minyæ being recognised both by the Spartan and Theræan tradition is urged by Dr Arnold himself to corroborate another circumstance mentioned in it (p. 641. n.); he cannot therefore refuse to admit the minority of Eurysthenes and Procles, and the guardianship of Theras. To another possible objection that Theras may have made the division, which is attributed to Eurysthenes and Procles, because it took place in their reign; it is an obvious answer that the acts of Lycurgus when guardian of Charilaus are never attributed to the latter.

Secondly, it appears that these six provinces contained towns which were not reduced by the Spartans till many generations after the invasion, and which remained not as subjects or tributaries, but in a state of absolute independence. Among these are some particularly mentioned by Ephorus as belonging to the Spartans and strengthening their power: such as Aegys, which was not taken till the time of Archelaus and Charilaus, more than two centuries, Pharis and Geronthræ by Teleclus, more than two centuries and a half after the invasion. (Pausan. III. 2. 5, 6). “But the period (says Dr. Arnold) to which Müller alludes is not that of their political subjection, but of their destruction, when the old inhabitants were extirpated, and the town peopled by Dorians. The expressions in Pausanias are ἐξείλον, ἡνδραποδίσαντο.” p. 648. But from his expressions πολέμῳ κρατήσαντες, ἐχόντων ἔτι Ἀχαιῶν, and ὑποπτεύσαντες ὥς οἱ Αἰγῦται φρονοῦσι τὰ Ἀρκάδων, it is probable that he understood the Achæans of these towns to have been hitherto independant. Dr Arnold probably infers from the following passage of Paus. III. 22. 6. that these towns received a Doric population. It seems however very improbable that any of



the towns of the Periæci were peopled by Dorians; nor does such a supposition agree with Dr Arnold's general view of the Doric conquest of Laconia. The Spartans out of the chief city, mentioned by Xenophon in his account of Cindon's conspiracy, were resident not in the country towns, but on their own estates in the district of the citizens, the *χώρα πολιτική*. (Hell. III. 3. 5).

3. Among these towns was Amyclæ, which though not three miles distant from Sparta, is known to have held out till the reign of Teleclus, 278 years after the invasion, and to have been in a state of constant hostility to Sparta. So frequent indeed were the alarms of an attack, that the Amycleans are reported to have made a law that no one should give warning of the enemy's approach: and it was so current a tradition in antiquity that the city was taken by surprise in consequence of this regulation, as to be made a matter of allusion by an early Roman satirist. It does not therefore appear that Amyclæ was soon after the invasion in such a state of subjection that it could be given as a reward to a friend, in the same way that Bonaparte gave kingdoms to his relations and generals: and its destruction mentioned by Pausanias may naturally have been provoked by so long and determined a resistance.

There is however an explanation (such as it is) which Dr Arnold might allege. Conon (Narr. 36) states that Philonomus *the Spartan*, who had betrayed Lacedæmon to the Dorians, received Amyclæ as the reward of his treachery, and peopled it with settlers from Lemnos and Imbros (i. e. Minyæ). In the third generation these colonists rebelled against the Dorians, were driven out of Amyclæ, and went, accompanied by some Spartans and headed by Pollis and Delphus, to Crete. This statement of a writer of low authority is rendered more suspicious; 1. Because Philonomus<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Archbishop Whately has justly ridiculed those sceptical historians, who get rid of real persons by an etymological resolution of their names, when he urges as a probable mode of accounting for the fable of Buonaparte's existence, the suggestion that in fact he is a mere representative of a *large part* (*buona parte*) of the French nation. Nevertheless in this instance the name *Philonomus* (as Müller has remarked) is very suspicious, and seems as if it alluded to the fondness of this traitor for the νόμος 'Αμυκλαῖος.



is called a Spartan, while Ephorus calls him an Achæan, which he must have been in order to betray the Achæans; unless indeed Conon by Spartan meant only an inhabitant of Sparta, whether Achæan or Dorian. (See Nicol. Damasc. p. 445 ed. Vales.). 2. Because Pausanias makes no mention of this previous subjection of the Amycleans. 3. Because, allowing the longest time for a generation, it is impossible to make 278 years out of three generations, even if the third is taken complete; and Conon expressly says “*in the third generation.*”

4. Ephorus moreover states that Eurysthenes and Procles “built towns in the country,” or “fortified the country” (πολίσαι τὴν χώραν), which it is extremely improbable that the chiefs of a conquering aristocracy should do, even on the supposition that the whole of Laconia was reduced at the first invasion. Such a measure would have had the effect of strengthening their subjects, who must always have been considered as the enemies of the Spartan nobles.

5. Ephorus further states that Procles and Eurysthenes sent kings to the different provinces, with permission to receive any strangers who were willing to be partakers in the rights of citizenship (δέχεσθαι συνοίκους τοὺς βουλομένους τῶν ξένων, p. 364), on account of the depopulation of the country. And in another place he says that “Eurysthenes and Procles received foreigners (i. e. at Sparta), and governed by their means.” (p. 366).

It seems certain from the traditions respecting the early kings of Sparta, that, before the Achæan period, Laconia was inhabited by a Lelegian race. (See Meursius Reg. Lac. c. 1. 2). These Leleges appear afterwards to have been a class of subjects or slaves under the Achæans. Now when the Achæans were dislodged, the country was not dispeopled, so as to require these imaginary kings of Ephorus to admit foreigners to the rights of citizenship: nor is there any account of other settlers in Laconia besides the Dorians at this time. If moreover Eurysthenes and Procles reigned as tyrants over the Dorians by the assistance of foreigners, nothing would be more impolitic than to strengthen the country with fortresses, a measure never adopted by the arbitrary



princes of Greece<sup>2</sup>. It is also highly improbable that the chiefs of a conquering aristocracy should have succeeded so soon in obtaining a despotic power over those by whose efforts the country had just been subdued. The account of Ephorus seems to be no further true, than that in early times the Spartans, by reason either of their small numbers, or their unsettled dominion, were more liberal in admitting strangers to the rights of citizenship, a tradition alluded to by Aristotle<sup>3</sup>; and that the kings had at one time arrogated a greater power than belonged to their successors after the Lycurgean legislation<sup>4</sup>; but the other circumstances of his narrative bear strong marks of the rationalizing and modernizing spirit which pervades all his accounts of early times.

After making the statement concerning Philonomus's reward, Ephorus proceeds to say that the Perioeci were obedient indeed to the Spartans, but nevertheless enjoyed an equality of rights, sharing both in the rights of citizenship and in public offices: but that Agis the son of Eurysthenes took away their equality, and made them tributary to Sparta: that the inhabitants of Helos resisted and were made slaves, whence arose the class of Helots.

Now in the first place it is difficult to conceive how the Perioeci could have been obedient to the Spartans, or at least how the Spartans could have ensured their obedience, if they had possessed all the rights and advantages of Spartan citizen-

<sup>2</sup> Ἀκρόπολις ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ μοναρχικὸν, δημοκρατικὸν δ' ὁμαλότης, ἀριστοκρατικὸν δ' οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἰσχυροὶ τόποι πλείους. Aristot. Pol. VII. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Λέγουσι δ' ὡς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτέρων βασιλέων μετεδίδωσαν τῆς πολιτείας. Pol. II. 9. Herodotus however says that in early times they were ξείνοισιν ἀπρόσμικτοι, I. 65.

<sup>4</sup> Herodotus I. 65. and Thucydides I. 18. merely state that before Lycurgus the Spartans were ill governed and torn by seditions: but when Thucydides says that Sparta αἰὲ ἀτυράννευτος ἦν, he appears only to refer to the times *after* Lycurgus. Aristotle Pol. v. 12. cites the reign of Charilaus as an example of a change from τυραννίς to aristocracy. Comp. Heraclid. Pont. Pol. 2. καὶ τὸν Χάριλλον τυραννικῶς ἄρχοντα μετέστησε (Lycurgus.) The passage of Isocrates de Pace p. 178. C. which appears to contradict Panath. p. 270. A. is satisfactorily explained by Mr Clinton, F. H. Introd. p. v. n. z. Müller, Dor. Vol. II. p. 12. n. h. misinterprets Strabo VIII. p. 365. οἱ δὲ κατασχόντες τὴν Λακωνικὴν καὶ κατ' ἀρχαίς μὲν ἐσωφρόνουν, by referring these words to *internal* quiet; Strabo means that at first they made no *foreign* conquests, and did not aim at *external* ascendancy.



ship. The distinction between Spartans and Perioeci would have been a distinction without a difference, a mere variety of name, if a Perioecus could be elected to the chief magistracies and vote in the supreme legislative assembly of the state. Nor is it more probable of early than of later times that the inhabitants of remote towns should have belonged to the Spartan community, and been admitted to the Spartan ecclesia. (See Müller, b. III. c. 2 § 2). Again, it must be allowed that the Dorians formed an aristocratic order from their very first settlement in Sparta, and that their polity was always founded on subject and inferior classes. Now Ephorus says that the Perioeci were nearly their equals, and were not tributary, and that the order of Helots was not instituted by the disfranchisement of some of the Perioeci till the first generation after the conquest. Who then were the slaves in the reigns of Eurysthenes and Procles? Who in those early times enabled the Spartans to enjoy an exemption from trade and agriculture, by tilling the lands of which the Achæan Perioeci had just been dispossessed? It is so hard to believe that a conquering aristocracy should have willingly admitted the natives to such privileges as Ephorus describes, or that, if they were admitted, as in Argos just before the Persian war, their admission should have been followed by no dangerous consequences to the Spartans, that it seems much safer to reject the statements of Ephorus, so far as to suppose that the Achæans never were *ἰσόνομοι* with the Spartans, nor enjoyed the rights of Spartan citizenship, that is, that they were not, like the Aegidæ, admitted into the tribes<sup>5</sup>. The mistake of Ephorus (if mistake it be) perhaps arose from the Perioeci being above the condition of bondsmen, and their being eligible to some petty municipal

<sup>5</sup> Ephorus ap. Strab. VIII. p. 361. (emended by Müller Vol. I. p. 111.) states with equal improbability that Cresphontes had originally intended to make all the Messenians equal with the Dorians, but was prevented by the Dorians from fulfilling his project. Pausanias IV. 3. 6—8. confirms Ephorus as to the popular rule of Cresphontes, but he says that the Messenians agreed without a battle to divide their lands with the Dorians, nor does he mention equal rights. Let any body consider the legal relations introduced by the Norman conquest of England, by the Lombard conquest of Italy, by the Franks, Burgundians &c. in France, of which we have contemporary accounts, and then let him judge how far these statements of Ephorus are likely to have any truth.



offices in their own towns: for though they were under the general superintendence of Spartan governors or magistrates (Thuc. iv. 53. Xen. Hell. iii. 3. 8), the detailed management of their own internal affairs was probably left to them. Because the Roman Plebs were above the condition of the Clients, and had some officers who administered the affairs of their own body, does it follow that they stood on an equal footing with the Patricians, and enjoyed the full rights of Roman citizenship? It is moreover highly probable that the Helots of the Spartans were formed partly of a slave population which had tilled the lands of the Achæans, and merely changed masters, partly of a portion of these same Achæans, who had resisted the Spartans, and who, from being taken with arms in their hands, were called *εἰλωτες* or "prisoners," which word cannot consistently with the rules of the Greek language be derived from the town *Ἑλος*<sup>6</sup>.

Dr Arnold states in p. 643 that he has followed Isocrates Panath. p. 270. in "his view of the relative situation of the Dorians and the Achaian *περίοικοι*." Now as this account of Isocrates is completely inconsistent with that of Ephorus, Dr Arnold must, according to the law-phrase, be put to his election, and follow either the one or the other, and not take from both whatever suits his purpose. Isocrates states that the most accurate writers on early Spartan history (*οἱ τὰ κείνων ἀκριβοῦντες ὥς οὐδένας ἄλλους τῶν Ἑλλήνων*) say that the Dorians at first disagreed among themselves; and disunion, it is true, would naturally cause weakness among the

<sup>6</sup> See Müller b. i. ch. 4. § 7. b. iii. ch. 3. § 1. Steph. Byz. in *Ἑλος* . . . *οἱ πολῖται Εἰλωτες*—*λέγονται δὲ Εἰλωται καὶ Ἑλειοὶ καὶ Ἑλεᾶται. καὶ ἡ χώρα Εἰλωτεία*. The regular gentile name from *Ἑλος* would be *Ἑλεῖος*, as *Ἀργεῖος* from *Ἄργος*, and this is used by Strabo viii. p. 365. (comp. Müller Vol. i. p. 392. n. z.) The district of Helos is called *ἡ Ἑλία* in Polyb. v. 19. 7. for which we should read *ἡ Ἑλεία*. Theopompus in Athen. p. 272. A. uses *Ἑλεάτης*. Pausan. iii. 2. 7. calls the inhabitants of Helos *Ἑλωτες*, but probably on account of the historical explanation of the name of the slaves, and with no better authority than Stephanus had for stating that the district of Helos was called *Εἰλωτεία*. *Εἰλώτης* is a barbarous form, which probably never existed as a name either of the slaves or the Helians, and arose from the corruptions of the text of Herodotus by the introducers of supposed Ionisms. Antiochus appears not to have known the derivation of the *εἰλωτες* from *Ἑλος*, for he says that those Lacedæmonians who did not take part in the Messenian war, were made slaves, and called helots, Strab. vi. p. 278.



conquerors, and therefore strength among the conquered. But he goes on to say that they reduced the Perioeci to the abject state in which he describes them, without any mention of an intervening period of comparative liberty and equality<sup>7</sup>: so that his account is completely irreconcilable with that of Ephorus adopted by Dr Arnold.

In the foregoing remarks I have argued on the supposition of Müller, adopted by Dr Arnold, that the names and chronology of the Spartan kings from the Doric conquest are historical. Although Müller has been censured by Dr Arnold as too much inclined to scepticism, in this point it appears to me that he is more justly chargeable with too great credulity. For there is little reason for supposing that the Spartans possessed an earlier regular history than any other state of Greece, when we consider, 1. The fact noticed by Mr Clinton, F. H. Part II. p. 206, that the average length of the reigns before the beginning of authentic history considerably exceeds the average length of those after that epoch. 2. That the 14 first kings of both houses are represented as succeeding in the direct line from father to son, or from grandfather to grandson, without a single instance of female or collateral succession: a circumstance, which, as far as I am aware, cannot be paralleled by any single line of hereditary princes, and which moreover ceases in Sparta at the commencement of contemporary history; and how much is the improbability increased when the line is double! 3. Plutarch Lyc. 1. says that Eratosthenes and Apollodorus calculated the date of Lycurgus by the successions of the Spartan kings, i. e. by assuming a certain average number of years for every reign: which they would hardly have done, if there had been an accredited chronology of those reigns founded on contemporary registers. Buttmann has the following remarks on this subject: "The celebrated patronymic family-names are commonly derived from an ancestor belonging to the transition-period between fable and history, to the interval between the

<sup>7</sup> παρὰ σφισὶ μὲν αὐτοῖς ἰσονομίαν καταστήναι καὶ δημοκρατίαν τοιαύτην, οἷαν περ χρὴ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον ὁμονοήσκειν, τὸν δὲ δῆμον περιοίκους ποιήσασθαι p. 270. c. τῶν γὰρ οὕτω μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεινὰ πεπονθότων &c. p. 271 B.



expedition of the Heraclidæ and Pisistratus. Even the most celebrated of all, the two houses at Sparta, were not called after the two renowned epic names of the brothers Eurysthenes and Procles, but their common appellation was Agiads and Eurypontids, from two princes who lived in the dimness of the earliest history, the son and grandson of Eurysthenes and Procles. ‘Eurypon, *it is said* (Pausanias informs us, III. 7. 1.), reached such a height of glory, that this house took its name from him, which before his time had been called Proclids.’ The historical fact contained in this statement amounts only to this: that the two Heraclide, and, if we will, kindred, royal houses of Sparta were always called Agiads and Eurypontids; that is to say, as far back as the progenitors Agis and Eurypon, to whose time the true historical tradition ascends. Every thing beyond them belongs to the province of fabulous legends and epic poetry, and is the creature of that all-pervading spirit of historical fiction which derived the two ruling houses from two brothers, descendants of Hercules in the sixth degree.” Mythol. Vol. II. p. 266. The same method of explaining the double names of the two royal houses is also adopted by Niebuhr, when, speaking of the number of the Spartan gerusia, he says that “thirty houses were represented, the Agiads and Eurypontids by the kings: these names, when the descent of the two houses from twins had become an article of popular belief, were derived from certain alleged descendants of those mythical brothers.” Hist. of Rome, Vol. I. p. 333. Here Niebuhr does not, like Buttmann, make history ascend to Eurypon and Agis, though both writers agree in assigning the sons of Aristodemus to mythology; and indeed it is difficult to find sufficient testimony to accredit the received accounts of the early Spartan kings, liable as they are to such numerous and weighty objections. “Ce n’est pas (I may say with Adrien de Valois) que je sois incrédule: mais en fait d’histoire je veux quelque bonne autorité, autrement je n’y ajoute point de foi.” (Valesiana, p. 339). Nevertheless the names of the Spartan, as of the Roman kings, are doubtless derived from popular tradition, and are not, like the lists of the Egyptian kings in Herodotus, and of the Argive and Sicyonian kings in Eusebius, mere fabrications



of learned priests and chronologers. Nor is it to be denied that the descent of the two royal families from twins furnishes the most probable explanation of the singular fact of *two hereditary* kings. The consuls of Rome and the kings or suffetes of Carthage afford no parallel, as they were not hereditary.

Dr Arnold next proceeds to describe the Lacedæmonian form of government, as being an aristocracy or oligarchy rather in respect of its subjects, the conquered Achæans, than of its citizens the conquering Dorians; “although even in the relations of the conquering people among themselves, the constitution was far less popular than that of Athens,” p. 640. On the relation which subsisted between the Spartans and the Periæci, the remarks of Dr Arnold admit neither of abridgement nor improvement. The Spartans were and continued to be an army of occupation in the midst of a conquered country. They “were a nation of nobles; and in their feelings as well as their rank resembled the nobles of the middle ages. Relieved from all attention to agriculture by the services of their helots or villains, taught to regard trade as disgraceful, and literature as unmanly; passing their time in manly and martial exercises, like the hunting and tournaments of a later period; *regarding all the members of their own body as substantially equal, in spite of subordinate differences*, and all who were not of their own body as only born to render them obedience—the nobles of Sparta differed in one point alone from those of modern Europe, in their admirable organization and discipline. Their institutions united the high enthusiastic spirit of chivalry with that perfect self-command, that entire obedience to their officers, and thoroughly systematized union of action, in which the chivalry of modern Europe was happily deficient. Had the nobles of Burgundy and Austria been trained in the school of Lycurgus, the most truly glorious victories recorded in history would never have been won, and Morat and Sempach would be names as hateful to the lovers of liberty and justice as Ithome and Ira.” p. 643, 4.

That the Spartan constitution afforded no protection to the Periæci and Helots, and that in this sense it was an oligarchy, and a most oppressive oligarchy, will be readily



conceded to Dr Arnold. But it appears to me that he has not laid sufficient stress on its oligarchical character in respect of the *citizens* alone, and that he has committed a fundamental error in referring the expressions of the ancients on the form of its government to the structure of its entire community, inclusive of the subject classes, and in not limiting them to the internal arrangement of its body politic. In order to shew the grounds of this opinion, it will be necessary first to examine Dr Arnold's account of the disposition of the sovereign power in the Lacedæmonian state, then to collect the various names which the ancients gave to its constitution, and to explain their meaning and application.

The two royal Heraclide families are rightly described by Dr Arnold (after Müller) as deriving their hereditary title from traditionary feelings of religious respect handed down from an early period, and as reigning by a species of divine right ascending to their ancestors, the founders of the state<sup>8</sup>: the domestic and civil power of the kings in the times of which we have any knowledge, and after the legislation of Lycurgus, was however so inconsiderable as not to form an important branch of the constitution; nor is it ever noticed as influencing the form of government, except by the speculative politicians in treating of mixed governments<sup>9</sup>.

Dr Arnold then proceeds to describe the Ephoralty as a magistracy contrived for the purpose of protecting the body of the Spartan nobles against the power of the kings and the council of Elders: and to the existence of this office he attributes the stability of the Spartan constitution: for whereas in other Doric states the compact (as he styles it) between the Heraclide princes and the Dorian people was broken either by one or the other party, so that the kings

<sup>8</sup> Those (says Aristotle) who have greatly benefited the state have been made kings, some by saving it, others by freeing it, from a foreign yoke, others κτίσαντες ἢ κτησάμενοι χώραν, ὥσπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ Μολοττῶν, Pol. v. 10. But see above p. 41.

<sup>9</sup> The circumstance of there being *two* kings does not prevent Dr Arnold from speaking of "the hereditary *monarchy* of the Heraclidæ," p. 644. In this phraseology however he is countenanced by some writers alluded to by Aristotle, below p. 57. by Polybius vi. 11. 6, 7. who calls the Roman government *monarchical* on account of the *two* consuls; and by a passage attributed to Archytas, below p. 58.



either became absolute or sank into insignificance, in Sparta the balance of the two powers was trimmed by the institution of the Ephors. Although in the reign of Theopompus the power of the Ephors first reached its full extent, yet their existence may be traced to an earlier date; and the account of Herodotus, who classes them among the institutions of Lycurgus, merely means that they were retained in his legislation<sup>10</sup>. Having rejected this statement in its plain and literal sense, Dr Arnold adopts with some variations a modern hypothesis on the origin of the Ephors, which I will now proceed to examine.

Müller (Dor. b. III. c. 5. §. 4) first conjectured that the number of the Ephors was derived from that of the five *κῶμαι*, or hamlets of Sparta, certain territorial divisions of the town. In what manner however he obtained more than the four *κῶμαι*, Pitana, Limnæ, Mesoia, and Cynosura, he did not explain. This difficulty was afterwards pointed out by Wachsmuth (Hell. Alt. Vol. II. P. I. p. 19. n. 45.); and Boeckh, adopting the hypothesis of Müller, attempted to remove it as follows: "Quintum putaverim Δύμην fuisse. Hesych. Δύμη, ἐν Σπάρτῃ φυλὴ καὶ τόπος, ubi τόπος conjungendum esse cum ἐν Σπάρτῃ, nec de urbe Achaïæ cogitandum, docet sensus communis. Hujus vici cives a Dymanibus, Dorica tribu, poterant diversi esse, ut Δαιδαλιδῶν gens Athenis a Δαιδαλιδῶν demo, etc." (Corp. Inscript. Vol. I. p. 609). This conjecture however must remain doubtful, because it is by no means certain that Δύμη does not mean the tribe of the Dymanes, which may in the later times of Sparta have become a φυλὴ τοπικὴ; nor is there any other mention, than this brief notice in a very corrupt grammarian, of this supposed κώμη, whereas the other four are frequently mentioned. Much more satisfactory is the explanation of Müller himself in the English translation of the Dorians, that he understood the five divisions of the town

<sup>10</sup> Ἑλλάνικος μὲν οὖν Εὐρυσθένη καὶ Προκλέα φησὶ διατάξαι τὴν πολιτείαν· Ἐφορος δ' ἐπιτιμᾷ φήσας Λυκούργου μὲν αὐτὸν μηδαμοῦ μεμνηῖσθαι, τὰ δ' ἐκείνου ἔργα τοῖς μὴ προσήκουσιν ἀνατιθέναι, Strabo VIII. p. 366. The latter statement of Ephorus, whatever may have been its truth in this instance, taken in a general sense is the exact reverse of the truth: the tendency of tradition at all times has been to ascribe to celebrated names the works of unknown or obscure persons.



of Sparta to consist of the four κῶμαι, and the πόλις itself, the hill on which was the temple of Minerva χαλκίοικος (Vol. II. p. 550. and see Paus. III. 17 ad init.). It seems indeed evident that “the κῶμαι lay around the πόλις properly so called” (the words of Müller, Vol. II. p. 50): in which case the πόλις could not be included in them, but must have formed the centre and head of a fifth division of the town. Dr Arnold however, silently adopting Müller’s hypothesis, states it thus: “The five ephori were probably coeval with the first settlement of the Dorians in Sparta, and were merely the municipal magistrates of the five *demi* which composed the city, Messoa, Pitana, Limnæ, Cynosura and the Aegidæ,” p. 646. Now (to pass over the word δῆμοι applied to the κῶμαι of Sparta, as they were originally called, or φυλαί, as they afterwards became), whence does it appear that the Aegidæ was a territorial division of the town of Sparta? Herodotus calls the Αἰγείδαι a φυλὴ μεγάλη in Sparta, i. e. a numerous γένος, or φρατρία (see Müller Orch. p. 329 n. Boeckh. ib. p. 609. Hermann Griech. Staatsalt. §. 24. n. 9); and there is no reason for supposing that it ever became a local name. As to the time at which Dr Arnold derives the ephors from the five κῶμαι<sup>11</sup>, Müller is of opinion that “the Aegidæ did not become a Doric phratia or oba till after the taking of Amyclæ (Orch. p. 374). It must however, in order to support Dr Arnold’s hypothesis, be assumed that the Aegidæ became from a γένος a local division at the first conquest. But as he has given no references, it is impossible to understand the grounds of his opinion without further explanation.

The extension or creation of the Ephoralty is attributed

<sup>11</sup> This argument as to the origin of the Ephors assumes that their number was always the same: but (as has been rightly suggested to me), although the Ephors may have existed from the beginning, yet we have no proof that they were always five in number: their number, as well as their powers, may have been augmented in the time of Theopompus. On the other hand, it is to be observed that no mention is made of an increase in the number of Ephors, as in that of the Roman tribunes: in later times indeed, when the power and duties of the Ephors had been greatly increased five minor Ephors were added, who were probably the assistants of the other five, but without sharing the chief part of their authority. See Timæus Lex. Plat. in v. ἔφοροι. In Etymol. Magn. p. 403. 55. cited by Ruhnken for ἔφοροι ἄρχοντες ἦσαν ἄνδρες θ’ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, read ἄνδρες ἐ, i. e. ε for θ.



to Theopompus<sup>12</sup>, who, together with the other king, Polydorus, is stated to have greatly curtailed the power of the popular assembly by taking from it the right of originating or modifying any measure, and leaving it a mere veto. Dr Arnold reconciles these apparently contradictory accounts by supposing that “the rhetra of Theopompus brought matters between the Heraclidæ and Dorians to a crisis: a reaction followed, and the king was obliged to confirm those liberties which he had vainly endeavoured to overthrow.” (p. 646. n.)<sup>13</sup> Henceforth the Spartan constitution remained without disturbance in its new form.

With the exception of these two constitutional powers, all the internal institutions of Sparta were subservient to the object of maintaining the ascendancy of the Spartans over the subject classes. “Hence the strict obedience required of the young towards the old, of the private citizen towards the magistrate. Hence the great council of the whole body of nobles, the public assembly of Sparta, discussed only such questions as the council of elders submitted to it, and had no power of amending any measure proposed, but only of simply accepting or rejecting it. Hence also no private citizen—I might better say, private soldier—was allowed to speak in the assembly.” (p. 644.) This is all the notice bestowed by

<sup>12</sup> Aristotle in his account of the Lacedæmonian constitution seems to doubt whether the Ephoralty was *intended* to give the people a share in the government: *εἴτε διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην εἴτε διὰ τύχην τοῦτο συμπίπτωκεν* are his words, *Pol.* II. 9: although in another place he states that Theopompus diminished the power of the kings by the creation of the Ephoralty and by other measures, *ib.* v. 11. The chief difficulty with regard to the origin of the Ephors is caused by the speech of Cleomenes in Plutarch *Cleom.* 10. who is represented to have stated to the Lacedæmonians, in defence of his slaughter of the Ephors, that the Ephors were originally the deputies of the Kings, appointed by them during their long absence from home in the Messenian war, and that from this beginning these officers gradually encroached on the power of those whom they represented. If Plutarch's account is to be relied upon, the most probable explanation seems to be that Cleomenes misrepresented the true facts in order to make a good case for himself.

<sup>13</sup> This explanation had been suggested, without Dr Arnold's knowledge, by Platner, in a German journal: see Hermann *Griech. Staatsalt.* § 43. n. 3. The ancient error, long since corrected by Menage, that in *Diog. Laert.* I. 68. Chilon is stated to have been the first of the Spartan Ephors in Olymp. 56. 1. whereas it is meant that he was the first of the college, or the Ephor eponymus of that year, ought not to have been recently revived by L. Dindorf, on the *Paschal Chronicle*, p. 267. Müller Vol. II. p. 116. n. a. appears to repeat this mistake, though he refers to Manso, *Sparta* Vol. III. Part II. p. 332. who corrects it.



Dr Arnold on the Gerusia; which in the times anterior to the great power of the ephors was in fact the most prominent feature in the Spartan constitution, and wielded the chief part of the legislative and executive sovereignty<sup>14</sup>. It was a council of 28 members, chosen<sup>15</sup> for life by the Spartans from all the Spartans above 60 years of age, who were candidates for this dignity. The office of councillor was considered as the reward of virtue, that is, of the qualities considered as virtuous by the Spartan community, and enjoined by their laws; and the choice appears to have been conducted on aristocratical principles, and to have generally fallen (in later times at least) on a narrow privileged class within the body of Spartans<sup>16</sup>. The gerusia could alone initiate laws and decrees, which it debated with the kings, who presided in it by virtue of their office; and any legislative proposal carried by a majority of voices was then laid before the assembly of all the Spartans, convened by the magistrates for that purpose, which had only power to adopt or reject it as a whole: but no amendment could be made, nor could any private citizen speak in the assembly. Moreover the councillors were the<sup>3</sup> supreme court in all criminal offences, and they decided not according to written laws, but according to their own discretion. Having therefore the most important part of the legislative and judicial sovereignty, being appointed for life and subject to no legal responsibility, the gerusia was justly considered by the Greeks as an oligarchical institution, and as inconsistent with any considerable influence

<sup>14</sup> οἱ γέροντες—οἱ ἐπιστατοῦντες ἅπασι τοῖς πράγμασι Isocrat. Pan. p. 265. Α. των γερόντων οὓς ἐκεῖνοι καὶ αἰσχύνονται καὶ δεδίασι καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν μεγίστην εἶναι νομίζουσι, Aeschin. in Tim. p. 25. 36. ἡ γερουσία πᾶν εἶχε τῶν κοινῶν τὸ κράτος Dion. Hal. II. 14. ἡ μὲν δὲ γερουσία συνέδριον Λακεδαιμονίοις κυριώτατον τῆς πολιτείας, Pausan. III. 11. 2. and other passages in Wolf on Dem. Lept. p. 489. 18. Müller, Vol. II. p. 98. n. n. Cicero de Rep. II. 28. says that “[Lycurgus γέροντας La]cedaemone appellavit nimis is quidem paucos xxviii. quos penes summam consilii voluit esse, cum imperii summam rex teneret:” but the powers of the Spartan Kings are more correctly described by Aristotle Pol. III. 14. αὕτη (ἡ Λακωνικὴ βασιλεία) ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν στρατηγία κατὰ γένος αἰδῖος. and Isocrates Nic. p. 31 D. Λακεδαιμονίους—οἵκοι μὲν ὀλιγαρχουμένους, παρὰ δὲ τὸν πόλεμον βασιλευμένους.

<sup>15</sup> The mode of election does not clearly appear: but it is strongly censured by Aristotle, κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν ἐστὶ παιδαριώδης, Pol. II. 9.

<sup>16</sup> Müller, b. III. c. vi. § 1. Aristotle says of the gerons of Elis τὴν αἵρεσιν δυναστευτικὴν εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίαν τῇ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι γερόντων, Pol. v. 6.



of the body of Spartans; hence Demosthenes says that the Spartan councillor is lord of the community (*δεσπότης τῶν πολλῶν*, in *Lept.* p. 489. 20.); and the effect of this authority on the internal affairs of Sparta may be illustrated by reflecting that “the institution of the gerusia (as Müller has remarked) was in fact in its main features once established at Athens, when Lysander nominated the Thirty, who were to be a legislative body, and at the same time a supreme court of justice,” (*Vol. II. p. 99.*): this comparison however is not quite accurate, and is somewhat unfavorable to the Spartan constitution; for though the Thirty of Athens might have been copied from the Spartan gerusia, yet at Athens there were no ephors annually elected by the mass of the people to control their power, nor was there any popular assembly to exercise even a silent veto on their proceedings<sup>17</sup>.

According to the above explanation, the Spartan constitution about the time of the Persian war may be thus described. The whole nation or society was divided into three orders. 1. The Doric Spartans, out of whose body none enjoyed the full rights of citizenship. 2. The Perioeci, who were not slaves, but were excluded from all political rights enjoyed by the Spartans: they lived in the country, or in small towns of the Laconian territory, and cultivated the land, which they did not hold of any individual Spartan, but paid for it a tribute or rent to the *state*, or body of Spartans, being exactly in the same situation as the *possessores* of the Romain domain, or the Ryots in Hindostan before the introduction of the Permanent Settlement<sup>18</sup>. 3. The

<sup>17</sup> Perhaps the resemblance between the Thirty of Athens and the Spartan Gerusia goes no further than this: that the numbers of both were the same, and that both bodies had great power. For the Thirty did not like the Gerusia act directly as a court of justice, but only compelled the senate to go through the forms of judicature, (*Philol. Mus. Vol. I. p. 425.*) The nature of the office of the Thirty corresponds much more closely to that of the Roman decemvirs.

<sup>18</sup> A state of things, bearing some analogy to that in Laconia, (*viz.* three orders of persons, of three different races) existed in Ireland soon after its invasion by the Normans and the Saxons or English. The latter, in a state of servitude in their own country, accompanied their masters in this expedition, and retained in Ireland both their superiority as conquerors and inferiority as conquered. “*Anglici nostram inhabitantes terram, qui se vocant mediæ nationis,*” say the Irish in a letter addressed about the middle of the 14th century to the Pope. *Fordun. Hist. Scot. Vol. III. p. 916.* Compare Thierry, *Hist. of the Norman conquest, Vol. III. p. 155. Engl. Transl.* “Thus the men of English race who had come to Ireland in the train of the Normans



Helots, the servile class: who differed from the Athenian slaves in not being saleable out of the country<sup>19</sup>. They were partly, like the serfs or villeins of the middle ages, *adscripti glebæ*, and tilled the estates of the individual Spartan landlords, to whom, like *métayers*, they paid a rent of a fixed portion of the gross produce of the soil<sup>20</sup>; and partly they attended their masters as domestic servants; waiting on them at the public tables, taking care of their children, accompanying them as esquires in the field, &c.

Of these three classes, the Helots appear to have had no rights whatever, except the right of not being sold out of the country, and perhaps not without the landed estate to which they belonged. The Perioeci were certainly freemen and not slaves; but their rights seem to have been confined to the possession of land, and the administration of some petty municipal affairs<sup>21</sup>. They were excluded from the great

were placed in a middle state between the latter and the natives; and their language—in their own country the most despised—held in the isle of Erin an intermediate rank between that of the new government, and the Celtic idiom of the vanquished people—degraded by the conquest, like the population which spoke it.”

<sup>19</sup> Ephorus in Strabo VIII. p. 365. says that the helots surrendered on two conditions, 1. that they should not be sold out of the country, and 2. that their masters should not be able to liberate them. This is one of the many cases where existing institutions have been referred to an imaginary contract: for it would be absurd to suppose that prisoners would stipulate that they should not be liberated by their masters. The *νεοδαμώδεις* of Sparta did not correspond to the *libertini* of Rome: for the former were manumitted by the state on grounds of public policy, the latter by their masters on grounds of private kindness. The account of Archemachus (Athen. VI. p. 264 A. Phot. in *πενέσται* p. 409. 18.) that some of the Boeotians of Arne became the slaves of the Thessalians on condition that their masters should not sell them out of the country or have the right of life and death over them, is liable to no objection of this kind.

<sup>20</sup> At one time as much as a half, *ἡμισυ πάν ὅσον καρπὸν ἄρουρα φέρει*, Tyrtaeus ap. Paus. IV. 14. 5. The rent now usually paid by the French *métayers* is half the price of the entire produce of the soil. To this class of helots, Livy's description of the measure of Nabis refers: “Ilotarum deinde quidam (hi sunt jam inde antiquitus castellani, agreste genus) . . . . per omnes vicos sub verberibus acti necantur,” XXXIV. 27. On the meaning of *castellanus* see Ruperti on Livy v. 5.

<sup>21</sup> This is conjectured by Müller from the circumstance of the Perioeci living in *πόλεις*, which were in late times detached from Sparta by T. Quinctius, and by Augustus constituted into a separate community (the *Ἐλευθερολάκωνες*, i. e. *independent*, not *free* Laconians), b. III. c. ii. § 1, 3. There were also at one time *καλοὶ κάγαθοι* among the Perioeci, Xen. Hell. v. 3. 9. and Müller has remarked that Paus. III. 22. 5. mentions an inhabitant of Aciriæ in Laconia who was an Olympic victor: Göttling on Aristot. Pol. p. 465. has suggested that this person might have been an Eleutherolaconian: and although Müller Proleg. p. 428. has observed that



legislative assembly of the state<sup>22</sup>, from all command over Spartans, civil and military, from the public tables and education, and from the city of Sparta. The entire government of these two classes, as well as of their own order, was vested in the Spartans, whose political constitution may be briefly described as follows. The legislative sovereignty was shared between the great assembly of all the Spartans, and the gerusia, which body could alone initiate any legislative measure: while the assembly could only accept or reject it as proposed to them, nor could anything be said except by a public magistrate. The judicial sovereignty was shared by the gerusia and the Ephors: the former had the criminal, the latter the chief part of the civil jurisdiction. Besides the command of the army most of the other administrative powers belonged to the Ephors, who were annually chosen by the Spartans from their own body.

This being then the construction of the Lacedæmonian state, the question is whether it was by the Greeks considered as an oligarchy on account of the situation which the

the words of Pausanias *ἄνδρα ποτὲ ὀλυμπιονίκην* appear to refer to a period earlier than the establishment of the Eleutherolaconians by Augustus, yet the Laconian Periæci were virtually independent from a much earlier period, probably from 369 B. C. after which Sparta never fully recovered her authority, and certainly from 192 B. C. after the defeat of Nabis. But the Periæci doubtless approached the condition of the helots much more nearly than that of the Spartans; for although they were sometimes employed in places of trust and authority (Thuc. VIII. 6. 22. cf. Xen. Anab. v. 1. 15), yet when the numbers of the Spartans had much diminished, the state was forced to employ even helots in public situations (Xen. Hell. III. 5. 12). The oppression of the Periæci and their readiness to revolt appears from many passages, Clinton, F. H. Part II. p. 406. n. g. Generally too periæci are joined with slaves, as if they belonged to the same general class. Thus Plato says, that when his perfect state is corrupted, the governors will enslave those whom they formerly protected, *περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας ἔχοντες*, De Rep. VIII. p. 547. Aristotle makes the periæci of Crete correspond to the helots of Sparta, II. 10. So in another place he says that the best of all is that the husbandmen should be slaves, of different races; the next best that they should be periæci of a barbarous race: Pol. VII. 10. compare what Isocrates Pan. p. 270 c. says of the Spartans, *τὸν δῆμον περιοίκους ποιήσασθαι, καταδουλωσαμένους αὐτῶν τὰς ψυχὰς οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ τὰς τῶν οἰκετῶν*.

<sup>22</sup> Götting on Aristot. Pol. p. 464. infers that the Periæci were not admitted to the ἐκκλησία from the words of Archidamus in addressing that assembly, *πρὸς μὲν γὰρ Πελοποννησίους καὶ ἀστυγείτονας παρόμοιους ἡμῶν ἢ ἀλκῆ*, Thuc. I. 80, by *ἀστυγείτονας* understanding the *περίοικοι*. But the two words signify the same thing by different means. Peloponnesians are opposed to Athenians as being without the Isthmus; *ἀστυγείτονας*, the neighbours of Lacedæmon, to those who, like the Athenians, *γῆν ἕκας ἔχουσι*, whose territory lies at a distance.



Spartans held with respect to the Perioeci, or on account of the disposition and administration of the sovereign power *within* the Spartan body: so that it would have equally been called an oligarchy if there had been no such class as that of the Perioeci.

In the first place it may be observed that the ancient speculative writers are not uniform in their language with respect to the Spartan government; and though (as Dr Arnold says) “every one knows that the Spartan government was an oligarchy, and that it was the head of the oligarchical interest throughout Greece” (p. 640), yet its constitution is sometimes called by other names. Thus Plato doubts whether it ought not to be called a *τυραννίς*, or despotism, on account of the arbitrary power of the Ephors, or a royal government on account of the kings; while at other times no state seemed more democratical: “although (he adds) not to call it an aristocracy (i. e. a government of the *ἄριστοι*, or best) is altogether absurd.” Leg. iv. p. 712. So too Isocrates says in one place that the Spartans established among themselves an equal democracy (p. 270, cf. p. 152 A.), and in another that the Spartan government was a democracy mixed with aristocracy (p. 265. A). To the like effect are the remarks of Aristotle: “Some persons contend that the best form of government is one mixed of all the forms: wherefore they praise the Lacedæmonian constitution, some saying that it is composed of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy—a monarchy on account of the kings, an oligarchy on account of the councillors, a democracy on account of the Ephors: others saying that it is a despotism (*τυραννίς*) on account of the Ephors, and a democracy on account of the public tables, and the other regulations as to the ordinary mode of life.” Pol. II. 6. In another place Aristotle says that “the test of a well-mixed constitution is the uncertainty of its name: thus the Spartan constitution is sometimes called a democracy, because the rich and poor are treated in the same manner, as to education, dress, and food; and because the people have a share in the two highest offices, by electing the one and being eligible to the other: sometimes an oligarchy, because it has many oligarchical institutions, such as that none of the magistrates are chosen by lot, that a few



persons have power to pass sentence of banishment<sup>23</sup> and death, &c." A fragment of a work on Law and Justice, written in the Doric dialect, and attributed to Archytas the Pythagorean, contains the same doctrine: "Laws and states ought to be compounded of all the forms of government, and to have something of democracy, something of oligarchy, something of royalty and aristocracy: as in Lacedæmon, where the kings are monarchical, the gerons aristocratical, the ephors oligarchical<sup>24</sup>, the hippagretæ and youths<sup>25</sup> democratical." (Stob. XLIII. 134.) A nearly similar view of the Spartan constitution is taken by Polybius, who represents it as combining the excellencies and peculiarities of all the different forms of government; and he, as well as the authors just quoted, considers certain institutions as characteristic of the several forms of government, and united in the Spartan state. (VI. 3. 8. VI. 10.) It is of course evident that none of these writers could understand the terms monarchy, oligarchy or aristocracy, and democracy, in their strict sense, as signifying governments in which one person *alone* governs, in which a few persons or the best *alone* govern, or in which the majority *alone* govern; as every state must be governed by some definite number of persons, which must be either one or several, and if several, either more or less than half the community.

In all these passages the application of the terms monarchy, royalty, and despotism to the Spartan constitution is sufficiently obvious: but the vacillation between oligarchy and democracy may seem less easy of explanation. If indeed we take the term democracy in its proper sense, as meaning a government in which the sovereignty resides in the greater

<sup>23</sup> IV. 9. If this language is precise, Müller is wrong in supposing that banishment was never a regular punishment at Sparta, see Vol. II. p. 239. 551.

<sup>24</sup> It is curious to observe how authors vary in considering the same institutions or powers as characteristic of different forms of government. Thus Plato calls the Ephors despotic, Aristotle calls them democratic, and this writer makes them oligarchical. If the Ephors had jointly possessed the entire sovereign power, the Greeks would have called the government αὐτοκρατεία, i. e. a very narrow oligarchy.

<sup>25</sup> Κόροι καὶ ἵππαγρέται. The κόροι here meant are the 300 knights who were commanded by the hippagretæ. See Meursius Misc. Lac. II. 4. p. 117. Müller Vol. II. p. 257. n. s. Müller p. 256. says that these κόροι were chosen on aristocratic principles, i. e. according to merit, but see Xen. Hell. III. 3. 9.



part of the body politic of the community, there is no doubt, when we remember that ever Spartan citizen voted in the supreme legislative assembly, and that, according to the constitutional act of Sparta, the people had sovereign power<sup>26</sup>, that the Spartan government was strictly a democracy. But in practice it was an oligarchy or aristocracy, that is, its constitution worked as if the sovereignty had belonged to a minority; in other words the government was administered in the same manner as in most states which were truly oligarchies. Hence it was not improperly called an oligarchy, as the Roman government after Augustus is called an absolute monarchy, although the emperor was only sovereign in fact and not in name: so we call the government of France under Napoleon an absolute monarchy, although the sovereign power was nominally shared by the emperor with the shadow of a senate. Sparta no less acted in the aristocratical interest, and was not less the head of the oligarchical party throughout Greece, than if its constitution had been in form, as well as substance, aristocratical. Legally it was a democracy, but in spirit, in the practical effect of its institutions, it was an oligarchy: a distinction the same as that pointed out by Thucydides, when he says that Athens under Pericles was in name a democracy, but in fact a monarchy<sup>27</sup>. Things which in reality are one thing, and in appearance another, are not unfrequently called by both names; as Catullus calls the promontory of Sirmio both an island and a peninsula<sup>28</sup>: because as seen from above it has the appearance of an island, though it is in fact connected with the shore of the lake by a narrow tongue of land: for although an island cannot be a peninsula, and a peninsula cannot be an island, yet as it *is* one and *seems* to be the other, Catullus gives it the names of *both*.

The above passages do not indeed determine whether Sparta was considered by the Greek politicians as an oligarchy

<sup>26</sup> δάμω δὲ κυρίαν ἡμεν καὶ κράτος, Rhetra of Lycurgus in Plutarch Lyc. 6. see Müller, Vol. II. p. 87. n. 1. Tyrtæus ap. Diod. Exc. Vat. VII—X. 3. δήμου τε πλήθει νίκην καὶ κάρτος ἔπεσθαι. In these passages δῆμος signifies the order of Spartans, as in Dion Cassius, as epitomized by Zonaras, it is applied to the Roman Populus, or Patrician order without the Plebs, Niebuhr, Vol. II. note 367.

<sup>27</sup> ἐγίγνετο λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή, II. 65.

<sup>28</sup> Peninsularum Sirmio insularumque  
Ocelle.



in respect of its citizens, or of its Perioeci; but they shew that, in estimating the character of a government, the superior and not the subject class was alone taken into the account. Thus Plato says that it was an aristocracy not by reason of the Perioeci, but of the gerons: and when he, Isocrates and others call it democratic, they allude to the power of the whole Spartan order in making laws, and in electing magistrates, to the equality of education, to the public tables, &c.: which are democratical institutions in relation to the body of Spartans, though they were aristocratical in respect of the Perioeci and Helots; that is, they were institutions contrived to perpetuate the rule of the Spartans over the inferior and subject orders by training them to an austere discipline, and forming them into an army of occupation in an enemy's country.

The principal authority for Dr Arnold's view that the Spartan constitution was oligarchical, because it was "an aristocracy of conquest, in which the whole conquering people stood towards the conquered in the relation of nobles to commons," (p. 640), is furnished by Thuc. iv. 126, where Brasidas exhorts his soldiers not to fear superior numbers, inasmuch as "they came from states, in which not the many rule over the few, but the few over the many, having gained their power by no other means than victory in the field." There is no doubt that this assertion is true, and that one of the most important characteristics of the Spartan system was the subjugation of the Perioeci and Helots, and the exclusive privileges of the Spartans: nevertheless it does not follow that the aristocratic character of the Spartan government was derived from this circumstance alone, or that the internal arrangement of the Spartans is to be entirely placed out of the question. Thus when Niebuhr justly compares the Spartans and Perioeci with the Roman patricians and plebeians (Vol. i. p. 476), it does not follow that he means that the Spartan government was called an oligarchy for the same reason that the early Roman government was an oligarchy: it does not follow that, because these two orders stood to each other in the same relation in both states, therefore the internal arrangement of any two corresponding orders was the same. A similar view is taken by Wachsmuth, *Hell. Alt.* l. i. p. 188,



who says that in respect of the Perioeci the Spartan constitution was an oppressive aristocracy: but these words do not imply that its common name of aristocracy had not its origin in different circumstances. Nor again when Müller, arguing against the absurd supposition that the Perioeci were admitted to the legislative assembly of Sparta, says that the constitution would have been democratic if the Perioeci had possessed that right (Vol. II. p. 22), does he imply that it was oligarchical because they did *not* possess that right; for although their admission might have made it democratical, it does not follow that their exclusion made it oligarchical.

There can be no doubt that the exclusion of the Perioeci from the rights of citizenship had a most important influence on the Lacedæmonian state, and gave it in this respect an aristocratical character: yet it is not therefore certain that this was the prominent consideration in the minds of the Greeks when they called it an aristocracy. In all ages the form of government has been considered as determined by the arrangement of the sovereign power in the body politic, without any account being taken of the subjects and slaves. Thus there are states of the American union which are not the less called democracies because the number of slaves exceeds that of the freemen: nor in the Greek states were slaves ever included in the enactments of new legislations (Wachsmuth II. 1. p. 11). The example of Athens proves that the most oppressive conduct of a dominant community towards subjects under the name of allies is quite consistent with the most complete democracy *within* that community<sup>29</sup>. When therefore we consider the constitution of the Spartan body, the restraints imposed on the assembly<sup>30</sup>, the extensive powers of the councillors, their election for life, their irresponsibility, the exercise of all jurisdiction by the magistrates, the absence of written laws, of paid offices, of offices determined by lot, and other things thought by the Greeks characteristic of a democracy, it is difficult not to think that these circumstances,

<sup>29</sup> "Like the Venetian nobility they form a democracy among themselves, although they may be the rulers over subjects many times their own number." Niebuhr, Vol. I. p. 302.

<sup>30</sup> Aristotle attributes the content of the Spartan people to their share in the constitution through the Ephors, not through the ecclesia, Pol. II. 9.



and not the situation of the subject classes, gave to the Lacedæmonian government the name and character of an oligarchy. This is distinctly recognized by Müller, who “calls the Spartan constitution an aristocracy without the least hesitation, on account of its continued and predominant tendency towards governing the community by a few, who were presumed to be the best” (b. III. c. 9. § 18). The same view is implied in all the numerous passages respecting the Lacedæmonian government above quoted, in which the structure of the Spartan body is alone attended to. So Aristotle in describing the decline of this constitution says that the Ephors being chosen from the people, and having extensive and almost arbitrary powers, the kings were compelled to court them; so that the government became a democracy from an aristocracy (II. 9): whereas if the other view were correct, no change in the rights of the Spartans would have made the government democratic without a change in the rights of the Periœci. Again he says that the women are not sufficiently restrained by law from luxurious indulgence, and consequently that the lawgiver, intending that the *whole* state should be austere and temperate in their habits, had succeeded only so far as the men are concerned: where the ‘whole state’ evidently excludes the Periœci and Helots. The mysterious secrecy which Thucydides ascribes to the Lacedæmonian state could not have existed, if *any* part of the community had been governed on popular principles (v. 68). Can it indeed be doubted that, if the Athenians had prevailed in the Peloponnesian war, and had sent *their* Lysander to remodel the constitution of Lacedæmon, they would have set about making a democracy, not with raising the subjects to citizens, a measure which every Athenian would have considered absolutely destructive of his own state, but with opening the close constitution of the Spartans, by removing the restrictions on the popular assembly, by giving the criminal and civil jurisdiction to numerous and popular tribunals, by making all magistrates responsible, by establishing nomination by lot, by abolishing the minute and severe regulations of private life<sup>31</sup>, and the many other measures which an

<sup>31</sup> “That interference with the freedom of private life which characterized the whole Spartan system was as alien to the spirit of democracy as it was congenial to



Athenian demagogue would have well known how to apply? And if after the first act of the Peloponnesian war and the successes of the Athenians such changes had taken place, although the Periœci might have been left in their ancient degradation or expelled from the country, would the oligarchical Bœotians and Megarians have thought an alliance with Lacedæmon more beneficial than with the democratic Argos<sup>32</sup>?

The question however as to the origin of the name of the Lacedæmonian government cannot be decided in the precise and definite manner which the foregoing remarks would seem to point at; as a certain degree of obscurity and uncertainty is necessarily caused by the gradual transition of the Spartans into the inferior classes. For the citizens were not divided from the subjects and bondmen by a plain and broad line, such as that which separated the Athenians from their allies and slaves; but the several orders ran into each other in a manner which our imperfect knowledge of the Spartan constitution, and of the changes which in the process of time it underwent, prevents us from correctly apprehending: though it is evident that (at one time at least) all the Spartans had not equal rights, and that within the body politic there was a class whose interests coincided with those of the subjects and bondmen. It appears that during the Peloponnesian war, if not at an earlier period, the Spartans were divided into two orders, called *Equals* and *Inferiors*, ὅμοιοι and ὑπομείονες. From a passage in Xenophon's *Anabasis* (iv. 6. 14) it would seem that the rank of an Equal was hereditary: at least Xenophon represents himself as saying that all the Lacedæmonians who belong to the class of Equals practise the art of stealing from their childhood (εὐθὺς ἐκ παιδῶν), at which age merit is of course impossible. Probably the son of an Equal was an Equal, unless he lost his rank by not per-

that of aristocracy," p. 647. Here Dr Arnold forgets his own explanation, and makes the Spartan government an aristocracy in respect of the *citizens*.

<sup>32</sup> Νομίζοντες σφίσι τὴν Ἀργείων δημοκρατίαν αὐτοῖς ὀλιγαρχουμένοις ἦσσαν σύμφορον εἶναι τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας, Thuc. v. 31. Compare Aristophanes in *Ath.* III. p. 75. A.

σुकᾶς φυτεύω πάντα πλὴν Λακωνικῆς  
τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ σύκον ἐχθρόν ἐστι καὶ τυραννικόν·  
οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἂν μικρόν, εἰ μὴ μισόδημον ἦν σφόδρα.



forming the duties imposed on him by law (Xen. Rep. Lac. x. 7). That the Equals were considered as forming a higher rank among the Spartans, may be inferred from the circumstance that the king when in the field was attended, among others, by three Equals (ib. XIII. 1<sup>33</sup>). Demosthenes (Lept. p. 489. 20) says that, “whereas in Sparta the reward of virtue is for the councillor to become a master of the state *together with the Equals*<sup>34</sup>, at Athens the people has that power, and there are safeguards of religion and law to prevent any other person from obtaining it.” The meaning of Demosthenes in this passage (which is not expressed with greater precision than his purpose required) appears to be, that the sovereign power, or the legislative and administrative authority, exercised by the whole body of citizens at Athens, in Sparta belonged to the council and the Equals. It may moreover be remarked that the *ὁμότιμοι* of Xenophon in his Cyropædia, which are generally admitted to be copied both in name and substance from the *ὅμοιοι* of Sparta, were a small body who ruled over the mass of the Persian nation<sup>35</sup>. From these vague and incidental notices it seems probable that the Equals were an aristocratical class within the body of Spartans, who were much employed in public offices, and had great influence on the government; originally perhaps selected for their merit, and afterwards their rank became hereditary: it must also be remembered that scarcely in any state did virtue less agree with the common sentiments of mankind, or the standard of morality as it ought to be, than in the republic of Sparta: *its* virtue consisted in an implicit obedience to the magistrate and a strict adherence to the duties prescribed by law<sup>36</sup>: so that even if the Equals were

<sup>33</sup> Rep. Lac. XIII. 2. θύει μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον οἴκοι ὧν Διὶ ἀγήτορι καὶ τοῖς σὺν αὐτῷ. L. Dindorf corrects σὺν τοῖς σὺν αὐτῷ, comparing s. l. τρέφει ἡ πόλις βασιλέα καὶ τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ. I should prefer καὶ οἱ σὺν αὐτῷ. See Elmsley ad Med. 865.

<sup>34</sup> The *ὅμοιοι* probably includes all the public magistrates. See Wolf ad l. Müller, b. III. c. 5. § 9. Schäfer ad l. conjectures that μετὰ τῶν ὁμοίων means ‘with his peers’ (mit seines Gleichen) i. e. with his colleagues, the other gerons: but I am not aware of any place in which *ὅμοιος* has this sense. On this subject generally, see Cragius de Rep. Lac. i. 10.

<sup>35</sup> ὀλίγοι ὄντες οὗτοι οἱ ὁμότιμοι καλούμενοι πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἄλλων Περσῶν ῥαδίως ἄρχουσιν II. 1. 3. comp. I. 3. 15. I. 5. 5.

<sup>36</sup> “The measure of what is everywhere called and esteemed virtue and vice is



originally, or for the most part, selected for their meritorious qualities, these qualities would have been thought meritorious in scarce any other state but Sparta.

Of this privileged class, or of some class possessing a similar precedence, was probably composed the *small assembly*, which seems to have been convened in times of need, and for occasions which were either not of sufficient importance to require, or of too pressing urgency to wait for, the decision of the entire Spartan body. Doubtless this assembly was more frequently convoked than the other<sup>37</sup>; and thus an additional restraint was laid on the power of the Spartan comitia.

This latter assembly is only known from its incidental mention by Xenophon in his account of the conspiracy of Cinadon, which, as it alone throws much light on the relation in which the Equals stood towards the inferior Spartans and the subject classes, may be here noticed with some detail. In the year 399 B. C. the Ephors received information of a treasonable plot contrived by one Cinadon, a man of vigorous mind and body, but not one of the Equals. In answer to some questions, their informant stated that Cinadon desired him to count how many Spartans there were in the market-place: that he counted the King, the Ephors and councillors, and others, to the number of about 40, when Cinadon said, ‘These are your enemies, but all the other persons in the market-place to the number of more than 4000 are your allies:’ that Cinadon had stated that there were not many concerned with him in the same plot, but they thought that they were in concert with all the Helots and Neodamodes, and with the Inferiors and the Periœci: for whenever mention was made of Spartans in the presence of any of these, none could conceal that he would gladly eat their flesh raw. Having obtained further information as to the manner in which the conspirators intended to procure

the approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which by a secret and tacit consent establishes itself in the several societies, tribes, and clubs of men in the world: whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them, according to the judgment, maxims, or fashion of that place.” Locke on the Understanding, II. 28. 10.

<sup>37</sup> Xenophon says, οὐδὲ τὴν μικρὰν καλουμένην ἐκκλησίαν ξυλλέξαντες, Hell. III. 3. 8, as if the convening of that, and not of the large assembly, would naturally have been the first step.



arms, the Ephors devised a pretext for sending Cinadon into the country, where he was apprehended by his attendants, was charged with the offense imputed to him; and having confessed in the presence of the Ephors, and stated in reply to a question, that his object was to be inferior to none in Lacedæmon, he and his fellow-conspirators were dragged round the city and slain amidst all the circumstances of disgrace and torture<sup>38</sup>.

From this account it evidently appears that at the time of Cinadon's conspiracy the Inferiors were so fully identified with the subject classes as even to be opposed to the Spartans in name as well as interest. The oligarchical constitution of the Spartan body had become so close and severe, that there was scarce any distinction between the unprivileged portion of the body politic, and the various classes which were subordinate to that body politic as a whole. The regular decline in the number of Spartans, which, in spite of the legal encouragements to marriage (Wachsmuth, H. A. II. 1. p. 351—3), was caused by the mischievous institutions of their state, made it necessary for them partially to break down the barriers which excluded the inferior classes from the full rights of citizenship: hence even the Helots were in later times employed abroad, in the army as hoplites, and occasionally in a civil capacity as harmosts (Xen. Hell. III. 5. 12). The Helots moreover assumed the appearance of a regular class in the state, and became both useful and formidable to their masters in a greater degree than the Athenian slaves; because they were not foreigners kidnapped in distant countries, and joined by no common bond of nation,

<sup>38</sup> Xen. Hell. III. 3. 4—11. comp. Polyæn. II. 14. Aristotle Pol. v. 7. says that revolutions take place in aristocracies *ὅταν ἀνδρώδης τις μὴ μετέχη τῶν τιμῶν*, giving the example of Cinadon. It is not expressly stated that Cinadon was a Spartan; but this appears to follow from several circumstances in the narrative of Xenophon; and Aristotle would have said *τῆς πολιτείας*, not *τῶν τιμῶν*, 'the magistracies,' if Cinadon had not been a citizen. Isocrates Panath. p. 246. B. asserts with great confidence that the Lacedæmonians had slain more of the *Greeks* without a trial than had ever been tried at Athens: but it does not clearly appear whether he means natives or foreigners. In p. 271. B. he states that the Ephors had power to slay without a trial; see Dr Arnold, p. 649. n. y. This statement appears to be confirmed by Xenophon's account of Cinadon's execution: but Plutarch states that Agesilaus together with the Ephors ordered certain Spartans to be executed without a trial, *οὐδενὸς δίχα δίκης τεθανατωμένου πρότερον Σπαρτιατῶν*, Agesil. 32.



language<sup>39</sup>, or family, but natives cultivating the land with their wives and children, inheriting their disabilities, and with them a hatred for their masters. The moral claims of the Helots for their enfranchisement were much stronger than those of the Athenian slaves: the former rather resembled the European serfs of the middle ages, the latter the negro-slaves in the American states and the West India islands: the former might as easily have been incorporated into the state as the villeins of England or the clients of Rome: but the difference of race and language presented an almost insuperable obstacle to the incorporation of the Athenian slaves. It was for these reasons that (with few and unimportant exceptions) we never hear of servile wars in Attica, and other states which were supplied with imported slaves and did not rear any at home: while the Helots from the very beginning were a disobedient and rebellious body, keeping (as Aristotle says) a constant watch on the misfortunes of their masters (*Pol.* II. 7), and on many occasions bore arms against the Spartans, sometimes so as to endanger their very existence. Thus Ephorus described the Helots as revolting with the Partheniæ against the Spartans immediately after the first Messenian war (*Strab.* VI. p. 280). The protracted contest which the Helots entrenched in Ithome waged against the Spartans, who were at length forced to suffer them to depart on terms, is well known. Equally celebrated is the cold-blooded assassination by which the Spartans privately despatched about 2000 of the bravest, and therefore most dangerous of these bondmen (*Thuc.* IV. 80). In the 50 years alliance made by the Lacedæmonians and Athenians after the taking of Pylos, it was stipulated that, if the slaves of the Lacedæmonians should

<sup>39</sup> The Helots all spoke the same language (*Thuc.* III. 112), the danger of which is remarked by Plato, *Leg.* VI. p. 777. The Helot population moreover maintained itself by natural reproduction, as the serfs in the country were able to marry and rear their children (see Hume on the Popul. of Anc. Nations, Works, Vol. III. p. 438, Müller II. p. 37): whereas at Athens, and in other states similarly situated, the numbers of the slaves were kept up by importation, as they could be purchased at a cheaper rate from the slave-merchant than they could be reared at home. The diminution observed in the numbers of the slaves in the English West India islands (where fresh supplies cannot be procured by importation) has probably taken place in all bodies of slaves not belonging to the class of serfs; only the additional numbers procured from abroad prevented the small number of births from being perceived. See Wachsmuth I. 1. p. 172.



revolt, the Athenians should assist the Lacedæmonians against them with all their forces: but this condition was not mutual (Thuc. v. 23). Similar revolts, and similar apprehensions of danger often occur in later times. After the battle of Leuctra, many of the Perioeci, and all the Helots revolted to the Thebans. They kept up this character to the very last, when they joined the Romans in the war which extinguished the independence of Sparta<sup>40</sup>.

Living therefore in the midst of a united, a warlike, a tributary, and a hostile population, the Spartans were compelled (as Dr Arnold has remarked) to be constantly on the watch, and to maintain such an attitude as would awe their subject enemies into submission, and afford them no opportunity for a successful attack. The rents and tributes of the inferior classes afforded them at once an immunity from taxation, and the means of devoting their whole time and attention to the maintenance of their dominion: “*Exempti (as Tacitus says of the ancient Batavians) oneribus et collationibus, et tantum in usum praeliorum sepositi, velut tela atque arma, bellis reservantur.*” In this principle we may find a solution of the difficulty stated above with respect to the double character of the Spartan constitution. In order to maintain the power of the Spartans over the subject classes, it was necessary that their government should be military; and in order that their government should be military it was necessary that it should be oligarchical. The unity and promptness of command, the regular and austere discipline, the watch and ward, the subordination and implicit obedience to authorities, the silence, the restraint, the monotony, the hard fare and gymnastic exercises of a camp, could not exist under the changeable and many-headed dominion, the

<sup>40</sup> See Xen. Hell. I. 2. 18. VI. 5. 29. VII. 1. 29. VII. 2. 2. Plutarch Agesil. 32. Strabo VIII. p. 366. Compare Thuc. IV. 80. αἰὲν τὰ πολλὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις πρὸς τοὺς εἰλωτας τῆς φυλακῆς πέρι μάλιστα καθεστήκει. Plato Leg. VI. p. 777. πολλάκις ἐπιδέδεικται περὶ τὰς Μεσσηνίων συχνὰς εἰωθυίας ἀποστάσεις γίγνεσθαι ὅσα κακὰ συμβαίνει. Aristot. Pol. II. 10. οἱ εἰλωτες ἀφίστανται πολλάκις. The Spartans had power of life and death over the Helots (Aristot. ap. Plutarch. Lyc. 28.), which they doubtless had not over the Perioeci: the Thessalians had not this power over their Penestæ, above p. 55. n. 19. Müller, Vol. II. p. 48, says that Plato calls the Laconian bondage the hardest in Greece: but I cannot find anything to this effect in the passage which he refers to, Leg. VI. p. 776.



publicity, and varied existence of a democracy. Hence we may say that Sparta *was* an oligarchy by reason of its subject classes, but was *called* an oligarchy by reason of the constitution of its citizens. The Spartans could not govern their subjects without being themselves governed by a few; and being governed by a few, their government was an oligarchy. It was for the purpose of *domestic* rule that the ascetic principles of legislation, which Mr Bentham rightly attributes to a motive of security<sup>41</sup>, were put in force at Sparta. With this view the Spartans were soldiers by profession (τεχνῖται καὶ σοφισταὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν, Plutarch. Pelop. 23); with this view they dedicated their whole time and energy to warlike exercises, and required the same devotion from the youths. Accordingly those ancient writers appear to be somewhat mistaken, who, after representing the Lacedæmonians as being trained only to military virtue (which is true), proceed to blame their lawgiver for making a nation of conquerors, unable to exist without external dominion founded on successful warfare (Plato Leg. i. p. 630. Aristot. Pol. ii. 9. vii. 2. vii. 14, 15). The discipline engendered by these institutions might, no doubt, be turned to foreign conquest; and there was great temptation to abuse a power which they possessed; nor can it be denied that this power was often abused: but its proper and direct object was security against domestic not foreign enemies; the coercion of discontented tributaries and unruly slaves, not territorial aggrandisement or distant conquests. To the same source may be traced many other singularities of the Spartan institutions, such as the prohibition to leave the country<sup>42</sup>, travelling being like desertion, or quitting a man's post in the field. So the interdiction to the citizens of all money-getting

<sup>41</sup> Principles of Morals and Legislation, Vol. i. p. 18.

<sup>42</sup> Isocrates Busir. p. 225. A. states that this prohibition only extended to the fighting men: in which statement he is, according to Harpocration in *κάθετος*, confirmed by other writers on the Lacedæmonian constitution; although Aristotle says that the prohibition was general, the object being to prevent the Lacedæmonians from acquiring a love for foreign institutions. If the Lacedæmonians acquired a love for foreign institutions, they would probably cease to be good soldiers: but it may be reasonably conjectured that Isocrates and those who agreed with him were so far right, that, although the legal prohibition was general, it was only *enforced* with regard to men of a fighting age.



pursuits, and even of the use of money itself, was founded on the same fear that the military efficiency of the soldier-citizen might be impaired. So completely did the lawgiver set at nought those moral rules which most nations have recognized, that it even seemed worth while to train the youths in their profession of warfare by sending them out to plunder in the country and by exercising them in adroit stealing, in order that from irregular pilferers they might ripen into regular soldiers. By these mischievous institutions, the result of great prudence and a determined resolution working at a mistaken object, the military government of Sparta, having been made an oligarchy within an oligarchy, having so successfully discouraged all art, science and literature, that none of its citizens contributed anything to the delight or instruction of mankind, having cramped by an unbending system of legal interference and inquisition the very citizens for whose benefit the subject classes were avowedly sacrificed, until their number dwindled to insignificance<sup>43</sup>, and having

<sup>43</sup> The constant decline in the number of the Spartans is traced by Mr Clinton, in his admirable Appendix on the population of Ancient Greece (p. 410), to the unequal distribution of the lands, which gradually fell into the hands of a few persons, and to the prohibition of gainful employments, which prevented the citizens from obtaining a livelihood by their own industry. Compare, besides the passages quoted by Mr Clinton, Aristot. Pol. v. 7. *ἐν Λακεδαίμονι εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσῖαι ἔρχονται, καὶ ἔξεστι ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν θέλωσι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτῳ θέλωσιν.* The extreme poverty of the younger brothers of the Spartan families is strikingly proved by a fact mentioned in the lately published fragments of Polybius, that it was an ancient and prevailing practice for several brothers to have only one wife among them, and the children were common to all: *παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ πατρῖον ἦν καὶ σύνηθες τρεῖς ἄνδρας ἔχειν γυναῖκα καὶ τέτταρας, τότε (l. ποτὲ) δὲ καὶ πλείους, ἀδελφοὺς ὄντας, καὶ τέκνα τούτων εἶναι κοινά.* XII. 6. in Mai. Script. Vet. Vol. II. p. 384. and see Müller, Vol. II. p. 204. This practice, which is a proof not only of the most pinching poverty, but also of a very depraved state of morality, is (I have understood) not uncommon among the lower classes in some parts of Italy. With regard to the decline of the Spartan population, it should likewise be mentioned that there were no paid offices in Lacedæmon; and the public coffers seem to have been always ill supplied, notwithstanding the tributes of the Periæci. There were no salaries for citizens serving in the army or navy. There was no class of advocates, rhetoricians, or sophists, who could earn a subsistence by pleading causes, by writing speeches, or by instructing the youth; medicine was not a profession, and literature, even if under any circumstances it could in Greece have produced a pecuniary reward, was in Lacedæmon discouraged and discountenanced. In this state of things a law of compulsory succession by primogeniture was tantamount to a law that all younger brothers and unmarried women should be beggars: for (as Mr Clinton has properly remarked from Aristotle) the public tables



pervverted by its system of legal rewards the standard of right and wrong, succeeded only in training its children into warriors, brave indeed to an admirable degree, but devoid of the frankness and sincerity which usually characterize the soldier: for though in their dealings with one another they found it their interest to practise that honesty which the proverb attributes to men united in a bad cause, yet towards foreign states their conduct was as notorious for bad faith as for an uniform regard for their own exclusive advantage<sup>44</sup>.

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were open to the Spartan citizen only on the same condition that a public inn is open to a modern traveller, that he pays for the food which he consumes. The more attentively we consider the Spartan constitution, the more marvellous it seems that it lasted so long.

<sup>44</sup> See Thuc. v. 105, where the remark of the Athenians is not made at random, although it comes from an enemy: and the passages collected in Meursius Misc. Lac. III. . Müller, Vol. II. p. 410. n. c.

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## ON THE HOMERIC USE OF THE WORD 'HPΩΣ.

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THE word ἥρως occurs at least 110 times in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and once in the hymn to Aphrodite. If we could ascertain the sense in which the author or authors of these poems used it, we should, I am persuaded, be able to apply this knowledge to our enquiries into the state of society in the times to which the poems refer, or at any rate in the times at which the author or authors lived. Besides, I suspect it would throw some light on a very interesting question,—the state of the great national families which ultimately constituted the mixed body of the Greeks, as these families stood at a very early age, though not the earliest known to us in the Greek traditions. The age in question, too, is one which exhibits strong and interesting analogies to particular eras in the history of many other nations; and, besides this, it is an age as to which we have, through the Homeric poems, a very vivid picture of the habits and feelings of those who acted in it; so that the enquiry has a historical and moral, as well as a philological interest.

But unfortunately I must begin by owning that my researches on the subject have not satisfied me. On the one hand, I have been unable to verify some notions which have been adopted by scholars of eminence; and, on the other, I have succeeded in completely overturning four or five hypotheses of my own. That which I shall hereafter submit to the reader is a very vague one, and I have but little confidence in it. If, however, we cannot get at the truth, we may at least get rid of some errors.

I need scarcely remark that, as we are enquiring into the *Homeric* use of the word, we have nothing to do with the acceptation of it which prevailed in a later time, and



which is mythological. Such is the account which Hesiod gives of the fourth race of mankind, himself living, as he says, with the fifth race.

Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ γαῖα κάλυψε,  
αὐθις ἔτ' ἄλλο τέταρτον ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ  
Ζεὺς Κρονίδης ποίησε δικαιοτέρον καὶ ἄρειον,  
ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῖον γένος, οἳ καλέονται  
ἡμίθεοι προτέρῃ γενεῇ κατ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν.  
καὶ τοὺς μὲν πόλεμός τε κακὸς καὶ φύλοπις αἰνῇ,  
τοὺς μὲν ἐφ' ἐπταπύλῳ Θήβῃ, Καδμήϊδι γαίῃ,  
ᾧλεσε μαρναμένους μῆλων ἕνεκ' Οἰδιπόδαο·  
τοὺς δὲ καὶ ἐν νηέσσιν ὑπὲρ μέγα λαῖτμα θαλάσσης  
ἐς Τροίην ἀγαγὼν Ἑλένης ἕνεκ' ἠυκόμοιο.  
ἐνθ' ἦτοι τοὺς μὲν θανάτου τέλος ἀμφεκάλυψε·  
τοῖς δὲ δίχ' ἀνθρώπων βίον καὶ ἦθε' ὀπάσσας  
Ζεὺς Κρονίδης κατένασσε πατὴρ ἐς πείρατα γαίης.  
καὶ τοῖ μὲν ναίουσιν ἀκηδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντες  
ἐν μακάρων νήσοισι, παρ' Ὠκεανὸν βαθυδίνην,  
ὄλβιοι ἥρωες· τοῖσιν μελιηδέα καρπὸν  
τρὶς ἔτεος θάλλοντα φέρει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα.

"E. καὶ 'H. 155—171.

I have given this whole passage, in order to comprehend the last lines, which exhibit so very striking a contrast to the Hades in which the Homeric heroes are placed<sup>1</sup>, and which Lucian considers so base a condition of existence<sup>2</sup>. Menelaus, it is true, had a peculiar fate<sup>3</sup>; but it seems that he was not to die at all. These notions of the dignity of a preceding race belong to an early state of society; and, as civilization advances, more time is continually required to throw the preceding age sufficiently far backward. As men grow more sharp-sighted, the distance must be increased in order to produce the mystic effect. When the worship of heroes became a recognized practice, the greater part of them were as early at least as the Trojan times. I put out of the question any instance where the making a hero of a *contemporary* was a mere piece of flattery: any hero so created has of course no mythological rank, properly speaking. Thus the two annual sacri-

<sup>1</sup> Od. xi. especially v. 487, foll.

<sup>2</sup> Dial. Mort. Achill. et Antil.

<sup>3</sup> Od. iv. 561.



fices offered by the Sicyonians at the tomb of Aratus, as mentioned by Plutarch in his life of Aratus, the sacrifices and honours paid to Brasidas by the Amphipolitans (Thucyd. v. 11.) *ὡς ἥρῳι*, the honours shewn at Calauria to the tomb of Demosthenes (if that be the meaning of the passage in Pausanias, II. c. 34.) cannot be considered as implying any belief in the mythological character of the object of the ceremony. The latest mythological heroes perhaps were those who fell at Marathon. <sup>4</sup>Pausanias says, *Σέβονται δὲ οἱ Μαραθῶνιοι τούτους τε, οἱ παρὰ τὴν μάχην ἀπέθανον, ἥρῳας ὀνομάζοντες, καὶ Μαραθῶνα, ἀφ' οὗ τῷ δήμῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἐστὶ, καὶ Ἡρακλέα.* From the company in which we find these heroes, and the legends peculiar to the place, it is clear that they had acquired a mythological rank. Sounds of tumult and battle were nightly heard there by any who had not come for the purpose of listening; and there was a hero Echetlæus (or, as the name is elsewhere written, Echetlus<sup>5</sup>), a mysterious champion at the battle of Marathon, like the Dioscuri at the battle of the lake Regillus<sup>6</sup>, or St Iago at that between the Spaniards and Moors; he also was worshipped at Marathon. In the seventy-first Olympiad we have a hero formally created after this wise<sup>7</sup>. One Cleomedes of Astypalæa killed a man at the Olympic games, boxing with him. The Hellanodicæ refused him the prize, whereupon he went mad, and, going back to Astypalæa, pulled down a school-house upon the heads of about sixty children. At this the people of Astypalæa were going to stone him; but he fled into the temple of Athene, got into a chest there, and shut down the lid. The people tried to open it for a long while, and at last forced it, but there was no Cleomedes. They sent to Delphi, to have this explained, and received this response,

*Ὑστατος ἥρώων Κλεομήδης Ἀστυपालαιεὺς,  
ὃν θυσίαις τιμᾶθ' ὡς μηκέτι θνητὸν εἶοντα.*

This creation, or canonization, of a hero shews that the mythological rank had by that time (if the story be really

<sup>4</sup> Attic. I. 32. § 4.

<sup>5</sup> Pausan. Attic. I. 15. § 4.

<sup>6</sup> Cic. Nat. Deor. III. 5. 11. 12. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. VI. 13.

<sup>7</sup> Pausan. VI. 9. § 3.



as old as Pausanias makes it) become defined and technical, like the degree of a Doctor, conferred by royal mandate. The age before the heroes, in Hesiod, is the age of the giants; afterwards, the heroes themselves had the attribute of great size. Thus Pausanias<sup>8</sup> says of Pulydamas, μέγιστος πάντων ἐγένετο ἀνθρώπων, πλὴν τῶν ἡρώων καλουμένων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τι ἄλλο ἦν πρὸ τῶν ἡρώων θνητὸν γένος.

I can find no traces whatever of this use of the word in the Homeric Poems. They were composed (I do not speak of the hymns) at a time when the heroes were living and acting beings, or so very soon after, that no mystical associations had become connected with the name. There is no passage in them from which a mythological or traditional dignity must *necessarily* be inferred: the only ones to which we can apply such notions are the following. Posidaon, on beholding the bulwarks of the besiegers, complains:

τοῦ δ' ἦτοι κλεὸς ἔσται ὅσον τ' ἐπικίδναται ἡώς.  
τοῦ δ' ἐπιλήσονται, ὃ τ' ἐγὼ καὶ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων  
ἥρω Λαομέδοντι πολίσσαμεν ἀθλήσαντε. II. VII. 451—3.

This passage certainly proves nothing; all that can be said is, that if we knew, from other sources, that Laomedon was a mythological hero, we should recognise the connection between him and the building of the walls by the gods, as a natural and consistent tradition. But the passage is generally considered to belong to a later time than the body of the Iliad; and so is the corresponding one at the beginning of the 12th book, in which the poet, after saying that the works of the besiegers would not long resist the Trojans, tells us that they were built without due honours being paid to the gods, and that after the destruction of Troy they were swept away by natural convulsions which the gods produced, and, among these, by the overflowing of the rivers; and there he speaks thus of Simois,

καὶ Σιμόεις, ὅθι πολλὰ βοάγρια καὶ τρυφάλεια  
κάππεσον ἐν κονίησι, καὶ ἡμιθέων γένος ἀνδρῶν.

II. XII. 22—3.

This last expression is exactly in the spirit of the passage

<sup>8</sup> Pausan. vi. 5. § 1.



from Hesiod before cited, and may be added to the other arguments against the genuineness of this part of the Iliad<sup>9</sup>.

In Phœnix's speech to Achilles, this passage occurs:

οὕτω καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν ἐπευθόμεθα κλέα ἀνδρῶν  
ἡρώων. Il. ix. 524.

Here the ἥρως might, or might not, be considered as more than common men: to be the subjects of κλέα, or ballads of renown, must have been a common expectation with the warriors of Homer: Odysseus hears a κλέος about himself in Phæacia<sup>10</sup>.

There are two passages in the account given by Odysseus of his visit to Hades, which, in the same way, will *suit* the hypothesis of an old race of heroes of renown, and somewhat mythological character, but which do not necessarily *require* it. The first is this:

Πάσας δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι, οὐδ' ὀνομήνω,  
ὅσας ἡρώων ἀλόχους ἴδον ἠδὲ θυγάτρας. Od. xi. 328.

The second occurs at the end of the scene.

Αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν αὐτοῦ μένον ἔμπεδον, εἴ τις ἔτ' ἔλθοι  
ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων, οἳ δὴ τὸ πρόσθεν ὄλοντο.  
καὶ νύ κ' ἔτι προτέρους ἴδον ἀνέρας, οὓς ἔθελόν περ  
[Θησεά Πειρίθοόν τε, θεῶν ἐρικυδέα τέκνα.]  
ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἐπὶ ἔθνε' ἀγείρετο μυρία νεκρῶν,  
ἡχῇ θεσπεσιή. Od. xi. 628—633.

This is perhaps the strongest passage: the line about Theseus and Pirithous is indeed *suspectæ fidei*; but the opposition of the heroes to the vulgar ghosts, ἔθνεα μυρία νεκρῶν, is remarkable. Lastly, the speech of Antinous to Odysseus, in the Odyssey, when he tells the story of the Lapithæ, contains the word<sup>11</sup> ἥρως applied to the Lapithæ, who, it might be contended, had a mythological character.

<sup>9</sup> Perhaps I ought to allude to the passages where the great feats of strength of some distinguished warriors are spoken of as being such as to require two of the poet's time. Such are Il. v. 303. xii. 383. 449. But these seem to me to prove very little, and I much doubt whether we are to infer from them that ordinary men of the Trojan era were meant to be represented as superior to ordinary men of the poet's time. The men of the present time are mentioned merely as furnishing the most intelligible and familiar units for the calculation.

<sup>10</sup> Od. viii. 73. For a comment on the expression κλέα ἀνδρῶν the reader need only be referred to Mr Frere's very interesting article in the Museum Criticum, Vol. II. p. 243.

<sup>11</sup> Od. xxi. 299.



These are the only passages I can discover, to which the mythological notion seems applicable; and I think it may be safely asserted that, if we had the word no where else, these would not have been sufficient to establish, or even suggest, such an interpretation. We shall soon find that we *must* give the title a much humbler meaning. Before going further, I will refer to the interpretations offered by Damm<sup>12</sup>. He says it is *honoris vocabulum*, and that heroes were to men much as θεοὶ to δαίμονες. This analogy of ratios comes, in fact, from Eustathius, whose words I transcribe. <sup>13</sup>ἥρως ἡ παλαιὰ σοφία γένος τι θεῖον εἶναι δοξάζει, μέσον θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων. Καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον φύλον εἰς θεοὺς διαιρεῖ καὶ δαίμονας. . . . τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους εἰς τε ἥρως καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀνθρώπους. Καὶ ὑποβεβηκέναι μὲν φησι θεοῖς δαίμονας, ἀνθρώπους δὲ ἥρωσιν, οὓς καὶ ἐκ θείου καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου σώματος φύναι λέγουσι. Διὸ καὶ Ἡσιόδος ἡμιθέους αὐτοὺς λέγει. This, as I observed before, belongs to an age later than that of the Homeric poems. The heroes, says Damm, were usually of divine blood, but the principal warriors got the name also. "In Homero autem omnes fortes bellatores et viri, si sunt illustres natalibus, dicuntur heroes." He makes ἀρά, prayer or imprecation, the theme, and places ἥρως between the words ἀρετὴ, ἄριστος, and so on, and ἐσχάρα. He also suggests that it may be derived from one of the following words; ἔρα, the earth; ἔρως; ἀήρ; ἱερός. Some of these he seems to me to have taken from the scholiasts on the passage of Hesiod. Proclus says <sup>14</sup>Ὡσπερ τὰ ἄλλα γένη ἀπὸ τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ ὑλῆς ἐκάλεσεν, χρυσοῦν καὶ ἀργυροῦν, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτο ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, ὃν ἡρώϊκον. Ἐρα γὰρ ἡ γῆ, καὶ ἡρία τὰ χώματα· προείρηκε δὲ ὅτι ὁ Ζεὺς ἐκέλευσεν Ἡφαιστον,

περίκλυτον ὅττι τάχιστα  
γαῖαν ὕδει φύρειν.

referring to the 60th line of the Ἔργα καὶ ἡμέραι. Tzetzes says as follows: <sup>15</sup>ἥρως λέγονται ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔρας, ἡγουν τῆς γῆς, κατὰ διάλεκτον· ἐξ ἧς πᾶς ἀνθρώπος ἥρως ἂν λεχθείη.

<sup>12</sup> v. ἥρως.

<sup>13</sup> Ad Il. A. p. 17—13, 36.

<sup>14</sup> Schol. Hes. "E. καὶ 'H. 156.

<sup>15</sup> Schol. in Hes. "E. καὶ 'H. 158.



ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος· αἱ ψυχαὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνθρώπων διαζυγεῖσαι σωμάτων καθ' Ἑλληνας, τὸν ἀέρα περιπολοῦσαι, ἐφορῶσι τὰ τῆδε. ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀρετῆς, ὡς φησιν Ὀρφεύς· (Λιθ. 63.)

Μητέρα δ' ἡρώων Ἀρετὴν ἀπάτερθε κλύοντες.

ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐράσεως καὶ μίξεως τῶν θεῶν· ληροῦσι γὰρ ὅτι οἱ θεοὶ θνηταῖς γυναιξὶ μιγνύμενοι, καὶ ἀνδράσι θεαὶ, ἐποιοῦν τὸ τῶν ἡρώων γένος. Damm also suggests that the Latin *herus*, and the German *herr*, come from the same root: I am told that the real root exists in the Sanscrit *sūras*.

Whatever the etymology of the word may be, I think I shall shew that even the most extensive interpretation here given to it is too confined.

Wachsmuth says that the hero is every one who in any way stands out from the mass, as, for instance, even a herald<sup>16</sup>. Even this depends upon what the mass is. Is it the mass of the army before Troy? or the mass of mankind? in the latter case, every one mentioned might be a hero; for he probably would be mentioned for something remarkable in him, something worth mentioning.

The persons who are called heroes in Homer comprehend the following mixture. Laomedon<sup>17</sup>, Alcatous the son in law of Anchises<sup>18</sup>, Eurypylus the leader of the Cetians<sup>19</sup>, Adrestus<sup>20</sup> the commander of the Trojan auxiliaries from Adrestia, Agastrophus<sup>21</sup> the son of Pæon, Menætius<sup>22</sup> the father of Patroclus, Peneleos<sup>23</sup> the leader of the Bœoti, Cebriones<sup>24</sup> the charioteer of Hector, Deiphobus<sup>25</sup>, Laertes<sup>26</sup>, Machaon<sup>27</sup>, Helenus<sup>28</sup>, Demodocus<sup>29</sup> the bard at the court of Ithaca, Meriones<sup>30</sup>, Agamemnon<sup>31</sup>, Protesilaus<sup>32</sup>, Pirous<sup>33</sup> the leader of the Thracians, Menelaus<sup>34</sup>, Æneas<sup>35</sup>, Sthenelus<sup>36</sup>, Leitus<sup>37</sup> one of the leaders of the Bœotians, Diomedes<sup>38</sup>, Odysseus<sup>39</sup>, Eurypylus<sup>40</sup> the commander of the troops from

<sup>16</sup> Hellen. Alt. I. Th. I. Abth. § 16.

<sup>17</sup> Il. VIII. 453.

<sup>20</sup> Il. VI. 63.

<sup>23</sup> Il. XIII. 92.

<sup>26</sup> Od. I. 188.

<sup>29</sup> Od. VIII. 483.

<sup>32</sup> Il. II. 708.

<sup>35</sup> Il. V. 308.

<sup>38</sup> Il. X. 154.

<sup>18</sup> Il. XIII. 428.

<sup>21</sup> Il. XI. 339.

<sup>24</sup> Il. XVI. 781.

<sup>27</sup> Il. IV. 200.

<sup>30</sup> Il. XXIII. 893.

<sup>33</sup> Il. II. 844.

<sup>36</sup> Il. V. 327.

<sup>39</sup> Il. XI. 463.

<sup>19</sup> Od. XI. 520.

<sup>22</sup> Il. XI. 770.

<sup>25</sup> Il. XXII. 298.

<sup>28</sup> Il. XIII. 582.

<sup>31</sup> Il. I. 102.

<sup>34</sup> Il. III. 377.

<sup>37</sup> Il. VI. 35.

<sup>40</sup> Il. XI. 819. II. 736.



Ormenius, Asius<sup>41</sup> who leads one of the five parties against the walls of the Greeks, Idomeneus<sup>42</sup>, Achilles<sup>43</sup>, Automedon<sup>44</sup> his charioteer, Pisistratus<sup>45</sup> son of Nestor, Telemachus<sup>46</sup>, Alcinous<sup>47</sup> king of the Phæacians, Echeneus<sup>48</sup> a Phæacian γέρων, Phidon<sup>49</sup> the king of the Thesprotians, Mulius<sup>50</sup> the herald from Dulichium and attendant of Amphinomus, Alitherses<sup>51</sup> and Ægyptius<sup>52</sup> speakers in the agora of the Ithacans, Phædimus<sup>53</sup> king of the Sidonians. These are nearly all who are mentioned *by name*. It is true that all these are persons of considerable distinction; but those who were mentioned *by name* could not but be of some distinction. I think we shall soon see that the distinction, if any, which entitled a man to the appellation, must have been a very slight one.

But I will, in the first place, admit that there are some instances in which it might be contended that the word is used as an intentional appellation of honour.

Nestor exhorts the warriors

ᾠ φίλοι, ἥρωες Δαναοὶ, θεράποντες Ἄρης. Il. vi. 67.

Ajax in another place uses the same words<sup>54</sup>. Zeus is said to make Agamemnon

ἐκπρεπέ' ἐν πολλοῖσι καὶ ἔξοχον ἡρώεσσιν, Il. ii. 483.

There are other instances in which the excelling above *heroes* might be said to be put as a sort of *a fortiori* case<sup>55</sup>. Dolon calls Odysseus hero<sup>56</sup>, not knowing him; it may be said that this was in deprecation. When Apollo is inciting Æneas to fight Achilles, he says

ἥρως, ἀλλ' ἄγε, καὶ σὺ θεοῖς αἰειγενέτησιν  
εὐχεο· καὶ δὲ σέ φασι Διὸς κούρης Ἀφροδίτης  
ἐκγεγάμεν, κείνος δὲ χερείονος ἐκ θεοῦ ἐστίν. Od. xiv. 97<sup>57</sup>.

But, to pursue the same kind of argument as before, all these passages are also consistent with the interpretation of the word

<sup>41</sup> Il. xii. 95.

<sup>42</sup> Il. xiii. 384.

<sup>43</sup> Il. xxiii. 824.

<sup>44</sup> Il. xxiv. 474.

<sup>45</sup> Od. iv. 415.

<sup>46</sup> Od. xiv. 312.

<sup>47</sup> Od. vi. 303.

<sup>48</sup> Od. xi. 342.

<sup>49</sup> Od. xiv. 317.

<sup>50</sup> Od. xviii. 423.

<sup>51</sup> Od. ii. 157.

<sup>52</sup> Od. ii. 15.

<sup>53</sup> Od. iv. 617.

<sup>54</sup> Il. xv. 733.

<sup>55</sup> Il. ii. 579. Il. xxiii. 645. Il. xviii. 56. 437. Od. iv. 268.

<sup>56</sup> Il. x. 416.

<sup>57</sup> To these might be added the 25th and 88th lines of the 24th book of the Odyssey; but there appears to me no doubt that the first 204 lines of that book are spurious.



in a humbler and commoner sense; so that from these alone we should not have derived the notion that it was an epithet of distinction. In the passages which I shall now cite, the application seems much more indiscriminate. One or two of them, taken alone, might be strained to a more confined sense; but I think, when viewed together, they make strongly against the notion that the term implied much distinction, at any rate in the Iliad. Asius, the Trojan ally, says

—— οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγ' ἐφάμην ἥρωας Ἀχαιοὺς  
σχήσειν ἡμέτερόν γε μένος καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους—

Il. XII. 165.

where he seems to speak of the Greeks simply. So Menelaus says to the Trojans,

νῦν αὖτ' ἐν νηυσὶν μενεαίνετε ποντοπόροισιν  
πῦρ ὅλοον βαλέειν, κτεῖναι δ' ἥρωας Ἀχαιούς. Il. XIII. 628.

So Zeus says to Apollo,

ἀλλὰ σύ γ' ἐν χείρεσσι λάβ' αἰγίδα θυσσανόεσσαν,  
τὴν μάλ' ἐπισσεῖων, φοβέειν ἥρωας Ἀχαιούς.

Il. xv. 229.

Accordingly Apollo tells Hector,

—— τρέψω δ' ἥρωας Ἀχαιούς. Il. xv. 261.

Again,

Τρῳσὶν δ' ἔλπετο θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἐκάστου  
νῆας ἐνιπρήσειν, κτενέειν θ' ἥρωας Ἀχαιούς. Il. xv. 701.

When Zeus is exerting himself in behalf of the Trojans, and Posidaon in behalf of the Greeks, the expression is,

τῷ δ' ἀμφὶς φρονέοντε δὺν Κρόνον υἱὲ κραταιῷ  
ἀνδράσιν ἡρώεσσι τετεύχετον ἄλγεα λυγρά.

Il. XIII. 345.

In all these passages the word might be taken for the warriors generally: we can scarcely believe it to be confined to the chiefs, or the owners of chariots, an opinion I at one time entertained: at any rate they *suggest* no such notion. But there are three passages in the Iliad, in which the heroes are spoken of as forming the *στίχες*, the ranks. When Apollo carries off Æneas from Achilles,

πολλὰς δὲ στίχας ἡρώων, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ἵππων  
Ἀινείας ὑπερᾶλτο, θεοῦ ἀπὸ χειρὸς ὀρούσας. Il. xx. 326.



Athene's spear too is said to be that

—— τῷ δάμνησι στίχας ἀνδρῶν

ἥρώων. Il. v. 746. VIII. 390.

which words are also found in the Odyssey, i. 100. Here it cannot be argued either that στίχες ἥρώων means a select body, or signifies ranks *in* or *over* which were chiefs called ἥρωες. Let us see the other uses of the same word, especially with a genitive.

The lion, pressed by the ἄνδρες θηρευταί, is described as <sup>58</sup> στίχας ἀνδρῶν πειρητίζων. Compare this with the description of Hector, in another passage.

καὶ ῥ' ἔθελεν ῥῆξαι στίχας ἀνδρῶν, πειρητίζων,

ἧ δὴ πλεῖστον ὄμιλον ὄρα καὶ τεύχε' ἄριστα·

ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὥς δύνατο ῥῆξαι, μάλα περ μενεαίνων.

ἴσχον γὰρ πυργηδὸν ἀρηρότες . . .

ὥς Δαναοὶ Τρῶας μένον ἔμπεδον οὐδ' ἐφέβοντο.

Il. xv. 615.

Observe also the following line:

ῥηξάμενος Δαναῶν πυκινὰς στίχας ἀσπιστάων.

Il. XIII. 680.

The main bulk of the host standing about Machaon is thus described:

—— ἀμφὶ δὲ μὴν κρατερὰι στίχες ἀσπιστάων

λαῶν, οἳ οἱ ἔποντο Τρίχης ἐξ ἵπποβότοιο, Il. iv. 201:

and there is a similar passage with regard to Pandarus<sup>59</sup>. Soon after,

<sup>60</sup> τόφρα δ' ἐπὶ Τρώων στίχες ἦλυθον ἀσπιστάων,

which occurs in another place<sup>61</sup>. The whole bulk of the two hosts, in a very picturesque passage, where they are halted to listen to Hector's challenge, is called στίχες πυκναί<sup>62</sup>, and again <sup>63</sup> στίχες Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρώων τε. This is quite enough to establish, what perhaps I might have assumed without proof, that ἥρων στίχες are not a select body, and that the ἥρωες make up the στίχες, such being the force of the genitive in every instance adduced. I do not see therefore how we can stop short of inferring that the ἥρωες throughout the Iliad, are neither more nor less than the ἄνδρες ἀσπισταί, the great body and bulk of the host.

<sup>58</sup> Il. XII. 47.

<sup>59</sup> Il. IV. 91.

<sup>60</sup> Il. IV. 221.

<sup>61</sup> Il. XI. 412.

<sup>62</sup> Il. VII. 60.

<sup>63</sup> Il. VII. 65.



In the great assembly convoked in the nineteenth book of the *Iliad*, those who are summoned are the ἥρωες.

εἰς ἀγορὴν καλέσας ἥρωας Ἀχαιοὺς, v. 34 ;

and again,

ὥσεν δ' ἥρωας Ἀχαιοὺς. v. 41.

Now the whole host seem to have come together—

πάντες ἀολλίσθησαν Ἀχαιοί, v. 54—

even those who belonged merely to the naval force, and to the administration of the stores<sup>64</sup>. Agamemnon addresses this assembly as ἥρωες Δαναοί<sup>65</sup>.

There is no reason therefore to believe that those who attended the ἀγορὴ were in any way a select party, or caste, in the *Iliad*, though they seem to be identical with the ἥρωες. The whole λαὸς<sup>66</sup> is convoked in the first book. Assuming this, we shall find that the ἥρωες comprehended ranks of which the distinctions were to a certain degree recognized. Before the ἀγορὴ in the second book there is a select council—

βουλὴ δὲ πρῶτον μεγαθύμων ἰζε γερόντων. v. 53.

The breaking up of this meeting, and the summoning of the general assembly, are thus described :

ὥς ἄρα φωνήσας βουλῆς ἐξ ἡρχε νέεσθαι.

οἱ δ' ἐπανεστήσαν, πείθοντό τε ποιμένι λαῶν,

σκηπτοῦχοι βασιλῆες ἐπεσσεύοντο δὲ λαοί. v. 84.

These λαοί are afterwards called by Agamemnon, as in the other instance, <sup>67</sup> ἥρωες Δαναοί. This assembly also is a mixed one: the heralds marshal them, and they come together, not to discuss, but to listen to their betters.

—— ἐννέα δέ σφεας

κήρυκες βοόωντες ἐρήτυον, εἶποτ' αὐτῆς

σχοίατ', ἀκούσειαν δὲ Διοτρεφέων βασιλῆων. v. 98.

And we have a distinction drawn between the <sup>68</sup> βασιλῆα καὶ ἔξοχον ἄνδρα and the <sup>69</sup> δήμου ἄνδρα.

It may perhaps strike some one, that this is the common βούλη and ἐκκλησία of later Greece; and no doubt it represents the state of things in which such assemblies sometimes originate: however they are not here two deliberative bodies,

<sup>64</sup> See vv. 42—45.

<sup>65</sup> Il. XIX 78.

<sup>66</sup> Il. I. 54.

<sup>67</sup> Il. II. 110.

<sup>68</sup> Il. II. 138.

<sup>69</sup> Il. II. 198.



but first a special meeting of chiefs aiding the general with their counsel, and then a full meeting of the whole host, to hear the result and receive communications.

The ἀγορὴ in the first book has more the appearance of a deliberative assembly: we may perceive however that they are summoned to try if there is any one in the whole army who has had *intelligence* either by revelation or dream<sup>70</sup>.

In the Odyssey too, those who are called to the ἀγορὴ in Ithaca, are termed ἥρωες<sup>71</sup>.<sup>72</sup> Alitherses and<sup>73</sup> Ægyptius, who speak there, are called heroes. But in the Odyssey I think I discover a rather more aristocratical character in the ἀγορή. It is evidently deliberative; yet its principal business seems to be to *receive intelligence*. Thus Ægyptius, after saying that there has been no ἀγορὴ since the departure of Odysseus, goes on:

νῦν δὲ τίς ὧδ' ἥγειρε; τίνα χρεὶώ τόσον ἵκει  
ἢ νέων ἀνδρῶν, ἢ οἱ προγενέστεροί εἰσιν;  
ἢ τίς ἀγγελίην στρατοῦ ἐκλυνεν ἐρχομένοις,  
ἢ χ' ἡμῖν σάφα εἶποι, ὅτε πρότερός γε πύθοιτο;  
ἢ τίς δῆμιον ἀλλοῖον πιφάνσκειται ἢ δ' ἀγορεύει; II. 28.

Telemachus says that they are of the same rank, or at any rate comprehend some of the same rank, as the suitors; for he calls the suitors

τῶν ἀνδρῶν φίλοι νῆες, οἱ ἐνθάδε γ' εἰσὶν ἄριστοι. II. 51.

The suitors are opposed by Mentor, in the assembly, ἄλλω δήμῳ<sup>74</sup>, still a part of the assembly. Telemachus asks this assembly to supply him with a ship and crew<sup>75</sup>.

In the Phæacian city, Odysseus admires

αὐτῶν ἡρώων ἀγορὰς καὶ τείχεα μακρὰ, Od. VII. 44,  
as if the assembly and the bulwarks belonged to the heroes peculiarly.

Echeneus, a Phæacian γέρων, who feasts with king Alcinous, is called hero<sup>76</sup>.

If it be true, that the ἥρωες and the assemblies in Ithaca are more select than those in the Iliad, there would in reality

<sup>70</sup> Il. I. 62.

<sup>71</sup> Od. I. 272.

<sup>72</sup> Od. II. 157. See also Od. XXIV. 451.

<sup>73</sup> Od. II. 15.

<sup>74</sup> Od. II. 239.

<sup>75</sup> Od. II. 212.

<sup>76</sup> Od. VII. 155. Od. XI. 342.



be no inconsistency. If there was a predominant tribe, or caste, their predominance would appear at home, amid the mixed population. But when the armed force, consisting principally or entirely of the predominant race, was abroad and on service, the distinction would of course disappear, because there would no longer be a mixture. The principal difficulty which meets one, in attempting to establish the distinction, is that there are few or no traces of the subordinate caste. Wachsmuth has attempted<sup>77</sup> to point out some distinctions of rank, and successfully; but he makes out, I think, nothing below the δῆμος, excepting of course servants or slaves. Now the δῆμος, as I think I have shewn, comprehended the ἥρως, and constituted the ἀγορή; and indeed I do not feel satisfied that δῆμος in Homer signifies *plebs*: it seems rather to mean *populus*, in the old Roman sense, which Vico<sup>78</sup>, I believe, first pointed out; a view which Niebuhr<sup>79</sup> has completely confirmed.

There are numerous passages in which the word ἥρως is applied, without meaning, so far as I can discover, any thing more than a common title, like gentleman in our language; or at least in which nothing can be supposed to be designated *emphatically* by it. Such is the passage where Menelaus repulses Adrestus, who is begging for his life.

—— ὁ δ' ἀπὸ ἔθεν ὤσατο χεiri

ἥρω' Ἀδρηστον. Il. vi. 63.

Such is that where Alcinous desires Telemachus to attend to his words,

—— ὄφρα καὶ ἄλλω

εἶπης ἡρώων, ὅτε κεν σοῖς ἐν μεγάροισιν  
δαινύη παρὰ σῇ τ' ἀλόχῳ, καὶ σοῖσι τέκεσσιν.

Od. viii. 241.

where ἥρως are simply those on visiting terms with Telemachus. It is assumed that those to whom he would tell it would be ἥρως, but the word is not used for the purpose of pointing this out. I could cite a great many

<sup>77</sup> Hellen. Alt. i. Th. i. Abth. § 16. Beil. 8. to i. Th. i. Abth.

<sup>78</sup> See Principi di Scienza Nuova. Ed. Milan. 1801. Vol. i. p. 77. Vol. ii. p. 97, 197, 224. Compare also Vol. ii. p. 123, 163, 174.

<sup>79</sup> Roman History i, pp. 417—420.



more instances of this kind<sup>80</sup>; but I will merely mention a passage or two where the phrase αὐτὰρ ὃγ ἥρως occurs, meaning merely *he*.

Diomedes hits Æneas with a stone,

—— αὐτὰρ ὃγ ἥρως

ἔστη γυνὴ ἐριπών. Il. v. 308.

Sthenelus, having driven off the horses of Æneas, returns to Diomedes :

—— αὐτὰρ ὃγ ἥρως (i. e. Sthenelus)

ὦν ἵππων ἐπιβάς κ. τ. λ. Il. v. 327.

In the Dolonia, the party go to the tent of Diomedes :

—— αὐτὰρ ὃγ ἥρως

εὖδ'. Il. x. 154.

The Trojans attack Odysseus :

—— αὐτὰρ ὃγ ἥρως

αἴσσω ὦ ἔγχει ἀμύνετο νηλεὲς ἦμαρ. Il. xi. 483.

Deiphobus receives in his shield the spear of Meriones, which is broken,

—— αὐτὰρ ὃγ ἥρως

αψ ἐτάρων εἰς ἔθνος ἐχάζετο. Il. xiii. 164.

Agamemnon gives Meriones a spear,

—— αὐτὰρ ὃγ ἥρως

Ταλθυβίῳ κήρυκι δίδου περικαλλὲς ἄεθλον. Il. xxiii. 896.

I think this phrase does not occur in the *Odyssey*. But it seems impossible that the word so used should mean more than *he*, that *person*, that *soldier*.

The next enquiry which suggests itself, is whether the title is confined to a particular tribe or nation of Greeks. It certainly is not so confined. I have already cited several cases in which the phrase ἥρως Ἀχαιοὶ occurs<sup>81</sup>. We find the same term applied to the Δαναοί. In one passage they are put in apposition with the Ἀργεῖοι<sup>82</sup>.

Νέστωρ δ' Ἀργείοισιν ἐκέκλετο μακρὸν αὔσας·

ᾧ φίλοι, ἥρως Δαναοί, θεράποντες Ἄρης.

Il. xix. 78. Il. 256. xv. 733. Il. 110.

<sup>80</sup> Il. xi. 339. Il. iv. 200, where Machaon is called hero; he was called φῶτα at line 174. Il. iii. 377. Il. vi. 35. Il. vi. 61. Il. xiii. 384. Il. xiii. 575. Il. xiii. 788. Od. iv. 21. Od. iv. 303. Od. vii. 303. Od. x. 516.

<sup>81</sup> Il. xii. 65. Il. xiii. 629. Il. xv. 230, 261, 702. Il. xix. 34, 41. Od. i. 272. Il. xv. 219. Od. xxiv. 68, probably spurious.

<sup>82</sup> Il. vi. 66.



I mention this indiscriminateness in the application, because, although in the two poems the general host of the Greeks is called indifferently by the words Ἀχαιοὶ, Ἀργεῖοι, Δαναοὶ, yet the last two names are never applied to the people of Ithaca, or the predominant caste there, if such there be, while Ἀχαιοὶ is very often so applied. It is, I think, highly probable that the Ἀχαιοὶ were a predominant race in Ithaca in the Homeric times.

But in fact, as we have already seen in many instances, the title ἥρως is not confined to the allied Greeks. We have seen it applied to the Phæacians, a people who stand in a strange and scarcely intelligible relation to the Greeks of the Homeric times. Their royal family<sup>83</sup> is the third generation from the Gigantes; and Alcinous says that the gods shewed themselves to them, not disguised in human form, but in their own proper shapes,

—— ἐπεὶ σφισιν ἐγγύθεν εἰμὲν,  
ὥσπερ Κύκλωπές τε καὶ ἄγρια φῦλα Γιγάντων.

Od. vii. 205.

Their ships carried Rhadamanthus on his visitation to Tityus, Γαιήϊον υἱὸν<sup>84</sup>; these ships are instinct with motion and knowledge<sup>85</sup>; and the country and city seem a sort of fairy land.

Adrestus, the commander of the Trojan allies from<sup>86</sup> Adrestia, Apæsus, Pityia, and mount Teria, is called a hero<sup>87</sup>; and the same word is applied to a<sup>88</sup> Cetian (probably a Mysian, see schol. on Od. xi. 520, and Strabo, xiii. 615, 6.), to Trojans in many instances, to a Thracian, to a Thesprotian, and to a Sidonian. I before mentioned that the Lapithæ are called heroes<sup>89</sup>. One cannot therefore be surprised that Greeks who were not on the Trojan expedition, such as Telemachus<sup>90</sup> and Pisistratus<sup>91</sup>, should be called so.

Before I mention the hypothesis which I propose to suggest, I will recapitulate the *conditions* which it ought to satisfy, as well as I can collect them from the instances of the use of the word already brought forward. I will first observe that, in weighing any conjecture as to the origin of

<sup>83</sup> Od. vii. 56. sqq.

<sup>86</sup> Il. ii. 828.

<sup>88</sup> See above pp. 78, 79.

<sup>91</sup> Od. iii. 415.

<sup>84</sup> Od. vii. 324.

<sup>87</sup> Il. vi. 63.

<sup>89</sup> Od. xxi. 299.

<sup>85</sup> Od. viii. 559.

<sup>90</sup> Od. iv. 21.



the word, we are to recollect that it is a *substantive*; and therefore we cannot treat it like such words as *μεγάθυμοι* or even *ἵπποκορυστῆς*, of which it may be said that, from being distinguishing epithets at first, they came into common use, to amplify the diction and give it a dignified tone. We never could have had *αὐτὰρ ὄγε μέγαθυμος*, or *αὐτὰρ ὄγ' ἵπποκορυστῆς*, as we have *αὐτὰρ ὄγ' ἥρως*.

1. The title ought to be common to the whole *λαὸς* at Troy, all the *ἄνδρες ἀσπισταί*, whether *Δαναοὶ* or *Ἀχαιοὶ*; I think we may also add *Ἀργεῖοι*, on the strength of the passage cited in note 82.

2. It ought to be applicable to other fighters, or, in some character or other, to the Lapithæ, and to the Trojans generally.

3. It ought to be applicable to men of consequence, who were not Greeks or Trojans, as kings, princes, people of the ruling rank, where such a rank can be found. It ought to include, if not all the people of Ithaca, the *Ἀχαιοὶ* or ruling rank there. *Rank* is a safer word than *caste*.

4. I think we may add that, however wide its application, the word is never applied when the general effect of the sentiment is *contempt*.

5. The hypothesis must be compatible with the circumstance that the word afterwards disappeared from common use, and became mythological.

Had I succeeded in extracting a satisfactory explanation of the word from the Homeric poems, I might, as I suggested at the beginning, have applied it to our speculations on the state of society, and the relations, of the different Greek tribes in the Homeric age. Having failed to do this, I can only have recourse to the inverse method. I have already illustrated it, as far as I can, from the manners and habits of the Homeric time. Let us now take a very short view of the state in which the Greeks then stood, as to their constituent national families.

We know of nothing earlier in Greece than the prevalence of the Pelasgians, unless indeed we are to except the *Προσέληνοι* of Aristotle, mentioned by the scholiast upon Aristophanes<sup>92</sup>. Among the Homeric Greeks, I assume the name

<sup>92</sup> Nub. 397. (Kuster.)



'Αργεῖοι to be due to the old Pelasgian race; for "Αργος<sup>93</sup> in Argolis had a citadel Larissa, which is known to be a Pelasgian name. The Pelasgian Argos in Homer<sup>94</sup> is a part of Thessaly. "Αργος, according to Strabo, signifies a *plain* in later writers, *παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις*<sup>95</sup>; but he says that the name is Thessalian or Macedonian. It is probably Pelasgian, for it signified the plain round Larissa in Thessaly<sup>96</sup>. In Pausanias<sup>97</sup> we read of a plain called "Αργος in Arcadia, the retreat of the old Pelasgian race.

The next period is that of the colonists from beyond sea, when the Σπαρτοὶ ἄνδρες (a Lelegic tribe, I believe) founded Sparta<sup>98</sup>, settled in Bœotia<sup>99</sup>, and when other tribes of Leleges and Cares settled all along the coasts. One set of immigrants often overpowered another, of which there are plentiful traditions; as, in the case of the Leleges, we have the legend of the Σπαρτοὶ ἄνδρες springing from the earth, from the dragon's teeth<sup>100</sup>; of the Leleges springing from the earth when Deucalion threw the stones there<sup>101</sup>, and so on. Among these colonists were the Danai, from Egypt, if we follow the old tradition.

Then we have the state of things described by Thucydides<sup>102</sup>: 'Ελληνας δὲ καὶ τῶν παίδων αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ Φθιώτιδι ἰσχυσάντων, καὶ ἐπαγομένων αὐτοὺς ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ἐς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις, κ. τ. λ. Thucydides attributes to this the use of the name 'Ελληνες, which came by degrees to comprehend all the Greeks, but which required a considerable time to win its way. The name 'Αχαιοὶ had gained an earlier preeminence, and probably retained it till the return of the Heraclidæ.

<sup>93</sup> Strabo VIII. 370. IX. 440.

<sup>94</sup> Il. II. 681. Strab. IX. 431.

<sup>95</sup> VIII. 371, 2, where see Eustath. as cited by Casaubon, and see further Kruse, Hellas. Vol. I. chap. v. p. 437. not (160.)

<sup>96</sup> Strabo IX. 431.

<sup>97</sup> Arcad. VIII. 7. § 1.

<sup>98</sup> Eustath. II. B. fol. 294.

<sup>99</sup> Strabo IX. 401. Schol. Eurip. Phœniss. 674. 969. (Beck.)

<sup>100</sup> The meaning of the serpent, in this and other traditions, is whimsically commented upon by Vico, P. S. N. II. p. 128. &c. Perhaps in the story of Cadmus it means merely the old nobility overpowered by the Phœnicians. The reader will recollect the ὄφις οἰκουρὸς of the Athenian *citadel*. See Aristoph. Lysist. 759. and Herod. VIII. 41. Compare Larcher's note on Herod. I. 160. (not. 358.) Pausanias conjectured that Erichthonius might be represented by the snake sculptured in the Parthenon, which was near the spear of Athene. I. 24. 7.

<sup>101</sup> Hesiod. fragm. XI.

<sup>102</sup> I. 2.



The Ἀχαιοὶ are mentioned with the Μυρμιδόνες and Ἕλληνες<sup>103</sup> as the soldiers of Achilles, the inhabitants of the Pelasgic Argos, of Phthia, Hellas, &c. The prevalence of this name<sup>104</sup> was owing, it seems, to the good fortune or superior courage of the band of adventurers who became masters of Argos and Lacedæmon. According to the legend found in Pausanias<sup>105</sup>, Archander the son of Achæus (Herodotus<sup>106</sup> makes him the son of Phthius and grandson of Achæus), and Architeles, came to Argos from the Phthiotis, and married respectively Scæa and Automate the daughters of Danaus. Archander had a son called Metanastes. The family became so powerful, that the people of Argos and Lacedæmon received the name of Ἀχαιοὶ. Pausanias says that Δαναοὶ was then a name confined to the people of Argos. Strabo<sup>107</sup> says that Achæus himself came to Laconia; elsewhere<sup>108</sup> he says that the Achæi of the Phthiotis came with Pelops to the Peloponnesus, and held Laconia. The story is also told in Apollodorus<sup>109</sup>. These genealogies are no further important, than as shewing the early national opinions as to the relations of the different tribes. Ἀρχανδρος and Ἀρχιτέλης, of course, are words designating the leaders of bands of adventurers, such as those spoken of in the passage of Thucydides. We know that τέλεια was the technical name, in the Homeric times, for bands of soldiers<sup>110</sup>. The legend of the companions of Demaratus, Eucheir and Eugrammus<sup>111</sup>, who brought the plastic art to Italy, according to Pliny, exhibits much such another derivation of name. The word Μετανάστης also explains itself, as Pausanias perceived<sup>112</sup>. Perhaps Αὐτομάτη and Σκαιὰ

<sup>103</sup> Il. II. 684.

<sup>104</sup> Since the present Essay was written, I have endeavoured to explain the view here taken, in an article in the Quarterly Journal of Education, Vol. II. No. v. p. 87.

<sup>105</sup> VII. 1. § 3.

<sup>106</sup> II. 98.

<sup>107</sup> VIII. 383.

<sup>108</sup> VIII. 365.

<sup>109</sup> p. 27. ed. Heyn.

<sup>110</sup> Il. XI. 730. XVIII. 298. VII. 380, if the line be genuine. See Wachsmuth Hel. Alt. Beil. 14. to I. Th. I. Abth. Arnold's note on Thucyd. I. 58, and the review of it in the Quarterly Journal of Education, No. VII.

<sup>111</sup> Plin. H. N. XXXV. 43. See also Niebuhr, Roman History I. 369. (ed. 3.)

<sup>112</sup> Μετανάστης was probably a term of reproach imposed by the earlier inhabitants. Achilles says, Il. IX. 647.

Μνήσομαι, ὥς μ' ἀσύφηλον ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἔρεξεν  
Ἀτρείδης, ὥσεί τινα ἀτίμητον μετανάστην.



may have some meaning also. The story of the marriage may or may not be true; yet, no doubt, the history of the times of the Condottieri would furnish analogies. The origin of the sovereignty of the Sforzas over Milan was owing to the marriage of the great leader of the free companions, Francesco Sforza, with Bianca Visconti, as may be seen in the sixth book of Machiavelli's *Italia*. The great kingdom of Argos, over which the Achæi presided, seems to have retained its relations with the tribes of the North, and other countries without the Isthmus. Traces of this perhaps are to be found in the legends of the persecution of Hercules by Eurystheus, of the wars of Thebes, and of an Acrisius king of Argos, who arranged the constituency of the Amphityonic Council. Wachsmuth<sup>113</sup> conceives that this last mentioned tradition can be accounted for only by supposing that something which took place after the return of the Heraclidæ had become mixed up with the more ancient mythology<sup>114</sup>. But it may have been an institution controuled by the monarch of the great kingdom of Argos in the South, as the confederation of the Rhine was by Napoleon<sup>115</sup>.

This brings us to the monarchy of the Atridæ. I conjecture therefore that ἦρωες may be the name which designated the warriors of those roving bands, whose prevalence in Greece was so common, according to Thucydides, and who were the founders of the kingdom the monarch of which headed the confederation against Troy. It may originally have been confined to the chiefs; but my hypothesis is that it ultimately belonged to every member of the band. We will now recur to the five conditions proposed, and see whether this hypothesis will fall in with them.

The first condition agrees with it well enough; every body admitted into the ranks on a military expedition would acquire the title.

As for the second condition, the word, in the mouths of this race, might easily come to signify a soldier.

The third condition is rather less manageable. Yet, in the conflicts and struggles which gave extension, first to the

<sup>113</sup> Strabo IX. 420.

<sup>114</sup> Hellen. Alt. I. Th. I. Abth. § 24.

<sup>115</sup> The Ἀχαιοί, as is remarked in p. 86, were also established in Ithaca.



Achæan, and then to the Hellenic name, it is clear that the members of these bands must have learnt to consider themselves as the superior and predominant caste. And the application of their own title to any one whom they respected, would follow naturally enough. In Lydgate's story of Thebes, Amphiaraus is called the bishop Amphiorax, and the warriors are termed knights; and one can easily understand how ballads of the age of the Crusaders came to represent the Saracen warriors as knights, and how the Moors were so represented in Spanish ballads. It may be worth while to remind the reader of a passage in Ivanhoe, where a leader of a band of free companions gives an account of the marriages of the tribe of Benjamin<sup>116</sup>: "How, long since in Palestine, a deadly feud arose between the tribe of Benjamin and the rest of the Israelitish nation; and how they cut to pieces well nigh all the chivalry of that tribe; and how they swore by our blessed Lady, that they would not permit those who remained to marry in their lineage; and how they became grieved for their vow, and sent to consult his holiness the Pope how they might be absolved from it; and how, by the advice of the Holy Father, the youth of the tribe of Benjamin carried off from a superb tournament all the ladies who were present, and thus won them wives without the consent either of their brides or their brides' families." There is less difficulty in understanding the presence of the ἥρωες in the ἀγορή. The army of a predominant tribe is, in early times, the assembly: in fact the *array* is the assembly, whether at home or abroad; and when inferior castes are admitted to higher political privileges, in the early history of nations, it is almost always, by their being admitted to bear arms. The *comitia centuriata* are a very remarkable instance of this. Another illustration is furnished by the *testamentum in procinctu*, which was a will made before the *general assembly*, whether on military service or not. See Niebuhr Roman History i. 473. It seems to have been originally no more than a particular form of the *testamentum in comitiis calatis*. See Heinec. Antiq. Syntagm. ii. Tit. x. xi. xii. § 1, 2, 3, 4.



The fourth condition would be fulfilled by a natural consequence of the same feeling. The soldiers of these free bands would feel respect for the title, and would hardly employ it when they wanted to abuse one another.

As to the disappearance of the common use of the word, we must recollect that the race which supplanted the 'Aχαιοι, however nearly allied to them by blood, was altogether alien and hostile to them at the time. The manner in which the 'Aχαιοι were driven up into Ægialia, shews clearly that the Heracleid invaders made what is called clean work. There is nothing remarkable therefore in the disappearance of the word from common use: neither is it strange that, when the new settlers began to look back for stories of glory and feats of arms, their attention should fall, almost as a matter of course, upon that generation whose exploits had been perpetuated, either by the greatest of poems ever composed, or by the noblest collection of legends which the world has ever seen.

Even if these conditions are satisfied, the hypothesis still rests upon very slight evidence. They are not sufficiently inconsistent at first sight, to make it very remarkable that a hypothesis should be capable of being shaped into conformity with all of them. However, it may be said that it is a hypothesis which has no improbability *a priori*: such people as composed these bands did exist, we know; it is likely that they should have a peculiar name; and we find, I think, no other name for them.

I have only to add that I have taken the whole of the Iliad and Odyssey as safe authority. If we believe them to be the work of a great number of poets, the evidence as to the use of any word found in them generally, or of any habits appearing consistently throughout, is still stronger than if we consider the whole as the work of a single author.

T. F. E.



## ON AFFECTATION IN ANCIENT AND MODERN ART.

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No point of difference between the works of ancient and modern art is more striking, than the almost total absence of affectation in the former, and its prevalence in the latter. The thorough examination of the reason why what is the rule in one case should be the exception in the other, would oblige us to consider all those peculiarities, physical and moral, which made the Greeks first in sculpture and in poetry : for no phenomenon of this nature can be considered as insulated ; it is only one point in that aggregate which we call national character, and to the growth of which a thousand various and mingled causes must contribute. An attempt of this kind, even the slightest, would demand a far abler hand and occupy too large a space ; but it may be useful to see if we can trace any of the more *immediate* causes of this one among the many superiorities of the Greeks.

We must first consider what we mean by the term. *Affected* is generally opposed to *natural* ; and affectation may be defined as a visible struggle to produce an effect on a spectator. To do an act naturally is to do it as if the means were *natural* to us, that is, so familiar that our thoughts do not dwell on them for a single moment, and as if we were unconscious of the presence of another, by a sort of singlemindedness in which to *do* the act, and not *how* to do it, is all we think of. The way in which affectation is generally shewn, is in losing sight of the end, and substituting for it a close and manifest attention to the means. It is displeasing to us, because we look suspiciously on any avowed intention on the part of another to produce an effect upon our minds, and because in almost every instance



an anxiety so strong as to betray itself implies a consciousness of deficiency. So that even if the deficiency do not exist, we assume that nothing but a doubt of attaining the end could demand such attention to the means.

In applying this to art I speak of course only with reference to the artist, not to those cases in which he *intends* to represent this feeling as existing in the *subject* of his work. In that case the fault is one of another kind, the choice of an unpleasing subject: a fault rare among the ancients, but too common among the greatest modern artists, and closely connected with the point we are considering, as it has often arisen from a wish to display that skill and knowledge which are of themselves but means. When the subject is chosen the artist's task is twofold: to conceive it in his own mind as he wishes to convey it to others, and to impart to those others, by the mechanical means of his art, a perfect image of that conception. There are certain principles which he must not violate, and which are to be traced in the works of great masters; conditions indispensable, but not of themselves sufficient, and on which if he dwell, so as to make them an end, affectation will result. We constantly hear it objected, when a beauty is pointed out in a work of art, "But I doubt if the artist *meant* that". Schelling has observed that in the *highest* works the artist is necessarily not aware of all the beauties he is producing; and that works which want the stamp of this unconscious skill, are shallow and possess, as it were, no independent existence<sup>1</sup>. The artist has *reasoned* out principles of excellence, and laboriously added beauty to beauty; but there was wanting that feeling which catches the leading character of the subject, and instinctively adapts every feature of the whole to that character. From this alone can be produced the thorough unity and reality of a work of nature. Sir Joshua Reynolds says, <sup>2</sup> "when a young artist is first told that his composition and his attitude must be contrasted, that he must turn the head contrary to the position of the body, in order to produce grace and animation; that his outline must be undulating and swelling

<sup>1</sup> Ueber das Verhältniss der bildenden Künste zu der Natur.

<sup>2</sup> Discourse VIII.



to give grandeur; and that the eye must be gratified with a variety of colours—when he is told this, with certain animating words of spirit, dignity, energy, grace, greatness of style, and brilliancy of tints, he becomes suddenly vain of his newly acquired knowledge and never thinks he can carry those rules too far.” To this process, ripened into mannerism, we owe the lengthened limbs and contorted attitudes of Parmegianino, the academical display of muscles of the Florentines, and the exaggerated passion of the French school.

Such I take to be the nature of affectation in art; and it is far less easy to say why the ancients were entirely free from it, then to assign some of the reasons why modern works are so generally tainted with it; and this lighter task is all I shall attempt.

Through long and distinct periods of history different arts have predominated and given a tone to the others. In Egypt sculpture never ceased to bear the impress of architectural character and symmetry; and the political and religious institutions of that singular people contributed not a little to preserve it from change. On the other hand when we look to Greece this is no longer the case; and, though the one is always essential to the perfection of the other, yet sculpture existed free and independent. She exercised however a similar though less rigid sway there over her younger sister, Painting, who followed her as well in manner as in time. If again we consider their relation in modern ages<sup>3</sup>, we shall find this latter art predominant, and exerting an influence as powerful and more mischievous than she herself had previously submitted to. All this is sufficiently obvious. The Memnon or the Sphinx are almost as much buildings as statues; and the Aldobrandini marriage with its single succession of detached<sup>4</sup> figures is a basrelief in

<sup>3</sup> The analogy of the literature of the ancients and moderns is so close that *mutatis mutandis* whatever is said of the so called imitative arts may be applied to it: but this is beyond my subject, and has been developed already by one far more competent to the task.

<sup>4</sup> It is singular that even in cases where the height above the eye and the object of the work require particular distinctness, this principle has so often been violated by the moderns in sculpture. In 1829 there was an exhibition in Paris of a number of



colours; whilst the confused grouping and contracted limbs of Puget's Alexander and Diogenes at Versailles betray the favorite pupil of Pietro di Cortona, and might be called a picture in marble. This sacrifice of sculpture to painting appears to be one of the principal causes of the fault in question. It has brought with it the struggle for the expression of passion, and the substitution of this for form and dignity, arising from the peculiar fitness of painting for it, and from the tendency of mankind to push a thing too far, when it has already succeeded up to a certain point. The contrast between the progress of the two arts has often been remarked. Painting, being associated with the Christian worship, and eminently calculated to portray the sentiments of the heart in the face, attained, while the art of drawing the figure was yet rude, to a perfection in expression which has never been surpassed, and which has not existed in union with the same simplicity and serene beauty since the days of Raphael. Sculpture, when she had once individualized the gods of epic poetry, without attempting to express feelings<sup>5</sup>, proceeded to clothe them in those glorious forms which led Aristotle to say, ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὥς εἰ τοσοῦτον γένοιτο διάφοροι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους πάντες φαῖεν ἂν ἀξίους εἶναι τοῦτοις δουλεύειν. Pol. i. 5.

Expression indeed is used for two very different things; and the ambiguity is worth dwelling on for a moment, as it is in constant use, and has probably caused much mischief in art. It is obvious that we may employ the term for the expression either of character or passion<sup>6</sup>, of those emotions which agitate the human frame and distort the features, or

models in sculpture for the pediment of the Madeleine; of these not above two or three had avoided the fault of having more than one plan. Compare Sir Joshua Reynolds, Discourse x.

<sup>5</sup> A. Thiersch Epochen der Griech. Kunst.

<sup>6</sup> Unterschied in Ansehung der Schönheit des Ausdrucks zwischen transitorischem und permanentem. Jener ist gewaltsam und folglich nie schön; dieser ist die Folge von der öftern Wiederholung des Erstern, verträgt sich nicht allein mit der Schönheit, sondern bringt auch mehr Verschiedenheit in die Schönheit selbst. Lessing Fragmente zum 2ten Th. des Laokoon, Werke x. 7. Compare Meyer's notes on Winkelmann's Werke. iv. p. 363.



of that which is the result of a succession of such emotions in a moral being.

The one displays the *ἦθος* or habit of mind, as far as it is capable of shewing itself not only in the face and figure, but even in the drapery, that “thousandfold echo of the form,” according to the poetical and strictly accurate expression of Goethe<sup>7</sup>; the other the transitory feelings, which are violent in proportion to the shortness of their duration, and which must be moderated and partly concealed before they can be reconciled with the unity and beauty requisite in a work of art. The eye, in which the passion of the moment is most visible<sup>8</sup>, belongs to painting only; the lines of the mouth and forehead, which mainly convey the character, are better given by sculpture: passion is excited by external circumstances, and therefore requires accessories to be intelligible; character is complete in itself, and is rather marred than improved by the presence of such accidents. Thus whilst sculpture led the way, painting was restrained from any undue exercise of her powers<sup>9</sup>; and there was little fear of their proceeding too far in a track so ill suited to the faculties of the one who acted as guide. As long as this was the case, and the mere overcoming a difficulty was not considered so much an end as to authorize the choice of a subject and the adoption of a style incompatible with the principles of sculpture and the nature of the materials, so long exaggeration and affectation were unknown. The Greeks felt that passion is doubly hideous grinning in the hard lines of marble, and that to destroy beauty of form by the distortion of violent feeling can *never* answer, least of all where that beauty of form is the very condition of the art itself, and where the eye cannot be indemnified for its loss by the contrast of light and shade or the richness of colouring. Let us see how the case stands with us: the public taste and the works of artists react

<sup>7</sup> Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, 1tes Buch. 8tes K. cf. Müller Handbuch. p. 432.

<sup>8</sup> Animi est enim omnis actio, et imago animi vultus est, indices oculi; nam haec est una pars corporis, quae, quot animi motus sunt, tot significationes et commutationes possit efficere. Oculos autem Natura nobis, ut equo et leoni jubas, caudam, aures, ad motus animorum declarandos dedit. Cic. de Orat. III. 59. Profecto in oculis animus inhabitat. Plin. XI. 37. cf. Junius de Pict. Vet. p. 179.

<sup>9</sup> Aristotle says of *painters*. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πολύγνωτος ἀγαθὸς ἠθογράφος, ἡ δὲ Ζεύξιδος γραφή οὐδὲν ἔχει ἦθος. Poet. VI.



one on the other; and it is to be hoped that Canova's style was the transition to a great improvement in both. His <sup>10</sup> Boxers and his Hercules are positively *fearful*: they are *French* pictures in marble; and, as if to shew how he could err in both extremes, he has substituted a simpering prettiness in his Graces for the dignity of the ancients. In his Dancer we have the studied attitudes and airs of the ballet fixed in the stiffness of a statue. Still he has the merit of having in many of his works gone a great part of the way back towards the antique; and such men as Flaxman, Thorwaldsen, and Rauch, have nearly completed the task. The first demand which we hear made by the mass of those who affect to judge works of art is expression, and expression of something definite: they like to point to a face and be able to tell exactly what passion or feeling it is meant to display. Hence the Dying Gladiator is more popular perhaps than any other statue; and hence, where we can find one who estimates properly the tranquil beauty of Bellini, Perugino, Francia, and Raphael's earlier manner, there are a thousand who dwell with raptures on the works of the later Bolognese school and of the Flemings, even in cases where their great and characteristic merits are impaired by this very exaggeration. What shall we say when we find <sup>11</sup> Sir Joshua Reynolds himself saying that "The Apollo, the Venus, the Laocoon, the Gladiator, have a certain composition of action, have contrasts sufficient to give grace and energy in a high degree; but it must be confessed, of the many thousand antique statues which we have, that their general characteristic is bordering at least on inanimate insipidity"?

To fix any line by which to measure the due quantity of expression of passion is impossible: it necessarily varies with the power of the artist. There must be a certain *groundwork* (if I may use the expression) of character, to support the feeling: if the latter be so strong as entirely to efface

<sup>10</sup> Compare A. W. Schlegels Schreiben an Goethe über einige Arbeiten in Rom lebender Künstler, 1805. (Krit. Schriften, Th. II. p. 339.) We might apply to these two works the word *παρένθυρσον* as given by Longinus, Sect. III. *τούτῳ παρακεῖται τρίτον τι κακίας εἶδος ἐν τοῖς παθητικοῖς, ὅπερ ὁ Θεόδωρος παρένθυρσον ἐκάλει. ἔστι δὲ πάθος ἀκαιρον καὶ κενὸν ἔνθα μὴ δεῖ πάθους, ἢ ἀμετρον ἔνθα μετρίου δεῖ.* Compare Winkelmann, IV. p. 155. Junius de Pict. Vet. p. 187.

<sup>11</sup> Discourse VIII. Compare Winkelmann Werke, IV. p. 158.



the former, the work will convey the idea of a mask rather than of a real being. It has been remarked of Shakespeare, that one of his great excellencies arises from the persons in his plays not being mere representatives of a class, but individuals with definite characters of their own, who rise and mingle as such in the events before us. So must it be in every *finished* work of real poetry and art. In both cases the *ποίησις* is the re-embodying in the shape of individuals the abstractions previously formed in our minds: and Wordsworth has truly said "that poetry takes its origin from emotion recollected in tranquillity<sup>12</sup>." When we see a good portrait we say that "there is much *truth* in it;" and we mean, if I mistake not, that it looks like a real person with some kind of character of his own, though we have never seen him for whom it is intended; in short that it is not one of the ideal "Ladies or Gentlemen" of the Exhibition, who represent the *class* mainly by virtue of their clothes<sup>13</sup>. This use of the word "truth" is philosophically just; for to paint passion without character is to exhibit an abstraction of the mind to the eye. It is *realism* in art, or an attempt to give an independent existence to that which in nature exists only in individuals combined with all their accidents. The passion of anger for instance is only *really* exhibited to us as affecting the character or swaying the actions of an *individual* man: and therefore that artist is not true to nature who merely bends the brow and flushes the cheek of his figures as anger would do, but he who combines those marks of passion with the impress of a definite character, and thus creates.

The case with regard to affectation in form and grouping is much the same as in exaggerated expression: it is as rare in ancient as common in modern art. Grouping indeed, as we generally apply the word, was almost unknown to the simplicity of <sup>14</sup> Greek sculpture: the number of persons was

<sup>12</sup> Preface to Lyrical Ballads, Works, iv. p. 380.

<sup>13</sup> Hence in landscape also the importance of sketching from nature; for that alone can give individual character to every object, and preserve an artist from generalizing in such a way as must finally lead to mannerism.

<sup>14</sup> Müller has well remarked that the mixture of Greek and Asiatic customs at Rhodes produced "a peculiar compound, of which the Rhodian oratory, painting, and sculpture should be considered as the products. The latter art had flourished there from ancient times; but later it took a particular turn towards the colossal, the imposing,



small as on the stage<sup>15</sup>; and that which it required a crowd to portray literally, such as a town or a nation, was represented by a single figure. The difference is the same as that between the comparative simplicity of ancient titles and modes of address and the long ceremonial of later times: it is life out of doors beneath a clear sky, contrasted with life in the cumbrous splendour of a palace. Winkelmann has remarked the progressive degeneracy from M. Angelo to Bernini. The earlier Italian sculptors, though not absolutely free from affectation, redeemed it by many other excellencies, which are visible in a high degree also in the works of Goujon in the sixteenth century. At length we arrive at the graceful contortions of Bernini, and what was thought the sweeping outline and richness of the sculptors under Louis XIV. In their hands all unity, all simplicity vanishes: the most trifling ornament, the twist of a leaf, or the turn of a finger equally betrays the besetting sin of thinking *how* they should be graceful. They knew not that singleminded devotion to their subject which would have dwelt on the end instead of the means; and they substituted a studied display of mechanical skill for the purity and dignity visible in the works of the ancients, and in many of the products of what we term the *dark ages*.

E. W. H.

and the grand style. The Laocoon and the Toro Farnese are among the number of its finest productions." Dorians, II. p. 415. Tauriscus, one of the sculptors of the last named work, was of Tralles. Plin. xxxvi. 5. And it is an exception to the usual simplicity of composition in Greek Art. Doubts have been expressed on other grounds as to the antiquity of Michael Angelo's seal in the Royal library of Paris. See Millin Introd. p. 200. The want of simplicity in the composition, which more resembles that of a picture, appears to me somewhat suspicious.

<sup>15</sup> Müller, Handbuch, p. 435.



## DE ARATI CANONE

### AUGUSTI BOECKHII PROLUSIO ACADEMICA.

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ARATO Solensi, clarissimo caelestium signorum enarratori, tum veterum Graecorum et Romanorum multi iique maxime insignes viri<sup>1</sup> operam dicarunt, in his Attalus Rhodius et Hipparchus Bithynus mathematici, postea Achilles Tatius et Theon Alexandrinus, ex quorum commentariis quaedam supersunt, in primis vero M. Tullius Cicero et Caesar sive Germanicus sive Domitianus, juvenilibus uterque studiis Aratum interpretatus; tum eidem post longam saeculorum seriem manum admovit Hugo Grotius vix tum pueritiam egressus, et nostra aetate in Germania et in hac potissimum urbe complures iique fama florentissimi docti lucem attulerunt et afferunt. Nam post Buhlii collectionem Io. Henr. Vossius, bonis litteris nuperrime ereptus, vernaculis Aratum versibus expressit notisque illustravit; Phil. Buttmannus novis adjutus copiis parabilem adolescentibus editionem ante hos duos annos curavit; ampliorem nunc ipsum adornavit collega noster Imm. Bekkerus; et Lud. Ideler, vir huic rei in paucis par, publicis Aratum scholis explicare commilitonibus nostris solet. Accessit erudita commentatio de operibus Arati<sup>2</sup>, a Guil. Henr. Grauerto eo consilio composita, ut poema de astris longe amplius olim et fere quinquepartitum<sup>3</sup> fuisse demonstraret, comprehendens illud duas Phaenomenorum partes, Ἀστροθεσίαν, et Συνανατελλόντων καὶ συνδυνόντων sive Ἀνατολήν (Hipparcho initio commentariorum Συνανατολὰς dictas), tum Κανόνα, et post hunc Prognostica, quas Graeci Διοσημίας<sup>4</sup> vocant. Nos nunc, quoniam de *Canone* non videtur sufficienter disputatum, de hoc ipso exponere constituimus.

<sup>1</sup> Vide commentariorum a P. Victorio editorum finem. p. 123.

<sup>2</sup> Mus. Rhen. jurispr. philol. etc. T. I. F. IV. p. 336 partis philologicae.

<sup>3</sup> Quintum librum Ἀστρορικῶν citat Tzetzes l. c. infra.

<sup>4</sup> De hac forma vide Grauertum, et Hasium ad Io. Lyd. de Ostent. p. 291.



Canonis ter meminit Achilles Tatius in Prolegomenis Arateis. Primum<sup>5</sup> postquam Aratum docuit noluisse in Phaenomenis de planetis agere, quippe hoc deprecatur vs. 460 his verbis,

Οὐκέτι θαρσαλέος κείνων ἐγὼ ἄρκιος εἶην

ἀπλανέων τά τε κύκλα τά τ' αἰθέρι σήματ' ἐνισπείν,

addit Achilles; Παραιτεῖται δὲ διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας· πρῶτον ὅτι φαινόμενα ἠθέλησε καὶ πᾶσι σύμφωνα δεῖξαι ἄστρα, οὗτοι δὲ πολλὴν διαφωνίαν ἔχουσι καὶ οὐδὲ πᾶσιν εἰσὶ φανεροί· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ αὐτοῦ κανόνι τὸν περὶ αὐτῶν ποιούμενος λόγον ἁρμονία τινὶ καὶ συμφωνία μουσικῇ τὰς κινήσεις αὐτῶν λέγει γεγονέναι. Hoc repetit paulo post<sup>6</sup>: περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐναρμονίου κινήσεως αὐτῶν (τῶν ἐπτὰ σφαιρῶν) εἶπεν ὡς ἔφην Ἄρατος ἐν τῷ κανόνι καὶ Ἐρατοσθένης ἐν τῷ Ἑρμῇ καὶ Ὑψικλῆς καὶ Ἀδραστος Ἀφροδισιεύς· ἤρξαντο δὲ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι· πάντα γὰρ ἁρμονία καὶ τάξει λέγουσι κινεῖσθαι. Et mox<sup>7</sup>: Πολλοὶ τῶν ἐπιφανεστέρων περὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἐπραγματεύσαντο, ἰδίᾳ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν πέντε· διὸ καὶ Ἄρατος ἰδίως μὲν περὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης πρὸς τῷ τέλει τῆς ποιήσεως εἶπεν, ἰδίᾳ δὲ περὶ τῶν πέντε ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ κανόνι. Sed magis diserte libri hujus argumentum eloquitur index ejus in vita Matritensi<sup>8</sup>, Κανόνος κατατομή; superest enim praeclarus libellus Euclidi tributus, qui inscribitur Κατατομή κανόνος<sup>9</sup>, superest in Theonis Smyrnaei libro, quem de musica scripsit, caput<sup>10</sup> περὶ τῆς τοῦ κανόνος κατατομῆς e Thrasyllō maxime petitum; unde constat canonis sectionem, canonices musicae opus, nihil esse aliud nisi musicorum certi alicujus systematis sonorum in monochordo designationem, quae secundum longitudinem chordarum instituatur. Jam vero qui harmoniam sphaerarum exponendam suscepit, ei canonis sectionem opus est: sicut Thrasyllus et Theo Smyrnaeus canonis sectionem eo consilio proposuerunt, ut ex ea Platonis psychogoniam indeque aptum sphaerarum concentum explicarent; et quem Achilles Tatius ut Aratum in Pythagorica illa sphaerarum harmonia tractanda versatum esse dixit,

<sup>5</sup> C. 15.

<sup>6</sup> C. 16.

<sup>7</sup> C. 19.

<sup>8</sup> T. II. p. 442. ap. Buhl.

<sup>9</sup> In septem Musicis Meibomii, post Euclidis introductionem harmonicam.

<sup>10</sup> C. 35.



Adrastum Peripateticum, Timaei Platonici quodammodo interpretem, eum et ipsum in canonis sectione esse occupatum, docet frequens de eo in rebus harmonicis mentio<sup>11</sup>. Itaque Aratum in Canone sonorum musicorum designationem et cum hac sphaerarum concentum et aliquid fortasse de motu docuisse liquet; conjiciasque illud sphaerarum systema harmonicum, quod a musicis excogitatum refert Achilles Tatius<sup>12</sup>, ex Arateo esse Canone petatum: quibus rebus adspectuum quoque rationem conjungere Aratus potuit, quos musicis consonantiis comparavit certe Ptolemaeus.

Carminis conceptum Arati Canonem esse licet nemo tradiderit, tamen facile credet qui Arateum considerarit ingenium, et ex Arato, Eratosthene, aliis, quousque in rebus vel subtilissimis poetice narrandis progressi Graeci sint, aestimaverit. Achillis Tatii quidem verba, quibus Canonem et τὸ τέλος τῆς ποιήσεως opponit, quamquam possunt eo trahi, ut Canon soluta oratione scriptus putetur, hoc ipsum neutiquam evincunt, propterea quod, etiamsi Canonem ibi non a *solo fine carminis*, ut Grauertus<sup>13</sup> interpretatur, distingui judicabis, sed a *carmine* quod superest *universo*, Achilles potuit dicere τῆς ποιήσεως, ut *eam, in qua versabatur, poesin* significaret, non ut negaret etiam Canonem esse versibus conceptum. Accedit, quod Caesar in translatione Phaenomenorum v. 441, ubi Canonis memor est, quo Aratus planetas illustraverit, ita fere de eo opere ut de carmine dixit:

Hoc opus *arcanis si credam* postmodo *Musis*,

Tempus, et ipse labor, patiantur fata, docebit.

Quodsi Canonem non fuisse poema certe non constat, quaesieris, utrum is cum Phaenomenis et Diosemiis unum constituerit opus, Ἀστρικά, cujus quintum librum memorat Tzetzes, an distinctus ab illis Canon fuerit. Et primum in fine operis, post Diosemias, Canon annecti commode non potuit, quod Diosemiarum

<sup>11</sup> Canonis sectionem docuimus et ipsi, partim ad harmoniam sphaerarum illustrandam in Comment. de procreatione animae mundanae in Platonis Timaeo (Daub. et Creuzer. Stud. T. III. p. 66 sqq.), partim musicae veteris explicandae causa in libris de Metris Pindari III. 7. p. 208 sqq. quae nollemus ignorata esse. In priore libro etiam de Adrasto monuimus p. 45.

<sup>12</sup> C. 17. Hoc exposuimus in Comm. de procreatione animae p. 91. et cum aliis composuimus.

<sup>13</sup> Hic enim Canonem in medio carmine insertam fuisse putat, cui opponatur τὸ τέλος τῆς ποιήσεως.



ea pars, quae est post signa ex luna et sole petenda, jam omnino aliena ab astrorum doctrina est: initio vero carminis quum collocatus esse nequeat, superest ut inter Phaenomena et Diosemias interpositus fuerit. Sed utut claudicat a Phaenomenis ad Diosemias transitus (vs. 732—739), has cum illis certissime conjungit vs. 740 carminis:

Ἄκρα γε μὴν νυκτῶν κεῖναι δυοκαίδεκα μοῖραι  
ἄρκιαι ἔξειπείν:

quae verba redeunt ad alteram Phaenomenorum partem de ortu signorum Zodiaci sive *Συνανατολὰς*: ad quam partem tam breviter provocari non poterat, si inter illam et Diosemias integer intercessisset Canon diversi prorsus argumenti. At dicas de signorum Zodiaci ortu etiam Canonem exposuisse: quippe duo supersunt Caesaris Prognosticorum fragmenta<sup>14</sup>, in quibus de tempestatibus, quae sub singulis Zodiaci signis accidere soleant, et de propriis viribus agatur, quas planetarum quisque illa signa possidens adjungat; quae fragmenta initio Prognosticorum Caesaris collocata fuisse ex ejusdem Scholiaste recte colligitur<sup>15</sup>: haec igitur Caesar ex Canone transtulisse putatur, qui inter Phaenomena et Diosemias esset insertus. Sed postquam Canonis argumentum prorsus aliud et maxime musicum esse docuimus, quis non probabilius dixerit, Caesarem illa de suo addidisse, non vertisse ex Arato? Neque ullum illis fragmentis vestigium Graeci inest exemplaris: quodsi in iis Graeca reperiuntur signorum nomina, ut *Aegoceros*, *Chele*, suo his jure Latinus poeta usus est, nec propter haec debemus illos versus ex Graecis translatos judicare: et verba<sup>16</sup>,

*Qui fundit latices, caelo quoque permovet imbres,*  
quibus lusus Graeci poetae in voce Ὑδροχόος expressus dicitur, sine Graecis explicari optime possunt: “Aquarius, qui secundum receptam in Catasterismis imaginem ex urna fundit latices, est etiam auctor imbrium caelo delabentium”. Quid quod Aratum quinque planetarum in certis Zodiaci signis situi ullam ad tempestates efficiendas tribuisse vim, haud docueris facilius, quam genethliacorum illum addictum insaniae fuisse? Quod vero Caesar, scilicet Arati Canonem inter Phaenomena et Diosemias lectum secutus, in eodem Prognosticorum initio simul

<sup>14</sup> Apud Buhlium T. II. p. 102 sqq. Cf. Grauert. p. 342 sqq. et p. 344.

<sup>15</sup> V. Grauert. p. 344.

<sup>16</sup> Fragm. I. v. 18.



de solis et lunae cursu et de ortu et occasu stellarum singulis diebus certis Graeciae locis et in Aegypto accidente exposuisse censetur, quippe de quibus rebus disputarit ejus Scholiastes<sup>17</sup>, id facili opera removeris. Nam ut concedamus, de sole et luna Aratum in Canone egisse, tamen ortus et occasus astrorum, qualem Caesaris Scholiastes exhibet, cum Canonis argumento nihil fere commune habet: nec si Caesar in Prognosticis de ortu et occasu astrorum dixisset, ut tempestates simul accidentes demonstraret, poterat hoc ex Aratei carminis parte inter Phaenomena et Diosemias inserta petisse, propterea quod Aratus in Diosemiis<sup>18</sup> ipse significat sese haec non tractasse, utpote ex Metonei calendarii ἐπισημασίαις nota. Denique ne Caesarem quidem in Prognosticis de illis, quae dicuntur, rebus exposuisse constat: ut Achilles Tattius multa exponit, de quibus nihil Aratus in Phaenomenis, ita Scholiastes Caesaris suo Marte quaedam de sole et luna congegit, et ex variis parapegmatis stellarum annotavit ortus et occasus, qui certis diebus accidebant in Attica (ex Metone haud dubie), in Boeotia, Aegypto, apud Assyrios, Chaldaeos, postremo in Italia, frequenter provocans etiam ad Caesarem, hoc est ad Divum Julium, cujus calendarium notissimum erat: prorsus ut ex Claudio Tusco Jo. Lydus contexuit ἐφήμερον τοῦ παντὸς ἐνιαυτοῦ, in qua similiter commista diversa calendaria<sup>19</sup> sunt. Quae Scholiastes ad astrognosiam illustrandam contulit, non rettulit ex Caesaris Prognosticis; neque illa ad Aratum pertinent ulla ratione. Postremo inter Arati Phaenomena et Diosemias nihil interpositum fuisse, non modo Scholiastae Aratei et Avienus agnoscunt, sed ipse Achilles Tattius his verbis<sup>20</sup>: Ὁ δὲ Ἀρατος περὶ τῶν πέντε λέγει παραιτησάμενος μετὰ τὴν τῶν φαινομένων δεῖξιν περὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης λέγει: quae verba Canonem ex illo loco excludunt manifesto. Quodsi idem Achilles Diosemiarum initium de sole et luna dicit πρὸς τῷ τέλει τῆς ποιήσεως esse, non potest hoc, ut nuper factum est, ita intelligi, ut Canonem ante Diosemias lectum fuisse significet auctor, qui quidem paulo ante ipse docuerit Phaenomena continuari Diosemiis, sed illas voces

<sup>17</sup> Apud Buhlium T. II. p. 108 sqq.

<sup>18</sup> V. 20. (751.) cf. Schol. et Ideler. Chronol. T. I. p. 314. 327.

<sup>19</sup> V. Has. p. 326. ed. Lyd. de ostent.

<sup>20</sup> C. 18.



πρὸς τῷ τέλει τῆς ποιήσεως de altera eaque minore carminis parte parum exacte dictas esse concedendum est. Sive enim Canonem Achilles ipse legit, sive ex priore aliquo auctore traxit ejus notitiam, certe verba πρὸς τῷ τέλει τῆς ποιήσεως non debentur antiquiori, sed sunt Achilli propria, ideoque ita explicari debent, ut consentiant cum iis, quae dixerat paulo ante.

Canon igitur quum neque in fine Diosemiarum neque ante has positus fuerit, utique eximendus ex eo opere videtur, cujus partes supersunt; et peculiarem illum librum fuisse, colligas ex ipsa Achillis dictione, ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ αὐτοῦ κανόνι<sup>21</sup>, et multo magis ex ejusdem verbis, Ἄρατος ἰδίᾳ μὲν περὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης πρὸς τῷ τέλει τῆς ποιήσεως εἶπεν, ἰδίᾳ δὲ περὶ τῶν πέντε ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ κανόνι, ubi illud ἰδίᾳ separatum significat opus. Neve ante Achillis Tatii aetatem exemptum e reliquo opere Canonem et seorsim a librariis scriptum traditumque esse putes, Aratus ipse v. 460 se de planetis *in hoc opere* non dicturum profitetur:

Οὐκέτι θαρσαλέος κείνων ἐγὼ ἄρκιος εἶην

ἀπλανέων τά τε κύκλα τά τ' αἰθέρι σήματ' ἐνισπείν.

Οὐκέτι est *non jam*, *non amplius*, aut ad tempus praecedens relatum, aut ad *rem aliquam*, cui alia opponatur res; hic autem ad rem relatum est: “Aliis argumentis exsequendis ut par sim, *huic jam argumento non sum par*”<sup>22</sup>. Itaque Aratus quum Phaenomena condebat, imparem sese Canonis argumento fassus est: neque is hoc potuit in eodem opere tractare, nisi obloqui sibi ipse volebat. Sed postea auctis viribus quidni aggressus rem fuerit, cui sese olim judicarat imparem? Quae quum ita sint, si Ἀστροκοῖς, quod probabile dixeris, Phaenomena et Diosemiae comprehensa fuerint, quaeritur, quid de quinto illorum libro statuendum videatur, cujus meminit Tzetzes<sup>23</sup>: Ἄρατος δὲ ἐν τῇ πέμπτῃ τῶν Ἀστροκῶν τέσσαρας λέγει (Μούσας), Διὸς τοῦ αἰθέρος καὶ Πλουσίας νύμφης Ἀρχήν, Μελέτην, Θελξινόην καὶ Αἰοιδήν, quae verba Grauertus<sup>24</sup> rectissime in versum redegit. Qua de re etsi nihil potest certi proferri, tamen conjicias Tzetzen esse eorum

<sup>21</sup> C. 15.

<sup>22</sup> Monemus hoc, quod οὐκέτι illo loco est *nondum* redditum, quasi esset οὐπω. De Vossii lectione dicere non opus videtur.

<sup>23</sup> Ad Hesiod. O. et D. p. 6. ed. Heins.

<sup>24</sup> p. 343.



aliquem secutum, qui Phaenomena et Diosemias in quattuor diviserant libros<sup>25</sup>, in calce Diosemiarum autem perisse epilogum quendam carminis, qui sit quintus liber vocatus. In quo quum de Musis dictum fuerit, Musarumque Heliconiarum rebus conjunctus sit Pegasus, indidem haustum esse potest quod de Pegaso sidereo equo et ejus parentibus ex Arato tradidit Hyginus<sup>26</sup>.

Scr. Berolini d. II. m. Jan. a. MDCCCXXVIII.

<sup>25</sup> V. Grauert. p. 338.

<sup>26</sup> Poet. Astr. II. 18.

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## ANECDOTA BAROCCIANA.

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THE scholars of the present day have been so industrious in collecting Anecdota from the manuscripts of the continental libraries, that little now remains to be gleaned from that quarter. Our own too, I fancy, are pretty nearly exhausted. Yet now and then a scrap may be discovered, which, if it contains unpublished remnants of the great classical writers, cannot but be deserving of notice. The following grammatical *excerpta* περὶ Βαρβαρισμοῦ καὶ Σολοικισμοῦ come under this description. They are found in a Baroccian MS. of the Bodleian Library, No. 216. f. 101, and so far as I know have never been printed, though they may exist in other libraries. Valckenaer published two *Opuscula* on the same subject at the end of his Ammonius; but they are very different from these. The first fragment here given is very similar to what is said on the same subject in the Greek Grammar of Theodorus Prodromus, a writer who flourished in the twelfth century. The second may perhaps be from Herodian, whose treatise περὶ Σχημάτων occurs in the same MS.<sup>1</sup>

Τῶν περὶ τὰς λέξεις ἀμαρτημάτων ἃ μὲν περὶ μίαν λέξιν γίνεται, ὡς ὁ βαρβαρισμός· ἃ δὲ περὶ λόγον, ὡς ὁ σολοικισμός· ἃ δὲ περὶ ἐναλλαγὴν λέξεως ἐν συντάξει, ὡς ἡ ἀκυρολογία. Βαρβαρισμός ἐστὶν ἀμάρτημα ἐν μιᾷ λέξει περὶ τὴν παρ' ἐκάστοις συνήθειαν. Γίνεται δὲ κατὰ τρόπους τέσσαρας· ἔνδειαν· πλεονασμόν· μετάθεσιν· ἐναλλαγὴν· ἥτις ἀντίθεσις καλεῖται. Κατὰ μὲν οὖν ἔνδειαν, εἴτις λέγοι Δημοσθένη χωρὶς τοῦ ᾧ καὶ γέγραφαν καὶ πεποίηκαν ἀντὶ τοῦ γεγράφασι καὶ πεποιήκασιν· περὶ δὲ πλεονασμόν, εἴτις λέγει Αἰσχίνηα σὺν τῷ ᾧ καὶ ἐλέγοαν καὶ ἐφέροαν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔλεγον

<sup>1</sup> This MS. is described briefly enough in the Bodley Catalogue as "Schedae aliquot in Pergameno variae formae et argumenti." The best part however is written on paper.



καὶ ἔφερον· καὶ κοιμᾶσαι καὶ στεφανοῦσαι τὸ δεύτερον παθη-  
τικόν, δέον κοιμᾶ καὶ στεφανοῖ· ἢ εἴτις διαιροίη μὴ καλῶς ὡς  
κοῖλον, κῳῖλον. Περὶ δὲ μετάθεσιν, εἴτις φαίη κότραφον  
τὸν κρόταφον· καὶ δρίφον τὸν δίφρον. Παρὰ δὲ ἐναλλαγὴν  
γίνεται βαρβαρισμὸς περὶ τὰς προσῳδίας· καὶ ὅταν ἕτερα  
ἀνθ' ἑτέρων προλαμβάνηται γράμματα· οἷον εἴτις λέγει  
φιέλην τὴν φιάλην· καὶ ὕελον τὴν ὕαλον· Αἰνεῖά τε καὶ Λυσία  
τὴν γενικὴν τοῦ Αἰνείου καὶ Λυσίου· καὶ πετάμενος, δέον  
πετόμενος· καὶ εἰλάμην, καὶ οὐχ εἰλόμην. Περὶ δὲ τὰς  
προσῳδίας, Περὶ μὲν τοὺς τόνους· εἴτις λέγοι μὲν φίλος,  
βαρέως δὲ σόφος· καὶ περισπωμένως σανιδῶν, βαρέως δὲ  
Θράκων. περὶ δὲ τοὺς χρόνους, εἴτις τὸν μὲν μὴ ἐργαζόμενον  
συνεσταλμένως ἀργὸν λέγει, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐκτεταμένως Ἄργος.

Γίνεται δὲ ἐν γραφῇ μόνη βαρβαρισμὸς, ὅταν τις μὴ κατὰ  
τὸν τῆς ὀρθογραφίας λόγον γράφῃ· διὰ μὲν τῆς εἰ διφθόγγου  
τὴν νείκην· διὰ δὲ μόνου τοῦ ἰ τὸ νῖκος· ἢ τὸ ἐνκέφαλος διὰ  
τοῦ ν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τοῦ γ. Βαρβαρίζουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ ὅλως ἐκφύλως  
ταῖς λέξεσιν ἢ καθόλου ὑπηλλαγμέναις χρώμενοι, καὶ λέγον-  
τες τὸν στίλλον μὲν τὸ γραφοῖσιον, καὶ κράββατον τὸν  
σκίμποδα.

Σολοικισμὸς ἐστὶν ἡμαρτημένη λέξεως σύνθεσις παρὰ τὴν  
παρ' ἐκάστου συνήθειαν· ὡς δὲ ὁ βαρβαρισμὸς περὶ τοὺς βαρ-  
βάρους εἴρηται, οὕτω καὶ ὁ σολοικισμὸς περὶ τοὺς σολοίκους· καὶ  
γὰρ οὕτω τινὰς προσηγόρευσαν τοὺς βαρβάρους· ἢ κατὰ τὸ  
ἔτυμον σολοικισμὸς ἐστὶ σώου λόγου αἰκισμὸς· γίνεται δὲ κατὰ  
τρόπους τέσσαρας. Κατὰ ἔνδειαν· ὡς ἐν τῷδ' "οἷχονται πεδίοιο,"  
(Il. B. 801) ἐνδεῖ γὰρ ἢ διὰ πρόθεσις. κατὰ πλεονασμόν·

Σειρὴν χρυσεῖην ἐξ οὐρανόθεν κρεμασάντες· (Il. Θ. 19)  
πλεονάζει γὰρ ἢ ἐξ. Κατὰ δὲ ἐναλλαγὴν γίνεται σολοικισμὸς,  
ἥτοι ὅταν μέρος λόγου ἀνθ' ἑτέρου τεθῇται· οἷον—ἢ οὕτω  
τύχοι ὄνομα ἀντὶ ῥήματος·

Ὅν τις οἷστεύσας ἔβαλεν, τόξων εὖ εἰδώς· (Il. Δ. 196)  
ἀντὶ τοῦ τοξεύειν. ἢ ὄνομα ἀντὶ ἐπιρρήματος·

νέον δ' ἐσαγεῖρατο θυμόν· (Il. O. 240)  
ἀντὶ τοῦ νεωστί. ἢ μετοχὴ ἀντὶ ῥήματος·

Αἰνῶς ἀκτίνεσσιν εἰκότες ἠελίοιο· (Il. K. 547)  
ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰόκασιν. ἢ ἄρθρον ἀντὶ ἀντωνυμίας·

Τῷ γὰρ ἐπὶ φρεσὶ θῆκεν·  
ἔδει γὰρ τούτῳ. ἢ ἄρθρον ἀντὶ ἐπιρρήματος·  
Τῷ τοι προφρονέως ἐρέω·



ἀντὶ τοῦ δίο. ἢ ἐπὶ ῥῆμα ἀντὶ προθέσεως·  
ἀλλὰ Σκάμανδρος

Οἷσει δινήεις εἴσω ἄλός εὐρέα κόλπον· (Il. Φ. 124)  
ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰς εὐρέα κόλπον. ἢ ὅταν τὰ συμβεβηκότα τοῖς τοῦ λόγου μέρεσιν εἰς ἄλληλα ἐναλλάσσονται· εἶδος, γένος, ἄριθμος. ἢ ὅταν αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν ἐπὶ ῥημάτων, ἢ αἱ προθέσεις, ἢ οἱ συνδεσμοί, ἢ αἱ τάξεις τῶν συνδέσμων ἐναλλάσσονται. εἶδος, ἐν μὲν ὀνόματι, “δία γυναικῶν,” ἀντὶ ὑπερθετικοῦ· καὶ “μελάντερον ἢ ὕτε πίσσα,” ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπολυτικοῦ τοῦ μέλαν ὡς πίσσα. ἐν δὲ ἀντωνυμίαις εἶδος, ὡς Ζηνόδοτος γράφει, “μνήσαι πατρὸς σεῖο,” ἀντὶ τῆς σοῖο κτητικῆς. ἐν δὲ ἄρθροις εἶδος·

Καὶ θώρηχ’· ὁ γὰρ ἦν οἱ· (Il. Σ. 460)  
ἀντὶ τοῦ ὅς γὰρ ἦν οἱ. καὶ

Μῦθος δ’ ὅς μὲν νῦν ὑγιῆς εἰρημένος ἔστω· (Il. Θ. 524)  
ἀντὶ τοῦ ὁ μὲν νῦν. Γένος, ἐν μὲν ὀνόμασιν·

Αἶθη θήλυς ἐοῦσα· (Il. Ψ. 409)  
ἀντὶ τοῦ θήλεια· καὶ ἡδὺς ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡδεῖα. ἐν δὲ μετοχαῖς γένος·

Οὐκ ἂν ἐφ’ ὑμετέρων ὀχέων πληγέντε· (Il. Θ. 455)  
ἀντὶ τοῦ πληγεῖσαι δυνικῶς. Ἀριθμὸς δὲ, ἐν μὲν ὀνόμασιν “Θέσπιαν Γραιάντε” ἀντὶ τοῦ Θεσπέϊας· καὶ “μειδιῶν βλοσυροῖσι προσώπασιν” (Il. Η. 212), ἀντὶ τοῦ προσώπῳ· καὶ Ἀμφότερον κῦδός τε καὶ ἀγλαΐη καὶ ὄνειαρ· (Od. Ο. 78)  
τὸ γὰρ ἀμφότερον ἐπὶ δύο καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ πλείονων τάσσεται. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ λόγου μέρεσιν εἰ ἐναλλάσσονται οἱ ἀριθμοί. Περὶ δὲ σχῆμα ἐν ἀντωνυμίαις·

Ζωγρεῖτ’, αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ἐμὲ λύσομαι· (Il. Κ. 378)  
ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐμαυτὸν συνθέτον. Πτώσις, ἐν μὲν ὀνόμασιν·

Νεστορίδα δ’ ὁ μὲν οὔτασεν· (Il. Π. 317)  
ἀντὶ τοῦ Νεστοριδῶν. καὶ

Τρωσὶν μὲν προμάχιζεν· (Il. Γ. 16)  
ἀντὶ τοῦ Τρώων· καὶ “μητίετα Ζεὺς” ἀντὶ τοῦ μητιέτης. ἐν μετοχαῖς πτώσις, “ἀστράπτων ἐπιδεξία” (Il. Β. 353), ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀστράπτοντα καὶ φαίνοντα. ἐν δὲ ἀντωνυμίαις πτώσις·

ἡμῖν δ’ αὖτε κατεκλάσθη φίλον ἦτορ· (Od. I. 258)  
ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡμῶν· ἐν δὲ ἄρθροις πτώσις·

δοιοὺς δ’ ἄρ’ ὑπήλυθε θάμνους,  
Ἐξομόθεν πεφυῶτας· ὁ μὲν φυλῆς, ὁ δ’ ἐλαίης· (Od. Ε. 477)  
ἀντὶ τοῦ, τὸν μὲν φυλῆς, τὸν δὲ ἐλαίης. Περὶ δὲ τὰς ἐγκλίσεις, “ἵνα εἴδομεν ἄμφω” (Il. Α. 363), ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰδῶμεν· καὶ



“μὴ ἴομεν Δαναοῖσι μαχησόμενοι,” (Il. M. 216) ἀντὶ τοῦ μὴ ἴωμεν. Διαθέσεις ἐν ῥήμασιν· “ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὀρῶμαι” (Il. N. 99), ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀρῶ. Διαθέσεις ἐν μετοχαῖς· “πόλεις εὐναιεταώσας,” ἀντὶ τοῦ εὐναιομένας· καὶ “κρεα πολλὰ δαιόμενος” (Od. P. 332), ἀντὶ τοῦ δαίων καὶ μερίζων. Πρόσωπα ἐν ῥήμασιν·

“Ἄλλοι μὲν γὰρ πάντες ὅσοι θεοὶ εἰς’ ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ

Σοὶ τ’ ἐπιπείθονται καὶ δεδμήμεσθα ἕκαστος· (Il. E. 878)  
ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπιπειθόμεθα καὶ δεδμήμεθα. πρόσωπα ἐν ἀντωνυμίαις·

Δεῦτε δὴ, ἐννέπετε σφέτερον πατέρ’ ὑμνείονσαι.

(Hesiod. Op. et D. I. 2)

ἀντὶ τοῦ ὑμέτερον. χρόνοι ἐν ῥήμασιν·

“ἐγὼ δέ κ’ ἄγω Βρισηΐδα” (Il. A. 184),

ἀντὶ τοῦ ἄζω. ἐν δὲ μετοχαῖς χρόνοι, “τοῖσι δ’ ἀνιστάμενος μετέφη,” ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀναστάς. Ἐν δὲ ἐπιρρήμασι γίνεται σολοικισμὸς οὕτως· “καὶ εἴσω δόρπον ἐκόσμει.” (Od. H. 13) ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔνδον. καὶ “ἐγγύθεν ἵσταμένος,” ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐγγύς. ἐν δὲ προθέσεσιν· “εἰς Ἀγαμέμνονα δῖον,” ἀντὶ τοῦ πρὸς Ἀγαμέμνονα. καὶ “ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθον,” ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ Ἴλιον. ἐν δὲ συνδέσμοις

Αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼ μενέω νηῶν ἐν ἀγῶνι,

Ἄλλ’ ἔταρον πέμπω· (Il. Π. 240)

ἀντὶ τοῦ ἑταῖρον δέ. καὶ

Ἄλλὰ κακῶς ἀφίει, κρατερόν δ’ ἐπὶ μῦθον ἔτελλεν· (Il. A. 25)

ἀντὶ τοῦ κρατερόν γάρ. Περὶ τὴν ἐναλλαγὴν τῆς συντάξεως τῶν συνδέσμων· γίνεται γὰρ σολοικισμὸς οὕτως ὥς παρὰ Μενάνδρῳ.<sup>2</sup>

Θυγάτριον ἢ νῦν ἡμέρα δίδωσί μοι,

Ἡ δόξαν, ἥτοι διαβολήν·

ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἥτοι δόξαν, ἢ διαβολήν. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα παρὰ τοῖς ποιηταῖς σχήματα· καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν δὲ ἐν χώρᾳ σολοικισμῶν παρείληπται.

Βαρβαρισμός ἐστιν ἀμάρτημα ἐν λέξει γενόμενον παρὰ τὴν τῶν Ἑλληνιζόντων συνήθειαν· εἴρηται δὲ οὕτως βαρυνδατισμός τις ὢν. γίνεται δὲ τρόποις ἐ· προσθέσει· ἀφαιρέσει· ἐναλλαγῇ· μεταθέσει· καὶ περὶ προσωδίαν. προσθέσει γράμματος, ὥς εἰάν τις λέγῃ Ἀισχινέον. δέον Αἰσχίνου. ἀφαιρέσει,

<sup>2</sup> This fragment of Menander is to be added to those taken from uncertain plays.



εάν τις λέγῃ Δημοσθένε, δέον Δημοσθέnea. ἐναλλαγῇ γράμματος, οἷον εάν τις δρίφος ἀντὶ τοῦ δίφρος. μεταθέσει γράμματος, ὡς κίσηλις, δέον κίσηρις. γίνονται δὲ βαρβαρισμοὶ καὶ περὶ προσωδίαν. Σολοικισμός ἐστὶν ἀκατάλληλος θέσις τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν. εἴρηται δὲ σολοικισμός, ἥτοι ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς Σόλους μετοικησάντων, οἱ πειρώμενοι τῇ Σόλωνος χρῆσθαι διαλέκτῳ ἡμάρτανον· ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ τὸν σῶον λόγον λυμαίνεσθαι· ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ θολισμόν εἶναι τοῦ λόγου· τοῦτ' ἐστὶ σκοτισμόν. Γίνεται δὲ περὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, καὶ περὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα. περὶ τὰ γένη, ὡς Εὐριπίδης·

ὦ Κύπρις ὡς ἠδεῖα καὶ μοχθηρός<sup>3</sup>.

περὶ τὰς πτώσεις, ὡς “ὦ φίλος.” περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς·

Τὸ μὲν τι χαίρω, τό δέ τι καὶ λυπούμεθα.

Περὶ τὰ σχήματα σολοικίζουσιν οἱ λέγοντες ὄναγρον, τὰ γὰρ σύνθετα ἐκ διαιρέσεως προφέρονται Ἀττικοί. περὶ τὰ εἶδη·

Ὅς Οἰδίπουν ἀπώλεσ', Οἰδίπους δ' ἐμέ<sup>4</sup>.

περὶ τοὺς χρόνους·

ἐγὼ δέ κ' ἄγω Βρισηίδα καλλιπάρησον (Il. A. 184).

περὶ τὰς διαθέσεις, ὡς παρὰ Πινδάρῳ,

Καλεῖτ' ἐς χορὸν Ὀλύμπιοι,<sup>5</sup>

ἀντὶ (τοῦ) καλεῖσθε. περὶ τὰς ἐγκλίσεις ὡς παρὰ Καλλιμάχῳ·

<sup>3</sup> This fragment appears to be new. I will transcribe two others also from a Baroccian manuscript.

Cod. Barocc. 50. Ἐκλογ' διαφόρων λέξεων συνηλεγμένων ἐκ τε τῆς γραφῆς καὶ τῶν θύραθεν πραγματειῶν. f. 307. Κέρχνη, δοτική· Ἀριστοφάνης Ὀρνισιν· κέρχνης, πυρίορχις, γύψ, κύμινδης, ἀετός ὅλως τὸ σοῦτος καὶ φιλοξενέστατος Εὐριπίδης. We ought to read, Ἀριστοφάνης Ὀρνισιν (v. 1181. Ed. Bekker.)

Κερχνῆς, τριόρχης, γύψ, κύμινδης, ἀετός·

Then follows the line from Euripides, which probably refers to ἀετός·

Ὁ λῶστος οὔτος καὶ φιλοξενέστατος.

Choerobosc. Cod. Barocc. 50. f. 213. Ἀλκμέωνος· τὸ μὲ ψιλόν, ὡς παρὰ Εὐριπίδῃ ἔχει ἢ χρῆσις· συστείλας τὸ ε̄ φυλάττει τὸ ῶ· ὡς κύριον ἐν τῇ γενικῇ.

<sup>4</sup> This line probably belongs to the *Œdipus* of Euripides.

<sup>5</sup> There can be little doubt that this fragment is the first verse of the dithyrambic ode of which a considerable extract has been preserved by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (de Comp. Verb. t. II. p. 41. Huds.); but we have here a remarkable various reading, which in my opinion is much more akin to the “audaces dithyrambi” of the great Theban poet, than the commonly received text, Δεῦτ' ἐν χορὸν (Frag. Pind. Dith. III. p. 46—48.) Some MSS. have Ἰδετ' ἐν χορὸν. I may observe by the way, that in another fragment from the dithyrambics of Pindar, preserved by the Etymol. Magn. and Meletius de Nat. Hom. the Baroccian MS. 131, which contains the Greek text of the latter, reads ἀλόγχῳ ποτὲ θωριχθεὶς ἐπεῖχεν ἀλλότρια.



Ἴσχε τέκος, μὴ πῖθι.<sup>6</sup>

προστακτικὴ ἀντί τῆς ὑποτακτικῆς τῆς μὴ πίης. περι πρό-  
σωπα ὡς ἐν ἀντωνυμίαις.

σφέτερον πατέρ ὑμνείουσαι. (Hesiod. Op. I. 2)

ἀντὶ τοῦ ὑμέτερον. περὶ τὰς μετοχάς.

Οὐκ ἂν ἐφ' ὑμετέρων ὀχέων πληγέντε κεραυνῶ. (Il. Θ. 455)  
ἀντὶ τοῦ πληγείσαι. περὶ τὰ ἄρθρα.

Μακροῖσι ξυστοῖσι τὰ ῥά σφ' ἐπὶ νηυσὶν ἔκειτο. (Il. Ο. 388)  
περὶ τὰς προθέσεις.

Κάππεσον ἐν Λήμνῳ. (Il. A. 593)

καὶ παρὰ Θουκυδίδῃ· “εἰς τὸ Ἡραῖον ἐκαθέζοντο”<sup>7</sup>. καὶ παρὰ  
Μενάνδρῳ.

Καθίζάνει μὲν ἐνίοτ' εἰς τὰ σήσαμα (MS. σάσημα).  
καὶ ἐν Ψοφοδεῇ.<sup>8</sup>

Ἐπίσημον αὖ τὴν ἀσπίδ' εἰς [τὴν] Διὸς στοὰν  
Ἀνέθηκαν.

περὶ τὰ ἐπιρρήματα, ὡς παρ' Εὐριπίδῃ.<sup>9</sup>

Πολλὴ μὲν ἐν βροτοῖσι κούκ ἀνώνυμος  
Θεὰ κέκλημαι Κύπρις, οὐρανοῦ τ' ἔσω.

<sup>6</sup> This passage is probably from the Hecale. I will subjoin some additional fragments from the same poet.

Melet. de Nat. Hom. Cod. Barocc. f. 246. Τὸν δὲ τοῦ διαφράγματος ὑμένα περί-  
πεπλον λέγουσι, διὰ τὸ περιειλεῖσθαι αὐτὸν τοῖς σπλάγχνοις· ἢ πέπλον, διὰ τὸ  
ὑφαπλουῖσθαι· ἢ πάτος ἀπὸ τοῦ πεπηῆχθαι καὶ οἶον συνεφίχθαι· διὸ καὶ ὁ Καλλιμάχος  
οὕτως ἔφη·

Ἦρας

Ἄγνον ὑφηνάμεναι τῇσι μέμηλε πάτος.

The Latin version reads corruptly, ἦρις ἂν ὑφηνάμεναι τῇσι μέμηλε πάτος.

Theognost. Cod. Barocc. 50. Can. 207. Ἀμαζών, Ἀμαζόνος λέγεται καὶ ἀρσενικῶς,  
ὡς παρὰ Καλλιμάχῳ· ἵν' Ἀμαζόνες ἄνδρες ἔωσιν.

Choerobosc. περὶ ποσότητος Cod. Barocc. 50. f. 177. Τὰ εἰς σ̄ λήγοντα ὀνόματα  
μονοσυλλαβὰ περισπώμενα διὰ τοῦ εἰος παραγόμενα διὰ τῆς εἰ διφθόγγου γρά-  
φονται, οἶον βοῦς βοεῖος, σῦς, συεῖος, μῦς μυεῖος, παῖς παίδειος τρόπος· δεῖ δὲ  
προσθεῖναι μὴ ὄντα ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰς αὐς, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα διὰ τοῦ ι γράφεται· οἶον γραῦς.  
γράϊος καὶ γρηῖος παρὰ Καλλιμάχῳ· “γρηῖον εἶδος ἔχουσα,” τοῦτ' ἐστὶν γραός.  
This fragment occurs also in the Etymol. Magn. but the name of the poet is not men-  
tioned (p. 603. 23).

<sup>7</sup> The passage here referred to is in the 1st Book, ch. 23. ταῦτα δὲ ἰκέται καθε-  
ζόμενοι ἐς τὸ Ἡραῖον ἐδέοντο.

<sup>8</sup> Both these fragments are new. For an account of the Ψοφοδέης of Menander,  
see Meineke Menandr. Rel. p. 183. The following citation in Barocc. MS. 50. f. 313.  
may possibly be also from Menander: Χαλεφῆς· ἀπὸ τοῦ χαλέπτω· σύγγαθί μοι  
καὶ μὴ χαλεφῆς ὦ πάτερ.

<sup>9</sup> The opening of the Hippolytus.



ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔνδον. περὶ τοὺς συνδέσμους, εἴαν τις τῷ μὲν τὸν δὲ μὴ ἐπενέγκῃ· οἶον

Τρωσὶν μὲν προμάχίζεν Ἀλέξανδρος θεοειδής,

Παρδαλέην ὥμοισιν ἔχων καὶ καμπύλα τόξα. (Π. Γ. 16.)

Ὁς περισσὰ λέγει καὶ ὑπερήφανα, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἀμέτρως λέγει, σολοικίζει τῷ πλεονασμῷ· ὡς δὲ καὶ ὁ σιωπῶν ἂ μὴ δεῖ, καὶ ὁ μικροπρεπής· καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐλλείψει. καὶ ὁ ψευδόμενος δὲ τῇ ἐναλλαγῇ. κατὰ γένος δὲ ὁ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἢ παιδία ποιούμενος φιλίας, ὀφείλων πρὸς ἄνδρας. κατὰ εἶδος ὁ ὑποκορισμῷ χρώμενος πρὸς οὓς οὐ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ πατρὶ ὡς δούλῳ. κατὰ ἀριθμὸν, ὁ πολλὰ μὲν ὀφείλων, διδούς δ' ὀλίγα. κατὰ πρόσωπον, ὁ τῷ ὑστέρῳ τὴν προτέραν διδούς τάξιν, ἢ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν. κατὰ χρόνον, ὁ ἔξω καιροῦ τι ποιῶν, ἢ ζητῶν κατὰ διάθεσιν, ὡς ὁ δο.....ὀφείλων εἶναι ζητῶν· ἢ φθόνον ἢ δειλίαν ἐνθα μὴ δεῖ, ἢ ἀνδριζόμενον ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, ἀλλὰ θρασυνόμενον. κατ' ἐγκλισιν, ὡς ὁ προστάττων ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ παρακαλεῖν. κατὰ σχῆμα ὁ εἰρωνεύόμενος ἢ ὑποκρινόμενος, καὶ ὁ διαστρέφων.....ἦτοι τὸν Λουκιάνου ψευδοσολοικιστήν...

In the same MS. the following observation with regard to Æschylus occurs *f.* 163—4. Βαρεώτερος· ἀπὸ τῆς γενικῆς εἶπον, βαρεώς βαρεώτερός, σπανίως μέντοι· καὶ ἔτι Αἰσχύλος· μειζονώτερος, ὑπερτερώτερός τε, καὶ χεριώτερος, καὶ ῥήϊτερος, καὶ πλειότερος. ὡς δὲ καὶ τοῦ ὑπερθετικοῦ τὸ πρῶτιστος· “εἴλαυσαν<sup>10</sup> εἰς τὸ πρῶτιστον.”

In MS. Barocc. 35. *f.* 24. there is a copious collection of Greek adverbs and interjections by some anonymous grammarian, from which I will extract what relates to the imitative particles employed by Aristophanes<sup>11</sup> and other comic writers.

<sup>10</sup> This should probably be ἤλασαν. The following fragments may be added to those already collected by the editors of Æschylus.

Cod. Barocc. 50. Λέξεις ἐκ τοῦ Θεολόγου, *f.* 284, b. Τονθορύζω· (Cod. τονθορύζω) ὡς ἡ Χρυσοστομοῦ· γυναικῶν τινῶν γραῖδων ὑποκοθωνιζομένων καὶ ὑποτονθορυζόντων· καὶ Αἰσχύλος· ἐτονθώρυζεν ταῦρος νεοσφαγής. This should be Ἐτονθόρυζε ταῦρος ὡς νεοσφαγής.

Cod. Barocc. 159. Επιμερισμοί· Κηδεῖα· ἢ ἐπιγάμβρευσις παρ' Αἰσχύλῳ. The word ἐπιγάμβρευσις is not to be found in any Greek lexicon.

<sup>11</sup> The Baroccian MS. 50. supplies two citations from Aristophanes Theognost. Can. 298. Στρεψαῖος ὁ Ἑρμῆς παρὰ τῷ Ἀριστοφάνει, παρὰ τὸ διεστράφθαι τὰς ὀψεις.

Choerobosc. Orthogr. *f.* 153. Λείπω· λέγει ὁ Ὡρος ὅτι πάντα τὰ παρὰ τὸ λείπω



Ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι τὰ μεσότητος ἐπὶ ῥήματα πανταχῶς λέγεται· κατ' ἔπαινον, οἷον καλῶς, σαφῶς· κατὰ ψόγον, οἷον πονηρῶς, ἀσεβῶς· κατὰ μετουσίαν, οἷον ἀνθρωπικῶς· κατ' ἐναλλαγὴν, οἷον ἄλλως, αὐτως. τὰ δὲ εἰσὶν ἀθροίσεως ὠρισμένου τινος, οἷον· πανδημεί, πανσυδί, πανοικί. τὸ ἕα ἐκπληκτικόν, τὸ πλὴν ἐξαιρετικόν, τὸ ὥστε ἀποστατικόν, τὸ ἐμποδῶν διακωλυτικόν, τὸ λάθρα ἀποκρυπτικόν, ἀναφανδόν, διαῤῥηδὴν ἐμφαντικόν· σχεδὸν διαστάσεως· ὁδὰξ, λάξ, πύξ ὀργανικά· δηλονότι, δηλαδή, ἡγουν, ἐξηγηματικά· εἶεν διασαφητικόν· ἀμωσγέπως, ἀμηγέπη, ὅπως οὖν, ὅπωςδήποτε, ὅπωςδηποτοῦν ποσότητος ἀορίστου καὶ ποιότητος· σπανίως, ἐλάχιστα, μόγισ ἀφαιρετικά· μενούνγε ἐκλογῆς· Ἡρακλεῖς, Ἀπολλων, ἀποτρεπτικά· Ἑλληνιστὶ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια ἐθνικά.

Τὸ αἰ καὶ αἰ θρηνητικόν· τὸ αἰ ἀντὶ τοῦ αἴθε κατ' ἀποκοπὴν· τὸ αἰβοῖ σχετλιασμοῦ καὶ χαρᾶς· ποποῖ, ποποῖ, ποποῖ, ἰῶ, ἰῶ, ἰτῶ, ἰτῶ, ὀξυτόνως προφέρονται κατὰ μίμησιν ὀρνέου φωνῆς· ὁμοίως τιὸ, τιὸ, τιο· ὁμοίως καὶ τορὸ, τορὸ, τορὸ, τοροτίγξ· ὁμοίως καὶ κικκαβαῦ, κικκαβαῦ· τορὸ, τορὸ, το-λιλίγξ· τιὸ, τιὸ, τίγξ. ποῦ, ποῦ ὅστις, διὰ τὴν ἐπανάληψιν τὴν σπουδαίαν ζήτησιν ἐμφαίνει. ποῖ, ποῖ, ἔχ' ἀτρέμας, ἐπίσ-χες τοῦ δρόμου, ποδαπή, εὐραξ, πατάξ ἐπιφθέγματα εἰσι τάχέα. Τὸ ὅπ ἐπὶ ῥήμα παρακελεύσεως ἐπὶ τοῦ παύσασθαι τινὸς ὑποθέσεως, ὡς οἱ κωπηλατεύοντες. Τὸ βαβαιᾶξ, ὠκ-βάτανα τοῦ φρονήματος. Τὸ στριβιλικίγξ, ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐδεμίαν ῥανίδα· στρίβος καλεῖται ἡ ὀξεῖα βοή, λικίγξ δὲ ἡ λεπτὴ φωνὴ τοῦ ὀρνέου. Τὸ ταττὰ, τατταταὶ θρῆνοι εἰσι τραγωδοί. Τὸ ἰατταταιᾶξ τῶν κακῶν, καὶ ἰατταταὶ, σχετλιασμοῦ. Τὸ ὑπαπαὶ ἐπιφώνημα ἐστὶ ναυτικόν. Τὸ ἱπαπαὶ ἐπὶ ἱππῶν. Τὸ βαβαί, βαβαιᾶξ σχετλιαστικά. Τὸ ὠείας, ὠεία μίμημα βαρβάρων ἐλκόντων τι. Τὸ φῦ, φῦ, ἐπὶ τῶν φυσώντων πῦρ. Τὸ βῦ, βῦ ἐπὶ σιωπῆς. Τὸ παπαὶ, παπαιᾶξ σχετλιασμός γερόντων. Τὸ αῦ, αῦ μίμημα ὑλακτούντων κυνῶν. Τὸ ῥυπάπαι, βομβᾶξ, ἄτταται, τατταταὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλγούντων. Τὸ μῦ, μῦ, ἐπὶ τῶν ἡχούντων διὰ μυκτήρων. Τὸ ἱαπαπαιᾶξ. Τὸ εὐοῖ, εὐαί, εὐὰν ἐπὶ νίκης· καὶ εὐὰ χωρὶς ν. Τὸ ἄ, ἄ ἐπὶ ῥήμα ἐκπλήξεως καὶ κελεύσεως. Τὸ ἀβάλε ἐκπλήξεως. Τὸ ἦ, ἦ,

διὰ τῆς εἰ διφθόγγου γράφεται, οἷον λειπόνεως, λειποταξία, λειποτάξιον, λειπο-στράτειον· ὁ δὲ Ὀρειγένης (Cod. Ὀρειγένων) διὰ τοῦ ι λέγει γράφεσθαι· οἷον ἔλιπον παρ' Εὐφορίωνι· λιποτρόφια παρὰ Νεοπτολέμῳ· ἐλλίπεις παρ' Εὐφορίωνι· λιποκτενίασσα (λιποκτέανος), λιπονᾶνται, λιποτάξιον παρ' Ἀριστοφάνει.



σιώπα συγκαταθετικόν. Τὸ ἰή, ἰή πρόσφθεγμα καταφρονούντος. Τὸ ἰὼ, ἰὼ, ἰοὺ, ἰοὺ, ἐπὶ λύπης· τὸ ἰοῦ δὲ ἐπὶ χαρᾶς.

It might be curious to compare the interjectional particles here collected with those of other languages, in order to ascertain how far nature, which is said to suggest such exclamations from the momentary impulse of the passions, proceeds according to any general principles in modulating the accents designed, however indistinctly, to give utterance to those passions. In pursuing such an enquiry however, it would be necessary to discard many interjections as altogether artificial and arbitrary, and no way originating from the action of spontaneous feeling on the organs of speech. How artificially such particles may be made the symbols of feeling, may be seen from the fact that in our own language many are borrowed from others, such as *alas*, *hurrah*, *huzza*, *holla*, *bravo*. It is certain too that many of the sounds which accompany any bodily action or energy differ greatly among different nations. Thus the tones with which our coachmen and carters chide or urge on their horses, are very unlike those one hears in France, Germany, or Italy. The same may be said of the sounds uttered by our sailors and artisans. All these therefore must be classed with those which are purely arbitrary. Those particles which are strictly imitative of the voices of animals, and other sounds in nature, will of course offer a greater appearance of resemblance; but as they have nothing to do with feeling or passion, they cannot throw any light on the enquiry here suggested. I should apprehend that natural interjections, if they exist at all in a common form, would present little more than mere modulations of the vowels, or at most different diphthongous combinations. But these are merely hints thrown out for some abler and more industrious philologer

I. A. C.



## ON THE ROMAN *COLONI*,

FROM THE GERMAN OF SAVIGNY.

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THE cultivation of the earth has led, in ages and nations the most different from each other, to the growth of peculiar social relations. In a large part of Europe these relations in our days have undergone a change, brought about by violence in some places, in others peaceably; and thus they have become the object of general attention. In the Roman state under the Christian emperors such relations are also found very widely diffused, alongside of the class of slaves, which was gradually circumscribed and supplanted by them. An account of these relations of the peasantry among the later Romans will not be a waste of labour, since hardly any notice has of late years been taken of them.

The sources for such an enquiry are to be found partly in the Theodosian code, and the *Novellæ* belonging to it<sup>1</sup>, partly, and much more abundantly, in the Codex and the *Novellæ* of Justinian<sup>2</sup>. Important assistance may also be drawn from several letters of Gregory the Great<sup>3</sup>. In modern times the authors of systematic treatises on Roman law have scarcely paid the slightest regard to this subject, the

<sup>1</sup> Cod. Theod. Lib. v. Tit. 9, 10, 11, and above all the passage lately discovered by Peyron, Lib. v. Tit. 4. Const. 3. p. 284 in Wenck's edition.

<sup>2</sup> Cod. Just. Lib. xi. Tit. 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 63, 67. Nov. 54, 156, 157, 162. Justiniani const. de adscriptitiis, p. 671 ed. Gotting. Justini const. de filiis liberarum, p. 672. Tiberii const. de filiis colonorum, p. 672.

<sup>3</sup> Lib. i. ep. 44. Lib. iv. ep. 21. Lib. viii. ep. 32. Lib. ix. ep. 19. The first of these four letters contains the most information. The fourth, which orders the Syracunan *coloni* of the Roman church to pay obedience to a newly appointed *defensor*, is incorporated almost word for word, with merely slight alterations, in the *Liber diurnus Romanorum pontificum*, cap. 6. Tit. 5. I am indebted to Niebuhr's friendship for my acquaintance with these instructive passages.



causes of which neglect will be stated further on: and even what is found about it in commentators is exceedingly meagre. The writings of the Glossatores are of no service on this topic; for they confuse the whole question by the arbitrary and unfounded assumption that there were several kinds of *coloni*<sup>4</sup>. Cujacius has seized the main point correctly, but has not followed out his view in detail, and has mixt it up with several errors<sup>5</sup>. Jacob Gothofredus, who is usually referred to as the principal writer on this subject, has merely amast a quantity of materials, without doing the least to arrange them: the utter groundlessness of his historical views on this point will be spoken of lower down<sup>6</sup>. But far more unsatisfactory still is the dissertation of Heraldus, who formed an entirely erroneous notion concerning the condition of the *coloni*; and thus even his interpretations of particular passages are mostly wrong<sup>7</sup>. That condition however has recently been represented by Winspeare more correctly than by any previous author<sup>8</sup>.

The names used to designate this class of society are the following: *coloni*, *rustici*, *originarii*, *adscriptitii*, *inquilini*, *tributarii*, *censiti*. No precise definition of these terms can be given till a further stage in the enquiry.

I will begin by describing the social condition of the class, as it is set forth in our works on jurisprudence, and then tack on some historical investigations. For the former purpose there are three points to be treated of: the origin of this condition with reference to particular individuals, the rights and obligations connected with it, and finally the manner in which it might be shaken off.

<sup>4</sup> See Pillius, *Summa in tres libros* (the continuation of the *Summa* of Placentinus),—Azo in his *Summa*, and his Commentary on the Codex,—and the Glosses,—all on the abovementioned titles from the eleventh book of Justinian's Codex.

<sup>5</sup> The chief passage occurs in his Commentary on the last three books of the Codex, Lib. xi. Tit. 47 (with him 48), *de agricolis*, especially in the introduction to this title. To this add his *Observationes*, iv. 28, and Comm. in L. 112 pr. D. de leg. 1. (Opp. v. 1077. ed. Neap.)

<sup>6</sup> Ad. Cod. Theodos. Lib. v. Tit. 9, 10, 11, especially paratit. on v. 9. Amaduzzi ad Papianum Tit. 48, p. 289, sq. is of no value.

<sup>7</sup> *Quaestiones quotidianae* i. 8, 9.

<sup>8</sup> *Storia degli abusi feudali* T. i. pp. 105—111. This writer's historical views will be spoken of hereafter.



A person might become a *colonus* in three ways, by *birth*, *prescription*, or *agreement*.

Of these *birth* was the ordinary one, and on it is grounded the name *originarius*<sup>9</sup>. When both the parents belonged to this class and to the same master, the condition of the child was not liable to any possible doubt. On the other hand the following cases require a more specific examination.

The father might be a *colonus*, the mother a slave, or conversely. In such cases everything was determined by the class of the mother<sup>10</sup>, as well with regard to the condition of the child generally, as to the possible claims of different masters, if such could be brought forward. From the expressions in Justinian's constitution one might suppose that this rule was first laid down by him; which however is very improbable, inasmuch as according to the oldest principles of Roman law it is scarce possible that the matter should ever have been decided otherwise<sup>11</sup>.

Or the father might be free, the mother a *colona*. The children then in all ages were *coloni*, and belonged to the master of their mother<sup>12</sup>.

Or the father might be a *colonus*, the mother free. The law on this case underwent many changes. Before the time of Justinian the child, following his father, became likewise a *colonus*<sup>13</sup>: so that in this and the preceding case the rule was the same as among the Germanic nations with regard to

<sup>9</sup> *Originarius*, L. un. C. Theod. de inquilinis (v. 10). L. 7. C. J. de agric. (xi. 47). *Originarius colonus*, L. 11. C. J. de agric. (xi. 47). *Colonus originalis*, L. un. C. Theod. de inquil. (v. 10). *Originalis colonus*, L. 1. C. J. de agric. et mancip. (xi. 67).

<sup>10</sup> L. 21. C. J. de agric. (xi. 47): *Matris suae ventrem sequatur*.

<sup>11</sup> Gaius Lib. 1. § 56, 67, 80. Ulpian Tit. 5. § 8. It is true that Gaius (§ 83—86) cites certain express exceptions to the principle, that the children of parents who had no *connubium* were to follow the mother: but no such exception is mentioned in the constitution of Justinian: on the contrary it seems to assume that the point hitherto had been wholly undetermined, and that this could not be allowed.

<sup>12</sup> L. un. C. Theod. de inquilinis (v. 10). L. 16. 21. 24, C. J. de agric. (xi. 47). L. 4. C. J. de agric. et mancip. (xi. 67). Only in case the father was bound to any town or corporation by a special obligation of service, the children were to be divided for the first forty years, but not afterward. L. 16. Theod. de his qui condit. (xii. 19). This was not incorporated in the code of Justinian. [The words in the Theodosian code—*qui tamen intra hos proxime quadraginta annos docebuntur fuisse suscepti*—seem rather to mean, *those who have been born within the last forty years*: and this would be a more reasonable limitation.]

<sup>13</sup> Nov. 54. pr.



similar relations, that the child followed the baser blood<sup>14</sup>. Justinian abolished this, and at first declared the child to be perfectly free: only he gave the master of the husband the right of compelling him to separate from his wife<sup>15</sup>. Subsequently he subjected this freedom of the children to the following restrictions: they were to be capable of holding property of their own, but were to be personally bound to remain on the estate to which their father belonged, and to till it, unless they wanted to settle on and cultivate an estate of their own, which he allowed them to do<sup>16</sup>. In a still later constitution he deprived the children even of this limited freedom, and reduced them entirely to the condition of *coloni*<sup>17</sup>. Not long after however this limited freedom of the children was assumed in certain constitutions of Justin II and Tiberius as notorious and prevalent, without mention of the later severer ordinance of Justinian<sup>18</sup>.

Fourthly, both parents might be *coloni*, but in the service of different masters. That in this case the children also would be *coloni* could not be questioned; but to which of the masters they were to belong was a point which was never permanently arranged. At first the master of the mother was to have a third part of the children<sup>19</sup>. Then all of them were assigned to him<sup>20</sup>. Lastly it was settled that each of the two masters should have half the number of children, and that, if the number was an odd one, the larger half should fall to the mother's share<sup>21</sup>. In direct opposition

<sup>14</sup> Eichhorn Deutsche Staats-und Rechtsgeschichte I, § 50.

<sup>15</sup> L. 24. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47); confirmed in Nov. 54. pr. C. 1, only with a proviso against its acting retrospectively. Subsequently the marriage was even declared to be invalid: Nov. 22. C. 17.

<sup>16</sup> Nov. 162. C. 2.

<sup>17</sup> Const. de adscriptitiis.

<sup>18</sup> Justini const. de filiis liberarum. Tiberii const. de filiis colonorum. It is difficult to make out the exact relation between these contradictory ordinances. Cujacius (Observ. IV. 28) assumes that Justinian's last constitution was never actually introduced; and by the help of this supposition all may be explained very easily.

<sup>19</sup> L. un. C. Theod. de inquilinis (v. 10).

<sup>20</sup> L. 3. C. J. ut nemo (XI. 53).

<sup>21</sup> Nov. 162. C. 3. Nov. 156. The most questionable passage is L. 13. pr. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47): Definimus ut inter inquilinos colonosve—suscepti liberi, *vel utroque vel neutro* parente censito, statum paternae conditionis agnoscant. Even the text is doubtful. Pillius says: *utroque* parente censito *vel ultro* (utro?) i. e. altero—Sed in multis codicibus inveni *vel neutro*, quod subtilioribus relinquo. Azo in his commentary on this passage remarks: in libro M. (Martini) deest *vel utroque*. The gloss:



to this we find another ordinance of Justinian, according to which the master of the husband was authorized to keep all the children, and even the wife too: this ordinance however, the date of which is uncertain, was nothing but a local regulation, as Cujacius has rightly explained it, nor was it to be more than temporary; that is, it was not to hold good as a permanent rule for the future, but only for the marriages subsisting at that very time<sup>22</sup>.

By *prescription* the condition of a *colonus* was determined in two distinct cases. First, if a free man lived for thirty years as a *colonus*, the owner of the estate thereby acquired a right of mastership over him and his posterity: he enjoyed important privileges however with regard to property, which were likewise inherited by his children, and the nature of which will be explained by and by<sup>23</sup>. Secondly the possession of a *colonus* belonging to another person was secured after a stated time by prescription against the claims of his original master: this rule too cannot be made quite clear till further on.

With regard to a person's becoming a *colonus* by a voluntary *agreement* the following regulation was originally laid down. Free men or women were to become *coloni*, if they declared this purpose in court, and at the same time contracted a marriage with a person belonging to that class. This was ordained by Valentinian III<sup>24</sup>. Neither this nor any other specific regulation touching such an agreement was admitted into the code of Justinian; so that one might imagine that he meant it no longer to hold good, that is, that no one was thenceforward to become a *colonus* except by birth or prescription. Nevertheless there is a constitution of his, which, although it seems to have another object, may at the same time have been drawn up mainly with reference to

al. *utroque* i. e. *altero*—*alii habent vel utroque vel neutro*. Holoander reads *alterutro* instead of *neutro*. The best way however is to keep *vel neutro*, and to adopt the following explanation given by Cujacius: if both the parents were *coloni*, the children became so likewise, whether the parents were *censiti*, that is, liable to pay taxes (see below notes 60, 90), or not. The words *paterna conditio* may now be interpreted to mean the class of the parents generally, without specific reference to the claims of the two masters.

<sup>22</sup> Nov. 157. See Cujaciuses commentary on it.

<sup>23</sup> L. 18. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47). eod. *Alii*—tempore triginta annorum *coloni* fiunt, liberati manentes cum rebus suis. L. 23. § 1. eod. See below p. 132.

<sup>24</sup> Nov. Valentiniani Tit. 9.



such an agreement<sup>25</sup>. This constitution speaks of the evidence requisite to shew that a person is a *colonus*, and enacts that a single proof, such for instance as a written contract, an acknowledgement in court, a registering in the tax-books, should not be sufficient, but that there should be a combination of at least two such proofs. Now what is here spoken of as evidence for the previous existence of such a relation, might without doubt be employed as a form of agreement when a free man wanted to enter into it for the first time: for if he concluded a written contract, and afterward signified his assent to its substance before the court, the law was fully satisfied, and he could not withdraw himself again from his dependence. Indeed this process may perhaps have been the real object of the ordinance; and it may arise merely from an inaccuracy of expression that the proofs appear to be the only things spoken of.

The rights and obligations contingent to the *colonus* were of three kinds: some related to his personal condition, others to his connexion with the soil, others to his property and taxes.

As to the personal condition of the *coloni*, they were free, that is, distinct from the slaves; but it unquestionably bore a great resemblance to that of the slaves. That they were distinct from the slaves, is proved by the following evidence. In several imperial constitutions they are mentioned along with the slaves, and by way of opposition to them<sup>26</sup>. In others they are expressly declared to be *ingenui*<sup>27</sup>. We find too that they were held capable of contracting a real, genuine marriage<sup>28</sup>, which slaves, it is well known, were not<sup>29</sup>. The same thing is implied in the punishment with which they

<sup>25</sup> L. 22. pr. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47).

<sup>26</sup> L. 21. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47): Ne diutius dubitetur, si quis ex adscriptitia et libero, vel ex adscriptitia et servo, vel adscriptitio et ancilla fuisset editus, etc. Compare L. 7. C. eod. Nov. Valent. Tit. 9.

<sup>27</sup> L. un. C. J. de colonis Thracensibus (XI. 51): Ipsi quidem originario jure teneantur: et licet *conditione videantur ingenui*, servi tamen terrae ipsius, cui nati sunt, existimentur etc.

<sup>28</sup> L. 24. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47). Nov. Valent. Tit. 9.

<sup>29</sup> L. 5. § 1. D. de bonis damnatorum (XLVIII. 20): Nam cum *libera mulier remaneat*, nihil prohibet et virum *mariti affectionem*, et mulierem *uxoris animum* retinere. Consequently a slave could not possibly be in a state to fulfill this primary condition of all marriages: Nov. 22. C. 10. Non dicimus solvi matrimonium sed ab ipso initio neque matrimonium fieri.



were threatened in case of their running away: they were to be put in fetters, and treated as a punishment *after the manner of slaves*<sup>30</sup>; which expression clearly demonstrates that they were essentially distinct from slaves. In Gregory the Great's letters too this essential distinction between the two classes is established in the most unequivocal manner<sup>31</sup>. Several Jews in the town of Luna were possessed of Christian slaves. For these slaves Gregory commissions the bishop of Luna to procure their freedom, as was enjoined by the laws<sup>32</sup>: if however they had been employed in agriculture, they were to continue on the estates as *coloni*. But should the master of such a *colonus* endeavour to remove him from the estate, or to reduce him to domestic service, the *colonus* was to be perfectly free; since his master would now have lost his right of property by the general enactment of the laws, and have forfeited the *jus colonarium* by his own arbitrary proceeding.

But on the other hand the freedom of the *coloni* was so limited, that no doubt it bore a great similarity to the condition of the slaves<sup>33</sup>. This similarity is acknowledged in general terms in several passages<sup>34</sup>. Hence they are called *servi terrae*<sup>35</sup>; and the term *liberi* is now and then used in opposition to the *coloni*, as well as to the slaves<sup>36</sup>. They were liable like the slaves to corporal punishments<sup>37</sup>. In like manner the rule which prevailed with regard to slaves, that they should not bring an action against their master,

<sup>30</sup> L. 1. C. Th. de fugit. colonis (v. 9): Ipsos etiam colonos, qui fugam meditantur, in servilem conditionem ferro ligari conveniet, ut officia quae liberis congruunt, merito servilis condemnationis compellantur implere. Gothofredus explains the words in servilem conditionem very correctly by *instar servi*.

<sup>31</sup> Lib. iv. Ep. 21.

<sup>32</sup> These laws are found in Cod. Just. Lib. i. Tit. 10.

<sup>33</sup> Heineccius despatches this whole enquiry very briefly (Antiq. Lib. i. Tit. 3. § 8), by pronouncing without more ado that the *coloni* were slaves, merely mentioning by the by that several persons had entertained doubts on the point.

<sup>34</sup> L. 21. C. J. de agric. (xi. 47): Quae enim differentia inter servos et adscriptitios intelligatur, cum uterque in domini sui positus sit potestate. L. 2. C. J. in quib. causis coloni (xi. 49): pene est ut quadam dediti servitute videantur.

<sup>35</sup> See the preceding and the 42d notes.

<sup>36</sup> L. 21. C. J. de agric. (xi. 47). L. 16, L. 22. pr. L. 24. eod. Sometimes too this expression is used to designate a freer class among the *coloni* themselves, as distinguished from the less free: on this point I shall speak lower down: see note 36.

<sup>37</sup> L. 52. 54. C. Theod. de haereticis (xvi. 5). L. 24. C. J. de agric. (xi. 47).



was extended to them: two exceptions however were made to it, in case of an arbitrary raising of their rent (*superexactio*), and if they wanted to accuse their master of a crime<sup>38</sup>. What is still more remarkable, even the principle that a runaway slave was regarded as a thief of his own person was applied at one time to them<sup>39</sup>: which application certainly seems to be at variance with the recognition that they were *ingenui*, but can be defended by analogical cases in the old Roman law<sup>40</sup>. The relation borne by the lord of the estate to the *coloni* was designated, in the want of a peculiar technical term, by the name *patronus*<sup>41</sup>.

The relation of the *colonus* to the soil consisted mainly in his being indissolubly attached to it, so that he could not be separated from it either by his own act or by his master<sup>42</sup>. Consequently if a *colonus* quitted an estate, the master of it might lay claim to him. This claim might be maintained against any other landholder, should the *colonus* have settled on his estate<sup>43</sup>; and the landholder, if he was aware that he was detaining his neighbour's *colonus*, had to pay a considerable fine<sup>44</sup>. Or it might be maintained against the *colonus* himself, if he was living as a free man. No rank, no

<sup>38</sup> L. 2. C. J. in quib. causis coloni (XI. 49). They were allowed indeed—as appears from L. un. C. Theod. utrumvi (IV. 23), L. 20. 22. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47)—to bring an action on the question whether they were *coloni*, and whether, what was connected with that question, the estate was their property or the master's: but this was no peculiar privilege, inasmuch as the slaves also had always had the *liberale iudicium* open to them.

<sup>39</sup> L. 23. pr. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47): Secundum exemplum servi fugitivi sese diutinis insidiis furari intelligatur.

<sup>40</sup> Gaius Lib. III. § 199. § 9. I. de obl. quæ ex del. (IV. 1.)

<sup>41</sup> L. un. C. Theod. ne colonus (V. 11). The names *dominus* and *possessor* indeed are also found: these denote however not his personal relation to the *colonus*, but his ownership of the estate, on which, it is true, that relation was dependent.

<sup>42</sup> L. un. C. J. de col. Thrac. (XI. 51): servi—terrae ipsius. L. 15. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47): glebis inhaerere præcipimus. One must not however take this indissoluble attachment too literally. Its purpose was only to prevent a permanent change of abode and employment: mere interruptions, even for a considerable period, were permitted, at least if the master did not object to them. Thus for instance Gregory the Great (Lib. VIII. Ep. 32) speaks of a *colonus* who had been working for three years in building a church at Catanea; and his absence from the estate is assumed to be perfectly allowable.

<sup>43</sup> L. 1. C. Theod. de fugit. col. (V. 9). L. un. C. Theod. de inquilinis (V. 10). L. 6. L. 23. § 2. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47).

<sup>44</sup> L. 2. C. Theod. de fugit. col. (V. 9). L. 12. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47). L. un. C. J. de col. Thrac. (XI. 51). L. 1. C. J. de col. Illyr. (XI. 52). L. 2. C. J. de fugit.



dignity could protect him, not even the having enlisted as a soldier<sup>45</sup>. As to what regards the clerical order, at first the only rule laid down was, that no *colonus* should be ordained except in his native place, and that he should continue to pay his polltax himself<sup>46</sup>. Afterward his ordination was made dependent on the consent of his master, so that, unless the master had given it, he might demand his *colonus* back out of the church, and in like manner out of any monastic order<sup>47</sup>. Finally Justinian returned to the original rule, and allowed the *colonus* to be ordained in his native place even without his master's consent, but obliged him to continue to discharge his obligations on the estate<sup>48</sup>. The episcopal office according to Justinian's ordinance gave a *colonus* his full freedom<sup>49</sup>.

But on the other hand the master also was not allowed to separate the *colonus* from his estate. He had indeed an absolute power of disposing of him along with the estate, but none at all without it<sup>50</sup>. Such a sale was null: the seller might redemand his *colonus*; and the purchaser lost his purchase-money: this was to be the case even if a small piece of land was given into the bargain at the sale, for the purpose of evading the law<sup>51</sup>. By an ordinance of Valentinian III however the exchange of one *colonus* for another was allowed<sup>52</sup>: but this did not find its way into the code of Justinian. In like manner a landholder was further prohibited from selling his estate and keeping back the *coloni*<sup>53</sup>. On the other hand a person who possessed several estates, if there was a superabundance of *coloni* on one of them, and a deficiency on another, might remove a portion of them: and

col. (XI. 63). The highest of these fines prevailed in Thrace: it amounted to two pounds of gold.

<sup>45</sup> L. 6. 11. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47). L. 1. 3. C. J. de fugit. col. (XI. 63).

<sup>46</sup> L. 33. C. Th. de episc. (XVI. 2): that is, L. 11. C. J. de episc. (I. 3).

<sup>47</sup> L. 16. L. 37. pr. C. J. de episc. (I. 3).

<sup>48</sup> Nov. 123. c. 17.

<sup>49</sup> Nov. 123. c. 4.

<sup>50</sup> L. 7. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47): *Originarios absque terra—vendi omnifariam non licebit. L. 21. eod. Et possit (dominus)—adscriptitium cum terra dominio suo expellere. Nov. Valent. Tit. 9.*

<sup>51</sup> L. 7. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47).

<sup>52</sup> Nov. Valent. Tit. 9.

<sup>53</sup> L. 2. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47): *Si quis praedium vendere voluerit, vel donare, retinere sibi transferendos ad alia loca colonos privata pactione non possit.* It is the same passage as in L. 3. C. Theod. de censu sine adscript. (XIII. 10).



this new arrangement then became unalterable, even though one of the estates should afterward be sold<sup>54</sup>.

The reason for these restrictions on the landholder one might be disposed at first to look for in certain rights possessed by the *colonus* himself, in which case his consent would have been sufficient to remove them. But no mention is ever made of any such consent; nor in fact had the *colonus* any manner of right in the soil. That he was not the proprietor of it, and so could not himself dispose of it, was clear<sup>55</sup>: but even the lowest kind of real right to the soil is never ascribed to him. Indeed that no such existed, follows necessarily from the before-mentioned rights of the master to exchange his *coloni* and to remove them. So that in fact it was only for the interests of the state that those restrictions were imposed<sup>56</sup>, although the *coloni* thereby indirectly obtained a similar protection against arbitrary conduct on the part of the landowner, as if they had themselves had a right in the soil. These interests of the state consisted primarily and mainly in its superintending care for agriculture, which was held to be especially promoted by the encouragement of such a relation<sup>57</sup>. Beside this however there were the interests of the revenue, which will be spoken of presently. The welfare of the *coloni* themselves was not considered, except in certain subordinate regulations, which, it is true, were founded on humanity, but the very need for which is enough to prove that they had no right in the soil. Thus for instance when an estate held in common, to which there were *coloni* belonging, was divided, married couples and relations were not to be separated<sup>58</sup>. Again if *coloni* were transferred from one estate to another, and then one of these estates was sold, the children were in like manner to remain with their

<sup>54</sup> L. 13. § 1. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47).

<sup>55</sup> L. 1. C. Theod. ne colonus (v. 11): Non dubium est colonis arva quae subigunt—alienandi jus non esse. L. 17. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47).

<sup>56</sup> There is a direct reference to this in the words *privata pactione* in the passage quoted in note 53.

<sup>57</sup> Nov. Valent. Tit. 9: Ne ad alterum coloni, ad alterum possessio exhausta perveniat. L. 7. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47): Neque vero—id usurpet legis illusor—ut parva portione terrae emptori tradita, omnis integri fundi cultura adimatur.

<sup>58</sup> L. 11. C. J. comm. utr. jud. (III. 38).



parents<sup>59</sup>. It deserves notice that the abovementioned superintending care for agriculture, as well as the humane regard for the preservation of family ties, was not confined to the *coloni*, but even embraced the slaves, when they were employed in husbandry, and as such were enrolled in the registers<sup>60</sup>. This assimilation of the two classes is a further proof that the *coloni* were not supposed to have any personal right in the soil, since any such right vested in a slave was utterly inconceivable.

Such being the origin of the inseparable connexion between the *colonus* and the soil, we easily get to a very natural limitation of it. If a higher public interest pleaded in behalf of its dissolution, and the landowner was disposed to allow it, there would be no scruple about the matter. But this would happen in the following important and frequent case. The charge of recruiting the army was imposed on the landholders, in proportion to the value of their property<sup>61</sup>. Now as no slaves were enlisted<sup>62</sup>, it must without doubt have been calculated that the recruits furnished by the landholders would consist mainly of their *coloni*. In such a case the landowner's consent was already procured; and with regard to the state the care for agriculture and for the revenue<sup>63</sup> was outweighed by the still more important care for the army. The passages quoted above (note 45), which authorize the redemanding a *colonus* even when he has become a soldier, speak only of runaway *coloni*, that is, such as have left the estate against the will of the owner.

<sup>59</sup> L. 13. § 1. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47). Thus permission was granted even in earlier times, when claim was laid to a *colonus*, to avert the separation of a married couple or of parents and children by the production of substitutes. L. un. C. Theod. de inquil. (v. 10). Nov. Valentin. Tit. 9.

<sup>60</sup> L. 7. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47): Quemadmodum originarios absque terra, ita rusticos censitosque servos vendi omnifariam non licebit. L. 11. C. J. comm. utr. jud. (III. 38). Previously there had only been a prohibition against their being sold out of their province: L. 2. C. Theod. sine censu (XI. 3).

<sup>61</sup> Vegetius I. 7. L. 7. C. Th. de tironibus (VII. 13). Nov. Theod. Tit. 44. C. 1.

<sup>62</sup> L. 8. C. Th. de tironibus (VII. 13).

<sup>63</sup> For as soon as the recruit was supplied, his polltax was beyond a doubt taken off from the estate. Properly speaking he would now have had to pay his polltax himself: but he belonged to the number of those who had a special exemption; and it was laid down with great precision in what cases he alone, and in what cases his family also were to benefit by the exemption.



In another point on the contrary the *coloni* were protected by an immediate personal right. They paid the landowner a yearly rent for the enjoyment of the farm which they inhabited<sup>64</sup>. Generally speaking this rent was to be paid in kind, and a money-payment was not to be demanded<sup>65</sup>: there might also be cases however in which the rent was to be paid in money, unquestionably either by contract or custom<sup>66</sup>. Now with regard to this rent there was this important rule, that the landowner was altogether unable to raise it above what till then had been customary<sup>67</sup>: and by this provision the condition of the *colonus*, in other respects so hard, was very much lightened.

This rent for the lands occupied by the *coloni*, though it is indisputably one of the most important features in their condition, receives little light from the old lawbooks: but this only increases the value of the information which is contained in a letter of Gregory the Great<sup>68</sup> concerning the *coloni* of the Roman church in Sicily, and of which I will attempt to give a connected statement. The church did not cultivate her estates on her own score, but farmed them on a large scale to *conductores*<sup>69</sup>. Hence all the *coloni* living on the small plots of the estate were farmed out along with it to the *conductor*<sup>70</sup>, that is to say, they had to pay their rent not to the church but to him, so that the regulations contained in the pope's letter are to be regarded in the first instance as a code for the farmers and *coloni* of the church.

<sup>64</sup> *Annuae functiones*: L. 2. C. J. in quib. causis col. (XI. 49). *Reditus*: L. 20. pr. L. 23. § 1. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47).

<sup>65</sup> L. 5. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47). *Domini praediorum id quod terra praestat accipiant, pecuniam non requirant, quam rustici optare non audent: nisi consuetudo praedii hoc exigat.*

<sup>66</sup> L. 20. § 2. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47).

<sup>67</sup> L. 1. 2. C. J. in quib. caus. col. (XI. 49). L. 23. § 1. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47). This was the only case in which the *colonus* was allowed to maintain a private action against his landlord. See note 38.

<sup>68</sup> Lib. I. Ep. 44. p. 533, sqq. ed. Paris, 1705.

<sup>69</sup> These *conductores* are mentioned in pp. 534, 535, 536. They again to a certain degree formed a class by themselves: at least it was held by many persons that their property at their death did not descend to their relations, but fell to the church. This doctrine is reprehended by the pope (p. 535), who orders that the common law of inheritance should be observed.

<sup>70</sup> Hence in pp. 536, 537 we find the words: *Quoties conductor aliquid colono suo injuste abstulerit.*



The rent in Sicily consisted universally in a certain portion of the produce, which however was sometimes delivered in kind, sometimes bought off with money. In the former case the *coloni* had to bear both the risk of the voyage, and the unavoidable damage on board ship, for which they had to give the sailors an average compensation. With regard to the latter case the pope enjoins that the sum taken is always to be the real marketprice at the time, it having hitherto been the practice in cheap years to oppress the *coloni* by arbitrarily fixing higher prices. The passage of the letter which lays down a general rule for the rate of the rent is peculiarly important, but very difficult. Gregory says, it had hitherto been the custom on many estates to extort the oppressive rent of three bushels and a half out of seventy from the *coloni*<sup>71</sup>, and even to increase this rent by sundry by-charges. He orders that in future no more than two bushels out of seventy should be taken, and that nothing should be required beyond<sup>72</sup>. And to the end that the *coloni* may

<sup>71</sup> That is, a twentieth of the produce, or half a tenth. The rent in future was to amount only to a *thirtyfifth*. How the number *seventy* came to be used, I am unable to explain.

<sup>72</sup> The passage, about the substance of which there can be no question, though it is far from easy to explain the words, stands in the Paris edition as follows: *Cognovimus etiam, in aliquibus massis Ecclesiae exactionem injustissimam fieri, ita ut a septuaginta terni semis, quod dici nefas est, conductores exigantur: et adhuc neque hoc sufficit, sed insuper aliquid ex usu jam multorum exigi dicuntur. Quam rem omnino detestamur—et prout vires rusticorum portant, pensionem integram ad septuagena bina persolvant.* It is clear that the pope meant to say, *We have heard that in many places the farmers exact three and a half out of seventy (from the coloni): nay it is said that they are not even contented with this, but still demand something more.* In order however to understand the words in this way, they must be explained and amended as follows. The subject of the whole proposition is the *rustici ecclesiae*, who are mentioned so repeatedly in the preceding part of the letter that there is nothing at all forced in supplying them here. Besides we must read *a septuagenis terna semis*, and afterward *per conductores exigantur*. *Septuagenis* is found in some of the manuscripts, and supported by the analogy of *septuagena* just after. *Terna* has no manuscript authority; but the numerals of the older manuscripts might easily be converted by a mistaken interpretation both into *terni* and *ternis*. *Ternis* especially may have arisen from an erroneous notion that it was to be taken along with *septuagenis*: and then the *s* at the beginning of the next word may have led to the change of *ternis* into *terni*. *Terna* is to be taken as the accusative, and the whole clause is to be filled up and constructed as follows—*ita ut (rustici) per conductores exigantur terna semis a septuagenis*: which construction is confirmed by the exactly parallel one immediately after: *insuper aliquid (rustici) exigi dicuntur*. On this construction of *exigantur* see Cramer pr. ad Gellium excursuum trias. Kil. 1827. pp. 29. sq.



not be deprived of this benefit after his death, he orders that official statements of the rate of the whole rent should be made out and given to them. Now this rent certainly seems to be incomprehensibly low: this appearance however may be explained in some measure by the following remarks. In the first place the above-mentioned prohibition of extra charges is not to be construed too literally: so that we do not know how many such were still to continue; and by these the rate fixt was unquestionably raised somewhat higher. Thus for instance every *colonus* had to pay a certain sum to the farmer for permission to marry, which however was not to amount to more than a *solidus* (p. 535). Moreover the pope with great indignation forbids the levying the rent by an imaginary *modius* larger than the common one (p. 533), and adds that no more than eighteen *sextarii* to the *modius* must be demanded at the utmost. Now as the common *modius* contained only sixteen *sextarii*<sup>73</sup>, he at all events here allows an arbitrary addition, though without doubt one sanctioned by usage, of two *sextarii* to the *modius*, that is, of an eighth of the whole rent; so that he does not prohibit every kind of abuse, but merely the carrying it too far. Of still greater importance however is it that the *coloni* had to discharge the landtax to which their plots were liable. Now if we assume, what is very probable on other grounds, that the landtax at that period was very high<sup>74</sup>, we shall easily understand that a high rent could not be paid at the same time to the landlord. The important fact, that the *coloni* really had to pay the landtax for their plots to the treasury, results from the following passage of the letter referred to (p. 535). The pope says that the first payment of the tax prest especially hard on the *coloni*; for since at the time of payment they had not sold their produce yet<sup>75</sup>,

<sup>73</sup> Volusius Maecianus de Asse, at the end of the treatise.

<sup>74</sup> See the fourth section of my Dissertation on the Roman Finances under the Emperors: [a translation of which will be inserted in a future Number of the Philological Museum.]

<sup>75</sup> The landtax for the year was levied in three payments made on the first of January, of May, and of September: see the third section of my Dissertation on the Roman Finances. Now on the first of these days the olive-harvest was hardly over; and the oil, the sale of which must probably have been the chief resource for procuring money, could not be disposed of, unless the *coloni*, as the pope says, to get out of



they were forced to borrow the money from the officers of the revenue at a usurious interest. He orders that in future the money should be advanced (unquestionably without interest) from the church-chest, and that the *coloni* should refund it by degrees. The whole passage is as follows: *Praeterea cognovimus quod prima illatio burdationis*<sup>76</sup> *rusticos nostros vehementer angustat, ita ut priusquam labores suos venundare valeant, compellantur tributa persolvere: qui dum de suo, unde dare debeant, non habent, ab auctionariis publicis*<sup>77</sup> *mutuo accipiunt, et gravia commoda pro eodem beneficio persolvunt: ex qua re fit ut dispendiis gravibus coangustentur. Unde praesenti admonitione praecipimus ut omne quod mutuum pro eadem causa ab extraneis accipere poterant, a tua experientia publico*<sup>78</sup> *detur, et a rusticis Ecclesiae paulatim ut habuerint accipiatur; ne dum in tempore coangustantur, quod eis postmodum sufficere in inferendum poterat, prius compulsi vilius vendant, et hoc eis minime sufficiat.*

With regard to property the *coloni* seem at first sight to stand on exactly the same foot as the slaves. What they possess is called *peculium*, just as is the case with slaves: it is said that the claims of the master did not merely extend to the person of his *colonus*, but embraced his *peculium*<sup>79</sup>; nay that the *coloni* earned for their master, and that what they earned belonged not to them, but to him<sup>80</sup>. A minuter

their straits consented to part with it under its value. With reference to a mere corn-country the passage would be nonsense; for in such the produce might assuredly have been conveniently sold before the first of January.

<sup>76</sup> The word *burdatio* occurs nowhere except in two passages of this letter (pp. 535, 536); and its etymology is uncertain. There can be no doubt however about its meaning, both on account of the *prima illatio* coupled with it (see the third section of my Dissertation on the Roman Finances), and because the word *tributa* is used immediately after as equivalent to it.

<sup>77</sup> We should follow the manuscripts which read *actionariis*. *Actionarii publici* was a general name for all the officers of the revenue, and is used here for the tax-collectors. See Ducange on *actionarius* and *auctionarius*.

<sup>78</sup> *Tua experientia*, as appears from several passages, is the official honorary title which the pope gives to the subdeacon, Peter. *Publico* is the dative, and means the same as *fisco*, the exchequer. The reading of the old editions, *ex publico*, is to be rejected therefore without hesitation.

<sup>79</sup> L. un. C. Theod. de inquilinis (v. 10). L. 23. § 2. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47).

<sup>80</sup> L. 2. C. J. in quib. caus. coloni (XI. 49): *Quem nec propria quidem leges sui juris habere voluerunt, et—domino et acquirere, et habere voluerunt.* L. 18. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47).



examination however will convince us that these expressions are not to be taken literally. In fact the *coloni* were capable of holding property; and they were only prohibited from alienating their property without the consent of their landlord<sup>81</sup>, it being unquestionably more advantageous both for the estate itself and for its master to have a wealthy *colonus* than a poor one. This incapacity of alienating property is all that is meant by the abovementioned inaccurate expressions; so that the difference between the *colonus* and the slave in this point was very great. For a slave actually had nothing of his own; and, as the most important consequence of this principle, his master could take away everything that he possessed: a *colonus* had property of his own, which could not be taken away from him, and he was only debarred from alienating it at discretion. That this was really the state of things is set beyond a doubt by the following instances. If a *colonus* was a Donatist, he was to lose a third part of his *peculium* as a punishment for his heresy<sup>82</sup>, a penalty which evidently assumes that he had property of his own. Moreover it was a general rule that, if a priest or monk died without a will, and left no heirs, his property went to his church or convent. To this rule however there were three exceptions: if the deceased was a freedman, or a *colonus*, or a member of a *curia*, his property was to go to his patron, or landlord, or *curia*<sup>83</sup>. The object of this rule, as well as the mention of the *colonus* alongside of the freedman and the *curialis*, shews that the *coloni* must have had heritable property of their own. This limited power in disposing of their property was all indeed that the *coloni*, generally speaking, possessed: but there were two exceptions to this, which have already been mentioned above. For such *coloni* as had become so by prescription were to have a perfectly free command of their property<sup>84</sup>: and so were those who sprang from the marriage of a *colonus* with a free woman<sup>85</sup>. One may therefore assume, with reference

<sup>81</sup> L. un. C. Theod. ne colonus (v. 11). L. 2. C. J. in quib. caus. coloni (xi. 49).

<sup>82</sup> L. 54. C. Theod. de haereticis (xvi. 5).

<sup>83</sup> L. un. C. Theod. de bonis clericorum (v. 3). L. 20. C. J. de episcopis (i. 3).

<sup>84</sup> L. 18. L. 23. § 1. C. J. de agric. (xi. 47). See above p. 121.

<sup>85</sup> Nov. 162. C. 2. See above p. 120.



to this distinction, that there were two classes of *coloni*, of which one enjoyed greater freedom than the other<sup>86</sup>.

One of the most difficult points connected with the condition of the *coloni* is what regards the public taxes. This is a matter however of which nothing more than a general view can here be taken: to investigate it in detail, with a thorough examination of the historical evidence that may throw light on it, would be impossible except in connexion with the whole fiscal system of the Romans. At the time when the *coloni* became a distinct class, and even long before, two direct taxes prevailed one along with the other through the Roman empire, a landtax, and a polltax. The first was paid by all landed proprietors (*possessores*), the second by those who had no landed property, provided they were not freed from it either by their rank (*plebeii*), or by some particular exemption. From this outline of the general system of taxation we may draw the following inferences with regard to the *coloni*. The landtax for their plots of land fell on the landlord, because the property belonged to him. So far as relates to this obligation in itself no material differences could prevail: the only one was whether the actual payment of the landtax was made immediately by the landlord or by the *coloni*, which indeed must have been a matter of not the slightest moment to the treasury<sup>87</sup>. On the other hand all the *coloni*, as a class, were liable to pay polltax: for they were all plebeians without exception, and can very seldom have been exempted as landed proprietors, since they never had any property in the plot which they cultivated (see p. 126), and their having any landed property lying elsewhere was assuredly a very rare occurrence. Indeed among those who paid the polltax they were far the most numerous and productive class, more especially after the towns were exempted from it. Thus it came to pass that the liability to pay the polltax, though neither

<sup>86</sup> Hence in L. 23. § 1. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47) these privileged *coloni* are called *liberi* by way of contrast to the others. On the other hand the expression *liberi coloni*, in L. un. C. J. de coll. Illyr. (XI. 52), seems to designate the *coloni* generally as opposed to the slaves: while in L. 1. C. J. de praed. tamiacis (XI. 68) it must mean free peasants as distinguisht from the *coloni*, properly so called, who are there termed *adscriptitii*.

<sup>87</sup> See above p. 130.



an essential feature in the condition of a *colonus*, nor exclusively confined to it, was yet regarded as regularly and ordinarily appertaining to it. Hence when the polltax was taken off in some of the provinces, it was thought necessary expressly to add that the condition of the *coloni* was nevertheless to continue in other respects the same<sup>88</sup>. The charge of answering for the polltax of the *coloni* was imposed on the landlord: it was entered into the registers along with the landtax of the estate: the landlord had to pay it to the collectors, and was left to recover it from his *coloni* at his own risk and cost.

From this general liability of the *coloni* to pay the polltax, they derived the following appellations: *tributarii*,—which name therefore must by no means be derived from the rent they paid to their landlords<sup>89</sup>,—*censiti* or *censibus obnoxii*<sup>90</sup>, and those which occur so frequently, *adscriptitii*, *adscriptitiae conditionis*<sup>91</sup>, *censibus adscripti*<sup>92</sup>. The latter do not refer, as one might be inclined to suppose, to the peculiar relation between the tax paid by the *coloni* and that paid by the estate, to which the other was a kind of supplement or appendage: they merely express generally that the *coloni* were registered in the tax-rolls, and so were (personally) liable to pay tax. For the term *adscriptio* is also applied to the estates themselves<sup>93</sup>; so that in fact it is merely a general designation for the entering of any object in the taxbooks, in other words, for its liability to pay tax.

This liability of the *coloni* to the polltax was one of the two reasons for which the state tried in every way to

<sup>88</sup> L. un. C. J. de col. Thrac. (XI. 51). L. un. C. J. de col. Illyr. (XI. 52).

<sup>89</sup> L. 3. C. J. ut nemo (XI. 53). L. 12. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47). L. 2. C. Th. si vagum (x. 12). That the name *tributarii* does in fact come from the polltax paid to the state, not from the rent paid to the landlord, is incontrovertibly proved by the laws quoted in the preceding note, in which it is said that the *coloni* are to be freed from their *tributarius nexus*.

<sup>90</sup> L. 4, 6, 13. pr. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47). See above note 21. L. 1. C. J. de tiron. (XII. 44). They were also termed *capite censi*: Juliani epit. nov. const. 21. C. 12. Slaves also might from like reasons be *censiti* and be so called. L. 7. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47). L. 10. C. J. de re milit. (XII. 36). See note 60.

<sup>91</sup> L. 6, 21, 22, 23, 24. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47). L. 11. C. J. comm. utr. jud. (III. 38).

<sup>92</sup> L. 19, 22. pr. 4. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47). L. 2. C. J. in quib. caus. col. (XI. 49). L. 20. C. J. de episc. (I. 3).

<sup>93</sup> For instance in L. 5. C. Th. ne collat. translatio (XI. 22).



encourage and to uphold them as a class; and this was also one of the motives why the landlord was prohibited from arbitrarily severing the *colonus* from his estate. Indeed several expressions might lead one to believe that the erection of the whole class had proceeded originally from the distribution of the multitude who were without property, among the landowners, purely for the sake of the revenue<sup>94</sup>: this however from other grounds is very improbable, and at the utmost can only have been the case in certain countries and at particular times.

It remains for me to speak of the way in which a *colonus* ceased to be one. The practice with regard to slaves might at first induce us to expect that he might be set free by the will of his landlord, acting either at his own absolute discretion, or at all events with the consent of the *colonus* himself. Yet nothing of the sort is anywhere mentioned<sup>95</sup>: and this may easily be accounted for from the abovementioned prohibition against separating a *colonus* from the estate. For the same motives which stood in the way of the sale of a *colonus*, would likewise oppose his being set free; nor was there anything like the same urgent reasons for liberating him, as for the slaves. On the other hand we find mention of two cases in which the bond of a *colonus* might be dissolved by prescription, when he had lived for a certain time either as a free man, or under another master. The term assigned in both cases was originally thirty years for men, twenty for women: and with regard to the second case a more specific provision was added, that, if a man had lived with several landlords in succession, the one under whom he had

<sup>94</sup> L. 26. C. Theod. de annona (XI. 1): Nullum gratia relevet: nullum *iniquae partitionis* vexet incommodum, sed pari omnes sorte teneantur: ita tamen, ut, si ad alterius personam transferatur praedium, cui certus plebis numerus fuerit adscriptus, venditi onera novellus possessor compellatur agnoscere.

<sup>95</sup> Indeed the expression used in L. 21. C. J. de agric. (XI. 47) seems to point out pretty clearly that it was inadmissible: *et possit (dominus) servum cum peculio manumittere, et adscriptitium cum terra dominio suo expellere*. So that he could not do it *sine terra*. In the whole passage there is a design to bring out the resemblance between the *coloni* and the slaves: this is the reason why the manumission of the slaves *cum peculio* is mentioned, because this could certainly be in some measure compared to the disposing of the *colonus* along with his farm, whereas there was nothing connected with the *coloni* analogous to the *manumissio sine peculio*, which unquestionably was equally admissible.



lived the longest was to keep him, or, if there was no difference of time, the last<sup>96</sup>. The first kind of prescription, by which a *colonus* obtained his freedom through his own act, was entirely abolished by Justinian; so that from his time forward there was no limit to the period after which the master of a *colonus* might lay claim to him<sup>97</sup>. With regard to the second kind of prescription, by which a *colonus* came into the hands of another landowner, he did not lay down any rule; nor did he incorporate the beforementioned regulations made by his predecessors<sup>98</sup>. Hence it seems that in this case the general rule with regard to prescription in all actions must now have come into force, so that a thirty-years possession would be secured against the claims of the prior master, without regard to those specific regulations.

After going through these details we may now give the following general view of the condition of the *coloni*. They were attached to the soil by their birth, not as day-labourers, but as farmers, who tilled a piece of land on their own account, and rendered produce or money for it: that they had also to perform any services on their landlord's estate is nowhere mentioned. They had no personal right in the land: but as the state from economical and financial reasons insisted on their continuing on their farms, and as their rent could not be raised, their condition was nearly as well secured as it would have been by personal rights. They could hold property, only they were precluded from disposing of it at will: some classes however were free even from this restriction. Generally speaking they paid a polltax: but even in cases where this was remitted, their condition as *coloni* still continued unchanged<sup>99</sup>. If we compare their condition with

<sup>96</sup> L. un. C. Theod. de inquil. (v. 10). Nov. Valent. Tit. 9.

<sup>97</sup> L. 23. pr. C. J. de agric. (xi. 47).

<sup>98</sup> L. 23. pr. C. J. de agric. (xi. 47) speaks of a claim advanced against the *colonus* himself, and expressly forbids all prescription in such case: the second section speaks of claims urged against another proprietor, and in so doing says nothing about any sort of prescription.

<sup>99</sup> Hence we see that among the *coloni* by way of exception there might be found instances of two totally different privileges, the right of disposing of property, and the exemption from the polltax. There was no sort of connexion between them, and Cujacius, who jumbles them up together, is evidently mistaken. For in L. un. C. J.



the old division of all the free inhabitants of the empire into *cives*, *Latini*, and *peregrini*, there can be no question that they might belong according to circumstances to any one of these three classes. But as the existence of *Latini* and *peregrini* in later times seems to have been merely a rare exception, the chief part of the *coloni* would no doubt be in possession of the Roman franchise<sup>100</sup>. In this case they had a legal *connubium*, not merely with each other, but even with free citizens. It is true that Justinian forbade the marriage of a free woman with a *colonus* belonging to another person, and declared it to be null<sup>1</sup>: not however assuredly from the want of the *connubium*, in which case her marriage with her own *colonus*, and that of a free man with a *colona*, would in like manner have been invalid: his aim was merely by this decree, emanating solely from his own authority, to secure the land effectually against the loss of such a *colonus* and his posterity. The names given to these peasants in a state of hereditary dependence were partly derived from the hereditary nature of their service,—*originarii*,—partly from the polltax they paid—*adscriptitii*, *tributarii*, *censiti*—partly from their relation to the soil which they cultivated and inhabited. From this source comes the general name used throughout this dissertation, *coloni*: so does the general name *rustici*, which also occurs as a specific term for this particular class<sup>2</sup>: and lastly the name *inquilini*, the meaning of which however has been very much disputed. In most of the passages where it occurs this name is used so vaguely,

de col. Thrac. (xi. 51) it is expressly stated that the *coloni* in Thrace were tax-free, but at the same time that their landlord might lay claim to them *cum omni peculio*.

<sup>100</sup> See the Dissertation on the Jus Latii, above Vol. I. pp. 152—159. From this example we may perceive most distinctly how inadequate the legal notions and technical terms which arose in the classical period were to give a correct idea of the actual state of the empire in later times: so that for instance Justinian's attempt to adapt the Institutes of Gaius to the state of the law in his own age, by little else than abridging them and omitting parts, could not but turn out very unsatisfactorily at best. For the *coloni* in later times formed one of the most important orders in the state; yet no mention is made of them in Justinian's Institutes: they occupied a middle station between the free men and the slaves; yet according to the old classification retained in the Institutes we should be forced to place them all among the free men, and the greater part even in the first rank of the free men, the *cives*.

<sup>1</sup> Nov. 22. C. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Gregory the Great (Ep. I. 44) mostly calls them *rustici ecclesiae* or *rustici nostri*, occasionally however *coloni* also.



that one is uncertain whether it is meant to designate a particular sort of *coloni*, or is merely a synonym for the whole class<sup>103</sup>: but there is one passage which leaves no doubt that the latter is the case<sup>4</sup>: and the probability seems to be that all these names were in use for the same order of citizens, one prevailing more in one province, another in another.

Before I conclude I have to add a few general remarks on the history of this order in the Roman state; but I must preface them by observing that this is the very branch of the subject which is the most obscure. In our lawbooks we find mention of the *coloni* from the time of Constantine downward<sup>5</sup>, and that too very widely diffused from the first, throughout all parts of the empire, for instance even in Gaul and Italy<sup>6</sup>. After this time their condition was always regarded as a most important object of legislation; and in this light it appears in Justinian's collections, and in his own laws. There being no mention of them in the Institutes is to be accounted for from their not having been spoken of in Gaius: this however is the cause why modern jurists, on whose views the system of the Institutes has always exercised a preponderating influence, have left them almost wholly unnoticed.

If we go further back than the time of Constantine, we find nothing but dubious traces of them. In a passage of the Pandects Marianus speaks of a testament by which *inquilini* are bequeathed without the estate they are attacht to: this bequest, he says, is of no effect with regard to the object exprest in

<sup>103</sup> L. un. C. Theod. de inquil. (v. 10). L. 2. C. Theod. si vagum (x. 12). L. 6. C. J. de agric. (xi. 47). L. un. C. J. de col. Illyr. (xi. 52). L. 11. C. J. comm. utr. jud. (iii. 38).

<sup>4</sup> L. 13. pr. C. J. de agric. (xi. 47): Definimus, ut inter inquilinos colonosve, quorum quantum ad originem (i. e. prolem) vindicandam *indiscreta eademque paene videtur esse conditio, licet sit discrimen in nomine, etc.* Cujaciuses notion that the *coloni* and *inquilini* were, properly speaking, the freer classes of the hereditarily dependent peasantry, as opposed to the *adscriptitii*, is totally unfounded.

<sup>5</sup> L. 1. C. Theod. de fug. col. (v. 9) is a law of Constantine's, as early as the year 332.

<sup>6</sup> In Gaul, L. 13. 14. C. J. de agric. (xi. 47):—in Italy, L. 3. C. Theod. de censu (xiii. 10), that is, L. 2. C. J. de agric. (xi. 47): Imp. Constantius A. ad Dulcitium consularem *Aemiliae*:—in Palestine, Thrace, Illyria, Cod. J. Lib. xi. Tit. 50, 51, 52, etc. And this institute speaks of it everywhere under the same form.



it; the value in money however may be demanded, if such was the testator's intention<sup>107</sup>. This passage may unquestionably be explained with great ease in reference to the *coloni* of the later empire as described above: but it will also admit of an application to common leases, the right to which, or their profits, may have been bequeathed. This is decidedly the case with a passage of Ulpian on returns to the census, that whoever did not return his *inquilini* or *coloni* made himself answerable for them<sup>8</sup>. This passage must be interpreted with reference to common renters or farmers, whom the landowner was to return, because they might otherwise escape the notice of the collector, and thereby avoid paying their polltax: indeed it would hardly be applicable to the hereditary *coloni* of later times, since these must already have been entered in the taxrolls, and so would have been known to the collector without the landlord's returning them. If however these passages of the Pandects are actually to be regarded as traces of the order of *coloni* at an earlier date, it cannot at that time have spread at the utmost beyond a very narrow circle. This is proved partly by the circumstance that the old jurists do not speak more fully and unequivocally about it, partly by the want of any settled technical name for the class: for these very words, *coloni* and *inquilini*, which were subsequently used so determinately for it, meant at that time in common use something totally different, that is to say, ordinary free farmers and renters, who stood in no state of personal dependence.

In a still earlier age our attention is arrested by the following passage of Varro: *Omnes agri coluntur hominibus servis, aut liberis, aut utrisque. Liberis, aut cum ipsi colunt, ut plerique pauperculi cum sua progenie; aut mercenariis, cum conducticiis liberorum operis res majores, ut*

<sup>107</sup> L. 112. pr. D. de leg. 1. (30): Si quis inquilinos, sine praediis quibus adhaerent, legaverit, est inutile legatum. Sed an aestimatio debeatur, ex voluntate defuncti statuendum esse, Divi Marcus et Commodus rescripserunt. Far less can any evidence be drawn from L. 17. § 7. de excus. (Callistratus): Inquilini castrorum a tutelis excusari solent: nisi eorum, qui et ipsi inquilini sunt, et in eodem castro eademque conditione sunt. There is nothing in this passage referring to the relation of a hereditarily dependent peasantry.

<sup>8</sup> L. 4. § 8. D. de censibus: Si quis inquilinum vel colonum non fuerit professus, vinculis censualibus teneatur. See the Dissertation on the Roman Finances, Sect. 3.



*vindemias ac foenificia, administrant; iique quos obaerarios nostri vocitarunt, et etiam nunc sunt in Asia, et Aegypto, et in Illyrico complures*<sup>109</sup>. Many manuscripts instead of *obaerarios* read *obaeratos*; and it has been suggested that this means the debtor-slaves, *nexi obaerati*. These however in Varro's time were assuredly so few and insignificant, that there could not possibly be any occasion for mentioning them in a treatise on agriculture: besides Varro is not speaking of a third class, distinct from the *pauperculi* and the *mercenarii*, but only of a peculiar denomination of the latter—*iique* for *iique sunt etc.* The most natural explanation therefore is, that Varro is merely mentioning *operarius* as another name for *mercenarius*, whether we suppose that by writing *obaerarios* he meant to point out what he conceived to be the etymology of *operarios*, or whether we introduce *operarios* into the text itself. So that this passage does not contain a word about any hereditary *coloni*. Cujacius indeed is of a different opinion, since he makes the following express assertion—founded no doubt on nothing more than an arbitrary combination of this passage with those above quoted from the Pandects—that the Romans in all ages had a peasantry in a state of hereditary dependence, who in earlier times were called *operarii*, then *inquilini* or *coloni*, and finally *adscriptitii*<sup>10</sup>.

On the other hand we certainly do find a class in a similar condition at a much earlier period. The clients under the original Roman constitution were also peasants without property; and they too lived in a state of hereditary dependence. But it is not likely that anybody will maintain that there was any historical connexion between the ancient clients and the later *coloni*. They are separated by a period of many centuries, during which slavery in its simple strict form had occupied the place of almost every other kind of personal dependence. Even the cultivation of the soil was carried on almost exclusively by slaves: and although other institutions, analogous to the ancient ones, were subsequently introduced with regard to this class of slaves, yet assuredly this was

<sup>109</sup> De re rustica i. 17.

<sup>10</sup> Ad. L. 112. pr. de. leg. 1. Opp. T. vii. p. 1077.



not done from the imitation of an order of things which had past away long before; nor were they the invention of the legislator: it was the personal interest of the landlords that led to them. Thenceforward the slaves and the *coloni* subsisted side by side: but the condition of the former was in some measure assimilated to that of the latter<sup>111</sup>, which was more in accord with the prevalent opinions of the age, and no doubt also with its wants. Still it is not easy to explain how this class of *coloni* could first arise. Individuals became members of it by birth: thus much we know: but how the whole class originally grew up, our lawbooks do not inform us. In later times at least, as it seems, persons were not allowed to enter into it at will<sup>12</sup>: so that it would appear necessary to assume that at some period or other now unknown a number of persons placed themselves in this state; after which the admission into it was closed, or at least obstructed and limited. Nor was such a voluntary entrance into a state of dependence at all agreeable to the principles of the older Roman law. Nevertheless our only definite piece of historical information is directly in favour of this supposition. It is found in a passage of a book by Salvianus, written toward the middle of the fifth century<sup>13</sup>. He complains about the great hardships of the landtax, which prest mainly on the poor, the rich contriving to monopolize the benefit of whatever was done to alleviate it<sup>14</sup>. The effects of these hardships he enumerates under the following stages. Some persons took refuge under the protection of the rich, made over the property of their land to them, and became farmers upon it: after all however they had such a heavy rent to pay, that in fact they were still compelled to bear the landtax, from which they had been trying to escape<sup>15</sup>. Others quitted their own land altogether, and

<sup>111</sup> See above p. 125.

<sup>12</sup> See above p. 127.

<sup>13</sup> Salvianus de gubernatione Dei v. 8, 9.

<sup>14</sup> This agrees entirely with what Ammianus says, XVI. 5.

<sup>15</sup> *Cum rem amiserint, amissarum tamen rerum tributa patiantur, cum possessio ab his recesserit, capitatio non recedit, proprietatibus carent, et vectigalibus obruuntur.* Here *capitatio* must evidently be the landtax, not the polltax, as it is usually rendered: this is proved both by the expression *rerum tributa*, and by the complaint about its intolerable pressure; for the polltax assuredly was not so high that the farmers could be ruined by it.



became *coloni* on the estates of the rich<sup>116</sup>. Others again underwent the hardest fate of all, being received at first as free strangers, and then reduced to an actual state of slavery<sup>17</sup>. Now the second of these classes is to our purpose; and what is said of it certainly shews that it must have been possible for a person to become a *colonus* by his own act. At the same time nothing is stated touching the conditions and limitations under which he could do so: and above all we are still left in doubt whether the practice spoken of was sanctioned by law, or was merely a prevalent abuse, which however might always be legalized in course of time by prescription (see p. 121): at least the oppression exercised on the third of the abovementioned classes must indisputably have been merely a prevalent usurpation, that is, a piece of open injustice, not a proceeding according to law.

A very natural hypothesis would be to suppose that the original *coloni* were either all or in part slaves, who were set free under the abovementioned restrictions; and the use of the name *patronus* for the landlord (see note 41) might be cited in support of this view. Such a modified system of manumission however would have been something entirely new, and without any precedent in the ancient institutions.

The simplest and easiest way of accounting for the origin of the *coloni* would be, if we could prove that such a state of hereditary dependence had existed immemorially in particular provinces: in that case it might not only have continued to subsist under the Roman dominion, but also have been extended to other parts of the empire<sup>18</sup>. There seems however to be an utter want of historical evidence for such an assumption.

Gothofredus conjectures<sup>19</sup> that the original *coloni* were

<sup>116</sup> Fundos majorum expetunt, et coloni divitum fiunt—jugo se inquilinae abjectionis addicunt, in hanc necessitatem redacti ut extorres non facultatis tantum, sed etiam conditionis suae,—et rerum proprietate careant, et jus libertatis amittant.

<sup>17</sup> Quos esse constat ingenuos, vertuntur in servos. If one does not attend to the abovementioned classification, the whole passage becomes unintelligible. In this way it has been misunderstood by Naudet, Administration—sous les règnes de Dioclétien etc. T. II. p. 108.

<sup>18</sup> This opinion is advanced by Rudorff in the Rhenish Museum for Philology, II. p. 178, but very justly as a mere conjecture, not as a positive assertion.

<sup>19</sup> Parat. Cod. Theod. (v. 9) p. 496, and Comm. ad. L. un. C. Theod. de inquil. v. 10.



partly Romans (*inquilini*), partly foreigners (*coloni*) who submitted of their own accord to the Roman yoke on condition of enjoying these rights; and that the latter were hence termed *dedititii*. But not only does he make these assertions without bringing forward any evidence to support them; he also seems to confound totally distinct ages and notions. In the days of the republic the name of *dedititii* was used for such conquered nations as surrendered at discretion, for which act there were peculiar solemn forms. The *lex Aelia Sentia* applied it as a mere technical expression to those freedmen who had suffered ignominious punishments during their slavehood, and who consequently on their manumission were not to become *cives*, but merely *peregrini*, and that too with very limited rights. Neither of these uses will suit the case supposed by Gothofredus: but in selecting the term he seems to have had both its ancient meanings in his head, without forming any clear notion about them.

Winspeare<sup>120</sup> assumes that there was an internal connexion between the institutions of the old Roman colonies, and the tenure of land in the provinces, as well as that of feudal times: he maintains that all these institutions were essentially the same, that is to say, dependent property subject to certain restrictions and burthens; and that the condition of the *coloni* under the empire was nothing more than a modification of that of the old colonists, the peasantry being regarded as a lower class, from the similarity of their occupation to that of the slaves. The correctness of this comparison however I must dispute in all its parts, though without entering into a detailed examination and refutation of it.

A very important contribution to the history of the *coloni* is supplied by a recently discovered constitution of the Theodosian code<sup>21</sup>. In this the emperors state that the barbarian nation of the Scyrians had now been subjected by war to the Roman dominion: and permission is given to every landowner<sup>22</sup> to apply to the prefect of the *praetorium* for labourers

<sup>120</sup> In the work quoted in note 8, pp. 102, foll.

<sup>21</sup> Lib. v. Tit. 4. Const. 3. p. 284, ed. Wenck. This ordinance is by Honorius and Theodosius, dated from Constantinople in the year 409.

<sup>22</sup> *Ideoque damus omnibus copiam ex praedicta gente hominibus agros proprios frequentandi, ita ut omnes sciant, susceptos non alio jure quam colonatus apud se*



out of this nation for his estates; but these labourers are to be placed on the foot of *coloni*, and in no respect to be treated as slaves. They are not however to be carried into any but the transmarine provinces, not for instance into Thrace or Illyricum. Thus we have here a very remarkable, indeed the only known example, clearly pointing out the manner in which bodies of *coloni* on a large scale originated. The emperors might have sold the barbarians who had fallen into their power, as slaves, but preferred (without doubt from politico-economical grounds) giving them away as *coloni*. Now one might conjecture that the whole class sprang up originally after the same manner, so that this single instance should be only a repetition of similar previous ones<sup>123</sup>. I cannot however by any means allow that this is at all a necessary consequence: on the contrary it is just as conceivable that the first origin of the *coloni* was totally different, and that the emperors on this occasion merely placed a great number of barbarians by their own arbitrary edict in a class which had grown up and been wellknown long before.

In conclusion I must still speak of the relation between the Roman *coloni* and the villeins of modern Europe, a class which appears from very early times under a great variety of modifications. The general resemblance between the two institutions strikes us at first sight: but I cannot see the slightest ground for supposing that there was any historical connexion between them. Thus I do not believe that the origin of the *coloni* can be accounted for by assuming that they were instituted in imitation of the German serfs, although the existence of such a class among the Germans was known to the Romans in the time of Tacitus<sup>24</sup>. Still less reason however is there for imagining that the German serfs arose out of the Roman *coloni*, although, from the use of the Latin language in the drawing up of the codes of the Teutonic nations, the technical terms of the Romans were taken in this, as in other matters, to

*futuros*. It is true however that the passage stands under the title *de bonis militum*; and so it is possible that the soldiers who possess land were the only persons to whom this great advantage was offered.

<sup>123</sup> This is the way the passage is explained by Wenck, p. 286. note x.

<sup>24</sup> Germania c. 25. *Ceteris servis, non in nostrum morem descriptis per familiam ministeriis, utuntur. Suam quisque sedem, suos penates regit. Frumenti modum dominus, aut pecoris, aut vestis, ut colono, injungit: et servus hactenus paret.*



designate corresponding German institutions. There is one important difference however with regard to the origin of the two classes more especially noticeable. That of the Roman *coloni* occurred at the time when the nation was in decay: they were introduced arbitrarily in order to meet a particular emergency, but never acquired any special political importance. The origin of the German serfs is coincident with the primary formation of the various classes of society in the nation; and hence they have exercised the most important influence on its constitution and civil institutions: in this respect the old Roman clients are unquestionably a fairer subject of comparison with them than the *coloni*, although in point of time they happened to fall in exactly with the latter.

After the conquest of the Western empire by the German nations the two institutions came into immediate contact, and their intermixture could not be avoided. This hastened the entire overthrow of the ancient system of slavery, for which the way had already been prepared by the formation of the *coloni*.

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## MEMNON.

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AMONG the celebrated names which strike the attention of every one who has been led to stray in the twilight of mythical history, few perhaps rouse a livelier curiosity, or present a more enticing and perplexing problem, than that of Memnon. The oftener it occurs to us the more we feel inclined to ask: Who is this rosy son of the morning, whose image towered above the banks of the Nile, but, while it saluted the beams of the rising sun, pointed toward Meroe and the Ethiopian ocean? this founder of palaces and citadels in Susa and Ecbatana, whose home lay in Cerne, the farthest island of the East? this conquering hero, who cut a road through the heart of Asia, to find his grave or to leave his monuments on the coast of Syria and the shores of the Propontis? Without hoping to furnish a satisfactory answer to this question, I feel tempted to review the legends relating to this renowned person, for the purpose of inquiring in what manner they may be best connected and reconciled. The subject has already employed the pens of so many learned and ingenious men, that little, if anything, can remain to be done for the collection of materials: but it also presents so many sides, that it may not be useless to consider it from one which, though it has not been entirely overlooked, seems not to have been sufficiently noticed.

The immediate object of the inquiry proposed is to trace the Greek tradition about Memnon to its source, or at least so far as to ascertain the nature, historical or imaginary, of the ground from which it sprang. It will therefore be necessary to begin by mentioning the earliest form in which it appears to us among the Greeks, and the new features



which it gradually assumes or discloses under the hands through which it successively passed.

We have reason to congratulate ourselves on the preservation of the few lines in which Memnon is named or alluded to in the *Odyssey* (iv. 188. xi. 521). But for this lucky chance some critics would probably have asserted that the legend was wholly unknown in the age of Homer, and it would have been impossible to refute them. That it does not occur in the *Iliad*, where there would have been some difficulty in introducing it, cannot raise a reasonable doubt. Eustathius indeed informs us that there were persons who instead of μετ' ἀμύμονας Αἰθιοπῆας, Il. A. 423, read μετὰ Μέμνονας Αἰθιοπῆας, imagining that the hero had given his name to an Ethiopian tribe<sup>1</sup>! But we may very well dispense with this conceit, and still believe that the exploits of Memnon before Troy were as familiar to the poet of the *Iliad* as those of Achilles. The *Odyssey* however only speaks of Memnon as the son of Eos, as the most beautiful of mortals, and as the vanquisher of Antilochus. Hesiod, who calls him king of the Ethiopians (Th. 985), adds the name of his father Tithonus, whose history is related in the Homeric hymn (Ad Venerem 219—239). It may have been about the same time that Arctinus made the adventures of the Ethiopian warrior the most prominent subject of an epic poem, the *Æthiopis*, of which we only know that it described the combat in which Memnon was slain by Achilles, and how his mother obtained Jupiter's leave to endow her son, as she had his father, with immortality. But as there is good reason for believing that Quintus Calaber in the first five books of his poem followed the *Æthiopis* very closely, it is highly probable that most of the features of his narrative were drawn from Arctinus, and formed a part of the earliest tradition. In his second book, after the hopes of the Trojans have been dashed to the ground by the death of Penthesilea and her Amazons, Memnon arrives to the relief of the city with a countless host of Ethiopians. In his first interview with Priam he describes the immortal life of his father, and his

<sup>1</sup> Steph. Byz. Μέμνονες ἔθνος Αἰθιοπικόν ὃ ἐρμηνεύεται ὡς ὁ Πολύστωρ φησιν ἀγρίους τινὰς ἢ μαχίμους, καὶ χαλεπούς.



mother Eos, the floods of Tethys, the uttermost bounds of the earth on the east, and the whole of his progress from the verge of Oceanus to Troy, in the course of which he had broken a vast army of the Solymi who attempted to impede his march. The next morning he slays Antilochus, and then meets Achilles, with whom he maintains a long and doubtful combat. After his fall the air is darkened, and at his mother's bidding the winds lift his corpse stript of his armour above the ground. The blood which drops from it on the plain forms a stream called by those who dwell at the foot of Ida the Paphlagonian, which every year on the return of the fatal day again runs blood, and sends forth a loathsome stench, as of a putrefying sore. The body is borne to the banks of the *Æsepus*, where is a grove sacred to the Nymphs, who mourn over the hero. His faithful Ethiopians are likewise gifted with supernatural vigour, and enabled to follow their king through the air to his resting place. Eos descends with the Months and the Pleiads in her train to bewail her son. At first she threatens to withhold her presence from Olympus, and for a whole day she keeps the world wrapt in darkness. But the thunder of Jupiter shakes her resolution. The Ethiopians bury their king, and are changed into birds which bear the name of Memnon, and once a year flock to his tomb, sprinkle it with dust, and contend with one another in pairs till at least one of each has fallen. Memnon himself, whether in Hades or in Elysium, rejoices in these funeral honours. His tomb on the banks of the *Æsepus* was shewn in the time of Strabo, and near it was a village called by his name<sup>2</sup>.

If Quintus took this account of Memnon's burial from Arctinus, *Æschylus* must have drawn the legend which he worked up into his *Ψυχόσταςία* from a different source. For there can scarcely be a doubt that in that tragedy he represented Eos as carrying her son's corpse away, not to the banks of the *Æsepus*, but to those either of the Nile or of the Choaspes. And the latter seems the more probable supposition, especially if Dr Butler (*Fragmm. Æsch.* 169) is right in his conjecture that Strabo is alluding to

<sup>2</sup> Strabo XIII. p. 587.



this play, where he says that Æschylus had spoken of Memnon's Cissian parentage<sup>3</sup>. Æschylus was perhaps the first Greek poet who brought the hero to Troy from Susa; and it is manifest enough why a dramatic poet should have adopted this legend, which gave a new and deeper interest to the combat between Memnon and his Greek antagonist, in preference to any others that he might have heard of. The connexion between Memnon and Susa was so celebrated in the time of Herodotus, probably by means of the drama, that the historian speaks of the royal palace at Susa simply as τὰ βασιλήια τὰ Μερμόνια καλεόμενα (v. 53), which he explains in the following chapter by saying Σούσων, τοῦτο γὰρ Μερμόνιον ἄστυ καλέεται. In vii. 151 the same epithet is used, as if the city had been known principally through this legend. In what manner Æschylus explained the origin of this connexion we have no means of guessing. But it is not probable that he knew much about the history related by Diodorus (ii. 22), who informs us, that at the time of the Trojan war Tithonus governed Persia as viceroy of the Assyrian king Teutamus, who was then master of Asia (which agrees with the language of Plato, *De Legg.* iii. p. 296 Bek.), and that his son Memnon, then in the prime of life, built the palace on the citadel at Susa, which remained standing till the days of the Persian monarchy, and was called from him Memnonia, and likewise made a highway through the country which retained the same name. Diodorus adds that the Ethiopians likewise claimed Memnon as a native of their

<sup>3</sup> I use this general expression because the meaning of Strabo's words is not quite clear. He says (xv. p. 720) Λέγονται δὲ καὶ Κίσσιοι οἱ Σούσιοι. Φησὶ δὲ καὶ Αἰσχύλος τὴν μητέρα Μέρμονος Κισσίαν. Professor Welcker (*Æsch. Trilogie* p. 435) understands by this that Æschylus had somewhere or other called Cissia (the land of the Cissians) the mother of Memnon: and he thinks it improbable that this should have been in the *Ψυχοστασία*, because to have spoken of Cissia as Memnon's mother in the same play which represented him as the son of Eos or Hemera would have bred confusion. But this must depend on the context which is lost. On the other hand I doubt whether Strabo's words will bear the construction Prof. Welcker puts on them. The more obvious sense of them seems to be, that Æschylus had applied the epithet Cissian to the mother of Memnon. And this he might have done, using it with a poetical latitude which would not surprize us in Æschylus, even if the lines quoted by Athenæus (ii. p. 165. Dind.) referred to Memnon, and were taken (as Prof. Welcker believes) from the *Ψυχοστασία*. All that they say of him (if he is the subject of them) is: Γένος μὲν αἰνεῖν ἐκμαθὼν ἐπίσταμαι Αἰθιοπίδος γῆς.



country, and shewed there ancient palaces which to that day were called Memnonia. At all events the Ethiopians who followed Memnon to Troy carried his bones back to Tithonus<sup>4</sup>.

Pausanias, in describing the painting of Polygnotus in the Lesche at Delphi (x. 31. 6.), combines the two accounts we have been hitherto considering. Birds, he says, were seen wrought in Memnon's chlamys, and these were the birds called Memnonides, which, as was generally believed near the Hellespont, were used to go on certain days to the tomb of Memnon, and sweep it with their wings, where it was not covered with trees or herbage, and sprinkle it with the water of the Æsepus. Polygnotus had represented a naked Ethiopian boy standing by the side of Memnon. This, Pausanias observes, was because Memnon was king of the Ethiopians. Yet he had come to Troy, not from Ethiopia, but from the Persian city of Susa and the river Choaspes, having subdued all the nations that lay in his way. And the Phrygians still shew the road by which he led his army, for which he had chosen the shortest cuts: it was the same along which the state-couriers travelled. This tradition he repeats i. 42. 3.

What is thus put together by Diodorus and Pausanias, was torn asunder by other writers, as Philostratus (V. Apoll. vi. 3. Heroic. p. 672. Ic. i. 7.), Eudocia. p. 46, who distinguish between an Ethiopian Memnon who reigned at the time of the Trojan war, and a Trojan of the same name on whom Achilles avenged the death of the blooming Antilochus. On the other hand there was a legend which ascribed the foundation of the palace at Ecbatana to Memnon<sup>5</sup>; and beside the Memnonium on the Æsepus there was one near

<sup>4</sup> Ælian Hist. An. v. 1. thus notices both legends: λέγουσιν οἱ τὴν Τρωάδα ἔτι οἰκοῦντες ἡρίον εἶναί τι τῷ τῆς Ἑοῦς Μέμνονι εἰς τιμὴν ἀνετον. καὶ αὐτὸν μὲν τὸν νεκρὸν εἰς τὰ Σοῦσα τὰ οὕτω Μεμνόνεια ὑμνούμενα ὑπὸ τῆς μητρὸς κομισθέντα μετέωρον ἐκ τῶν φόνων τυχεῖν κηδεύσεως τῆς προσηκούσης αὐτῷ, ὀνομάζεσθαι δέ οἱ τὴν στήλην τὴν ἐνταῦθα ἄλλως.

<sup>5</sup> By which Simonides is uncertain. Strabo says ταφῆναι λέγεται Μέμνων περὶ Πάλτον τῆς Συρίας παρὰ Βαδᾶν ποταμὸν, ὡς εἶρηκε Σίμωνίδης ἐν Μέμνονι διθυράμβῳ τῶν Δαλιακῶν. A younger Simonides had visited Meroe, and had written on Ethiopia: Plin. N. H. vi. 35. One of these Syrian Memnonia is alluded to by Oppian, Cyneg. ii. 152. Πάντη δ' ἔργα βοῶν θαλερὰς βέβριθεν ἁλῶας Μεμνόνιον περὶ ναὸν ὅθ' Ἀσσύριοι ναετῆρες Μέμνονα κωκύουσι κλυτὸν γόνον Ἑριγενείης.



Paltus in Syria on the river Badas, which had been spoken of by Simonides in a poem called Memnon (Strabo xv. p. 728<sup>6</sup>) and another on the river Beleos two stadia distant from Ptolemais (Joseph. Bell. Jud. II. 10. 2).

The great majority of voices however agree in tracing the origin of Memnon to Ethiopia. The only notion attached to this word in the Homeric age seems to have been that it was a region extending to the utmost verge of the earth, bounded by the Ocean stream, and that its inhabitants, blest with the immediate presence of the rising and the setting sun, were the most innocent and the happiest of mortals. All that Homer could have had to relate about the march of Memnon, was that he came from a far country in the East. The Homeric distinction between the eastern and western Ethiopians (Od. i. 24), which was grounded on a view of geography that had long ceased to be understood in the age of Herodotus, was nevertheless probably the occasion of that which this historian adopted between the Asiatic Ethiopians on the borders of India and those of Africa (VII. 70). The name of Ethiopia however was gradually confined to Africa, and there to the upper course of the Nile; and the Greek travellers who were curious about the history of Memnon expected to find the fullest and surest information about him in Egypt, which appeared to have been either the country of his birth, or the scene of his earliest adventures.

The Egyptians were probably consulted very early on this subject; and their learned priests can have found no difficulty in satisfying the Greeks who inquired of them. But their answers would vary according to the nature of the question proposed. If Memnon was described as a royal conqueror who had traversed Asia and subdued all the nations he passed through, he would naturally be compared with some one or other of the mighty kings of Egypt, the fame of whose exploits had once resounded through the habitable world, and might have been preserved by the faint and confused echo of the Greek tradition. He might have

<sup>6</sup> Hygin. 223. Domus Cyri regis in Ecbatani, quam fecit Memnon lapidibus variis et candidis vinctis auro.



been that Sesostris whose invincible arms had penetrated eastward as far as the Ganges, and westward to the extremity of Thrace: or that Osymandyas whose Bactrian expedition was recorded in the sculptures of his sepulchral palace at Thebes (Diodor. i. 47. 55). On the other hand if the Ethiopian hero was to be considered as the son of Aurora, as a youth of more than mortal beauty, whose untimely death had clouded the face of nature with sadness, and was commemorated every year with mournful rites, the Egyptian mythology could produce a being of similar character and fate. Such was the mysterious person who was revered as the guardian of Thebes, and whose statue, in the Roman period, was often heard to utter a plaintive strain<sup>7</sup>. The Egyptian title by which he was known at Thebes was Phamenoph or Amenophis<sup>8</sup>, which came near enough to the Greek name of Memnon to confirm the supposition of their identity.

The name of this Amenophis appears among the kings of Egypt<sup>9</sup>: but there is every reason to believe that he was a merely ideal being, though his character and attributes have been the subject of much dispute among the learned. Our present purpose does not require that we should enter very deeply into this question, though we must not entirely pass over it. Jablonski was, I believe, the first writer who expressed the opinion that the famous vocal statue did not represent any historical personage, but was merely symbolical and mystical. This he thought was plain from the legends concerning Amenophis, as well as from his being called the son of Aurora; and he conjectures that this statue, as well as the pyramids, were destined by the priests to the purpose

<sup>7</sup> An inscription on the colossus, as corrected by Jacobs (Transactions of the Munich Academy T. II. p. 42). *φωνή δ' ὀδυρμὸς ἦν πάλαι μοι Μέμνονος τὰ πάθη γοῶσα.*

<sup>8</sup> Paus. i. 41. 3. *εἶδον καθήμενον ἄγαλμα ἠχῆεν* (according to Scaliger's correction) *Μέμνονα ὀνομάζουσιν οἱ πολλοί. τοῦτον γὰρ φασιν ἐξ Αἰθιοπίας ὀρμηθῆναι ἐς Αἴγυπτον καὶ τὴν ἄχρι Σούσων. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ Μέμνονα οἱ Θηβαῖοι λέγουσι, Φαμένωφα δὲ εἶναι τῶν ἐγχωρίων οὗ τοῦτο ἄγαλμα ἦν. ἤκουσα δὲ ἤδη καὶ Σέσωστριν φαμένων εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ἄγαλμα ὃ Καμβύσης διέκοψε.*

<sup>9</sup> Syncellus i. p. 286 ed. Bonn. *Αἰγύπτου μ. ἐβασίλευσεν Ἀμενώφθις. Οὗτος ὁ Ἀμενώφθις ἐστὶν ὁ Μέμνων εἶναι νομιζόμενος καὶ φθεγγόμενος λίθος. ὃν λίθον χρόνοις ὕστερον Καμβύσης ὁ Περσῶν τέμνει νομίζων εἶναι γοητεῖαν ἐν αὐτῷ ὡς Πολύαινος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἱστορεῖ.*



of astronomical observations (Opusc. i. p. 27). The name Amenophis he interprets either *guardian of the city of Thebes*<sup>10</sup>, or *announcer of good tidings*, quasi dicas εὐαγγελιστής, and he refers this meaning as well as the other to the astronomical observations of which he conceives the statue to have been an instrument. Creuzer, as might be supposed, takes a different view of the subject, though he is perfectly willing to adopt Jablonski's first explanation of the word, to which, as he remarks, the etymology of the Greek name corresponds so closely that it might be taken not for a corruption but for a translation of the Egyptian<sup>11</sup>. This Phamenophis-Memnon is, according to Creuzer, identical with Osymandyas, and closely resembles the Persian Mithras. All his attributes and legends point to the vicissitudes of light and darkness, the changes of the seasons, the courses of the planets. He is himself of dazzling beauty, but his followers who bring their offerings to his tomb shew the complexion of night. He answers the greeting of his worshippers with a joyful strain when he is touched by the first rays of the rising sun, but in the evening his voice is plaintive like the tone of a broken chord. He is Horus in the prime of his strength and beauty; but again he is doomed to an untimely death, and is bewailed as Maneros, and corresponds to Linus and Adonis and the other heroes of this numerous class. Another German writer<sup>12</sup> has proposed a very singular hypothesis about the Egyptian Memnon, which perhaps deserves to be noticed, though it is very difficult to describe it with the necessary brevity, without making it appear more fanciful and arbitrary than it really is. He compares Memnon, not with the young victorious god Horus, but with his vanquished adversary Typhon, who though overpowered still retains a feeble and lingering existence, and from time to time sends forth a faint note of lamentation over his own sufferings. He represents however no physical object or

<sup>10</sup> In one of the inscriptions Μέμνων Θηβαίων πρόμαχος.

<sup>11</sup> Symbolik i. p. 453. He refers to Plato, Cratylus p. 395, who says of Agamemnon ὅτι οὖν ἀγαστὸς κατὰ τὴν ἐπιμονὴν οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐνσημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων—the most essential quality, Creuzer observes, of a guardian and champion.

<sup>12</sup> Wilhelm von Schütz in the Wiener Jahrbücher xxi. p. 107.



event, but is the symbol of a period in the history of the nation, one of primitive simplicity, which had past away and lived only in memory, having been replaced by one of strife and conquest, power and pomp, a calculating and oppressive rule. “Sesostris, whose name according to Jablonski means the prince who gazes on or adores the sun, probably represents a new dynasty. He is a conqueror, and the destroyer of the earlier principle; with him too begin new buildings; obelisks and pyramids succeed to the colossal images of former times. These ancient statues continue to exist, but the legend describes them as mourning over the glories of the past, and as fostering a languid hope of a future revival<sup>13</sup>.”

The reader will perceive from this specimen, which is perhaps but a scanty one, how copious a harvest of conjecture the subject is capable of yielding. But the question we are at present mainly concerned with, is not what notions the Egyptians attached to their Memnon, but in what manner he became known to the Greeks so as to fill a conspicuous part in their heroic poetry. This question has been profoundly investigated by Mr Jacobs, in a very learned and instructive essay published in the *Memoirs of the Royal Academy of Munich*, Vol. II, and reprinted among his miscellaneous works. But as it may probably not be found in many libraries in this country, it may be doing a service to those of our readers who take an interest in such researches, to lay before them the substance of his opinions and arguments in some detail.

The essay begins with an enumeration of the monuments of Memnon scattered over Asia, for the knowledge of which, it is observed, we are indebted chiefly to incidental allusions. One of these, which I have not yet mentioned, is found in Dictys (*De Bello Trojano* vi. 10), where after the death of

<sup>13</sup> He conjectures that the sounds heard proceeded not from the statue itself, but from some local cause that operated in its vicinity (as Humboldt speaks of subterraneous sounds that issue at sunrise from the rocks on the Oronoko), and that this phenomenon was either applied by the adherents of the ancient system to an existing statue, or that a statue was erected there to take advantage of it. It is to be regretted that so ingenious a hypothesis should not have the minutest particle of historical ground to stand upon. See however Plutarch *De Is. et Os.* c. 30.



Memnon his sister Hemera goes in search of his body. At Paphus<sup>14</sup> she meets with the Phœnicians whom Memnon had sent by sea, while he himself led the main body of his army over Mount Caucasus to Troy. From them she receives an urn containing his remains, with which she sails to Phœnicia and there buries them in a region called Palliochis. Mr Jacobs places this story in a new light by comparing it with the legend of the search made by Isis after the body of Osiris, which she finds in Phœnicia (Plutarch *De Is. et Os.* c.15). He proceeds to notice the various hypotheses that have been formed about these monuments. Are they the works of a conqueror who traversed Asia? If so, how is it that we find so many sepulchres erected in honour of him? Are we to suppose that one really contained his remains, and that the others were cenotaphs? Or will the difficulty be solved if we separate the Trojan from the Egyptian Memnon, and each of these from the Assyrian. This method Mr J. justly pronounces an arbitrary expedient: and it may be added that it merely multiplies the questions instead of answering them. But on the other hand with equal judgement he rejects the vain attempt of Diodorus to connect the various legends by a historical thread. “This mode of interpretation,” he remarks, “being that which is most agreeable to the most vulgar understanding, has for this very reason always found many partisans, and even now, though its defects have been long perceived, it has not yet lost all its influence. Imaginary personages in human form, and mostly decked with crowns and robes of state, still continue to play a usurped part on the theatre of ancient history.” It is indeed much easier and safer to laugh at these phantoms than to attempt to dethrone them.

Mr J. then addresses himself to a different class of critics, and asks whether there is any better reason for considering Memnon as a king and conqueror, than for viewing Thoth or Osymandyas or Dionysus in that light.

<sup>14</sup> There is a confusion in the narrative between Paphus and Rhodes, as the reader may see by looking back to iv. c. 4. And yet it must be owing to the author, not, as one of the commentators seems to have suspected, to the transcribers: for Hemera would naturally begin her search in Cyprus. Palliochis is probably connected either with Paltus or the Beleus.



The fables relating to the last of these mythical persons have likewise been forced into the shape of a political history. Yet no one believes that they have any other kind of historical foundation than the propagation of a certain worship from the remote East to the shores of the Ægean. And such Mr J. conceives to be the real import of the various legends concerning Memnon. He too was a god, whose rites were carried from Ethiopia through Egypt and Asia to the coast of the Propontis.

To clear the way for his hypothesis Mr J. combats the opinion of Marsham and Jablonski, who imagined that Ethiopia in the fable of Memnon included Upper Egypt. He contends that according to the greater part of the ancient authors this name was applied to the country of which Meroe was the capital. Philostratus asserted that Memnon was worshipped at Meroe as well as at Memphis by Ethiopians as well as by Egyptians<sup>15</sup>, and that he cherished his hair in honour of the Nile, which rose in Ethiopia<sup>16</sup>; and Agatharchides mentions that the Memnonia at Thebes were built by Ethiopians<sup>17</sup>. The descriptions of Lycophron<sup>18</sup> and Quintus Calaber<sup>19</sup>, which speak of Cerné and the southern Ocean, point the same way: and the exceeding beauty for which Homer praises the hero, is a characteristic not of the Egyptians but of the Ethiopians, who, Herodotus says, were

<sup>15</sup> Heroica p. 699. Θύουσιν αὐτῷ κατὰ Μερόην καὶ Μέμφιν Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ Αἰθίοπες, ἐπειδὴν ἀκτῖνα πρώτην ὁ ἥλιος ἐκβάλλῃ.

<sup>16</sup> Imag. i. 7. ο τῶν βοστρύχων ἄσταχυς, οὓς οἶμαι Νείλῳ ἔτρεφε· Νείλου γὰρ Αἰγύπτιοι μὲν ἔχουσι τὰς ἐκβολὰς, Αἰθίοπες δὲ τὰς πηγὰς. There is a curious misprint in the German, which is not noticed in the *corrigenda*: *dass er sein Heer dem äthiopischen Nil genähert habe*.

<sup>17</sup> Ap. Phot. p. 448 Bek. These Ethiopians however are here represented as comparatively recent invaders: he is speaking of the gold mines on the Red Sea: εὔρηται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πρώτων τοῦ τόπου βασιλέων τῶν μετάλλων ἢ φύσις, διέλιπε δὲ ἐνεργοῦσα ποτὲ μὲν Αἰθιοπῶν ἐπὶ τὴν Αἴγυπτον πλήθους συνελθόντος καὶ πολλὰ τὰς πόλεις ἔτη φρουρήσαντος (ὑφ' ὧν καὶ τὰ Μεμνόνεια συντετελέσθαι φασί), ποτὲ δὲ Μήδων καὶ Περσῶν ἐπικρατησάντων.

<sup>18</sup> Cass. 18. Aurora goes forth Τιθωνὸν ἐν κοίτῃσι τῆς Κέρνης πέλας Λιποῦσα. On the other positions of this fabulous island the reader may consult Eustath. ad. Dionys. Perieg. 218, who speaks of the πανύστατοι Αἰθιοπῆες αὐτῷ ἐπ' Ὀκεάνῳ πυμάτης παρὰ τέμπεα Κέρνης. There is a learned and luminous dissertation on this subject in Völcker's *Mythische Geographie*. p. 56—81.

<sup>19</sup> II. 118. Memnon describes ἀκαμάτου πέρατα χθονὸς, ἀντολίας τε Ἡελίου καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπ' ὠκεανοῖο κέλευθον Μέχρις ἐπὶ Πριάμοιο πόλιν καὶ πρόνας Ἰδῆς.



the finest men in the world<sup>20</sup>. All these indications favour the supposition, that the Egyptians became acquainted with Memnon in the same way and through the same channel as that by which they acquired their knowledge of Ammon. The latter god came from the Ethiopian Meroe<sup>21</sup>, the central seat of his worship, to his still more renowned sanctuaries in Egypt and Libya. Thebes in Upper Egypt was a colony of Meroe, and its Egyptian name, *Amoun-noh*, the city of Ammon, shews that the worship of that god was the basis on which the colonists founded their new state. Memnon too originally belonged to Meroe, which was deemed the place of his birth, because it was the earliest seat of his worship. In Thebes he was revered as Phamenophis, Guardian of the city of Ammon, that is, as a ministering god, one of the class which the Greeks designated by the names of *Θεοὶ πάρεδροι* and *όπαδοί*. So in the Egyptian mythology Thoth is the servant of Isis and Osiris, and Anubis the guardian of Osiris and the attendant of Isis. And thus, as Ammon himself migrated with his priesthood from Ethiopia to Egypt, the guardian of his sanctuary accompanied him in his wanderings, and, when his origin was forgotten, was honoured at Thebes as a native hero.

In the ancient world religion and commerce were inti-

<sup>20</sup> III. 114. *ἄνδρας μεγίστους καὶ καλλίστους καὶ μακροβιωτάτους*. To this we may add the fact mentioned by Athenaeus (p. 566) *καθίστων δὲ καὶ πολλοὶ τοὺς καλλίστους βασιλέας, ὡς μέχρι νῦν οἱ Ἀθάνατοι καλούμενοι Αἰθίοπες, ὡς φησι Βίων ἐν Αἰθιοπικοῖς*, to which Aristotle also alludes, *Pol. IV. 4. εἰ κατὰ μέγεθος διενέμουντο τὰς ἀρχὰς ὥσπερ ἐν Αἰθιοπία φασί τινες*. This may be probably considered as a historical fact, and is perfectly consistent with what Diodorus says (III. 5) about the election of the kings by the priests: *οἱ ἱερεῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν τοὺς ἀρίστους προκρίνουσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν καταλεχθέντων ὃν ἂν ὁ θεὸς κωμάζων κατὰ τινα συνήθειαν περιφερόμενος λάβῃ, τοῦτον τὸ πλῆθος αἰρεῖται βασιλέα*. Another Ethiopian custom reported by Diodorus (III. 7) deserves to be mentioned here: *φασὶ σύνηθες εἶναι καὶ τὸ συντελευτᾶν ἐκουσίως τοὺς ἐταίρους τοῖς βασιλεῦσι*. So that the honours which Memnon's companions pay to his tomb are quite in keeping with the national character. Mr Jacobs has not noticed Quintus Curtius IV. 8. Alexander—Memphim petit. Cupido, haud injusta quidem, ceterum intempestiva, incesserat, non interiora modo Aegypti, sed etiam Aethiopiam invisere. Memnonis Tithonique celebrata regia cognoscendae vetustatis avidum trahebat paene extra terminos solis. Demetrius ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν κατ' Αἴγυπτον (ap. Athen. xv. p. 680): λέγεται δὲ τις μῦθος ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων, ὅτι οἱ Αἰθίοπες στελλόμενοι εἰς Τροίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ Τιθωνοῦ, ἐπεὶ ἤκουσαν τὸν Μέμνονα τετελευτηκέναι, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ τοὺς στεφάνους ἀνέβαλον ἐπὶ τὰς ἀκάνθας.

<sup>21</sup> See Heeren Ideen II. p. 441 and foll.



mately connected together. The gods accompanied their worshippers into the foreign lands to which they were led by the pursuit of gain, and their successive stations were marked by new temples, altars, and rites. "The Indian commerce carried the worship of Bacchus from the Ganges to Thrace and thence farther southward: so Serapis was transported from Egypt to Colchis, and thence to Sinopé, whence he returned to his native home: so the Phœnician Hercules travelled to Gades, and the Astaroth of the same people was introduced by them into all the islands and countries visited by their fleets and caravans." And as the numerous birthplaces of Bacchus, his Nysas, in Ethiopia and India, Arabia and Thrace, plainly indicate so many seats of his worship, so the Memnonia may be regarded as traces of the progress of the Ethiopian god. We find his sway permanently established in several cities: and it may be fairly conjectured that it was not confined to the comparatively few spots in which we happen to have heard of it.

The chief difficulty that stands in the way of a historical interpretation of the legend of Memnon, arises from the great number of sepulchral monuments that laid claim to his remains from Meroe to the *Æsepus*. But the hypothesis now proposed affords a complete explanation of this singular fact, which is in perfect accordance with the oriental genius, and especially with that of Egyptian antiquity. The religion of Egypt was as gloomy and melancholy, as that of the Greeks was cheerful and gay. It filled life with images of death, and even dashed the pleasures of the banquet with recollections of the grave. The gods themselves die and are buried and bewailed. Many cities in the valley of the Nile contested the possession of the remains of Osiris; and the sepulchre of Isis was shewn at Memphis, and at Philæ, near the borders of Ethiopia. Her festival was celebrated with mourning, like many others in the East. And there can be no doubt that Amenophis was honoured with similar rites. We learn from Philostratus that the Ethiopians mourned over Memnon's untimely death (*Vit. Ap.* vi. 4.); and Oppian (*Cyneget.* ii. 151) says the same of the Assyrians. This agrees perfectly with the Greek legend about the yearly contests of the birds at the Memnonian



barrow. Hence it appears that according to all analogy Memnon must be admitted into the ranks of the Egyptian and Ethiopian gods. His graves are his sanctuaries, and his palaces are like many in Egypt, which were mansions not of the living but of the dead. Foreign as such buildings are to our usages and notions, they were familiar to those of the Egyptians, in whose eyes life had no import but that of a transition into the realm of death. Hence the magnificence of the sepulchral palace of Osymandyas; and the Labyrinth was destined to a similar purpose. We meet with instances of the same usage in other parts of the East. The temple of Belus was sometimes called his palace, sometimes his grave. Semiramis buried Ninus in her palace (Diodor. II. 7); and Persepolis was at once the residence and the burialplace of the Persian kings: such therefore we may conclude was the character of the Asiatic Memnonia.

I am conscious that this slight sketch has not done full justice to the arguments of a writer who is no less distinguished by his eloquence than by his learning: yet I hope it will have enabled the reader to understand and enter into his opinions. I must now proceed to assign some reasons which prevent me from assenting to his hypothesis, and lead me to prefer a different view of the subject. The sum of his reasoning amounts to this: the supposition that the Greek legend of Memnon was founded on a historical basis leaves the most essential of its features, the death of the hero, and the rites with which he was honoured, wholly unexplained; whereas the hypothesis just stated accounts satisfactorily for these and all the other circumstances of the case. I shall first say why I am not satisfied with this explanation, and shall then attempt to shew that the one I adopt is consistent with all the conditions of the question.

And in the first place I must express my doubts as to the extent which Mr Jacobs attributes to the worship of the Ethiopian god or hero in Asia, as indicated by the Memnonia. Instead of presuming that these monuments once existed in far greater numbers than the fragments of ancient history disclose to us, I am inclined to suspect that we hear of more than ever existed. I collect from a passage in Mr J.'s essay that Jablonski entertained the same opinion: but as



I have not been able to meet with that author's *Syntagmata de Memnone*, I do not know on what arguments he founded it. To me the Memnonia reported to exist at Ecbatana and at Susa seem very extraordinary, even on Mr J.'s hypothesis; and the closer they are examined the more suspicious do they appear. As to the former of these capitals, what Hyginus attributes to Memnon is the same work which Herodotus ascribes to Deioces. From the notice this historian takes of the Memnonian Susa, it seems fair to conclude that he had never heard of any connexion between Memnon and Ecbatana; and it is not very probable that such a report, if it had existed in his day, should have escaped him and have reached Hyginus. On the other hand when it was once known that Memnon had founded Susa, or at least built the palace there, it was quite in the spirit of Greek invention to extend the story to the Median metropolis. I do not therefore even think it necessary to have recourse to the Syrian Ecbatana, though this, which lay near the river Beleus and the Memnonium mentioned by Josephus and, as it would seem, alluded to by Oppian, might certainly, as Mr Jacobs himself admits, have been confounded with the Median<sup>22</sup>. On the other hand the legend that Memnon dwelt at Susa appears to be confirmed by the authority of Herodotus, who repeatedly adds the epithet Memnonian to the name of the city or the palace. But it is still very questionable whether we ought to look upon this as the record of an ancient tradition. I lay no stress on the fact that Susa was founded by Darius Hystaspis<sup>23</sup>, because this statement, though probably authentic, needs not to be taken so literally as to exclude the previous existence of a town or a temple on the same site. But Diodorus (i. 46) relates that the Persians were said to have built or adorned the famous palaces in Persepolis, and Susa, and Media, with the treasures which they carried away from Egypt, and with the aid of Egyptian artists. I see no reason for questioning this fact, except with regard to the treasure; and I conceive that this is not only the most

<sup>22</sup> Plin. N. H. v. 19. Promontorium Carmelum et in monte oppidum eodem nomine quondam Ecbatana dictum. Juxta Getta, Jebba: rivus Pagida sive Belus. It was the residence of the Babylonian Jews, Joseph. Vit. 6.

<sup>23</sup> Plin. N. H. vi. 27. In Susiana vetus regia Persarum Susa a Dario Hystaspis filio condita.



probable explanation of the Egyptian character, which, as Mr Jacobs infers from the report of Diodorus, was visible in the buildings at Susa and Persepolis, but that it also satisfactorily accounts for the legend which had become prevalent among the Greeks in the time of Herodotus, that Susa was the abode of Memnon. I am therefore strongly inclined to strike both Ecbatana and Susa out of the list of the original Memnonia.

This however is but a secondary question. My chief objection to Mr Jacobs's hypothesis is, that it implies either a state of things which is not only attested by no evidence, but at variance with all that we know of ancient history, or else a particular fact equally unattested and intrinsically improbable. If Memnon was an Egyptian god whose worship passed from his own country into Asia, it was undoubtedly spread by human means: and the question is, Who were its carriers? It is to be regretted that Mr Jacobs has not been so explicit on this point as was necessary to secure the reader from the danger of misunderstanding him. For it is not from a direct assertion, but from rather vague allusions and comparisons, that we collect the precise nature of his opinion. After mentioning that the ancient religions migrated with mankind from the east toward the west, and remarking the connexion between ancient commerce and devotion, that "the merchant journeyed from one sea to another under the guidance and protection of his gods," he proceeds to illustrate his meaning, in the passage above quoted, by the examples of Bacchus and Serapis, Hercules and Astarte, which he immediately applies to the worship of Aménophis, but without expressly saying that it was propagated by commerce or by any other means. Since however he alludes to commercial intercourse, and to no other channel of communication, and at the outset combats the opinion that Memnon was a conqueror, and the Memnonia trophies of his victories, we must conclude that he conceives the Egyptian worship to have been diffused over Asia, like that of Hercules and Venus, by a peaceable traffic. But which was the people that took the active part in this traffic? This is the question on which every thing seems to me to depend, and for which nevertheless I can find no distinct answer in Mr J.'s essay. Still there are only two suppositions that can be made on this subject: and each



of them raises a difficulty in my mind which appears to me insurmountable. The nation whose commerce this form of religion followed in its progress, was either the Egyptians themselves, or some other. Nothing certainly can be imagined more likely than that Egyptians should have planted the worship of one of their tutelary gods in the countries they traversed. But in what period do we hear of a commerce in which the Egyptians were active? Of fleets and caravans conducted by Egyptian merchants? This is something which must be proved before it can ever be made the foundation of a tenable hypothesis. It implies a state of things not only attested by no evidence, but at variance with all that we know of ancient history, which informs us that except for some temporary conquests, or in consequence of a forced migration, the Egyptians before the age of the Ptolemies never left their native land. On the other hand notwithstanding our uncertainty about the dates of the Phœnician colonies and of their commercial expeditions, their high antiquity is sufficiently probable and well attested to be readily admitted in the discussion of any hypothesis. But we have the strongest proof of which any negative assertion is capable, that they did not spread the worship of Amenophis over Asia, because we meet with no trace of that worship in any of their known settlements, but with others apparently differing from it both in nature and in name. If there was ever room for such a being as Amenophis in the Phœnician mythology, it seems to have been very early filled up by another person of kindred attributes, by their Thammuz or Adonis. Which of these two suppositions expresses Mr J.'s meaning, I cannot even conjecture: but that he must adopt one or the other, and cannot have had any third people in his view, as the instruments of diffusing the worship of Amenophis, seems certain: but in neither case can I reconcile his hypothesis with history or analogy: it implies a fact wholly unattested, and intrinsically improbable.

For these reasons I must at least suspend my assent to it, until the difficulties I have stated shall have been removed.

The hypothesis I am about to propose can scarcely claim the merit of originality; for the steps which led me to it had been already taken, all but the last. Among others Butt-



mann, in the second volume of his *Mythologus*<sup>24</sup>, has brought together a number of facts and observations, which might have been expected to have led him to the same conclusion; and perhaps they would have done so, if he had not been dazzled by the captivating form into which Mr Jacobs has wrought his hypothesis, so that in another place<sup>25</sup> he thinks it scarcely possible to withhold assent from it. In the essay on the Minyæ Buttman's object is to render it probable that Minyas, the ancient king of Orchomenus, is a person of exactly the same mythical character with the Indian Menu, the Egyptian Menes, the Phrygian Men or Manes, and the Cretan Minos, with whom the history of their respective countries begins, and he compares the Mannus of the Germans (*Tacit. Germ.* 2), the son of the god Tuisco, who was celebrated in the ancient songs of the nation. To this list I would add the conquering hero Memnon. I scarcely imagine that any reader will be startled by the slight variation in the form of his name from that of the above mentioned persons: but should this be the case, it will be sufficient to remember that Memnon is only a dilatation of Menon, and then to remark that in a Greek author quoted by Pliny the old king of Egypt occurs under the latter name<sup>26</sup>. Indeed in this respect my hypothesis seems to have a considerable advantage over Mr J.'s. For the real audible name of the Egyptian god or hero whom he seeks to identify with Memnon, was not Amenophis but Phamenoph<sup>27</sup>,

<sup>24</sup> Vol. II. Ueber die Minyæ der ältesten Zeit. p. 232—241.

<sup>25</sup> I. p. 199.

<sup>26</sup> There can be no doubt, I should think, about the person meant. N. H. VII. 56. Anticlides in Aegypto invenisse (litteras) quemdam nomine Menona tradit xv. annis ante Phoroneum antiquissimum Graeciae regem.—Anticlides might well conclude that Menes was the inventor of letters, since his son Athothis wrote books on anatomy. Syncell. I. 101. "Αθωθις—οὗ φέρονται βίβλοι ἀνατομικαί, ἱατρὸς γὰρ ἦν. He also built the palace at Memphis. It is proper to observe that the same character and similar actions are attributed to the second king of the third dynasty, p. 106. Σέσορθος ὅς ᾽Ασκληπίος παρὰ Αἰγυπτίοις ἐκλήθη διὰ τὴν ἱατρικὴν. οὗτος καὶ τὴν διὰ ξεστῶν λίθων οἰκοδομὴν εὗρατο. ἀλλὰ καὶ γραφῆς ἐπεμελήθη. Again the second king of the fourth dynasty, Suphis, emulates his predecessors by building a pyramid and writing a book: Pliny, N. H. VI: Aethiopia clara et potens, etiam usque ad Trojana bella Memnone regnante.

<sup>27</sup> One of the inscriptions begins ἔκλυον ἀυδήσαντος ἐγὼ Πόπλιος Βαλβῖνος φωνὰς τὰς θείας Μέμνονος ἢ Φαμένωφ.



though the first letter is only the article: and the corruption of this word into Memnon is certainly much less simple and natural than the other. Beside this there is a resemblance between the character of Memnon and some of the persons with whom I compare him, sufficiently close at least to raise a presumption in favour of my conjecture. The Phrygians, as we read in Pausanias, viewed Memnon as a great conqueror, and as the maker of the highway that passed through their country. On the other hand Plutarch observes, that among the Phrygians all brilliant and wonderful works are called Manic, because Manis, one of their ancient kings, whom some name Masdes, was a brave and powerful man in his day: and Plutarch himself compares this hero with Semiramis and Sesostris<sup>28</sup>. So too what is reported of the first king of Egypt agrees extremely well with the general outline of Memnon's history. I lay no stress on the coincidence between Menes and Osiris, though it seems very clear that the actions of the one are attributed to the other<sup>29</sup>. But Menes is represented not merely as a founder of religious institutions, and the author of a higher degree of civilization, but also as a conqueror, who gained great renown by an expedition which he led into foreign

<sup>28</sup> De Is. et Os. 24. μεγάλοι μὲν ὑμνοῦνται πράξεις ἐν Ἀσσυρίοις Σεμιράμιος, μεγάλοι δὲ αἱ Σεσώστριος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ· Φρύγες δὲ μέχρι νῦν τὰ λαμπρὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ τῶν ἔργων Μανικὰ καλοῦσι, διὰ τὸ Μάνιν τινὰ τῶν πάλαι βασιλέων ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῖς, ὃν ἔνιοι Μάσδην καλοῦσι. The latter name reminds us of the Persian Ormuzd or Oromasdes, which is written by oriental scholars, Ahurô Mazdâê: the last word is an epithet signifying *great*.

<sup>29</sup> Plutarch, De Is. et Os. c. 8, mentions the story of the curses recorded at Thebes κατὰ Μείνιος τοῦ βασιλέως ὅς πρῶτος Αἰγυπτίους τῆς ἀπλούτου καὶ ἀχρημάτου καὶ λιτῆς ἀπήλλαξε διαίτης. c. 13. he says βασιλεύοντα δ' Ὀσιριν Αἰγυπτίους μὲν εὐθὺς ἀπόρου βίου καὶ θηριώδους ἀπαλλάξαι, καρπούς τε δείξαντα καὶ νόμους θέμενον αὐτοῖς καὶ θεοὺς δείξαντα τιμᾶν· ὕστερον δὲ γῆν πᾶσαν ἡμερούμενον ἐπελθεῖν. Diodorus, i. 45, relates of Menas, καταδείξαι τοῖς λαοῖς θεοὺς τε σέβεσθαι καὶ θυσίας ἐπιτελεῖν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις παρατίθεσθαι τραπέζας καὶ κλῖνας, καὶ στρωμνῇ πολυτελεῖ χρῆσθαι, καὶ τὸ σύνολον τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτελῆ βίον εἰσηγήσασθαι. When we compare these descriptions, and remember the ὑπερόριος στρατεία of Menes, it is difficult to approve of Wyttenbach's criticism, who objects to Squire's opinion that Menas and Osiris were one and the same person. "Atqui diversae sunt res, diversae traditiones. Menis Aegyptios primus a simplici et frugali victu ad lautiores delicatiorumque convertit, at Osiris a vita inopi et ferina ad frugum agrisque culturam ac Deorum cultum eos traduxit." As if luxury and frugality were not relative terms. Then he adds a chronological argument: *et omnino hic illo antiquior celebratur*.



lands<sup>30</sup>. It may therefore be fairly assumed that a name which a Greek would naturally form into Memnon, was long before the time of Homer celebrated in the west of Asia, as that of a hero who had come from the East, and had achieved many glorious exploits: and this very simple supposition, if it may not rather be termed a well attested fact, appears to me quite sufficient to explain every feature in the Greek legend of Memnon. This I shall proceed to shew by analysing the legend and successively examining its elements. These are, the parentage of Memnon, his extraordinary beauty, his premature death, his funeral honours.

As to the first point I may be very brief, because it raises no difficulty, at least none that is peculiar to my hypothesis. To say that Memnon came out of the distant East, was equivalent to calling him an Ethiopian, and no parent could be assigned to him more befitting his beauty and his illustrious deeds than the goddess of the morning. It was not an arbitrary fiction, but a mythological deduction, as legitimate as that which determined the lineage of Achilles and Æneas. The beauty of Memnon may at first sight appear a necessary result of his birth: since the rosyfingered goddess could bear none but comely children. It is however quite as probable that the beauty of the hero was the earlier feature, and contributed to fix the story of his birth. The sense of beauty, which gradually developed itself among the Greeks in so many directions, manifested itself in the attention paid to the human form, perhaps before they had begun to attempt even the rudest imitation of it. It is a characteristic tradition, even if it should not be literally true, that Cypselus, the ancient king of Arcadia, instituted a contest for the palm of female beauty on the Alpheus<sup>31</sup>. The antiquity of similar contests at Tenedos

<sup>30</sup> Syncell. p. 102. (Bonn.) Μετὰ νέκρας καὶ τοὺς ἡμιθέους πρώτην δυναστείαν καταριθμοῦσι βασιλέων ὀκτώ. ὧν γέγονε Μήνης, ὃς διασήμως αὐτῶν ἡγήσατο—Μήνης, ὃν Ἡρόδοτος Μῆνα ὠνόμασεν.—οὗτος ὑπερόριον στρατείαν ἐποιήσατο καὶ ἐνδοξος ἐκρίθη. ὑπὸ δὲ ἱπποποτάμου ἡρπάσθη. It is remarkable that he too comes to an untimely end.

<sup>31</sup> Nicias ἐν τοῖς Ἀρκαδικοῖς Athen. XIII. p. 609. The contest took place at the festival of the Eleusinian Ceres. Another is mentioned in the same page, on the authority of Theophrastus, among the Eleans for the other sex. On comparing this passage with what is said of the Elean contest in p. 565. F. we are led to suspect that the object in all these contests was to select the most comely persons for the service of the deity.



and Lesbos was probably very great<sup>32</sup>. The scholiast on Il. ix. 129 imagined that the poet alluded to that in the latter island, which was held in the precincts of the temple of Juno<sup>33</sup>. And I am inclined to suspect that the legend of the rival goddesses may have owed its origin to this local usage. The Homeric poems contain abundant evidence that beauty and valour were attributes equally essential to the idea of a perfect hero. Achilles surpasses all the other Greeks equally in both<sup>34</sup>. At the same time it is necessary to distinguish this from other cases, in which the beauty ascribed to a mythical person was probably connected with a totally different train of associations. The beauty of Hylas and Hyacinthus, and perhaps that of Pelops and Endymion<sup>35</sup>, belongs to a separate head, and has nothing in common with that of Achilles. But that of Peleus, of Bellerophon, of Jason, and Theseus<sup>36</sup>, and other similar heroes, may be properly considered as an early indication of the national turn of mind. And this is confirmed by the importance which the Lacedæmonians, who retained the old Greek character with so few refinements, attached to this quality<sup>37</sup>. If the Ethiopians paid exclusive regard to it in the election of their kings, we read that Archidamus was fined by the ephors, for preferring a rich wife to one who was more likely to bear princes worthy of Sparta<sup>38</sup>, and we know what a difficulty the oracle threw into the way of Agesilaus in mounting the throne. If therefore Memnon was a great warrior, it followed almost of course that he was a person of surpassing beauty.

But the third feature in the legend of Memnon seems to be that which Mr J. found most difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis that he was a real conqueror; and as this objection would apply with equal force to the supposition of his having been an imaginary one, I must endeavour to remove

<sup>32</sup> Theophrastus ap. Athen. XIII. p. 610.

<sup>33</sup> *παρὰ Λεσβίοις ἀγὼν ἄγεται κάλλους γυναικῶν ἐν τῷ τῆς Ἥρας τεμένει λεγόμενος Καλλιστεῖα.*

<sup>34</sup> Il. II. 674.

<sup>35</sup> Athen. XIII. p. 564.

<sup>36</sup> About Theseus, see Athen. XIII. p. 601.

<sup>37</sup> Heraclides Lembus ap. Athen. p. 566. *κατὰ τὴν Σπάρτην θαυμάζεται μᾶλλον ὁ κάλλιστος, καὶ γυνὴ ἢ καλλίστη.*

<sup>38</sup> *ἐπιλέγοντας ὅτι βασιλίσκους ἀντὶ βασιλέων τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις γεννᾶν προαίρεται.*



it. The premature death of Memnon may I conceive be satisfactorily accounted for by two causes, which, though distinct from each other, may have had an equal share in the formation of the legend. In the first place it must be remarked, that it is not owing to a merely accidental association of ideas that all the qualities of an accomplished hero, the highest fulness of strength, fleetness, beauty, and courage, meet to adorn the character of Achilles, who is to be cut off in his prime. This cannot be denied, even by one who should contend that Homer was only relating a fact, and that Achilles may be considered as much a historical person as Brasidas. For still it will be certain that it could be only by the choice and design of the poet, that the hero's untimely death is represented as the price which he has to pay for his glory<sup>39</sup>. Hence it is clear that his fate is nothing more than the appropriate epical expression for the same feeling which afterwards breaks out in the plaintive strains of the lyric muse, the feeling of sadness produced by the shortness and uncertainty of life, by the inflexible destiny which contracted all human enjoyments within a narrow span, and often embittered it with sorrow, often snatched away the most precious gifts of nature and fortune, almost before the possessor had time to taste them. That this motive entered into the composition of the legend of Memnon, seems the more probable, because he is slain by Achilles, and because it is by his hand that Nestor is bereaved of the youthful Antilochus.

It was not however only the high degree of beauty and valour attributed to Memnon that may have given this turn to the legend; it might be very naturally suggested by his character as a conqueror. For he was a conqueror of ancient times: his greatness had past away; his name was preserved only by a faint echo of his old renown; a new generation had sprung up to occupy the scene of his exploits; what monument of him could be found there but his tomb? That this was a natural train of thought, appears to me sufficiently proved by what Sallust says of the African legend about Hercules, who was believed, after leading a vast army out of the East to the conquest of the Western world, to have died

<sup>39</sup> *Il.* XVIII. 95—121. *ὥς καὶ ἐγὼν, εἰ δὴ μοι ὁμοίη μοῖρα τέτυκται, Κείσομ', ἐπεὶ κε θάνω· νῦν δὲ κλέος ἐσθλὸν ἀροίμην.*



in Spain<sup>40</sup>. I shall presently have occasion to mention what I conceive to be another parallel instance. But without dwelling on this point, it might be enough to say that, as there can be no doubt that from the earliest times the plains of Asia were covered with numberless barrows, raised by the various tribes who had contended for the possession of the country, if the name of Memnon was celebrated there, it would have been scarcely possibly that it should not have been connected with some of these monuments even before the Trojan war. Wherever a nameless sepulchre was found, there was probably a tale to account for it: just as in all parts of Peloponnesus, but especially in Laconia, the people shewed great barrows which they called the graves of the Phrygians who accompanied Pelops on his famous expedition<sup>41</sup>. Yet those Phrygians were conquerors. And must we here have recourse to the hypothesis of an Egyptian worship? It would surely not be a very extravagant conjecture, that among those numerous barrows which, as Strabo informs us<sup>42</sup>, were in his day shewn almost all over Asia, and called by the name of Semiramis, some at least passed among the natives for her tombs. This however, I must acknowledge, is an argument which would drop out of my hands, if any one should choose to deny that Semiramis had any thing to do with the Assyrian dominion, and should contend that she is only another representative of the Egyptian worship, which Mr J. supposes to have prevailed throughout Asia until it was compelled to give way to the Persian arms<sup>43</sup>. The barrow on the Æsepus was apparently distinguished by the neighbourhood of Troy, and by being

<sup>40</sup> Jug. 18—postquam in Hispania Hercules, sicut Afri putant, interiit, exercitus ejus compositus ex variis gentibus, amisso duce ac passim multis, sibi quisque, imperium petentibus, brevi dilabitur. Ex eo numero Medi, Persae, et Armeni, navibus in Africam transvecti proximos nostro mari locos occupavere. So that Hercules must have come from Susa and Ecbatana. Pliny N. H. v. 8: Pharusii quondam Persae comites fuisse dicuntur Herculis ad Hesperidas tendentis.

<sup>41</sup> Athen. p. 625. F. ἴδοις ἂν καὶ τῆς Πελοποννήσου πανταχοῦ, μάλιστα δ' ἐν Λακεδαίμονι χώματα μεγάλα ἃ καλοῦσι τάφους τῶν μετὰ Πέλοπος Φρυγῶν.

<sup>42</sup> XVI. p. 737. καὶ τῆς Σεμιράμιδος, χωρὶς τῶν ἐν Βαβυλῶνι ἔργων, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα κατὰ πᾶσαν γῆν σχεδὸν δείκνυνται, ὅση τῆς ἡπείρου ταύτης ἐστὶ, τὰ τε χώματα, ἃ δὴ καλοῦσι Σεμιράμιδος, καὶ τεῖχη κ. τ. λ.

<sup>43</sup> Note p. 27. "The triumph of the Persian arms put an end to the Egyptian worship in Asia, and the sepulchral palaces of Memnon were converted into residences of kings."



embosomed in a grove sacred to the River Nymphs<sup>44</sup>. As to the story of the birds, by which Mr J. thinks his hypothesis is confirmed, I can only say that I can discover no ground for assuming that the Memnonides were the original type after which all the other animals of the same class, the birds of Diomed, of Meleager, of Achilles<sup>45</sup>, were invented, or that any of these legends were founded on anything more than observations more or less correct on the habits of birds in particular places, which were naturally connected with local legends. Any one who reads the stories Pliny has collected in the tenth book of his history about birds of passage, will very easily understand what ample materials the popular imagination might find in them<sup>46</sup>.

It will not be irrelevant, before we quit this part of the subject, to remark that, though Mr J.'s reflexions on the gloomy character of the Egyptian worship, and the contrast between it and the Greek are in general very just, still there is a very important branch of the Greek religion to which they are not applicable, and this is, the rites celebrated in honour of the dead. These rites were necessarily of a funereal character, and all festivals of which they formed a part presented a dark as well as a light side<sup>47</sup>. The original distinction between the worship of the gods and that of the heroes was never effaced, though it was sometimes difficult to ascertain which was most properly due, as in the cases of Hercules, Achilles,

<sup>44</sup> Quint. Calab. II. 588. ἦ χί τε Νυμφάων καλλιπλομάνων πέλει ἄλσος Καλὸν, ὃ δὴ μετόπισθε μακρὸν περὶ σῆμ' ἐβάλλοντο Αἰσηποῖο θύγατρες, ἄδην πεπυκασμένον ὕλη Παντοίῃ.

<sup>45</sup> On the transformation of Diomed's companions into birds, Strab. VI. p. 284. On the Meleagrides, Pliny N. H. x. 38. Simili modo pugnant Meleagrides in Boeotia.—Meleagri tumulus nobilis. Aelian H. A. IV. 42. In Philostratus, Heroic. p. 746, the birds perform the same office at the temple of Achilles as at the tomb of Memnon: κοσμοῦντας αὐτῷ τὸ ἄλσος τῷ τε ἀνέμῳ τῶν πτερῶν, καὶ ταῖς ἀπ' αὐτῶν ῥανίσιν.

<sup>46</sup> To select one specimen: c. 31. Pythonos comen vocant in Asia patentibus campis, ubi congregatae (ciconiae) inter se commurmurant, eamque quae novissime advenit, lacerant. Such congregations would most frequently take place, or at least would attract most attention, on solitary hillocks. The Seleucides mentioned in c. 39 seem to have owed their name to Greek flattery.

<sup>47</sup> See the description of the Hyacinthia in Athen. p. 139. Philostratus, Heroic. p. 740, observes, τὰ μὲν Κορινθίων ἐπὶ Μελικέρτῃ...καὶ ὅποσα οἱ αὐτοὶ ὀρῶσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τῆς Μηδείας παισὶν—θρήνῳ εἴκασται τελεστικῷ τε καὶ ἐνθέῳ.



Diomede, and others<sup>48</sup>. Though I should hesitate very much to deduce the whole of the Greek religion, as some ancient

<sup>48</sup> Paus. II. 10. 1. Φαῖστον ἐν Σικυωνία λέγουσιν ἐλθόντα καταλαβεῖν Ἡρακλεῖ σφᾶς ὡς ἥρωι ἐναγίζοντας· οὐκ οὐν ἡξίου δρᾶν οὐδὲν ὁ Φ. τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς θεῷ θύειν.—Achilles received divine honours at Olbia (at least if Dion. Chr. II. p. 80, ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεός, is to be taken literally) and at Astypalaea: Cic. De N. D. III. 18, Achillem Astypalaeenses insulani sanctis sime colunt; qui si deusest, et Orpheus et Rhesus dii sunt, Musa matre nati. At Ilium he seems to have received the honours both of a god and a hero: Philostr. Her. p. 741. The passage is worth transcribing, because it illustrates better perhaps than any other the distinction between the two rites, and is in this respect equally valuable, whatever opinion we may hold as to the writer's authority. He relates that in ancient times before the Persian invasion in compliance with the injunction of the oracle of Dodona, ἐς Τροίαν πλέοντας θύειν ὅσα ἔτη τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ καὶ σφάττειν τὰ μὲν ὡς θεῷ, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐν μοίρᾳ τῶν κειμένων. The Thessalians had every year sent a ship to Troy, with black sails, having on board 14 θεωροί, and two bulls, one white and the other black. The messengers on their arrival at the tomb of Achilles δρόμοις ἐρρύθμισμένοις συνηλάλαζον, ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν Ἀχιλλέα, στεφανώσαντες δὲ τὴν κορυφὴν τοῦ κολωνοῦ, καὶ βόθρους ἐπ' αὐτῇ ὀρύξαντες, τὸν ταῦρον τὸν μέλανα ὡς τεθνεῶτι ἔσφαττον· ἐκάλουν δὲ καὶ τὸν Πάτροκλον ἐπὶ τὴν δαῖτα—ἐντεμόντες δὲ καὶ ἐναγίσαντες κατέβαινον ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν ἥδη, καὶ θύσαντες ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ τὸν ἕτερον τῶν ταύρων Ἀχιλλεῖ πάλιν, κανοῦ τε ἐναρξάμενοι καὶ σπλάγχχνων ἐπ' ἐκείνῃ τῇ θυσίᾳ, ἔθουον γὰρ τὴν θυσίαν ταύτην ὡς θεῷ, περὶ ὄρθρον ἀνέπλεον ἀπάγοντες τὸ ἱερεῖον, ὡς μὴ ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ εὐωχοῖντο. He then proceeds to relate that these rites having been neglected, and Thessaly in consequence having been afflicted with a drought, and an oracle bidding them τιμᾶν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ὡς θέμις, ἃ μὲν ὡς θεῷ ἐνόμιζον ἀφείλον τῶν δρωμένων, ἐξηγούμενοι ταύτῃ τὸ ὡς θέμις, ἐνήγιζον δὲ ὡς τεθνεῶτι. Compare Heroic. p. 707, and the descriptions of Pausanias, x. 4. 10, III. 19. 3; Plutarch Qu. Rom. 34. Xenophanes is said to have been consulted by the people of Elea whether they ought to sacrifice to Leucothea and to bewail her: the philosopher advised them εἰ μὲν θεὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι μὴ θρηνεῖν, εἰ δ' ἄνθρωπον μὴ θύειν. Aristot. Rhet. II. 23. Plutarch (De Is. et Os. c. 70) places the scene of the story in Egypt, and gives the speech of X. a different turn: εἰ θεοὺς νομίζουσι μὴ θρηνεῖν, εἰ δὲ θρηνοῦσι θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν.—The origin of the confusion above exemplified between divine and heroic honours may in general be accounted for by the well known fact, that in numberless instances a god was transformed by a legend, which laid hold of one of his epithets as the name of a distinct person, into a mortal hero. (See Mueller Prolegomena z. e. w. M. p. 271. foll.). Whether a hero (before the Macedonian period) was ever really sublimated by the mere enthusiasm of his adorers into a god, is very doubtful; so that a great part of Cotta's argumentation becomes a mere sciomachy. It must however be admitted, that we find the belief in the general possibility of such an apotheosis prevailing very early among the Greeks. It was perhaps partly founded on the language of the Odyssey (XI. 601 and IV. 561), which however admits of a different construction, and partly on the fact that in different places (and sometimes it would seem in the same place) both kinds of rites were actually performed in honour of the same person. Pindar Nem. x. 11. says: Διομήδεα δ' ἄμβροτον ξανθά ποτε Γλαυκῶπις ἔθηκε θεόν (Compare the quotation from Polemo in the Schol.) This was after the example of Menelaus. Hesiod (Pausan. I. 43. 1), among his other innovations, reported Ἰφιγένειαν οὐκ ἀποθανεῖν, γνώμη δὲ Ἀρτέμιδος Ἐκάτην εἶναι. Empedocles indeed speaks of a change from the human to the divine nature as the ordinary effect of certain religious observances. But this was manifestly a



and modern writers have done, from this source, still I as little see the necessity of attributing an oriental origin to such rites, when we meet with them among the Greeks. Homer's description of the obsequies of Patroclus, though the poet strives to soften the ferocity of the act, by leading us to view it as a measure of the love of the hero for his deceased friend, when combined with other ancient legends, seems to imply that the Scythian practice described by Herodotus, of sacrificing human victims together with other animals at the tombs of their dead kings, was not unknown to the Greeks of the heroic age<sup>49</sup>? The inference I draw from this remark is, that, even if it could be proved that mournful rites had once been performed at the grave of Memnon on the *Æsepus*, Mr J.'s hypothesis would gain nothing by the admission.

I must here digress for a moment to meet an objection which may possibly occur to some readers, who have been led to consider it as an unquestionable truth, that hero-worship was unknown to Homer, and may therefore have been startled by the foregoing observation. Mr Mitford says (Chap. II. Sect. 1.) "Nor is there found in Homer any mention of hero-worship, or divine honours paid to men deceased, which became afterward so common." This is an unfortunate mode of expression, since it must in general have the effect of preventing the reader from suspecting the real state

philosophical or mystic doctrine wholly unknown to the ancient Greeks, though Professor Disson (Pindar Comm. p. 653) seems to view it in a different light. "*Ne Empedocles quidem philosophus deos ex his animabus fieri dicens plane inania finxit.*" Yet in the very passage he refers to, the distinction between the doctrine of Emp. and the old Greek theology appears very clearly, when we consider how Pindar expresses the same thing. Emp. (Sturz. v. 407—9) says: *εἰς δὲ τέλος μάντεις τε καὶ ὕμνοπόλοι καὶ ἱητροὶ, καὶ πρόμοι ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθονίοισι πέλονται, "Ενθεν ἀναβλάσθουσι θεοὶ τιμῇσι φέριστοι.* Pindar merely says: *Οἷσι δὲ Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος δέξεται, ἐς τὸν ὑπερθεὺς ἄλιον κείνων ἐνάτῳ ἔτεϊ ἀνδιδοῖ ψυχὰς πάλιν. ἐκ τῶν βασιλῆες ἀγανοὶ, καὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ, σοφία τε μέγιστοι ἄνδρες αὔξοντ'· ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἥρωες ἀγνοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλεῦνται* Thren. 4. Indeed it can scarcely be imagined that Empedocles meant to express any commonly received doctrine, since he spoke of himself as a god in his life-time: *ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκ ἔτι θνητὸς Πωλεῦμαι μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος, ὥσπερ ἔοικε.* v. 367. Aristotle, or some one for him, says in his apology (Athen. p. 697) *οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε Ἑρμεία θύειν ὡς ἀθανάτῳ προαιρούμενος ὡς θνήτῳ μνῆμα κατεσκεύαζον, καὶ ἀθανατίζειν τὴν φύσιν βουλόμενος ἐπιταφίοις ἂν τιμαῖς ἐκόσμησα.*

<sup>49</sup> Quintus III. 680 describes a similar sacrifice at the funeral of Achilles, which he probably took from Arctinus.



of the case. It is as if one should say: Saint-worship, or divine honours paid to men deceased, is a practice of which we find no mention in the writings of the Apostles. A Greek theologian would not only have denied that hero-worship was the same thing with divine honours paid to men deceased, but would have been able to point out a broad visible distinction between the honours paid to heroes and those paid to the gods, which must have prevented even the vulgar from confounding them. Hero-worship consisted in the repetition of certain funeral ceremonies, and may be said to have existed as soon as such repetitions began to be practised. At what period this practice arose is certainly a disputable question. Homer does not expressly mention it; nor does the word *hero* with him signify a person who was the object of it. But since his poems exhibit the feelings and opinions on which the practice was grounded in full force, there is strong reason, independent of those which might be deduced from the old Italian religion, to believe that it existed in the age they refer to, though it undoubtedly underwent many modifications both as to its form and its objects, before it became the hero-worship which we find prevailing in the historical period.

But to return to the subject. I find all the leading features in the Greek legend of Memnon intimately connected together, and all springing naturally out of a single cause, the tradition of the presence of a great eastern warrior and conqueror in the west of Asia. If I should have succeeded in establishing this point, my inquiry would be here properly at an end. For this conclusion cannot be at all affected by the aspect which the legend presents among a different people, and least of all by the allusions made by ancient writers to the honours which Memnon received in Syria. In the first place considering the proximity of Egypt and Syria, and the early and frequent intercourse between the two countries, we might admit the probability of the supposition that the Egyptian Memnon was really worshipped in the places of which Josephus and Simonides spoke, and to which Oppian alludes, without being led to any further conclusion about the Memnonium on the *Æsepus*. But on the other hand as we do not know what was the Syrian name of the person whose



monument and worship the Greeks found there, we may with equal probability suppose that they applied the name of Memnon, with which they were familiar, to some object of Syrian devotion, which was foreign to them, but which suggested the comparison by its history, attributes, or rites. And more particularly I conceive that the Egyptian Maneros, who presents many points of resemblance, on the one side to Memnon, and on the other to the Syrian Adonis, might have served as the middle term in such a comparison<sup>50</sup>. At all events these instances cannot suffice to establish that gigantic system of Memnonian worship, by which Mr J.'s imagination connects Ilium with Susa and Ecbatana.

As it was the resemblance already pointed out by others between the names and characters of Menu, Menes, Minos, &c. that led me to the view here taken of the Greek Memnon, so it may perhaps receive some additional recommendation from a comparison between the latter and one of the most celebrated of the former personages, the Cretan lawgiver. As such Minos certainly reminds us much more of the Indian and Egyptian sages. Indeed his connexion with the latter appears much closer than it really was, in the legends of the Egyptian priesthood or their Greek admirers. For like the Egyptian Memnon he is made to build a labyrinth, which has now vanished again into air<sup>51</sup>: and on the other hand Sesostris, not content with conquering all Asia, subdues the greater part of the Cyclades, like Minos, and concludes his expedition in the Minoan period of nine years<sup>52</sup>. But Minos also resembles Memnon in two main points, which are not like the former of late invention: in the beauty of

<sup>50</sup> He was the only son of old Menes (Herod. II. 79), as, according to Jablonski, Opusc. I. p. 178, his name imports. He was cut off like his father by an untimely death: though Herodotus does not say that he was swallowed by a hippopotamus. In Hesychius, *Μανέρως*, Jablonski proposes to read *θεολογῆσαι*. But since Hesych. adds, *καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πᾶσιν ἀνὰ στόμα γενέσθαι*, and Pollux says, IV. 54, *Αἰγυπτίοις μὲν ὁ Μανέρως γεωργίας εὐρετῆς, Μουσῶν μαθητῆς, Λιτυέρσης δὲ Φρυξίν*, and again I. 38 *λίῃνος καὶ λιτυέρσης σκαπανέων ὥδαι καὶ γεωργῶν*, I am led to conjecture *γεωργῆσαι*. At all events Wyttenbach should have considered this, before he joined in the outcry against the luxury introduced by Menes.

<sup>51</sup> Hoeck Kreta I. p. 62 has shewn very satisfactorily that the Cretan labyrinth is a late fabrication.

<sup>52</sup> Diodor. I. 55. *τὴν λοιπὴν Ἀσίαν ἅπασαν ὑπήκοον ἐποιήσατο καὶ τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων τὰς πλείστας, — συντελέσας τὴν στρατείαν ἐν ἔτεσιν ἑννέα.*



his person, and in his violent death, which snatches him away at the height of his power and glory. As to the beauty of Minos, I need only mention his adventure with the traitress Scylla<sup>53</sup>. But what renders this legend remarkable is, that it occurs again in a different scene, and with different persons. In the expedition of Amphitryon against the Taphians, Comætho is seduced, like Scylla, to cut off the fated golden hair from the head of her father Pterelaus<sup>54</sup>. According to Apollodorus the seducer on this occasion was Amphitryon himself: but according to another version it was his ally Cephalus<sup>55</sup>. And Cephalus is beloved by Aurora, as his wife Procris must have been by Minos, since he gave her the hound which was alone capable of overtaking the Cadmean fox<sup>56</sup>. These coincidences are singular, though they may possibly be accidental. The death of Minos in Sicily seems to be a legend of similar import with that of the death of Hercules in Spain, though perhaps it admits of a more precise interpretation, into which however it would be unseasonable to enter here.

It now only remains to add a few remarks on the origin of the tradition on which, according to the hypothesis here proposed, the legend of Memnon was founded. Buttmann has endeavoured to shew that the names Menu, Menes, Minos, &c. originally signified nothing more than our word *man*, and that these mythical persons were at first only representatives of their several nations, or of mankind in general, who afterwards became kings and lawgivers<sup>57</sup>. To this view of the subject I have no objection, and would only observe that it is perfectly consistent with the early existence of a tradition, that one of these kings was a mighty conqueror who came out of the East. By what means such a tradition was connected with the name of Memnon, it is scarcely possible to ascertain, and is therefore of very little use to inquire,

<sup>53</sup> Hence Nonnus xxv. 165, surrounds Minos with a host of Cupids, and adds, *Μίνως μὲν πτολίπορθος ἕω ποτε κάλλει γυμνῷ Ὑσμίνης τέλος εὔρε, καὶ οὐ νίκησε σιδήρω, Ἀλλὰ πόθῳ καὶ ἔρωτι.*

<sup>54</sup> Apollod. II. 4. 7. The hair of Pterelaus is of gold, that of Nisus purple (Pausan. I. 19. 4). It is the same variation which occurs about the golden fleece: see Mueller Orchom. p. 172.

<sup>55</sup> Tzetz. ad Lyc. 934.

<sup>56</sup> Apollod. II. 4. 7.

<sup>57</sup> Mythologus II. p. 239.



except for the purpose of shewing how such a connexion might have arisen. There are three ways in which this may be conceived to have happened. One, which would perhaps be the simplest explanation of the fact, is a migration by which the people to which the legend belonged had exchanged its earlier seats for a new country in the West. In this case the hero who represented it would assume the character of a conqueror, who had led a victorious army out of the East. And there can be no doubt that such migrations very often changed the face of western Asia, as we are led to believe in particular with regard to the Phrygians, from the fact mentioned by Hérodotus, that they were related to the Armenians; for though he expresses this by saying that the Armenians were a colony of the Phrygians<sup>58</sup>, historical analogy renders it much more probable that the latter race originally sprang from Armenia. It would however be also possible, that the exploits of a foreign conqueror, who had passed through the land in ancient times, should have been transferred to a native hero. And thus the legend of Memnon may appear to attest the expedition of Osymandyas or Sesostris. But this explanation can only be adopted by those who are satisfied as to the reality of the enterprises attributed to these conquerors, which of late has begun to be vehemently questioned. Indeed it appears that even in the last century suspicions had arisen among the learned on the subject. Marsham, in the spirit of criticism which prevailed in his age, distinguishes between the expeditions of Sesostris and Osymandyas, by what appears to him a decisive mark. He observes (*Canon*. p. 404) that the Bactrians are not numbered among the nations conquered by Sesostris, whereas they formed a part of the empire of Rameses, as described in the monument shewn to Germanicus, or at least by the priests who interpreted it, and having afterwards rebelled were reduced to submission by the victorious arms of Osymandyas, who on this occasion made a progress through the extensive dominions acquired by Sesostris. Perizonius (*Ægypt. Orig.* p. 301) is so far from admitting the force of this argu-

<sup>58</sup> VII. 73. See Hoeck's *Kreta* I. p. 125. He produces several strong arguments drawn partly from history and partly from geography for his opinion that the Armenians were the ancestors of the Phrygians.



ment, that on the contrary he believes the conquests of Sesostris or Rameses (whom he considers as the same person) to have been greatly exaggerated both in Diodorus and Tacitus: and he suspects (p. 306) that Sesostris was no other than Osymandyas. He is however willing to receive his expedition as a historical fact, provided it be confined within reasonable limits, and considered merely as a transient inroad into the heart of Asia, not as the beginning of a long period during which a great part of Asia was subject to the kings of Egypt: a state of things as to which Lipsius had already expressed his incredulity<sup>59</sup>. Freret observes “that it is impossible to doubt that Sesostris conquered a part of Asia Minor, and even carried his arms into Thrace. In all these countries he left monuments of his conquests: Herodotus assures us that he saw two of these monuments in Ionia; and he speaks of those in Thrace as one who was certain of their existence (II. 103). The same historian informs us, that Sesostris left a body of troops in Colchis, to secure this frontier of his new empire<sup>60</sup>. It is scarcely possible to doubt that he posted another with the same motive in Asia Minor<sup>61</sup>.”

The progress of critical caution now renders it necessary to modify Freret's proposition, and will only permit us to say, that it is impossible to demonstrate that the expedition of Sesostris never took place. The authority on which it rests appears to a modern critic far from conclusive. He observes “that no really historical traces have yet been found of the expedition of Sesostris. For it is to be hoped that those strange monuments of it which the ancients saw in Palestine and Scythia, though their existence is satisfactorily proved by the testimony of Herodotus, will not be pronounced such, until some of them shall have been brought under our inspection, so that modern as well as ancient criticism may attempt to decide, whether they are memorials which really demonstrate the fact, or whether the observers of those days

<sup>59</sup> Ad Tacit. Annal. II. 60. De hac tanta potentia Aegyptiorum nihil legi, nec facile credam. He was perhaps equally ignorant of the vast extent of their ancient commerce.

<sup>60</sup> This is not a correct statement of what Herodotus says. He assigns no such motive to Sesostris, and does not even make up his mind about the cause which led the Egyptians to settle there; see II. 103.

<sup>61</sup> Memoires de l'Academie des Inscript. Vol. XLVII. p. 131.



accepted as such without suspicion an interpretation given to certain hieroglyphics by an ancient legend, or even inscriptions by which a later generation attested its belief in a legendary fact<sup>62</sup>." It must be allowed that these doubts are not arbitrary and groundless suspicions. The arguments adduced by Herodotus in favour of his conjecture about the Colchians excite our curiosity with respect to the particulars which he has passed over<sup>63</sup>, but cannot convince us that he did not misconstrue them; more especially as here we do not even hear of any such monuments as were said to have marked the bounds of the conqueror's march in Thrace<sup>64</sup>. As to those which the historian himself saw in Palestine and in Ionia, beside the general objections thrown out by Buttmann, they seem liable to doubt on some more special grounds. The relations between Egypt and Syria, which arose in an early historical period, render it impossible to draw any safe inference from Egyptian monuments in the latter country, as to events assigned to the mythical ages. And a similar objection is applicable to the authority of those sculptures seen by Herodotus in Ionia, of which he pronounces, with a confidence which we cannot share without knowing something more of his reasons, that they were monuments, not of Memnon, but of Sesostris. We learn from Xenophon, that Cyrus planted some colonies of Egyptians in Asia Minor. And though this statement is suspicious from the place in which it appears, it is in substance at least confirmed by a more historical testimony<sup>65</sup>. Whether these Egyptians were, as Xenophon represents them, auxiliaries of Cræsus, or on the contrary of Cyrus himself, which would be quite consistent

<sup>62</sup> Buttmann Mythologus I. 198.

<sup>63</sup> How desirable would it be to know the precise grounds of the remark *καὶ ἡ ζοὴ πᾶσα καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα ἐμφερὴς ἐστὶν ἀλλήλοισι*, and whether with respect to the latter point they were more cogent, than from the specimen given they seem to have been as to the former!

<sup>64</sup> It is not clear whether we must add, *and in Scythia*, as Buttmann appears to do in the passage quoted above. But it seems better in II. 103 to refer *τούτους* and *τούτων* to the Thracians only, since it is probable that Herodotus was speaking with reference to Greece.

<sup>65</sup> Cyropæd. VII. 1. 45. The Egyptians receive several cities from Cyrus, *τὰς μὲν ἄνω αἱ ἔτι καὶ νῦν πόλεις Αἰγυπτίων καλοῦνται, Λάρισσαν δὲ καὶ Κυλλήνην παρὰ Κύμην πλησίον θαλάσσης, ἃς ἔτι καὶ νῦν οἱ ἀπ' ἐκείνων ἔχουσι*. This Egyptian Larissa is again mentioned in Hell. III. 1. 7.



with the relation in which, according to Herodotus, the Persian conqueror stood to Egypt<sup>66</sup>, and even with the main fact related by Xenophon himself, in either case, if the fact of the Egyptian settlements be admitted, they seem to afford an easy explanation of the monuments seen by Herodotus in Ionia. If on any of their marches the Egyptian troops found themselves at leisure in a station near a rock, which struck them by its remarkable appearance, the thought of carving on it the image of one of their ancient heroes, who had perhaps passed by that very road, and had unquestionably conquered the country, would not be very unlikely to occur to them.

It is to be regretted that Mr Jacobs has not thought it necessary, in discussing the legend of Memnon, to state more explicitly his opinion on this disputed question. He assumes the existence of the Colchian colony, but he seems to consider it as a commercial, not a military one, and leaves us in doubt whether he acknowledges Sesostrius as a historical person, or regards him as no less fabulous than the equally celebrated Osymandyas, whose wars he treats with as little respect as his library. But the argument on which he appears to ground his belief in this Colchian colony, whatever was its origin, is too remarkable to be passed over in silence. "Serapis was carried by Egyptians to Colchis, whence he migrated to Sinopé, and thence back to his original country." This manner of alluding to the wellknown affair of Serapis strongly excited my curiosity as to the reasons which had led the author to such a conclusion. But the reference which accompanies it is merely this: *Fontenu Memoir. de l'Acad. des inscript. T. x. Galliot. Dissert. sur le dieu Serapis. Amsterdam. 1760.* The latter work I have not yet met with; and indeed my curiosity was so fully satisfied by the perusal of the former, that perhaps I have not done all that I might to gain a sight of it. The essay of the Abbé de Fontenu is a dissertation on a medal of the younger Gordian, struck at Sinopé, and on the history of that city. It contains some observations on the medal, which are not uninteresting, beside a mixture of

<sup>66</sup> It seems to result from Herod. II. 1 and 2 that Cyrus treated Amasis as his vassal: the only argument he can produce against the assertion of the Egyptians, that Cyrus demanded their princess for his harem, is that Cambyses was not her son.



fable and history about the city itself, in the usual style of the French Academicians, who in treating of a place or a person seem always to proceed on the supposition that their learned colleagues never heard of the name before. But as to the main point, the matter of Serapis, all that I could find proved by the dissertation is, that, wherever an opinion has been firmly embraced, everything will be sure to make for it. The opinion which Mr J. adopts about the deity of Sinopé is so far from being established by the Abbé, that it is only one among a great number of conjectures which he proposes as about equally probable, and is not even that which he himself prefers. All that is disputable in the question we are now considering he takes for granted. The difficulty with him is not where to find Egyptians out of Egypt, but to choose between the numerous points from which an Egyptian deity might have been brought to Sinopé. He observes that Sinopé might have received the worship of Serapis, if not immediately from the inhabitants of the neighbouring provinces, who had it from the Syrians and Phœnicians, among whom it had been introduced from Egypt, at least from the Colchians, an Egyptian colony, with whom Sinopé was closely connected by commerce, or perhaps from the Milesians, whose colony it was, and who, having kept up an intimate connexion with Egypt ever since the time of Psammetichus, could not fail to be thoroughly versed in the Egyptian religion. This last is in fact the conjecture he prefers, so that he really lends no support whatever to Mr J's hypothesis: and to remove all difficulties he subjoins: "I might add that the Athenians, whose colony the Milesians themselves were, had too great a veneration for Isis and Serapis, the knowledge of whom they had received from Egypt through Cecrops and Erechtheus, two of their kings who were natives of that country, not to have established or promoted the worship of those two Divinities on the coasts of the Euxine, where they were so powerful during a long period, and where they founded so many celebrated colonies." (p. 500.)

In the meanwhile the main point on which Mr J.'s argument depends—that the god of Sinopé had ever been an Egyptian deity before he was introduced into the temple at



Alexandria—is left by the Abbé in equal uncertainty with the road by which he reached Sinopé. “Would we know, he asks, to what country the worship of Jupiter Plutus originally belonged! It is very probable that it was Egypt. Even if Plutarch (De Is. et Os.) did not assure us that this God was no other than the Egyptian Serapis, it would be impossible to mistake him from the modius on his head, his Egyptian dress, his attitude, his demeanour, and his hands raised toward heaven.” How far a mistake on this subject is possible, may be partly inferred from a previous remark of the Abbé’s on the same figure, which he says is drest *in the Greek or rather in the Egyptian fashion*<sup>67</sup>, but will become much clearer from an inspection of the figure itself, which could certainly never have suggested such a thought to one who did not view it through the glass of a favorite hypothesis. The good Abbé has the truly astonishing simplicity to add: “We need only compare several medals of Egyptian cities on which Serapis is represented, with the reverse of this of Gordian and several other medals of Greek towns, which exhibit the Jupiter Plutus of the Greeks, to perceive at once that it is one and the same deity.”

After this we could not have been surprised to find that he received the whole story told by Plutarch and Tacitus as a matter of fact. But since Mr J. certainly does not, it would have been more to his purpose to have assigned some reason for thinking that the Pluto of Sinopé was an Egyptian god, than to have appealed to the Abbé, on whose dissertation I should not have dwelt so long, if it had not afforded a signal example of the danger of trusting to references, even in the writings of the most learned and candid men. It would carry us to a great distance from our subject, and would be of little use to discuss this question: but I may be allowed to remark that the accounts we have of the transaction raise no presumption whatever in favour of Mr J.’s opinion. It seems very clear that Ptolemy’s object in the juggle he concocted with the aid of his Greek and Egyptian theologians (one of whom was the Manetho on whose veracity so much of what sometimes passes for history depends) was

<sup>67</sup> La figure de Sérapis est ici vêtue a la Grecque, ou plutôt a l’Egyptienne. p. 497.



to promote the trade of Alexandria, and to unite his Greek and Egyptian subjects, by the introduction of a new deity, who might be considered as belonging equally to both. The God of Sinopé was recommended by the variety and ambiguity of his attributes and ensigns, which, with the help of a little pious fraud, rendered him peculiarly fit for the purpose. If the neighbourhood of Colchis had influenced the king's choice, that circumstance would probably have been mentioned among the proofs by which Manetho and Timotheus convinced him of the identity of Pluto and Serapis<sup>68</sup>.

But to return from this digression, it appears that we cannot rely on the expedition of Sesostris as a historical ground for the legend of Memnon, even though we may admit it to be highly probable that he, or some other king of Egypt, really gained those naval victories which are represented in the sculptures of Medinat-Abou<sup>69</sup>; for we shall not look for the scene of these exploits among the Cyclades, but in the Arabian gulf, where the monuments mentioned by Strabo may certainly be genuine<sup>70</sup>. There is however still a third supposition which I will venture to hint, with the diffidence

<sup>68</sup> The nature of the transaction will be best understood by comparing the pagan writers Tacitus H. iv. 83. Plutarch De Is. et Os. 28, to whom may be added Eustath. ad Dionys. 255, with two of the fathers, Clemens Al. Protrept. c. 4. and Cyril contra Jul. p. 13. Lest I should appear to dismiss the subject too hastily, I will transcribe the remark of a modern critic, Bernhardt on Eustathius: Serapidis cultum, quem Jovem Ditem fuere qui interpretarentur, a Ptolemaeo Sotere, prudentissimo consilio, ne sacra peregrina videretur Aegyptiis invitis obtrusisse, monitu scilicet insomnii, Sinope (cujus nummos effigium dei exhibere docet Eckhel D. N. P. I. Vol. II. p. 391, eique accedit Diogenis facetia ap. Diog. Laert. vi. 63) fuisse depromptum exposuit Tacitus. Nam G. I. Vossii hariolatio huic deo per Aegyptum priscam adjudicantis venerationem, nititur conjecturis et argumentationibus incertis: quamquam proxime abest sententia Jacobsio (de Memnon. p. 19) probata, ut Serapis ab Aegyptiis mercatoribus in Colchidem sit translatus posteaque patria in jura restitutus.

<sup>69</sup> Ritter, Afrika p. 744, remarks: "what Herodotus and Diodorus, following Hecataeus and the accounts of the priests, relate of Sesostris, seems to be confirmed by these sculptures." This however depends on the question whether the hostile navy and crews are really Indian.

<sup>70</sup> Strab. xvi. p. 769. At Deira on the straits of Babelmandel it was said στήλην εἶναι Σεσώστριος τοῦ Αἰγυπτίου μνηύουσιν ἱεροῖς γράμμασι τὴν διάβασιν αὐτοῦ. Φαίνεται γὰρ τὴν Αἰθιοπίδα καὶ τὴν Τρωγλοδυτικὴν πρῶτος καταστρεψάμενος οὗτος· εἶτα διαβὰς εἰς τὴν Ἀραβίαν, καντεῦθεν τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐπελθὼν τὴν σύμπασαν· διὸ καὶ πολλὰ τοῦ Σεσώστριος χάρακες προσαγορεύονται καὶ ἀφιδρύματά ἐστιν Αἰγυπτίων θεῶν ἱερῶν. This must be compared with the passage above quoted about Semiramis. Pliny, N. H. vi. 34, says Hucusque Sesostris exercitum duxit.



that belongs both to the obscurity of the subject and to my own very imperfect means of forming an opinion on it. The relation between the Egyptians and the Indians is a question that has long exercised the curiosity of the learned. That the former were an Ethiopian colony, seems now to be placed almost beyond dispute by the concurrence of tradition with arguments drawn from the nature and history of the two countries. But the origin of the Ethiopians themselves has long appeared to be buried in impenetrable darkness. They claimed, like many other nations, the honour of being autochthons<sup>71</sup>. When the Macedonians became masters of Egypt, and Greek travellers began to explore Ethiopia, and sometimes made a long stay at Meroe<sup>72</sup>, it is probable that many conjectures were formed on this point. But it is scarcely before the Roman period that we hear of a tradition that the Ethiopians were of Indian origin: and the writers who report it are not of the highest authority. Philostratus introduces an Indian Bramin Iarchas, relating that the Ethiopians of Meroe were once inhabitants of India; but having killed their King Ganges, they were pursued by his spectre, and could find no resting place: (before, we are to suppose, they quitted the country<sup>73</sup>). Elsewhere he brings in an Egyptian saying, that he had heard from his father that the Indians were the wisest of men, and the Ethiopians a colony of the Indians, who preserved many of the institutions of their ancestors<sup>74</sup>. It seems evident that, beside the suspicious character of the author, these accounts deserve not the slightest attention as an Indian tradition, and that they cannot have been an Ethiopian one. We find however the same fact more simply stated by Africanus, in a passage abruptly inserted after the mention of Amenophthis-Memnon in a list of Egyptian kings, under a title: “concerning the Ethiopians, whence they were, and where they settled;” which is explained as follows: “The Ethiopians migrated from the

<sup>71</sup> Diodor. III. 2. ὅτι οὐκ ἐπήλυδες ἐλθόντες, ἀλλ’ ἐγγενεῖς ὄντες τῆς χώρας, οἰκαίως αὐτόχθονες ὀνομάζονται, σχεδὸν παρὰ πᾶσι συμφωνεῖται.

<sup>72</sup> Pliny N. H. VI. Primus Dalion ultra Meroen longe subvectus: mox Aristocreon et Bion et Basilis: Simonides minor etiam quinquennio in Meroe moratus cum de Aethiopia scriberet.

<sup>73</sup> Vit. Apoll. III. 6.

<sup>74</sup> VI. 8.



river Indus, and settled on the frontiers of Egypt<sup>75</sup>." It is unnecessary to dwell on the extreme uncertainty of such statements, and I will only point out two causes which may explain their origin, and which do not appear to have been sufficiently noticed by those who, having been inclined to adopt them on other grounds, have attributed a higher value to them than they can fairly claim<sup>76</sup>. In the first place we find that early after the Macedonian conquests attempts began to be made to deduce the Egyptian mythology from the Indian. Plutarch censures Phylarchus for having said that Dionysus first brought two oxen into Egypt from India, and that the one was named Apis, the other Osiris<sup>77</sup>. It is clear enough to what historical inferences these mythological conjectures were likely to lead. In the next place we read in Procopius as an acknowledged fact, that the Nile flows from India<sup>78</sup>. When this hypothesis was first started we do not know, but whenever it was received, the conclusion that the Ethiopians came from the same land in which the river took its rise, might naturally follow.

But however unworthy of regard may be the scanty testimony of the ancients on this question, there are other sources of information still open, from which it may not be too sanguine to hope for a solution of it. This can only be looked for from a comparison of the ancient systems of religion and polity in the two countries: but it seems by no means improbable that such an investigation may finally ascertain the degree of connexion between them, and their relative antiquity. In the mean while the author of an

<sup>75</sup> Syncell. I. p. 286. Περὶ Αἰθιοπῶν, πόθεν ἦσαν, καὶ ποῦ ᾤκησαν. Αἰθίοπες ἀπὸ Ἰνδοῦ ποταμοῦ ἀναστάντες πρὸς τῇ Αἰγύπτῳ ᾤκησαν. Parthey, De Philis Insula p. 6, thinks this passage spurious as to the form, though not, if I understand him, as to the substance. He says, after mentioning one of the passages of Philostratus; *Alia coloniae Indicae mentio apud Syncellum spuria nobis videtur, cum res Aethiopum toto libro non amplius commemorantur. Duo versus: περὶ Αἰθιοπῶν—ᾤκησαν inter quadragesimum et quadragesimum primum Aegypti regem intempestive interjecti, (?) pro capitis amissi initio argumentove margini adscripto habemus.*

<sup>76</sup> Bohlen I. p. 119. says "The attacks on these testimonies may be parried with no less ease than it may be shewn on the other hand that they are not conclusive."

<sup>77</sup> De Is. et Os. c. 29.

<sup>78</sup> De Edif. VI. near the beginning. Νεῖλος μὲν ὁ ποταμὸς ἐξ Ἰνδῶν ἐπ' Αἰγύπτου φερόμενος. Perhaps we may attribute something to the distinction made by Herodotus, and seemingly confirmed by Homer, between the Eastern and Southern Ethiopians.



excellent work on Indian antiquities has produced a number of very strong arguments, to prove that the religion of Egypt must have been transplanted from India<sup>79</sup>. That he has decided the point would perhaps be too much for any one, certainly for one who is not familiar with the literature of both countries, to pronounce. But if upon continued examination this opinion should be as generally received as that of the Ethiopian origin of the Egyptian priesthood, which not long ago was as generally rejected<sup>80</sup>, we should then have another key to the mysterious legend we have been discussing. For as it would then be clear that there was a historical connexion between the Indian Menu and the Egyptian Menes, so it would not be an extravagant conjecture, that the movements which transported an Indian colony into Africa, vibrated through the heart to the extremities of Asia, and that the same shock which agitated the nations, carried the name of Memnon on the wave of conquest and migration from the Indus to the *Æsepus*. As however I do not wish the reader to strain his eyes upon this distant retrospect, I will conclude with reminding him that the hypothesis here proposed is quite independent of all these conjectures, though perhaps if it were to be tried by their merits it might bear to be confronted with its rival; but that the advantage it claims over its antagonist is, that it gets rid of a cumbrous load of hypothetical machinery, which, though it cost the ingenious author little trouble to raise, his readers cannot so easily support, and that it preserves the essence of an ancient tradition, while it illustrates the character of the people which interwove the foreign legend with their national poetry.

C. T.

<sup>79</sup> v. Bohlen. *Das alte Indien mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Aegypten*.

<sup>80</sup> Wesseling on Diodor. III. 2. (Vol. I. p. 175) observes : *Quod si tamen Aegyptiis respondendi locus esset, dubium non est quin iisdem rationibus pugnarent, et Aethiopas suos esse colonos pertenderent : manebit ergo lis sub iudice, donec aliunde, utri antiquitate praestent, probabitur : quod Aegyptiis fortasse in facili erit.*



## ON THE POSITION OF SUSA.

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AMONG the many illustrations history affords of the instability of human greatness, one not the least remarkable is that the site of the "Memnonian city" should have become a subject of controversy. Many of our readers are probably acquainted with the difference of opinions that has arisen on this question, who do not know that it has been at length, if not completely decided, at least brought so near to that point, as scarcely to admit of any farther doubt. This is one of the services rendered to Oriental geography by the celebrated Orientalist, Joseph von Hammer. But the discovery by which he threw a new light on the subject was first published in a German review, which I believe has but a very narrow circulation in this country, the Vienna *Jahrbücher der Literatur*, Vol. VIII, and there is reason to believe that few even of the persons who take an interest in eastern geography are yet informed of it. At least in a popular work, the author of which has paid more than ordinary attention to eastern geography, the opinion which v. Hammer has refuted, or at least shaken to its foundation, is adopted and stated in a manner which clearly implies that the writer was not aware of the strongest arguments that have been brought against it. In the life of Alexander the Great in Mr Murray's Cabinet Library, p. 168, 169, *Susa* is described as situate on the *Choaspes*, the modern *Kerah*, and as corresponding to *Shus*, "where a small temple still commemorates the burial place of Daniel." The proposition which v. Hammer maintains is that the *Kerah* is not the *Choaspes*, nor *Shus*, *Susa*, but that the modern *Schuster* or *Tostar* occupies the site of the ancient city of Memnon, and that the *Choaspes* is the modern *Karoon*. A glance at a good map of Asia will shew that the distance between the two places is so considerable as to render the



question of some importance to ancient history: and I may therefore hope that my labour will not be wasted if I make v. Hammer's discovery more generally known. For this purpose I subjoin a translation of that part of his article which relates to this point. But for the sake of readers to whom the subject may not be familiar, I will first briefly state the principal arguments which had been previously adduced on each side of the controversy. This I shall do with the assistance, and partly in the words of Mr Kinneir, who in his *Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire* (p. 101–106) has reviewed the conflicting reasonings of Major Rennel and Doctor Vincent, and has declared himself, though not with absolute confidence, in favour of the former, who places *Susa* on the site of *Shus* and on the banks of the *Kerah*, or *Haweesa*, or *Karassu*, against the latter, who contends that *Susa* is *Shuster*, and the *Karoon* the *Choaspes*.

Mr Kinneir, as an eyewitness, informs us, (p. 99.) that “about seven or eight miles to the west of *Dezphoul* (a town on the eastern bank of the *Abzal*, twenty eight miles west of *Shuster*) commence the ruins of *Shus*, stretching not less perhaps than twelve miles from one extremity to the other. They extend as far as the eastern bank of the *Kerah*, occupy an immense space between that river and the *Abzal*, and like the ruins of *Ctesiphon*, *Babylon*, and *Kufa*, consist of hillocks of earth and rubbish covered with broken pieces of bricks and coloured tile. These mounds bear some resemblance to the pyramids of *Babylon*, with this difference, that instead of being entirely made of brick, many are formed of clay and pieces of tile, with irregular layers of brick and mortar five or six feet in thickness, to serve, it should seem, as a kind of prop to the mass. Large blocks of marble, covered with hieroglyphics, are not unfrequently here discovered by the Arabs, when digging in search of hidden treasure; and at the foot of the most elevated of the pyramids stands *the Tomb of Daniel*, a small and apparently a modern building, erected on the spot where the relics of that prophet were believed to rest.”

Major Rennel's arguments in favour of *Shus* are three in number. “First (as Mr Kinneir states them) the similarity of name; and the situation, which agrees better with



the distance between *Sardis* and *Susa* mentioned in the tablets of Aristagoras than that of *Shuster*. Secondly, the legend of the Prophet Daniel whose coffin was found at *Shus*; and thirdly, that *Susa* ought to be placed on a river which has its sources in *Media*." I pass over Dr Vincent's reply to the first and second of these arguments, since the reader will easily guess them, as well as his own mistake, which Mr Kinneir corrects, about the name *Kuzistan* (which he confounds with *Kuhistan* and derives from the mountains which surround the province). But as to the river of *Susa*, Dr V. observes that it was the *Euleus*: that *Nearchus sailed up to Susa without entering the Shat-ul-Arab; which he could not have done, had that city stood on the Kerah*: and that, when Alexander descended the Euleus, he sent his disabled ships through the cut of the Hafar into the Shat-ul-Arab. And finally that a strong reason for placing *Susa* at *Shuster* occurs in Ibu Haukul, who says that *there is not in all Kuzistan any mountain except at Shuster, Jondi Shapour, and Ardz*: and as it is evident that the castle at *Susa* was a place of strength, it is reasonable to suppose that it stood upon a hill.

The words in Italics contain the strength of Dr V.'s reasoning, which however does not convince Mr Kinneir, who fortifies Major Rennel's position with an additional argument derived from the ruins of *Shus* above described, which is certainly very striking. He remarks, "Strabo tells us, that the Persian capital was entirely built of brick, there not being a stone in the province. Now the quarries of *Shuster* are very celebrated, and almost the whole of the town is built of stone: but there is no such thing in the environs of *Shus*, which was evidently formed of brick, as will appear from my description of the pyramids that now remain."

I must here stop to observe that Mr K. makes Strabo say something which I cannot find in his Greek text, and which materially affects the question. Strabo says of *Susa*, "The walls of the city, and the temples and the palace likewise, were built, as those of *Babylon*, of brick and bitumen, according to some authors."<sup>1</sup> But he does not add here, nor any where

<sup>1</sup> καθάπερ εἰρήκασί τινες.



else in his description of *Susiana*, that there was not a stone in the province, unless Mr K. collects this from what he says of the rugged mountains that separate *Susiana* from *Persis*.<sup>2</sup>

Still after all the abatement which must be made on account of the manner in which Strabo expresses himself, which implies that all his authorities were not agreed on the subject, it may be admitted that Mr Kinneir has strengthened Major Rennel's case by this observation. But on the other hand he has nothing to oppose to Dr Vincent's argument about the citadel of *Susa*, which Strabo and others speak of, and of which there seems to be no trace at *Shus*: and to meet the objection drawn from the voyage of Nearchus, he is forced to contend that the *Euleus* and the *Choaspes* were two different rivers. He says: "If we admit the ruins of *Shus* to be those of ancient *Susa*, the *Kerah* will correspond to the description of the *Choaspes*, but not to that of the *Euleus*: for the latter entered the gulf by a channel of its own, whilst the *Kerah* flows into the *Shat-ul-Arab*. As it is not however ascertained that the *Choaspes* and *Euleus* were the same, &c." Hence the sense in which he understands the statement that Nearchus sailed up to *Susa*, is this, "Nearchus might have ascended either the *Abzal* or the *Karoon*, without entering the *Shat-ul-Arab*; and certainly could not have done so by the *Kerah*, which meets that stream between *Bassora* and *Korna*.<sup>3</sup> But this circumstance will not be much in favour of Dr V.'s assumption; for the ruins of *Shus* approach within a few miles of the *Abzal*: and we are uncertain whether the *Euleus* flowed to the east or west of *Susa*." These few miles, it must be remembered, according to the passage above quoted from Mr K., are as many as seven or eight.

<sup>2</sup> παρεμπίπτει ὀρεινὴ τραχεῖα καὶ ἀπότομος μεταξύ τῶν Σουσίων καὶ τῆς Περσίδος.

<sup>3</sup> In the "Life of Alexander the Great," the *Euleus* is spoken of as the same river with the *Choaspes*, the modern *Kerah* (p. 352), and yet Alexander is made to enter the Persian Gulf by the main channel of the *Karoon* (p. 350); which is meant for a translation of Arrian's account that Alexander κατέπλει κατὰ τὸν Εὐλαῖον ποταμὸν ὡς ἐπὶ θάλασσαν, VII. 7. How the author reconciles these two statements I am at a loss to imagine. As to Mr Kinneir's explanation, it should be compared with the expressions of Arrian, Ind. c. 36. καταστήσῃ τὸ ναυτικὸν ἐς Σοῦσα—ἔστε σοι σώας καταστήσω ἐς Σοῦσα τὰς νέας.



The reader will now be prepared to hear the observations of the learned writer who has since taken up the subject, which Mr K. was compelled to own he left, as he found it, *perplexed*.

After observing that “Mr Kinneir has very superfluously made the *Euleus* and the *Choaspes* two distinct rivers in his map,<sup>4</sup> though d’Anville, Vincent, Mannert, and after them Hoeck, (in a Latin prize essay entitled *Veteris Mediae et Persiae monumenta*) have placed the identity of the *Euleus* and the *Choaspes* beyond all doubt,” he proceeds to say, “Arrian, Pliny, and the Bible place *Susa* on the *Euleus*; Herodotus, Strabo and Curtius, on the *Choaspes*; and what some relate of the *Euleus*, others mention with regard to the *Choaspes*, that it was famed for its exceedingly light and excellent water, that the Persian kings drank of no other, and carried it with them on their journies.” Then after mentioning the difference of opinions as to the position of *Susa*, and Dr Vincent’s argument drawn from the voyage of Nearchus, he adds, “Without dwelling on the force of this and the other reasons adduced by Vincent for the identity of *Susa* and *Shuster*, we hasten to communicate a passage from the original sources of Persian Geography, which decides the question, and fixes the site of the ancient *Susa* at *Shuster*. This passage occurs in the valuable Manuscript, No. 433 of the Imperial library, which seems to be a portion of the *Nusetol-Kulub*.”

“The *Tigris* of *Shuster* rises in the yellow mountain (*Kuhiserd*) and the (other) mountains of Great *Louristan*, and after a course of thirty and odd parasangs reaches *Shuster*. It is always cool, and digests food, so that in the hot weather

<sup>4</sup> The distinction however is not altogether superfluous for Mr Kinneir’s argument: the epithet would be more applicable to Mr Mitford’s distinction between the *Euleus* and the *Pasitigris*, which, he imagines, both fell by separate mouths into the Persian gulf, having their courses nearly parallel and not very distant for a considerable way before reaching the gulf. He adds, “*Susa* stood on the *Euleus*. But this river was, towards its mouth, so inconvenient for navigation, that the preferable course for vessels from the gulf to *Susa* was up the *Pasitigris* to a canal communicating with the *Euleus*.” (Ch. LV. Sect. v.) No authority is cited for this assertion, but it seems to be founded on the description of Alexander’s voyage down the *Euleus*, Arrian VII. 7, combined with Ind. 42, in neither of which passages however is there any allusion to such a canal. The only one mentioned is the *Hafar Cut*.



the people of the country rely on its digestive quality, and eat coarse food, and it is digested<sup>5</sup>.”

“In this passage the excellent quality, on account of which the water of the *Euleus* or *Choaspes* was drunk by the kings of Persia, is sufficiently marked: this property of the river, which the lapse of centuries has not changed, at once unties the knot, and would of itself suffice to determine the identity of the two streams, if the name, *Tigris* of *Shuster*, did not expressly testify that this river united with the *Pasitigris* is the same which Nearchus sailed up with his fleet from the sea, and down which Alexander sailed from *Susa* to meet him. The *Pasitigris*, the modern *Jerahi*, flowed into the *Euleus*, the modern *Karoon*, from the east, and since the river of *Shuster* is likewise called the *Tigris* of *Shuster*, the modern Persian geography has preserved the name of the *Pasitigris* which was used by Nearchus. So the *Simois* toward its mouth is called the *Mendere* after the *Scamander* which falls into it.”

In a subsequent passage, after remarking on the want of an eminence at *Shus* corresponding to the citadel at *Susa*, he adds: “Our authorities enable us completely to demolish one of the strongest arguments of our opponents founded on *Daniel’s Tomb*, which is shewn at *Shus* and not at *Shuster*. The following extract from the valuable list of cities by Achmed of Tus proves that Daniel’s tomb was originally at *Shuster*, and not at *Shus*, and that the prophet’s body was transported from *Shuster* to *Shus* in consequence of a great famine.

“*Shuster* is a good city on the banks of the river *Meshrikan*,<sup>6</sup> in the district of *Kusistan*. This is the river on

اب دجله تستر ازکوه زرده و جمال اور بزرگ بر میخیزد  
و بعد از سی و چند فرسنگ تد تستر صی رسد هذوز  
سرد می باشد هاضم طعام جندانکه در آن کرما  
اهل آن دیار اعتماد بر هضم آن ماکولات غلیظ  
خورند و هضم شود

<sup>6</sup> This is the name of the artificial canal, occasioned, as Mr Kinneir says, (p. 99.) by the construction of the dyke called by the Persian author the *Shadrewan*: it discharges its waters into the *Ab-zal*, half a mile from the place called *Bundekeel* by Mr K., which v. Hammer takes to be the same with one called *Asker Mokerrem* by the Eastern geographers.



which Sapor built the *Shadrewan* before the gate of the city, because it lies on a hill, and the water does not come up to it. He built *Shuster* with stone and iron pillars. The body of Daniel (peace be with him) was formerly at *Shuster*. The people of *Shus* who were afflicted with a famine desired the body of Daniel (peace be with him) to turn away the famine. The body was sent to them to *Shus*, to turn away the famine. They hid the coffin in the river, and the elders of *Shus* swore that the coffin was not in their city. After this they asked the boys; the boys said that the coffin was in such a place. Wherefore it is the custom to hear the testimony of boys. The glory of this city is the dyke *Shadrewan* on the river *Meshrikan*: its wares are rich stuffs and rice."

To this is added an extract from a Turkish geographical work, the *Jehannuma*, which, though it does not mention the transfer, yet on the whole confirms the statement of the Persian author. "*Daniel's Tomb* is on the west side of the city (*Shus*), they say it has remained there ever since the captivity in the time of Nebuchadnezzar. At the time of the (Moslem) conquest a coffin was found which was taken for that of Daniel, and was brought out in time of dearth and honoured with prayers. Abu Musa Elashari made a vaulted chamber of stone under ground by the bank of the river that flows by the city, in which he deposited the coffin and turned the river of *Shus* over it, out of reverence, that the body of a prophet might not lie in the hands of the people." The same Turkish author in mentioning *Shuster* notices the excellent quality of the water in digesting the coarsest food.

Two observations of v. Hammer seem after this to set the question completely at rest: "In the first place the river of *Susa* can only be that which flows under the walls of the city, and not another flowing several miles off (as the *Ab-zal*), because Daniel stood at the gate of the city (VIII. 2.) by the river of *Ulai*. In the second place it is by no means uncertain whether *Susa* stood on the eastern or western bank of the *Euleus* (as Mr Kinneir supposes), because Alexander on his march toward the east arrives first at the *Choaspes* and then at *Susa*. This circumstance has been clearly pointed out by Hoeck, to prove the position of *Susa* on the eastern



bank of the *Euleus* or *Choaspes*, only he is quite wrong in looking for this river in the *Kerah* or *Karasu*."

Lastly, we are indebted to the ingenious author for a happy conjecture, which removes the only remaining difficulty that might seem to leave a doubt on the subject. With this we shall conclude our extracts.

"The five authors who maintain the identity of *Susa* and *Shus* (Rennell, Barbié du Bocage, Sir William Ouseley, Kinnaird, and Hoeck) may ask their five opponents (D'Anville, Herbelot, Vincent, Mannert, and the writer) to what place the vast ruins of *Shus* correspond, if it be not the ancient *Susa*? We will meet this question with another which involves an answer to it. Where are the ruins of the great city of *Elymais*, the capital of the province of the same name, which contained the great temple Azara, mentioned by Strabo, Josephus, and Zonaras,<sup>7</sup> dedicated to Venus or Diana (Zaratis, Sohra, or Anaitis, Anahid)? where are they to be looked for but here in the centre of the province of *Elymais*, which the river of *Shuster* separated from *Susiana*? *Elymais* was the capital of the province *Elymais*, and *Susa* that of the province *Susiana*; the former lay on the eastern bank of the *Kerah*, the latter on the eastern bank of the *Karoon*. Both were celebrated for their temple of Anaitis, which in the former city was called after the other name of the goddess (Zaratis) τὰ Ζάρα or τὰ Ἀζαρα. By an oversight which has never before been noticed, the party who maintain the identity of *Susa* and *Shus* have entirely forgotten the capital of *Elymais*, and have attempted to transfer the capital of *Susiana* into the heart of *Elymais*."

C. T.

<sup>7</sup> Strabo XVI. 1. 18; Joseph. Antiq. IX. 1; Zonaras IV. 20.



## ON CERTAIN TENSES ATTRIBUTED TO THE GREEK VERB.

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Nothing in language is more beautiful and perfect in its kind than the Greek verb. Its varied inflexions, as expressive in signification as they are euphonious in sound, furnish us with means of indicating the times, circumstances, and relations of actions, with a readiness and precision not elsewhere to be met with. And when we consider how large a proportion these constitute of the subject matter of discourse, and how it is the most difficult task of language to give them adequate expression, we shall be able to estimate the real merit of this transcendent member of the Greek tongue, and the degree in which it alone establishes the superiority of that language above all others known and studied among us. It is not, however, the design of this paper to illustrate the excellence of the Greek verb, an undertaking which could not be properly accomplished within a small space, but to point out what are apprehended to be some injurious errors which have long prevailed in its grammatical analysis, and by which the general perception of that excellence has been impeded. It is intended to prove that the analysis of the Greek verb, as commonly taught in our schools and colleges, has not yet attained that degree of simplicity which not only practical utility, but consistency with the truth itself requires.

The mechanism of the Greek verb is certainly artificial and complicated; as much so, perhaps, as any thing in human language. Not only has it more tenses than the verb of any other European language either ancient or modern, but each of those tenses is developed through a greater variety of forms sustaining the function of the several moods and participles, and these participles again are declined with a fulness quite peculiar. In all this richness of apparatus it surpasses the



Latin, as far as the Latin does that of most modern tongues. Elaborate, however, as the Greek verb really is, it has been made to appear complicated beyond the reality, by the defective manner in which it has commonly been analysed. It has not quite so formidable a troop of tenses as it is ordinarily made to display; nor does it shoot out into quite so ample and luxuriant a tree, as sometimes flourishes in that solitary picture which is allowed to embellish our Greek grammars.

To deny that the regular Greek verb possesses two forms of the aorist and future, or any distinct form at all for a tense called the perfect middle, will to some readers probably appear a startling paradox, which they will readily impute to ignorance or presumption. But others, perhaps, will feel no great indisposition to believe that the assertion may not be far from the truth. They may have become conscious, from their own observations, of those facts which in effect establish it.

But before going farther, lest the reader should be indisposed to bestow on the question that share of attention which it really deserves, it may be well to advert briefly to its practical importance, and this will be found to be by no means inconsiderable. The least evil of the present system is, that the student has to commit to memory a much longer verb than he ought to have. Undoubtedly the length and complexity of the verb, as at present exhibited, is felt to be the most serious difficulty in attaining a knowledge of Greek grammar: and many are so much discouraged by the formidable appearance of the tables presented to them, that they never undertake the task with sufficient spirit fairly to master it, and so never do or can attain a sound acquaintance with the language. But a far greater evil than this, which after all resolves itself into the necessity of a little additional painstaking, is the confusion and obscurity in which the entire use of the verb is involved. Fictitious tenses are ascribed to the verb: then certain uses or significations are assigned to these tenses: for instance, it is attempted to define the proper use of the second aorist as distinct from the first. Now it is obvious, that such significations must either be wholly imaginary, in which case the labours both of tutor and pupil will



be mere Quixotism, or they must be borrowed from those of the real tenses, and these will in consequence be robbed of a part of that range of use which in truth belongs to them. Hence will arise one or other of two extremes, and nothing is more common than to meet with both of them among Greek students. In the one case the sense of confusion is such that the student comes to regard three or four tenses as nearly, if not quite, equivalent, and such as it is but lost labour to attempt to discriminate. Thus he looks on the imperfect, the two aorists, and the perfect, to be all pretty much of the same meaning; as tenses that have in general a past signification, but with little constancy of discrimination, and such as may be substituted for one another without material error. Yet what sorry scholarship is this! Such a student would have perceived no impropriety had Pilate's answer, instead of ὁ γέγραφα, γέγραφα, been ὁ ἔγραψα, ἔγραψα, or ὁ ἔγραφον, ἔγραφον. Such a student will not be prepared to observe that the common rendering of the words ἀπέπλυναν τὰ δικτύα, (Luc. v. 2) "*they were washing* their nets," is plainly inadmissible. On the other hand the beautiful propriety, with which that tense, which is peculiar to the Greek verb, is selected in such a passage as the following, will be unperceived by him.

Καὶ δὴ δοῦρα σέσηπε νεῶν, καὶ σπαρτὰ λέλυνται.

Only the student who has been accustomed to discriminate the use of the tenses with accuracy, will observe that the poet could not here with equal propriety have employed the aorist or imperfect, because he intends to describe the present condition of the spars and rigging; and yet that he could not have used the present tense, because that would have represented the decay as in progress, rather than as complete; that they were *rotting* not *rotten*. Thus neither in interpreting the sense, nor enjoying the beauty of Greek, will he possess either the discrimination or the relish of a sound scholar. But if such be the case when he is reading, how much worse will it be when he is writing Greek: then indeed he makes rare work of it: he writes a Greek comedy without intending it, and gives us a new application for the old words *tempora mutantur*, such as he himself is little aware of.



The opposite evil arising from the exhibition of fictitious tenses, is that of labour lost in excessive and fanciful refinement. Every student is not content to go on regularly conjugating his Greek verbs with two futures and two aorists, without endeavouring to obtain some idea of that difference which, he naturally supposes, must exist in the force or meaning of these duplicate tenses, and of the propriety which should regulate their use. It is true, neither his tutor nor his grammar are in general likely to give him any satisfactory information on this point; but notwithstanding the intelligent and active-minded youth will be busy with his enquiries. Perchance he is engaged in composing a piece of Greek prose, and he has a verb to render which he supposes should be expressed by one of the aorists: he will then be endeavouring to determine which of the two will be most suitable. Nor is this to be wondered at, when we remember that the whole course of his Greek instruction has tended to impress him with the opinion that both these tenses are the proper and ordinary complement of the regular Greek verb. If the contrary opinion, now to be advocated, be correct, if the common form of the Greek verb no more presents two aorists or two futures, than it does two presents or imperfects; how miserably must he be misspending his time and industry!

And thus we are brought to the principal question, that of the existence of the before mentioned tenses in the regular Greek verb. I assert, and shall attempt to prove, that they do not exist; that they are mere grammatical fictions; in short, that occasional redundancies, or anomalies of formation, have been preposterously magnified into distinct tenses.

I may probably assume, with the assent of most readers, that the laws and structure of a language are to be deduced from its prevailing usage, and that in the present case, if it be the fact that the vast majority of Greek verbs are destitute of the tenses in question, this tense ought then to be excluded from the models of regular declension. Because a few verbs, through accidental redundancy of formation, present duplicate forms of some of their tenses, it surely cannot be right to represent this as the general law of the language, or to exhibit them in those examples according to which the



student naturally supposes that all regular verbs are to be inflected.

Now in order to decide the question proposed, we must put it upon each of the several tenses distinctly. Let us first take the case of what is called the second aorist active, which is probably the strongest of all for those who would defend the existing system. Here the facts of the case would seem to be briefly these. Two modes of forming the common past or historical tense got early into use in Greece: the one gave that which we call the first, the other that which we call the second aorist. The former from its origin was truly a distinct tense, having a system of terminations altogether peculiar to itself; but the latter is little else than a slight modification of the imperfect. Usage early declared itself in favour of the former; and at the period when Greek literature began, the second form obtained only in a limited number of the more primitive verbs; while every verb of more recent and derivative formation exhibited the first exclusively. In a very few verbs only are both forms to be found; and even in these the duplicates for the most part belong to different dialects, ages, or styles. In import these two forms of the aorist never differed; but this it would be superfluous to attempt to prove, because I presume that every competent judge will at once admit it.

We may find a satisfactory illustration of this matter in our own language. In English also there are two originally distinct modes of forming the common past tense: the first by adding the syllable *ed*, as in *I killed*: the other, chiefly by certain changes in the vowels, as in *I wrote*, *I saw*, *I knew*, *I ran*; and many others. Let the reader call the former and regular form the first aorist, and the latter the second, and he will have a correct idea of the amount of the distinction between those tenses in Greek. The form *ἐτύψα* in Greek is what *I killed* is in English, that is, the regular form of the past tense, which obtains in the vast majority of verbs: the form *ἔλαβον*, on the other hand, is altogether analogous to *I took*, or *I saw*, acknowledged by all grammarians not as a second or distinct preterite, but as an instance of irregular variety of formation obtaining in certain verbs.



But some will probably deem it an objection to the view here taken, that there are verbs in Greek,—many, they perhaps suppose,—in which both forms of the aorist are in use together. I admit that a few instances of this kind do occur; but even in this point we shall find that the analogy with our own language still holds good. Without rummaging in old authors, we meet with many instances in which English verbs retain both forms of the preterite. Thus, for example, we may say, *I hanged*, or *I hung*; *I chid*, or *I chode*; *I spit*, or *I spat*; *I climbed*, or *I clomb*; *I awaked*, or *I awoke*; *I cleft*, *I clave*, or *I clove*; and a score of others. Except in their greater abundance, wherein do these differ from the analogous duplicate forms of the Greek aorist, such as *ἐκτεῖνα* and *ἐκτανον*, *I killed*; *ἐτυψα* and *ἐτυπον*, *I struck*; *ἐθάμβησα* and *ἐταφον*, *I was astonished*? Such duplicates in Greek are extremely rare: probably there is not one Greek verb in five hundred in which they can be met with. The form improperly called the second aorist is, indeed, common enough; but then where it exists, that of the first aorist is almost always wanting. We have *εὔρον*, *ἔλαβον*, *εἶδον*, *ἤγαγον*, *ἔλιπον*, *ἔδραμον*; but the regular form is as much a nonentity in these verbs, as it is in the English verbs, *I found*, *I took*, *I saw*, *I led*, *I left*, *I ran*. The first aorist in these would be sheer vulgarity; it would be parallel to *I finded*, *I taked*, *I seed*.

Now if the circumstances of the Greek and English, in regard to these two tenses, are so precisely parallel, a simple and obvious enquiry arises. Which are in the right, the Greek grammarians or our own? For either ours must be wrong in not having fitted up for our verb the framework of a first and second preterite, teaching the pupils to say, 1st pret. *I finded*, 2d pret. *I found*; 1st pret. *I glided*, 2d pret. *I glode*; or the others must be so in teaching the learner to imagine two aorists for *εὐρίσκω*, as aor. 1. *εὔρησα*, aor. 2. *εὔρον*; or for *ἀκούω*, as aor. 1. *ἤκουσα*, aor. 2. *ἤκοον*. It is a custom with many masters, and on a better system it would be a good one, to exercise their pupils in conjugating a variety of verbs, according to their Greek trees, as they are called. How hard it is to find verbs which can with any propriety be subjected to this process, is doubtless well known to all such masters; and to



realize both a first and second aorist is assuredly not one of their least difficulties. In short, it is the plain truth in point of fact, and it is infinitely more convenient in point of practice, to say that the Greek verb has but *one* aorist active: that aorist, when regular, following the model ἔτυψα; but being sometimes formed less regularly in another manner, like ἔλαβον; and that now and then, in the variety of dialects and styles, two forms appear in the same verb, as in ἔπεισα and ἐπιθον: one of these however, as in this instance ἔπεισα, being that in ordinary use; the other rare, anomalous, and nearly obsolete.

We ought next to consider the tense called the second future: but really to attempt to demolish this would be merely combating with a man of straw. Where is it, or what is it? “De non apparentibus, et de non existentibus eadem est ratio.” When a fair specimen of the second future active is produced, it will be time enough to attack it. In the mean time I confess that I am totally unacquainted with it, except in the recollections of my grammar. It is true indeed, that the form ascribed to this tense is very common, inasmuch as it is the regular and only future of that class of verbs which has a liquid consonant before the final ω; and in some others it is formed by contraction, as ἐλῶ for ἐλάσω, from ἐλαύνω. But here, droll to say, our grammarians, as if determined that this unfortunate tense should never be realized, have actually cashiered it of its proper title, and given its form the name of the first future. The simple fact appears to be, that the existence of two active futures in the Greek verb is one of the rarest phenomena in the language.

The circumstances of the so called second aorist and second future middle are so similar to those of their namesakes in the active voice, that it would be tedious to dwell on them. The future and aorist middle have undoubtedly two forms, corresponding with those of the same tenses in the active voice, from which they are derived. The common and regular forms are such as λύσομαι, ἐλυσάμην, and, where these are in use, we rarely find any others: but occasionally we encounter such forms as ὀλοῦμαι, ὠλόμην, which then supersede the regular ones.

On that modification of the perfect active, which is com-



monly represented as forming a distinct tense, under the title of the perfect middle, so much has been written, that the facts respecting it are pretty well ascertained. No one at present, moderately acquainted with the subject, can be unaware that this supposed tense is of very rare occurrence, so as to have far more the character of an occasional redundancy than of a regular formation. In fact, when the preterite exists in this particular form, it very rarely exists in the same verb in any other form: and where two forms do occur, it will generally be found that the one did not come into use till the other was growing obsolete. It is true, that those peculiarities of formation which are considered as characteristic of the perfect middle, are oftenest found in verbs of a neuter or reflex signification; and this may be regarded by some as evidence of its being a distinct tense. But giving the utmost weight to this consideration, it can only prove that in verbs of that kind the perfect affects this character, and not that there are two distinct perfects; especially when it is considered, that the features by which the middle form is discriminated, are inconsiderable and uncertain. But in fact, though what is called the middle form has undoubtedly some degree of alliance with a neuter sense, this alliance is very far from constant. This form has often a truly active and transitive signification, as for example λέλοιπα *I have left*, ἔκτονα *I have killed*; while on the other hand the form considered as active is of frequent occurrence in a neuter or reflex sense, as in κέκμηκα *I am weary*, βέβηκα *I am gone*, πέφυκα *I am produced*, ἔστηκα *I stand*, μεμένηκα *I remain*, ἡμάρτηκα *I have erred*, ἔσβηκα *I am extinguished*, βεβίωκα *I have lived*, τέθνηκα *I am dead*. These instances, which might be easily multiplied, are surely sufficient to prove that there is no good ground for assigning to either of these forms of the perfect any determinate cast of signification, whether it be active or neuter. Some *preference* of what is called the middle form for the neuter sense is the utmost that can with truth be maintained. In a few instances *both* the forms certainly do exist, and with a characteristic difference of signification, as ὀλώλεκα *I have destroyed* and ὀλωλα *I am undone*; πέπεικα *I have persuaded*, and πέποιθα *I am confident*: in others the two forms occur indeed, but with little discrimination in sense, as πέπραχα and πέπραγα, δέδοικα and



δέδια. If in the whole range of the Greek language some half a dozen instances of a distinct perfect middle can be found, in addition to the perfect active, surely this is no adequate ground for representing these two tenses as the proper and regular complement of the verb, unless it be proper to confound the rule with the exception.

We now come to the consideration of the passive tenses. It is undoubtedly much easier to produce duplicates here, than either in the active form or the middle. Examples such as ἀλλαχθῆναι and ἀλλαγῆναι, συλλεχθῆναι and συλλεγῆναι, are by no means scarce, even among the Attic prose-writers. But in the first place the difference of formation is in these cases slight, not at all affecting the terminations; and secondly there is not a shadow of ground for supposing that these two forms were used as distinct tenses, that is, with any difference of signification: on the contrary it is evident that they were perfectly equivalent, and used, as regarded their signification, with absolute indifference; in short they were mere varieties of formation, which, in verbs of a certain description, got into use for one and the same tense. This is evident from the circumstance, that hardly any author will be found using more than one of these forms in the same verb: the fashion, so to speak, by which a preference was given to one or the other, having prevailed at different times and places. Moreover the proportion of verbs in which even this, the most numerous, species of duplicates obtain, is very limited, being confined almost entirely to a portion of those in which labial or guttural consonants precede the final ω. It is only therefore, at most, to verbs of this particular class that any rule for their formation should extend. But the fact is, that, although writers of different ages and dialects formed these tenses with some variety, yet any given writer seldom felt himself at liberty to use more than a single form. To revert once more to our own language, the case is simply the same as with *I spake* and *I spoke*, *I brake* and *I broke*, *I caught* and *I caught*, where an older and a newer form occur in writers of different ages or styles, but still most strictly as representatives of the same tense. To found on such anomalies a superfluous complexity in the general mechanism of a language, and especially to introduce such complexity into



elementary works, is at least but a display of mischievous ingenuity.

The following quotation from Matthiæ's elaborate work on Greek grammar is adduced as a confirmation of the foregoing statements. After giving an account of the formation of the tenses, he adds, p. 244; "There is no single verb which has all these tenses that can regularly be derived from it. It is very seldom that a verb has the two tenses, aor. 1. and aor. 2. active, as ἀπήγγειλα and ἀπήγγελον, the aor. 1. and 2 pass. and perf. 1 and perf. 2 (middle) at the same time. When it has these tenses, they commonly belong to two different dialects, or two different ages of a dialect, as ἐπιθον only in the old Ionic, ἐπείσα in Attic and the rest: ἀπηλλάχθην, συνελέχθην in the older Attic dialect, ἀπηλλάγην, συνελέγην in the new; or they have different significations, as πέπραχα in an active sense, πέπραγα in a neuter sense."

The conclusion from the foregoing observations is, that the common analysis of the Greek verb, which ascribes to it a second future, a second aorist, and a perfect middle, as appertaining to its regular formation, is false and wrong; there being, in fact, no such tenses whatever, unless occasional redundancies, or irregularities of formation, are to be dignified with that title. Nor is this merely a speculative error, but one that introduces much difficulty, confusion, and even ultimate failure in sound Greek scholarship, into our schools and colleges: and it ought therefore to excite the serious attention of those who superintend the instruction of youth in this important and interesting branch of learning.

A charge of presumption may perhaps be thought to lie against me for advancing such propositions in the face of the venerable sanctions which consecrate the prevailing system. I readily confess, that I make not the slightest pretension to vie in point of Hellenic lore with a hundred names by whom that system has, at least, not been blamed. My apology is this: The present question does not appear to be one of profound and exquisite scholarship. Whether a language has, or has not, certain tenses, in the common and regular declension of its verbs, must be a point on which even an ordinary scholar may feel himself entitled to an opinion; nay, on which he is as competent to form one as though he had the honour to be



numbered among the giants of learning. After all, it is not a question of authority but of fact. Is it, or is it not, a fact, that the immense majority of Greek verbs are destitute of these duplicate tenses? Is it, or is it not, a fact, that in the few instances where they do occur, they are used, not as distinct tenses, having each its proper signification, but merely as various modes in which the force of one and the same tense has been expressed by different writers or possibly, even by the same writer at different times, by the same kind of caprice which may lead an English author to use *I hanged* in one page, and *I hung* in the next? Can any valid exception be taken to the analogy which has been pointed out, in respect of these duplicates, between the Greek language and our own? And is it, or is it not, a just and important practical inference, that the models exhibited for the declension of the regular Greek verb ought to be retrenched of these perplexing and superfluous anomalies?

Let these points be but fairly examined, and the light of candid investigation thrown on them, and, if I am found wrong, I shall be ready to submit to such chastisement as my error may deserve.

Ποίησον δ' αἶθρην, δὸς δ' οφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδέσθαι,  
'Εν δὲ φάει καὶ ὄλεσσον.

T. F. B.

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IN inserting the foregoing article the editors have been in some measure influenced by one or two secondary motives. It will probably strike many of our readers that they have long been familiar with most of the assertions here brought forward under an apparent notion that they are original. But in the first place even after a discovery has already been established in public opinion on the most satisfactory evidence, it may often be a matter, not merely of idle curiosity, but of no little speculative interest, to observe how the same or similar conclusions have been attained to independently by others, who have been following out their own thoughts in the more sequestered paths of literature, and who, as



they have come upon the truth from different points of view, will probably have seen some things in different lights. Besides in the present instance the article itself clearly shews that even those propositions in it which may already have received the assent of the learned, are by no means generally notorious even to the diligent students of the ancient languages in England: and as the being aware of ones ignorance is always a help at least toward getting rid of it, a good purpose may be served by anything which reminds us how much still remains to be done before even our simplest elementary knowledge of the Greek language can be raised to the level at which in these days it ought to be. After all that has been written, after all the subtilty and erudition that have been displayed by our own scholars as well as those of Germany in unravelling the perplexities of the ancient languages, the grammars which are taught in some of our principal public schools are still, with very slight changes, the same as they were some two hundred years ago. Hardly one obsolete and exploded error has been expunged from them: hardly one of the observations by which light has since been thrown upon the analogies regulating either the forms or the combinations of words, has been incorporated in them: Busby and Lily are held to be infallible; or at all events it must be deemed indecorous that boys should know more than Busby and Lily could have taught them. Hence one of the first tasks that a lad, who has a taste for classical studies, has to go through on leaving school, is to unlearn a great part of what he has been learning there: and it is fortunate if this process do not convert his taste into a distaste. With such peculiar felicity too are those grammars constructed, so much care is taken to keep at a respectful distance from everything like a principle, such dead hedges are they of arbitrary rules broken down at every other step by a crowd of exceptions, that almost all those advantages are lost, which render the study of grammar better fitted perhaps than any other for training the youthful understanding to discern the latent operation of general laws in the concrete forms of things. But where the seed is cankered, it can never produce a strong and healthy plant: in order therefore to promote the growth



and spread of classical learning in England, it is above all things requisite that the elements of the ancient languages should be taught according to a system more in harmony with their real nature.

As to the particular topics discusst in the foregoing pages, it must be observed that they do not by any means stand all on the same footing. That there was no such tense in the Greek language as a second future active or middle, and that such futures were sheer fictions devised by grammarians, for the sake of symmetry, in order that the second aorist might be made to come from a second future, like the first aorist from the first future, has been repeatedly maintained by scholars, at least since Dawes in his usual tone of confidence asserted, *pace grammaticorum in me praestandum recipio futurum secundum formae vel activae vel mediae in Graeco sermone nusquam reperiri*. The same doctrine appears to have been held by some of the Greek grammarians themselves, as we learn from a fragment of Chæroboscus quoted by Buttmann from Bekker's *Anecdota*, p. 1290, where we read that Herodian said, no instance could be brought forward of a second future active in use, and that the instances cited by Apollonius were either fabricated by him,—such as  $\phi\nu\gamma\hat{\omega}$ ,  $\delta\rho\alpha\mu\hat{\omega}$ ,  $\tau\nu\pi\hat{\omega}$ , which were never employed by any ancient writer,—or were in fact present tenses with a future signification. Indeed the instances of futures fashioned according to the rules laid down for the second future are so exceedingly rare—barring such as come from verbs having a liquid for their characteristic letter, all of which form their futures after this manner, in consequence of the harshness the Greek ear seems to have found in a sibilant following a liquid, as appears for instance from the change of  $\tau\iota\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\varsigma$  into  $\tau\iota\theta\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ , of  $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\nu\sigma\iota$  into  $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota$ , of  $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\nu\sigma\alpha$  into  $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha$ , of  $\acute{\alpha}\rho\sigma\eta\nu$  into  $\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\rho}\eta\eta\nu$ , and the like, analogous to the French change of *oeils* into *yeux*, *ayeuls* into *ayeux*—that they assuredly do not afford an adequate ground for including such a tense in the systematic complement of the Greek verb. Chæroboscus cites  $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\kappa\lambda\iota\hat{\omega}$  from Eupolis: and we find  $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\chi\epsilon\hat{\omega}$  in the Acts, II. 17, and in Jeremiah, VI. 11. The latter at all events is nothing more than an Alexandrian corruption of the Attic future  $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\chi\acute{\epsilon}\omega$ , (see Elmsley's



Review of Hermann's *Supplices*, on v. 772), even if we are not warranted in introducing ἐκχέω into the text. So that a single fragment of a comic poet is all that can now be adduced in behalf of a second future active. A little better show can indeed be made in favour of the second future middle: but that is all. The Attic future of μάχομαι is μαχοῦμαι, that of πίπτω πεσοῦμαι, that of καθέζομαι καθεδούμαι: πιοῦμαι is used by the later Greek writers, τεκοῦμαι in the hymn to Venus, μαθοῦμαι in a passage of Theocritus. It is possible that other similar forms, such as λαβοῦμαι, τυχοῦμαι, ἐλθοῦμαι, may have been found in particular dialects: but unless, like Buttman, we give the name of second futures to the ordinary futures of verbs in λω, μω, νω, ρω—which from their connexion with the first aorist are called first futures by the old grammarians—the few instances just enumerated are unquestionably insufficient to shew that Greek verbs, generally speaking, had any such tense. Besides it is pretty certain that the futures in ῶ and οῦμαι are not independent forms, but merely contracted modifications of those in σω and σομαι: thus there is scarcely more reason for dignifying them with the name of a distinct tense, than for calling βίοιο a second genitive. Hence there do not seem to be any strong reasons for hesitating to adopt the opinion pronounced by the editor of the translation of Matthiæ's Grammar, that "the second future ought to be expunged from the common school-grammars:" and thus it has been left out for example in that published by Dr Russell for the use of the Charterhouse school. It is true that in grammar, as in other matters, there is always some inconvenience attending a departure from any received usage. But when a law, like that allowing the wager of battle, is become a dead letter, and the recollection of it is only revived by the inconvenience resulting from an appeal to it in a particular instance, the most cautious legislator need not scruple about rescinding it: and such is just the case with the second future, of which we are seldom reminded, except when some ignorant critic tries to defend a corrupt reading or an erroneous interpretation by means of it. In fact, with reference to the actual state of things, Buttman's practice of calling τεμῶ and στελῶ second futures is a much wider



deviation from common usage than it would be to erase the tense altogether.

On the other hand the second aorist has much better ground to stand on. The instances of it are numerous; and it is a tense of perpetual occurrence. It has been remarked indeed by others, as it is by our correspondent, that this tense is not commonly found except in verbs the first aorist of which was not in use. *Solet enim ferme* (says Hermann, de Emend. Rat. Gr. Gram. p. 246) *in iis maxime verbis secundi aoristi usus requiri, quorum primus aoristus propter molestiorem pronunciationem neglectus fuit.* Yet a writer in the former volume of this Museum (p. 239) has enumerated several verbs, both the aorists of which are to be met with even in the tragedians and Aristophanes; and the number might be considerably enlarged, if the research were carried through the whole range of the classical writers. It would be well if some scholar would do so, and make out a complete list of the Greek verbs the second aorist of which is anywhere found, distinguishing all those among them which had a first aorist along with it, and pointing out in what cases the two were in use together, in what cases one of them was superseded by the other, or survived only in a particular dialect. That the first aorist was the prevalent form in the later ages of the Greek language cannot be questioned. Buttmann, like our correspondent, observes, that “while all clearly derivative verbs, such as the great mass of those in  $\epsilon\upsilon\omega$ ,  $\iota\zeta\omega$ , and so on, never have any but the first aorist, none save primitives, or those which may be classed along with them, admit of a second aorist active; and that even of these it is only found in a limited number of such verbs as belonged to the earliest period of the language.” In the last words there is something rather like tautology; for there could hardly be any primitive verbs, except such as belonged to the earliest period of the language. These however for this very reason are many of them words that occur in almost every page. On the whole it is perfectly clear that in the early Greek language there were two entirely distinct modes of forming the indefinite preterite, though one or the other was in most cases preferred, as euphony or some analogy dictated, till at a later period the first aorist got



complete possession of the field, so that every newcomer enlisted under it. Indeed as the method of forming the second aorist was by a change of the penultima, while the principle implied a modification of the theme, it could not well be applied to any but dissyllabic verbs. The comparison suggested by our ingenious correspondent with what has taken place in our own language holds in all its parts. Here too in early times the numbers of regular and so-called irregular preterites must have been pretty equally balanced: but as the adding *ed* was a simpler and easier task than modifying the theme according to analogies the principle of which was not very distinct, all our later preterites have been formed by the first of these processes; and in sundry instances the older form has been driven out of use by the more recent one. The comparison, I grant, is perfectly just. But is it a just inference from that comparison, that we ought to alter the system of our Greek grammars, which has been drawn up at the cost of so much learning and thought, for the sake of adapting it to the system, if system it can be called, of our own grammars, which are seldom remarkable for anything else than their slovenliness, their ignorance, and their presumption? Is the higher to be brought down to the level of the baser? is Apollo to be drest out in a coat and waistcoat? Rather might it be deemed advisable to remodel the system of our own grammars, to give them, so far as the character of our language will allow, a more orderly and shapely form, and to lessen the number of those irregularities of which they are pretty nearly made up. For it is a singular property of English grammars that they mostly consist of little else than a catalogue of exceptions. Some broad general rule is laid down; and then we have a string of examples shewing how it has been transgressed, without any attempt to explain the principle of such deviations. For it is easy enough to lay down a rule, and then to assert that whatever contravenes it must be wrong: but if it be ever true that the exception proves the rule, it can only be where the exception is a rare one. Wherever the exceptions are numerous, they prove that the rule is faulty, and has been drawn up without a due consideration of the subject matter. Indeed, if allowance be made for the play on the



word, one might say that we never shall have a perfectly unexceptionable grammar, until we have one without a single exception in it. The business of wisdom, in all its operations, is to breathe the spirit of order into that which is, or appears to be, without order. Thus in language a philosophical grammarian will seek to discover, to arrange, and to classify, the principles and the analogies by which a nation has been guided and influenced in fashioning the vocal symbols of its thoughts. In Greek grammar a good deal has already been effected with this view: and a new life has been infused into it by the principle, which Hermann has done more than any other writer to enforce and illustrate, that nothing in it is arbitrary, that every rule has a cause, and that every deviation from that rule must also have a cause of its own, though the fragmentary nature of our materials may often impede or prevent our detecting it.

Instead, I say, of introducing the disorderliness and bad housewifery of our English grammars into the Greek, we might employ our time more profitably in trying to make our own grammars a little tidier. At present we have a single high column of verbs piled up in the middle of the room, while all that will not suit that pile, to the amount of about two hundred, lie scattered over the floor in confusion. Surely one cannot hold out this as a pattern of arrangement. Moreover those two hundred verbs, be it remembered, belong to the prime stock of the language, being all, I believe, without a single exception, Anglosaxon primitives (see Vol. I. p. 668): and they are among the words which occur the most frequently, and have given birth to the largest families. In Germany also the state of the case some time since was much the same. There too every verb, which did not answer exactly to the one regulation-standard, was called irregular: and Adelung makes the somewhat singular observation, that “originally all verbs seem to have been irregular (*ursprünglich waren wohl alle Verba irregulär*);” that is to say, they did not conform to a rule, which did not exist. It is a curious instance of the power of technicalities over thoughts, that he was not aware of the nonsense he was talking. A language could no more coalesce out of irregular words, than a world could out of the indeterminate atoms



of Epicurus. He shewed however that these irregular verbs were not quite so unruly as they appeared to be; and he classed them under a variety of heads. Some little in the same way was done for our own language by Wallis and Lowth; and the latter even throws out hints for “a division of all the English verbs into three conjugations:” but in most of our recent grammars the only principle of arrangement applied to them is the most mechanical of all, the alphabetical. Nay Mr Gilchrist in the Introduction to his Etymologic Interpreter, a work not without ingenuity, but grievously disfigured by the contemptuous arrogance of its tone, and the extravagance of its groundless assertions, after saying that “irregular verbs, like all anomalies, are exceedingly troublesome,” adds (p. 167): “most of them, evidently, originated in blundering carelessness, or in that aversion to polysyllables which operated so powerfully on our Saxon ancestors.” When and where his work can have been written it is hard to divine: one might almost fancy it must have fallen from the moon: at least he does not appear much better versed in the English language of the present day, than in that of our Saxon ancestors. For he has found out that such preterites and participles as *awoke, bent, bereft, built, caught, dug, froze, gilt, shone, slew, slain*, have “most of them an *olden* uncouthness, except to the lovers of antique obsolescence and *whilom* forms of literature;” and further, that *bled, blew, chose, drunk, flew, flung, knew, struck, told, wept*, are “constantly heard among the ungrammatical members of society:” whereas its grammatical members, with whom he no doubt is in the habit of conversing, wherever it may be their fate to be found, whether in New Zealand or Laputa, of course always say *choosed*, and *drawed*, and *flinged*, and *striked*, and *telled*, and *drinked*. Yet our older grammarians had set us a much better example in this matter. Ben Jonson after speaking of the first conjugation, “which fetcheth the time past from the present by adding *ed*,” and which is “the common inn to lodge every strange and foreign guest,” classes our other verbs in three additional conjugations, and prefaces his account of the second by saying: “That which followeth, for anything I can find (though I have with some diligence searched after



it), entertaineth none but natural and homeborn words, which, though in number they be not many, a hundred and twenty, or thereabouts, yet in variation are so divers and uncertain that they need much the stamp of some good logic to beat them into proportion. We have set down that, that in our judgement agreeth best with reason and good order. Which notwithstanding, if it seem to any to be too rough hewed, let him plane it out more smoothly; and I shall not only not envy it, but, in the behalf of my country, most heartily thank him for so great a benefit; hoping that I shall be thought sufficiently to have done my part, if, in tolling this bell, I may draw others to a deeper consideration of the matter: for, touching myself, I must needs confess, that after much painful churning, this only would come." Unfortunately old Ben tolled his bell in vain: nobody has heeded his summons: Wallis declared it was a delusion: and our grammarians of late, instead of going on churning, to see whether anything better would come of it, seem rather to have taken a pleasure in tossing in everything pellmell, as it were into a witches hodgepodge. With the help however of what has been done for the grammar of all the Teutonic languages by Grimm, and for that of the Anglosaxon by Rask, it would not be very difficult to draw up our irregulars in something like rank and file. It is a pity that Mr Bosworth in his Anglosaxon Grammar did not shake off the trammels of the vulgar system, but lays down (p. 132) that "in Anglosaxon all the inflexions of verbs may be arranged under one form: there is therefore only one conjugation:" though he is thereby compelled soon after (p. 156) to declare that "in Anglosaxon most verbs are irregular:" and says (p. 144) that "the primitive preterite in Anglosaxon is formed by the change of the characteristic vowel or diphthong of the verb," and that "the modern English past tense is no other than the past participle with that usurped signification." And yet Wallis, who appears to have been the founder of the Procrustean school of our grammarians, and to have first set up the system of throwing all our verbs into the same mould, and condemning all such as did not fit it, had protested against the injurious error committed by his predecessors in arranging the English language



according to principles drawn not from its own practice, but from that of other tongues: and Mr Bosworth repeats his protest, and commends it: which however, specious as it may have been in Wallises days,—when there was so much that was merely inveterate and taken for granted in the prevalent opinions on such matters, that whatever led men to explore their validity and tenableness was not without its use,—seems at the present day quite out of place. Now that the affinity of the Teutonic languages to the Greek and Latin, as well as the other offsets of the great Indian family, has been so incontrovertibly establisht,—now that the family likeness which runs through them, and which in some features, as is often the case in families, after having been lost sight of for a time, reappears in the remoter branches, has been so clearly pointed out,—now that the pervading operation of the same principles has been traced through all their varieties of formation and inflexion with such subtilty and accuracy, as it has been more especially by Bopp,—it is time to give over the barbarian cry that we have nothing to do with the Greeks and Romans. We too, it ought to be our boast, “are sprung of Earth’s first blood:” we too belong to that race, which has brought forth almost every great act and almost every wise thought whereby man has adorned and enlightened his birthplace: and our speech is the titled deed of our descent from it. Greatly as it has been modified and changed by the concourse, the shock, and the fusion of dialects, and by the influences of climate, of habits, of ways of thinking, our language in its primary characteristics still resembles the Latin and Greek: and the same elementary principles of classification may not inappropriately be applied to it. Even Hickes, though he gives only one regular conjugation of the Anglosaxon verbs, and throws all the others in a heap as anomalous or irregular, remarks (pp. 54, 55) that the greater part of these anomalous verbs follow a principle of their own, and form their preterite by casting off the termination of the present, and changing its penultimate vowel, generally into *a*; and he adds that these *forsan magis proprie secundam conjugationem constituere videantur quam inter anomala recenserì. Quamobrem in Grammatica Francica id genus verba ad secundam conjugationem tanquam ad suam*



*classem reduximus.* Lye however, in the Grammar, founded on that of Hickes, which he prefixt to Junius, unaccountably overlookt this important remark, which is the clue to the whole labyrinth, and after giving the first conjugation says, that there are many verbs *quae neque ad hanc reduci possunt, neque aliam commode constituent conjugationem.* And as he who comes after is sure to make a point of going beyond those who went before him, Manning in his Grammar prefixt to Lye's Dictionary declares them to be a mere mass of confusion: *Complura sunt, tam Anglosaxonica quam Gothica verba, quae ad nullam regulam, vel certam conjugandi methodum reduci possunt.* Such a hazardous thing is it for any one to alter the words of a writer, whose thoughts he purposes to express, without examining the grounds of them: he will often leave out the little limiting words which constitute the very difference between truth and falsehood. What Lye says is merely injudicious: what Manning says, is untrue. But it is a broad assertion: and we are all too fond, not only of making broad assertions, but also of converting what we hear or read into them. I have had to touch on this point before: but the paramount, indispensable importance of veracity in little things, of accuracy in details, of fidelity in the colours and shades as well as in the outline, is so little regarded, either in real life or in literature, and so much evil in both has accrued from the neglect of it, that it can hardly be urged too repeatedly: and one evermore finds occasion for enforcing it.

The best system for an English grammarian to adopt—if I may venture to express an opinion on a subject which requires no little thought and a long familiarity with it to make out what the best system really is,—would seem to be that followed by Becker in his excellent German Grammar: to divide the whole body of our verbs into two distinct conjugations,—the first, or, as he terms it, the old form, comprising almost all the so-called irregulars, in which the vowel of the theme undergoes a change in the preterite, and which would have to be subdivided into several classes,—the second, or new form, in which the preterite adds *ed* (or *d*) or *t* to the theme, according as the termination is preceded by a flat or a sharp consonant (see Vol. i. p. 662). Were such



a plan pursued, this portion of our grammar would assume an entirely new and much more intelligible as well as graceful character. In Becker's Grammar we further see the meaning of the words quoted above from Adelung. All the primitive verbs, he remarks, belonged originally to the first of his two conjugations, though many of them in course of time have gone over to the second. It would be an interesting enquiry to ascertain, as well as our means will enable us, how far the same thing is true of the Greek aorists. Buttmann's observation quoted above (p. 207) might lead us to suspect that the case may have been nearly the same: and there is a striking analogy between the mode of forming the second aorist, and that of forming the preterite in Becker's first conjugation; while the addition of  $\sigma\alpha$  in the first aorist may in some measure be compared to that of *de* or *te*. In a complete English grammar there should be a list of all such turncoat verbs, as well as of those that have remained faithful to the old system in despite of fashion: it would be desirable also to illustrate this list by a collection of all similar preterites still preserved in our provincial dialects, such as *snew* (*snowed*), *mew* (*mowed*), *hew* (*hoed*), *ris* (after the analogy of *bit*, *slid*, *chid*), which are still found, as no doubt many like forms are, in some of our counties: and it should be ascertained, as far as it can be, by a diligent examination of our old writers at what period the changes took place. Thus for instance in the first ten chapters of the *Morte d'Arthur* I have fallen in with *lough* (*laught*), *pight* (*pitcht*), *wan* (*won*), *awroke* (*awreakt*), *alight* (*alighted*), *yield* (*yielded*). It would be well also if such verbs were illustrated by a view of their forms in German and the other cognate languages. For a grammar, to be good, must be of a historical character. Our grammarians at present only think of teaching us what the language is, or what they choose to fancy it ought to be, at this day. Yet in language, more almost than in anything else, it is impossible to understand the present, except in connexion with the past. Nor is the question we have been discussing a mere empty dispute about a name, devoid of any practical significance. Such is the sway of words over thoughts and opinions, that to call anything irregular or anomalous is to fasten a stigma upon it: and the mere notion that our



irregular verbs as such are an inordinate excrescence in our grammatical system, has led many of our grammarians to recommend our getting rid of them: just as the name *rotten boroughs*, to take the most recent instance in point, has exercised an incalculable influence in convincing people that such boroughs ought to be abolisht. Yet our language would be a very great sufferer by such changes as Cobbett and Mr Gilchrist recommend: its harmony above all would be deplorably injured: we should lose many of our most sonorous words, and have an ever-recurring final dental in their stead. What would become of our poetry, if *arose* were to be turned into *arised*, *abode* into *abided*, *fought* into *fighted*, *sought* into *seeked*, *taught* into *teached*, *caught* into *catched*, *thought* into *thinked*, *brought* into *bringed*, *sang* and *sung* into *singed*, *came* into *comed*, *bound* into *binded*, *broke* into *breaked*, *strove* into *strived*, *drank* and *drunk* into *drinked*, *flew* and *flown* into *flied*, *forgot* into *forgetted*, *gave* into *gived*? The genius of language works its winding way like a river; and beauty springs up spontaneously along its margin, and pleasure may float upon its surface: but a grammarmonger's language would be like a sluggish monotonous canal, with its bare unsightly banks, fit for nothing but barges of cumbrous marketable commodities to be dragged along it. And yet even in a practical point of view, when nature puts forth her power, no creature of art can vie with her: nor is the canal after all anything more than a base copy, fed by draining off the waters of the river, which it no doubt despises as very crooked, useless, wasteful, troublesome, and irregular.

But if it be a sorry mode of improving a grammar to increase the number of irregularities in it, neither is such a course likely to be very successful in affording relief to the memory. For not only have we much less to remember in a rule than in a list of anomalies; but in the former case the understanding aids the memory, in the latter it rather thwarts it. Nor does there seem to be any strong reason for apprehending that too much time and ingenuity will be wasted in attempts to discover a distinction between the two aorists, or that an unfortunate boy will be posed, like the long-eared quadruped between his two bundles of hay, to which of them he ought to betake himself. It is to be feared that boys



are seldom overnice in balancing between contending claimants for their attention. They are quite content at finding, or at supposing that they have found, any word that will answer their purpose; and the first that comes uppermost serves them. At all events it might very easily be stated in the grammar, and undoubtedly it should be so, that there is no difference at all between the two aorists, and that, unless perhaps in one or two peculiar idioms, they are used without the slightest discrimination. Among the numberless vagaries that have entered the heads of the learned this appears to have been one of the rarest. Hermann indeed, in the passage above referred to, mentions the *mira opinio* of a certain scholar named Steinbrüchel, *cui aoristi secundi ad primum eadem ratio visa est esse, quae est plusquamperfecti ad perfectum*. Dr Murray too says in his History of the European Languages (Vol. II. p. 117) that “there is a difference between ELEXA and ELEGON, the aorist: the one is more active, and, by possession of SA, alludes more to operative performance, the other barely expresses the fact.” But as there never was such an aorist as ἔλεγον, it will not be very easy to determine the exact shade of difference which separated it from ἔλεξα: nor would it be much easier to find out the distinction between ἔκτεινα and ἔκτανον, or in what respect the latter was deficient in “operative performance.” It is true that in certain verbs, both the aorists of which were retained in ordinary speech, a distinction was made between them, and that the first aorist was used in a transitive or causative sense, the second in an intransitive or neuter: such was the case for instance with ἑστησα and ἑστην, with ἔφυσα and ἔφυν, with ἑσβησα and ἑσβην, and others, a list of which is given by Buttmann, Vol. II. pp. 48, foll. A similar distinction was supposed by Lowth to prevail in the use of the preterites from our own verb *hang*: which, “when active (he says), may perhaps be most properly used in the regular form; when neuter, in the irregular.” It might have been well if this practice, supposing it ever was the practice, had established itself. The Germans too, Buttmann remarks, draw the same line between *verderbte* and *verdarb*, between *schwellte* and *schwoll*. This however is far from a general characteristic



of the second aorist: in the great bulk of verbs which have that tense, its signification is no less transitive than that of the present. Nor do the facts seem to bear one out in conjecturing, as one might incline to do, that the verbs the second aorist of which kept its currency were of an intransitive cast: the preference seems rather to have been dictated by a regard to the form of the word than to its meaning. It cannot, one should imagine, be very difficult to teach a boy that such is the case, especially with the help of the analogies which our own language supplies.

But though I think we may safely abide by the practice of the old grammarians in giving the active voice a double aorist, it is very desirable that we should abandon them when they talk about a perfect middle with the same termination as the perfect active; and that, with Hermann, Buttmann, Matthiæ, Rost, Pinzger, we should transfer the tense to which they give that name, and of course its satellite too along with it, to the active voice. The reasons for doing so are stated by Buttmann in his admirable Grammar (Vol. i. pp. 370, foll.) with his wonted clearness and good sense. It is true that this form of the perfect has not unfrequently an intransitive meaning, and that in some verbs, in which we meet with both forms of the perfect in *α*, the same distinction, which was remarked above between the second aorist and the first, is observable between this perfect and the other: for instance between *πέποιθα* and *πέπεικα*, between *ὄλωλα* and *ὀλώλεκα*, between *πέπραγα* and *πέπραχα*. But in like manner the other form will sometimes go along with the second aorist in taking an intransitive sense when the present has a transitive one, as we see in *ἔσβηκα*, *πέφυκα*, *ἔστηκα*. In fact one has much oftener occasion to speak of a past state, than of a past action, with immediate reference to the present moment, in the manner denoted by the Greek perfect. “*I have lived and have loved*,” says Thekla in her beautiful song: and many might be led to say the same: but few would ever find inducement to say, *I have loved a person*: in speaking of our feelings toward others we should mostly use the indefinite preterite, *I loved them*. Indeed the story of Thelymnia at the beginning of this number supplies us with a passage just in point. *Did you ever love any one?* she asks Euthymedes. Unless



she had added *any one*, she would probably have said, *Have you ever loved? Did you ever love?* would indeed have been perfectly appropriate: but so graceful a speaker could hardly have asked, *Have you ever loved any one?* though even if it were worded in this way the question would still refer to the feelings of Euthymedes, not to the object of them. Thus one often says, *I have just eaten my dinner*: but this is merely equivalent to *I have just dined*; and he who says it is speaking with reference to himself, not to the dinner. On the other hand the dandy, who was asked whether he never ate pease, answered, *Why, yes ma'am, I believe I did once eat a pea*. I do not mean to say that one can never use the perfect objectively, but that one has much more frequent need to use it subjectively: and this may enable us to understand why so many of the Greek perfects, even when they come from transitive verbs, are intransitive, and why most of those in common use are so, to whichever form they belong: for instance *ἔοικα*, *βέβηκα*, *τέθνηκα*, *ἄραρα*, *δέδια*. *Ὀλωλα* occurs a hundred times for once that we meet with *ὀλώλεκα*: *πέποιθα*, *πέπραγα* are at least twenty times as common as *πέπεια*, *πέπραχα*. But there is no valid reason whatsoever for assigning the subjective perfects to the middle voice when they belong to the one form, any more than when they are of the other. The middle voice has no greater claim upon *δέδια* than it has upon *δέδοικα* or *ἔδεια*, no greater upon *πέπραγα* than upon *πράττω* when it is used intransitively, no greater upon *ἀκήκοα* than upon *ἤκουσα* or *ἀκούω*. It must be allowed that some of the tenses which belong more appropriately to the middle voice, have often a corresponding signification: thus the future of the last-mentioned verb is *ἀκούσομαι*. But in like manner we meet with a large number of verbs, of which there is a tolerably long list in Buttman's Grammar, Vol. II. p. 52, which have a passive or middle form of the future answering to an active present. In fact this was one of the artifices to which the genius of the Greek language had recourse, to avoid speaking presumptuously of the future: for there is an awful, irrepressible, and almost instinctive consciousness of the uncertainty of the future, and of our own powerlessness over it, which in all cultivated languages has silently and imperceptibly modified the modes of expression



with regard to it: and from a double kind of *litotes*, the one belonging to human nature generally, the other imposed by goodbreeding on the individual and urging him to veil the manifestations of his will, we are induced to frame all sorts of shifts for the sake of speaking with becoming modesty. Another method, as we know, frequently adopted by the Greeks was the use of the conditional moods: and as sentiments of this kind always imply some degree of intellectual refinement, and strengthen with its increase, this is called an Attic usage. The same name too has often been given to the abovementioned middle forms of the future: not that in either case the practice was peculiar to the Attic dialect, but that it was more general where the feelings which produced it were stronger and more distinct. Here again our own language supplies us with an exact parallel: indeed this is the only way of accounting for the singular mixture of the two verbs *shall* and *will*, by which, as we have no auxiliary answering to the German *werde*, we express the future tense. Our future, or at least what answers to it, is, *I shall, thou wilt, he will*. When speaking in the first person, we speak submissively: when speaking to or of another, we speak courteously. In our older writers, for instance in our translation of the Bible, *shall* is applied to all three persons: we had not then reached that stage of politeness which shrinks from the appearance even of speaking compulsorily of another. On the other hand the Scotch use *will* in the first person: that is, as a nation they have not acquired that particular shade of goodbreeding which shrinks from thrusting itself forward. It is rather characteristic, that Cobbett in his Grammar entirely passes over the distinction between *shall* and *will*, saying that their uses “are as well known to us all as the uses of our teeth and our noses; and to misapply them argues not only a deficiency in the reasoning faculties, but almost a deficiency in instinctive discrimination:” for assuredly there never was a man more abhorrent from every kind of *litotes*, which, to judge from the interpretations he gives of such Greek words as he is compelled to make use of, he would probably say meant *sheepishness*. Nor is Cobbett the only grammarian who tries to cover his evasion of this difficulty by having recourse to a little blustering: Mr Gilchrist’s



“grammatic members of society” do not seem to understand much about it: so after telling us (p. 161) that *shall* “is, we believe, merely a diversity of *will*,” and talking about the “perplexity caused by it,” he exclaims that, “if the *collective wisdom* of the grammatic world were deified with legislative omnipotence, English would in time be rendered as invincibly difficult as Greek.” This sentence was perhaps designed as a sample how invincibly easy English might become, were it not for the troublesome shackles of grammar and logic and sense. A writer in the *Edinburgh Review* too (Vol. XLVII. p. 492), who has collected a number of instances to shew that the ancient usage did not coincide with the modern, and who, if he chose, might collect almost as many to prove that the Athenians in the time of Demosthenes did not talk Homeric Greek, inveys against “this unlearnable system of speaking,” as “one of the most capricious and inconsistent of all imaginary irregularities:” assuring us, as a Bœotian might have assured Menander, that we “value ourselves on a strange anomaly,” which “is comparatively of recent introduction, and has not been fully established for so much as two centuries.” But even our more intelligent grammarians are by no means satisfactory on this point. Johnson in his *Grammar* says nothing about the matter: and his account of *shall* and *will* in his *Dictionary* is clumsy and far from precise. The generality on the other hand follow Wallis, in laying down that “*will* in the first person promises or threatens, in the second and third only foretells,” and that “*shall* on the contrary in the first person simply foretells, in the second and third promises, commands, or threatens.” Yet no attempt is made to give any explanation of this inconsistency. That the one suggested above is correct, seems to be confirmed by the fact that in interrogative and dependent sentences, when the use of *shall* does not convey any appearance of infringing on another’s free will, it is still employed in the old way to express futurity. We say, *Shall you be at the play this evening?* and *John does not think he shall be there.* With such nicety however do we guard against what we look upon as an offensive encroachment, that, if John’s thought had related to another person, we should say *John*



does not think he will be there. It would be well perhaps if grammarians, and indeed all system-makers, when they are driving their triumphant car along amid the prostrate victims of their speculations, and casting an exulting eye over the train manacled by their despotical rules, had a monitor to cry in their ears, *Remember that thou art a man*. A number of peculiarities in language, which at present seem to hold out insuperable difficulties, would become easily intelligible if we only took into the account that it was framed and fashioned by beings with human notions and feelings.

But to return to the so-called perfect middle: that it has no good title to be called so, is sufficiently proved by the fact stated by Buttman (p. 370), that in all cases where a verb has a regular middle voice, with its appropriate reflex signification, the perfect and plusperfect passive, and they alone, are used as the perfect and plusperfect of that voice, and possess that signification along with their own. By this remark the whole phenomenon of the middle voice is very much simplified. It no longer appears to us as an incongruous and perplexing patchwork of active and passive forms, mixt together one cannot tell how or why. We perceive that throughout it is nothing else than the passive verb, used under a peculiar modification of its meaning, and illustrating the tendency of the Greeks in early times to look upon themselves in all reflex acts, whether external or internal, as patients rather than agents: a tendency which is exemplified in every page of the Homeric poems, and which belongs more or less to every people in an early stage of civilization, before the nation comes of age, and acquires the consciousness along with the free use of its powers. This seems to be the reason why so many of the verbs employed by the Greeks to denote states of mind or of feeling have a passive form; such as *φράζομαι, οἶομαι (οἶμαι), αἰσθάνομαι, σκέπτομαι, ἐπίσταμαι, βούλομαι, ἄγαμαι, ἥδομαι, μαίνομαι*. In some tenses indeed, in which a variety of forms presented themselves, one of them was allotted more peculiarly to the passive signification, another to the middle: that instinct, which in all languages is evermore silently at work in desynonymizing words, as Coleridge terms it, and giving definiteness to the speech of a people in proportion as its thoughts become



more definite, manifested itself in assigning one form of the future and aorist to the passive voice, another to the middle; the preference being perhaps determined by the affinity of the latter to the corresponding active tenses, of the former to the perfect passive. Instances however remain to shew that, at the time when the Greek language comes first into view, the line of demarcation was not deemed quite impassable: and the passive voice would not unfrequently assert its rights to its cast-off future, and now and then, though very rarely, even to the aorist. If we wish to understand the true nature of the Greek verb, to appreciate the delicacy of its organization and the consistency of all its parts with each other, we must bear in mind what was the true state of the case; that for instance the use of the future middle in a passive sense, which is so common in Attic writers, was not an arbitrary licence, but was in perfect accord with the original force of that tense, a force which it had not yet entirely lost. It was not that the Attic writers *multa futura media ponebant pro passivis*, as Pierson says in a note on Mœris, p. 13: but that form, which in the later ages of the Greek language, in the ages when the grammarians wrote, seems to have been used exclusively in a middle sense, had previously had a wider range legitimately belonging to it. To call such things licences implies an oblivion of seasons and circumstances: it is like taxing Shakspeare and Chaucer with taking liberties with the English language, because they often use words in a different meaning from that we now attach to them; a charge which might be deemed inconceivably silly and absurd, if so many of our grammarians and commentators on our old writers were not perpetually bringing it forward. In like manner the misnomer given to what is commonly called the perfect middle has led us to mischarge the Greek verb with a double anomaly, and to regard what is the regular and legitimate usage in two cases as a licentious exception. When a scholar trained in our school Greek grammars, which, little as they teach, contrive that much of that little should be wrong, falls in with such a tense as ἔκτονα, ἔσπορα, λέλοιπα, he pronounces, either immediately, or after vainly trying to discover what he would deem an appropriate meaning for it, that it is the perfect



middle used in lieu of the perfect active: if he has not very frequent occasion for committing this error, this may be accounted for from what was observed above concerning the objective use of the perfect. When on the other hand he finds a perfect of the passive form with a middle signification, he calls this a use of the perfect passive instead of the perfect middle. That even learned men may have their views of the Greek verb distorted by the effect of their early misinstruction, appears, to take an instance, from Dr Blomfield's Glossary on the Agamemnon, v. 252, where he says, *πεπυσμένη: participium passivum, sensu activo*,—and then proceeds to cite similar instances: as if *πυνθάνομαι* had any other perfect, or as if this were not the ordinary and legitimate force of *πέπυσμαι*. Few things have been more injurious to the study of Greek than this belief that the ancient writers had a kind of plenary indulgence to substitute one word for another whenever it suited their fancy. Having begun by drawing up an incorrect definition, or laying down a rule, which, if not totally groundless, is at least tottering every moment, like a house of cards, from the inadequateness of its foundation to bear it, as soon as we meet with anything which will not answer to our definition, which will not bend to our rule, or enter our crazy house without upsetting it, we call this an example of lawless caprice, and, instead of correcting our definition, or examining the grounds of our rule, we pronounce that the Greek language delighted in such or such an anomaly. We might just as well lay down that every plant in a certain border is a rose, and then, when one of them comes to blossom, and the flower turns out to be a lily, declare that it is a lily instead of a rose, or, in the peculiar phraseology of our grammars, *plurimae rosae liliis gaudent, et liliaceum habent florem*. Whatever be the object of our study, be it language, or history, or whatsoever province of the material or the spiritual world, we ought in the first instance to be strongly impressed with the conviction that everything in it is subject to the operation of certain principles, to the dominion of certain laws, that there is nothing lawless in it, nothing unprincipled, nothing insulated or capricious, though from the fragmentary nature of our knowledge many things may possibly appear



so. In short all knowledge, of whatsoever kind, like everything else that is to be stable and lasting, must be founded on faith: and unless we set about our task with a firm persuasion that some valuable conclusion is to be arrived at, we shall never find out anything worth finding.

To call anything an exception therefore is merely in other words to own that we know nothing about it: and with regard to the perfect middle, as well as the second aorist, it can hardly be desirable that any alteration should be made in our grammars to increase the number of exceptions in them, and to make them still more irregular than they are already. It might be possible indeed, even without terming either form of the perfect in *a* an anomaly or a redundancy, to class them both, as Thiersch has done, under the same head. But at all events it must be admitted that the manner in which they are derived from their theme is totally different; and so are their characteristics. One of them appears to have belonged to an earlier stage of the language than the other; for the theme appears in it under what may not unreasonably be regarded as an older form. In several verbs too we meet with both. So that perhaps the most judicious course is to range them side by side, not as distinct tenses, but as distinct forms of the same tense, to which, from the desynonymizing tendency before spoken of, distinct meanings were in some cases allotted.

In like manner too it might be advisable to retain the names of the first and second aorist, the first and second future, in the passive voice, though care should be taken to inculcate that they again are not to be considered as distinct tenses, but as varieties of the same tense. For Buttmann has clearly shewn (Vol. i. p. 450) that the secondary forms in this instance are not independent of the primary, but are merely dialectic modifications of them, which they underwent for the sake of euphony. That the second aorist passive does not come, as it is traced in our grammars, from the second aorist active, he demonstrates by the remarkable fact that *τρέπω* is the only verb which had an active and passive second aorist in common use: and even of *τρέπω* the second aorist active was almost superseded by the first. So that in reality the second aorist passive is only a softer form of



the other, in which the penultima of the latter was modified according to the rules followed in the formation of the second aorist active. Nevertheless as it has been constantly regarded and spoken of under a distinct name from the time of the Greek grammarians downward, as every verb which has this form has the other also, and as the analogy of the second aorist active must unquestionably have been present to the mind of the Greeks when they framed it, I cannot help thinking that it is best in a matter so immaterial as a name, when that name entails no ulterior consequences, to conform to established usage. “The great esteem (says Buttmann, Vol. I. p. 371, speaking on one of the points we have been discussing,) which one cannot but entertain for whatever has existed for centuries, partly from the fear lest one should oneself have to retract an idea of one's own, after having set it up and in a manner forced it upon others, without however having viewed it under a sufficient variety of aspects,—partly for the sake of offering as little disturbance as possible to our common inheritance of knowledge, and to the general mutual understanding among the learned,—this esteem I have always manifested in my elementary works, and shall continue to observe the same course, as the best counterpoise to the prevalent tendency to new-fashion the whole system of education according to our own individual notions.” In every department of human activity indeed the wise and the good will strive to adhere to the same principle, will feel the same reverence for antiquity; and, while they are anxious to get rid of whatever is wrong or vicious, they will be scrupulous not to do more, not to be misled by fanaticism, or that selfconceit which makes us pamper and dote on the offspring of our own brain, into changing beyond what is necessary for the establishment of right and of truth. But if a reverence for antiquity be in all things seemly, of Philology it is the very vital principle. Indeed the great business and office of Philology is to preserve and uphold the union of the past with the present and the future, to secure the records of the human mind from being effaced or disfigured by time, to search out and trace the pedigree of all our thoughts and feelings, and to set forth the whole history of mankind as in a map, with its mountain-chains of



religion stretching from clime to clime, its streams of poetry descending from them to fertilize and beautify the vallies, its gardens of art, its groves and forests of philosophy growing along their banks, and all the varieties of custom and manner that gather and settle beside them. To a philologist whatever is ancient is precious, whatever is of yesterday is of little value, except so far as it is connected with the past: and though he will be no less anxious than other men to remove what is evidently erroneous, he will be more desirous than others, at least if he has the spirit that becomes him, to keep as much of the old house as may be, and, unless it be decidedly a nuisance, not to pull down any thing which can tell him of former days. It is full time however to close these remarks, which at first were merely intended to convey a few hints concerning what has been done by other scholars with regard to the subjects broacht in our correspondent's letter, but which have grown much after the fashion of ill weeds, and have spread far beyond the space I meant to allot to them.

J. C. H.

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QUO ANNI TEMPORE PANATHENAEA MINORA,  
ΤΑ ΜΙΚΡΑ ΠΑΝΑΘΗΝΑΙΑ, CELEBRATA SINT,  
QUAERITUR.

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Hoc pro explorato habemus, quinto quoque anno ab Atheniensibus celebrata esse magna Panathenaea, tribus reliquis annis minora. Et illum quidem annum majorum Panathenaeorum Olympiadis cujusque tertium fuisse, scriptores docent et tituli (v. Boeckh. Oeconom. Athen. publ. ad titul. 1. T. II. p. 165. ed. german.), ita ut minoribus Panathenaeis primus, secundus, et quartus Olympiadis annus relinquatur. Neque hoc in dubitationem vocatur, quod Panathenaea majora Hecatombaeone, id est primo Attici anni mense, ad finem vergente, die mensis vigesimo octavo, *τρίτῃ φθίνοντος*, celebrata sunt. Constat hoc quidem teste Proclo, comment. ad Platonis Timaeum p. 9 (Τὰ γὰρ μέγала Π. τοῦ Ἑκατομβαιῶνος ἐγίνετο τρίτῃ ἀπιόντος), et Schol. in Platon. R. P. I. p. 3, 1. ed. Bekker.

Sed minora Panathenaea Corsinius, Fastorum Atticorum T. II. p. 357 sqq., eodem quidem mense, sed media decade, decimo fere et quarto vel quinto Hecatombaeonis die acta esse statuit. Eamque opinionem tam idoneis argumentis firmasse videbatur, ut etiam probatissimis antiquitatis scrutatoribus eam persuaderet: in his Boeckhio, qui mihi horum studiorum dux et auctor est. V. Oecon. Athen. publ. tit. 1. T. II. p. 167. et ad tit. 8. T. II. p. 248. cf. Corp. Inscript. tit. 157. p. 251: In qua tamen opinione jam hoc mirationem facit, quod eadem solennia (nam easdem majorum et minorum Panathenaeorum caeremonias fuisse compertum habemus, nisi quod in illis omnia majore apparatu, tenuiore in his agebantur) eodem quidem mense sed diversis mensis diebus acta esse dicuntur. Facilius crederem equidem, si diverso plane



anni tempori tribuerentur. Sed Corsinius ut ita statueret, iis maxime motus est, quae a Demosthene in oratione contra Timocratem de concione quadam ab hoc et ejus amicis anno Olymp. cvi, 4 habita narrantur. Hanc enim concionem indici in diem Hecatombaeonis duodecimum ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν Παναθηναίων προφάσει, perinde quasi festum ipsum proxime immineret: hinc apparere, Panathenaea quarti anni Olympici, id est minora, proximis post Hecatomb. xii. diebus celebrata esse. Aliud argumentum repetit Corsinius ex solenni Metoeciorum, quod Athenis actum scimus Hecatombaeonis d. xvi. Id cum ad memoriam Atticorum hominum in unam urbem ex agris collectorum institutum esse dicatur, ab origine conjunctum fuisse videri cum Panathenaeis, universi Athenarum populi sacris Minervalibus. At hoc argumentum manifesto infirmius, atque ex eorum numero est quibus fidem pro arbitrio et habere et denegare possis: illud ex Timocratea oratione specie quidem gravius est et accuratius dispiciendum.

Haec autem sunt, quae loco illo a Demosthene narrantur: quorum nexum Corsinius non satis expedivisse videtur. Ex lege Atheniensium antiquiore (Demosth. in Timocrat. p. 706.) prima anni prytania undecimo die de legibus vel confirmandis vel abrogandis ad populum ferebatur. Si quae leges his comitiis abrogatae essent, prytanes de ea re τὴν τελευταίαν τῶν τριῶν ἐκκλησιῶν, id est ut puto tertiam legitimarum concionum, quot in Hecatombaeonem mensem cadebant, ad eum finem instituebant, ut nomothetarum judicium de his legibus, ne inconsulto mutarentur, plebiscito constitueretur. Nunc ea hominum factio, contra quam oratio Timocratea scripta est, per Epicratem in comitiis illis xi Hecatombaeonis die habitis plebiscitum rogaverat, ut nomothetarum collegium postero statim die, quo etiam propter Cronia solennia cum populo agere non licebat, in comitiis constitueretur, id scilicet agens, ut leges suas commodo singulorum, civitatis detrimento inventas facilius perferret, sed praetexens id propterea tantum fieri ut τὰ ἱερὰ θύηται καὶ ἡ διοίκησις ἱκανὴ γένηται καὶ εἴ τινος ἐνδεῖ πρὸς τὰ Παναθήναια διοικηθῇ (p. 709). Qua ex re ad Panathenaeorum tempus constituendum nihil efficitur nisi hoc: tertiis comitiis si nomothetae instituti fuissent, tempus non amplius superfuturum fuisse, ut coram hoc judicum collegio de apparatu Panathenaeorum instruendo ageretur.



Quid autem mirum, etiamsi Panathenaea eo anno ante diem tertium exeuntis mensis celebrabantur, cum iudicibus, qui ex plebiscito tertiorum comitiorum constituebantur, de iis celebrandis non amplius agi potuisse. Nam si ea comitia circa trigesimum mensis diem habebantur, ut in argumento valde incerto de comitialibus prytaniarum diebus statuere licet, Panathenaea jam peracta erant: sed fac etiam, circa vigesimum quartum Hecatombaeonis legitimum eorum tempus fuisse, etiam tum in apparatu horum solennium, qui paucis diebus non poterat confici, nihil magnopere poterat mutari. Profecto id negotium, quo plures dies supererant, eo melius accurari posse videbatur: ac facile intelligitur satis credulas populum Atticum praeuisse aures his hominibus, qui ei persuadere studebant, duodecimo statim mensis die nomothetas constituendos esse, quorum ex legibus et decretis hostiae magis opimae et coenae lantiores et splendidior apparatus ad Panathenaea destinarentur.

Jam si hoc argumento non amplius uti licebit ad Corinianam sententiam defendendam: proferamus ea quae facere videntur ad eam refellendam. Primo loco ponimus quod de Minervae solennibus in universum dicit Euripides Heraclidis v. 777. Ἄλλ' ἐπὶ σοὶ (Minervam alloquitur chorus) πολύθυτος ἔσαιεὶ τιμὰ κραίνεται, οὐδὲ λήθει μηνῶν φθινὰς ἀμέρα, νέων τ' αἰοδαὶ χορῶν τε μολπαί. ἀνεμόεντι δὲ γᾶς ὄχθῳ ὀλολύγματα παννυχίοις ὑπὸ παρθένων ἱακχεὶ ποδῶν κρότοισιν. Sermo est, ut intellexit Barnesius, de statis Minervae sacris in acropoli Athenarum magno victimarum apparatu et cantu chororum nocturnaue comessatione celebratis, et φθινάδι mensis die, accurate ab Atheniensibus observata, semper redeuntibus. Οὐδὲ λήθει (quae lectio praestat) μηνῶν φθινὰς ἀμέρα, nihil significat nisi: neque Athenienses latet aut oblivione opprimitur mensium φθινὰς ἀμέρα, id est extremae decadis dies. Hunc loci sensum, credo, etiam Hesychii locus, cum plenior esset, explanavit, adductus is quidem sed non explicatus a Musgravio T. III. p. 438. Locus hic est: φθινὰς ἀμέρα· τὴν ἱσταμένου τρίτην τριμήνιον λέγει T. II. p. 1504 Alberti. Qui cum aperte corruptus sit, Elmsleius ut sic corrigatur suasit: τὴν ἱσταμένου τρίτην ἱερομηνίαν λέγει. Aug. Jul. Edm. Pflugk, qui nuper Euripidis tragedias commentario in usum scholarum instruere coepit, Vol. I.



Sect. iv. p. 80, sanio<sup>riorem</sup> huic loco medicinam exspectat a grammatico Bekkeri Anecdotorum Vol. i. p. 306, 32. Τριτό-  
 μηνις· ἑορτὴ ἀγομένη Ἀθηνᾶς τῇ τρίτῃ, et ab Harpocrate  
 p. 176 ed Lips. τριτόμηνις. Λυκοῦργος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς ἱερείας·  
 τὴν τρίτην τοῦ μηνὸς τριτομηνίδα ἐκάλουν. δοκεῖ δὲ γενέσθαι  
 τότε ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ. Ἰστρος δὲ καὶ Τριτογένειαν αὐτὴν φησι διὰ  
 τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ σελήνῃ νομιζομένην. Eadem-  
 que fere Photius p. 603, 21. ed Porson. et Eustathius ad  
 Iliadis l. iv. p. 504, 27 et alios locos, cum Tzetz. ad Lycophr.  
 v. 519. Sed quanquam ex his satis intelligitur, tertio ἰστα-  
 μένου μηνὸς die caeremonias quasdam Minervales statutas  
 fuisse: non tamen intelligitur, quomodo φθινάδα ἀμέραν  
 Euripidis huc trahere potuerit grammaticus ille, ex cujus  
 copiis haec Hesychii glossa excerpta est. Nam Hesychium  
 φθινάδα ἀμέραν conjunxisse in unam notionem, neque, ut  
 sunt qui putent, de labentibus atque intereuntibus diebus  
 poetici sermonis cogitasse, hoc satis evincitur, quod con-  
 juncta haec vocabula φθινὰς ἀμέρα explicationi suae prae-  
 posuit. Huc potius advertendum, quod praeter tertium  
 primae decadis diem etiam τρίτη φθίνοντος sacris Palladis  
 celebris erat, et pro natali ejus die habebatur. Τριτογένεια,  
 ὅτι τρίτη φθίνοντος ἐτέχθη, Scholia Homer. Il. viii. 39.  
 Quid quod, teste Proclo in Schol. ad Hesiodi Opera et Dies  
 v. 778, Philochorus Atticarum antiquitatum peritissimus πά-  
 σας τὰς τρεῖς id est ut videtur τὰς τρίτας dixerat ἱερὰς τῆς  
 Ἀθηνᾶς. Ac quia tertio ante exitum mensis die Minerva  
 nata ferebatur, ὀνοματοθήρας ille apud Athenaeum iii. p. 986,  
 Panathenaea, nullo discrimine facto inter majora et minora,  
 γενέθλιον τῆς ἀλέκτορος Ἀθηνᾶς ἀμέραν dicit. Quibus Mi-  
 nervalium sacrorum temporibus admodum firmatur sententia  
 eorum, qui Minervam in religionibus Atticis interiore quo-  
 dam nexu conjunctam fuisse arbitrantur cum luna: quae  
 cum τρίτη φθίνοντος e conspectu fere evanisset, τρίτη ἰστα-  
 μένου jam magis conspicua in caelo novo lumine fulgere  
 incipit (ἡ σελήνη ἀπὸ συνόδου τριταία φαίνεται, Tzetz. ad  
 Lycophr. v. 519. Etymol. M. s. v. Τριτογένεια). Sed ne ad  
 religiones explicandas aberremus: ex iis quae monita sunt  
 intelligitur, Hesychianum locum nobis tanquam fragmen ple-  
 nioris interpretationis superesse, sive locus in fine truncatus  
 est et integrior fuit: οὐ τὴν ἰσταμένου τρίτην ἢ τριτομηνίδα



λέγει, ἀλλὰ τὴν φθίνοντος, sive medius discerptus et ita restituendus: τὴν φθίνοντος τρίτην, οὐ δὲ τὴν ἱσταμένου τριτομηνίδα λέγει.

A diverticulo Hesychiani loci ad Euripidem revertentes hoc ad nostram rem inde exputavimus, quod Minervae solennia in acropoli Athenarum accurata quadam observatione φθινάδι ἡμέρα, id est ut videtur τρίτῃ φθίνοντος, agi solita esse tradit. Jam ut lubens concesserim, quovis tertio die mensis exeuntis caeremonias quasdam Minervae obiisse sacerdotes Athenienses: πολύθυτος tamen τιμὰ et χορῶν μολπαὶ ad splendidiora sacra, id est ad Panathenaea eodem mensis die celebrata, referri debebunt. Verum hinc etiam colligere licebit, semper hoc die acta esse: certe si haec solennia plerumque μεσοῦντος μηνός, et quinto demum anno φθινάδι illa ἡμέρα, obire moris erat: omnem vim loci infringi fateberis. Idemque fere sentire video Lobeckium Aglaophamo p. 435.

Fortius tamen argumentum extremae disputationi reservavimus, titulum dico, quo, quantum ex δερματικῷ per aliquod tempus ad publicos reditus redundaverit, computatur, editum a Boeckhio Oecon. publ. T. II. p. 249. Corp. Inscript. tit. 157. Hôc cum sacrificia stata eo quo se excipiebant ordine enumerentur, Panathenaea recensentur post sacrum Pacis. Paci Athenienses eodem Hecatombaeonis die litabant, quo Synoecesia sive Metoecia celebrabant, sexto decimo. Schol. Aristoph. Pac. 1017. Metoecia celebrata esse Hecatombaeonis die sexto decimo, etiam Plutarchus Theseo cap. 24. affirmat. Haec igitur Panathenaea nullo modo cadere possunt in diem Hecatomb. quartum vel quintum decimum, sed, cum etiam Ammonis sacrificium inter Pacis solenne et Panathenaea interponatur, ultimae mensis decadi tribuenda erunt. Atqui haec Panathenaea minora sunt, cum ea tituli pars ad Nicocratem archontem, cujus nomen praescribitur, id est ad Olympiadis cxi annum quartum pertineat. Fit conclusio, etiam minora Panathenaea ultima mensis decade, eodem mensis tempore quo majora, esse celebrata.

Hoc loco, quanquam jam ad metam disputationis decucurrisse nobis videmur: intelligimus tamen imperfectum a plerisque habitum iri hoc negotium, nisi etiam contra eam sententiam disputaverimus, ex qua minora Panathenaea alii plane mensi, Thargelioni, attribuuntur: praesertim cum eam nuper



defenderit et resuscitaverit quodammodo H. F. Clintonus, vir doctrina aequae atque incorruptae iudicii sanitate conspicuus (Fastis Hellenicis p. 333. p. 346 ed. latinae). Haec sententia derivatur a Proclo, commentatore Platonis, adoptata est a Meursio, Panathenaico c. 6, impugnata et deserta a Petito, Legibus Atticis, et Corsinio, de quo diximus. At primum dicendum, quid Proclus censuerit, et, quod non minus necessarium, cur ita censuerit. Platonis Republica cum Timaeo et Critia eo vinculo continetur, ut Socrates, qui dialogum in Republica expressum Timaeo et Critiae Hermocra-  
 tique enarravit, postridie hos viros narrantes et disserentes audiat, utque qui pridie in hoc sermonum convivio a Socrate laute excepti fuerint (*δαιτυμόνες*), nunc vicissim eum excipiant, *ἐστιάτορες* fiant. V. Platon. Timaeum ab in. At sermones, qui in Republica a Socrate cum Timaeo et Critia communicantur, ab ipso et aliis habiti dicuntur pridie ejus diei quo narrantur (V. exordium libri I de Republ. *Κατέβην χθές*). Atque habiti finguntur hi sermones in Piraeo, cum Bendideorum solenne primum ab Atheniensibus eo loco celebraretur. Bendidea autem, Proclus testatur consensu *τῶν περὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν γραψάντων* poni Thargelionis die nono decimo (Ad Timaeum p. 9): quanquam idem alio lo (ad Timaeum p. 27) ex Aristotelis Rhodii sententia ea vigesimo Thargelionis die ponit. Igitur Timaei et Critiae sermones cadunt in diem Thargelionis vigesimum primum vel secundum. Nunc Plato eodem die festum diem Minervae agi narrat, ipsisque his sermonibus ad vetusta Athenarum tempora spectantibus *τὴν θεὸν ἅμα ἐν τῇ πανηγύρει* vult celebrari (Timaeo p. 21). Convenire dicuntur ii sermones *τῇ παρουσίᾳ τῆς θεοῦ θυσίᾳ* (Timaeus p. 26). Jam sumitur haec sacrificia, quae panegyri frequentantur, esse Panathenaea. Panathenaea autem majora cum notissimum fuerit, Hecatombaeonis *τρίτῃ ἀπιόντος* acta esse: supersunt minora Panathenaea, quae ex hoc ipso argumentorum nexu collectum est in ultimam Thargelionis decadem incidisse. Nullam aliam ob causam nisi ex hac ratiocinatione Proclum de Panathenaeorum tempore ita statuuisse, ut liquido appareat, adscribam locum ex commentario in Timaeum p. 9. *Δηλοὶ δὲ ἐκ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ χρόνοι τῶν διαλόγων τῆς τε Πολιτείας καὶ τοῦ Τιμαίου. εἴπερ ἡ μὲν ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδείοις ὑπόκειται*



τοῖς ἐν Πειραιεὶ δρωμένοις, ὁ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐξῆς τῶν Βενδιδείων. (Quod ἐν τῇ ἐξῆς dicit, non satis accurate facit: sed hoc praetermitto) ὅτι γὰρ τὰ ἐν Πειραιεὶ Βενδίδεια τῇ ἐνάτῃ ἐπὶ δικάτῃ Θαργηλιῶνος, ὁμολογοῦσιν οἱ περὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν γράψαντες ὥστε ὁ Τίμαιος ὑποκέοιτο ἂν τῇ εἰκάδι τοῦ αὐτοῦ μηνός. εἰ δὲ, ὡς ἐξῆς ῥηθήσεται, καὶ Παναθηναίων ὄντων ὑπόκειται, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ μικρὰ ἦν ταῦτα Παναθήναια. τὰ γὰρ μεγάλα τοῦ Ἑκατομβαιῶνος ἐγένετο τρίτῃ ἀπιόντος, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἱστόρηται. Hicne sermo est hominis certis documentis de tempore Panathenaeorum minorum edocti, an ratiocinantis et computantis? Intelligitur autem hujus ratiocinationis cardinem verti in illis Timaei locis de sacrificio et panegyri Minervae. At quod nos cogat ut haec sumamus fuisse Panathenaea, in Platone nihil invenio. Sed Proclus non primus haec sibi finxit, sed, antiquiores sequitur commentatores, qui argumenta jam eo modo composuerant. Nam ad locum de panegyri Minervae Proclus (p. 217.) haec annotat: ὅτι γε μὴν τὰ Παναθήναια τοῖς Βενδιδείους εἶπετο, λέγουσιν οἱ ὑπομνηματισταί, id est, ii ipsi commentatores, quorum conclusiunculas, fallaces ut opinor, supra jam suas fecerat Proclus. At pergit Proclus: καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὁ Ῥόδιος ἱστορεῖ τὰ μὲν ἐν Πειραιεὶ Βενδίδεια τῇ εἰκάδι τοῦ Θαργηλιῶνος ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἔπεσθαι δὲ τὰς περὶ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ἑορτάς (ita scribendum; ed. Basil. habet ἑορτάν, merum sphalma). Concedo, Aristotelem hunc ea non ex interpretatione Platoniorum locorum, sed ex fide monumentorum referre videri. Sed quid haec ad Panathenaea, de quibus nihil est in verbis Aristotelis, quanquam illis in eum sensum detortis sive a Proclo sive ab antiquioribus Platonis commentatoribus. Imo verba illa: αἱ περὶ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ἑορταί haud satis apte de Panathenaeorum solenni dicta essent. Potius ea respicere putabimus (ut putavit Petitus) ad duo sacra Minervae Atticae, quae certis testimoniis constat sub hos Thargelionis dies celebrata esse, eaque inter se eo conjuncta quod utrumque ad antiquum Minervae signum in arce Athenarum spectat. Callynteria dico et Plynteria. Illa Photio teste Thargelionis die nono decimo agebantur, haec, Plutarcho auctore, ejusdem mensis die vigesimo quinto (ἕκτῃ φθίνοντος), si Photio major fides, vigesimo nono (δευτέρῃ φθίνοντος). Ea Plynteria, sancte nec sine



festivo apparatu ab Atheniensibus celebrata, proprius certe absunt ab eo tempore, quod Plato designat, quam Panathenaea, siquidem haec recte Hecatombaeoni vindicavimus. Potest in dissensu Plutarchi et Photii utriusque auctoritati tantum detrahi, ut id solenne vigesimo primo vel secundo Thargelionis die ponatur, id est tertio post Bendidea, undevigesimo vel vigesimo die acta.

Sed haec utut sunt, nam de Plynteriorum tempore et sacro illo Minervali quod a Platone significatur nihil affirmo, hoc satis demonstratum puto, Procli de Panathenaeis sententiam non effectam esse nisi ex interpretatione Platoniorum locorum. Et plane dissentiendum mihi est ab iis, qui, cum Proclo Platonem tanquam fundum ejus sententiae subtraxerint, hanc tamen sententiam nullo tibicine fultam per se stare posse autumant. Sed etiam magis mihi in toto hoc argumento notandi veniunt ii, qui Platonicos de Republica sermones a Proclo Panathenaeis attribui, et Bendidea ab eo cum Panathenaeis misceri et confundi scribunt. Quod multos facere video. Hic error soli Scholiorum in Platonis Rempublicam scriptori (p. 3, 3 Bekker.) imputandus est, qui, cum a doctioribus grammaticis disputata truncaret et plane perverteret, pleraque a melioribus scriptoribus de Bendideis narrata Panathenaeis minoribus tribuit.

His in examen vocatis pauca sunt quae adjiciam. Epi-cratis plebiscitum, de quo in Timocratea oratione dicitur, supra cum Corsinio Olympiadis cvi quarto anno assignavimus, et Panathenaea, quae id attingit, propterea minora diximus: quanquam nihil ipsi ad nostram sententiam stabiliendam hinc derivavimus. Nihil igitur nos cogit, ut Clintono obloquamur, qui id plebiscitum priori anno tribui posse contendit ejus, quo oratio habita sit: ita ut oratio quidem Timocratea locum suum, i. e. Ol. cvi a. 4., teneat, plebiscitum autem in tertium annum removeatur. Probabilis tamen etiamnum antiquior sententia mihi habetur. Nam cum plebiscitum illud ineunte anno, Hecatombaeone mense, factum sit: satis multum temporis eodem anno ad litem instituentem supererat, neque ulla morae ab aliis injectae mentio exstat, quae nos moveat, ut litem in sequentem annum protractam putemus.

Non magis Lysiae loco moveor, Ἀπολογίας δωροδοκίας



p. 161. s. § 4, ut Panathenaea minora Thargelione acta mihi persuadeam. Hôc quidem chorus Pyrrhichistarum ad Panathenaea minora instructus postponitur comico Dionysiorum ejusdam anni choro. Sed hujus rei causa, quae in tempore solennium quaeritur, etiam alia poterat esse. Duae statim in promptu sunt, altera quod comicus chorus multo majore sumtu instruebatur quam Pyrrhichistae, quod ipse orator nos docet, altera quod is qui causam suam orat, comico choro vicit, Pyrrhichistis certavit tantum.

Sic repulsis quae contra stare posse videbantur argumentis repeteremus summam rationum, quae pro nobis pugnant, nisi verendum esset, ne satis jam taedii scrupulositas nostra legentibus creaverit.

C. O. MÜLLER.

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## MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS.

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### I.

#### *Death of Paches.*

IN Niebuhr's essay on Xenophon's Hellenics translated in the last number of this Museum, there is an allusion to the fate of Paches (p. 495), which I would have explained to the reader if I had remembered from what source it was drawn. But the manner in which it was mentioned led me to imagine that what Niebuhr had found was something till then undiscovered, and thus deterred me from searching for it in any of the books to which I have access, and still more from attempting to recollect whether I had before seen or heard of it. Otherwise it might possibly have occurred to me that the anecdote is mentioned by Schneider in a note to Aristotle's Polit. v. 3. My attention was accidentally drawn to this fact by a remark in an excellent little book, Plehn's *Lesbiaca*, where Schneider is censured for giving too much credit to the story. Perhaps I cannot better make amends for my oversight than by laying before the reader the original authorities and some of the opinions which modern critics have exprest upon them. The passage to which Niebuhr evidently refers, and which his edition of the Byzantine Historians had recently brought under his notice, is an epigram of Agathias, (57. in Niebuhr's ed. Anthol. Gr. Jacobs, Tom. iv, p. 34.)

Ἑλλανὶς τριμάκαιρα, καὶ ἅ χαρίεσσα Λάμαξις  
ἦστην μὲν πάτρας φέγγεα Λεσβιάδος.  
ὄκκα δ' Ἀθηναίησι σὺν ὀλκάσιν ἐνθάδε κέλσας  
τὰν Μιτυληναίαν γᾶν ἀλάπαξε Πάχης,  
τᾶν κουρᾶν ἀδίκως ἠράσσατο, τῶς δὲ συνεύνως  
ἔκτανεν, ὥς τήνας τῇδε βιησόμενος.



ταὶ δὲ κατ' Αἰγαίοιο ῥόου πλατὺ λαῖτμα φερέσθην,  
καὶ ποτὶ τὰν κραναὰν Μοῦσοπίαν δραμέτην·  
δάμω δ' ἀγγελέτην ἀλιτήμονος ἔργα Πάχητος,  
μέσφα μιν εἰς ὅλοήν κῆρα συνήλασάτην.  
τοῖα μὲν, ὦ κούρα, πεπονθήκατον· ἄψ δ' ἐπὶ πάτραν  
ἤκετον, ἐν δ' αὐτᾷ κείσθον ἀποφθιμέναι·  
εὖ δὲ πόνων ἀπόνασθον, ἐπεὶ ποτὶ σᾶμα συνεύνων  
εὐδετον, ἐς κλεινᾶς μνᾶμα σαοφροσύνας·  
ὑμνεῦσιν δ' ἔτι πάντες ὁμόφρονas ἡρώϊνας,  
πάτραs καὶ ποσίων πῆματα τισαμέναs.

Mr Jacobs remarks on this epigram (Animadv. Vol. III. 1. p. 112.), Paches, cujus amores et supplicium in hoc epigr. enarrantur, missus est adversus Mitylenaeos anno quinto belli Peloponnesiaci Ol. 88. 2. Ejus in Mitylenaeis tractandis lenitatem et moderationem laudat Thucyd. III. 28. Cf. Diodor. Sic. T. I. p. 515. (XII. 55.) Nec omnino quidquam est apud historicos quod historiae in hoc. epig. narratae fidem faciat, nisi fortasse quod Aristoteles tradit Polit. v. 4. (Schneid. 3.) bellum illud Mitylenaeorum adversus Athenienses a mulieribus ἐπικλήροις originem cepisse. Recte igitur Reiskius, p. 220. hanc historiam ad veteres fabellas amatorias, quas Milesias appellant, referendam esse censet. In the passage referred to Aristotle says: καὶ περὶ Μιτυλήνην δὲ ἐξ ἐπικλήρων στάσεως γενομένηs πολλῶν ἐγένετο ἀρχὴ κακῶν, καὶ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐν ᾧ Πάχης ἔλαβε τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν· Τιμοφάνους γὰρ τῶν εὐπόρων τινὸς καταλιπόντος δύο θυγατέρας, ὁ περιωσθεὶς καὶ οὐ λαβὼν τοῖς υἱέσιν αὐτοῦ Δόξανδρος ἤρξε τῆς στάσεως, καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους παρώξυνε, πρόξενος ὢν τῆς πόλεως. Schneider's note is: Thucydides III. 2, ubi narrat bellum a Pachete gestum et Mitylenen captam originem referens obiter hæc posuit. καὶ αὐτῶν Μιτυληναίων ἰδίᾳ ἄνδρες κατὰ στάσιν πρόξενοι Ἀθηναίων μηνυταὶ γίνονται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. In Agathiae Epigr. Analectorum III. p. 64. narratur Pachetem in amorem incidisse duarum Mitylenaeorum mulierum, Lamaxidis et Hellenidis, quarum maritos cum occidisset, eos secum abduxit, deinde ipse ab iis occisus. Forte hae sunt illae ipsae duae ἐπικληροὶ virgines de quibus noster narrat. Mr Plehn in the work above quoted, p. 61, observes: Schneiderus Agathiae narrationi plus quam par est tribuere videtur. Merito Reiskius et Jacobsius



historiam illam ad veteres fabellas amatorias, Milesiarum nomine appellatas, referendum esse existimant.

If I venture to interpose a word in this discussion, it is certainly not because I attach any importance to the question, whether the story in Agathias is anything more than an idle fiction arbitrarily connected with a historical name. Few unprejudiced persons will think either much better of the Athenians, if they condemned their general for an atrocious crime committed for his own private ends, or much worse of them, if they did not accept his public services as a sufficient defence against a charge of misconduct which appeared to them clearly proved. But still as the behaviour of the Athenians towards Paches has been made a ground of severe censure on them by some writers, both ancient and modern, the question deserves to be placed on a right footing, which, it seems to me, none of the critics whose remarks I have quoted have done.

In the first place, the story in Agathias certainly does not gain the slightest degree of credibility by being compared with the fact mentioned by Aristotle: for that the two daughters of Timophanes should have been the same women who became the victims of the lust of Paches, would be a most extraordinary coincidence, which it would be arbitrary beyond measure to assume without any authority: so that I can scarcely believe that this was Schneider's meaning. On the contrary, it would be very easy to conceive how the incident mentioned by Aristotle might in the course of ages be combined with the violent death of the conqueror Paches, and so worked up into the tale on which the epigram is founded, which would not be a stranger perversion of history than we find frequently occurring in Malalas. But this bare possibility is not in itself an argument sufficient even to raise a presumption, and surely will not justify us in pronouncing the Lesbian legend to be no better than a Milesian story. The reasons given by Mr Jacobs for treating it with contempt, are such as I should not have expected from an intelligent critic. I lay no stress on the public conduct of Paches, whom Mr Mitford, not certainly without reason, brands with the reproach of treachery and cruelty: because it does not follow, though he looked upon all means as indifferent in the



service of the state, that he was equally reckless in his private capacity. But on the other hand we should be as little at liberty to presume, that, if he was capable of being transported by the heat of his passions into an outrage against humanity, he must therefore have been a monster of cruelty, who could find pleasure in executing a commission to massacre the population of a whole city in cold blood. We do not want the light of Profane History to assure us that this would be a very erroneous inference. No conclusion therefore can be drawn as to this point from the character of Paches, so far as it is known to us from history. The story of Agathias considered by itself contains no improbable circumstance, unless it be that Paches committed two crimes of the same kind. Otherwise there is nothing in it that presents any appearance even of exaggeration. It sounds like a simple unvarnished narrative of a fact which was likely to live long in the recollection of the Lesbians. The legitimate course therefore would seem to be, to inquire whether this fact is inconsistent with any other, which has been transmitted to us on better authority. Mr Mitford's description of the end of Paches would lead the reader to suppose that we have only to choose between Agathias and Plutarch; and this would certainly reduce us to a painful perplexity. But the passages to which Mr Mitford refers in his margin, do not contain quite so much as he has stated in his text. Neither in the life of Aristides, c. 26, nor in that of Nicias, c. 6, where he alludes to the death of Paches, does Plutarch mention the specific charge brought against him. This deficiency Mr Mitford has supplied by relating that Paches was "called upon to answer a charge of peculation." This term is undoubtedly well adapted to raise a strong suspicion of sycophancy on the part of the accusers, and of levity and ingratitude on the part of the judges, who, perhaps on very slight evidence, were excited by "the virulent orators who conducted the accusation" against the honest plainspeaking soldier, and by their credulity "so raised his indignation," that he stabbed himself to the heart in their presence. Plutarch however only relates the issue of the cause: the rest of the scene is from the hand of Mr Mitford. I do not mean by this to impute to him a wilful fabrication, but only an oversight, into which



he was betrayed by the natural desire of producing an additional illustration of his favorite thesis. But when a history is written for the sake of a certain theory, there is always a danger that the theory will every now and then become the foundation of the history.

A different, but perhaps an equally instructive way of writing a romance on the subject, would have been to suppose, that in the intoxication of his military success Paches had given way to a strong temptation, and had been led to tarnish the honour of a glorious life by a base and cruel murder: that he returned to Athens to receive the reward of his services, but was followed by the unhappy women whose peace he had destroyed: that in the presence of the assembled people they disclosed and proved his guilt: and that when, instead of congratulation and applause, he heard nothing but the accents of horror and indignation from all around him, shame and remorse and the avenging Furies stung him to madness, and he turned his victorious sword against his own breast.

This would indeed have been a romantic adventure for an Athenian, or any other court of justice. Yet it must be remembered that the circumstance which sounds most romantic in it, is that which belongs equally to the other version of the story; and I will only add, that if the latter be the true one, if an Athenian officer in the Peloponnesian war was unable to support a verdict given against him on a charge of peculation, and was excited by it to fall on his own sword, the case affords a new illustration of a common remark, that things sometimes happen in the world, which would be thought too improbable for a romance.

C. T.

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## II.

*On the Title of Xenophon's Greek History.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF L. DINDORF.\*

NIEBUHR was induced to consider Xenophon's Greek history as compounded, against the author's intention, of two works written at different times, namely, the conclusion of Thucydides, and the Hellenics, by arguments partly derived from internal, partly from external evidence; on the latter of which I purpose to offer a few remarks. In the first place, Niebuhr's statement that according to the *Bibliotheca Graeca* all the seven books are in the Aldine edition entitled *Paralipomena Thucydidis*, rests upon an error, the correction of which he himself would have been the first to approve. The words of Fabricius both in the edition of 1707 (Vol. II. p. 74) and in that of Harles (Vol. III. p. 9) are: *Hos libros Xenophontis, sub titulo Paralipomenon, Thucydidi Graece subjecit Aldus anno 1502. Fol.:* and so I find elsewhere the Latin title of that Aldine edition stated thus, *Xenophontis omissa, quae et graeca gesta appellantur*, without any mention of the name of Thucydides. And even the word *παραλειπόμενα* can only be in the titlepage, and not in the superscription itself; for this in the complete Aldine edition of Xenophon dated in 1525 is *Ξενοφώντος Ἑλληνικῶν πρῶτον*: and it is evident that the sheets containing the Hellenics in this edition are the same which were used in the former one, as even without being able to consult the latter I infer both from the two blank leaves between the Anabasis and the Hellenics, while in other places there is a great parsimony of paper, and also from the printer's marks: for the first leaf of the supplement to the Aldine edition of 1503, which was afterwards published separately, and contains Gemistus, Herodian, and the Scholia to Thucydides, has the mark η ii, while the last leaf of the Hellenics of 1525 is marked η; and the Hellenics in the edition of 1525 also begin with

\* These remarks are printed in the *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik* for 1832, Vol. I. p. 254, and as they contain a correction of an erroneous statement made in an essay, a translation of which appeared in our last number, we have thought it right to lay them before our readers.



a blank leaf, which is followed by one marked *a ii*, although the *Anabasis*, which precedes it, concludes with one marked *L iiii*\*. Consequently of the title *Paralipomena Thucydidis* one half is destitute of authority, and the other half is confined to the titlepage, while the superscription of the book, which doubtless approaches more closely to the reading of the manuscript, does not agree with it. Nevertheless Niebuhr's conjecture that Aldus took the name of *Paralipomena* from some manuscript, is completely confirmed by the collation of Victorius, in which there is noted at the beginning of the first book *Ξενοφώντος παραλειπόμενα Ἑλληνικῶν*, at the end of the seventh *τέλος τῶν Ξενοφώντος παραλειπομένων*. Niebuhr thought that this *παραλειπόμενα* together with the name of Thucydides (supposing that both words were supported by manuscript authority), was the original title of the first two books, only misapplied by being extended to all the seven: on the contrary, I am convinced that it was only invented at a very late period, probably from a remembrance of the *Paralipomena* of the Old Testament, by some one who considered the whole work in connexion with Thucydides, and perhaps with Herodotus also, as forming a body of Greek history, which Gemistus carried down to the destruction of Greece at Chæronea. Hence Aldus in the preface to his Thucydides gives the same name to the work of Gemistus, although in his

\* That Dindorf is perfectly right in his notion that the *Hellenics* in the Aldine Xenophon of 1525 were not printed for that edition, but were transferred to it from that of 1503, which must probably have hung on hand, and in which it formed a part of the same volume with Gemistus, Herodian, and the *Scholia* on Thucydides, is proved to the eye by the colour of the paper, by the shape of the types, by the number of lines in a page (55 instead of 54), and the width of the spaces between them. In all these respects the *Hellenics*, with the exception of one or two leaves that are reprinted, differ from the rest of the volume in which they are found, and agree with that from which they have been taken. Owing to this a complete copy of the volume published in 1503 appears to be a rarity: at least Dindorf had only seen one that wanted the Xenophon: and this is all that is found in the Bodleian catalogue, or in the library of the University of Cambridge, or in that of Trinity College, though the latter is very rich in Greek Alduses since the bequests it has received from Dr Raine and Professor Dobree, who took great pains in collecting them. When these imperfect copies were issued, Asulanus prefixt a new titlepage to them, and on the reverse of it he tells the reader, *quae Xenophontis opera, tum παραλειπόμενα tum ἑλληνικά a Graecis appellata, in hunc locum (Aldus) incluserat, nos tanquam avulsum membrum, cum totum Xenophontem emitteremus, quasi suo corpori conjungendum putavimus*.



edition he prefixes to it the title of Ἑλληνικά: *Eram daturus* (he says) *una cum Thucydide* τὰ τε Ξενοφώντος καὶ Πλήθωνος Γεμιστοῦ παραλειπόμενα: *sed quia non habebam minimum tria exemplaria, distulimus in aliud tempus.* With regard to Xenophon, no grammarian who cites the Hellenics gives the name of Paralipomena either to the entire work, or to the first books; and the earliest of them, Athenæus, quotes that which now passes for the first book of the Hellenics, as such. This, and what Diodorus, XIII. 42, says about Xenophon's history, makes it very improbable that Marcellinus, who is unquestionably a writer of a late date, should have been acquainted with a different name and division of that work; or that, when in his Life of Thucydides he stated τὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐξ ἑτῶν πράγματα ἀναπληροῖ ὃ τε Θεόπομπος καὶ ὁ Ξενοφῶν, οἷς συνάπτει τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν ἱστορίαν, he meant anything more than that its contents, not its outward divisions, consisted of two parts. But although the external evidence which Niebuhr has adduced in support of his opinion, seems to me to have no weight, yet any person who considers the internal proofs as convincing, is still at liberty to hold that the Hellenics were written at different times, and even with different objects, since it has not been shewn that Xenophon himself published this work, which was not completed till a very late period of his life.

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### III.

#### *On English Preterites and Genitives.*

IN the first volume of this Museum, pp. 654—666, in the course of some remarks on the form of certain English preterites and participles, it was shewn that the ancient and modern orthography had varied, and a return to the former mode of spelling was recommended. In confirmation of those remarks the following passages may likewise be noticed. Rask in his Anglo-Saxon Grammar, §. 205, speaking



of the inflexion of the second class of his first conjugation says, that “in this class it is necessary to observe whether the characteristic is a hard or a soft consonant; in the latter case it forms *de* in the imperfect, and *ed* in the part. pass., in the former, *te* in the imp. and *t* in the part. pass. The soft consonants are *d*, *ð*, *f*, *w*, *g*, also *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, *s*; the hard are *t*, *p*, *c*, *h*, *x*, and *s* after another consonant.” He gives as instances *alysan*, *alysde*, *alysed*, to redeem, *amyrran*, *amyrde*, *amyrrred* to waste, *metan*, *mette*, *(ge)met*, to meet, *dyppan*, *dypte*, *dypt*, to dip. He further adds that “if the consonant be double, one is always rejected, when another consonant follows,” §. 206. Grimm in his Grammar gives similar rules with regard to the modern English verb, of which they are not true according to the actually prevailing orthography. “In case” he says, “the *e* is omitted in the preterite, the *d* becomes *t*, after *l*, *m*, *n*, *p*, *k*, *f* (from *v*), *gh* (from *k* and *ch*), and *s*,” citing as examples the words *dealt*, *felt*, *dwelt*, *spelt*, *spilt*, *smelt*, *dreamt*, *leant*, *meant*, *learnt*, *burnt*, *crept*, *kept*, *slept*, *swept*, *wept*, *leapt*, *reapt*, *dipt*, *slipt*, *tipt*, *whipt*, *crackt*, *knockt*, *left*, *reft*, *sought*, *lost*, *kist*, *mist*, *blest*, Vol. i. p. 996. These various instances exactly correspond with the suggestions in the article referred to.

With regard to the English genitive case, on which some observations are made in the same place pp. 669—678, there can be no doubt that, when the flexions of our Saxon language were disturbed by the admixture of the heterogeneous Norman element, the *s* was transferred from those substantives in which it properly marked the genitive case, to all others, both Saxon and Norman, whatever might be their form; in the same manner as the same letter became a universal mark of the plural number, without reference to the original and proper mode of inflexion: see Grimm, Vol. i. p. 694. 709. Vol. ii. p. 944. Nothing therefore can betray a greater ignorance of the history and character of our language, than to suppose that such expressions as *the king's house*, *the man's garden*, are contracted from *the king his house*, *the man his garden*. Besides the impossibility of accounting for such forms as *the Queen's Majesty*, *a mother's milk*, unless the *s* is taken to be the mark of the genitive, there are also



two other cases in which the hypothesis of the contraction of the pronoun *his* would create an absurdity. Not only do we say *the King of England's palace*, *Lady Jane Grey's execution*; making, for the purpose of inflexion, *King-of-England* and *Lady-Jane Grey* into one word (see Grimm, Vol. II. p. 959); but in many cases where the names of two different persons are constantly connected with each other, we unite them, for the sake of declension, into one word. Thus *Beaumont and Fletcher's plays*, *Barnewall and Alderson's Reports*, *Rundell and Bridge's shop*, (like the German *Ersch und Grubers Encyclopädie*); where it is obvious that, if any pronoun had place, *their* and not *his* would have been used. Moreover the genitive case occurs in some instances where no pronoun, of any gender or number, can be supposed to have existed: thus *a picture of the King* is a representation of the King's person, *a picture of the King's* means a picture belonging to the King, a picture of the King's pictures, i. e. one of his collection: in the same manner that *a friend of mine* means *a friend of my friends*. In cases of this kind such a mode of speech as *a picture of the King his*, is a manifest absurdity.

But it does not follow that, because one form of expression has been incorrectly derived from another by dreaming etymologists, therefore that form is absurd, or was invented merely to furnish an etymology. The connexion between two forms may be a fiction, though the existence of both may be real. Accordingly it seems to me very questionable whether such expressions as *the king his house*, *Jesus Christ his sake*, are not perfectly correct, and in accordance with the spirit of the language: just as such phrases as *der König sein Haus* are used by the Germans in familiar conversation, although they are less precise than the use of the genitive case, with which they have plainly no connexion. Swift, in some verses entitled *Merlin's Prophecy*, has the feminine pronoun in the same way:

Seven and ten, addyd to nine,

Of Fraunce her woe this is the sygne.

The position of the nominative case, to which the pronoun afterwards gives a genitive sense by relation, is exactly analogous, in respect of its want of grammatical connexion,



to the mode of expression so common in the mouths of illiterate persons, by which the nominative case is placed alone, and followed by a pronoun which governs the verb. *John he goes*, or *Mary she does*, are the pleonastic forms which such persons constantly use in narration. Nor were they formerly, before our language had been universally reduced to the standard of empiric grammatical rules, confined to inaccurate speakers: as is proved by the following extract from the letter of the accomplished and the eloquent Raleigh written to his wife immediately after his trial. "I cannot write much (are his words): *God he knows* how hardly I steal this time while others sleep; and it is also time that I should separate my thoughts from the world." Jar-dine's Criminal Trials, Vol. i. p. 455.

G. C. L.

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THE remarks on the English genitive in our last Number were almost entirely confined to their immediate object: and as that was an orthographical, not an etymological question, I did not bring forward any arguments to prove that the final *s* does not stand for *his*, but, assuming this to be notorious, merely pointed out the general law, of which the mistake on this matter was an exemplification, that languages, when they combine, are wont to lose their grammatic forms, and to pass from the synthetic to the analytic class; and then endeavoured, though very imperfectly, to trace the history of that mistake, to shew how it maintained its ground in spite of repeated protests against it, and to establish, what I had more directly in view, that our present practice of writing our genitives with an apostrophe emanated from it. In the passages indeed cited from our older grammarians more than one argument is urged, which, if arguments had always the same power in effect as in idea, would have set the old and correct opinion on its feet again, and put down the error altogether. We all know however that it is often no less difficult to get rid of an error, than it would be to



get rid of the gout, by reasoning. On the contrary when it has once fast hold, like the old man on Sinbad's neck, the more you argue with it, the faster it sticks: and the only thing to be done is to let it have its own way, unless perchance one can have recourse to Sinbad's stratagem of making it drunk. Else Wallises remark that *his* itself is only the genitive of *he*, proves that this fancied derivation is in the literal sense of the word preposterous; so preposterous indeed, that one wonders it should ever have found favour with anybody, unless it had been with that recent Historian of the Bible, who, to explain why the Almighty employed six days in the work of creation, when he might have effected it by a word, suggests with becoming humility, as a possible motive, that God designed to "establish the sanctity of the sabbath as well by example as precept, and to place it upon a footing more secure than by any other means it could have acquired." Moreover if there be any value in an *argumentum ab homine*, the disciples of Horne Tooke might be convinced that, as their master says nothing on this point, nothing can possibly be made of it in support of his favorite hypothesis, that all words and all ideas are a kind of zoophytes, which have no means of growth except by adhering to each other, and which you may cut into as many pieces as you like without doing them any material mischief. Nor am I acquainted with any writer of late years, who, either practically or theoretically, has held that *his* is a component part of our genitive: and Mr Crombie in his sensible and useful work on the Etymology and Syntax of the English language, though he might, and perhaps ought, to have exprest himself more decidedly, shews that our present genitive has come down to us without any interruption from our Saxon ancestors. So that if *man's* be *man his*, *hominis* must also be *homin his*, and *ἀνδρὸς* must be *ἄνδρ his*. For in the present state of that science, which might appropriately be termed Comparative Etymology, it is impossible to doubt that the *es* of the genitive in the Saxon and other Teutonic dialects is identical with the *is* of the Latin, and with the *ος* of the Greek genitives. It is found too, as oriental scholars tell us, in Sanscrit. To bring forward our *his* therefore, for the sake of solving a phenomenon which runs over half the world, would be about as



reasonable, though nothing like so witty, as Voltaire's mode of accounting for the beds of shells often found in the centre of vast continents, which shells, for fear that they should be regarded as a proof of a universal deluge, he maintained had been dropt there by pilgrims to the Holy Land. What the meaning of the termination *is* may be, must be learnt in the East. Mr Gilchrist indeed does not think it necessary to go so far, but makes it out by his own mother-wit: he tells us (Etymol. Interpreter p. 122) that 's "is a contraction of *is* or *es*," and that this "is the sign of the genitive singular, third declension of Latin nouns; which was adopted by the Saxon writers to answer the same purpose in the native language which they were forming: and there can be no doubt that said *is* was originally a separate word answering in meaning or use to *of* with us: which *of*, as well as the termination *is*, is a contraction or fragment of some compound word." This to be sure is a truly invaluable piece of accurate information. The former part of the passage refers to the author's bosom-fancy; that, "if not all, nearly all that very part of our language which is most confidently received as Saxon and Gothic, is, in fact, neither more nor less than a corruption of Greek and Latin (p. 5);" and that the chief agents in this transformation, by which the old language of the Saxons, if indeed they had any, was almost entirely extinguisht, were the men of letters: so that the influence of such persons upon the language of their countrymen, one must suppose, varies inversely as their number and the quantity and circulation of their writings. For the pride of literature is sadly humbled when we examine the rustic dialects, whether of our own or of any other tongue, and perceive how very slight and minute is the influence exercised by books, even in the course of many centuries, on the spoken language of the people. A few extraneous words will now and then take root among them: but even if you sow the finest pippin, it comes up in the shape of a crab. So far are the lower orders from borrowing grammatical forms from the higher, that the very words which they do adopt, they almost always disfigure and distort, in order to bring them under the analogies they themselves are wont to be guided by. In truth this hypothesis, for the sobriety of judgement it indicates, the strength of



argument on which it is founded, and the knowledge of human nature, of history, and of language that it implies, is an admirable match for Dugald Stewart's celebrated notion that the Sanscrit language was an offset of the Greek, carried to India and planted there by Alexander's army. Stonehenge, we shall next be told, consists of stones hewn from the Tarpeian rock, and that Julius Cesar's soldiers brought them over in their pockets. The slight difficulty attending such a hypothesis, from the size of the stones, when it is suggested to the hypothesizer, he will reply, may be got over in two ways, either by supposing that they have grown since then, or that the men in those days had bigger pockets than they have now: and he will remind us that Pope's Homer tells us how his ancestors used to lift much heavier stones than he could. For my own part I would rather contend that this primeval temple is formed of the teeth of the great earthsprung giant whom Corineus slew.

But to stoop from these flights: there are sundry questions connected with the use of our genitive which require more elucidation than they have hitherto received; and among them are the three idioms to which my friend G. C. L. refers. Would it not be possible for instance to throw some sort of light on that singular peculiarity which compells us to prefix the genitive to the noun it is to be coupled with? When did this restriction come into use? It did not prevail in Anglosaxon: Cædmon has *heafod ealra gesceafta*, *head of all creatures*, *thurh gewæld Godes*, *through the wielding of God*. Who is the latest writer in whom one finds such a collocation of words? I have not noticed it in Chaucer or Maundevile, or in the little I have read of Gower and Robert of Gloucester: but unless one is expressly on the watch, even such an idiom as this might occur repeatedly, without making any durable impression on the memory. In German prose the usual order is for the genitive to follow: that is to say, in most of the cases in which we should place the genitive before the noun it depends on, the Germans would do the same: but in that far more numerous class of cases where we should have recourse to the preposition *of*, they subjoin the genitive. They, like us, would say *Goethes Faust*, and not, unless for the sake of some



particular emphasis, *der Faust Goethes*. But at the same time they would say *die Einwohner der Stadt, die Grösse des Hauses, die Furcht des Todes*: Werther begins his first letter with *was ist das Herz des Menschen*, and closes the second with *ich erliege unter der Gewalt der Herrlichkeit dieser Erscheinungen*. In phrases of this kind if the usual order is inverted, it gives the style an elevated cast: nor is such an inversion common except in poetry, where, as in English, it is very acceptable, because, as the genitive in some measure defines the word it is attacht to, it serves in lieu of the article. The general principle by which the order of the words in such cases is regulated, is the same in German and English: the less important leads the way, the more important, as in a procession, follows. Thus for example, if we take the opening of *Paradise Lost*—*Of man's first disobedience, and the fruit Of that forbidden tree*—it is evident that, had Milton written *Of the first disobedience of man, and that forbidden tree's fruit*, his meaning would have been different from what it is: he now calls on the Muse to sing of man's first act of disobedience, as distinguisht from all his other acts, and of the fruit of that forbidden tree, as distinguisht from that of all other trees: whereas the other arrangement of the words would have laid the stress on man as distinguisht from other beings, and on the fruit as distinguisht from the rest of the tree. Hence such expressions as *the Paradise lost of Milton, the Principia of Newton*, to which I objected in the last Number (p. 678) on the score of inelegance, are faulty also on another count: except where there is a special purpose to challenge attention for the author, rather than for the work. When the work is the main object, it ought to stand last. It is exceedingly thoughtless therefore to say, as most of our grammarians do, Mr Crombie for instance (p. 256), that “the genitive case is generally resolvable into the objective with the preposition *of*: as the *king's sceptre*, or *the sceptre of the king, his head*, or *the head of him* :” as if any creature that had a notion of speaking English could ever say, *the executioner cut off the head of him*. Indeed one might pronounce pretty confidently that no people under the sun was ever so devoid of all power of analysing its thoughts, as to go on for



century after century using two words or two phrases without drawing a distinction between them. Cobbett too says just the same thing as Mr Crombie, adding, that, “as to when one mode of expression is best, and when the other, it is a matter which must be left to taste:” so that he felt there was a difference between them, though he was unable to explain it, and therefore referred the question to taste, that last arbiter invoked by those who have nothing else to appeal to: as if taste were something totally arbitrary and unaccountable, and as if the very business of a grammarian were not to set forth the rules which taste lays down for the usage of speech, and to explain their motives and grounds. It may be not uninteresting to remark that the general principle of the ancient languages with regard to the order of words, so far as relates to the matter we are now discussing, was the reverse of ours, and that, both in Latin and Greek, genitives as well as adjectives, unless they were emphatic, stood in the rear, except under peculiar circumstances: and moreover that in compound words, our general practice being to throw back the accent as far as possible, the most important word usually comes first. Hence for instance *Tom the son of John* becomes *Tom Johnson*: but nobody would call him *Tom John’s son*. In Gaelic names on the contrary, whatever the reason may be, as in *Macdonald*, *Macleod*, *Macpherson*, the word expressing filiation is prefixt.

May not these remarks point our way to the reason which led us to retain the genitive for one, and yet only for one, particular construction? When the two languages out of which the modern English has grown up, began to coalesce, one of the results of their union, as was remarkt in the last Number (pp. 667-9), was a tendency to get rid of grammatical forms. For in the first place when foreign words are imported in any numbers, there is always a good deal of difficulty in transforming them into natives, as may be seen in the unenglish character of our scientific phraseology, in which we have not yet been able to give a national form even to the plurals of *genus* and *species*, and in which the words are often no less uncouth a medley than the objects they are meant to stand for. One might almost fancy that our men of science had lost their perception of what the



English language is: so much accustomed are they to Latin terminations, that they seem to forget the difference between those and our own. Now when a vast mass of foreign words is let all at once into a nation, a similar bluntness of perception ensues. They many of them refuse to conform to the analogies which have hitherto guided its speech: and thus the people has to deal with two distinct classes of words, which cannot be brought under the same laws. Meanwhile that instinct, which is ever at work in all languages, assimilating whatever is incorporated into them, and endeavouring to produce a uniform homogeneous whole, does not cease to act: it picks out those forms in the old language which are most easily fitted to the new; for instance the mode of formation by affixes, instead of that by modifying the radical part of the theme: but above all it has recourse to auxiliaries and prepositions, in lieu of organic flexions; for these may be applied to any word without the slightest alteration of its character. At the same time a kind of compromise takes place; and the homesprung words gradually throw aside more and more of those peculiarities which separate them from their new brethren, till at length the combination assumes something like a harmonious consistency. Thus at the marriage of the Anglosaxon with the Norman French, one of the natural conditions was that the former should give up its cases: and to this stipulation it agreed, provided that some substitute could be found for them, in order to express the same relations which till then had been expressed by their means. Now when the genitive followed the noun on which it depended, the substitute was easily procured: the preposition *of* fully answered the purpose, and, as it corresponded to the French *de*, served moreover to bring the two languages nearer to each other; *de* having in like manner taken the place of the Latin genitive in the Romanesque tongues. On the other hand when the genitive preceded its noun, there was no way of filling up its place. To have said *of heaven the ruler* instead of *heaven's ruler*, *of the sword with the edge* instead of *with the sword's edge*, would have been utterly repugnant to the genius of each of the two united languages. In the former case the Norman had shewn what was to be done; but it had nothing parallel to the



latter. Yet this construction, as appears from all the remains of Anglosaxon literature, was exceedingly prevalent, and indeed appears to have been the commoner of the two: and so, as languages are seldom willing to part with any right, unless they can get an equivalent, which at the moment they deem preferable, in its stead, this use of the genitive was not given up. All this, I grant, is merely conjectural; and to confirm it would require a diligent examination of the monuments of our language anterior to the age of Chaucer. Perhaps that examination might convince us that the peculiarity in question arose in a totally different way. Though the explanation I have been suggesting appears to me by no means improbable, I propose it with great diffidence: nor should I have brought it forward until I had gone through a good deal more of the requisite investigation, but that I have unintentionally been led by G. C. L.'s remarks to resume this subject prematurely.

The foregoing observations will help us to account for the anomalous idioms cited by G. C. L. As we only retained the genitive for one particular construction, and as the character of our language led us in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred to place it immediately before the noun it depended upon, or at least before an adjective connected with that noun, we lost the perception of its meaning in any other position, and fancied it was absolutely necessary for the final *s* to stand close to the second noun, even when we could not place it there except by tearing it away from the word to which of right it belonged. Hence Wallis, as appeared in the passage quoted in the last Number, was led to deny that our genitives were anything but possessive adjectives. Thus for example we cannot say, *the king's of England palace, Alexander's the Great victory*; but make the *s* shift its place, though in the first example it occasions an ambiguity, and in the second attaches itself to an adjective, which under all other circumstances is indeclinable. Thus again people more frequently say *nobody elses* than *nobody's else*. It is curious to observe the straits and awkwardnesses into which this peculiarity has led us. The Collect for the fourth Sunday after Trinity ends with *for Jesus Christ's sake, our Lord*; that for the twenty-fourth Sunday with *for Jesus*



*Christ's sake, our blessed Lord and Saviour.* At the time these words were so arranged, it can hardly have been thought allowable to transfer the termination from the main word to a subordinate one: else *sake* would have stood at the end of the sentence. In the *Morte d'Arthur*, III. 1, Arthur tells Merlin "*I love Gwenever the kynges doughter Lodegrean of the land of Camelerd,*" that is, *the daughter of Lodegrean king of the land of Camelerd.* Again, in III. 8, we find *My name is Gavayne, the kyng Lott of Orkeney sone;* and shortly after, *Sir Gavayne kyng Lots sone of Orkeney.* Again in IV. 7, *I am the lordes doughter of this castel.* In I. 2,—*kyng Uryens, that was Sir Ewains le blaunche maynys fader*—we meet with an adjective intervening between the genitive and its governing noun: such a collocation cannot be common, I should think, after the beginning of the sixteenth century, even if it be so before. In Arnold's chronicle (printed about the year 1502) we read (in p. xxxv of the reprint) *the Dukis of Yorke eldest sone toke upon hym the crowne.* But the practice at that time must have been very unsettled: for a few pages further on we find, *the kyng of Spayns doughter;* and soon after *the kyngys doughter of Spayne;* and again (p. XLIX) *the sister of the kyngys of England,* where we have a genitive with the preposition preceding it. The usual mode however seems to have been to insert the noun on which the genitive depends between it and its attributives, as in the instances quoted above from the collects, and three of those from the *Morte d'Arthur*. In the same way in our version of St Matthew we are told that Herod put John in prison, *for Herodias sake, his brother Philip's wife.* And we meet with the same construction in Chaucer's *Jack Upland*: "If Christe might and could and would have made a rule perfect without default, and did not, he was not *Gods sonne almighty,*" that is, *the son of God Almighty.* Again in his translation of Boethius (p. 398, ed. 1687), "*Agamemnon wan agen Heleine, that was Mene-laüs wife, his brother:*" and at the beginning of the *Troilus and Creseide*, "*The double sorow of Troilus to telle, That was the king Priamus sonne of Troy.*" It would require some research to make out when the modern usage became the current one. In the *Provoked Wife*, A. IV. Sc. 1, we



find *the doctor of the parish's gown*: in Swift (Vol. IV. p. 66. ed. 1824), "I doubt not but you are curious to know the secret of *Monsieur Prior, an English gentleman's late journey to Paris*;" (p. 353) "the first opportunity was that of *the Prince of Denmark's death*." But even in Queen Elizabeth's time such seems to have been, if not the only, at least the general practice. In the *Palace of Pleasure*, Vol. I. p. 146, we read of "a great lady, which was *one of the marshalles of Englandes wives*," that is, *one of the wives of the marshals of England*; and soon after of "*one other of the kyng of Englandes marshalles*." It is remarkable that, as we learn from Grimm (V. II. p. 960), the same anomaly is common among the lower orders in Germany, who say *des Kaiser von Oestreich's Armee*, instead of the legitimate expression, *des Kaisers von Oestreich*. In explaining this way of speaking, Grimm remarks that we regard *king-of-England* as one word, from which we form a genitive: and no doubt, if we are to give a grammatical account of it, this is what we must say; though at the same time, but for the indistinctness of our perceptions with regard to the proper nature of inflexions, we could hardly have so misapplied them. In the same manner we sometimes attach the plural *s* to a phrase. In the *Witch of Edmonton*, Act II, Cuddy applies to mother Sawyer to send him one of her *what-d'ye-call-'ems*. Swift in his *Journal* is fond of the expression, "one of these *oddcome-shortlies*:" which as well as the former has gained a kind of conversational currency. With regard to names our usage is still unsettled: some persons would say *the Miss Thompsons*, others *the Misses Thompson*: the former mode is clearly more in keeping with the general practice of the language, and ones leaning at first would be toward it: but those who plume themselves on their accuracy adopt the latter; and at all events they can alledge the authority of Swift, who writes (Vol. I. p. 64) "I went to *the ladies Butler*." At times too we allow ourselves to play the same tricks with other formative terminations. In *Wycherly's Country Wife*, Act II, Horner says, "Every raw, peevish, *out-of-humour'd*, tea-drinking, arithmetic fop sets up for a wit." In his *Gentleman Dancing-Master*, Act II, bashfulness is said to be "the only *out-of-fashion'd* thing that is agreeable." In the *Double*



Dealer, Act II. Sc. 1, Lady Froth complains that Mellefont wants “something of his own that should look a little *je-ne-say-quoyish*.” *Church of England* too having been often used as an epithet—South for instance talks of the *Church-of-England royalists* (I. p. 276), the *Church-of-England clergy* (I. 347),—Mr Bentham—for even he could not devise words which were utterly repugnant to all analogy—publisht a volume on what he called *Church-of-Englandism*.

The very same blindness to the meaning of a flexional termination, and the same notion that the *s* of the genitive ought to stand immediately before the noun by which it is governed, led us further, when two distinct nouns connected by a conjunction depend upon the same noun, to affix it only to the latter. The earliest instance I have remarkt of this usage is in the *Morte d'Arthur*, B. I. ch. 13: “*by kyng Ban and Bors counceill they let brenne and destroye all the contrey afore them:*” but to be sure these two kings are mostly spoken of as if they had but one soul, and hardly more than one tongue, between them. Chaucer indeed in his *Jack Upland* says, “And why clepest thou the rather of *S. Francis* or *S. Dominiks rule* or religion or order, than of Christes rule or order?” This passage however settles nothing: for with Chaucer the genitive of nouns in *s* does not change; and a little before we find *S. Francis rule*. A translation of *Dares and Dictys's Trojan war* in verse was publisht in 1555. In the old ballad of the Taming of the Shrew (publisht in Utterson's *Early Popular Poetry*, p. 185), we read “How the bryde was maryed *with her father and mothers good will*.” To refer to the instances cited by G. C. L., nobody would say he had been at *Rundell's and Bridge's*; nobody would talk about *Beaumont's and Fletcher's plays*. The same idiom may perhaps be found in Germany. The example quoted by G. C. L. however does not altogether prove that it is: for *Ersch* is a name which the Germans never decline when they can help it: just as when they quote any work by *Thiersch*, his name is usually left standing without any modification. The ordinary practice, at least in books, when two names are coupled in this way, is to put them both in the genitive. W. Schlegel in his *Dramatic Lectures* speaks of *Beaumonts und Fletchers Werke*. Ritter



in his History of Philosophy refers to Schleiermacher's essay on Heraclitus in *Wolf's und Buttmann's Museum*. So does Krug, and also to Bœckh's on the Platonic soul of the world in *Daub's und Creuzer's Studien*. Müller (Archæol. p. 21) quotes *Stuart's und Revett's Antiquities of Athens*. And a writer in the Vienna Review (III. 3) speaks of *Galls und Spurzheims Methode*. It would be easy to multiply instances: these however are sufficient to shew that the German received idiom on this point is the reverse of ours: and that it should be so is easily to be accounted for, from their being much more familiar with the meaning of cases than we are. To explain our practice grammatically we must suppose that the two names are as it were under a bracket, and that the final *s* belongs to them both: pretty much as when two compound words, the latter half of which is the same, are coupled together, we go to work on an economical plan, and allow only one tail to two heads. This is very common in German, which might perhaps convince us that an economy of words is not the real object aimed at: but in English also we should talk of a *wine and spirit-merchant*, a *bread and biscuit-baker*, a *tea and coffee-dealer*. Swift (Vol. II. p. 186) speaks of *eel and trout-fishing*. Milton (I. p. 169) exclaims against the dieting the ignorance of the clergy "with the limited draught of a *matin and evensong drench*." And South in one of his bursts of plainspoken force (I. p. 132) says that the consciences of most men "nowadays are *hell and damnation-proof*."

The preceding remarks at all events shew how well disposed we are to assume that the final *s* of the genitive is not an essential part of the noun, but a kind of affix which may be removed from it, and attacht to some other word connected with it: and such being the case, we need not be surprised that the erroneous notion of its standing in the room of *his* should have met with such ready acceptance. That notion I called "a gross blunder" in the last Number: and that it is so G. C. L. agrees with me: indeed nobody at this day who knows anything about the matter could be of a different opinion. He reminds me however very justly that "the connexion between two things may be a fiction, and yet that both may have a real existence."



Thus, to refer to the most celebrated instance of such a fictitious connexion, it may be very true that Troy was destroyed, and that a portion of its inhabitants survived its fall; and it is certain that Rome must have had an origin at one time or other: the fiction in which the legend indulges, is, that these two events were connected together. As the origin of the use of *his* in the place of the genitive was not the question immediately before me, I assumed rather too hastily that it was a mere blunder, without looking round to ascertain, as one always ought to do, whether there was no other way of accounting for it: for such a charge ought not to be brought forward except as a kind of last resource. G. C. L. is inclined to question whether “such an expression as *the king his house* is not perfectly correct and in accordance with the spirit of the language.” Now in this, as in so many other discussions, it is next to impossible to prove a negative. Above all in language, which is subject to the perpetual operation of such manifold, unaccountable, and incalculable influences, is one bound to abstain from laying down what anything must or cannot be, and to content oneself with determining and explaining what it is. The utmost that can be done is to shew that there is no sufficient evidence in favour of the construction in question as a legitimate part of the language, that it is at variance with its prevalent analogies, and then to point out the way in which the mistake, supposing it to be one, may have first gained a footing. Now in the first place I do not believe that the use of *his* instead of the genitive termination prevails in any of our provincial dialects: I find no mention of it in such glossaries as have fallen in my way; and the general tendency of the speech of our lower orders, in consequence of their retaining the Saxon English with much less admixture, and thus having a more vivid feeling of its analogies, is rather to preserve its old grammatical forms to a greater extent than they are preserved in the speech of cultivated society. Nor do the idioms referred to by G. C. L. appear to me to establish his position. At all events the use of the personal pronoun after a proper name, which is found so perpetually in our old ballads, and in the old German poems,



for instance in the Lay of the Nibelungen, is no way at variance with those rules which G. C. L. terms empirical, that is to say, which have been drawn from the general practice of languages. On the contrary it is grammatically defensible, as merely an instance of apposition: and it corresponds very nearly to the Homeric use of the demonstrative pronoun along with proper names. Wallis in his Grammar, ch. 4, speaks of it as a construction which occurs seldom in Latin, more frequently in Hellenistic Greek, but is very common in Hebrew and in English. As a proof that its purpose is mostly to give emphasis, I may observe that this use of the pronoun after a name is, I believe, pretty nearly confined to the nominative case. *The Eldridge knighte, he pricked his steed;—That knighte, he is a foul paynim;—Sir Cauline, he slewe the Eldridge knighte:* these expressions are perfectly agreeable to grammatical idiom, and in all of them the pronoun adds to the force of the passage. If we often hear this pleonasm used by the lower orders with regard to matters which to us do not appear to be of the slightest importance, it may perhaps arise from our having a different scale to judge of importance from theirs, and from our not considering how entirely the uneducated are taken up by whatever happens to be immediately before them, whether before their senses or their thoughts, if indeed in their case such a distinction is applicable. Nobody however would say *Sir Cauline slewe the Eldridge knight him:* and yet this expression comes much nearer to the one we are considering, only that the latter is ungrammatical into the bargain, or, if that expression be not allowable, is inconsistent with the rules followed in the combination of words both in our own language and the cognate ones. I grant that, if the Germans do indeed use such an expression as *der König sein Haus* in familiar conversation, this analogy would be a strong argument in favour of the corruption I am impugning. But I am disposed to doubt the genuineness of that phrase, more especially as it is not mentioned by Becker in his Grammar (Vol. I. p. 172), where he is speaking of the pleonastic use of the pronoun, and instances the redundancies *des Vaters sein Hut, der Mutter ihr Kleid*, as habitual among the lower orders. This cumulative



use of the possessive may be compared to that of the negative, so common in vulgar speech; and both arise from that tendency to put forth more force than is necessary, which is always found among the inexpert, in words as well as in deeds. Such expressions indeed as *der König sein*, *der Vater mein*, are common in the popular language, and occur perpetually in old poetry: but here *mein* and *sein* are used in their original manner, as genitives. This is a point however on which I cannot venture to speak with the slightest confidence. With regard to our own phrase the best way to establish its legitimacy would be to bring forward passages, if such are to be found, in which *her* or *their* is used in the same manner: for such a use could not be resolved into a corruption. If such passages are not to be found, this will be a strong negative argument the other way. The one from Swift, which is the only one I ever remember to have seen, is curious as shewing what his notions about our old language were, but of course is of no weight as a proof that such a mode of speaking did ever actually prevail: he merely inferred, from having often met with *his* in old English, that *her* must also have been used in the same manner. As it is, I cannot help still thinking that what led so many of our old writers to use *his* instead of the genitive termination, was the notion that that termination had originated out of it. That such a persuasion did actually exist was shewn in my former remarks on this subject; and it is confirmed by the fact that in our version of the Bible *Asa his* and *Mordecai his* were introduced, as if they were corrections, instead of the older readings *Asas* and *Mordecais*, as well as by the substitution of *Christ his sake* in the new prayers for *Christs sake*, the close of the old ones. At what period the error, if it be one, first gained ground, still remains to be made out: it would seem to have been very prevalent in the middle of the sixteenth century: for two translations from Horace were publisht in 1566 and 1567, one of them entitled *Two Bookes of Horace his Satyres Englyshed, accordyng to the prescription of Saint Hierome*, the other *Horace his Arte of Poetrie, Pistles, and Satirs Englyshed by Tho. Drant*: and a translation of *Ovid his Invective against Ibis* came out in 1569. May not the



source of the corruption be found in the practice, which is not uncommon, when a person cannot write himself, to put *John Tomkins, his mark*, over against his signature? and in the analogous one of those who, not content with writing their names in their books, in the pride of property add *his* or *her book*? If the first appearance of the phrase was on titlepages, we should have less difficulty in accounting for it.

There is still another idiom mentioned by G. C. L., that in which we subjoin the genitive to the preposition *of*. This he explains in the usual way, namely that a picture of *the king's* stands for *a picture of the king's pictures*. I confess however that I feel some doubt whether this phrase is indeed to be regarded as elliptical, that is, whether the phrase in room of which it is said to stand, was ever actually in use. It has sometimes struck me that this may be a relic of the old practice of using the genitive after nouns as well as before them, only with the insertion of the preposition *of*. One of the passages quoted above from Arnold's chronicle supplies an instance of a genitive so situated: and one cannot help thinking that it was the notion that *of* governed the genitive, that led the old translators of Virgil to call his poem *the booke of Eneidos*, as it is termed by Phaer, and Gawin Douglas, and in the translation printed by Caxton. Else it may be that we put the genitive after the noun in such cases, in order to express those relations which are most appropriately expressed by the genitive preceding it. *A picture of the king* is something very different from *the king's picture*: and so many other relations are designated by *of* with the objective noun, that, if we wish to denote possession thereby, it leaves an ambiguity: so for this purpose, when we want to subjoin the name of the possessor to the thing possessed, we have recourse to the genitive, by prefixing which we are wont to express the same idea. At all events as, if we were asked whose castle Alnwick is, we should answer, *the Duke of Northumberland's*, so we should also say *what a grand castle that is of the Duke of Northumberland's!* without at all taking into account whether he had other castles besides: and our expression would be equally appropriate whether he had or not.



Before I close these remarks I must repeat that I am but too well aware how very imperfect they are, and that these questions require much more thought and much more research to be answered in a satisfactory manner: but these unfortunately it is not at present in my power to give to them; nor should I have toucht on them till I had tried to fit myself for the task by the necessary investigations, but that I thought myself in a manner bound to take some notice of G. C. L.'s suggestions. If the reader will not accept this apology, let him shame me by treating the subject as it ought to be treated, so that in the midst of my shame I may at least have the pleasure of being set right and of acknowledging my obligations to him for clearing up a question which I may be thought to have left more perplext than I found it.

J. C. H.

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## ON THE USE OF DEFINITIONS.

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THERE appears to be a persuasion pretty widely prevalent, that definitions of terms may be of great use in getting at truth, even in cases of seeming doubt and difficulty. When two eager disputants begin to argue systematically, the attempt generally leads very soon to a demand for a definition on one side or the other; a demand, however, which does not in most cases materially shorten or elucidate the debate. And it has been much the habit for systematical writers on the conduct of the understanding to assure us that a large proportion of the disputes which are carried on among men, are merely quarrels about words, which would vanish if men would only define the terms they use. Some of these writers indeed have complained of the ingratitude with which controversialists usually receive the proposal to terminate their contest by proving that it turns on the ambiguity of words; and they inform us that the persons concerned often take such a suggestion as an affront, and forthwith bestow upon the mediator even more ill-will than they feel towards their opponents<sup>1</sup>.

If both litigants conceive that the judge who thus volunteers his services, proves, by his summing up, that he has taken a very incomplete view of the matter in dispute, and feel that they are contending to establish views and systems substantially different in their consequences and effects, even though they may not have shewn the most exact knowledge of forms in the selection of the issue on which they have put the question, it is perhaps very natural that they should still listen with some impatience and peevishness to a person who assures them they are fighting about nothing.

Whether in such cases, the promulgation, by any benevolent philosopher, of definitions of the terms mainly employed in the discussion, tends much to bring the parties, or even the majority of impartial and intelligent bystanders, to

<sup>1</sup> Whately's Bampton Lectures, p. 196.



an agreement upon the subject discussed, seems, so far as experience shews, to be far from certain. It is however a question much too wide for these pages. But it may not be unsuitable to this place to treat the matter in a more philological manner, and to shew by some instances how the adoption of exact definitions, and the consequent introduction of fixed technical terms, appears to have been connected with the progress of real and certain knowledge in those branches of human speculation which are now considered to be past all danger from controversy.

It will be found, it is conceived, that in these cases exact definitions have been, not the causes, but the consequences of an advance in our knowledge: that terms have been vague and ambiguous and ill-defined, so long as men's perception of the laws of facts was obscure and incomplete: that new discoveries, even while imperfect and confused, introduced new terms, not admitting probably of strict definition, but yet not without their use: that when the laws so discovered became clear and entire, the requisite terms were easily and immediately provided with a greater exactness of meaning. In these, the progressive sciences, the case has been that the real logomachies have taken place among those who attached much importance to definitions; who, having nothing to add to human knowledge, wished to alter the mode of presenting that which was already known. Persons thus ready to wrangle about the meaning of words have been found at every stage of the progress of truth; but truth has generally passed rapidly forwards, and left them behind to enjoy their favourite amusement.

We shall take a few instances of scientific terms and their definitions, beginning with the most exact and complete sciences.

Pure mathematics (Geometry and Analysis) can hardly supply us with a case in point; for in such speculations there can be, properly speaking, no *new* truth; none, that is, which was not necessarily involved in what we knew before. In the provinces of physical philosophy, definitions are needed to *express* the principles from which our reasonings must proceed; but in pure mathematics the definitions *are* themselves the first principles of our reasonings; and if these



be complete we need no other materials of knowledge. The example of geometry, therefore, gives us no encouragement to endeavour to make other sciences equally complete and logical, by selecting such definitions as will but lend themselves to our syllogistic process; except we can find other sciences which, like geometry, are independent of the external world, and require no verification of their principles by experience.

Mechanics is the most perfect of the branches of mixed mathematics. It has also been the most happy in its definitions. But its happiness consisted in this; that mechanical philosophers resolved beforehand to employ words in such a manner, that those laws of nature which experience proved to be *true*, should be expressed in the *simplest* terms. Galileo and his opponents agreed in asserting that bodies, falling by the action of gravity, were *uniformly* accelerated: but there was a real question between them, whether the velocity increased proportionally to the space, or to the time. When the latter appeared to be the fact, it was no longer contested that the expression should be appropriated to this law, and disjoined from the other. The definition *followed* the settlement of the dispute.

In Optics such terms as ‘the angle of incidence’ ‘of refraction,’ &c. were introduced *after* it had been found that the appearances of objects were governed by the course of the rays of light passing from them to the eye, and that the course of these rays, when they fell on transparent bodies, was regulated by the angle they made with the surface. A lady who was describing an optical experiment which had been shewn her by a great philosopher, said, “He talked about increasing and diminishing the angle of incidence; and at last I found he only meant moving my head up and down.” The philosopher’s phraseology would have been far less commendable than the lady’s, if he had not known that his terms referred to an essential, and her’s to an accidental, condition of the experiment. If he had defined the angle of incidence to be that which is increased by moving the head up and diminished by moving it down, he might have deduced geometrical inferences from his definition, but he would not have been able to see the image by the help of them.



A most curious assemblage of optical phenomena have attracted attention of late years, which have been grouped under the term "polarisation." The phenomena are somewhat complex, and the theory of them was, at least till lately, unexplained; so that no very rapid or popular exposition of them was possible. In consequence of this it happened, that when a person to whom the word polarisation was new, enquired the meaning of it, there was generally found some one, who, too well informed to suspect a latent meaning, would answer "It is something of which the philosophers themselves know nothing; they call it polarisation; they might as well call it  $x$ , an unknown quantity." Yet those who had attended to the subject a little more patiently, knew that this word, though with something of vagueness, indicated very significantly both the general character of the facts, and the history of the attempts made to explain them. It might be difficult to give a definition of the term; but it implied a general circumstance belonging to all the experiments; namely "an opposition of properties, associated with an opposition of positions;" a circumstance common to these facts, and to those of magnetic polarity. Now that the undulatory theory of light is conceived to be satisfactorily established, we may, if we please, say that "a ray is polarised in a certain plane, when it consists of vibrations perpendicular to that plane;" but we may presume that no one will assert, that the indistinctness of ideas which formerly prevailed upon this subject, existed because it did not occur to any one to propound this definition. The definition is a result of the establishment of the theory.

As we advance to sciences which are as yet in a more incomplete state, it becomes more and more evident how impossible it is for us to possess exact definitions, except in proportion as our knowledge becomes general and systematic. When did Chemistry acquire that symmetrical nomenclature which has been so much admired? The moment that Lavoisier had established the true theory of the combinations of elements with the acidifying principle. His account of the composition of his treatise is remarkable. "While I thought myself employed," he says, "only in forming a nomenclature, and while I purposed to myself nothing



more than to improve the chemical language, my work transformed itself, by degrees, and without my being able to prevent it, into a treatise upon the elements of chemistry." And if any one would undertake to make definitions without a knowledge of facts, and the laws of facts, let him try his skill upon the words, *acid* and *alkali*; words recognised as of great importance ever since chemistry was written upon; but to this day afflicting to learners, from the want of a classical definition of each, and from the debates prevalent among the highest authorities concerning their boundary lines.

Within this few years, names, accompanied by definitions, have been proposed for different kinds of *clouds*, by Mr Howard. If the manufacture of definitions were an arbitrary process, which might be executed at one period of a science as well as at another, we might have expected that these objects, so universally talked of and speculated upon, would have long ago been classified and named. No one however as yet, had thought of defining a "mare's tail" or a "mackarel sky." But Mr Howard had studied the laws of the formation of clouds, and the sequence of atmospheric phenomena connected with them: and hence his terms, so constructed as to be subservient to the description of such connexions, have already obtained a very general currency. His names are borrowed from the Latin: one of his followers has endeavoured to give us equivalents for them of an English, or at least, Teutonic form: but to these proffered translations Mr Howard objects. We will give both sets of terms.

1 Cirrus	2 Cirrocumulus	3 Cirrostratus
<i>Curl cloud.</i>	<i>Sonder cloud.</i>	<i>Wane cloud.</i>
4 Cumulostratus	5 Cumulus	6 Nimbus
<i>Twain cloud.</i>	<i>Stacken cloud.</i>	<i>Rain cloud.</i>
7 Stratus		
<i>Fall cloud.</i>		

"The names" Mr Howard says, "which I deduced from the Latin, were intended to describe the *structure* of the clouds, and the meaning of each was carefully fixed by a definition. The observer having once made himself master



of this, was able to apply the term with correctness, after a little experience, to the subject under all its varieties of colour, form, or position."

By the adoption of such names and definitions it becomes possible to make general assertions concerning the effects of clouds. The possibility of doing this is the condition and the proof of the scientific propriety and value of the nomenclature just noticed, and of any other.

Cuvier, with great philosophical justice, applies this test to shew the absurdity of a classification, and consequently of a nomenclature, which had been adopted in another branch of science, Zoology. "Gmelin" he says, "by putting the *lamantin* in the genus of *morses*, and the *sirene* in that of *anguilles*, had rendered any general proposition with regard to their organisation impossible." To define a lamantin to be or not to be a morse, does not merely make one proposition true instead of another, but decides whether there shall be any true proposition at all: and to know whether it is to be so defined, we must first know the analogies of organisation which it is the business of scientific language to express.

In another branch of natural history, the inconvenience which arises from the assumption that any one may construct or appropriate names, without regulating himself by any general views, has been most oppressively felt. We speak of Mineralogy. Here the general principles of classification being still in utter obscurity and confusion, there has been nothing to prevent any one from giving new names to new specimens, without ascertaining whether they were related to minerals already named, as another genus, another species, another variety, or, it may be, another fragment of the same mass. It may easily be supposed that this unrestrained licence has filled our mineralogical books with a mob of names, destitute of arrangement and subordination, and consequently of use. Even eminent philosophers have not abstained from adding to the croud. Sir J. Herschel has called one substance *Leucocyclite*, because with polarised light it gives black and white rings: Sir David Brewster has named another mineral *Tesselite*, because examined in the same way it appears to be constructed of several pieces of different properties joined



together. But in the meantime we are still ignorant in what measure the optical properties of minerals depend either on their physical or their chemical nature: so that we may have substances, not externally distinguishable from Herschel's Leucocyclite or Brewster's Tesselite, and yet, we shall not be able to tell whether we are to call them by such names, till we have subjected them to the very optical experiments by which the phenomena are elicited. And if we find that they are thus, by definition, Leucocyclite and Tesselite, we shall still be ignorant whether our specimens agree in chemical composition with those which suggested the names to Herschel and to Brewster. Such are the inevitable embarrassments which arise from defining without possessing a system; from naming objects without knowing their relation to other objects.

If we want decisive evidence of the way in which the possibility of good names necessarily implies much previous knowledge, we may find such evidence in the progress of Geology. The terms now used in that science, to designate the various strata, albeit harsh and rugged in many instances, are of signal use and value, because they express the result of a laborious examination and classification of the real materials of the earth. *Gneiss* and *killas*, *coral rag* and *corn-brash*, are of service in enunciating intelligible general propositions with regard to the structure of this and other countries; and therefore sound harmonious to a philosophical ear. And their music is but little impaired by the consideration that they are not susceptible of exact definition; or that the literal meaning of the terms used does not suggest the most characteristic attributes of the thing signified. At one of the meetings of the Geological Society of London, a memoir was read on "*The Green Sand*" by an eminent member of the Society. At these meetings, the readings are followed by oral discussions, usually conducted with a rare mixture of acuteness and good breeding. On the occasion just mentioned, a distinguished geologist, well known both for the extent of his knowledge and the fastidiousness of his taste, stated that he had three objections to the *Title* of the paper:—First, to the article *The*, since there are several green sands: second to the adjective *Green*, since the stratum spoken of is more commonly red: third to the substantive



*Sand*, because in many places it is more calcareous than siliceous. The subtlety of this criticism was applauded: but the name still keeps its ground, and is to this day a good and serviceable name, inasmuch as it is universally understood to designate certain members in a known and widely extended series of strata. If the writer of the memoir had been compelled to arrest his researches till he had secured himself against such attacks, or if he should suspend the publication of them, till he can begin his work with a definition of *The Green Sand*, unimpeachable by logical or philosophical rules, those who desire the increase of geological knowledge will have little reason to think definitions promote *their* interests.

The reader who has followed this train of examples so far, will have little difficulty in perceiving that the same reflexions might be made with respect to any other assemblage of facts which can become the subject of classification. If, for instance, we consider the languages of the earth, what a long and comprehensive labour of comparison was gone through before philologists had a clear view of the classes of languages which are now termed the Indo-European and the Semitic! And how little would it have contributed to the progress of philological knowledge, if, before this labour had been gone through, men had used the word Semitic, and defined it to mean “the languages spoken by the descendants of Shem,” without knowing whether these languages resembled each other more than Arabic and Latin!

And what is true of the languages of nations is surely no less true of any other circumstances in which they may resemble or differ: of their modes of life, their social structure, the amount and distribution of their means of subsistence, of luxury, of greatness. In contemplating all such subjects on the whole surface of the earth, we may, and, if our facts are laboriously collected and well compared, in the end we shall, arrive at general classifications; perhaps at general laws of connexion and causation. Voyages and travels, history and legislation, politics and statistics, will all be needed as materials for such a survey, and such a result. And when we have reached this point, *then*, indeed, terms to designate our classes, definitions to enable us to express our laws, will



be wanted: and there can be little doubt that then we shall have no great difficulty in laying our hands on such terms. But if at first and at once, before our classification is begun, we define terms, we deduce laws, we assert these to be universally true, we cast about in each case for modes of evading the discrepancy between the rules which we promulgate and those which the course of human affairs follows, what are we to expect? From what has preceded, the answer is clear. We are not to expect to attain any knowledge which will be applicable to facts, except the progress of *this* science should follow rules and conditions altogether different from those which any other progressive science has ever yet followed.

What is this science? the science which thus attempts to trace the laws which determine the polity, the economical structure, the *wealth of nations*? Is it Political Economy? Probably not: for the most celebrated teachers of that science speak with scorn of the prospect of collecting *their* principles by this slow and laborious process of observation and comparison. Their truths are to flow from the inexhaustible fountain of *definition without previous knowledge and classification of facts*. So that Political Economy must be a branch of metaphysics, in the same sense in which Bacon truly asserts that Geometry is so.

But the science which treats of the wealth of nations, that is of the wealth which they actually have, and not of that which, according to certain suppositions, they would have, is still a province of human knowledge worthy some of our notice. And in this, a science of observation, we must expect to find the same rules regulating our progress which, as we have seen, have hitherto governed the progress of other sciences of observation. We must expect that we shall be able to obtain definitions worth putting into words, only so far as we succeed in classifying facts, and discovering some traces of law. For instance, if we compare the payments made by the occupiers of the soil to the owners of it, in different countries, we may call them all by the common term *rent*, because such an application of the word appears to be consistent with common usage. But if we are rash enough to give a *definition* of the amount of rent, depending upon some conjectural hypothesis or special accident, as for instance, on the possibility of



removing farming capital to trade, if farming profits be below trading profits; our chance of any further success in our enquiry is gone:

Ibi omnis

Effusus labor.

There is an end at once of all hope of our carrying with us into the light of day the fair form of Truth which we trusted was accompanying our steps.

While we are endeavouring to discern the classes and laws of facts, it may happen, that we are upbraided for delighting in darkness, because we find that it requires time and effort to make our way to the light; the thief, it may be said, after Homer, delights in the mist<sup>1</sup>. It may be supposed that they who say this, find that the mist in their neighbourhood is dispersed or converted into a luminous halo by the mere brightness of *their* honesty; we can only say, that we discern no heads encircled by such a glory. It may be said that the pick-pocket loves to put out the lamps<sup>2</sup>. It might be supposed that this dignified rebuke can proceed from none but some member of the venerable corporation of The Lamplighters: but it touches not us; for we complain that these, our worshipful masters, do indeed set up an abundant supply of lamps of all sorts of sizes and shapes; and ever and anon, when men complain of darkness, construct and put forth another and another; but that all this avails us not, so long as there is in these lamps no drop of oil, no provision of enlightening matter. The way is just as dark as ever, and the only consequence is that, in addition to other lumber, we stumble over the lamps themselves.

W.

<sup>1</sup> Whately's Lecture on Political Economy. 1832.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.



## ON THE ATTIC DIONYSIA.

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THE Attic festivals which were signalized by dramatic exhibitions have naturally been objects of peculiar interest to the learned, nor ought it to be believed that the attention bestowed on them has been misplaced. Not only would our knowledge of antiquity be imperfect without a clear and correct notion of the outward conditions and occasions that determined the production of those masterpieces of dramatic art which are among the most precious treasures bequeathed to us by the genius of Greece, but the study of these great works themselves would often by the same defect be deprived of important aids, in its endeavours to apprehend their peculiar character and relations. It is not however on this ground alone that any one who duly prizes the value of ancient literature ought to rest the utility of such researches. It is not a prudent, but a feeble and timid spirit that dissuades us from indulging our curiosity in literary or scientific inquiries, before we have accurately calculated the importance of the result we expect to obtain from them. However diminutive may be the object that attracts us in any new direction across the boundless field of antiquity, we may safely abandon ourselves to the impulse which urges us to investigate it. Even if we should not find any use to which it is immediately applicable, we shall assuredly be rewarded for our labour, not merely by the invigorating effect of the exercise, but by the air we shall breathe, the new views that will open on us, and the flowers that we shall gather in our way.

This remark has been beautifully illustrated by Professor Boeckh in an essay on the Attic Dionysia, published in 1819 among the Transactions of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, to which it was read in the year 1817. In this paper the author has taken an entirely new view of a question which had been long agitated by philologists, and which appeared to have been at length completely decided, as to the



identity of the *Lenæa* with one or other of the Dionysian festivals which are known to us under different names. The opinion maintained after Selden and Corsini by Ruhnken<sup>1</sup>, that the *Lenæa* coincided with the *Anthesteria*, had been received by the learned with general acquiescence, and had been adopted by Boeckh himself in his work *De tragædiæ Græcæ principibus*, with some modifications suggested by Spalding, who has discussed the subject in his preface to his edition of the Oration against Meidias, and in a Latin essay *De Dionysiis Atheniensium festo*, published in the Berlin Transactions of 1804–1811. But in the year 1817 the author of a thick volume on the ancient comic theatre of Athens<sup>2</sup> took up the question, and among a number of paradoxical opinions peculiar to himself, asserted one which had already been sanctioned by many great names, that of the identity between the *Lenæa* and the Rural Dionysia. Hermann shortly after gave new importance to this opinion by a review of the work, in which, after an elaborate discussion of the arguments advanced by the contending parties, he declared himself on the side of Ruhnken's opponents. It was apparently this revival of the controversy that induced Boeckh to investigate it afresh. The result of his researches seems to be almost entirely unknown to the English public: at least no notice has been taken of it, so far as the writer knows, in any of the works since published in England relating to this branch of ancient literature, and in Mr Clinton's *Fasti* Ruhnken's doctrine is assumed as finally established, with the remark that he "had poured upon the *Anthesteria* so clear a light, that the subject is placed beyond the reach of doubt or controversy." (I. p. 332). We shall at all events not rate Boeckh's labours too highly, if we venture to say, that this is no longer the state of the question, at least in the same sense: and his name is sufficient with all lovers of learning to ensure a patient and respectful attention for his views and arguments. It is not therefore for laying

<sup>1</sup> Auct. Emend. ad Hesych. p. 991. He has committed a singular mistake in claiming Scaliger, Casaubon, and Petavius, as advocates of his own opinion. The two former (*De Em. Temp.* p. 29. *De Sat. Poes.* I. v. p. 123 Ramb. ad Theophrast. p. 131) distinctly assert the identity of the *Lenæa* and the rural Dionysia. (See also Casaubon ad Athen. An. v. c. 18.) Petavius ad Them. p. 647 F. tacitly admits it.

<sup>2</sup> Kanngiesser. *Die alte komische Buehne in Athen.* 1817.



them before the philological public that any apology can be required. But it is necessary to explain and justify to the reader the mode in which this has been done in the following pages. He will find here not a translation, nor a detailed analysis of the original essay, but a free description of it, intended to comprize what is most important and interesting in its contents. The motive for using this freedom was, that the length of the original, near eighty quarto pages, very far exceeded the space which could have been allowed for it in our Journal, while it seemed possible to curtail many parts without impairing the force of the argument, or doing wrong to the opposite side. The reader indeed will perhaps not be able from this summary fully to appreciate the value of Hermann's reasoning: but he will regret this the less, because it was not directed against the opinion proposed by Boeckh, but applied only to the two between which the choice of the learned had till then been divided.

The order pursued in the following abridgement corresponds to that of the original. We shall consider the subject under seven heads:

I. Evidence as to the time of the year when the Lenæan festival was originally celebrated:

II. Express testimonies of the ancients to the coincidence of the Lenæan festival with either of those with which it has been supposed to be identical, or to the contrary effect:

III. Arguments drawn from the locality of the festival:

IV. Arguments drawn from allusions to the subject in Aristophanes:

V. Arguments drawn from the mode in which the festival was celebrated:

VI. Arguments drawn from its occasion and nature:

VII. Traditions of the ancients as to the introduction of the worship of Bacchus into Attica:

I. The first object of our inquiry is the month in which the Lenæa were celebrated. That the rural Dionysia were celebrated in Poseideon, and the Anthesteria in Anthesterion, is admitted on all hands. The name Lenæa clearly points to that of the month Lenæon, which was unquestionably derived from it. The earliest mention of Lenæon occurs in Hesiod, who fixes it in the depth of winter:



Μῆνα δὲ Ληναίων, κάκ' ἤματα, βούδορα πάντα,  
 Τοῦτον ἀλεύασθαι, καὶ πηγάδας, αἶτ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν  
 Πνεύσαντος Βορέας δυσηλεγέες τελέθουσιν.

a description which might suit the Attic Poseideon, but could never have applied to Anthesterion, the month of flowers<sup>3</sup>. Lenæon however, as we learn from the Greek Scholia on Hesiod (E. κ. H. 502) was not a Bœotian, but an Ionian month: and the question is, to which month of the Attic year it corresponds. Its place in the calendars of the Ionian cities, among which it was generally, if not universally received, is determined by unquestionable authority. In an inscription containing the names of magistrates of Cyzicus, two consecutive lists are headed as follows<sup>4</sup>:

[Ε] ΠΡΥΤΑΝΕΥΣΑΝ ΜΗΝΑ ΠΟΣΕΙΔΕΩΝΑ Κ [ΕΚΑ]  
 [ΛΛΙ] ΑΣΑΝ ΜΗΝΑ ΛΗΝΑΙΩΝΑ  
 ΕΠΡΥΤΑΝΕΥΣΑΝ ΜΗΝΑ ΛΗΝΑΙΩΝΑ Κ ΕΚΑΛΛΙ  
 [ΑΣΑΝ]  
 ΜΗΝΑ ΑΝΘΕΣΤΗΡΙΩΝΑ.

The same inference may be drawn from a passage of Aristides<sup>5</sup>. Hence it appears that the Ionian Lenæon corresponded to the Attic month Gamelion: which by its position in the Attic calendar suits Hesiod's description still better than Poseideon. Now the Ionian festivals and the order of their celebration, were undoubtedly derived from the mother city, as we know in the case of the Anthesteria from Thucydides, who informs us (II. 15) that this, the more ancient festival of Bacchus, was celebrated by the Athenians on the very same day of the month named after it, as among the Ionians in his own time. In the period therefore of the Ionian migration

<sup>3</sup> Harpocrat. Ἀνθεστηριών. ὄγδοος μὴν οὗτος παρ' Ἀθηναίοις, ἱερὸς Διονύσου. Ἰστρος δὲ ἐν τοῖς τῆς συναγωγῆς κεκλησθαι φησιν αὐτὸν διὰ τὸ πλεῖστα τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀνθεῖν τότε.

Anacreon ap. Eustath. p. 1012, l. 1. Μῆς μὲν δὲ Ποσειδηίων ἔστηκε, νεφέλαι δ' ὕδατι βαρύνονται, ἄγριοι δὲ χειμῶνες παταγοῦσι. Twisten, *Commentatio Critica de Hesiodi Carmine quæ inscribitur Opera et Dies*. p. 61, suspects the lines of Hesiod which describe Lenæon, the only month named in the poem, to be interpolated. Still they would be evidence of the place it occupied in a very ancient calendar.

<sup>4</sup> Caylus Rec. d'Antiq. II. P. 111. Tab. 68-70.

<sup>5</sup> I. p. 274-280 Jebb.



there must have been two distinct Dionysiac festivals at Athens: that which gave its name to the Ionian month Lenæon, and that which continued in the age of Thucydides to be celebrated, in Attica as well as in Ionia, in the following month Anthesterion. The descriptions of Hesiod and Anacreon leave no room for doubting, that the Ionian months Poseideon and Lenæon answered to the Attic Poseideon and Gamelion. This result is confirmed by the comments of the Greek grammarians on the abovequoted lines of Hesiod, though their words involve an apparent difficulty which requires explanation. Proclus makes the following remark, which we transcribe with two manifestly necessary corrections of Ruhnken and Wyttenbach. Πλούταρχος οὐδένα φησὶ μῆνα Ἀθηναίων καλεῖσθαι παρὰ Βοιωτοῖς· ὑποπτέυει δὲ ἢ τὸν Βουκάτιον αὐτὸν λέγειν, ὅς ἐστιν ἡλίου τὸν αἰγόκερων διϋόντος, καὶ τοῦ (Boeckh's emendation for τὸν) βούδορα τῷ Βουκατίῳ συνάδοντος, διὰ τὸ πλείστους ἐν αὐτῷ διαφθείρεσθαι βόας, ἢ τὸν Ἑρμαῖον, ὅς ἐστι μετὰ τὸν Βουκάτιον, καὶ εἰς ταῦτον ἐρχόμενος τῷ Γαμηλιῶνι, καθ' ὃν τὰ Ἀθήναια παρ' Ἀθηναίοις. Ἴωνες δὲ τοῦτον οὐδ' ἄλλως, ἀλλὰ Ἀθηναίων καλοῦσιν. Hence it appears that Plutarch, who had written on Hesiod's poem, compared Lenæon with the Bœotian month Bucatius (the antiquity of which is too clearly attested by its name, to leave room for the supposition that it had taken the place of Lenæon after the time of Hesiod), only however from conjecture, founded partly on the coincidence between the name Bucatius (from βούς καίνειν) and the poet's βούδορα, and partly on the character of the season, as we learn from another reference to Plutarch's work, which we owe to Hesychius, who writes: Ἀθηναίων μῆν' οὐδένα τῶν μηνῶν Βοιωτοὶ οὕτω καλοῦσιν· εἰκάζει δὲ ὁ Πλούταρχος Βουκάτιον· καὶ γὰρ ψυχρὸς ἐστίν· ἐνιοὶ δὲ τὸν Ἑρμαῖον ὅς κατὰ (perhaps we ought to read μετὰ with Proclus) τὸν Βουκατίον ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐορτὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ἄγουσιν. Bucatius, as follows from the description, ὅς ἐστιν ἡλίου τὸν αἰγίκερων διϋόντος, corresponds to the Attic Gamelion, which probably began the *old* Attic year, as did Bucatius the Bœotian. But either Plutarch or some other writers (to whom Hesychius alludes in his ἐνιοὶ) conjectured that Hesiod's Lenæon might be Hermæus, which followed Bucatius, and coincided with Gamelion.



This last statement is incorrect with regard to the order of the months: for Hermæus in this respect corresponds to Anthesterion. But Boeckh has shown by a table of the Attic months for three years beginning with Gamelion, compared with the Bœotian, in which the intercalation is supposed to take place at the end of the year, that if the Bœotian period of intercalation differed from the Attic, Hermæus might coincide with Gamelion, sometimes once in three years, sometimes once in two years<sup>6</sup>. Hence notwithstanding that Lenæon was the Attic Gamelion, it might be correctly compared with Hermæus. The words of Proclus, καθ' ὃν τὰ Λήναια παρ' Ἀθηναίοις, can only be referred to the Attic month Gamelion, and prove that not only in the earliest times, but in those of the authors from whom Proclus drew his statement, the Lenæa were celebrated in that month. Hesychius indeed omits the mention of Gamelion, but this is no reason for suspecting any interpolation in the words of Proclus, since it would be difficult to conceive how the ancients could compare Hesiod's wintry Lenæon with Anthesterion, even setting the express testimonies to the contrary out of the question. Hesychius speaks of Hermæus, considering it, with Proclus, as coinciding with Gamelion.

Another commentator, whose words are subjoined to those of Proclus, says that Lenæon received its name διὰ τὸ τοὺς οἶνους ἐν αὐτῷ εἰσκομίζεσθαι, adding that it was the beginning of winter: then another etymology is suggested: διὰ τὰ λήναια, ὃ ἐστὶν ἔρια, καὶ προβατοδόραν καὶ αἰγιοδόραν καλούμεν, apparently in allusion to βούδορα: and again, ἡ ἐπειδὴ Διονύσῳ ἐποίουν ἑορτὴν τῷ μηνὶ τούτῳ, ἣν Ἀμβροσίαν

<sup>6</sup> This supposes the Bœotian period to have been the octaeteris, in which the years of intercalation are 3, 5, 8, so that intercalation took place once in the second, twice in the third year.—To understand the author's reasoning, the reader has only to make out two parallel lists of the Attic and Bœotian months for three consecutive years, beginning with Gamelion—Bucatus, and supposing an intercalation in the first Attic year. Then the intercalary month, Poseideon II, will correspond to Bucatus of the next Bœotian year, and the next Gamelion to Hermæus; but the intercalation at the end of the second Bœotian year will bring the third Gamelion again opposite to Bucatus. The author adds "If the Attic and Bœotian intercalary years did not, as is here assumed, follow one another so that the Bœotian intercalary year was always next to the Attic reckoned from Gamelion, and if a year intervened between them, then in every three years in which an intercalation took place, Hermæus coincided with Gamelion twice, and Bucatus but once."



ἐκάλουν. This festival of *Ambrosia* will be considered under another head of the subject. It is mentioned by Moschopulus also, who compares Lenæon with January. Tzetzes too, in a note which amply illustrates the saying, πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει, observes that Lenæon was the name given by the Ionians to the month answering to January or to the Egyptian Χοιάκ. The author of the Etymologicum Magnum (Ληναιών) also makes this last comparison, and adds that Lenæon was ἀρχὴ μηνῶν: and as such it corresponds perfectly with Gamelion, on the supposition that Poseideon was the last month of the old Attic year. Another remark of Tzetzes certainly seems to favour Ruhnken's opinion, for he observes (according to a reading which Dr Gaisford has not admitted into the text) that Lenæon was so named ὅτι τὰ Πιθοίγια ἐν τούτῳ ἐγένετο. But such an auxiliary must do more harm than good to any cause: for if we listen to him, we must believe that the Anthesteria were celebrated in the depth of winter. There are some other testimonies of grammarians which corroborate the conclusion to which the preceding arguments lead, and which Ruhnken vainly endeavours to explain away. The Rhetorical Lexicon (Bekker Anecd. p. 235. 6) has the article Διονύσια· ἑορτὴ Ἀθήνησι Διονύσου. ἦγετο δὲ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀγροὺς μηνὸς Ποσειδεῶνος, τὰ δὲ Λήναια Γαμηλιῶνος, τὰ δὲ ἐν ἄστει Ἐλαφηβολιῶνος. This seems sufficiently clear. But as Hesychius, (Διονύσια) has the same words, only substituting Ληναιῶνος for Γαμηλιῶνος, Ruhnken, who suggests what is extremely probable, that Hesychius was led to mention the Ionian month in order to mark its connexion with the festival, supposes that the author of the Rhetorical Lexicon, not knowing what to make of Lenæon, substituted Gamelion for it at a venture. We have seen however that he might have done so advisedly, and with perfect propriety. The same statement is repeated by the Scholiast on Æschines (III. p. 729 Reisk.). A variation, probably accidental, in the Scholiast on Plato (p. 167), who substitutes Maimacterion, makes for no party. An inscription edited by Corsini and Chandler (Marm. Oxon. II. XXI) records a ceremony which took place in Gamelion connected with the worship of Bacchus, in the words κίττωσεις Διονύσου.



Still though the Ionian month Lenæon corresponded to the Attic Gamelion, and derived its name from the Attic festival, the Lenæa, it does not necessarily follow that the latter was celebrated in Gamelion. For it is possible to conceive that after the Ionian migration the Attic festival may have been united with either the rural Dionysia or the Anthesteria, or that the Ionians may have separated two festivals which were before united, and have transferred the Lenæa to a different month which they may have named after it. An instance of a similar variation actually occurred in the case of the old Ionian festival, the Apaturia, which at Athens was solemnized in Pyanepsion, but at Cyzicus in Apatureon, though there was another month, Pyanepsion or Cyanepsion, in the calendar of Cyzicus. This however is not a case which can be fairly presumed without express evidence: and until it can be proved with regard to the Lenæa, the testimonies hitherto adduced must incline us to consider them as a distinct festival celebrated in Gamelion. Accordingly

II. We may now proceed to examine those which assert or deny the coincidence of the Lenæa with either of the two festivals with which it has been supposed to be identical.

The only express statement of any ancient author in favour of Ruhnken's opinion is that of Tzetzes in the passage already quoted. There is indeed a show of evidence on the same side in the Scholiast on the Acharnians of Aristophanes (960), who quotes a legend from Apollodorus to explain the origin of the Choes. His words are: *φησὶ δὲ Ἀπολλόδωρος, Ἀνθεστήρια καλεῖσθαι κοινῶς τὴν ὅλην ἑορτὴν Διονύσω ἀγομένην· κατὰ μέρος δὲ Πιθοιγίαν, Χόας, Χύτραν. καὶ αὖθις ὅτι Ὀρέστης μετὰ τὸν φόνον εἰς Ἀθήνας ἀφικόμενος (ἦν δὲ ἑορτὴ Διονύσου Ληναίου) ὥς μὴ γένοιτο σφίσιν ὁμόσπονδος ἀπεκτονῶς τὴν μητέρα, ἐμηχανήσατο τοιόνδε τι Πανδίων. Χοᾶ οἴνου τῶν δαιτυμόνων ἐκάστω παραστήσας ἐξ αὐτοῦ πίνειν ἐκέλευσε μηδὲν ὑπομιγνύντας ἀλλήλοις, ὥς μήτε ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κρατῆρος πίοι Ὀρέστης, μήτε ἐκεῖνος ἄχθοιτο καθ' αὐτὸν πίνων μόνος, καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνου Ἀθηναῖοις ἑορτὴ ἐνομίσθη οἱ Χόες.* We have here evidently the very words of Apollodorus, except that as to those included in the parenthesis there may be a doubt whether they do not rather belong to the scholiast. But admitting that they are



as authentic as the rest, we cannot consider them as evidence that the Anthesteria was the same festival as the Lenæa. All that Apollodorus asserts is, that the former was a festival of Διόνυσος Ἀθηναῖος. Phanodemus in Athenæus x. p. 437. relates the same legend, only substituting the name of Demophoon for that of Pandion, without making any mention of the Lenæa or the Lenæan god: except that the citizens were directed, when they had taken off the chaplets which they wore during the feast, which were polluted by the presence of Orestes, instead of hanging them on the temples, to twine them round the cups they had drained, καὶ τῇ ἱερείᾳ ἀποφέρειν τοὺς στεφάνους πρὸς τὸ ἐν Λίμναις τέμενος. On the other hand both the Χόες and the Χύτροι are expressly distinguished from the Lenæa: the former by Alciphron II. 3. p. 230), who makes Menander write, that he would not take all the treasures of a palace in exchange τῶν κατ' ἔτος Χοῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τῆς χθιζῆς ὁμολογίας, καὶ τῶν τοῦ Λυκείου γυμνασίων, καὶ τῆς ἱερᾶς Ἀκαδημίας, and by Suidas: Τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀμαξῶν σκώμματα ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπαρακαλύπτως σκωπτόντων. Ἀθήνησι γὰρ ἐν τῇ Χοῶν ἑορτῇ οἱ κωμάζοντες ἐπὶ τῶν ἀμαξῶν τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας ἔσκωπτόν τε καὶ ἐλοιδόρουν. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὕστερον ἐποιοῦν. The Χύτροι again are no less clearly distinguished from the Lenæa by Ælian Hist. An. IV. 53, Κεκήρυκται γὰρ Διονύσια καὶ Ἀθήναια καὶ Χύτροι καὶ Γεφυρισμοί, and Hippolochus in Athenæus IV. p. 130 who writes to his friend: σὺ δὲ μόνον ἐν Ἀθήναις μένων εὐδαιμονίζεις τὰς Θεοφράστον θέσεις ἀκούων, θύμα καὶ εὐζωμα καὶ τοὺς καλοὺς ἐσθίων στρεπτούς, Ἀθήναια καὶ Χύτρον θεωρῶν<sup>7</sup>. Ruhnken, who notices these passages, finds himself compelled by them to suppose, either that the name Lenæa, beside being a general one for the whole festival Anthesteria,

<sup>7</sup> The author has an ingenious remark on this passage. Hippolochus, who has been describing a sumptuous banquet at which he was present in Macedonia, rallies his friend on the poor entertainments he has been enjoying in the mean time at Athens: and as he names, not the more magnificent spectacles of the great Dionysia or the Panathenæa, but the Lenæa and the Chytri, we may conclude that these were the festivals which Lynceus would have lost if he had left Athens to enjoy the hospitality of Caranus. But if the Lenæa fell in Poseideon, the interval including the rural Dionysia and the Anthesteria would be longer than was required for such a journey: whereas if the Lenæa occurred in Gamelion, the time allowed for the journey would have been no more than sufficient.



was also peculiarly applied to the first day, *Πιθοίγια*, or else that there was a fourth day distinguished by this name. The first of these conjectures is merely ungrounded, unless such an authority as that of Tzetzes be thought to support it; but the second labours under the additional difficulty, that this fourth day is omitted in every detailed description of the festival, where there was apparently just as much reason for mentioning it as any of the other three.

Ruhnken's opponents are able to produce a greater number of witnesses to the identity of the *Lenæa* and the rural *Dionysia*. *Stephanus Byzantinus* has an obscure and seemingly mutilated article, in which he appears to confirm this opinion: *Λήναιος ἄγών Διονύσου ἐν ἀγροῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ ληνοῦ. Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τρίτῳ χρονικῶν. καὶ Ληναϊκός, καὶ Ληναιεύς. ἔστι δὲ καὶ δῆμος.* The object of the Lexicographer was a geographical one, and this mention of the festival must have been merely incidental, though in the extract we now read it is put foremost. We cannot even gather the opinion of *Apollodorus* with safety from such a statement. But if it were worthy of the utmost credit that his name could give to it, we should still learn nothing more from it, than that there was a festival or a contest called *Λήναιος* or *Ληναϊκός*, celebrated ἐν ἀγροῖς. It would still remain to be proved that this was the same with that known by the name of τὰ ἐν ἀγροῖς Διονύσια. For as the *Anthesteria*, though celebrated in the city, were distinct from the *Dionysia* ἐν ἄστει, so might the rural *Dionysia* be from the *Lenæa*, though the latter were celebrated ἐν ἀγροῖς. But it seems most probable that the statement in *Stephanus* is only a premature inference from the etymology which he subjoins, which would not prove anything as to the ultimate locality of the festival. There are however two passages in the *Scholiast* on *Aristophanes* which assert the same thing more distinctly. In the first (*Acharn.* 201) we read, τὰ κατ' ἀγροὺς] τὰ Λήναια λεγόμενα. ἔνθεν τὰ Λήναια καὶ ὁ ἐπιλήναιος ἄγών τελεῖται τῷ Διονύσῳ. Λήναιον γάρ ἐστιν ἐν ἀγροῖς ἱερὸν τοῦ Διονύσου, διὰ τὸ πλεκτοὺς ἐνταῦθα γεγονέναι, ἢ διὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ ληνὸν τεθῆναι. In the second, 503: ὁ τῶν Διονυσίων ἄγών ἐτελεῖτο δις τοῦ ἔτους, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔαρος ἐν ἄστει, ὅτε οἱ φόροι Ἀθήνησιν



ἐφέροντο, τὸ δεύτερον ἐν ἀγροῖς, ὁ ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ λεγόμενος, ὅτε ξένοι οὐ παρήσαν Ἀθήνησι· χειμῶν γὰρ λοιπὸν ἦν. Both these scholia afford very strong ground for suspecting that their authors knew very little more on the subject than they might have collected from Aristophanes himself. In the first the words τα Λ. λ. were evidently a distinct explanation, and perhaps suggested the following remark, which sounds very much like the vague guess of a man who had heard something about a temple of Bacchus, which he supposed to be somewhere out of the city, but which he was unable to describe more accurately than by saying that it was in the country. The second passage too gives us no information which we might not have drawn from the play, and it is expressed so as to leave it at least very doubtful whether the writer knew of the existence of more than two Dionysia. He can only be defended on the supposition, that he meant to speak of no festivals but such as were celebrated with dramatic exhibitions. But he gives no proofs of learning such as might entitle him to so favourable a construction. Such testimonies can scarcely be thought to outweigh those above quoted from Hesychius, the Rhetorical Lexicon, and the Scholiasts on Æschines and Plato, who appear to have drawn their statements from the same author, but from one who was well informed, and who wrote not incidentally, but professedly on the subject.

III. If the time at which the Lenæa were celebrated is less distinctly marked by the testimonies of the ancients than could have been desired, the *place* of the festival at least is clearly and, almost without exception, uniformly described. Hesychius (according to a slight and unquestionable correction of Ruhnken) writes: Ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ ἀγών· ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ἄστει Λήναιον περίβολον ἔχον μέγαν, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ Ληναίου Διονύσου ἱερόν, ἐν ᾧ ἀπετελοῦντο οἱ ἀγῶνες Ἀθηναίων, πρὶν τὸ θέατρον οἰκοδομηθῆναι. So the author of the Etymologicum Magnum: Ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ περίβολός τις μέγας Ἀθήνησιν, ἐν ᾧ ἱερόν Διονύσου Ληναίου, καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἦγον τοὺς σκηνικούς. And Photius: Λήναιον περίβολος μέγας Ἀθήνησιν, ἐν ᾧ τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἦγον πρὸ τοῦ τὸ θέατρον οἰκοδομηθῆναι, ὀνομάζοντες ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ· ἔστι δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἱερόν Διονύσου. From these passages we learn, that the



Lenæon was within the city, and that the entertainments originally exhibited there were afterwards transferred to the theatre, which was of course built at no great distance from the hallowed ground. Accordingly Hesychius (ἱκρία) calls it τὸ ἐν Διονύσου θέατρον (see Ruhnken. Auct. Em.) and Pausanias (I. 20) describes the Lenæon, without mentioning its name, in exact accordance with the passages above quoted: Τοῦ Διονύσου δέ ἐστι πρὸς τῷ θεάτρῳ τὸ ἀρχαιότατον ἱερόν. δύο δέ εἰσιν ἐντὸς τοῦ περιβόλου ναοὶ καὶ Διόνυσοι, ὃ τε Ἐλευθερεὺς καὶ ὃν Ἀλκαμένης ἐποίησεν ἐλέφαντος καὶ χρυσοῦ. The same precincts are described by Hesychius in another passage by a different name: Λιμναγενές· Λίμναι ἐν Ἀθήναις τόπος ἀνειμένος Διονύσῳ ὅπου τὰ Λήναια ἤγετο. It was therefore the Lenæan Bacchus to whom the place called Limnæ was consecrated, and the same god was honoured by the festival of the Anthesteria. Ruhnken considers all this as evidence for his opinion. It might however be just as well used to prove that the great Dionysia were the same festival as the Anthesteria: for they are no less intimately connected with the same sacred inclosure: and as after the erection of the theatre the spectacles before exhibited at the Lenæa on the wooden scaffolding in the Lenæon were transferred to the new building, so there can be no doubt that the entertainments of the great Dionysia were anciently performed on the boards of the Lenæon. Nothing therefore can be inferred as to the identity of the festivals from the identity of the place, and as little from that of the god, since from a variety of causes, which any one conversant with the religious worship of the Greeks may easily imagine, the same god might become the object of two distinct festivals.

On the other hand this evidence as to the locality of the Lenæan festival, seems conclusive against those who maintain its identity with the rural Dionysia: and several of them have in fact seen no other way of eluding the force of the inference, than by resorting to very violent proceedings with the text of some of the obnoxious passages. Nor is the derivation of the name Lenæa, from the winepress, inconsistent with the fact, that the festival was celebrated within the city. The spot on which the winepress the erection of which it was supposed to com-  
me-



morate stood, though once part of a rural district, might in the course of time have been inclosed within the city walls, and then the festival solemnized there could no longer be called a rural one. Before however this inclosure took place, this district, the deme Lenæon or Lenæus mentioned in the above-quoted article of Steph. Byzant., was undoubtedly a rural one, and the spectacles exhibited there would be properly described as ἀγὼν Διονύσου ἐν ἀγροῖς. Whether Apollodorus, in the passage to which Stephanus referred, had really made a learned remark to this effect, and whether the passage of the Scholiast of Aristophanes may have been grounded on a perversion of this piece of antiquarian erudition, is a question which must be left to conjecture. One thing however is clear, that Lenæa was the name of a particular festival, referred by local tradition to a particular spot, which already in very early times formed part of the city.

To get rid of this difficulty, Hermann has adopted a peculiar hypothesis on the subject of the rural Dionysia. He supposes that though they were celebrated all over Attica, yet the dramatic exhibitions which accompanied them were confined to one place: that this was the district Lenæon, which lay originally, though near to the city, without the walls: hence the rural Dionysia, from being celebrated there by such spectacles, were called Lenæa. He further conjectures that the theatre built for the same exhibitions in the room of the wooden stage was that of Piræus or Munychia, which he takes to be one and the same, and he holds the Διονύσια ἐν Πειραιεῖ to be no other than the rural Dionysia celebrated at Piræus. The festival, even after this transfer to a new scene, might still, he thinks, have retained the name it derived from its ancient locality: or the rural Dionysia may, as Kanngiesser imagines, have lasted three days, distinguished by different names, of which the two first may have been Θεοινία and Ασκώλια, the third Ἀήναια.

The objections which Boeckh opposes to this conjecture apply partly to the general view it suggests of the mode of celebrating the rural Dionysia, and partly to the peculiar hypothesis regarding the theatre of Piræus. Dramatic entertainments are mentioned as exhibited in other rural districts of Attica. Those of Collytus are celebrated by the orators:



Æschines speaks of the comedies performed there during the rural Dionysia (c. Timarch. p. 158 *πρώην ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀγροῦς Διονυσίοις κωμῳδῶν ὄντων ἐν Κολλυτῳ*) and Demosthenes of the tragedies in which Æschines himself played a doleful part on the same stage (De cor. p. 288). Tragic performances at Salamis also are alluded to in a recently discovered inscription<sup>8</sup>: and a passage in Isæus (De Cironis Hered. p. 206) seems to justify the inference, that there were similar exhibitions at Phlyæ. For among other instances of affection shown by Ciron to his grandchildren, the speaker mentions: *εἰς Διονύσια εἰς ἀγρὸν* (which as we are afterwards informed was *Φλυῆσι*) *ἦγεν ἀεὶ ἡμᾶς, καὶ μετ' ἐκείνου ἐθεωροῦμεν καθήμενοι παρ' αὐτόν*. Icaria too, the birthplace of Thespis, and the cradle of the Attic drama, can scarcely have been destitute of such amusements. But all these, as is proved with regard to Piræus and Salamis by existing monuments, were spectacles furnished at the expense, not of the state, but of the several districts in which they were exhibited. The theatre at Piræus belonged exclusively to that community. Now a festival celebrated in the city could never have been transferred to a district without it; and even if this were supposed possible, and that the Lenæa when removed from Athens to Piræus still retained the name derived from the Lenæon, at least they could not have been described as *ἀγὼν ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ*. The conjecture that the rural Dionysia lasted three days, of which the last went by the name of *Λήναια*, can only be admitted when it becomes necessary. But the most decisive argument against this hypothesis is supplied by a law cited in the oration c. Mid. p. 517. which begins: *Εὐήγορος εἶπεν, ὅταν ἡ πομπὴ ἢ τῷ Διονύσῳ ἐν Πειραιεῖ καὶ οἱ κωμῳδοὶ καὶ οἱ τραγῳδοί, καὶ ἡ ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ πομπὴ καὶ οἱ τραγῳδοὶ καὶ οἱ κωμῳδοί, καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἄστει Διονυσίοις ἡ πομπὴ καὶ οἱ παῖδες καὶ ὁ κῶμος καὶ οἱ κωμῳδοὶ καὶ οἱ τραγῳδοί, καὶ Θαργηλίων τῇ πομπῇ καὶ τῷ ἀγῶνι*. From this passage it appears that the state took a part in the Dionysia of Piræus by a solemn procession, and celebrated those of which Lenæon was the scene by another.

<sup>8</sup> A Salaminian decree, partly published in Koehler Doerpt. Beitræge, 1814. i. p. 43, has the words: *καὶ ἀνειπεῖν τὸν στέφανον τοῦτον Διονυσίων τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τραγῳδοῦς (sic) ὅταν πρῶτον γένηται*.



Which proves not only that the festivities were distinct from one another, but also that if those of Piræus belonged to the rural Dionysia, those of Lenæon were connected with a different festival: since it would be incredible that two such spectacles as those described in the law should have been exhibited at the public charge on the same occasion.

The order in which the festivals are mentioned in the law of Evagorus raises another question. This order was probably not accidental or arbitrary: on what principle then did it proceed? Manifestly upon the order in which the festivals themselves took place, and this not in the natural but the civil year: for otherwise the two lastmentioned festivals would have been named first. This is conclusive against Spanheim's supposition (ad Vesp. Ran. p. 298 Kust.) that the Dionysia of Piræus were the Anthesteria. On the other hand the words of the law determine nothing as to the time of the Lenæa. If it was Gamelion, the Anthesteria, though a more solemn festival, is entirely omitted. So however at all events are the Panathenæa: and if we suppose that, at the time when the law was made, there were no dramatic exhibitions at the Anthesteria, both festivals may have been past over for the same reason. The same conclusion is suggested by an inscription first published by Boeckh in his Public Economy of Athens (Appendix VIII.), containing an account of sums which accrued to the state from the sale of the hides of victims slaughtered on great public occasions (δερματικόν). Among the festivals mentioned in this document, the date of which is Ol. 111 $\frac{3}{4}$ , the second is that of Διονύσια τὰ ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ, which is immediately followed by the words (according to Boeckh's reading): παρὰ μυστηρίων καὶ τελετῶν ἐκ τῆς θυσίας τῇ Δημητρὶ παρὰ ἱεροποιῶν: ἐξ Ἀσκληπιείων παρὰ ἱεροποιῶν: ἐκ Διονυσίων τῶν ἐν ἄστει παρὰ βωνῶν. The combination of the Lenæan festival with the mysteries (the *lesser*, which were celebrated in Anthesterion) shews that they could not have been separated from each other by a very wide interval, as would have been the case if the former was a part of the rural Dionysia. But neither is it necessary to suppose that they fell in the same month. If the mysteries were celebrated early in Anthesterion, and the Lenæa in Gamelion, they will have been near enough to each other to be included in the same article. In this case the Anthesteria



are omitted here again: which however would only indicate that this festival was not solemnized with a public banquet at the expense of the state, and therefore did not contribute to the *δερματικόν*. The name of the festival immediately preceding the Lenæa is lost, all but the concluding letters ΛΥΕΙΩΝΤΩΝ, out of which Boeckh, by a very easy correction and supplement, extracts *ἐκ Διονυσίων τῶν κατ' ἀγρούς*, which brings the order of the festivals in this inscription into harmony with that given by the grammarians and in the law of Evagorus. The victims of which an account is here rendered under the head of the rural Dionysia, were probably those sacrificed on the occasion of the procession mentioned in the law as made *τῷ Διονύσῳ ἐν Πειραιεῖ*.

IV. We may now proceed to examine the arguments which Ruhnken draws from Aristophanes, and on which he relies as the firmest support of his proposition. *Nos rem ex uno Aristophane ita demonstramus, ut nullus dubitationi locus relinquatur.* His proof is grounded principally on the chronological data in the Acharnians. In v. 960 (925 Bekk.) Lamachus wants to buy some dainties, to celebrate the Choes: *εἰς τοὺς Χοᾶς αὐτῷ μεταδοῦναι τῶν κιχλῶν*: and the same season is afterwards alluded to in the question (1171 Bek.), *τοῖς Χουσί γάρ τις συμβολὰς ἐπράττετο*; as the inroad of the enemy which occasioned the conflict, had been before announced at the same time (1040) *ὑπὸ τοὺς Χοᾶς γὰρ καὶ Χύτρον αὐτοῖσί τις Ἡγγεῖλε ληστὰς ἐμβαλεῖν Βοιωτίους*. The play then was acted during the festival which included the Χόες. But from other passages (487 and 1119): *αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐσμεν, οὐπὶ Ληναίῳ τ' ἀγών*, and *ὅς γ' ἐμὲ τὸν πλήμονα Λήναια χορηγῶν ἀπέκλεισ' ἄδειπνον*, it is equally clear that it was exhibited at the Lenæa, as the ancient didascalia expressly asserts. It follows that this is the same festival with the Choes. Those who have confounded it with the rural Dionysia, which are mentioned in the earlier part of the play, have overlooked that Dicæopolis is represented as returning to Athens, and enjoying the festivities of the Lenæa, after having celebrated the rural Dionysia in the country. Moreover the Frogs were also exhibited at the Lenæa, and yet in that play (215) the chorus intimates that it was performed at the Chytri: for they sing: *φθεζώμεθ'*



εὐγερυν ἐμὰν αοιδάν, κοᾶξ κοᾶξ, ἣν ἀμφὶ Νυσήϊον Διὸς  
Διόνυσον ἐν Λίμναισιν ἰαχήσαμεν, ἥνιχ' ὁ κραιπαλόκωμος τοῖς  
ιεροῖσι Χύτροισι χωρεῖ κατ' ἐμὸν τέμενος λαῶν ὄχλος.

This last argument rests on a misunderstanding which spoils the humour of the passage. The croaking choir describes the time when they raised their voices in their beloved haunts, ἐν Λίμναισιν, by the season when the human revellers flocked to the same scene to keep the holiday of the Chytri. For this, Anthesterion, was the time when marsh and pool resounded with such strains. But they were ready to entertain Bacchus with their music a month earlier than usual, if the Lenæa be supposed to fall in Gamelion. The passage of the Acharnians in which the chorus complains of having been dismissed by a choragus supperless, evidently refers to a former year. We have therefore only to consider the other allusions in that play, which relate to a time really or imaginarily present.

It ought not to be doubted that the Acharnians was really exhibited at the Lenæa, as is recorded in the didascalia, which has all the marks that can be desired of an ancient, trustworthy document. Kanngiesser and Hermann indeed have questioned its genuineness, the latter suspecting that it was fabricated according to an erroneous interpretation of the line, αὐτοὶ γάρ ἐσμεν, οὐπὶ Ληναίῳ τ' ἀγών. But the author at least cannot have drawn all the information he communicates from the play. He writes: ἐδιδάχθη ἐπὶ Εὐθυμένους ἄρχοντος ἐν Ληναίοις διὰ Καλλιστράτου καὶ πρῶτος ἦν· δεύτερος Κρατῖνος Χειμαζομένοις· οὐ σώζεται· τρίτος Εὐπολὶς Νουμηνίαις. It seems capricious to charge a person who relates so many facts which he could only have learnt from express authority, with inserting among them a conjecture of his own, on a point which he was likely to find similarly ascertained in the same works<sup>9</sup>. But the mode in which Hermann attempts to get rid of the

<sup>9</sup> The reader will probably be glad to hear Boeckh's general opinion on this subject. He says: "I venture to assert, that next to the coins and inscriptions and the works of the first historians, the διδασκαλῖαι are the purest and most trustworthy sources of information, contemporary original documents on the pieces actually exhibited, collected by writers, who had access to a world of monuments that has long perished, by Aristotle, Dicæarchus, Callimachus, Aristophanes of Byzantium, Apollodorus, Eratosthenes and others, who compiled them, not out of their own heads, nor by guesswork, but from accounts into which no error could find its way,



testimony of Aristophanes himself, appears still more violent. He supposes the play to have been acted at the great Dionysia, and that the passage in which Dicæopolis reminds the spectators that no strangers are present this time, is mere irony: οὐπω ξένοι πάρεσιν, not because they were still to come, but because there was now no tribute for them to bring: οὔτε γὰρ φόροι ἤκουσιν, οὔτ' ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οἱ ξύμμαχοι. But even if history sanctioned the supposition, that such was the state of affairs at the time when the play was acted (Ol. 88. 3), which it would be very difficult to prove, it would be incredible that the poet should have made such a bitter jest on the calamity of the state.

If then we consider with Ruhnken the incidents of the drama, we find that it opens at Athens with the assembly at which Dicæopolis conceives the plan of negotiating a separate truce with Lacedæmon, and sends off Amphitheus for that purpose. The assembly is scarcely dismissed before the envoy returns with the object of his mission, after a narrow escape from the fury of the Acharnians. Dicæopolis, after selecting the largest term, declares his intention of immediately using his privilege, by going in and celebrating the rural Dionysia: ἐγὼ δὲ πολέμου καὶ κακῶν ἀπαλλαγεῖς ἄξω τὰ κατ' ἀγροῦς εἰσιὼν Διονύσια. εἰσιὼν must refer to his own house, where he means to make preparation for the festival. It must be supposed to be visible to the spectators: for there is no reason to imagine a change of scene: and the audience who were not shocked at seeing Amphitheus return from Lacedæmon in the course of a few minutes after he had set out from Athens, would not be more startled by the spectacle of the rural Dionysia celebrated on the same ground which had just been occupied by the popular assembly. At all events the procession which presents itself in the next scene to the enraged chorus, is supposed to take place in the deme of Dicæopolis; for he addresses the associate of Bacchus in the words: ἔκτῳ σ' ἔτει προσεῖπον, ἐς τὸν δῆμον ἐλθὼν ἄσμενος, σπονδὰς ποιησάμενος ἐμαυτῷ, πραγμάτων τε καὶ μαχῶν καὶ Λαμάχων ἀπαλλαγείς. From which we may infer, that the festival is supposed to be

except an oversight of the collectors or a slip of the pen: and I regret that Spalding (De Dion. p. 75) should have countenanced the contempt that has been expressed for them."



celebrated not only at the usual place, in the country, in this instance at Chollidæ, where Dicæopolis lived (381. Δικαιόπολις καλεῖ σε Χολλίδης), but also at the proper time: for otherwise Dicæopolis would not have been so long deprived of the pleasure by the war, since the enemy did not remain the whole year through in Attica<sup>10</sup>. The chorus, after witnessing the commencement of the procession, begin their attack on Dicæopolis, who only obtains a hearing by threatening the existence of the little objects of their tenderest sympathies. When by this stratagem he has gained leave to make a formal defense, distrusting his powers of oratory, he further desires a garb fitted to move compassion, and being permitted to procure one, instantly makes an application to Euripides. The following scene, before the door of the tragic poet, brings us once more back to Athens, but, as before, without any visible change to assist the spectator's imagination. When Dicæopolis has stripped Euripides of all his tragic furniture, he begins his oration, which is addressed to the spectators (μή μοι φθονήσητ', ἄνδρες οἱ θεώμενοι) and is spoken throughout in the mind and person of the poet himself, so that the line, αὐτοὶ γάρ ἐσμεν, οὐπὶ Ληναίῳ τ' ἄγών, which occurs in the procæmium, must be taken as the literal expression of the fact. Dicæopolis finally gains his cause, and announces his intention of opening a private market to the Peloponnesians, Megarians, and Bœotians. After the parabasis we see him busied in fixing the boundaries of his marketplace, and the strangers whom he has invited come to deal with him. After he has despatched his various customers, the servant of Lamachus brings the message from which we learn that the Choes are about to be celebrated, ἐκέλευσε Λάμαχος σε ταύτης τῆς δραχμῆς εἰς τοὺς Χοᾶς αὐτῷ μεταδοῦναι τῶν κιχλῶν: and the play ends with the contrast between the wailings of Lamachus and the triumph of Dicæopolis, who has drained his χοεὺς first, and desires to be led to the judges to receive the prize.

<sup>10</sup> This is Boeckh's argument. But perhaps it presses the language of the poet a little too closely. The war might interrupt rural festivities in various ways, even when the enemy was not actually in the country, or might destroy the property which afforded the means of celebrating them. One can hardly infer from this passage that hostile inroads were usually expected in Poseideon on account of the vintage. Still the presumption that Aristophanes supposes each festival celebrated at its proper time will be sufficiently strong.



It seems clear from this description that there can be no more reason for identifying the Lenæa, the actual epoch of the performance, with one of the festivals represented in the action, than with the other: and hence analogy would incline us to believe that the former festival was equally distinct from each of them. If however it were necessary to identify it with either, it would be with the first rather than with the last. For it is long after the speech of Dicæopolis, in which he mentions the Lenæa, and after the marketings which follow his defense, that the herald comes to proclaim the Choes: ἀκούετε λεῶ· κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τοὺς χοᾶς Πίνειν ὑπὸ τῆς σάλπιγγος· ὃς δ' ἂν ἐκπίνῃ Πρώτιστος, ἄσκον Κτησιφῶντος λήψεται. So that the argument on which Ruhnken placed his chief dependence may be much more efficaciously turned against his hypothesis. But neither can the opinion which he controverted derive any support from the plot of the Acharnians, since it affords not the shadow of a reason for supposing that the play was exhibited at the rural Dionysia.

V. We have next to inquire whether the mode of celebrating the Lenæa corresponded with that of either of the other festivals, and with which. This enquiry, from the scantiness of our information, must be confined to one point, the dramatic spectacles exhibited at the several Dionysia. At the Great Dionysia tragedies and comedies were given, of which the former at least were always new pieces, or, if old, so much altered, that they might be considered as new. At the rural Dionysia old pieces were repeated: and no instance can be pointed out, after the drama had attained a regular form, of a play performed at that season for the first time. It is indeed natural to suppose that the poets would prefer exhibiting their new works in the capital, before they brought them on the minor stages. With regard to the Lenæa, it is certain that both tragedies and comedies were exhibited at that festival: the instances that occur are of new pieces: but the appropriation of the description, *καινῶν τραγωδῶν*, to the Great Dionysia, seems to indicate that repetitions were admitted at all the others. But as to the Anthesteria, it is very doubtful whether they were accompanied with any dramatic exhibitions, at least of the same nature as those of the other two festivals. Hippolochus indeed, in the



passage above quoted, uses the words *Λήναια καὶ Χύτρον* θεωρῶν, but this does not mark the nature of the spectacle<sup>11</sup>. And Alciphron, in coupling the *Χόες* with *τὰ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις Λήναια*, appears to distinguish between different entertainments. Philochorus, quoted by the Scholiast on the *Frogs* (218), speaks of *ἀγῶνες οἱ Χύτρινοι καλούμενοι*, which does not suggest the idea of a dramatic contest. Philostratus relates (V. Ap. iv. 7.) that Apollonius was disappointed at finding nothing but mystical ceremonies and religious poetry and music exhibited in the theatre at Athens during the Anthesteria, when he expected to have heard monodies and pieces of music, such as belonged to tragedy and comedy. These passages contribute little toward deciding the question. But there are two others which appear to prove that dramatic spectacles formed part of the amusements at the Chytri. One is an extract from Thrasyllus, given by Diogenes Laertius III. 56, in which it is said of the tragic poets: *τέτρασι δράμασιν ἡγωνίζοντο Διονυσίοις, Ληναίοις, Παναθηναίοις, Χύτροις, ὧν τὸ τέταρτον ἦν σατυρικόν*. Here however it is clear that the four names are an interpolation of some very ignorant and injudicious person, whose authority cannot have the slightest weight. But the mention of the Chytri may have been suggested by the remembrance of an institution of the orator Lycurgus, relating to the same festival, which is thus described in the *Lives of the Ten Orators* (Plut. vi. p. 253): *εἰσήνεγκε δὲ καὶ νόμους, τὸν περὶ τῶν κωμωδῶν, ἀγῶνα τοῖς Χύτροις ἐπιτελεῖν ἐφάμιλλον ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ, καὶ τὸν νικήσαντα εἰς ἄστυ καταλέγεσθαι, πρότερον οὐκ ἔξόν, ἀναλαμβάνων τὸν ἀγῶνα ἐκλελοιπότα*, to which is subjoined another law, regulating the mode of performing the plays of the three great tragic poets. The passage has been variously interpreted. Petitus (de leg. Att. p. 841) understood it as containing a direction, that the comedians should exhibit rival performances at the Chytri. Spanheim mentions two interpretations (Ran. p. 298), one that the comedians should give a spectacle at the Chytri, rivalling those of the theatre, another that comedies should be performed in the theatre in

<sup>11</sup> This remark is certainly true: but the author does not seem to have observed that it entirely destroys the force of the argument drawn in a preceding page from the words of Isæus as to the dramatic exhibitions at Phlyæ.



like manner as at the Chytri. He himself prefers the first of the two: which however need not detain us, as it cannot be extracted from the Greek words. On the other hand that of Petitus is liable to no other objection on this score, than that it does not assign a distinct meaning to the epithet ἐφάμιλλον, which, in a writer like the Pseudo-Plutarch, is a very trifling difficulty: nor is ἀγὼν ἐφάμιλλος a more censurable redundancy than Plutarch's ἄμιλλα ἐναγώνιος, which he uses on a similar occasion (Solon c. 29). According to this construction the passage might seem to favour Ruhnken's opinion, if the revival of the contest at the Chytri is brought into connexion with the decay of the Lenæan festival, mentioned by the Scholiast on the Frogs (406 ἦν τις καὶ παρὰ τὸν Ληναϊκὸν συστολή) on the authority of Aristotle. Hermann adopts the second of the interpretations mentioned by Spanheim, in which ἐφάμιλλον is referred to Χύτροις, and he conceives that the object of the law was to revive, in a new form and under legal sanction, a species of contest which had before been privately exhibited at the Chytri, but had fallen into disuse. He supposes this exhibition to have consisted, not in the regular dramatic recitations, but in readings, by which the poets submitted their new pieces to the judgement of a select audience. The novelty of the institution lay, not in the season, which was the same as before, but in the right conferred on the successful poet, of exhibiting his play at the ensuing Great Dionysia. That the poets in fact read their plays at the Anthesteria, seems to result from the accounts of the death of Sophocles given by his Greek biographer, who, after mentioning the singular story told by Ister and Neanthes, that Sophocles was choked in eating a bunch of grapes presented to him at the Choes, adds: Σάτυρος δέ φησι, τὴν Ἀντιγόνην ἀναγιγνώσκοντα καὶ ἐμπεσόντα περὶ τὰ τέλη νοήματι μακρῶ—σὺν τῇ φωνῇ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀφεῖναι. Οἱ δέ, ὅτι μετὰ τὴν τοῦ δράματος ἀνάγνωσιν, ὅτε νικῶν ἐκηρύχθη, χαρὰ νικηθεὶς ἐξέλιπε. That some such previous trial of the pieces to be produced at the Great Dionysia should have taken place, is in itself extremely probable, and the time of the Anthesteria, which left about a month for the theatrical preparations, was well adapted to the purpose. These trials may have been the ἀγῶνες χύτρινοι of Philochorus. We are also informed



that Sophocles put on mourning for the death of Euripides in common with all the Athenians, and brought on his actors without their usual garlands. The grammarian who relates this fact (Thom. M. in vit. Eurip.) speaks as if Sophocles had paid this mark of respect to his brother poet immediately on receiving the first news of his death, which, if Euripides died in the first half of the third year of Ol. 93, (see Boeckh Gr. Trag. Princ. p. 209) would imply that the mourning took place at the rural Dionysia in Poseideon. Otherwise the description might refer to the funeral rites performed at the Chytri, when, as we learn from Theopompus (Schol. Ran. 220), it was usual τοὺς παραγενομένους ὑπὲρ τῶν θανόντων ἰλάσασθαι τὸν Ἑρμῆν, and then it would harmonize with the statement, that the death of Sophocles occurred at the Anthesteria<sup>12</sup>.

We might adopt this view of Hermann's, without admitting his construction of the words of the law, which seems far less probable than that of Petitus. But at all events the utmost that can be inferred from the law is, that at a certain period comedies were exhibited at the Anthesteria: of tragedies we hear nothing, whereas both were performed at the Lenæa. On the other hand the theatrical regulations of the Lenæa were at variance with those of the rural Dionysia. For not to mention the improbability of the supposition, that the many new pieces brought out at the Lenæa should have been produced for the first time at the rural Dionysia, the part which foreigners were allowed to take in the exhibitions at Lenæa, implies that they were under the immediate controul of the

<sup>12</sup> In his treatise Gr. Trag. Princ. p. 211. the author came to the conclusion that Sophocles died shortly after producing his last work (a new edition of his Antigone) at the rural Dionysia. But he now retracts this opinion as having been founded on the belief he then entertained that Sophocles died Ol. 93. 3, which, as he observes, is impossible if the Frogs were as he now believes, performed in Gamelion of that year at the Lenæa: for Aristophanes must have begun his comedy before the rural Dionysia in Poseideon. He says (p. 97): Euripides probably died Ol. 93. 2, as the Parian marble states, and the last piece of Sophocles, before which Euripides was already dead, may have been publicly read at the Choes of the same year that is, in Anthesterion, Ol. 93. 2, not exhibited at the rural Dionysia.—He had also conceived that the story from Ister and Ne-anthes about the manner of the poet's death (that Callippides sent him a bunch of grapes παρὰ τοὺς Χόας, and that Sophocles was choked βαλόντα εἰς τὸ στόμα ῥᾶγα ἔτι ὀμφακίζουσιν) is more consistent with the season of the rural Dionysia. He now observes: it is indeed incomprehensible how unripe grapes come to be mentioned along with the Choes: but, to pass over the well known allegorical interpretation of the anecdote, the difficulty is not removed by substituting the rural Dionysia.



state, not like those of the rural Dionysia peculiar to the several rural districts, where strangers would have been excluded by religious scruples from taking a share in the local solemnities. As little can it be believed that they were permitted to fill so important an office as that of choragus at the Anthesteria, a festival of extraordinary sanctity, which included a variety of mysterious ceremonies, for which none but the wife of the Archon king and some select female attendants (the γέραιραι) were held qualified, and to which no other Athenians were admitted. The Lenæa indeed, as well as the Anthesteria, are under the immediate superintendence of the Archon king; and this would alone be a strong argument against their identity with the rural Dionysia, which were necessarily directed by the several local magistrates, the δήμαρχοι. But on the other hand we learn from the abovequoted inscription containing the account of the δερματικόν, that the Lenæa were celebrated with a public banquet at the expense of the state: whereas at the Choes (as we gather from the anecdote of Demades in Plut. Resp. Ger. Pr. c. 25) each citizen received a sum, with which he was to provide for his own repast. Entertainments indeed were given by persons whose office connected them with the festival, as in the Acharnians the priest of Bacchus invites Dicæopolis to a banquet at the Choes: but on this occasion the host provided only the accessories of the feast, such as are described in v. 1055 and the following lines: the more solid materials and the measure of wine each guest is expected to bring with him (1061 & foll.) So far therefore all the indications we are able to collect, point rather at the diversity than the identity of the Lenæa, and either of the Dionysia with which they have been compared.

VI. This result appears to be confirmed by the traditions preserved as to the occasion and nature of the various Dionysia. The name of the Lenæa evidently connects the festival with the operations of the vintage, and separates it from the season and the occupations of the Anthesteria. In the same degree it may certainly at first sight seem to lead us directly to the rural Dionysia. For this was unquestionably the feast of the vintage, held indeed late in the year, but not later than the vintage takes place, in a much more rigorous climate, in some of the vineyards which produce the Tokay wine, where the



grapes are kept hanging till December, frozen and often covered with snow, and are then accounted to yield a wine very superior to that made in the preceding months of the same year. Moreover had the festival been placed earlier in the year, it would in some years have happened before the end of the vintage. But the object of the festival in Anthesterion is entirely different. On the first day (Πιθοίγια) the casks are broached and tasted, on the second (Χόες) the new wine is drunk. A similar operation is said to be performed in Hungary in the month of February. This therefore can not be the festival which derived its name from the winepress erected in the place called Lenæon, at which the poets anciently received a prize of sweet must (τρυνγωδίαν φασί, διὰ τὸ τοῖς εὐδοκιμοῦσιν ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ γλεῦκος δίδοσθαι, ὅπερ ἐκάλουν τρύγα—the writer περὶ κωμωδίας in Kuster Aristoph. p. xi.) But yet it will not follow that the occasion of the Lenæa was precisely the same as that of the rural Dionysia. These were common to the whole country: the former were attached to a particular spot. It may easily be imagined, that, after the general vintage had ended, the fruit of some vines was still reserved to a later season, for the purpose of extracting from them a nectar, with which the erection of the first winepress was commemorated, the successful poets rewarded, and the Lenæan god honoured, and from which the festival itself may have received the name of Ἀμβροσία. (above p. 279.)

The partisans of Ruhnken's hypothesis felt the difficulty of assigning a vintage festival to the month of February, and have attempted to meet it, by supposing that the Lenæa, originally a rural festival, had in course of time been transferred to the city. Spalding (De Dionysiis p. 76) conceived that, after the concentration of the Attic state had been effected by Theseus, a festival was instituted to supply the place of the rural Dionysia, for those who had removed their habitations to the capital: but that the new festival, in order that it might not interfere with the old holidays, was fixed in Anthesterion. The third and latest of the Dionysia he supposes to have been instituted for the purpose of displaying the public magnificence to foreigners, and therefore annexed to Elaphebolion. He thinks that this view of the subject is confirmed by the re-



semblance between some features of the two festivals held in Poseideon and Anthesterion. The former is the season which, by the consent of almost all nations, has been dedicated to mirth and jollity. Its festival corresponded to the Roman Saturnalia. But at the Anthesteria likewise presents were made, and the slaves enjoyed a temporary freedom, as is signified by the verse, *Θύραζε Κᾶρες, οὐκέτ' Ἀνθεστήρια*. It does not however appear that the custom of making presents prevailed at the rural Dionysia: at the Anthesteria it may have arisen out of the usage already mentioned, according to which the guests carried their own viands to their host's banquet. The other practice, of extending the gladness of the season to the slaves, which was common to both festivals, may be satisfactorily explained from the character of the God, the dispenser of joy and freedom, without the supposition of any historical connexion. The mode in which Thucydides speaks of the Anthesteria, is so far from confirming Spalding's argument, that it leads to a directly opposite conclusion. The historian, after relating (ii. 15) that it was the revolution effected by Theseus that first made Athens a great city, proceeds to illustrate and corroborate his assertion by the fact, that the ancient temples were found either on the hill, or at its foot on the south side within the limits of the ante-Thesean city. Among the rest he mentions the sanctuary of Dionysus ἐν Λίμναις, the god in whose honour the more ancient Dionysia were celebrated in Anthesterion, at Athens as in Ionia. From this it seems clear that the Anthesteria did not arise out of the Union, but existed before it. These he calls the more ancient, evidently in comparison with the festival of Elaphebolion, which was the most splendid and celebrated, and was probably instituted to represent those of the various rural districts. The month may have been chosen, if not with a view to the season of the year, on the ground that it was the next after Poseideon which was not already occupied by a kindred festival. The Cecropian city, like many other places in Attica, had two Dionysian festivals, which were attached to peculiar local traditions and usages, and which survived after many others in the country had fallen into disuse. Both were celebrated in the same sanctuary of Bacchus, the Lenæon, in the Marsh, which originally lay a little way out of the city, and so might lead anti-



quaries to speak of the Lenæa as a rural festival, but was very early inclosed within the walls. This enlargement may have taken place before the age of Theseus, suggested perhaps by the sanctity of the ground, which would not have been taken into the original city. The selection of the marshy ground for the sanctuary of Bacchus, and for the site of the winepress, admits of various explanations. It is at all events conformable to the practice of other cities. So at Sparta the temple of Bacchus stood in the suburb called the Marsh from the nature of the ground, though in Strabo's time it had become dry<sup>13</sup>. Such was no doubt the case at Athens also: and the marsh was chosen for the sake of the water: but perhaps originally without any other motive than the convenience of applying it, collected in an artificial reservoir, to various uses connected with the festivals of Bacchus. One of these is described by Phanodemus (Athenæus p. 465) who relates that the Athenians were used to take sweet new wine (γλεῦκος) from the casks, and to mix it near the temple of Bacchus in the Marsh in honour of the god, and then to drink of it themselves: whence Bacchus received the epithet Limnæus, because the new wine was then first drunk diluted with water: and for the like reason the springs were called Nymphs and nurses of Bacchus, because the mixture of water increases the measure of wine: as Timotheus, in a fragment preserved by Athenæus in the same passage, speaks of the blood of Bacchus mixt with the fresh tears of the Nymphs. Phanodemus evidently alludes to the Πιθοίγυια and the Χόες, and means to relate their origin.

VII. It remains to inquire how far the preceding conclusions are confirmed by the accounts transmitted to us regarding the introduction of the worship of Bacchus into Attica. The Attic traditions mention Amphictyon as the first king who received the god in his dominions: in his reign Bacchus came into Attica, and was entertained by Semachus, and presented his daughter with a roeskin (Syncell. p. 297 ed. Bonn); and in a house behind a sanctuary of Bacchus in Athens, Pausanias saw a groupe of figures in clay, representing king Amphictyon feasting Bacchus and other gods (1. 2. 5.) We are

<sup>13</sup> VIII. p. 250. τὸ παλαιὸν ἐλίμναζε τὸ προάστειον, καὶ ἐκάλουν αὐτὸ Λίμνας· καὶ τὸ τοῦ Διονύσου ἱερόν ἐν Λίμναις ἐφ' ὕγρου βεβηκὸς ἐτύγχανε, νῦν δ' ἐπὶ ξηροῦ τὴν ἔδρυσιν ἔχει.



further informed by Philochorus (Athenæus II. p. 38.), that Amphictyon was the first who learnt from Bacchus the art of mixing wine with water in due proportions, so that men, who were before overpowered by the strength of the liquor, could hold their heads upright, and hence the king erected an altar to the upright Bacchus (ὀρθὸς Διόνυσος) in the temple of the Seasons, as the nurses of the fruit of the vine: and hard by he raised an altar to the Nymphs, in commemoration of the mixture: for the Nymphs are said to be the nurses of Bacchus: and he ordained that after meals men should drink of the unmixt wine, but only to taste it, for a sample of the power of the *good god*; and afterwards diluted as much as they would. Here it is evident (whatever may be thought of the interpretation given to the epithet ὀρθός) that the worship referred to Amphictyon is that of the Limnæan god, which Thucydides also asserts to have been the most ancient. The institution of the Choes took place later, on the occasion of the arrival of Orestes, according to Apollodorus under Pandion, or, as Phanodemus determined it with greater attention to chronological accuracy, under Demophoon. But in the reign of Pandion the first, the same in which Ceres came to Eleusis, Bacchus again visited Attica. On this occasion he was received by Icarius, and bestowed on him the gifts which proved so fatal to him and to his daughter Erigone. The anger of the gods, which was provoked by her death, was appeased by rites which ever after distinguished the festival of the vintage (Apollodorus III. 14. 7. Hyginus Fab. 130 *festum oscillationis—per vindemiam*. Astronom. II. Arctophylax). This legend clearly relates to the rural Dionysia: in it the scene is laid in the country, in Icaria, and all turns upon the cultivation of the vine and the process of winemaking, while in that of Amphictyon it is the mixture and use of the liquor that constitute the motive of the tradition. It does not however follow that the rural tradition was of later origin than the worship of the Lenæan god, which could not be the fact; but only that a distinguishing feature of the former was introduced at a comparatively late period. Those rural rites are manifestly of the same kind with those which Pegasus introduced from Eleutheræ, as appears both from the similarity of the two legends (Schol. Aristoph. Acharn. II. 242), and from the oracle men-



tioned by Pausanias (1. 2. 4) which, on the arrival of Pegasus, reminded the Athenians of the earlier presence of the god in the land in the time of Icarius. To this Eleutherian god the Great Dionysia were consecrated: and therefore the question as to the epoch at which they were introduced depends upon the date of the migration of Pegasus from Eleutheræ. That they were later than the Union under Theseus appears from the silence of tradition, which though it speaks of the various relations between that hero and Bacchus, never mentions him as the founder of the Great Dionysia. Eleutheræ was celebrated as an ancient seat of the worship of Bacchus. It was one of the places which claimed the honour of having given him birth (Diodor. III. 66. Ἡλεῖοι καὶ Νάξιοι, πρὸς δέ τούτοις οἱ τὰς Ἐλευθερὰς οἰκοῦντες, καὶ Τήϊοι, καὶ πλείους ἕτεροι παρ' ἑαυτοῖς ἀποφαίνονται τεκνωθῆναι). Its hero Eleuther (perhaps Bacchus, *Liber*, himself, though he is called a son of Apollo) was said to have erected the first statue to the god, and to have taught the right observance of his worship (Hyginus Fab. 225. Schol. Hesiod. Theog. 54). This Pegasus the Eleutherian brought with him to Athens: and the ancient image of the god, which was carried every year in procession from his temple to a chapel in the Academy (Pausan. 1. 29. 2), had once stood in the temple at Eleutheræ, where Pausanias saw a copy of it (1. 38. 8). It was not without opposition that Pegasus succeeded in establishing the rites of the god at Athens: the resistance of the Athenians was only overcome by manifest tokens of divine anger, and by the intervention of the Delphic oracle (Schol. Aristoph. Ach. 242). But what was the motive that led Pegasus to transplant the sacred image to a foreign city, where he was not even sure of a friendly reception? The motive is not assigned by tradition, but it may be collected from history. We are informed that the people of Eleutheræ united themselves with the Athenians, not from compulsion, but voluntarily, through their hatred of Thebes (Paus. 1. 38. 8). This has all the appearance of being a genuine historical tradition: but yet the event must have occurred in very early times, since we have no account, as in the case of Platæa, of its date. In the time of Pausanias (1. 38. 9) the site of Eleutheræ was only marked by a few ruins. Strabo (ix. p. 284) says that it was uncertain whether



it belonged to Platæa or to Bœotia: Pausanias considers it as part of Attica. But it appears from Thucydides (v. 42) that, according to an ancient treaty between the Athenians and the Bœotians, Panacton was not to be occupied by either people, but to be common ground (*μηδετέρους οἰκεῖν τὸ χωρίον ἀλλὰ κοινῇ νέμειν*). If this was the case with Panacton, which lay nearer to Athens than Eleutheræ, it was probably so with Eleutheræ and its district. The inhabitants must have migrated in a body to Athens, leaving their town to the first occupant. Hence it was not numbered among the Attic demes. The time when the power and hostility of Thebes induced the people of Eleutheræ to throw themselves into the arms of Athens, may therefore have been the half-historical period which intervenes between the Return of the Bœotians from Arne, and that of the Heracleids. We read of a war which arose between the Athenians and Bœotians at this period on account of some disputed ground, the district of Œnoe (Conon 39) or Celænæ (Schol. Aristoph. Acharn. 146) of which the former lay not far from Eleutheræ. The contest was decided by the wellknown stratagem of the Attic champion Melanthus, who was believed to have been favoured by an apparition of Bacchus, and in consequence to have honoured him under the title of *Μελάναιγος* with the festival *Ἀπατούρια*. This tradition connects itself in a very simple and natural manner with those about Eleutheræ and Panacton. After the progress of the Theban power had induced the inhabitants of the latter place to quit their ancient seats, the Thebans took possession of it, and proceeded to make encroachments upon Attica. These were repelled, with the aid of the newly received god: but Eleutheræ and Panacton continued to be debatable ground. If these combinations are well founded, the institution of the Great Dionysia, the latest festival of Bacchus at Athens, will but a little precede the Return of the Heracleids.

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THE reader will readily perceive, that the author's main proposition will be very slightly affected by the success of his endeavours to determine the order and the epochs in which the Attic Dionysia were instituted: and whatever may be



thought of the arguments proposed in the last section, it will be difficult to resist the accumulation of evidence which he has produced for the separate existence of the Lenæa, as a distinct festival celebrated in Gamelion. Still the subject last discussed is one perhaps not less interesting than the main question itself: and therefore our readers will probably not be unwilling to compare Boeckh's view of it with one proposed by Welcker in his *Nachtrag zu der Schrift ueber die Æschylische Trilogie*, from which we subjoin a short extract. The author conceives, that the religion of Bacchus, as one of rustic origin, and long confined to the peasantry who were employed in the care of flocks and the cultivation of the vine, met with opposition from the kings and noble families, as encouraging its followers to rise above their station, and to encroach upon aristocratical privileges. He thinks that the epithets of the god which describe him as a Deliverer (Ἐλευθέριος, Ἐλευθερεύς, Λύσιος, Λυσεύς) refer, not to a release from care and grief, but to the abolition of political distinctions, which the lower classes gradually achieved, and naturally ascribed to their tutelary deity. This he believes to be the real ground of several Attic legends: as that of the stranger Melanthus, who conquers and gains the crown by the aid of Bacchus, who appeared to him in a rustic garb (σὺν ἀγροικικῷ σχήματι Schol. Aristoph. Pac. 890) and was afterward honoured as Διόνυσος Μελανθίδης or Μελάναιγος: that of the daughters of Eleuther (the author, perhaps by mistake, names Erechtheus, but refers to Suidas: Μελαν), who treated the god with contempt, and were punished with madness: that of Ægeus, who, he imagines, represents the Αἰγικορεῖς, the worshippers of Bacchus, and who, though not sprung from the royal line, but only adopted by Pandion, marries the daughter of Hoples, and becomes king of Athens<sup>13</sup>. After

<sup>13</sup> The marriages of Ægeus with Meta (whose name connects her with the noble race of the Μητιονίδαι) with Chalciope daughter of Πηξήνωρ, with Autothe daughter of Perseus, with Æthra daughter of the sage Pittheus, all admit of the same interpretation, if Ægeus represents a class which rose, from a condition of political degradation, to an equality with the races which in earlier times claimed the exclusive possession of power, valour, and wisdom. But in his *Trilogie* the author adopted Mueller's view of Ægeus, as another name for Ποσειδῶν (Αἶγαιος). He now objects to it on the ground that in cases of a double genealogy, like that of Theſeus, there is usually no connexion between the names of the heroic and the divine parent.



this he proceeds as follows : (p. 207.) In a similar sense, it appears to me, we ought to understand the other Attic legend concerning the worship of Bacchus, which relates, that an image of Bacchus Eleuthereus was brought by Pegasus with the sanction of the oracle from Eleutheræ to Athens. The name of Pegasus is derived from the springs which this religion hallowed. Amphictyon was represented in a groupe of figures in clay, entertaining Bacchus with other gods : for in an Amphictyonic confederacy there must always be a variety of gods. The same king made ordinances, regulating the mixture of wine and the mode of drinking, according to gravity and decency. A legend explains the characteristic ceremony of the festival (the *φαλλαγωγίαι*) by the circumstance, that Pegasus was not at first well received by the Athenians. It is not improbable that some old families in the city may have resisted the introduction of these rites : but in such legends there are scarcely any limits to the freedom of fiction. Philochorus on the other hand explains the *Διώνυσος ὀρθός* in the temple of the Seasons, as a sign that men ought to keep their heads up, and not drink to excess ; a practical edifying application, suited to an age which was incapable of entering into the spirit of a physiological religion. The degree in which this incapacity prevailed, is proved by the language of Phanodemus, Theophrastus, Timothæus &c. (above p. 299) which shews that even the true relation of Bacchus to Limnæ (the Attic Nysa), and to water in general, was no longer understood or was explained away. But according to this tradition Bacchus had in fact been entertained in the deme of Semachus, by Semachus and his daughters, to whom he gave the roeskin, and from whom his priestesses descended (Steph. B. *Σημαχίδαι*). Semachus according to Philochorus was in the district of Epacria, probably toward the Bœotian frontier, which is also supposed to have been the situation of Icaria. The cooperation of the oracle may have been a matter of fact : it is also possible that a connexion may have been formed with Eleutheræ, as a place eminently distinguished for the worship of Bacchus, and that an image may have been brought thence. But it is probable that this took place after the union of the Attic *ἀμφικτίονες*, which is expressed by the name of Amphictyon,



so that a general Attic festival was established even before the Great Dionysia of the Thesean city, which themselves were at least earlier than the Ionian migration. As the ancient visit of the God to Icarius, which the oracle itself touches on, did not extend his benefits to Athens and the whole of Attica, a new appearance of the god was exhibited of more comprehensive efficacy. But as from the very notion of an amphictiony there could not be a house of Amphictionids, the priestesses, who are either the Pythian Thyiads, to whom the present of the roeskin seems very appropriate, or the γέραιραι of the Anthesteria, were taken from one of the demes where the worship of Bacchus had been long established, that of the Semachidæ. In Stephanus indeed we only read that his priestesses descended from the daughters of Semachus; but that by these priestesses we are to understand not those of the rural district, but those of the capital, is clear from the statement annexed in Eusebius and Syncellus, that Semachus received this blessing in the reign of Amphictyon. To soften the anachronism others, according to Eusebius, placed the arrival of Bacchus under the no less purely mythical kings, the second Cecrops, and Pandion. It appears to me utterly impossible to determine either the epoch of the god's appearance, or his nature and origin, with the scanty fragments we have remaining of the Atthides, and considering the arbitrary manner in which the traditions of different orders of men, framed with different views, have been, artificially or through misconception, arranged and interwoven according to historical conditions, as if they were all of the same kind. In general however we may say that from times so ancient as to lie beyond the investigation of the most learned Athenians, the worship of Bacchus existed at Icaria, on mount Icarius, at Semachus, Lenæus, Phlyæ, which last place (probably with reference to the Theban worship, though this may have been only an afterthought) honoured the Ismenian nymphs together with Διώνυσος Ἄνθιος, and had dramatic spectacles, and in other demes of Attica; of which several at least pretended to have witnessed a divine revelation and institution of this worship, and celebrated a festival of flowers and another of must, accompanied with Bacchic mummeries: and that their rites, in compliance with the example, and



perhaps at the instigation of Delphi, were adopted into the religion of the state. This adoption is not ascribed to Theseus; but the Oschophoria, a masquerading procession with bunches of grapes, which he is said to have introduced, were probably nothing but an autumnal festival, adopted from one or more of the demes.

That the Delphic oracle, in the exercise of its general superintendence of religious concerns, after having itself united Bacchus so closely as it did with its Apollo, because it was necessary for religious establishments of so national a kind to meet the faith of all classes, by the association of different gods, oracles, and ceremonies, directed the cities also to worship Bacchus, is not surprising. With regard to Athens, beside the support which, as Pausanias relates, Pegasus received from Delphi, the oracle cited by Demosthenes (c. Meidiam, p. 531) is remarkable:

Αὐδῶ Ἑρεχθείδαισιν, ὅσοι Πανδίωνος ἄστὺ  
ναίετε, καὶ πατρίοισι νόμοις ἰθύνεθ' ἐορτάς,  
μεμνήσθαι Βάκχοιο, καὶ εὐρυχόρους κατ' ἀγνιάς  
ἰστάναι ὠραίων Βρομίῳ χάριν ἄμμιγα πάντας,  
καὶ κνισσᾶν βωμοῖσι, κάρη στεφάνοις πυκάσαντας.

The words, ἄμμιγα πάντας, seem not to have been used accidentally and unmeaningly, but to recommend the amalgamation of the different orders. That there was at least occasion for this exhortation, is disclosed by the legend concerning the usage that prevailed at the Anthesteria on the day of the Choes, of drinking, not in common out of the same bowl, but each man separately out of his own cup. Demophon, who here stands for the priest of the united people (θυσία δημοτελής), or Pandion, who represents the union of the tribes and their modes of worship, is said to have introduced this regulation for the national banquet (εὐωχία δημοτελής), and at the same time to have closed the temples, because the matricide Orestes happened just at this time to arrive at Athens, and it was the king's object to avoid admitting him to a share in the drinking bout (ὁμόσπονδος), and yet not to offend him by making him alone drink apart from the rest. He felt the motive, as Euripides says (Iphig. T. 960), and endured the mortification in silence. Here, as the fiction is palpable, and even contradicts chronology, we



see a separation between the worshippers, for which it is difficult to account on any other ground but a reluctance in a part of those who met at the festival to holding entire fellowship with the rest. In the same way I explain the custom of keeping silence at this Orestean meal during the eating and drinking (Plut. Sympos. II. 10. 1). It is however very probable that Orestes was selected for the purpose of the legend, for the sake of a covert allusion to the real motive, the desire of the higher classes to keep aloof from the rustics (*ὄρεσται*), who had been admitted into the phratries: for this same mythical Orestes makes his appearance in another legend, where the allegorical meaning can admit of no doubt<sup>14</sup>.

C. T.

<sup>14</sup> The author alludes to a passage which Stanley in his Commentary on the Greek life of Æschylus quotes from an old Scholiast: *ἐν τοῖς χρόνοις Ὀρέστου ἐθαύμαζετο παρ' Ἑλλησι Θεόμης, ὃς πρῶτος ἐξεῦρε τραγωδικὰς μελωδίας*. He observes, p. 225 "Bentley (Epistola ad Mill. p. 45) quotes these words to ridicule them as a clumsy fiction, because he did not comprehend them as a poetical one. Orestes here again designates the old times and the rustic mode of life, as in the Ætolian legend (Hecataeus in Athen. II. p. 35. Orestheus is father of Φύτιος, father of Οἰνεύς, κληθεὶς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀμπέλων), and as in the Athenian of the Choes: Θεόμης is nothing but Δίομος, who in Sicily passed for the inventor of the herdsman's song (Βουκολιασμός Athen. XIV. p. 619.) and who in Attica was the first who slaughtered the ox at the Buphonia, and is termed priest of Jupiter (Porphyr. de Abstin. II. 22.)"



## ON THE PAINTING OF AN ANCIENT VASE,

FROM THE GERMAN OF UHDEN.

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THE vase, the painting of which is described in the following memoir, was found in Magna Græcia. This painting was most probably, like those of many vases, a copy from some greater work, which, in the style of the composition and the figures, reminds one of the paintings of Polygnotus on the walls of the Lesche at Delphi, described by Pausanias (x. 25–31.): as in them, so in the present instance, the names are annexed to the figures<sup>1</sup>.

And for this we owe the artist many thanks. For without these names, to what explanations and conjectures would not his work have been subject! and how likely would they all have been altogether to miss its real meaning! so destitute are some of the figures of all attributes, while others are invested with attributes, entirely different from those usually attributed to them, which, though perhaps occasionally mentioned in the writings of the ancients, are very seldom, and in part never found on ancient monuments. Considered merely in this respect the present painting is extremely valuable: and it is rendered still more interesting by its subject. For it exhibits one of the most ancient stories of Hercules, which, frequently as the deeds of this hero were the subject of such works, has never yet appeared in any monument hitherto discovered: so that this representation is new, and at present perfectly unique: and since it throws new light on one of the greatest masterpieces of the Attic drama, it unquestionably deserves peculiar attention.

<sup>1</sup> The original of this memoir was read to the Academy of Berlin in November 1810. It was accompanied with a copy of the painting, which is engraved in the Transactions of the Academy: but the minuteness and fidelity of the description will enable the reader to dispense with this illustration. It is also given by Millingen *Peintures des Vases*, T. 51. Tr.



In the centre of the painting is an altar constructed of large rough stones of various sizes, one of the largest, of quadrangular shape, forming the basis, and a similar one the upper slab. On the altar a flame is blazing before the statue of a female deity, here named  $\text{XPY}\Sigma\text{H}$ , which stands on a fluted Doric pillar. On the right of the goddess, by the side of the altar, is standing a robust man, bearded, naked as to the upper part of his body, but clothed in a peplum from his loins downward, wearing an olive garland, and holding his left hand open in the act of praying, his right on the head of a victim, a bullock, toward which his face is turned. Over this figure is painted the name  $\text{HPAK}\Lambda\text{H}\Sigma$ . By the side of the bullock stands a young man with a small travelling-hat on his head, his right arm wrapped in his chlamys, and holding two spears in his left hand: this figure is named  $\text{IO}\Lambda\text{E}\Omega\Sigma$ . Over against Hercules on the left side of the altar stands a female figure, with large wings on her shoulders spread aloft, clad in a tunic with a peplum thrown over it, holding a cup in her right hand, and in the left a large patera, encircled with three sprigs: she is designated by the name  $\text{NIKA}$ . By her side a boy is stooping, apparently for the purpose of putting a lid, which he is holding in both hands, on a fourcornered chest: to this figure no name is annexed.

The painting then represents a sacrifice, offered to a goddess Chryse by Hercules, in the company of his faithful Iolaus, and of a boy, and in the presence of Nika, who, as will be shown in the sequel, probably appears at this sacrifice as a symbol.

In one of the old Scholia to the *Philoctetes* of Sophocles, v. 195, it is distinctly related, that Hercules made a sacrifice on the island of Chryse, when he marched against Troy. Philostratus likewise mentions this sacrifice, though not so expressly<sup>2</sup>. Hercules, in passing over to Asia with his fleet of eighteen, or, as Homer has it, of six ships, to avenge the perfidy of Laomedon, landed on the little island of Chryse, and there sacrificed on the same altar which Jason had erected during the Argonautic expedition. Now if the name

<sup>2</sup> *Imag. Phil. Jun. 17.* In fact he mentions no sacrifice, but only the altar raised by Jason, when sailing to Colchis. But he subjoins, that Philoctetes shewed the altar to the Greeks,  $\epsilon\kappa\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \xi\upsilon\nu\ \text{Ἡρακλεῖ}\ \mu\upsilon\eta\mu\eta\varsigma$ . Tr.



of the tutelary goddess indicates that the scene takes place on the isle of Chryse, then the altar represented is that same altar: one of the most celebrated in antiquity, which the Greeks were bidden by the oracle to search for on their passage to Troy, seventy-five years after it was first erected: which Philoctetes found and cleansed, and from which the snake darted out, which wounded the hero, whose long and cruel sufferings and glorious triumph were exhibited by the three masters of Greek tragedy. He was acquainted with the altar, not from the time when Jason erected it on his way to Colchis: for Philoctetes was not one of the Argonauts, though Hyginus and Valerius Flaccus, without the countenance of any other author, and in contradiction to all chronology, number him among them: his acquaintance with the altar dated from the expedition of Hercules against Troy, on which Philoctetes had accompanied his friend and foster-father. The painting of the vase enables us clearly to understand, how, in the course of more than sixty years, an altar piled like the one here represented, might be covered up, and overgrown with bushes, so that nothing but a lively recollection of the spot where it stood could lead to its discovery; and also how the broad chinks and cavities left by stones so rounded off and laid on one another, might harbour a snake, which might dart forth and wound Philoctetes as he was busied in clearing out the altar.

Altars of this structure are the most ancient of any: they are rarely represented on ancient monuments, and as rarely are they accurately described by ancient writers. It is just such an altar that Apollonius makes the Argonauts pile up with stones on the seashore, before they embark, in honour of Apollo, as the patron of navigation<sup>3</sup>.

Widely different therefore from the original is the strange representation which Dosiadas gave of this same altar in long

<sup>3</sup> 1.402. "Ενθεν δ' αὖ λαΐγγας ἀλός σχεδὸν ὀχλίζοντες Νήεον αὐτόθι βωμὸν ἐπάκτιον Ἀπόλλωνος Ἀκτίου, Ἐμβασιόιο τ' ἐπώνυμον. The word λαΐγγες, here used by Apollonius, has misled his learned Italian translator (L'Argonautica di Apollonio Rodio tradotta ed illustrata, Roma 1791.4) to suppose the altar composed of *pietruzze*: but λαΐγξ is not always used as the diminutive of λᾶς. Hesychius explains λαΐγγες by λίθοι ὑπὸ ὕδατος λελειασμένοι, and Apollonius (iv. 1678) describes Talos as rolling βαρείας λαΐγγας to guard the harbour from the Argonauts. In the former passage therefore he probably had in his mind just such an altar as that represented in the painting.



and short verses, so arranged as to exhibit a cippus with architectural features of a very modern style, no less foreign to the noble simplicity of ancient times in its figure, than the idea and character of the poem itself.

The altar in the painting is consecrated to a goddess, who is set up near it on a fluted Doric pillar. Statues, vessels, and groupes, are not uncommonly represented in ancient monuments placed on single isolated pillars. The purpose of elevating an object of veneration, so that it may be visible from every side, seems most conveniently attained by its position on a pillar. Such pillars grew from the low Doric to the height of the columns of Trajan and M. Aurelius.

The image of the goddess, like the altar, bears the stamp of high antiquity: even in the picture it seems to disclose the material of which it was formed, and presents the appearance of a venerable ξόανον, in the proper sense of the word: a figure carved in wood. The arms, with open palms, are outstretched as in the act of benediction or prayer, as in the images of the Ephesian Diana: unless the symbolical interpretation was annexed in later times to this attitude, whereas in fact the helplessness of art in its earliest stage could devise no other way of separating the arms from the vertical body in the rude human figure, than by a transverse beam<sup>4</sup>. On the head of the goddess is a radiated crown: she is clad in an embroidered tunic, closely fitted to the body, with sleeves, girt with a broad zone above the loins: beside these she has no distinguishing attribute.

But the name affixed in the picture designates her as ΧΡΥΣΗ. The artist followed the legend, according to which it was the tutelary goddess of the isle of Chryse to whom the altar was dedicated on which Hercules sacrificed, which Philoctetes discovered, and where Chryse herself punished his neglect of her love, by the bite of a serpent which issued from her altar.

The island itself, which bore the same name with the

<sup>4</sup> So the celebrated δόκανα at Sparta, the ancient images of the Dioscuri, were a rude representation of two brothers clasping each other in their arms. The vertical beams represented the bodies, the two transverse beams the arms: only we must not conceive that one of these was above and the other below, but that both were carried through the upper part of the bodies, at a small distance from each other.



goddess, was one of the New Islands, *νήσοι νέαι*, that is of those which suddenly emerged from the sea near Lemnos, in consequence of volcanic eruptions<sup>5</sup>. Chryse, which was once not far from Lemnos, as we are informed by Pausanias (VIII. 33. 4) had in that writer's time again sunk into the sea. That this very island of Chryse, and not any other place of the same name, was meant in the legend of Philoctetes, is clear and unquestionable, from the tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides and the Scholia, as has been shewn by several learned commentators.

But who that cruel Chryse was, who inflicted those sufferings on the son of Pœas, when he came to the island which was named after her, is a question on which we have no precise information, except that the commentators with some scholiasts assert, that *Χρύση* is an epithet of Minerva, derived from the island. But they do not consider, that older and learned Scholiasts, as the author of the larger Scholia on the Philoctetes, as well as Eustathius on Homer, very cautiously mention both traditions about Chryse, telling us that according to some authors she is a nymph, according to others *Ἀθηνᾶ Χρύση*: that the Scholia, and other accounts, which exclusively identify Chryse with Minerva, appear to be of later origin, and that a local epithet of Minerva, who it is well known had many such, is scarcely to be found in the works of the ancients, whether poets or prosewriters, without the addition of her proper name.

Our painting seems to add a new and almost irresistible weight to the opinion, that the legend of a nymph Chryse,

<sup>5</sup> These islands were called *νέαι*, like the *Monte nuovo* near Naples, which is of similar origin. The Greeks derive the name from *νέω*, merely as in other instances, for the sake of tacking a legend to it. They are unquestionably the same as those of which Philostratus speaks in the passage above quoted. They are moreover mentioned by Herodotus, Antigonus, Stephanus, Suidas, and Pliny. To them probably belonged also the island Hiera, which lies at about three German miles south of Lemnos, and is now called by the modern Greeks Agiostrati (not Agiostati, as the name is written in Arrowsmith's great map of the world). Cellarius, and some modern geographical writers after him, hold this island to be the Chryse which lay close to Lemnos: though Pausanias, whom they cite, should have restrained them from making so erroneous an assertion, as well by his remark as to the short distance between the two lastmentioned islands, as by his positive statement that Chryse had disappeared. [On the site of Chryse, see Choiseul-Gouffier *Tour pittoresque dans la Grèce* T. II. and Dureau de la Malle, in Malte-Brun's *Annales géographiques* T. IX.]



the tutelary power of her island, had really an independent existence, and did not arise out of the tradition about a Minerva Chryse, but on the contrary gave birth to it with the help of some additions: and that the nymph Chryse was a being totally different from Minerva Chryse. For there is no instance, in descriptions or authentic monuments, of Minerva's being represented so entirely without any of her usual attributes, without helmet, or lance, or ægis, as she would be in this figure of Chryse; not to mention the ornament of the radiated crown, which is wholly foreign to Minerva, though very appropriate to Chryse, as the guardian lady of the island.

Hercules himself is performing the sacrifice: it is drawing to a close: the hero is standing with his face turned toward the victim, from which the hair over the brow has been already cut off, and he is scattering the *οὐλοχύται* on its head: he has a peplum, the gift of Minerva (Apollodor. 2. 4. 11. 9. with Heyne's note. Diodor. iv. 14. and Wesseling) thrown about the lower part of his person: his head is wreathed with a sprig of the wild olivetree, from which he took the chaplet he wore at the first institution of the Olympic games: the leaves and roundish berries are distinctly marked, the latter painted white. The wild olive and the poplar were two trees peculiarly sacred to Hercules; hence it is not unusual to find him crowned with a garland of poplar, which has often been taken for ivy. Hercules is here represented with a beard, as no longer a young man: for he undertook the expedition against Troy at the end of all his labours, after his period of servitude in Lydia had expired.

The horns of the victim are adorned with the woollen *στέμματα*, taken up in coralshaped slips. No instrument for slaughtering it is seen: it will be felled by the strong fist of the hero.

Iolaus, the companion and faithful ally of Hercules, is clad in the ordinary chlamys, and is holding two spears in his left hand: a small travelling-hat, such as often occurs in paintings of vases, and on coins, covers his youthful head.

Nike appears, to announce a certain victory: she stands ready to contract a solemn alliance with Hercules, and to



execute it in due form, she is holding the vessels of the σπονδή, the charger, and the cup, in her hands.

The boy, who seems about twelve years old, and who is busy with the chest which appears to be intended for the safe keeping of the ούλοχύται and the implements pertaining to the sacrifice, is probably no other than Philoctetes himself, who, at the time of the expedition of Hercules against Troy, was about the age of the boy here represented, and who from his childhood accompanied the hero as his ministering attendant, just as he appears in the painting (Philostr. Jun. Im. 17).

The little bush of sprigs with pointed leaves, perhaps of laurel, which is just indicated above the boy's head, marks the place of the sacrifice, the ἀκαλυφῇ σηκόν, as Sophocles calls the roofless inclosure within which the altar of Chryse stood (Phil. 1328).

The vase which contains this remarkable painting has the shape of an inverted bell, resting on one foot, with a handle projecting from each side. It is what the Greeks would have called a κρατήρ. The figures are painted red, on a black ground; the names, as well as some of the ornaments above described, white. The drawing is careless, particularly in the hands and feet. The vase, at the time when the painting was copied, belonged to a private person at Naples<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>6</sup> [The subject of this Memoir has been discussed both by the commentators on the Philoctetes of Sophocles, and by Dissen in Boeckh's edition of Pindar, Explic. p. 511. where he communicates Welcker's view of Chryse, as neither a nymph nor Minerva, but the ancient goddess Thia, whom Pindar invokes in his fourth Isthmian ode: Μᾶτερ Ἀλίου, πολυώνυμε Θεία σέο γ' ἑκατι καὶ μεγασθενῇ νόμισαν χρυσὸν ἄνθρωποι περιώσιον ἄλλων, and who is no other than the Lemnian goddess to whom human victims were sacrificed. (Steph. Byz. Δῆμνος). Welcker finds a confirmation of this opinion in the physiognomy of the goddess represented on the vase, *Oculorum ferocitas deam significat humanas hostias cupientem, quales ei videntur olim oblatae*. But it is difficult to decide, whether what is here described as ferocity, is any thing more than the want of any positive expression, which marks a rude essay of early art. Rückert *Dienst der Athena* p. 67. explains the epithet Χρύση applied to Minerva, from the golden panoply with which she leaped from the head of Jove: so the chorus in the Œd. T. invokes her as χρυσέα θυγατὲρ Διός: so she was represented in the Parthenon.]



## ON CERTAIN AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE PARTICLES OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

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ONE of the characteristics of Horne Tooke's *Diversions of Purley* is the extreme confidence with which he pronounces his opinion even when its grounds are at least very doubtful, and the arrogant manner in which he distributes his scorn on all who have differed, or may hereafter differ, from himself. In the case of Samuel Johnson indeed, there are so many instances in which he merited chastisement, that we do not feel very indignant at his getting a lash or two more than the specific charge warrants. We are disposed as a jury sometimes is, to find him guilty on the ground of general character rather than of the evidence before us. There is one unimportant case in which Horne Tooke has particularly shown this rashness, and has gone out of his way to pronounce that "ridiculous" which he could have had no means of judging. I allude to the place where he says, "But I believe they will be as little able to justify their innovation, as Sir Thomas More would have been to explain the foundation of his ridiculous distinction between *nay* and *no*, and between *yea* and *yes*<sup>1</sup>." In the note he quotes the following passage—a passage far more remarkable as illustrating how the principles of abstract toleration will desert the best and wisest when the opinions they dislike become embodied and attached to the person of an individual opponent, than in any philological view.

"I woulde not here note by the way that Tyndall here translateth *no* for *nay*, for it is but a trifle and mistaking of the Englishe worde: saving that ye shoulde see that he whych in two so plain Englishe wordes, and so common as in *naye*

<sup>1</sup> Div. of Purley, II. p. 496.



and *no*, can not tell when he should take the one and when the tother, is not for translating into Englishe a man very mete. For the use of those two wordes in aunswering a question is this. *No* aunswereth the question framed by the affirmative<sup>2</sup>. As for ensample if a manne should aske Tindall himselfe: ys an heretike mete to translate Holy Scripture into Englishe? lo to thys question if he will aunswere trew Englishe, he must aunswere *nay* and not *no*. But and if the question be asked hym thus lo: Is not an heretyke mete to translate Holy Scripture into English? To this question if he will aunswere true English, he must aunswere *no* and not *nay*. And a lyke difference is there betwene these two adverbs *ye* and *yes*. For if the question bee framed unto Tindall by the affirmative in thys fashion. If an heretique falsely translate the Newe Testament into Englishe, to make his false heresyen seem the word of Godde, be his bookes worthy to be burned? To this questyon asked in this wyse, yf he will aunswere true Englishe, he must auswere *ye* and not *yes*. But nowe if the question be asked him thus lo, by the negative. If an heretike falsely translate the Newe Testament into Englishe to make his false heresyen seme the word of God, be not hys bokes well worthy to be burned? To thys question in thys fashion framed if he will aunswere trew Englishe he may not aunswere *ye* but he must aunswere *yes*, and say yes marry be they, bothe the translation and the translatour, and al that wyll hold wyth them."

It seems highly improbable that Sir Thomas More would have stated the existence of such a distinction, especially in attacking an adversary, unless it either was observed in practice, or sanctioned by the opinion of well informed persons of his own day. So few questions are answered by simple *yes* or *no*, and so few of such questions occur in works of any kind with which I am acquainted, before this time, that I know not how we can determine such a minute point of usage. I cannot find that Tyndal notices so trifling a thing in his answer to More, though the passage may easily have escaped me; but at any rate it appeared

<sup>2</sup> It appears to me according to the instance and the use of the word affirmative a few lines lower down that Sir Thomas Moore meant *nay* here and not *no*.



to me not uninteresting to examine whether there was any difference in the origin of the words themselves which might lead to their different application, for few such usages are owing entirely to accident. I was thus led to look at Rask's Grammar, and from Rask to turn to Grimm's third volume, in the few last pages of which the subject of questions and their answers is discussed with his usual learning. So much it seems necessary to state, more as a sort of apology for the nature of the subject, by explaining how I was led to it, than with the intention of confining my remarks in the following pages to the point which first provoked my curiosity, or labouring to preserve the unity of subject, when anything of interest may suggest itself. My intention is to lay before the English reader some small part of what is stated by Grimm on the subject of interrogative particles and their answers, begging him to remember that all that is valuable, he owes to the learned and laborious German.

Grimm<sup>3</sup> divides questions into subjective and objective: in the former it is the copula, in the latter the subject or predicate which we ask about. The subjective has reference to the knowledge or opinion of the person addressed, the objective to the nature of that of which we are speaking. Thus, "have you seen the man?" (or not<sup>4</sup>) "is he there?" (or not) are subjective and admit in modern English of only one of two answers, *yes* or *no*; whereas in the following, "where have you been? who has done that?" it is to supply the subject or predicate, or something which modifies them that we put the question, and the answer may of course be anything.

The objective interrogative is a sort of indefinite relative of which we are looking (if we may so speak) for the *antecedent*, and in the Sanscrit and all its kindred European tongues the root of its variously modified forms is *K*<sup>5</sup>, *QV*, or *HV*. The Teutonic *h* constantly represents the Greek and Latin *k*; thus we find *καρδία*<sup>6</sup>, *cor*; Gothic, *hairtô*; *κάλαμος*, *calamus*;

<sup>3</sup> III. 751.

<sup>4</sup> Hence probably the Slavonian interrogative particle, *li* as a suffix, identical with *ili* "or." Grimm III. 763.

<sup>5</sup> Grimm, III. 3. 752. Compare Ihre de originibus Ling. Lat. et Græc. with his fragments of Ulphilas. Upsal, 1763, p. 51.

<sup>6</sup> Grimm, I. 587.



Gothic, *halam*, *halm*. This *k* remained in these interrogatives in the Ionic dialect, but in common Greek they commenced with  $\pi$ , which stood in Oscan also where the Latin had *qu*. All that is necessary to illustrate this analogy is to be found in Müller's Etruscans, Vol. I. p. 30<sup>7</sup>. The interchange of these sounds, though apparently not very easy, meets us elsewhere. The Carib tribes have corrupted the Spanish *polvora* into *colvora*<sup>8</sup>: and Scott<sup>9</sup> tells us that "*pa da lin*" would be the first efforts of a Scotch child to ask "Where's David Lindsay?" The labial *p* in this case standing for the guttural *quh*, which the Northern dialect used instead of our *wh*. A more complete case of analogy is found in the Celtic languages<sup>10</sup>: where the Cymric branch retains *p*, the Gaelic has *c*; thus the Bas Breton gives *pevar* and the Welsh *pedwar*, answering to the Æolian  $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\sigma\upsilon\rho\epsilon\varsigma$  and the Oscan *petora*<sup>11</sup>, for *four*, whilst the Erse has *keithar* or *keithra*, corresponding to the Latin *quatuor*; and this, I believe, runs also through the whole class of interrogative and indefinite pronouns. In the Latin *uter*, which answers to the Gothic *huathar*, the aspirate has been dropped and the first syllable contracted into a single vowel. Dacier<sup>12</sup> has well remarked that *piam* in *nuspian* and *quispian* stand for *quam* in *quisquam* and *nusquam*, just as the Oscan *pitpit* of Festus does for *quidquid*. Müller observes that the Greek relative  $\delta\varsigma$  must have lost its rough guttural sound very early<sup>13</sup>.

In subjective questions the Gothic used a suffix *u* in translating passages in which, in the Greek, the form of expression was the same as the mere affirmation; as *skuldu* ist kaisaragild giban kaisara? ἔξεστι κῆνσον καίσαρι δοῦναι<sup>14</sup>; In questions put negatively they used *niu*, a compound of *ni* and the *u*, answering exactly to the Latin *nonne*. These

<sup>7</sup> There is no need of dwelling on a point so generally known. The reader may compare Grimm, III. p. 1. Müller Dorians, II. App. VIII. p. 585. Niebuhr, Vol. I. For an aspirated form,  $\phi\eta$ , see Buttmann's Lexilogus, I. p. 236.

<sup>8</sup> Waterton's Wanderings, p. 73.

<sup>9</sup> Notes to Marmion, canto IV. note 4.

<sup>10</sup> Müller Etrusker, p. 32. Grimm, III. 2. note. Lluhyd's Archæologia Britan. pp. 134. 135.

<sup>11</sup> Festus in v. petoriturum.

<sup>12</sup> Ad Festum. in v. quispian.

<sup>13</sup> Etrusker. I. 31. note. Grimm, III. p. 23. note.

<sup>14</sup> Grimm, III. 753.



two modes of expressing the interrogative are wanting in the other Teutonic dialects.

Notker<sup>15</sup>, in his Psalms, and he alone, uses *na* to express a question; appended generally, though not always, to the end of the sentence, and only when a negative particle has preceded. It thus answers very nearly to the Latin *ne* in *nonne* and the Gothic *u* in *niu*: for example, *ne bist tu der na? esne ille?*

The Gothic *an* heads the sentence *an hua táujáima?* τί οὖν ποιήσομεν; Luke III. 10. *An huas* Grimm considers as equivalent to καὶ τίς, and thinks that the first of these words gives an emphasis to the question, just as *ec* in *ecquid*, which probably is formed by assimilation to the following consonant, from *et-quid*. The only case in which he quotes it in a subjective question is *annuh* Thiudans is Thu? οὐκ οὐν βασίλευς εἶ σύ; Luke XVIII. 37. The Old High German particle answering to the Gothic *annuh* is *innû*, *inû*, *ëno*, or with a sort of reduplication, *inûnû*. It sometimes expresses *num* and sometimes *nonne*, and is principally used by Notker in affirmative questions, *na* in negative; the former heads the sentence, the latter mostly closes it.

I have thus ventured to try the patience of the reader by mentioning the principal forms of the old Teutonic interrogatives given by Grimm, without however entering into the detail or citing the examples which are to be found in his Grammar. He considers the simple *an* as a transposition of *na*, and identical with the Latin *an*, and suggests in a note the possibility of a relationship to the Greek particle ἄν; a supposition which does not seem improbable, when we consider the natural connection of the duties which both perform, and the application of such words as πῶς, ποτε, κ. τ. λ. in an *indefinite* and *interrogative* sense.

The result is that there are three forms of the simple interrogative particle<sup>16</sup>. 1st, The Gothic *u*, related probably to the Greek οὐ; 2d, the Gothic *nu*, Old High German *nû*, Sanscrit *nu*, Latin *ne*, Greek μή, Old High German *na*; 3d, the Gothic *an*, Old High German *in*, Latin *an*, Greek οὖν.

<sup>15</sup> Notker was a monk of St Gall, who died 1022, and was distinguished from two others of the same name by the epithet of Labeo. His Psalms were published in Schilter, Vol. I.

<sup>16</sup> P. 760.



It is remarkable that all these are connected with the negative and, in the languages we are familiar with, with the inferential particles; as well as in some cases with the adverbs of time<sup>17</sup>. The feeling which produced the relationship with the first is probably the wish to suggest what one does *not* believe to be the case as the point to be examined, and thus dare a denial. When I say, Is it *not* so? I call upon the person addressed to deny my opinion, if he can, putting the negative pointedly before him. Perhaps it may be worth while to remark a case, not mentioned by Grimm, of the connection in Greek between the words which ask a question and denote an inference, I mean that of *ἄρα* and *ἄρα*; take for instance the following line of the Alcestis:

*ἄρα τὸν ξενον*

*στυγῶ δικάως ἐν κακοῖς ἀφιγμένον;*

if we write it in the usual way, interrogatively, and translate *ἄρα* “nonne,” the sense will be the same as if we omit the question, and understand it as strongly affirmative. Hence it is, I conceive, that Porson says in his *Præf. ad Hecub.* p. x, “in hisce interrogandi formulis negantem particulam pro arbitrio addunt vel omittunt Tragici.” Not that it was originally immaterial whether the negative was inserted or not, but that to ask a question negatively is equivalent to an assertion. The case was originally parallel to that of *οὐκοῦν* and *οὐκουν*; “apud veteres Atticos utraque particula semper propriam suam significationem servat. Ego ubique *οὐκ οὖν* scribo, *adhibita, prout opus est, vel omissa interrogatione*<sup>18</sup>. So that perhaps the passage in the *Œdipus Tyrannus* might be pointed thus,

*ἄρ' ἔφυν κακός·*

*ἄρ' οὐχὶ πᾶς ἀναγνος;*

The first clause asserting directly, the second interrogatively. When therefore we are told<sup>19</sup> to translate *ἄρα* by “nonne,” it might not have been amiss to have accounted for this ap-

<sup>17</sup> Compare *nam*, *οὖν*, *μήν*, *num*, *nunc*, *nun*, *νῦν*, and the usage of *ποτε* and *tandem* in questions.

<sup>18</sup> Elmsley ad Heraclid. 256.

<sup>19</sup> Monk ad Alcest. 351. cf. Hermann ad Vig. 292. 295. Porson had formerly corrected the line quoted above,

*ἄρ' οὐ τὸν ξένον, κ. τ. λ. Adversaria, 222.*



parent indifference of the absence or presence of *οὐ*. That the accent does not necessarily vary according to the interrogative or inferential sense has been already remarked by Hermann on Aristophan. *Nubes*. 1305. "Errant qui particulam *ἄρα* nonnisi in interrogationibus circumflecti volunt, quum accentuum ratio ubique *ἄρα* scribi postulat ubi prima longa est<sup>20</sup>, etiamsi interrogatio nulla sit. Ita contra sæpe *ἄρα*, primâ brevi, quod respuit circumflexum in interrogationibus est<sup>21</sup>." Dindorf has accordingly printed the line without a question:

Φεύγεις ; ἔμελλον σ' ἄρα κινήσειν ἐγώ.

After the simple interrogative particles of the old Teutonic dialects, which are mentioned above, and which are extinct in the modern German, Grimm notices some of a more complicated form. Of these I shall only remark the "ist wân?" for "num" or "numquid" of the old German glosses, and the Northern *mun*. The former he considers to be derived from *wân* opinio not *wan* defectus, and the latter is the third singular of the auxiliary *muna*, μέλλειν. Its derivatives, *monn* in Swedish and *mon* in Danish, are the only remains of that verb in those languages<sup>22</sup>. Both these interrogative forms are grounded on the connection between intention and futurity; at least if *muna* be related to the Gothic *munan* and the German *meinen*. There is also in Icelandic a verb, *man*, recordor<sup>23</sup>. The same relationship may perhaps account for the nearness of the forms μέλει and μέλλω. But Grimm's observation, that the resemblance of this Northern *mun* to the Greek μῶν<sup>24</sup> (μὴ οὖν) is merely accidental, is such a warning to ignorant and rash etymologists as to check me from yielding to the temptation of entering

<sup>20</sup> This is a parallel case to the change of accent in ἡμῖν and ὑμῖν. See Pors. Præf. ad Hec. xxxv. Elmsley Præf. ad Æd. Tyr. x.

<sup>21</sup> e. g. οὕτως ἄρ', αὖ παῖ, ταῦτά σοι δεδογμένα ; Æd. Col. 1433.

<sup>22</sup> It is singular enough that the equivalent German auxiliary *werden* is preserved *English* only in *one* obsolete phrase—"Woe worth the day." I have doubted whether *woe* were here a substantive or an adjective, as in the *Childe of Elle*, and elsewhere:

"And aye her heart was *woe*."

But the analogy of the phrase "woe is thee," and "well is thee," (in the *Psalms*) seems to show that it is a substantive.

<sup>23</sup> Grimm, i. p. 926. Hicke's Thesaurus, II. 84. who conceives the Northern phrase, "I *mun* do it," to be a relic of this verb. Vol. i. p. 87. (?)

<sup>24</sup> Etym. Magnum. p. 596. f. 23.



more fully into the possible connection of this root with other Greek verbs<sup>25</sup>.

A subjective question may be answered in the affirmative by repeating the word on which the stress was laid in the question, or by an affirmative particle, or by uniting the two. The first of these methods is the most usual in Latin, which possesses no negative or affirmative particles, properly so called, *as answers*.

Scin' me tuum esse herum Amphitruonem? scio.

Plaut. Amph. v. 1. 30.

Egone istuc dixi? Tute istic (*istuc. Meursius*).

Amph. II. 2. 115.

As these questions have reference to the decision of the person addressed *ain'* is often prefixed, and then the answer will be by repeating the first person *aio*. But in one or two cases the usage of *ita* and *non* by themselves approaches very nearly to that of independent affirmative and negative particles. Thus in the Eunuch of Terence, IV. 4. 29,

*Dor.* Venit Chærea.

*Phæd.* Fraterne? *Dor.* Ita. *Phæd.* Quando? &c.

*Dor.* De istac rogas

Virgine? *Pyth.* Ita. IV. 4. 54.

Vidistin' fratrem Chæream? *Dor.* Non. IV. 4. 46.

*Æschinus.* Nonne hæc justa tibi videntur postea?

*Micio.* Non. *Adelph.* IV. v. 27.

Still the Latin language does not seem to have possessed any particles like our *yes* appropriated to the answer of subjective questions, and necessarily unconnected with any words following them. They seem to have used *ita*, *immo*, *non*, *minime* elliptically, by which I merely understand that they could have been connected with and formed part of a regularly constructed sentence, and they only answer the purpose of negatives and affirmatives by supplying the place of what might have accompanied them. Thus in the above cases of *ita*, the answer might have been "*ita est*," "*ita rogo*;" and again, "*non vidi*" and "*non videntur*:" whereas such words

<sup>25</sup> I only mention the interchange of λ and ν in the Cretan βέντιον for βέλτιον, and the Sicilian ἦνθον for ἦλθον, φίντατος for φίλτατος (Müller's Dorians, II. Append. VIII. p. 504), considered with *muna*, μένειν, μέλει, μέλλω, *meinen*, *mens*, &c. Is it possible that the original idea should have been that of *thinking about a thing*?



as *yes* or *no* are incapacitated from forming part of any phrase, and are equally strong when unaccompanied. In Greek, *vaí* and *ov* stand by themselves as answers, but the same remark will apply to this latter particle as to *ita* and *non*; *vaí* is the Latin *næ*, and, as Grimm observes, seems, singularly enough, allied to the negative. He purposely avoids entering upon the subject of this connection. May it not have arisen from the use of the negative, like our “*nay*,” *immo*, or *anzi* (*ante*), in Italian? which are negative, inasmuch as they object to the preceding phrase as not being strong enough, whilst they agree with its general meaning and enhance its force? Certainly in these cases the negative and affirmative senses often approach very near to one another, as, for instance, in the following passage of B. Jonson: “A good man always profits by his endeavour, *yea*, when absent; *nay*, when dead, by his example and memory.”

The affirmative particle is in the Gothic *jai*, sometimes *ja*<sup>26</sup>. Old High German *jâ*<sup>27</sup>. Anglo-Saxon *gëa*, English *yea*; and from the junction of this with *sî* (*sit*) sprung the Anglo-Saxon *gese* and our *yes*, to which in Saxon there was a corresponding negative *nese*. The third way of answering a question by the union of a particle with some word on which an emphasis is placed, shows itself, when *ja* and *ne* are joined with the personal pronouns:—Thus, *ja ich*—*ja du*—*ja er*, were used; and the answer in the Anglo-Saxon version given by John to those who asked him, “Art thou that prophet,” is “*nic*.” It is on this usage that Grimm grounds his conjectures as to the origin of the French affirmatives. Besides *si* from *sic* or *sit*, it is known to everybody that the French language possessed the two

<sup>26</sup> This particle *ja* is an element also of the Gothic copula *jah*. Grimm (III. 270) consider the *h* to come from *hu* equivalent to the Latin *que*; we have seen above that analogy warrants this change of letters, and it is further borne out by *suah*, *sic*, and *huazuh*, *quisque*, &c. I cannot acquiesce in the notion of the Latin *et* and the Greek *τε* being a mere case of transposition, not so much on account of the different position they hold in a sentence as a leading word and an enclitic, (at least if we admit the view of *an* and *na* above), but because I consider that *τε* stands in the same relation to *que*, that *τις* does to *quis*, and *τέσσαρες*, to *quatuor*. The Oscan *pe* completes this analogy, and in the same way, *ποτε* and *ότε* become *ποκα* and *οκα* in Doric, (Müller, Etrusker, p. 30, 31, note) unless indeed he considers all of these forms as originally identical, and that usage made *et* and *καί* the leading, *que* and *τε* the enclitic copular.

<sup>27</sup> *Ya* is used by Barbour. See Jamieson in v.



affirmative particles which characterized their respective dialects, and served as landmarks of the provinces in which they prevailed—*oil*—and *oc*. From *oil*, that belonging to the North of France, came the modern French *oui* by dropping the *l*; as at the present day they constantly pronounce Neuilly, *Newiy*, the *l* being hardly perceptible; and as in Italian, it was after a consonant supplanted by the vowel *i*. Le Duchat in his notes to *Menage*<sup>28</sup> has justly remarked that this fact of its having been *oil* overthrows the Etymology of “*hoc est*,” which his author maintains to be the true one. At the same time he suggests one rather more improbable, “*hoc illud*”! Horne Tooke’s adoption of the derivation from *oui*, the part participle of *ouir*, is a good specimen of the practice of fitting etymologies on to words as they exist at present, without taking the trouble of searching into their history. This becomes valueless the moment one recurs to the earlier form *oil*. Grimm, whilst he does not consider the conjecture satisfactory, suggests that *oil* may be a modification of the particle *ja* joined with the pronoun of the third person, like the German *ja er*, and *oc* the same particle with the first person *ic*, equivalent to *ja ich*. The analogy of *nenil* is strongly in favour of this derivation and the objection that we find them applied to *all* persons as well as the *third* and *first* is not conclusive, for words in such frequent use might very soon cease to be changed according to the sense, especially if formed in the intercourse of two races, imperfectly acquainted with each other’s language; a circumstance which may account for the adoption of the Roman pronoun *il* in one case, and the German *ich* in the other. The use of the negative of the third or first person for all the others does not appear more irregular than such phrases as the Greek *ἐστὶν οἱ*, where the grammatical connection is completely gone; if indeed the question be asked why the Provençal should have selected the first, and the Northern dialect, the third person, I do not know that we can assign a more satisfactory reason, than for the fact, that the Italians took the termination of the ablative for their nouns in the singular number, and the Spaniards that of the accusative for their nouns in the plural.

<sup>28</sup> Etymologie Francaise, 1750, in v. ouy.



Our author rejects the connection of the particle *ja* with *jehan* to say<sup>29</sup>, and his reasons are strong. *Jehan* itself is according to him formed irregularly (*unorganisch*) from *îah* the præterite of *eihhan* the Old High German verb corresponding with the Gothic *aikan*, (Latin, *aijere*), of which the past tense was *aiáik*. Now as the particle *ja* exists in Gothic, it clearly could not come from a derivative of a tense of a High German verb. It ought rather to have been *aik* or *ai* in Gothic—but is it not possible that it may have been a transposition of this syllable, like *na* and *an*, *en* and *ne*<sup>30</sup>, or his own still bolder case of *et* and *τε*?

Our English *ay* may perhaps be looked on as confirming this view, and being a transposition of *ja*. Thus the process would have been reversed and *ja* changed again to *ai*; but there is perhaps greater reason to suppose that it is the Saxon *á*, of which we shall have occasion to speak a little further on; especially from the use of *aye* in the sense for *ever*. All such conjectures are idle when opposed to Grimm's learning and thorough knowledge of his subject, which I doubt not would have suggested what I have stated, had there not been some objection which I do not see.

The Gothic particle used in negative answers was *né*, but the other Teutonic dialects seem early to have adopted a less simple form. The High German is *nein*; the Anglo-Saxon *ná*, which is our English *no*. *Nein* is compounded of *ni-ein*, just as *non* in Latin was from *ne unum*, *nenum* is quoted by Nonius Marcellus from Lucillius and Varro, and it occurs in Lucretius<sup>31</sup> without the final *m*. Grimm supposes *unum* to have been<sup>32</sup> *ænum*, and compares *pæna*, *pænio*—*mania*—*munio*—*pomærium*—*murus*. Vossius admits this derivation of *non*, but conjectures that *nenum* may be from *νη*—*όν*. He then derives from *nenum* the French *nenil* and the Dutch *neen*! In Latin this compound *non*

<sup>29</sup> The verb *jahan* or *jehan* exists in Switzerland still, exactly in the sense of *aio* "was *jeh*t er?" was *spricht er?* (Simmenthal,) Stalders, Schweizerisches Idiotikon, Vol. II. p. 72.

<sup>30</sup> III. p. 711. 746. See Von der Hagen's Glossary to the Nibelungen lied in v. *en* or *ne*.

<sup>31</sup> III. 200, IV. 716. Scaliger would read, "*nenu expetet*" for "*nemo expetet*," Ter. Eunuch, I. 1. 7. ad Varron. p. 222.

<sup>32</sup> See Hesychius, *οὐνίζειν* τὸ μονάζειν κατὰ γλῶσσαν.



became the principal negative in conjunction with the verb. In German *nein* is only the answer to a question. In our own language and in German, *not* and *nicht*<sup>33</sup> have usurped the place of the simple negative *ne*, which we find in Chaucer, and which gave much greater flexibility to the language from its position before the verb.

Our own negative *no*, which enters into the composition of *not*, is satisfactorily shown by Grimm to consist of *ne*, and the Anglo-Saxon *á*, *ever* or *always*. The Gothic form of this was *ai*<sup>34</sup> (compare Greek *ἀει*; Latin *ævum*) and *ni-aiv* meant *never*. The Old High German used *éo* and *io*, whence *nieó*, *neó*, *nio*, and in composition *neóman*, *neówiht*, *no-man*, *nothing*. When therefore we say “no one,” it is originally the same phrase as the vulgarism “never a one.” *Never*, itself is compounded with the Dative, as Grimm supposes, of a lost substantive *æfer*, *æver*, derived from *áv* Gothic *aiv*. I am not aware of any traces in English of the Anglo-Saxon<sup>35</sup> *ne se* answering to their affirmative *ge se*; so that since the extinction of *nay* in common conversation, *no* is our only negative answer to subjective questions. There may be a question raised with regard to the origin of our *nay* or *nai*, and of the following suppositions I hardly know which is most probable; first that *ay* is the Saxon *á*, *ever*, which seems likely from the reason stated above, and that *nay* is that word with the negative prefixed, and therefore originally the same as *no*. The former perhaps being formed by the written language, the latter by the usual change of the broad *á* into *o*, as *ác*, *oak*, *bán*, *bone*. Or, secondly, that *nay* is the Gothic negative *né*, and unconnected with the affirmative particle which it resembles. It may be worth while perhaps to return for a moment to the distinction of Sir Thomas More, now that we have in some degree considered the origin of the particles which he speaks of. The difference asserted by him to exist, is, that *yea* and *nay* are the answer to the

<sup>33</sup> These two words are the same, and both mean *nothing*. The variations are, Old High German, *néowiht*, *niowicht*, *nieht*. Middle High German, *nicht*, *niht*. Modern High German, *nicht*. Anglo-Saxon, *náviht*, *náuht*, *nauht*. English, *nought*, *not*. Grimm III. 64, 721.

<sup>34</sup> Grimm III. 140. 67.

<sup>35</sup> Rask. p. 133. Grimm III. 766.



questions in which no negative is inserted, or when the opinion of the *speaker is not declared*. *Yes* and *no*, to those, in which by *expressing the negative*, the question is equivalent to, or implies an assertion on the part of him who proposes it. *Gese* and *nese* would apply more fitly to the case where a previous assertion is made, than to one where nothing has been pronounced before, and we find *nese* used in this manner, equivalent to “it is not so.” John vii. 12. “sume cwædon, he ys gód, oðre cwædon, *ne se*.” But nevertheless, I doubt very much whether the distinction that More upholds existed in Anglo-Saxon, at least in John xxi. 5, we find it disregarded in the case of *ne se*, cweðe ge hæbbe ge sufoll? Hig andswarodon hym, *ne se*.” It may however have grown up after this period, and yet be not the less grounded on a real difference in the words. The better way will be to go through the passages in the New Testament, in which the words *nay*, *yea*, and *yes* occur, and compare in each case the translation of Wiclif and of Tyndal. To begin with that in which Tyndal is attacked by More; John i. 21; “art thou that prophet?” is answered by *nay* in Wiclif’s translation, *no* in Tyndal, and *no* in our authorized version, John xxi. 5, “Children have ye any meat?” in Wiclif *nai*; Tyndal, *no*; our version, *no*; Luke xii. 51, “Suppose ye that I am come to give peace on earth?” is answered by *nay* in all these translations, and in the Anglo-Saxon by *ne*. The same is the case with the affirmative questions. Luke xiii. 3—5; Rom. iii. 9, “Are we better then than they?” in Wiclif the reply is *nai*; in Tyndal and the modern version *no*; but in the 27th verse of the same chapter, all use *nay*. In Cranmer’s Bible, Haggai ii. 12, (an affirmative question) is answered by *no*. In Coverdale’s and in our version, the negative question, Zech. iv. 5, “Knowest thou not what these be?” is replied to by *no*. It is clear I think, from these instances, that the distinction was practically gone in Henry VIII<sup>th</sup> time, however More might wish to renew it to disparage his opponent. But it is singular that whereas in the later translations, *no* and *nay* seem used indifferently, in no one of these cases of affirmative questions does *no* occur in Wiclif. Unfortunately I do not know of any *negative* question answered by a negative particle in the New Testament; if such



an instance should be pointed out, and Wiclif there used *no*, it would be pretty well decided that he acknowledged the usage.

With *yea* and *yes* there is not so much difficulty. In Matth. ix. 28, xiii. 51, Acts v. 8, xxii. 27, (all affirmative questions,) *yea* is used by Wiclif, by Tyndal, and by our own version. Whereas in Rom. iii. 29, "Is he the God of the Jews only? is he *not* also of the Gentiles?" *Yes*, is the answer in *all these translations*. I am aware that the number of instances I have cited is too small to form a complete induction; but I trust that some other person whose reading in the older writers is more extensive than my own, may point out such others as may decide the question. As it is, it seems as if there was *some* foundation for More's rule, though it evidently soon ceased to be observed. At any rate, trifling as such speculations are, I trust, one or two points may have been recalled to the reader's mind in these few pages, bearing on that most interesting fact<sup>36</sup>, "*that we too are sprung of Earth's first blood, and that our speech is the title deed of our descent from it.*"

<sup>36</sup> See p. 212 of this work, Vol. II.

E. W. H.



[THE perusal of the foregoing essay has induced us once more to draw on the treasures of the Berlin Academy, and to communicate to our readers a short memoir contained in the Transactions of the years 1812—1813, which will certainly be read with pleasure by all who take an interest in the subject discussed by our correspondent.]

## ON OC AND OYL,

PARTICULARLY WITH REFERENCE TO WHAT DANTE SAYS  
ON THE SUBJECT. BY J. E. BIESTER.

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ONE of the most remarkable, and (which is here of the greatest importance) one of the earliest passages relating to the two affirmatives of the elder French language, *oc* and *oyl* (or *oil*), occurs in Dante's work *de vulgari eloquentia*. This little work of the great poet, written in Latin, remained long unknown and in manuscript. When in 1529, that is, more than 200 years after it was written, Trissino published an Italian translation of it, doubts were started of its genuineness, and it was suspected of being a forgery of Trissino himself (for it was soon discovered that he, not the Genoese Doria, under whose name he attempted to conceal himself, was the editor or translator), and of being designed to support certain doctrines which he had previously maintained on the subject of poetry and of the Italian language, corresponding with those which appeared in this treatise. Such for instance was the judgement pronounced by Varchi (*Ercolano, dubit.* 6), who too boldly asserts that nobody had ever seen or known anything of the original. There were however several copies of it in existence, and accordingly the Latin text was edited in 1577, after the death of Varchi and Trissino, by Corbinelli, no partizan of the first translator, with whom on the contrary he declares himself by no means



satisfied. Indeed, without prejudice to Trissino's other merits, it is impossible to give him credit for a work, which in knowledge of the ancient literature, and still more in point of intelligence, far exceeded the compass of his abilities and acquirements. The controversy, or rather the doubt, lasted yet for some time; but the best Italian critics have long since decided that the treatise belongs to the great Florentine poet. Among others see Muzio (in his *Varchino*) who asserted this even in 1570, before the original was printed, Fontanini (*Eloqu. Ital. libro 2*), and Scip. Maffei, in his preface to the new edition of Trissino's works. Corbinelli's edition, which was published at Paris, was long the only one, and hence the Latin text was extremely rare, for which reason it was annexed to the translation in the new edition of Trissino 1729: but without Corbinelli's valuable Italian notes on the first book, which Maffei had meant to have also reprinted.

Now in this work (lib. i. cap. 8) Dante, singularly enough, determines the diversity of nations and their languages, according to their *affirmative particles*. In his great poem indeed he characterizes Italy in the same way, as the land where the *si* is heard, and one of its districts as that in which men say *sipa*<sup>1</sup>. Strange as it may appear that he should have selected these particles for his purpose, though in fact they are subject to less alteration than other words, one cannot but be struck with surprize and admiration, at finding that his piercing intellect had already recognized the truth, that language is the criterion of national descent. In the abovequoted passage of his Latin work, he gives a general division of the European nations, as after the confusion of language they either moved westward to occupy our quarter of the globe for the first time, or having originally sprung from it returned to their ancient seats, a point

<sup>1</sup> Infern. 33. 80 : Ahi Pisa, vituperio delle genti  
Del bel paese là, dove il sì suona.

and 18. 60

— lingue apprese

A dicer sipa tra Savena e'l Reno.

These two rivulets bound the city of Bologna and a part of its territory. According to the commentators and the Della Crusca Dictionary the Bolognese use or did use *sipa* for *si*: Fernou on the other hand explains it by *sia*.



on which he does not decide: His division is: northern Europeans: southern Europeans: *et tertii quos nunc Græcos vocamus partem Europæ partem Asiæ occuparunt.* a) He draws the line of northern Europe from the mouth of the Danube or the Palus Mæotis, above the boundaries of Italy and France, to the ocean which washes the western coast of England. Here, he says, there was formerly but one language, which affirmed with *jo*: this was afterwards split into several *vulgaria*, by means of Sclavonians, Hungarians, Germans, Saxons, and English: but as a proof of their common origin almost all the nations of these northern countries still use the affirmative particle *jo*. b) He touches but briefly on the people dwelling to the east of Hungary, and extending into Asia, whom he calls Greeks (meaning as is evident the subjects of the Byzantine empire), and does not give their affirmative particle. c) Southern Europe, that included within the line traced as above, has also, he says, in substance only one language, derived from the Latin, as is proved by the words there used for *Deus, cælum, amor, Mare, terra, vivit, moritur*, and almost all the rest. For the word *amor*, by way of proof and at the same time to illustrate his subdivision, he quotes three passages from as many poets, one Provençal, one French, one Spanish. For, he proceeds in the same chapter, the southern language is again divided into three dialects; some affirm with *oc*, others with *oyl*, others with *si*; *utputa Yspanii, Franci, Latini*. Why he here terms the Provençals Spaniards, we shall consider hereafter. His *Franci* are the French. *Latini* is the name by which he describes the Italians, both here and in the *Divina Comedia*, as is also the practice of his contemporary countrymen.

He now proceeds to determine the seats of these nations: those who use *oc* dwell westward of Genoa, and down toward the south; those who affirm with *si*, eastward to the Adriatic, and southward as far as Sicily, that island included; those who say *oyl* are seated to the north of the first, are bounded on the north by the English sea, and Germany, that is, by those who affirm with *jo*, and on the south *Provincialibus et Apennini devectione clauduntur*. Here therefore he himself names the Provençals (*Provin-*



*ciales*) as those who use *oc*, as he designates the Italians who say *si* by their mountains, the Apennines, which begin in the territory of Genoa. But what might create some surprize, is the clause he adds concerning the French properly so called (the people who affirm with *oyl*): *et montibus Aragoniæ terminati*; so that he does not, as is usually the case, assign the whole of Southern France, but only its eastern half, to the language of *oc*. This however is in some respects really more accurate; the *oc* language belonged principally to the coast of the Mediterranean. Whether, as is most probable, it spread from Provence and crossed the Pyrenees, or, as patriotic Spaniards insist, travelled from Catalonia into France;—at all events its principal seat was always on this coast: in Provence, Languedoc, thence turning aside to Gascony, and only a little higher in the Limosin; further in Barcelona or Catalonia, the adjacent kingdom of Aragon, which was long united with Catalonia, moreover Valencia, as far as Murcia; and also in the islands Minorca, Majorca, Ivica, and even Sardinia. These are the countries in which this language flourished, and for the most part still subsists. Now Dante is perfectly right, in not extending this language of *oc* in the south of France westward as far as the Atlantic; for there, in Navarre and a part of Aquitaine, an entirely different language prevailed—the Bask. But whether he confounded this with the French (the *oyl*), since he extends this last as far as the mountains of Aragon, or whether a strip of the *oyl* really ran down between the Bask and the *oc* into Spain, I do not venture to decide. It is true that in any case he has not noticed the Bask, any more than the Bas-Breton in the north-west of France; but then the subject of his treatise was no other than the languages of *oc*, *oyl*, and *si*; though, as a man of vigorous mind and original genius, he at the same time took a higher point of view for a general survey of the principal European languages, which however do not include tongues confined to so narrow a compass as the Bask, and the ancient British.

We now proceed to consider two important remarks of Dante on the literature of the abovementioned three languages, since it is on account of their literature that languages



are most interesting to us. These remarks relate to the antiquity and the contents of each literature. 1) In his admirable work, the *Vita Nuova*, he says (Keil's edition, p. 52) of the *lingua d'oco*, and *lingua di si*, that it was not more than 150 years since poems had been composed in these vulgar tongues (in contradistinction to the genuine Latin), and these only love-poems, designed for female readers, who would have found it too difficult to understand Latin verses. With his usual accuracy and precision, he twice declares, "I only say among us (*tra noi*), since the case may have been different with another people." These 150 years would reach to the middle, or up to the beginning of the 12th century, and in fact among the Provençal poets, who are admitted to be earlier than the Spanish, the Italian, and the French, none is certainly known to have preceded William, count of Poitiers, born 1077, dec. 1126. Here we are naturally led to think of the Germans, the first of whose *Minnesaenger*, Henry of Veldeck, sang not long after count William, scarcely a century after his birth. *Titurel* was written, according to Docen, about 1189: according to the more critical opinion of A. W. Schlegel, about 1221<sup>2</sup>. Though the latter date is about a century later than the death of the first Provençal poet, it is still just a hundred years earlier than the death of Dante: and though the subject and title of the poem shew that it was founded on the lays of southern poets, still it is manifest from the extreme beauty of the thoughts, the poetical expressions, and the metrical form, that the art must have been then practised for many generations by a series of very successful masters. Still greater is the antiquity of the poetical panegyric on S. Anno. Nothing can be produced in the literature of the south to be compared, in point of antiquity, with Otfried, who wrote his great German poem in the 9th century, and yet mentions earlier lays<sup>3</sup>, which in fact he wished to banish out of popular use by his own, because they appeared to him trifling and indecent. It would lead us too far, if we were to dwell on this subject; we therefore only refer to the two German poems of the 8th century published

<sup>2</sup> Docen's *Titurel*, p. 12 and 56, note. Schlegel's review in the *Heidelberg Jahrb. Novemb.* 1811. p. 1073.

<sup>3</sup> In his Latin dedication to the Archbishop of Mayence.



by the brothers Grimm, and to the Nibelungen, though we only possess this immortal work in secondary forms. 2) Dante (*de vulg. eloqu.* lib. i. cap. 10) briefly and happily distinguishes the qualities of the literatures of *oc*, and of *oyl*, which afterwards became the subject of a controversy, which excited almost as much zeal and jealousy as the rival literary pretensions of northern and southern Germany. The great Florentine, who was well acquainted with France, partly through his teacher Brunetto Latini, who resided there long, and even wrote an important work in French, and partly by personal inspection, calls the language of *oc* the elder and sweeter for poetry, that of *oyl* on the other hand the more polished and elegant for prose: this last, he says, possesses the Bible and the histories of Troy and Rome, and the beautiful chivalrous tales of king Arthur. It is nearly in the same way that Le Grand d'Aussy extols northern France on account of the more varied subjects of its poetry: whereas southern France, according to him, can produce nothing but monotonous love-songs, and for instance, no tales and histories. Millot, provoked by this reproach, brings forward some pretty Provençal stories. On the whole however Dante's observation is probably correct, though neither of the contending parties seem to have been acquainted with it: the greater luxuriance of nature has perhaps a tendency to inspire occasional strains and short tender lays, which however charming, and masterly in their form, weary in the end, and this narrowness of range may have been the cause of the early extinction of the Provençal poetry.

To proceed: Dante speaks fully enough of the *lingua oc*, but means nothing by it but the language itself. He has no name, such as Languedoc, for the country. On the other hand it is notorious that it was usual to say *lingua*, *langue*, for *people* or *nation*: and it was a very easy transition to use the same word for the land of the people which spoke the language. Still it is probable that there are not many examples of a country's being described by a word or expression of the language spoken in it. It is quite another thing when Dante uses *lingua d'oco*, *lingua di si*, shortly to designate the languages which contain those particles. But he does not say *the land of si* for Italy, the *district of sipa* for Bologna.



So it is quite another thing when in France, to which we must look for the name Languedoc, we read in ancient documents, *langue de Normandie* for the province: (*toute notre terre assise en ladite langue de Normandie*, says a count of Cressy, in 1348, of his lands situate there. Ducange, *Lingua*) and in the same sense *langue Picarde*. *Tongue* for a country is not too bold: on the other hand it would be less usual, though here quite proper, for a word from the language or dialect of Normandy or Picardy to be used to express those provinces.—Joinville, a contemporary of Dante, has not the name either, even when there was strong inducement to employ it. He tells of a hard battle in Syria, in which he was himself in great danger, till two other knights came to his aid: they were Olivier de Termes and Arnoul de Cominges. Both the names, whether of their possessions or birthplace, point to Languedoc, which is also confirmed by historical researches. But the narrative contains the words: “il s’en alla par devers Messire Ol. de Termes, et à ses aultres capitaines *de la torte langue*, et leur dit ——.” The expression is very singular, and difficult to understand. Ducange (*Lingua*) proposes to read *corte langue*, *lingua curta*, as Languedoc is said to be called in some manuscript *Notitiæ*, but he does not enter further into an explanation of the origin of the name. Le Duchat (in *Menage. Languedoc*) retains the reading *torte*, and explains it to mean *distorted*, that is, from the Latin: an epithet, which as it was very appropriate to the language of *oc*, might he thinks have been applied to it from the beginning. However this be, we see that nothing can be meant here but *les autres Capitaines de Languedoc*. Yet Joinville does not use the expression, or name, Languedoc, so that we are almost forced to conclude, that it did not exist in his time.

At a later period the expression *lingua Occitana* occurs in Latin documents, as in a charter of the French king Louis Hutin in 1315, and in one of Edward III. of England in 1347. But this epithet, which seems clearly to point to the word *oc*, is again rendered doubtful, and may appear to be a mere corruption, from the singular circumstance that at a still earlier period in the reign of Hutin’s father, Philip the Handsome, the same country is called *lingua Auxitana*



(Ducange. *Lingua*). This appellation immediately directs us to Auch, the capital of Gascony; so that in this instance again the language would be named from a place or a region, as in *langue de Normandie*, *langue Picarde*, not from one of its words. For Gascony comprises several races, or at least several popular languages. The name itself points to the Bask nation, and it is quite certain that many districts, that of *Labour* for instance, in which Bayonne is situate, belong to the region which it once occupied. But though this is unquestionably the case with regard to some western districts, and perhaps some southern ones also, where the Bask is still spoken, principally by the peasantry; it is no less certain that in other tracts of this province the language of *oc* prevails, having been introduced from the adjacent region of Toulouse and Languedoc, and only modified by some varieties of dialect. This is proved by the grammars and dictionaries of the language, in which the terms Languedocian and Gascon are used, and by natives of Languedoc, as perfectly equivalent. A collection of Tolosan poets, among whom Goudouli, who lived in the reign of Louis XIII., fills a distinguished place, was published at Toulouse under the title of *Recueil de poëtes Gascons*. In short there can be no doubt that Gascony itself is a seat of the *lingua Occitana*, which, as we have seen, is also denominated from the capital, and very properly and legitimately, *lingua Auxitana*.—Yet it would be precipitate to think of solving the whole enigma of the *oc* by this fact. Close as is the resemblance of sound between the adjectives, *Occitana*, *Auxitana*, there is little between their roots, *oc* and *Auch* (*ôche*). For this is the way in which the name of the capital is pronounced by the French, who for this reason often write it with an *s* (*Ausch*). This sibilant, which is wholly wanting in *oc* and *oco*, is a radical element in the other word, and hence is found in all its derivatives: in *Auchois*, an inhabitant of the town, and in its Latin names *Augusta Auscorum* or *Ausciorum*: and even in the epithet *Auxitana*.—If we were only to look at the spelling, instead of listening to the pronunciation, we should certainly be very much struck by the resemblance between the name of the Gascon city *Auch*, and the Gascon affirmative, *och*:



for it is often, especially in ancient times, found written with the aspirate, only however by natives of northern France: those of Languedoc protest against this way of spelling it, and with reason, since they pronounce the *ch* as in Spanish and English, *otch*. But according to them the word does not even admit the softer French sound of the *ch*; they call their country Lengadò (*lenga* signifying tongue), and in speaking French they never say *un Languedochien*, but *Languedocien*. Perhaps however the final *ch* was not intended to suggest a different mode of pronunciation, but to be sounded, as in the name of S. Roch, and many other words, like the simple *c*.

Does then the name of the province really come from the affirmative in use there?—I had believed, long before I found that others had asserted the same thing, that *langue d'oc* was a corruption of *langue de Goth*, or *langue Goth*. So says old Rabelais, who was not deficient in learning, in the first half of the 16th century: Pantagruel, livr. 3. ch. 4, (ed. Le-Duchât i. 382). Dante, as we have seen, terms the people who say *oc*, Spaniards. But Spain, properly so called, probably never used that particle. On the other hand every body knows that Spain was occupied by the Goths: the name of Catalonia is derived from Gothalandia: but the Catalan language is the Provençal, and this is the *langue d'oc*. The Goths were dominant in Provence itself, and in Languedoc: the capital of the latter country, Toulouse, was the residence of their Kings. In short we find Goths in the very tracts, the language of which we are here discussing. How easily may it have derived its peculiarities from them, or at least have borne their name! Even in the later Spanish historians we find Languedoc called *la Francia Gothica* (an instance from Scolano is given by Eichhorn in his *Einleitungs-Geschichte der Kultur* i. p. 61.).—The word Goth has been frequently mutilated and curtailed, so as to be no longer recognized: for instance in the Spanish title *hidalgo*, which, as has long been agreed among critics of the highest authority, means, not *son of something* (*hijo d'algo*), but *Goth's son* (*hi-d'al-go*). This derivation has been proved by German writers: the Spanish etymologists, I am told, know nothing of it. I may therefore be permitted to take this opportunity



of mentioning a trace of it, which has occurred to me in another quarter, in one of Scarron's comedies, which are now but little read. The plots of all these pieces are Spanish, and they are most probably borrowed from Spanish writers, who may therefore be considered as speaking in them. In *Jodelet Duelliste*, Act 1. Sc. 2, a swaggering, hectoring gentleman comes in: on his appearance the servant says: "Voici quelque fendant, issu d'un roi des Goths." In the *Bachelier de Salamanque* it is said of a young libertine, (Act 1. Sc. 2.)

Un More Grenadin est plus que lui dévot;  
Encor que d'origine il soit *chevalier Goth*,  
Je meure, s'il songea jamais a ses prieres.

The contrast between the Moors and the Goths is well known: the latter were brave and pious; and here the Spaniard, who ought to be so, is distinctly called a descendant of noble Goths, *chevalier Goth d'origine* answering exactly to *hidalgo*, because the Mahometans did not make so much account of purity of blood as the Christians and the Germans.

If on these grounds we should be inclined rather to derive the name of the country from a people than from a word, we are led to ask another question: Is *oc* really used there as an affirmative? For a native of Languedoc, the author of a dictionary of the language [Dictionnaire Languedocien—Français par l'Abbé de S.\*\*\* (Sauvage or Sauvages), Nîmes 1756. 8vo.] expressly asserts (p. 322) that it has only the three affirmatives *o*, *ôï*, and *oui*, and not *oc*, so that the name could scarcely be derived from it.—This assertion however, which I here notice as an instructive warning, is totally erroneous. The author himself retracted it in the altered and enlarged edition of his book which he published thirty years afterward (Nîmes 1785. two vol.). He there now and then illustrates the words with phrases, and also with passages from the Bible: and in these we frequently find *oc*. *Crezes aisso* (this)? *oc Senhor*. *Jehsu dix ad els* (said to them) *oc*. Peter saith: *Oc Senhor tu sabs que eu amo te*. Moreover Dante, who was thoroughly acquainted with the language, and himself composed poems in it, testifies that its affirmative was *oc* (as he writes it in Latin), or *oco* (the Italian spelling). When Richard Cœur-de-Lion, who, as he died 1199, was



nearly a century older than Dante, according to the custom of poets in those days, chose names for himself and the Provençal poet Bernard de Bonn, he named himself and his friend *oc* and *no* (yes and no. Millot hist. lit. des Troubadours i. 238). In Manni (Illustraz. istor. di Boccaccio, p. 311) in the story of the celebrated poet William of Cahestang, we read: *Exella dis, oc Senhor* (and she said, yes, Sir). In short, there can be no doubt that *oc* was used as an affirmative. But even with regard to the modern usage, though it is only the ancient language that we are concerned with in investigating this etymology, Sauvage, in his second edition, gives us better information. He says (p. 109—111): there are at present five modes of expressing assent: first the four, *o*, *oc*, *oco*, *oi*, according to the different districts: but all only in familiar conversation with persons whom one *thous*. The fifth, *ou-i* (for it is thus at full length that the later form *oui* is pronounced) is a respectful answer which one addresses to strangers and persons of higher rank, as being nearer to the French, because genuine Languedoc words are often accounted too vulgar or too familiar, so that one who is not on intimate terms with the company never hears them, though at other times the Languedoc may be the sole language of conversation. *Oc* therefore not only was, but still is, the affirmative used there: and this is also attested by all who have ever written on the subject.

It would therefore be carrying scepticism too far to hesitate about deriving the name Languedoc from the particle. As to the Goths, though they were at one time masters of the same countries, the nature of the language rebuts their pretensions. It is so much nearer to the Latin and so much more remote from the German, or Gothic, than for instance the modern French, that it cannot have been called, by way of contrast or distinction, the Gothic tongue. On the contrary the Provençals themselves for this very reason termed their language *Romana*: though that of France in general, both the south and the north was likewise so called (sometimes with the addition *rustica*): from which denomination of the vulgar languages, as is well known, were derived the terms *Roman*, *Romance*, for the



popular poetry.—Dante's naming the Spaniards as the people who spoke the *oc* language, is explained by a subsequent passage (lib. II. cap. 12), where he goes through the various metres, and fixes on the hendecasyllabic as the loftiest, or as he terms it, the tragic one: “Hoc (endecasyllabo) etiam Hispani usi sunt; *et dico Hispanos* qui poetati sunt in *vulgari Oc*.” and then he quotes Hamericus de Belemi. We see, as has been already shown, that those whom he calls Spaniards, are the same whom others call Provençals, or Limosins, or Catalans. (Aimeri de Belemi, or Belennai, or Belenoi, was born in the neighbourhood of Bordeaux, and only died in Catalonia. Millot. II. 331.) We have already traced the wide range of the *Oc*, or Provençal language, in France and Spain: but beside this all the early poets of the south of Europe were in point of language Provençals: and the first chapter of every history of poetry among the Italians, Sicilians, Spaniards, Portuguese, and French of the south, must begin with these *oc* poets, let them be named after whatever country they will. They themselves, and their language, belonged to various countries: there is no general denomination for them, that would not be liable to like objections as that of Spaniards which Dante uses.

Finally, however singular it may seem, that the name of a language, a people, or a country, should have been derived from a *word*, the fact is confirmed by the other name, formed in complete analogy to Languedoc, and contrasted with it: *la langue d'oui*. It is true that this appellation has not been in use for centuries, nor, ought it to be observed, was it ever so common as is often asserted and generally believed. Many old documents and ancient authors contrast *la langue d'oc* and *la l. Française*. For France was the name given to the dominions of the kings, in contradistinction to the territories of the great vassals, as here in the south of the powerful counts of Provence. Still, so far as books are concerned, Froissart alone is evidence sufficient: he wrote about 1400, and uses the term as a common one. He inquires of a knight with whom he is travelling, about the causes of the dissensions of the great men; his companion answers (Liv. III. ch. 7. Paris 1574. Johne's Transl. III. ch. 30. p. 118) that after the death of Charles V.,



during the minority of Charles VI., the kingdom was divided between the regents: *Le duc de Berry eut le gouvernement de la Languedoch, et le duc de Burgogne de la Languedoyl et de toute la Picardie*. Ducange seems not to have possessed, or to have seen any documents, in which the expression occurred, himself: at least he does not cite any according to his usual practice, but only refers to the opinion of others.—One should therefore be inclined to suppose that the term *langue d'oc* did not come into use *for the country* before the 14th century, but that it then took such deep root that it has lasted to the present time. This arose from the want of a general name for all the countries in which the language was spoken. Indeed one might wish to recall it in this sense, since *poets of the oc language* is a more accurate expression, and less apt to cause confusion of ideas than Provençal, or any other local name that can be chosen. The general name, which was not meant to designate any political or geographical relation, but only identity of language, was afterwards appropriated to a definite region (when it assumed the masculine gender) because the other countries acquired proper names, and some of them recovered their ancient ones, as Provence from the Roman *provincia*. The name *Langue d'oui* was formed merely for a contrast, but seems never to have had any great currency, though perhaps it may have lasted awhile in common conversation; but it was soon entirely lost: for in this case there was not the same need, which was supplied by the general terms, France and French, until all submitted to one master, and each province retained its own name, which now became more definite.

In conclusion, we once more return to Dante, briefly to consider the affirmatives which he mentions. For the north of Europe he fixes upon *jo*. This however is evidently only a Germanic particle. It is true that under the same head he names the Slavonians; but the Russians say *da* and *tak*, the Poles *tak*, the Bohemians *ano* and *tak*. *Jo* is found in Otfried, but sometimes also *ja*; Ulphilas has *ja* and *jai*; *jo* is still used by the Danes and Swedes, and keeps its ground even in some German dialects. The Hollanders say *ja*, as the modern Germans, the English *yea* and *yes*, Chaucer (who



has a surprising number of German forms) sometimes uses *ya*: the affinity of all these forms with one another, and with the elder *jo* and *jai*, is sufficiently close.—Of *oc* enough has been already said.—*Oyl* is only another mode of writing *oui*. The *l* was dropt at the end, as *nennyl* in time became *nenni*. Moreover books in old French have Loys for Louis, but the pronunciation of the former word was probably the same as that of the latter. I am informed by people personally acquainted with the ducal family of *Croy*, that the name is invariably pronounced *Croui*: the old spelling is always retained longest in proper names, particularly those of noble families. A family of emigrants in Germany who spelt their name *Moy*, pronounced it *Moui*. Even French grammarians teach that *o* before *i*, *e*, &c. when it is to preserve a distinct sound, and not to be blended with the following vowel, must be pronounced as *ou*. And thus while the pronunciation remained the same, the spelling was altered: in the passage already quoted from Froissart, the edition of 1518 has *Languedoyl*, that of 1574, *Languedowy*.

Now it is moreover remarkable, that these affirmatives are at the same time copulatives, signifying *and*, or perhaps more precisely *also* (*auch*). This is the case even with the Slavonic *tak*, which in Polish, Russ, and Bohemian, likewise signifies *also*, though with a slight alteration (*takke*, *takje*). In Otfried *jo* (or *joh*) is used both for *yes*, and for *and*: yet in the latter sense he likewise uses *inti* or *int*, for which reason some prefer explaining *jo* to mean *also*. In Book 1. ch. 5, both particles occur:

Erdun *joh* himiles  
*Int* alles liphafes  
 Scepheri worolti—  
 Gott gibit imo wiha (Weihe. Blessing)  
 Joh ero filu hoha.

In the 11th chapter *inti* occurs repeatedly, yet we also very frequently meet with *jo* as a copulative. In Ulphilas, who uses the affirmatives *ja* and *jai*, the former has likewise the sense of *and* or *also*; *jai* is only affirmative. Mark 15. *ja gahaihaitun alla hansa. ja gewasidedun ina. ja atlagidedan ana ina. ja dugunnun goljan ina. ja slohun is*



*hubit. ja bispiwan ina:* and in numberless other passages.

When we consider this, the *oc* of the Provençals will readily remind us of the Danish *og* and the Swedish *och*, which means *and*, but is evidently the German *auch*: and we are also reminded of the *Goths* who once inhabited the south of France. For though, as we have already observed, the language of that country sounds more Italian or Spanish, is geographically connected with the latter language, and betrays its affinity to the Latin, and its alienation from the German, by generally omitting to couple the personal pronoun with the verb: still traces of the Teutonic are to be found in it. I shall only mention the word *Franchiman* for northern French; for it designates not only the land of *oyl*, but also a man who comes from it, from Paris for instance, who indeed differs so widely in language and manners from the man of Languedoc, that he deserved to be described by a peculiar term. To the same class belongs the nickname *Lansoman*, a lubber, either from *Landsman* or *Landman*. Now since there are German words in the language, however small may be their number, *och* or *oc* might very easily have made one of them; and the old manner of spelling was not so wrong in adding an *h* at the end of the Languedoc affirmative, though it is true that it was afterward entirely dropt in the pronunciation. But the word was retained, not in its original signification of *auch*, *also*, but in the secondary one, *yes*; retained—from absolute need of it.

Just in the same way the later Latins, finding that the old Roman repetition no longer answered their purpose, adopted a peculiar affirmative, and this no other than the same conjunction *also: etiam*. Yet it occurs earlier in the best authors, since there were occasions when it was absolutely necessary to say *yes* or *no*; on which subject I shall only cite two passages from Cicero. Acad. 4. 32. “ut sequens probabilitatem aut *etiam* aut *non* respondere possit.” Pro Rosc. Com. 3. Utrum nomina digesta habes, an non? si non, quomodo tabulas conficis? si *etiam*, quamobrem &c. Other passages are produced by Forcellini, and in Plautus *etiam* stands by itself as an answer (Amphit. 1. 3. 46. nunquid vis? Al. *etiam*: ut actutum advenias).—It is un-



doubtedly one mode of expressing assent, to declare in answer to a question, that I am *also* of that opinion or so resolved, or I *also* did such an act. The application of the same expression to cases where literally no such terms as *and*, *also*, *likewise*, were suitable, is illustrated by the history of all languages.

C. T.

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## ON THE KINGS OF ATTICA BEFORE THESEUS.

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EVERY one who has endeavoured to form for himself a clear idea of Greek history and to estimate its evidence, must have felt himself perplexed to determine the relation in which the heroic ages stand to the historical. The Greeks themselves, indeed, for a long time felt no such perplexity; they received in simple faith the legends of their mythology, and never doubted that their kings and nobles were descended from the gods, that their temples had been founded, their hills, rivers and cities named, their ancient rites and customs introduced by an ancient race, whose close affinity with the gods enabled them to accomplish what would have been impossible to mere mortals. To them the *mythic* age appeared to be separated by no wide gulph from the *historic*; believing their divinities still to interpose in human affairs, the only difference was, that what was a rare occurrence in their own times had been an event of every day in the heroic age. Even those who might doubt of the supernatural part of the story never called in question the existence of the personages themselves whose names filled the early annals of every Grecian state.

The moderns reject of course all that is supernatural from the history of the heroic times, and many of them seem to have flattered themselves that by so doing, and supplying the place of the divine machinery thus withdrawn, by the human machinery of means and motives, they could convert mythology into very passable history. Allowing them to make these additions however, as a necessary liberty for an historian, whose building would advance slowly if he were not permitted to make mortar as well as to collect stones, we may at least claim to enquire strictly into the evidence



of what is professedly related on ancient authority. We shall find upon examination that for the heroic age this authority is far less than the faith with which its history has been received would have led us to expect. It is a striking circumstance that in going back into Attic history for example, with which we have here more immediately to do, we scarcely find half a dozen facts recorded from the legislation of Draco to the death of Codrus, but that we no sooner reach the times of Theseus and his predecessors, than information flows in upon us in a torrent. History spontaneously offers us far more than we should ever have thought of asking at her hands; curiosity is gratified not only with an account of changes of dynasties, wars, invasions, mutual slaughters and exiles, but with minute details of family anecdotes and gallant adventures. But as sudden wealth sometimes leads to the suspicion of forgery, this unexpected accession to the stores of history will make the cautious critic only look more narrowly for the stamp of genuineness<sup>1</sup>. His suspicions will be more easily excited than allayed. Contemporary authority is out of the question; there is a dark interval of unknown length between the supposed termination of the heroic times and the age of Homer and Hesiod; if any thing was composed, (for we must not speak of *writing*) in this interval, it had perished before the commencement of the historical times. Had we even possessed the works of the bards who before Homer employed mythology as the material of their epics, since the essential character of the poet is to *make*, we should still have been at a loss to know how much they had made and how much they had taken from historical sources. But in fact we have no reason to believe that a single line of the antehomeric poets was preserved even to the times of the *cyclici*, much less to the age in which prose writers began to systematize mythology and connect it with history.

Our belief then that the story of the heroic times is in the main historical, must arise from our confidence in the

<sup>1</sup> Περὶ μὲν τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς γεγενημένων τοὺς ἀκριβέστατα λέγοντας πιστοτάτους ἡγούμεθα, περὶ δὲ τῶν παλαιῶν τοὺς οὕτω διεξιόντας ἀπιθανωτάτους εἶναι νομίζομεν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες οὔτε τὰς πράξεις ἅπασας οὔτε τῶν λόγων τοὺς πλειστοὺς εἶδος εἶναι μνημονεύεσθαι διὰ τοσούτων. Ephorus, Marx. p. 64.



power of *tradition* to preserve it; tradition distinct from poetry, and probably not strengthened or steadied by any use of the art of writing for historical or chronological purposes. There is an illusive vagueness in the word, which makes it necessary to fix more exactly what is meant by it in the present enquiry. The whole matter of fact which is implied, when we say that there was a tradition of certain things in any age or country, is that a belief in their reality prevailed; but by a fallacy which Mr Bentham should have placed in his list, we go on to infer that this belief was *handed down* from a preceding age. Now though it may be thought that Niebuhr<sup>2</sup> has expressed himself too strongly when he says of a belief of this sort “they that would introduce it need but tell people roundly that it was what their forefathers knew and believed, only the belief was neglected and sank into oblivion,” yet there can be no doubt that what was at first the hypothesis of an antiquary or the fiction of a poet becomes in a generation or two a venerable tradition. Though the title was originally bad its defect is cured by length of possession. Even if it were admitted therefore, that the whole history of the heroic ages was believed to be true by the Greeks, we should not be authorized to receive it as true, because we know not how high a real tradition reached, nor consequently how far this faith was reasonable.

There is little satisfaction, however, in such general and negative conclusions, and they are only mentioned here, that no one who has hitherto received the heroic history of Greece as real, on the authority of poets and common books of history, may suppose that he has historical ground for his belief, and regard it as an act of wanton scepticism to suggest a doubt respecting it. The only course which can lead to any useful result is to examine minutely some portion of this alleged history, and see what marks of reality or invention can be found in it. The conclusion at which I have arrived is, that the whole series of Attic kings who are said to have preceded Theseus are fictions, owing their existence to misunderstood names, and false etymologies, to attempts to

<sup>2</sup> Hist. of Rome, Vol. I. p. 161.



explain ancient customs and religious rites and to exalt the antiquity of a nation or a family by giving it a founder in a remote age. There is nothing absolutely new in such a judgement of the heroic history of Athens, but though doubts have been expressed and explanations suggested respecting particular parts of it, I am not aware that they have been extended to the whole or exhibited in a regular form. Such a connected view however is particularly necessary, in an inquiry where much is conjectural, because repeated coincidences may give a high probability even to conjectures. When the die repeatedly shews the same face, we begin to think that something more steady than accident guides its fall.

At the head of the list of Attic kings is commonly placed *Ogyges* or *Ogygus*. The evidence of his historical existence is so slight that we should be justified in passing over his name without further remark. "We have no assurance," says Mr Mitford, "that even the name of Ogyges was known to the older Grecian authors. He is not mentioned by Hesiod, Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, or even Strabo, to all of whom apparently he must have occurred as an object of mention, had his story been at all known in their times, or at least had it had any credit." Hist. of Greece, ch. i. sect. 3. Fully agreeing with Mr Mitford in his conclusion, I nevertheless think it desirable to inquire into the circumstances which led to Ogyges' being placed at the head of the Attic kings. There is little *arbitrary* fiction in mythology, and though Ogyges, in the character of a king, be a recent addition to Athenian history, the name Ogygian is found in the oldest remains of the Greek language.

Ὠγύγιος is commonly explained as meaning ἀρχαῖος, and if this corresponded with any known root in Greek, or if all the other uses could be resolved into this, we should have concluded that the name Ogyges only alluded to the antiquity ascribed to this sovereign, the earliest ruler of Attica. But what propriety would there then be in the name Ὠγυγίη applied to the island in which Calypso detained Ulysses and which is not represented as distinguished by antiquity above other islands? The real root is probably γυγῆ signifying night or darkness Γυγαίη νύξ, ἡ σκοτεινή. Hesychius. That the ω in the longer form is merely *prothetic* and no part of



the root is rendered probable by analogy and by the variation in the prefixed letter. Thus we have in Hesychius ἐγώγνον, ἀρχαῖον, in the corresponding passage of Suidas explained by Ὠγύγιον. “Lex. Reg. MS. Ἐγώγιον καὶ Ὠγύγιον, ἀρχαῖον. Cyrill. Lex. MS. Ἐγύγιον. ἀρχαῖον.” Alberti ad loc. Ὀγύγια μέλη Hesych. where I believe we should read Ὀγύγια, μελανή a form which Hesychius elsewhere uses. Ὀρφναία, σκοτεινή. μελανή. In many words the ο is a mere euphonic prefix, as we perceive by a comparison of other words of the same family<sup>3</sup>. Thus ὄβριμος is evidently connected with βρι used as an intensive, with βριμός and βριθύς; ὄβελός is the same word as βέλος which is connected with the root βάλλω. So in the case of the double forms ὀκέλλω, κέλλω (Lat. celer Gr. κέλης): ὀδύρω, δύρω: ὀσκάπτω, Hes. σκάπτω (σκάφος cavus): ὀκρυοεῖς and κρυοεῖς (crudelis): the ο appears to be no part of the root. So ὀρέγω is clearly the Latin rego to make strait, ὀρεγόμεαι in the middle voice signifying to desire, as we naturally stretch ourselves towards and *make straight* for that which we wish to possess. The prefixed ο is sometimes interchanged with ε. What in common Greek was ὀδοῦς was in Æolic ἐδοῦς but the Latin dens and the German zahn show that the vowel is not radical. The grammarians generally suppose an aphæresis of the ο or ε, but the tendency of language is to add a letter before a consonant at the beginning to facilitate pronunciation. “Letters like soldiers,” says Horne Tooke, “are very apt to desert and drop off in a long march;” but on the other hand idle recruits are sometimes picked up by the way. It is remarkable that just the same change has taken place in the word Ὠλυγίων. σκοτεινῶν Hes. of which the root is clearly λύγη. Νυκτὸς ὄμμα λυγαίας Iph. T. 110. The ο was necessarily changed into ω, because ὀγύγιος could not enter into heroic verse. The sense of “dark” suits very well the Homeric application of the name Ὠγυγίη to the island of Calypso. It was situated on the furthest verge of the West, the region of the evening shades. The name of the goddess Καλυψώ (καλύπτω) shews her to have been originally a being presiding over darkness;

<sup>3</sup> Strabo calls the last king of Achaia (i. p. 556. Ox.) Ogyges; Polybius l. 2. p. 178. Gyges.



she is the daughter of Atlas, the upholder of the heavens, who in fulfilment of his office is variously placed by mythologists in the extreme East and the remotest West<sup>4</sup>. Where the Ὠγύγιον ὄρος was situated, of which Apollodorus speaks, in the fragment preserved by Strabo 1. 432. Oxf., we are not informed; but as it is mentioned along with the land of the Gorgons and Hesperides and the Rhipæan mountains, it was probably an imaginary chain of mountains on the western boundary of the world, which hid the sun and caused the darkness, as the Rhipæan mountains did on the North<sup>5</sup>. The name Γύγης, given to the king of Lydia, whose wealth and power of *darkening* himself, so as to become invisible, remind us so strongly of the *Nibelunghort* and the *Tarnkappe* of the Northern poem, is probably derived from the same root. The story of what passed between him and Candaules (Her. 1. 8. 12) seems to have had a mythological origin, although Herodotus, or those who had told the tale before him, have contrived to give it so much the air of a court anecdote. Γύγης is also the name of one of the three children of Οὐρανός and Γῆ, Hes. Theog. 149.

The ideas of darkness and antiquity are closely connected;

—— ambagibus ævi

Obtegitur *densa caligine* mersa *vetustas*. Sil. Il. VIII. 44. and hence Ὠγύγιος might easily come to signify ἀρχαῖος and be applied to an ancient king, of whom nothing more was known than that he was ancient. But I believe the origin of the king Ὠγυγος to be different. Pausanias says (Attic. 1. 38) that the people of Eleusis alleged their city to have been founded by a hero Eleusis, whom some made the son

<sup>4</sup> Κίρκη (κρίκος circus circulus) seems to be originally a representative of the "circle bounding earth and skies," the horizon; her abode therefore is variously placed in Hesperia or Colchis.

<sup>5</sup> The epithet ὠγυγιός is applied by Æschylus Eumen. 1039 to the earth; χωρεῖτε γᾶς ὑπὸ κεύθεσιν ὠγυγίοισι, with which the sense of "*dark*" suits as well as with the water of Styx Hes. Theog. 806. of which the source is thus described, πολλὸν δέ θ' ὑπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης Ἐξ ἱεροῦ ποταμοῖο ῥέει διὰ νύκτα μέλαιναν, Ὠκεανοῖο κέρας. The last words explain the use of Ὠγένιος of the water of Styx (Parthenius ap Steph. Byz. Ὠγενος) without implying any connexion between Ὠγύγιος and Ὠγενος. The confusion of Ogyges with the Jupiter Ogoa of the Carians, produced the genealogy mentioned by Steph. Byz. Ὠγυγία by which he was made the son of Termera. Τερμίλαι was the old name of the Lycians, Herod. 7. 91.



of Mercury and Daira, others the son of Ogygus. Now though Ogygus may have been of recent introduction into Attic history, he appears really to have belonged to the old legends of Bœotia (Paus. ix. 5. 1.) and the epithet of Ogygian Thebes and the name of the Ogygian gate were derived from his supposed rule. Bœotia was the country from which the Eleusinian religion proximately came. There was on the borders of the lake Copais an Eleusis, which the advance of its waters overwhelmed (Paus. ix. 24. Strab. i. 591. Oxf.). Ceres and Proserpine were said to have founded or occupied Thebes (Eur. Phœn. 694.), and when Eumolpus is called a Thracian, the Thracians of Bœotia are to be understood<sup>6</sup>. It was from this connexion of Ogyges with the Eleusinian rites that he was represented as the father of Πραξιδίκη (Steph. Byz. Κράγος) an Orphic name of Proserpine (Orph. H. 28. 5. Arg. 31<sup>7</sup>.) To the connexion of Ogyges with these rites I should also refer Pind. Nem. 6. 73. ἀσκίοις Φλιούντος ὑπ' ὠγυγίοις ὄρεσι. Celeæ, which was close to Phlius, (Paus. 2. 14) was a great seat of the Eleusinian worship. Heyne's interpretation of ὠγυγίοις ὄρεσι "jam olim nota" is very tame and unpoetic.

The propriety of connecting the establishment of the worship of the θεοὶ χθόνιοι with a personage whose name when examined means only *dark*, is obvious. Their rites were celebrated in the night. "Frumenti satio apud Eleusina a Triptolemo reperta est; in cujus muneris honorem noctes initiorum sacratae" Just. 2. 6. and whether we consider their physical import, as denoting the burial of the seed, or their moral association with the unseen world, the idea of darkness is inseparable from them. It may confirm the interpretation now given, to point out some other instances in which mythological fictions have been influenced by the same association.

Whether Ὀρφεύς be derived from Ὀρφικά or vice versa,

<sup>6</sup> Eumolpus is said Apollod. 3, 15, 3. 4 to have come with his son Ismarus to Tegyrus king of the Thracians. Tegyra was a town in Bœotia, Steph. Byz.

<sup>7</sup> The name is explained (Hes. s. voc.) ὥσπερ τέλος ἐπιτιθεῖσα τοῖς τε λεγομένοις καὶ πραττομένοις but it more probably means "exactress of justice," an epithet which well suits the office of Proserpine, as a goddess of the unseen world. The name seems to have been given to the Furies (Paus. 9. 32) but they also were goddesses of the earth (see Æsch. Eum. 1039 quoted above). Hence Ceres was called Ἐριννύς (Paus. 8. 25.)



he owes his supposed existence to the rites of darkness which the name describes. The root is found in ὄρφνη, σκοτία. νύξ μέλαινα Hes. in ὄρφανος (orbus, ὄρφος with digamma *furvus*) a child or parent wearing *black* garments, perhaps in Ὀρπα. Ἐριννύς. Hes. His descent into the infernal regions to recover his wife Εὐρυδίκη, whose name may be of the same import with Πραξιδίκη, belongs to the same circle of ideas as the search of Ceres for her vanished daughter; his being torn to pieces, to the fable of Bacchus Ζαγρεύς (Δαγρεύς δάζω) whether this primarily referred to the frenzied wildness of the orgies in which the victim was torn to pieces, or to the disintegration of the seed in the earth. The Ὀrphic, Bacchic and Eleusinian religions, though specifically different are in kind and origin the same<sup>8</sup>. Caucon, the founder of the mysteries of Ceres and Proserpine at Messene, is made a son of Κέλαινος<sup>9</sup> Paus. 4. 1. The name of Κέλεος connected with the Eleusinian rites had probably a similar origin; so Κελαινώ was made by one fabulist the mother of Δελφός, alluding to the worship of Bacchus on Parnassus; while another assigned to him Θυία as his mother and a third made him the son of Μέλαινα Paus. 10. 6. Other instances are less obvious. The mythologists tell us (Apoll. 1. 9) that Πελιάς derived his name from his face being *blackened* by the kick of a horse, when he was exposed as an infant with his brother Neleus. There are however strong traces in the history of Pelias of a connexion with the same rites whence Ὀρφεύς derived his mythological existence. The cutting up of Pelias by his daughters is the same story as that of the discription of Orpheus. The descent of his daughter Alcestis to the infernal regions and her rescue by Hercules, is only another form of the adventure of Orpheus and Eurydice; but Admetus who is properly the infernal god (see Müller Proleg. p. 306. Dorier. 1. 320. Germ.) has

<sup>8</sup> Δήμητρα Χθονίαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν σέβειν φασί, παραδόντος σφίσιν Ὀρφέως Paus. 3. 14.

<sup>9</sup> The epithet of Νυκτέλιος was given to Bacchus especially in reference to the mystical doctrine of his being torn to pieces and recomposed Lobeck Aglaoph. 712. The name of Liber applied by the Latins properly to the χθόνιος Διόνυσος and Libera to Proserpine are more probably derived from λιβρός, σκοτεινός Hes. (whence Λίβυες) than from λείβω. The Romans seemed to have called their children *liberi* in honour of the youthful deities Κόρος and Κόρη.



been changed into a king, the mortal husband of Alcestis. The signification of Νηλεύς is probably the same, for in mythology brothers frequently represent the same idea: ἔλα was an old Greek root for light, whence ἄελιος, σέλας, σελήνη, εἶλη and Νηλεύς is derived from it by the same negative prefix as νηλεής from ἔλεος<sup>10</sup>. From the same root and not the Hebrew לָהָב I should deduce Νεῖλος which meant black, whether it were so called from the black Æthiopians among whom it rose (Paus. 8. 24) or because “Ægyptum nigra fœcundat arena” Virg. Georg. 4. 291. Ἀμυθάων the brother of Pelias and Neleus is probably only an epithet; Μελάμπους, in whose name there is the same allusion to the rites of darkness, was the reputed hierophant of the Egyptian mysteries<sup>11</sup>, possessing like Proteus the power of changing him-into any shape that he pleased.

In the *dark faced* Pelops, for this is the meaning of the name Πέλοψ, I think we may discern another trace of the same religion, referred indeed not to Thrace like that which Ogyges and Orpheus represent, nor to Phœnicia and Egypt like that of Melampus, but to Phrygia. The difference however is not material, for the Phrygian worship of the earth, under the character of the great mother, was essentially the same as the Thracian, probably in origin the same. It is of no importance to inquire here whether the traces of this religion in the mythological history of Argos, arose from a real colonization from Phrygia, or from a connexion between the population of Greece and Asia Minor, preceding all historical records. My purpose is only to point out these traces and on the ground of them to assign to Pelops a mythical, instead of the historical character which he has hitherto sustained. Tantalus, the father of Pelops is said to have disclosed the mysteries of the gods, Eudoc. Viol. p. 390. Schol. Lycophr. 155. The story of the caldron and the division of the body is that of Orpheus and Pelias

<sup>10</sup> There were two rivers in Eubœa called Κιρεύς and Νιλεύς or Νηλεύς Strabo x. p. 655. Ox. the Κιρεύς made the sheep white, the Νηλεύς black. Κιρός or Κιρρός is a light or bright colour, such as that of white wine or white grapes, or flame; this use of Νηλεύς places beyond doubt the explanation of the name given in the text. A river in Bœotia was called Melas from the same quality Plin. 2. 103.

<sup>11</sup> Eudoc. Viol. p. 286. 7. Herod. 2. 49.



repeated; the devouring of the shoulder, which it is to be observed was the act of Ceres, has arisen from a misinterpretation of the mystical ὠμοφαγία, the restoration by Rhea connects the whole story with the worship of this Asiatic goddess. These fictions are not only absurd, but absolutely unaccountable, if we consider Pelops as the real son of a Lydian or Phrygian prince, leading an army into Greece and establishing a monarchy at Mycenæ; but they are easily explicable, if considered as resulting from an attempt to give an historical air to the misunderstood traces of a nearly obliterated mythus. The names Θυέστης, Ἀιγίσθος, Ἀερόπη, seem to be all connected with the same religious system. Θυέστης, in whose story the cutting up and partial devouring of Pelops is reproduced, is like Thyotes, the priest of the Samothracian mysteries (Val. Flacc. Arg. 2. 437) a *sacrificer*; Ἀιγίσθος, (αἰγίζειν. διασπᾶν Bekk. Anecd. 357. 29) one who tears to pieces; Ἀερόπη (ἀέριος) the dark; and though I am aware how hazardous an etymology must be, which assumes the existence of a root no longer found in the Greek, I am much inclined to believe that Ἀτρεὺς is synonymous with Πέλοψ and that its root is the Latin *ater*<sup>12</sup>. I

<sup>12</sup> Βροτέας whom one account (Paus. 3. 22) made the son of Tantalus, another his father (Paus. 2. 22) is a name allusive to the bloody (βροτός) sacrifice. Müller calls Niobe “ein dunkles Wesen,” and both her nature and the etymology of the name are obscure. I think it most probable that she represented the cultivated earth, and that the name is connected with νεῖον (Od. é. 127) as Φορωνεύς with φέρω, φορά. The mourning of Earth for her children is a natural and beautiful expression either of the desolation of winter, an event variously typified in the Asiatic religions, or of some sudden calamity, such as an earthquake. The name and mythus of Tantalus seem to describe the nature of the country around Sipylus, which was volcanic, and subject to earthquakes in remote ages as well as in that of Tiberius, from whom the *Magnetes a Sipylo*, as having suffered more than others, received a larger measure of relief. Tac. Ann. 2. 47. It was in the reign of Tantalus (Strabo 86. Oxf.) that Sipylus was destroyed by an earthquake. Τανταλίζω, τανθαλύζω are the same word as τονθορύζω (Valck. ad Ammon. 2. 10. Phil. M. 2. 114 not. 10) signifying to agitate with a loud sound. Comp. Hesych. ἐτανταλίχθη. ἐσείσθη. The trees of Tantalus, the fruit of which vanishes in the moment of its being grasped resemble those of the shores of the Dead Sea which “sive herbâ tenuis aut flore seu solitam in speciem adolevere, atra et inania velut in cinerem vanescunt.” Tac. Hist. 5. 7. Jos. B. J. 4. 8. And what can be a livelier image of a land, whose inhabitants live in perpetual apprehension of volcanic earthquakes, than a man over whose head a mass of glowing rock is suspended, ever ready to fall and crush him; which was probably the original punishment of Tantalus? Schol. Pind. Ol. 1. 91. Pors. ad Eur. Or. 5. The “fugientia flumina” belong also to the phænomena of earthquakes, by which rivers are suddenly engulfed. It is



do not pretend to explain all the relations in which these persons are placed to each other, as having a mythical meaning, much less the connexions in which Pelops and his family are said to have stood to other personages of the heroic age; such additions and variations were absolutely necessary in order to make the original mythus into poetry, and much more into history, and therefore however numerous they may be, they cannot bring the mythic origin into doubt. But the mythical circumstances are such as no poet nor historian would have invented, and this character cannot be affected by any incongruous additions which have been made to them.

Traces of the early diffusion of that Asiatic religion, of which Sipylus was the seat, where the legends of Tantalus and Niobe were connected with the worship of the mother of the gods (Paus. 5. 13. 3. 22.) are found in other parts of Greece. Niobe appears in the oldest legends of Sicyon and Ægialeia. We must not allow ourselves to be misled by the circumstance that in this connexion Niobe is made the daughter of Phoroneus; other things show clearly the Asiatic origin of the fable. Apis the brother of Niobe is said to have been murdered by Telchin, but the Telchines belonged to the worship of the mother of the gods, and they were the same with the Idæi Dactyli of Crete and Phrygia. These the author of the ancient epic poem *Φορωνίς* calls (Schol. Ap. Rhod. 1. 1131).

*ἀπάλαμνοι θεράποντες ὀρείης Ἀδρηστείης.*

but Adrastea was only another name of Rhea, under the character of Nemesis, Harpocr. *Ἀδράστεια*, and from her the fountain Adrastea (Paus. 2. 15.) was named; and all the Adrasti who appear in Argive, Sicyonian, Trojan, and

curious to look back on the history of the fable. There existed a lake under Sipylus called the lake of Tantalus i. e. the lake of the earthquake; but when the meaning of the word was lost, it was supposed to have derived its name from an ancient king, whose city had been overwhelmed and a lake formed in its stead. As great calamities were conceived to imply great crimes, some offence must be devised, by which Tantalus had offended the gods; the revelation of the mysteries offered a ready explanation, and he was made to suffer in Hades, what the volcano and the earthquake had inflicted on his country. Being once established as an ancient king of Phrygia or Lydia, the traces of a worship allied to the Phrygian and Lydian were referred by mythologists to him and his family.



Lydian history probably owed their origin to the connexion of her name with the mythology of these countries. Niobe appears also in Theban history, as the wife of Amphion. A story so widely diffused cannot have had its origin in the fantastic resemblance of the rocks of Sipylus to a weeping mother (Paus. 1. 21); the legend must have attached itself to the natural appearance. The high antiquity of the religion to which the legend belonged is shewn by the circumstance that Niobe was said to be the first mortal by whom Jupiter had children (Apollod. II. 1) and mother of Argos and Pelasgus; that is, she was a connecting link between the Antehellenic and Hellenic mythologies.

If the opinion of Payne Knight, Voss and others were well founded, and all the mystical religions had been introduced into Greece subsequently to the time of Homer, these conjectures and assimilations must fall to the ground. But I cannot believe that such a change as the introduction of this remarkable class of rites could have taken place after the Homeric age, and that every kind of *historic* evidence respecting it should have disappeared, and their whole institution have been referred to the times before Homer, and generally to the very earliest times. That Bacchus and Ceres, the chief deities of these mystical religions, were known to Homer, appears from passages in his writings of which the authenticity cannot be reasonably questioned. The symbolical and semibarbarous character which belonged to them made them unfit to bear a part among the agents in the Iliad, and it may be true that a great proportion of the fables by which the two religions were interwoven originated after the Homeric age. It is probable too that the growing prevalence of the Hellenic mythology gave in great measure to these rites of an earlier and ruder religion their *mystical* character; the orgies with which some of them were accompanied led the worshippers to withdraw themselves from the observation of the magistrate, and the secret solemnity with which others were performed impressed the imagination with a profound religious awe, which neither the poetry of Homer nor the statuary of Phidias could equal. But it is time to return to the series of Attic kings, the second of whom is *Cecrops*. I regard him as being in genuine Attic fable the



first; the true *αὐτόχθων* from whom according to the popular faith the Attic people had their origin. The story of his being *διφυής*, half man half serpent, is only an expression of his *autochthonia* Herod. i. 78. where the explanation given by the Telmessians of the serpents devoured by horses at Sardes is *ὄφιν εἶναι γῆς παῖδα*<sup>13</sup>. The story of his leading a colony from Sais in Egypt to Athens and the Egyptian origin of the Athenians, notwithstanding the firm footing which it has gained in our histories is a comparatively late invention. In the time of Solon<sup>14</sup> indeed the priests of Sais maintained that the Minerva of Athens and their Neith were the same, but instead of referring this identity to a Saitic colony under Cecrops, they told him a romantic tale respecting the Atlantians and the aid which the Athenians had given to the Egyptians when in danger of falling under subjection to them. Theopompus called the Athenians colonists of the Saitans or settlers among the Saitans, for there is a doubt whether *ἐποίκοι* or *ἀποίκοι* is the true reading<sup>15</sup>; Callisthenes and Phanodemus made Sais the colony; Diodorus Athens. There is then an entire absence of proof of even a legend of Egyptian origin existing among the Athenians themselves.

The name *Κέκροψ* (*Κρέκοψ*) appears to me to be nothing else than a synonyme of *αὐτόχθων*. It is well known that the *τέττιξ* or cicada, being supposed to be produced from the earth, was a symbol of *autochthonia* among the Athenians. Schol. Arist. Nub. 971. As the eggs of this animal fall to the ground from the stalks on which they are deposited, Arist. H. An. 5, 24 and are hatched in great numbers in showery weather, it was natural that the vulgar should consider the earth as producing them. The forms *κερκώπη* and *κερκώπιον* are common, being derivatives from *κέρκωψ*, one of the names of the cicada enumerated by Ælian H. A. 10, 44. Schneider supposes the name to be derived from *κέρκος*, the instrument by which the perforation was made to deposit the egg: but it seems more probable that the name was originally *κρέκοψ*.

<sup>13</sup> A variety of hypotheses to account for the epithet *διφυής* may be seen in Eudoc. Viol. *Κέκροψ*. he spoke two languages Greek and Egyptian; or he changed the nature of men from savage to civilized, or by instituting marriage he gave children two parents instead of one, &c.

<sup>14</sup> Plat. Tim. § 6.

<sup>15</sup> Heffter Athenadienst auf Lindus, p. 141.



Other names of this animal, as λακέτας (λάκω) ἀχέτας (ήχω) βάβακος (βαβάζω) as well as τέττιξ itself, refer to the sound which the animal emits. Κρέκω is the word used of its note in an epigram of the Anthologia 3. 24. 6

— φθέγγου τί νέον δεινδρώδεσι Νύμφαις  
Παίγνιον, ἀντῳδὸν Πανὶ κρέκων κέλαδον.

That Cecrops is really nothing more than the cicada, the emblem of autochthonia, converted into the first king of Athens, is rendered still more probable by the names of his daughters Πάνδροσος, Ἔρση, Ἀγρᾶυλος. In mythology we often find the name of the wife, the daughter or the son, repeating or slightly varying the name or attributes of the husband or father. As the ancients supposed the cicada to be produced from the ground, so they thought that it was wholly nourished by the dew. Ἀναπετόμενα δὲ, ὅταν σοβήσῃ τις ἀφιαῖσιν ὑγρὸν οἶον ὕδωρ, ὃ λέγουσιν οἱ γεωργοὶ ὥς—τρεφομένων τῇ δρόσῳ. Arist. ubi s.

Μακαρίζομέν σε τέττιξ  
Ὅτι δεινδρέων ἐπ' ἄκρων  
Ὀλίγην δρόσον πεπωκὼς  
Βασιλεὺς ὅπως αἰεῖδεις. Anacr.

and to the same purpose many well known passages of the classics. Hence the names Πάνδροσος and Ἔρση. Ἀγρᾶυλος (field piper), for so and not Ἀγλαυρος the name should be written: Heyne Apoll. III. 14. 2, is a name equally appropriate to the cicada, of whose music the ancients thought so highly, that it was doubted whether the Ionians did not wear the golden cicada in their hair in honour of Apollo. Schol. Nub. ubi sup<sup>16</sup>. The name Ἀγρᾶυλος is susceptible of another etymology, “lodging in the field,” which is also appropriate to the cicada<sup>17</sup>, and her name and that of her sisters have been interpreted, as if they presided over agriculture, Steph. Byz. Ἀγρᾶύλη. Such an interpretation might easily arise when

<sup>16</sup> Ἀχέεις τέττιξ, δροσεραῖς σταγόνεσσι μεθυσθεῖς  
Αγρονόμον μέλπεις Μοῦσαν ἐρημολάλον. Anth. 3. 24. 6.

<sup>17</sup> So the cicada is called τᾷ κατ' ἄρουραν ἀήδονι. Ib. 8.

Ἐκρεκες εὐτάρσοιο δι' ἰξυὸς ἡχέτα μολπάν  
Τέττιξ οἰονόμοις τερπνότερον χέλυσ. Ib. 7.

It was probably from the *autochthonia* of Cecrops that the ephebi at Athens used to swear in the temple of Agraulus ὑπερμαχεῖν ἄχρι θανάτου τῆς θρεψαμένης. Petit Leg. Att. 231. Wess.



the real nature of Cecrops was forgotten ; but when the whole fable is viewed in the connexion in which we have exhibited it, the congruity of each part with the rest is evident. In the other interpretation, there is no such congruity ; for there is nothing in Cecrops to lead us to suppose that he was a deity of agriculture, or a divine person at all. A hero he would of course be considered. It is unnecessary to inquire into the historical existence of the second Cecrops, the son of Pandion, Apoll. 3. 15. In endeavouring to reduce mythological legends to historical probability and chronological order, an easy method of escaping from difficulties was to suppose more than one person to have borne the same name, or if necessary three. Thus we have a second Minos, and Freret maintains that there must have been three kings of the name of Sardanapalus. The second hangs upon the first and must fall with him.

*Cranaus* comes next in the list of Apollodorus ; he too is an autochthon, contemporary with the flood of Deucalion. Even the most confiding reader will be startled when he is required to believe that Attica was called *Κραναή* (rocky) from a king whose name is *Κραναός*, and who takes for his wife *Πεδιάς* (the plain country) ; yet a hundred histories of Greece have repeated the name of Cranaus as a king of Attica.

Cranaus was expelled by *Amphictyon*, whom some called the son of Deucalion and others an autochthon. He, as we find from the Parian Marble, reigned originally at Thermopylæ, and formed the people of that district into the assembly which bore his name. Now it should be remembered that the flood of Deucalion had happened just before, and had so destroyed the population of Northern Greece, that it was necessary they should be renewed by supernatural means. If then we receive Amphictyon as a real personage, of whom was the original Amphictyonic council composed ? It must have been of the men who sprung from the stones which Deucalion and Pyrrha flung behind them. We have no right to demand from the author of a mythus, that he should conform to political arithmetic, and not let his imagination outstrip the geometrical ratio of the increase of mankind ; if he drowns a country by a miracle, it only costs him another to repeople it,



and he may institute a congress if he pleases the very year after his deluge. But history worships a more rigid Muse, who requires conformity with the laws of nature. If we admit an Amphictyon, reigning at Thermopylæ, we must admit the existence of an Amphictyonic council in the time of a son of Deucalion. At all events Amphictyon is an intruder in Attic history; for the Athenians had no title to be considered as founders of the council, of which Delphi and Thermopylæ were the seats, though no doubt the fabulist who inserted Amphictyon among the Attic kings designed to intimate such a claim. But did the Amphictyonic council owe its origin to any Amphictyon? As an answer to this question I shall quote the words of a learned and acute investigator of Greek antiquities. “Si fabulas sequimur, Amphictyones nomen traxerunt ab Amphictyone Deucalionis, patre Hellenis. Qui tamen antiquitatem altius crutati sunt, universam norunt genealogiam filiorum ab Hellene descendentium historiæ fide destitutam esse, seroque adornatam, tenu traditione duce, post Homericam ætatem, a cycliis maxime poetis, multo post reditum Heraclidarum, quo communem omnium Græcorum originem demonstrarent. Imprimis vero Amphictyonis persona conficta est, ne gentium origine recentius videretur sanctissimum illud Græciæ concilium, quod tamen non multo ante Heraclidas in Peloponnesum reversos conditum erat. Igitur, ut verum dicamus, Amphictyones appellati sunt populi qui circa Delphos habitantes fœdus et commune judicium fecerunt, religione conjuncti; ἀμφικτίονες sine περικτίονες, περίοικοι. Ita Androton rerum Atticarum scriptor ap. Paus. x. 8. Anaximenes ἐν πρώτῳ Ἑλληνικῶν ap. Harp. v. Ἀμφικτύονος Cf. Hesych. Suid. Tim. Lex. Plat. ibique Ruhnck.” Boeckh not. crit. ad Pind. Nem. 6. 40–42.

*Erichthonius* succeeds in the list of kings in Apollodorus, but as I believe that his name and that of Erechtheus are really the same, though Erechtheus is inserted at a later period, I shall consider them together. That Ἐρεχθεύς is only a title of Neptune is evident both from the etymology of the name and the positive testimony of ancient writers. Ἐρεχθεύς. Ποσειδῶν ἐν Ἀθήναις Hes. Lycophr. 178 and the Schol. Ἐρεχθεύς Ζεὺς ἢ Ποσειδῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐρέχθω, τὸ κινῶ. Many other writers declare the identity of Neptune



and Erechtheus. The Erechtheum of the Acropolis was contiguous to the temple of Minerva Polias, and its principal altar was dedicated to Neptune, "on which," Pausanias says, (i. 26) "they also sacrificed to Erechtheus;" a very natural variation of the story when it was forgotten that Neptune and Erechtheus were the same. Ἐρεχθεύς means "the shaker;" ἐρεχθομένη. σαλενομένη Hes. i. e. shaken by the motion of the waves, and this (Il. ψ'. 317) or the figurative sense of agitating with violent sorrow, (Od. ε', 83. 157.) is the only Homeric use of the word. It is therefore equivalent to ἐνοσιχθών or ἐννοσίγαιος, the most frequent epithets of the god of the sea. It is surely then much more probable, that the hero and king Erechtheus was simply Neptune, than that Neptune, and a king whose name happens to be exactly descriptive of Neptune, having some how or other been united in worship at the same altar, Neptune thus came to be called Ἐρεχθεύς, which is the explanation of Heyne ad Apoll. 3, 15.

That Erechtheus was really Neptune, is further evident from the circumstance that the well of salt water in the Acropolis, which was said to be the memorial of the contest of Neptune with Minerva for the honour of being the tutelary deity of Athens, was called θάλασσα Ἐρεχθήις. If Erechtheus had been, as Creuzer (Symbolik i. 401) supposes, an agricultural god, this connexion of his name with a well communicating with the sea (Apoll. 3. 14. Paus. 1, 26. 8, 10) would be very incongruous, whereas nothing was more natural than to call it from the name of Neptune.

It may seem a formidable objection to this explanation, that in the Homeric Catalogue, Il. β', 546. seq. Erechtheus appears in a very different character:

Οἱ δ' ἄρ' Ἀθήνας εἶχον, εὐκτίμενον πτολίεθρον  
Δῆμον Ἐρεχθῆος. μεγάλητορος, ὃν ποτ' Ἀθήνη  
Θρέψε, Διὸς θυγάτηρ, τέκε δὲ ζείδωρος ἄρουρα,  
Καδδ' ἐν Ἀθήνησ' εἶσεν ἑὼ ἐνὶ πίοι νηῶ,  
Ἐνθάδε μιν ταύροισι καὶ ἄρνειοῖς ἰλάονται  
Κούροι Ἀθηναίων, περιτελλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν.

I might reply to this, that as the Catalogue is generally admitted by critics to be a patchwork of very different ages, this passage is no proof that in the supposed age of Homer



this conception of Erechtheus prevailed<sup>18</sup>. But I prefer answering, that I admit that in Homer's time the original meaning of many things in mythology had been completely lost, in the popular and poetical notion of them. The worship of Minerva and Neptune at Athens must have ascended to the very foundation of the state, a time sufficiently remote from that of Homer to admit of the conversion of Erechtheus into an *αὐτοχθών* and a hero nourished by Minerva.

As *Ἐρεχθέυς* signifies "the shaker," so *Ἐριχθόνιος* "the earthshaker," still an epithet of Neptune. Such a compound as *Ἐρεχθιχθόνιος* would have been intolerable to Hellenic ears. The ancients fluctuate in their statements respecting Erechtheus and Erichthonius, some making them the same, others different; and as authority cannot settle the point, we must appeal to probability and internal evidence, which is so strong in favour of their identity, that even Clavier (*Hist. des Prem. T. de la Grèce* i. 122) regards them as the same. To Erichthonius is generally attributed the invention of yoking horses to the car; the Arundel marble attributes this to Erechtheus; both statements confirm their identity with Neptune,

cui prima frementem

Fudit equum tellus magno percussa tridenti.

How the god of the waters came to be so closely connected with horsemanship and driving, is difficult to say; whether because the level shores of inland lakes and of the sea were the earliest hippodromes; or because his worship and the use of the quadriga came together from Libya (*Her.* 4, 189. *Matthiä.* ad *H. Hom.* in *Ap.* 231 seq.), or from some more mystical connexion, Müller *Proleg.* p. 264.

The name of *Ἐριχθόνιος* appears in Homer and the legends of Troy, as the son and successor of Dardanus, *Il.* υ', 219 seq. That he is really no other than *Ποσειδών*

<sup>18</sup> In the *Odyssey* ι', 81, Minerva is said to go *Ἐρεχθῆος πυκινὸν δόμον*, as if this or *Ἐρεχθεῖον* were then the name of the principal temple of the Acropolis and consequently Erechtheus, *i. e.* Neptune, the chief divinity. So *Apoll.* 3. 14. 3. *ἦκεν πρῶτος Ποσειδῶν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν*. Neptune seems to have been properly the god of Attica, Minerva to have belonged more exclusively to the Acropolis; Neptune was the god of the Ionians, Minerva of the Athenians; and when Athens had ceased to be Ionian, except in remembrance, Minerva was exalted above Neptune.



Ἴππιος appears from the only circumstance mentioned respecting him :

Τοῦ τρισχίλιαι ἵπποι ἔλος κατὰ βουκολέοντο  
Θήλειαι, πώλοισιν ἀγαλλόμεναι ἀταλῇσι.

It is thus that mythology dwindles down into history ; the god who created the horse becomes in the historic garb a wealthy sovereign with a stud of three thousand mares. The Erichthonius of the Trojan dynasty is then no other than the Neptune who built the walls of Troy.

There is one circumstance, however, which distinguishes Erichthonius from Erechtheus ; it is to the former that a joint descent from Vulcan and Minerva is attributed. As Vulcan and Minerva were πάρεδροι, and as a great object with fabulists was to connect their supposed sovereigns and heroes with the gods of the country, this must be done also with respect to Minerva and Vulcan. It was not an easy matter in the case of the virgin goddess, and the difficulty was got over by a fiction, founded on the name of Erichthonius (ἐρίον χθών) which is no example of the elegance of Greek mythology. Apollod. 3. 14. That part of the fable, at least, which represented Minerva as flying from Vulcan was ancient, for it was exhibited on the throne at Amyclæ. Paus. 3. 18.

*Erysichthon*, though he appears in the Attic legends as we now have them, as a son of Cecrops (Paus. 1. 2) seems to me to belong properly to a different mythus. The Erysichthon, whose history is related by Callimachus (H. in Cer. Cal. 33 seq.) and who is punished for his impiety towards Ceres, is a poetical personification of the mildew which blights the corn, as is evident both from his hostility to Ceres and the etymology of his name. The first part of the word is the same as in ἐρυσίβη, ἐρυσίπελας, from ἐρέυθω to redden, from the redness of the spot which marks the disease, both in the human race and in the corn. So *rubigo* in Latin is connected with *ruber*, and the English *rust*, the appropriate name of the disease, with *roast*<sup>19</sup>, Germ. rost, rösten. The

<sup>19</sup> In the English edition of Noah Webster's Dictionary, this word is absurdly referred to the same root as rastallum, a rake ; or an unknown root meaning *crisp*. But what is this compared with another etymology in the same work ? "Egad Qu.



vengeance of the goddess is characteristic—she inflicts insatiable hunger on Erysichthon; from which circumstance, or because the rust seems to burn up the plant, he was called *Ἄιθων*. This fable is exceedingly appropriate to the worship of the Triopian Ceres, to which it properly belongs (Müller Proleg. 162) but I see no natural connection of it with either Attica or Delos, in the fables of which also Erysichthon appears. I am therefore inclined to conjecture that two names, slightly differing, have been confounded; that the name of the Attic and Delian hero is properly *Ἐρυσίχθων* or *Ἐρεσίχθων*<sup>20</sup>, which will then correspond with *Ἐρεχθεύς* and *Ἐριχθόνιος*; for *ἐρέσσω*, *ἐρέθω*, *ἐρίζω*, belong to the same family as *ἐρέχθω*, and signify primarily to agitate, or assail with violence. *Ἐρεσίχθων* would then have a very appropriate place in the mythology of the island of Delos, to which the Ionians so much resorted; for Neptune and Apollo were their chief divinities. He was said to have died at sea on his return from the Delian Theoria (Paus. i. 31), and later writers made him the founder of the temple of Apollo at Delos.

With Erechtheus the Ionians are connected, by the marriage of Xuthus with his daughter Creusa. (Apoll. i. 7. 2.) I must here revert briefly to what was said at the conclusion of my former paper, (Phil. M. i. 627) respecting the difference between the Ionians and the Pelasgians. In the mythi of other parts of Greece, where Pelasgian population is admitted to have existed, as Argos, Arcadia, Thessaly, we find a Pelasgus connected with the events of the earliest times, but he has no place at all in the Attic mythi, from which we may conclude that the Athenians did not attribute to themselves a Pelasgian origin. They well knew that the Pelasgians who were, as Herodotus says, *σύννοικοι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις*

Ch. *אֶלֶף* a lucky star, as we say, my stars!" To roast is to *redde*n by the application of heat.

<sup>20</sup> *Ἐρυσίχθων* is the reading of several MSS. in Plat. Crit. iii. 110. § 4. where the Attic hero is clearly meant, and *Ἐρεσίχθων* Apollod. 3, 14, 6 Heyne. In Ovid Met. 8, 737 seq. the name is spelt Erisichthon. Ovid combines the two personages; for Metra, the daughter of Erisichthon, is represented as receiving from Neptune the gift of changing herself into all shapes, which belonged to the marine deities and heroes, Proteus, Nereus, Glaucus. Hence the name *Μήτρα* (*μηῆτις*) such deities being preeminently oracular. Neptune was the Consus of the Romans, the god of counsels, an union of attributes which Scaliger could not comprehend. See Vossius Etym. L. L.



1. 57. and had been employed to build the wall of the Acropolis, were not themselves the Athenian or Attic people. Different opinions prevailed as to their origin; some thought they came from Thessaly, others from Italy<sup>21</sup>; but that they were *advenæ*, who had been rewarded for their labour in building the wall by the allotment of lands, and expelled through jealousy or resentment, (Her. 6, 137) was agreed by all. And though Herodotus himself does speak of the Attic nation as being Pelasgic, 1. 57, and even calls them Πελασγοὶ Κραναιοί 8, 44, I think any one who reflects on the absence of all historical monuments by which the use of the various names which he there supposes the Athenians successively to have borne, could be established, must conclude that he is not speaking from historical evidence, but from the assumption that poetical synonymes were national names. This was the reason for supposing the Athenians to have been called Cecropidæ and Cranai. And a similar want of historical evidence leads us to infer that when he calls the Athenians Pelasgi and when the Greeks alleged (Her. 7. 94<sup>22</sup>) that the Ionians had been called Πελασγοὶ Ἀιγιάλεες, it was only because they supposed all Greece to have been once called Pelasgia. As far as we know anything of the Pelasgic language, its affinities seem to have been to the Doric and Æolic, and the strong contrast in which from ancient times (Her. 1. 56) Dorian and Ionian stood is hardly intelligible, if the Ionians were also Pelasgians<sup>23</sup>.

Those who adopt the opinion that the original population of Attica was Pelasgic find a difficulty in explaining whence the Ionians came. They appear in Attic history, says Müller, “as if they had fallen from the skies” (Dorier 1. 11), and he supposes them to have detached themselves from some Northern tribe. Historically they are known in the following regions. Their occupation of the northern coast of the Pello-

<sup>21</sup> See Siebilis ad Paus. 1. 28.

<sup>22</sup> ὡς Ἕλληνες λέγουσι—§ 95 ὡς Ἑλλήνων λόγος speaking of the Æolians who were also alleged to be Pelasgians.

<sup>23</sup> It is a probable conjecture of Wachsmuth (Hell. Alt. 1. 48) that the Phæacians, i. e. Corcyreans were Ionians. The division into twelve Od. δ', 390, is characteristic of the Ionian states.



ponnesus to the junction of the bay of Corinth with the sea that washes Italy and Sicily is attested by the name *Ιόνιος* which this sea bore, and of which all the other etymologies are manifest fictions. The Cynurians on the Eastern side of the Peloponnesus were an Ionian people, and except the Arcadians, says Herodotus, 8. 73, and the Achæans, the only autochthones in it. In his time the Cynurians were completely detached from their kinsmen and had become Dorian, but probably in older times the Ionians had extended themselves from the Corinthian gulph as low down as Cynuria<sup>24</sup>. The Acte or coast of Argolis opposite to Attica (Müller Dorier i. p. 81.) was Ionian, and as the Ionian Tetrapolis which Xuthus is said to have colonized, (Strabo i. p. 555 Oxf.) included Marathon on the coast opposite to Eubœa, and Ionians were found also in the Southern part of Eubœa itself, except Carystus, (Thuc. 7, 57) we may regard the whole intervening space as included in the ancient limits of Ionia. The southern part of Attica was that to which the name *Ἀττική* properly belonged, for this word seems formed from *Ἀκτῆ*, and according to the observation of Niebuhr (Geogr. of Her. p. 23.) it is to such a promontory as this that the name *Ἀκτῆ* specifically applies. Hence *Ἀκταῖος* and *Ἀκταίων* in the Attic mythi. The southern part of Bœotia was also Ionian<sup>25</sup>.

The Ionians thus occupied a long line of seacoast, and when we consider how very slight a change would make

<sup>24</sup> I am inclined to think that the Pylians on the western coast were also Ionians. Apollodorus says that Pylas king of Megara founded Pylus in the Peloponnesus. This is evidently designed to make the Pylians, who under Neleus joined in the migration which followed the Dorian conquest, of Ionian origin; but the real connexion was probably older. Neptune was the chief divinity of the Pylians; Neleus is his son. Od. λ', 253; indeed Nestor himself (*νέω*, *Νέστος*) appears to me to be nothing else than a marine god, in lapse of time converted into a king and hero, yet retaining in his epic character the features of divinity, but relaxed and softened to the human aspect. Compare Hesiod's description of Nereus with the Homeric Nestor:

*Νηρέα δ' ἀψευδέα καὶ ἀληθέα γείνατο Πόντος*  
*Πρεσβύτατον παίδων· αὐτὰρ καλέουσι γέροντα,*  
*Οὔνεκα νημερτῆς τε καὶ ἥπιος, οὐδὲ θεμιστέων*  
*Δήθεται, ἀλλὰ δίκαια καὶ ἥπια δήνεα οἶδεν.* Th. 233.

Herodotus calls the Pylians Cauconians, as he calls the Ionians Ægialean Pelasgians. i. 147.

<sup>25</sup> Hesych. *Ἰώνες. ἔνιοι καὶ τοὺς Θρᾷκας Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ Βοιωτοὺς.* The Thracians here mentioned must be those of Bœotia.



'Ηιονία into 'Ιηονία or 'Ιαονία, and how destitute of all historical authority are the legends about Ion the grandson of Hellen, we shall perhaps regard this as a much more probable origin of the name. It corresponds with 'Αιγιάλεια, which part of the same region bore; a name which the mythologists referred to an Ægialeus, with as little scruple as Ionia to Ion, notwithstanding its palpable derivation from αἰγιαλός. Perhaps it will not be venturing too far into the regions of etymological conjecture to suggest that even the name 'Αχαία, which in the historic times this same country bore, is of similar meaning. A root answering to the Latin *aqua* probably existed in the Greek; we trace it in 'Αχελῶος and 'Αχέρων. This etymology of 'Αχαία suits equally with the position of the Thessalian Achæa, and a similarity of name, though arising from similarity of site, was quite sufficient to give rise to the story of a colony from the one to the other. Strabo and Apollodorus make Achæus and Ion brothers; and Herodotus, by considering the Achæans as autochthones in the Peloponnesus, virtually contradicts the story of a migration from Pthiotis. Whatever may be thought of this conjecture, it seems to me that by assigning to the Ionians an existence coeval with the earliest times of Grecian tradition, we extricate ourselves from a very great difficulty, arising from the mention of Javan in the book of Genesis x. 2. In the age of Moses there were no Ionian colonies in Asia, and the Ion of the mythologists was not born; even in the age of David the pilgrim fathers of these flourishing republics had but just set foot on its shores, and could not have given them a name. But if the Ionians were a widely extended tribe, autochthones on the northern and eastern limits of the Peloponnesus, in Attica, and Bœotia, their name might very well be used, even in the age of Moses, for southern Greece, as that of Hellas (Elisha) for northern Greece. This implies of course that Hellas had a much wider extent in early times than we, judging from the Homeric limitation of it, which is probably an archaism of poetry, commonly suppose<sup>26</sup>.

<sup>26</sup> The supposition that the Achæan and South Bœotian dialect was the same as the old Ionic and Attic, consequently in the main the same as the epic, would remove many difficulties in the history of the Greek language and literature.



It is the opinion of several able German writers, Müller Dorier i. 237. Wachsmuth Hell. Alt. i. 230, that the Ionians were a military caste, who reduced the agricultural Pelasgi to the condition of tributaries and made themselves a ruling aristocracy. No ancient writer however knows anything of such a distinction between the military class and the other three of whom the Athenian and other Ionic states were constituted; the Ergadeis, Aigicoreis and Teleontes are made to derive their names from sons of Ion according to the legend in Herodotus 5. 66, just as much as the military Hopletes. It is true that Herodotus represents Ion as *στρατάρχης*, and Strabo as *πολέμαρχος*, of the Athenians, and Müller regards this as an indication of the military character of the whole Ionian people. But the case admitted of no other representation of him. It was in some way to be accounted for that the Athenian people should have borne the name of Ionians and Attica of Ionia. They did not like the name of Ionians (Her. i. 143) and were not likely therefore to make Ion one of their native kings, but they represented him as entrusted with the government (Strabo i. 556) or as being made commander of their forces. So Eumolpus is represented (Apoll. 3. 15) as the commander of the army of Eleusis, though the Eumolpidæ instead of being a military caste were the hereditary priesthood of the Eleusinian Ceres. The story indeed hung badly together, for it was very improbable that the divisions of the people should be named from four sons of Ion, unless Ion had been something more to Athens than its polemarchus; but consistency is not to be looked for in such attempts. The Ionians appear to have been as ignorant of their having been a predominant caste as the Athenians of their having been subject to such a superiority: Herodotus gives no hint of anything of the kind. The passages in Attic authors to which Müller refers, as proving that the eupatrids at Athens were of pure Ionian blood, are far from establishing this point. In Demosth. c. Eubulid. 1315. to be taken to the temple of Apollo *πατρῷο* is mentioned as a proof of Athenian blood and citizenship, not of Ionian and eupatrid extraction; and if it be said, that anciently the citizenship was limited to Ionian blood and eupatrid extraction, we ask for the proof of this limitation.



In Plat. Euthyd. i. 302. § 72 it is evident that far from Ionian and Athenian being used in contrast to one another, the only reason of the mention of Ionians is that there were other Ionians besides Athenians, namely the Ionians of Asia, and that it was equally true of them, as of the Athenians, that Apollo, not Jupiter, was their θεὸς πατρώος. The reason assigned for this is that Apollo was the father of Ion. Of the magistrates it was inquired whether they were Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκατέρωθεν not Ἴωνες ἐκατέρωθεν Poll. 8. 85. The ἐφέται are said to have been ἀριστίνδην αἰρεθέντες Pollux 8. 124, but this by no means implies "chosen from the aristocracy" (comp. 8, 112) but for merit or rank, not from all classes without regard to qualification. There seems then to be nothing like evidence of the existence of an Ionian military caste at Athens, keeping an old Pelasgic agricultural population in the condition of tribute payers. The τελέοντες or γελέοντες who were a regular part of the fourfold division of an Ionian state as we know from their names occurring on the marble of Cyzicus, (Caylus Rec. des Ant. 2. 60. seq.) where Pelasgian tributaries are out of the question, are much more likely to be the ministers of religion<sup>27</sup>, who would otherwise have no place in the different classes of the community.

It may appear at first sight that the mythologist who made Xuthus the father of Ion marry a daughter of Erechtheus, must have intended to represent the Ionians as introduced into Athens subsequently to its first foundation. But all force has been already taken from this argument, as we have shewn that Erechtheus is no other than the god Neptune, whose worship was coeval with that of Minerva herself. Now Neptune was especially an Ionian god; he was worshipped at other places along the shore of the Corinthian gulf, but especially at Helice; at Corinth, in Bœotia; and when the colonists settled on the coast of Asia, they built at Mycale a common temple, where under the sanction of Heliconian Neptune the Panionian Panegyris was held. Apollo was also, but in a much inferior degree, an Ionian god, and

<sup>27</sup> Apollodorus i. 9, 16 makes Butes the son of Teleon; but the Eteobutadæ were the priests of the joint altar of Minerva and Erechtheus 3. 15. 1. Strabo i. 556. Ox. evidently took the τελέοντες to be ἱεροποιοί.



it was probably to accommodate the story to Athenian vanity, by giving them as close a connexion with the Delphian god as their rivals the Dorians, that Apollo, in the tragedy of Euripides, was made the real father of Ion. But though Apollo belonged more to the Dorian than the Ionian religion, there is no reason to suppose that he was merely adopted by the latter people; he belonged to the national mythology.

*Pandion* is the next name in the list of the Attic kings; for though Apollodorus makes him succeed Erichthonius, yet as we have seen that Erichthonius is only a synonyme for Erechtheus, we are really no further advanced than we were. The origin of Πανδιών is evident, I think, from the circumstance which Apollodorus connects with the mention of his name, ἐφ' οὗ Δημήτηρ καὶ Διόνυσος εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἦλθον. By their accession the list of *all the gods* who were especially honoured at Athens was made complete; the name of Pandion's mother Πασιθέα alludes to the same circumstance, as Ζευξίππη, that of her sister, to the chariot race of the Panathenæan festival, which Erichthonius was said to have instituted. This solemnity was evidently a joint celebration of the three principal divinities of the Acropolis. The procession and warlike exercises were in honour of Minerva; the chariot race of Neptune; the torch race began from the altar which was jointly dedicated to Vulcan and Prometheus. Schol. *Æd. Col.* 56. Prometheus indeed seems to have borne the same relation to Vulcan, as Erechtheus to Neptune, an epithet transformed into a distinct person. Vulcan represents the element of fire and its application to art, Prometheus the ingenuity by which the Κλυτοτέχνης produced his works. Dædalus is another artist, scarcely to be distinguished from Vulcan if we consider the original conception.

Passing over the second Erechtheus, the second Cecrops and the second Pandion as mere shadows of the first, we come to *Ægeus* the father of Theseus. That he also is no other than a synonyme of Neptune has been so convincingly shewn by Müller (*Proleg.* p. 271) that I shall quote his words and gladly avail myself of his authority.

“Theseus was a Poseidonian hero. He was worshipped, like Poseidon, on the eighth day of the month (*Plut. Thes.* 36.)



From the Marm. Oxon. 21. p. 15 it may be inferred that the Poseidia were celebrated on the eighth of Poseideon.) The father of Theseus is said to have been either the god Poseidon (Plut. 6) or the Attic king Ægeus, whose name, being derived from *Αἴγες*, waves, is a designation of the god of the sea, places consecrated to whom were called Ægea, and who was called on the Isthmus Ægeon (Callim. ap. Plut. Sympos. v. 3. 3) otherwise Ægæus (Pherecydes ap. Schol. Apoll. Apod. i. 831. comp. Lycophr. 135.) Hes. *Αἰγαιῶν*.— Ægeus is only another name for Poseidon.”

The reign of Ogyges began, as M. Raoul Rochette assures us, 1796 years before the Christian æra. “Cette date est précise, autorisée et se concilie aisément avec tous les témoignages historiques.” Vol. i. p. 101. It is at least equally certain that Theseus lived about 1200 B. C. Dr Lempriere says “the rape of Helen by Theseus took place 1215 B. C.” Making a reasonable allowance for the time which he would spend in this and other juvenile exploits, we may suppose him to have begun his graver labours as a legislator at the date abovementioned. Here then we have nearly 600 years of Attic history, and we have obtained nothing from it, but names derived from the mythology of the country, and tales connected with those names, evidently designed to explain rites, customs, institutions, and national affinities and relations, the true origin of which was lost. From Erechtheus to Ægeus we have been travelling round a circle, setting out from the worship of Neptune to arrive at the same fact again. There is nothing here which might not just as well have been invented and referred back to a venerable antiquity as preserved by tradition. The adaptations of names and explanations of customs are not incidental and occasional, in a history bearing in other respects the character of a real tradition; they are absolutely the whole of the history; there is not a single name in the list of kings, which has not an obvious reference to something which seemed to require an historical explanation. The history must therefore be referred to the desire to produce such an explanation, and what is true in it is only the existence of the facts to be explained, what is probable is only better imagined or more sagaciously inferred than what is improbable.



Perhaps no other portion of heroic history of equal length could be explained with the same facility on the same principle. The reason is that the Attic mythi have been of later origin and less intermixed than those of other parts of Greece; they are of a more exclusively domestic character, as might be expected among a people who had themselves undergone so little intermixture with other tribes. Those of the Peloponnesus from the opposite cause, are blended in a confusion which is perhaps inextricable. Yet the Attic mythi are too closely connected with those of the rest of Greece, to allow of their being withdrawn, as destitute of all historical reality, without endangering the stability of all the others. The mythological substratum which may be seen in its continuity throughout the heroic history of Attica, peeps out elsewhere in innumerable places, and we may fairly conclude that it everywhere lies at the bottom, though often hidden by the luxuriant productions of Greek imagination.

M. C. Y.

J. K.

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It has been suggested to me that in quoting (p. 348) Hesychius for Γυγαιή νύξ ἢ σκοτεινή, I have neglected to mention that the commentators on that Lexicographer consider Γυγαιή as a false reading for Λυγαιή. It is certain that the letters are easily confounded, and that false readings have arisen in Hesychius from their confusion. e. gr. Κελαινόν. σκοτεινόν μέγα evidently for μέλαν. It is therefore possible that γυγαιή may be an error of transcription for λυγαιή, but it is also possible that the learned men who have condemned it would have formed a different opinion, had it occurred to them to consider ὠγύγιος as belonging to the same root, and as primarily signifying dark. It is also by no means improbable that the letters γ and λ may have been interchanged in pronunciation; for μόγισ is considered to be the same word as μόλις and σίγαω to be the root of *sileo*. If however we must acquiesce in ἀρχαῖος as the primary meaning of ὠγύγιος, then the account that Ogyges was the first king of Attica or Bœotia will have the same probability as if he had been called Archæus. Those who maintain his real existence will not, I think, gain much by the substitution.

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In the article *On the Names of the Antehellenic Inhabitants of Greece*, in No. III. p. 611. l. 5. for *Tembices* read *Temmites*.  
 ibid. l. 1 from the bottom, for *deep of life* read *deep of lip*.  
 p. 623. l. 15. for *Lydians* read *Libyans*.  
 p. 625. l. 7. for *Lilga* read *Libya*.  
 ibid. l. 10. for *wandering* read *wondering*.



## ON ENGLISH PRÆTERITES.

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THE forms of the English præterites handled in the fourth number of this Museum, are of so much importance in a philological point of view, and have till of late been so unfortunately treated by persons entirely mistaken as to the great part they play in Teutonic Grammar, that we need no apology for returning to the subject; and endeavouring as far as in us lies to clear up their true character and history. That this can only be done, by tracing their history, and the forms they have successively assumed, I trust will appear to all who will take the pains to compare the system which we introduce to them with that of our predecessors in this almost untrodden field: and while we more immediately pursue the forms of the verbs, and observe the scale of affinities by which they are in regular order linked together, I am not without hope, that the thought may occur to some readers, that much which they have looked upon as arbitrary and irregular, appeared so to them, only because they had not learnt to cast their eyes over a sufficiently extensive circle of facts; and that they may feel, that in exact proportion to the number of elements which we introduce into the calculation, is our chance of perceiving the deep-laid and ever-ruling laws, on which as a foundation, Teutonic etymology is raised. In the following pages it will be shewn that a strict system prevails throughout our verbal forms; that it is complete within itself and incapable of alterations; that as such it has subsisted in the written Teutonic languages for upwards of fourteen centuries, and may, before the languages were written down have subsisted for as many more. And this will be enough for my present purpose, which is mainly to show that the verbs usually called irregular are nothing of the sort; and I therefore shall not follow these forms into their developement as nouns, ad-



jectives, and verbs formed in their turn from nouns and adjectives though this is perhaps the most interesting and important question in the etymology of our tongues. The error fallen into by most English grammarians has resulted from their confining themselves to the appearances of the verbs at some particular time, and their neglecting to inquire how and whence such forms arose, and what assistance might be gained from languages cognate to their own: in order to avoid this I shall call up the whole mass of Teutonic languages, from the earliest period, and following in the steps of that mighty philologist James Grimm, attempt to substitute a rational scheme for a word, by using the aids which history offers. For it must be quite clear to every one who has ever studied a language at all, that a great number of cases are not to be explained by any thing which he at any given time finds in the language itself; the English student for example would be very much puzzled if he were asked to say how the word *day*, the word *fair*, the word *brain* came to mean what they do. But the very first help which he would clutch at, would be the hope that in an earlier form of the language he might find a key to their meaning, and that a less corrupted combination of vowels and consonants might hint at the real signification of the roots: he might possibly find a difficulty in discovering the secret meaning of the roots *däg*, *fäg* and *bräg* by which the conceptions on which they rested were introduced into the words *däg* (Gothic *Dag-s*) *fäg-er* and *bräg-en*, but he would at any rate not be quite so likely to blunder as if he contemplated the *ai* in those modern forms as a true vowel. To take another and commoner instance; how much painful labour has not been bestowed upon the simple expression “me-thinks” by those who could not reconcile the apparent error of grammar with what they knew of the habits of the language. Yet when we reflect, that it was not till a late period that the form *think* spread itself beyond its limits, and involved a similar yet distinct verb, that the Gothic *þugkjan*. Anglo-Saxon *þyncan*. Ohd. *Dunhan*. Nhd. *Dünken*. *videri*, is as far removed in form as meaning from the Gothic *þagkian*. Ohd. *Denhan*. Anglo-Saxon *þencan*. Nhd. *Denken*. *cogitare*, our difficulty vanishes at once. “Me-thinks” is then a dat.



with an impersonal verb, and is actually translated by our expression "Me-seems." For further distinction I will add, that the præterite of þyncan was þûhte, that of þencan, þôhte. History of a language, and of all the languages, which belong to the same race, all these languages being considered only in the light of dialects, mere variations of a theoretic form, is therefore the best refuge we have in any etymological perplexity.

There are in the Teutonic language (embracing all the languages and all their periods from the fourth to the nineteenth century) but two kinds of verbs: the oldest and the youngest are in this alike. The first kind from a capability of forming their præterites out of themselves without the addition of any foreign element may be called strong: the second, add a new conception in the shape of a syllable and are called weak. The strong are again of two kinds. 1, Such as form their præterite by affecting the first consonant of the root, 2, those that affect the vowel, according to a particular relation, and leave the consonant as it was. In the Gothic, two conjugations partake of both forms. The manner in which the first consonant of the root was affected in Gothic was by duplication of it, with an intermediate vowel; and these pure conjugations were four in number; as follows:

1st. salt-a <i>salio</i> .	pr. sái-salt.	part. salt-ans.
2d. háit-a <i>voco</i> .	háit-háit.	háit-ans.
3d. stáut-a <i>percutio</i> .	stái-stáut.	stáut-ans.
4th. slêp-a <i>dormio</i> .	sái-zlêp.	slêp-ans.

The two which follow both double the first consonant, and change the vowel.

5th. lái-a <i>irrideo</i> .	pr. lái-lo	part. lái-ans.
6th. grêt-a <i>ploro</i> .	gái-grôt	grêt-ans.

I have said that in the remaining strong conjugations which from the Gothic to the English of the present day are neither more nor less than six in number, the method of expressing past time is by a change in the vowel, and that these changes are according to a particular relation. This relation I shall proceed to explain in terms of the Gothic, after first shewing the force of the Gothic vowels in Anglo-Saxon. The Teutonic language possesses ten vowels: three short; a, i, u,



and seven long; ê, ô, û, áí, áú, ei, iu. These appear in this pure form in the Gothic only, for as early as the ninth century, the Old High Dutch, changed a when followed by i, into e<sup>1</sup>. In the same language o arose occasionally out of u, and ë out of i. The Anglo-Saxon a, according to particular circumstances, became e (that is when followed in another syllable by i), or ä (written in MSS. æ) before certain combinations of consonants; or ëa, before h, r, l, and combinations of these letters; lastly before mm, nn and certain other duplications and combinations of consonants it deepened into o. In like manner the Anglo-Saxon i, before h, r, l became ë or ëo, as before h and r, the same i had in Gothic itself become áí. Before other consonants it either remained in Anglo-Saxon as i, or was dulled as in Ohd into ë. U which in Gothic before h and r, assumed the form áú and the sound of o, either remained in Anglo-Saxon u, or o, or if followed by i in another syllable, assumed the sound of the German ü and was written y. The Gothic ê found a representative in the Anglo-Saxon æ, (quite distinct from ä, and generally marked æ' in Anglo-Saxon MSS. and

<sup>1</sup> This the German grammarians since Klopstock, call *Umlaut*, or *About-sound*. Examples of the various changes here mentioned will make the matter clear.

a into e.	Got. Balg-s (m) pl. balg.eis.	Ohd. Palc. pl. Pelk-î. <i>cutis</i> .
u into o.	Got. Guþ (n) <i>idolon</i> .	Ohd. Kot. <i>deus</i> .
i into ë.	Got. Gib-a (f) <i>donum</i> .	Ohd. Këp-a.
AS. a into e.	Got. Har-j-is (m) <i>exercitus</i> .	AS. Her-ë.
a into ä.	Got. Dag-s (m) <i>dies</i> .	AS. dæg (the sound of this vowel is that of a in the word back).
a into ëa.	Got. Barn. (n) <i>infans</i> .	AS. Bëarn.
a into o.	Got. Man-s. (m)	AS. Mon.
i into ëo.	Got. Haír-us (m) <i>gladius</i> .	AS. Hëoro.
i into ë.	Got. Wig-s (m) <i>via</i> .	AS. Wëg. Ohd. wëc.
u into o.	Got. Daúh-tar. (f)	AS. Doht-or. <i>filia</i> .
u into y.	Got. Kun-i. (n)	AS. cyn (for cyn-në) <i>genus</i> .
Got. ê into æ.	Got. Dêd-s (f)	AS. dæd. <i>factum</i> .
ô into ê.	Got. Bôt-an.	AS. Bêt-an. <i>meliorari</i> .
û into ý.	Got. Hûs. (n) sing. <i>domus</i> .	AS. hýs. (n) pl. <i>domus</i> .
ái into â.	Got. Háim-s (f) <i>vicus</i> .	AS. Hâm. (m)
áu into eá.	Got. Láub-s (m) <i>folium</i> .	AS. leáf. (n).
ei into î.	Got. Neip (m) <i>invidiam</i> .	AS. Nip.
iu into ëó or ý.	Got. þiubs (m) <i>fur</i> .	AS. þëóf.
AS. ea into y or i.	Got. Maht-s (f) <i>potestas</i> .	AS. mēaht and miht.
eá into ý.	Got. Náup-s. (f) <i>invidia</i> .	AS. neád. and nýd. (more than once nēód which seems formed upon the present iu, rather than the præt. áu of the theoretic verb niuþan, náup.



so also by Rask who writes ä æ.) Gothic ô became ê or else remained ô, û remained as it was except when followed by i, which converted it into ŷ. Gothic áí was the Ohd ei, the Anglo-Saxon â. Gothic áú was the long Anglo-Saxon vowel eá (distinct altogether from the short ëa). Ei became î; iu became either ëó or ŷ. Besides these changes which are universal, ëa was sometimes in more modern Anglo-Saxon replaced by y, and eá by ŷ. With this view of the relative value of Gothic or Anglo-Saxon vowels, we may proceed to state the forms of the conjugation.

There being these ten Gothic vowels, and their larger number of Anglo-Saxon equivalents, and a fixed number of consonants, we should have a very large number of possible combinations, in which one vowel followed by one consonant, and one vowel followed by two consonants appeared. Historically speaking however, only the following are found in the roots of Gothic or any other Teutonic verbs: al. am. an. ar. ap. ab. af. at. ad. aþ. as. ak. ag. ah—il. im. in. air. (=ir). ip. ib. if. iv. it. id. iþ. is. ik. ig. aih (=ih).—ul. um. un. aúr (=ur). up. ub. uf. uv. ut. ud. uþ. us. uk. ug. aúh (=uh).—êl. êm. ên. êr. êp. êb. êf. êt. êd. êþ. ês. êk. êg. êh.—ôl. ôn. ôr. ôp. ôb. ôf. ôt. ôd. ôþ. ôk. ôg. ôh.—áim. áin. áip. áib. áif. áiv. áit. áid. áiþ. áis. áik. áig. áih.—áup. áub. áuf. áuv. áut. áud. áuþ. áus. áuk. áug. áuh.—eim. ein. eip. eib. eif. eiv. eit. eid. eiþ. eis. eik. eig. eih.—iup. iub. iuf. iuv. iut. iud. iuþ. ius. iuk. iug. iuh. These are the only combinations of a vowel with one consonant found in Gothic roots; no Gothic root can end in more than two consonants; and though I am inclined on this point to differ from James Grimm, and to say that no Gothic root can end in more than one, I shall waive this discussion here, and proceed to give the combinations of one vowel and two consonants found in a Teutonic verb; premising that the only consonants so combined are the following: ll. mm. nn. rr. pp. tt. kk. lm. lp. lb. lf. lv. lt. ld. lþ. ls. lk. lg. lh. mp. mb. mf. ms. nt. nd. nþ. ns. nk. ng. rm. rn. rp. rb. rf. rt. rd. rþ. rs. rk. rg. rh. ft. fs. zd. zg. sp. st. sk. ht. hs. Now no long vowel stands before these combinations, so that a, i, and u, alone unite with them in forming roots. (Deut. Gramm. II. 5 &c.)



The above combinations are arranged in the following manner in the remaining six strong conjugations,

No.	Pres.	Præt. sing.	Præt. pl.	Part.
7.	al &c.	ôl &c.	ôl &c.	al. &c.
8.	eim. &c.	áim &c.	im &c.	aim &c.
9.	iup &c.	áup &c.	up &c.	up &c.
10.	il. &c.	al &c.	êl &c.	il &c.
11.	il. &c.	al. &c.	êl &c.	ul. &c.
12.	ilp. &c.	alp. &c.	ulp &c.	ulp &c.

or as may be clearer seen in an example of each,

7. sak-a.	<i>increpo.</i>	sôk, sôk-um.	sak-ans.
8. kein-a.	<i>germino.</i>	káin, kain-um.	kin-ans.
9. hiuf-a.	<i>ploro.</i>	háuf, huf-um.	huf-ans.
10. gib-a.	<i>do.</i>	gaf, gêb-um.	gib-ans.
11. nim-a.	<i>sumo.</i>	nam, nê-m-um.	num-ans.
12. hilp-a.	<i>juvo.</i>	halp, hulp-um.	hulp-ans.

Such were in Gothic the twelve conjugations which have been nick-named *irregular*. Of these the first six or reduplicative, exist as such only in Gothic, though as late as the Anglo-Saxon of the seventh century, traces of the second remained in the word *hêht*, or as it should be divided *hê-ht*, the Gothic *hái-háit vocavi*. But the fact of an older organization of these verbs having perished seems proved in Anglo-Saxon by the observation that very few of them fall under the six last named forms, or have gone over into the weak conjugations in *-ede* and *-ôde*; and this it was natural for them to do at any rate, in process of time. But though they ceased to be reduplicative, they still did not cease to be regular, as will be seen by comparing with the Gothic reduplicatives above given, the following Anglo-Saxon verbs,

1. fēalle.	<i>cado.</i>	fēol, fēollon.	feallen.
2. swāpe.	<i>verro.</i>	swēôp, swēôpon.	swāpen.



3 hleápe.	<i>salto</i>	hlëôp, hlëôpon.	hleápen.
4. slæpe.	<i>dormio.</i>	slêp, slêpon.	slæpen.
5. blâwe.	<i>spiro.</i>	blëôw, blëôwon.	blâwen.

6. Seems to have gone entirely over into the fourth græte; grêt, grêton; græten, *ploro*<sup>2</sup>.

With regard to the third and fourth of these conjugations I cannot agree with Mr Rask. That great and lamented scholar considers the vowel in the præterite, short. He thinks that the vulgar pronunciation *lep* and *slep* represented the old Anglo-Saxon sounds, and that to counterbalance the unpleasant shortness, in Old English a *t*. was added at the end; to this it is answered that had this been so, the *t* would not have replaced -en in the participle, and that this one fact proves these verbs as many others were, to have been in process of time transferred to the weak form of conjugation. But returning to the true and firm conjugations, those last six, which no time has availed to alter, whose vowel relations lie at the deep foundation of the oldest nouns and adjectives we have, and without a knowledge of whose forms, we cannot hope to understand a single step of Teutonic etymology, returning to them let us see what alteration the Anglo-Saxon has made, and whether he alone has left a system which rules the tongues of the Old, the Middle and New High Dutch, the Old Saxon, the Middle and New Low-Dutch, the Middle and New Netherlandish, and the Old Frisian, lastly the languages of Scandinavia, the Old Norse, and its daughters Dansk and Swedish.

7. far-e.	<i>proficiscor</i>	fôr, fôr-on.	far-en.
8. bîd-e.	<i>expecto.</i>	bâd, bid-on.	bid-en.
9. crëópe.	<i>repo.</i>	creáp, crup-on.	crop-en.
10. swëf-e.	<i>sopior.</i>	swäf, swæfon.	swëf-en.
11. nim-e.	<i>sumo.</i>	nam, nâm-on.	nom-en.
12. hëlp-e.	<i>juvo.</i>	hëalp, hulpon.	holp-en.

As I mean to carry this enquiry further than Grimm from want of materials was enabled to do, it will be necessary before we proceed to the Old English, that is to

<sup>2</sup> Yet grëótan. *lamentari.* Bëowulf 102. which must have gone over into the ninth conjugation. This form is however not so true as Grætan. Grêtan, and sometimes though less correctly Greitan.



say the language between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries, to say a few words respecting the new forms of the vowels which were then introduced. For even as the Anglo-Saxon differs in appearance from the Gothic, so does the English of that period from the Anglo-Saxon, and when once the corresponding sounds have been ascertained, it will be seen that it changes its system just as little.

Yet before we step from the hard, and as it were iron-bound system of the Anglo-Saxons, into what at first sight appears a chaos of indigested and capricious variations, a word or two may be not impertinent, with regard to our authorities, when treating of what we consider a new language. It is no doubt matter of bitter regret to all whose love for the deep pursuits of etymology, has led them to trace downwards the progress of the English tongue, that so few documents have been supplied to them, in aid of their too-often wearisome task; they cannot but have heard it whispered that in our collegiate and public libraries, a vast and complete series of materials exists, which if once arranged, and given to the light, would furnish a history of every variation, and bridge over every gulph which now starts up beneath their feet, perplexing and amazing them. And knowing this, they must feel that the example of Germany, France, and Denmark, might worthily have been followed by ourselves, if leaving the consideration of mere every-day profit, we had bestowed some little pains upon the reproduction of these national treasures. For History, for Theology, for Art, vast stores are yet lurking in the concealment of ancient manuscripts, difficult in themselves to be decyphered, known by name to the curious, and as the world judges, the idle only, and too often shut with a jealous care from the gaze of those who would unroll them before their countrymen, whose true and most sure records they are in times which the self-satisfied indifference of the day, brands with the name of barbarous. To such students as these I think I shall be rendering a service by noting some of the documents which from the nature of their contents, will be useful in forming a systematic history of our tongue. The first deflection from the pure Anglo-Saxon, may be said to occur in the later years of the Saxon Chronicle, from the year 1100



or a little earlier: at the time when as we know from Stow, “the whole land began under the king [*Edward the Confessor*] and other Normans brought in, to leave off the English rites, and in many things to imitate the manners of the French. All the noble men tooke it to be a great point of gentrie in their courts to speake the French tongue, to make their charters and deeds after the manner of the French, and to be ashamed of their own custom and use, as well in this as in many other things.” Nearly following upon this is a MS. in our University Library (I. i. 1. 18) containing lives of Saints, prose and verse, four and twenty chapters of Ælfric’s Genesis, and sermons; the last of which being for the most part modernized copies of Ælfric, of whose homilies a pure Saxon copy is found amongst many others in the same library (G. g. 3. 28) are capable of a useful comparison; while the Genesis may be collated with the copy printed by Thwaites from an Oxford MS., and the lives of Saints and many of the homilies usefully compared with a multitude of such remains in our various libraries, and particularly in the Bodleian, and Cotton collections, in the last of which, a copy, (Jul. E. vij) not differing importantly in date, language or contents, from our own, is to be found. Ælfric’s Grammar is found in many libraries, more or less complete; the Cotton collection possesses two copies differing materially in point of date: so also the library of Trinity College, from the earlier of which (R. 9. 17) written shortly after the Norman usurpation, a very large number of Saxon and French interlinear glosses may be gained. But passing over these and other authorities in the Cotton, King’s, and the several University collections, we come to a document of most unmeasured importance; I mean Lajamon’s Chronicle of which there are two copies in the Cotton collection<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> We learn from a prospectus lately issued, that this noble record of Old England is about to be edited under the auspices of the Antiquarian Society. With all gratitude to the Society for this boon, for such it is, conferred upon English scholars, I cannot but regret that some Saxon scholar was not to be found among them, to whom the task of giving it to us, might have been committed. For Mr Madden, whose name appears as the intended editor, though as far as I know, a laborious and praiseworthy enquirer into the middle period of our language, is unfortunately a stranger to Anglo-Saxon; and the language of Lajamon must be descended upon, not risen to. An evidence of the difficulty that necessarily presses upon a person, coming unprepared with Saxon to



The earlier of these (Cal. A. ix) was in all probability written towards the end of the twelfth century: the later of them,

the consideration of Lajamon, will be found in Mr Madden's notes to Havelock the Dane, published by him under the patronage of the Roxburgh Club. It occurs, p. 189. where in order to prove that *seals* formed part of the dainties set before our forefathers in the twelfth century, the following passage is quoted, (Lajamon, fol. 45<sup>b</sup>. col. 2).

islajene wæron to þon mele  
twælf þusend ruðeren sele  
and þritti hundred hærtes  
ahd al swa feole hinden.

Now the word *sele* here is not, *sëol*, *phoca*, but *sæl*, *bonus*, *felix*, the Goth. *sêlis*, Luc. 8, 15. Mark. 7, 22. Luc. 6, 35. &c. The Old. H. d. *sæl*, *sælic* in composition, and the Old Saxon *sâlic* in the same. Letting alone therefore the copula which Mr Madden must have inserted in order to make any sense at all of the passage, we shall not read, twelve thousand bullocks *and* seals, but twelve thousand *good* bullocks: and we shall also think *bonus* or *felix* a better epithet to a hero than *phoca*, when we read in the same Lajamon "*þat Brutus þa sele; to þare sæ wolde.*" So in the very first page of the MS. we may incline to believe, that Lajamon was thinking of a pleasant residence, when he said, "*sel þar him þuhte,*" and not at all that he seemed to himself to be a *seal*. Or a very few paragraphs further, that when Assaracus received, "*sele þreo castles*" from his father, they were only three *good* castles. While upon this subject I will furnish Mr Madden with a better translation and arrangement of a portion of Beowulf, than that which I suppose from the hand of some injudicious friend, he has inserted at p. 197, among the same notes. At the same time it will be but just to the author of that performance to give his reading also; which I correct in columns 3 and 4.

P. 197. In Caines cynne	On Cain's kin (descendants)	In Caines cynne	On Cain's kin
þone cwealm ge-wræc	this sin (homicide) avenged	þone cwealm ge-wræc	the murder avenged
ece drihten	the eternal Lord	ece drihten	(the) eternal Lord,
þæs þe he Abel slog.	of him who Abel slew.	þæs þe he Abel slog.	In that he, Abel slew.
ne ge-feah he	he rejoiced not	Ne ge-feah he þære fæh-ðe	Nor rejoiced he in the feud,
þære fæhðe	in that act of hatred,	ac he hine feor for-wræc.	but he exiled him afar,
ac he hine feor for-wræc metod	but him afar off the creator exiled.	metod for þy mane	the creator, for the wickedness,
for þy mane man-cynne	Therefore many kinds of men,	man-cynne fram.	from mankind.
fram þanon un-tydras	from thence un-fruitful	þanon un-tydras	thence evil-progenies
ealle on-wocon	all arose. (took their origin)	ealle on-wocon	all arose
eotenas and ylfe	eotenes and ylfs	eotenas and ylfe	Iutes and ylfs
and orneas	and monsters.	and orneas	and orcneys.
swyke gi (gan)'tas	Such (were the) giants	swlyce gi (gantas)	Such giants
þa wið godewunnon	that against God strove	þa wið gode wunnon	then warred against god
lange þrage	a long period:	lange þrage	for a long period.
he hem þæs lean for-geald.	he them this loan requited.	(he) him þæs lean for-geald.	he them, therefore, reward, repaid.
		fol. 132b. Vitel. A. xv.	

Mæn. (*nefas*). The Old Saxon Mên. Isl. Mein. ought never to have been confounded with any form of manig (*multus*), nor is it easy to conceive how the dat. c. man-cynne could have been supposed right in connection with any case of that adj; or how the masc. subst. un-tydras could ever have passed for an adj.—þæs þe is universally to be rendered, *because*, *on account of* &c. and a careful distinction is no doubt to be made between læn (*a loan*) and leán (*a reward*).



(Otho. C. XIII) though often supplying us with valuable glosses upon the former, was evidently copied from it by a person to whom many of the expressions had become unintelligible, and who therefore whenever he came to a difficult passage, omitted it altogether. In all the MSS. above-mentioned the inflections and genders of the nouns, are still preserved, though by no means correctly in all cases. The usual variations which a language undergoes when about to lose its terminations &c. are observable; for example a dull *e* takes place of most vowels in the inflections, the *m* of the dat. pl. is changed into *n*, and the vowels which had become modified (Germ. *um-laut*) by the operation of *i*, recover their original form; in addition to these changes, we have the feminine inflection gradually perishing away, or replaced by the masculine; neuter plurals taking the masculine inflection; and above all weak nouns (which once made all their oblique cases in.-an) transferred to the strong masculine form; (gen. -es. dat. -e.) The distinction between adjectives definitely and indefinitely used (once marked by a difference in the declension) is often neglected; and many verbs which once were strong have past over into the weak form. But the greatest apparent change is naturally in the vowels, and the signs by which they are represented. Taking a period, (the twelfth century), when the variations seem to have somewhat settled, those with which we are concerned, appear briefly thus.

Got.	a.	OE.	a. æ. ēa. e.	AS.	a. ä. ēa. e.
	i. aí.		i. ē. ēo.		i. ē. ēo.
	u. aú.		u. o. y. i.		u. o. y.
	áu.		eá. e. ŷ. ei. æ.		eá. ŷ.
	iu.		ēó. ê. ŷ.		ēó. ŷ.
	ê.		â. ê. æ.		æ.
	ái.		â. æ. ô. ái. ei.		â.
	ô.		æ. ê. ô.		ê. ô.
	ei.		î. ŷ.		î.
	û.		û. ou. ŷ.		û. ŷ.

Using these vowels, one or other of which is found for its corresponding one, in the above named twelve conjugations, and first in the reduplicative, we have such forms as follow;



1. fallen. (inf.)	fëol, fëollen.		fallen.
2. hâten.	{ haihte en. heihte. hâte. hôte.		{ hâten. hôten.
3. hleápen.	hlêp. hlëôp. (hlup)en.		hleápen.
4. slæpen.	slêp. en.		slæpen.
5. blâwen.	blêw. blëôw en.		blâwen. blôwen.
and in the six last.			
7. slajen.	slôj (slôh).	en.	islajen. (slawen)
faren.	fôr.	en.	i-faren.
8. drîfen.	{ drâf later <i>drove</i>	drif-en.	i-driven.
rîden.	râd.	rid-en.	riden.
9. for-lëóse } lêse }	for-lëás	for-loren.	for-loren.
10. queðen	quað,	queðen.	iqueðen.
11. cumen. } comen }	com. } cume }	comen.	{ icumen. icomén.
12. finden.	funde.	funden.	i-funden.
ginnen.	{ gan gon	gunnen.	i-gunnen.

and all these are to be found in the first named Codex of Lajamon. The Middle English, that is to say, Chaucer and the Romancers, still keep to the law in their strong conjugations, varying the vowel of the præterite only as the same vowel varied in every other word; but generally mulcting the infinitive and præterite plural of its final *n*<sup>4</sup>. I refer the reader to J. Grimm's *Deutsche Grammatik* for the forms of the Middle and New English strong conjugations, Vol. I. pp. 981 and 994. observing that excepting where the vowel

<sup>4</sup> A useful thing by the way to bear in mind when we read Chaucer; for the final *e* one meets with is of two kinds; 1. It is a sign that the vowel next before it is long, as in *rede* (*consilium*), Anglo-Saxon *ræd*, and in this case it may not be pronounced; 2. It represents a perished inflection, as *tîm-e* (*tempus*), Anglo-Saxon *tîm-a*, *ban-e* (*mors*), Anglo-Saxon *ban-a*, *luf-e* (*amor*), Anglo-Saxon *luf-u*, *luf-e* (*amare*), Anglo-Saxon *luf-an*, and then it must be pronounced; for no doubt long after the inflections themselves had perished from the written language, they were retained in the feeling of speakers and readers.



In all the three Gothic weak conjugations the consonant *d* appears; the conjugations are distinguished by the vowel which precedes it. The first has *i*; *e. g.*

the second has ô ; *e. g.*

salb-ôda.

hab-an (*habere*).

hab-áida.

The Anglo-Saxon compresses these into two, one taking -e, the other -ô for its distinctive vowel; to wit,



1. cwel-j-an (cwellan). (*necare*). cwelede (cwelde).
2. sceáw-j-an (*intueri*). sceáw-ode.

The Old English (with exceptions) the Middle English, and the New, inflect all these verbs in a plain and toneless -ed. The reader will judge how far this, the *regular* conjugation, ought to have superseded the remaining twelve; and how far the language has lost by the change. One small advantage has no doubt been gained in some cases where an old *strong* verb has become *weak*; and this is, that the meanings have been divided, the original, and, as it were, self-created impulse has remained with the old form, the active and outward sense has been transferred to the new; for instance, the following verbs, neuter in their strong, active in their weak form, will explain and justify my remark:

(Rask p. 113.)

*Præt.*

yrnan (read irnan)	arn (to run)	ärnan (to <i>make</i> or let run).
byrnan (read birnan)	barn (to burn, <i>ardere</i> )	bärnan (to make to burn) <i>urere</i> .
drincan	dranc (to drinc)	drencan (to give to drink) <i>drench</i> .
sincan	sanc (to sink, <i>neut.</i> )	sencan (to sink, <i>act.</i> )
licgan	läg (to lie)	lecgan (to lay) <i>make to lie</i> .
sittan	sät (to sit)	settan (to set) <i>make to sit</i> .
drîfan	drâf (to drive <sup>5</sup> )	dræfan (to disperse).
lîdan	lâð (go by sea, <i>movere</i> )	lædan (to lead) <i>make to move</i> .
ârîsan	â-râs (to arise)	â-ræran (to raise, rear) <i>make to rise</i> .
fëallan	fëoll (to fall)	fyllan (to cast down, fell) <i>make to fall</i> .
wëallan	wëoll (to boil, <i>neut.</i> )	wyllan (to make boil).
flëôn (flëôgan)	fleáh (to fly)	â-flîgan (to put to flight) <i>make to fly</i> .
bûgan (bëôgan)	beáh (to bow, bend, <i>neut.</i> )	bîgan (to bend, <i>act.</i> ) <i>make to bow</i> .
faran	fôr (to go)	feran (to convey) <i>make to go</i> .
wacan	wôc (to wake, <i>neut.</i> )	weccan (to wake, excite) <i>make to wake</i> .

Most of these are formed upon the præterites of the strong verbs; this I allow, but we have instances where the *same* verb has two distinct meanings, as it is weak or strong; for example, the German *schmelzen* (to melt) if strong is *neuter*, if weak, active. So we use the word *behold*, if weak in a transitive sense, if strong in a subjective; that is to say, in its participle only; I was beheld by him, but I am beholden to him.

I have said that foreign words when received into the language are inflected weak; an example of which shall be

<sup>5</sup> Drîfan is very often active, but its neuter sense is obvious in such expressions as "to drive before the wind," &c.



the French, *adouber*, Sp. *adobar*, which we call *dubb*, and which as early as the Saxon Chronicle (An. 1085.) was conjugated *dubbade*. That weak forms progress may be seen in Shakspeare's *dupped* for *did up*, *donned* for *did on*, and in what I have elsewhere seen, *to dout*, for *do out*<sup>6</sup>. I have observed one word, and at present one only, which in old and trust-worthy documents appears to possess both forms, yet one meaning: If the strong form does not perhaps confine itself to the sense *suspendo*, the weak to that of *dependo*. It is the Anglo-Saxon verb *to hang*. From the very first it was a strange verb; two infinitives, one *hôn* (Goth. *hahan*), another *hangan* (Ohd. *hankan*), made their appearance: of these the latter soon disappeared, and at the same time fixed its præterite *hêng* upon the usual infinitive *hôn*, indicative present *hô*; though Grimm asserts rather too broadly that no other tense of *hangan* remained, it is certain that they were very rare. But in *Bëowulf* we have a *hangian*, (p. 104, 125. Ed. Thorkel.) which we must have considered a weak verb, even had we wanted the confirmation which we find in the præterite *hangode*. (*Bëow.* p. 156.) Lajamon continues to use the two forms. Of the word *fangan*, which is in every other respect similar to *hangan*, I am not at present able to say whether it did or did not appear in a weak form; for such an expression as the "fanged wolf" does not imply a *caught* wolf, but a wolf armed with fangs. This should be enough, little as it is, to assure the reader that the English verbs are not quite so irregular as he may have been led to believe. I have but one word of advice to give him, and that is, that he hasten to find in grammar the least capricious, the least arbitrary of all things: but that he do not trust to a form of language which the very operation of time itself, or a thousand other causes from without, may have altered widely from its ancient condition. Above all, that in every difficulty he seek those ancient forms, and the history of the tongue which he is investigating: he will find the study

<sup>6</sup> *Bringan* is given by J. Grimm as a verb of the twelfth conjugation, as well as a weak verb (*bringan. brôhte*). I have met with the word *brungen* in the Cod. Ex. fol. 9<sup>b</sup>. and this whether the participle, or an error of the transcriber for *brun-gon* (præt. pl.) is no doubt a strong form.



full of charms, and bringing with itself an interest which will enable him to grapple with the labour he must encounter. Perchance also it may be his lot to give the world evidence that etymology is a good and useful study, and not without its claims upon the attention both of the historian and philosopher.

I. M. K.

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## ON THE BIRTH-YEAR OF DEMOSTHENES.

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MOST of our readers are aware, that Mr Clinton has devoted a chapter (xx.) of the Appendix to the first volume of his *Fasti*, to the discussion of some disputed questions relating to Demosthenes, one of which is the date of his birth. The author has there examined several arguments of Petitus, Corsini, F. A. Wolf, and other critics, but seems not to have been acquainted with some important contributions which have been made since their time to the investigation of the subject, by German scholars, and particularly by Boeckh. As the question involves some of a more general nature, which are interesting to all students of Greek antiquity, it will be useful to consider the state of the controversy by the light that has been thrown upon it through the researches of the later authors. It is possible indeed that before this number of our Journal is published, Mr Clinton may have conferred another benefit upon literature by a new edition of his work, and may have discussed the subject in a manner that would render the following remarks superfluous. But as on the other hand it is not impossible that they may be fortunate enough to direct his attention to some points which he would not otherwise have adverted to, it seemed better to give them this chance of becoming useful, than to postpone them till it should be certain that they had not been anticipated.

We will first briefly mention the contradictory statements of the ancients, which are more fully reported by Mr Clinton, and will then examine the contending opinions of the moderns. The author of the *Lives of the Ten Orators*, which have been ascribed to Plutarch, assigns the birth of Demosthenes to the archonship of Dexitheus: *ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα ἔτη γεγονώς, λογιζομένοις ἀπὸ Δεξιθέου εἰς Καλλίμαχον, ἐφ' οὗ ἡ παρ' Ὀλυνθίων ἦκε πρεσβεία περὶ τῆς βοηθείας.* He



also mentions that it was in the year of Timocrates that Demosthenes gained his cause against his guardians: ἐπὶ Τιμοκράτους εἶλε τοὺς ἐπιτρόπους. “Between Dexitheus (B. C. 38 $\frac{5}{4}$ ), and Timocrates (B. C. 36 $\frac{4}{3}$ ), Mr Clinton observes, are twenty archons. Between Dexitheus and Callimachus (B. C. 34 $\frac{9}{8}$ ) are thirty-five archons. According to this chronology then Demosthenes was born B. C. 385, was in his twenty-second year when he prosecuted his guardians, and in his thirty-seventh at the time of the Olynthian war.”

Dionysius of Halicarnassus dates the orator's birth four years later, in the archonship of Demophilus, Ol. 99. 4. He says (ad Amm. 4) οὗτος ἐγεννήθη μὲν ἐνιαυτῷ πρότερον τῆς ἑκατοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος, ἄρχοντος δὲ Τιμοκράτους εἰς ἔτος ἦν ἐμβεβηκὼς ἐπτακαιδέκατον· δημοσίους τε λόγους ἤρξατο γράφειν ἐπὶ Καλλιστράτου ἄρχοντος, εἰκοστὸν καὶ πέμπτον ἔχων ἔτος. Mr Clinton observes, that, as there are sixteen archons between Demophilus and Timocrates, and twenty-five between Demophilus and Callistratus, Demosthenes, though he might be said to be seventeen in the year of Timocrates, could not be called twenty-five in the year of Callistratus, and he therefore proposes to correct the text of Dionysius, and to read εἰκοστὸν καὶ ἕκτον ἔχων ἔτος. And certainly if by the words as we now read them Dionysius meant, that Demosthenes only completed his twenty-fourth year in the archonship of Callistratus, we must either adopt Mr Clinton's correction, or charge Dionysius with an oversight; and indeed he repeats the expression in a subsequent passage (c. 7): ὁ μὲν εἰκοστὸν καὶ πέμπτον ἔτος ἔχων ἤρξατο πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ δημηγορεῖν. At all events, as Mr Clinton observes, “according to Dionysius, Demosthenes was born B. C. 381, was seventeen at the prosecution of his guardians, twenty-six at the time of his first public cause, and thirty-two at the period of the Olynthian war.”

A third account, differing by a year from that of Dionysius, is furnished by Aulus Gellius, who (N. A. xv. 28). describes Demosthenes as twenty-seven (septem et viginti annos natus) at the time of the oration against Androtion, which, as well as that against Leptines, Dionysius (ad Amm. 4). assigns to the year of Callistratus: and Gellius adds that he died at the age of sixty: (vixerunt alter tres



sexaginta annos: Demosthenes sexaginta). Since Demosthenes is known to have died in the archonship of Philocles, if the twenty-seven and the sixty years were complete at the epochs mentioned by Gellius, he was born in the year of Evander, the predecessor of Demophilus, Ol. 99. 3. This statement, as Mr Clinton remarks, is confirmed by Plutarch (Demosth. 15), who, after speaking of the oration against Androtion and some others, adds, that Demosthenes was thought to have composed them at the age of seven or eight and twenty (*δυοῖν ἢ τριῶν δέοντα ἔτη τριάκοντα γεγονώς*): and by Libanius, who relates (Vit. Demosth. §. 3) that there were some who attributed the speeches delivered by Demosthenes in the suit with his guardians (the *λόγοι ἐπιτροπικοί*) to Isæus, because they did not believe that he could have produced such works at so early an age: *διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν τοῦ ῥήτορος ἀπιστοῦντες (ὀκτωκαίδεκα γὰρ ἔτων ἦν ὅτε πρὸς τούτους ἠγωνίζετο)*.

If the question could be decided by evidence of this kind, the authority of Pseudo-Plutarch, as the weakest, would be forced to give way, and Dionysius would be outnumbered. If however he alone were considered equivalent to all the rest, Gellius and Libanius would appear to have come nearest to the truth. But as on this subject such testimony cannot of itself determine anything, its weight must wholly depend on its consistency with the information which Demosthenes himself has fortunately afforded, though not so distinct and unequivocal as could have been wished, as to his own age. The passages containing this information occur partly in the orations in the cause of the guardians, and partly in that against Midias. In these Mr Clinton finds a confirmation of the chronology of Gellius and Libanius, while the critics whom he endeavoured to refute, as well as others whose arguments seem not to have fallen in his way when he was writing his appendix, appeal to the same passages to corroborate the statement of Pseudo-Plutarch. These therefore must now be considered.

Demosthenes (in Aphob. i. p. 814) states that his father left him an orphan, seven years old (*ἑπτ' ἔτων ὄντα*): and he repeatedly mentions ten years as the term during which his guardians had the management of his estate. He also



speaks of a marriage which took place in the last month of the archon Polyzelus, immediately after which he was admitted to his estate, and began to call his guardians to an account (In Onetor. i. p. 868). ἐγήματο—ἐπὶ Πολυζήλου ἄρχοντος Σκίροφοριῶνος μηνός, ἢ δ' ἀπόλειψις ἐγράφη Ποσειδεῶνος μηνός ἐπὶ Τιμοκράτους, ἐγὼ δ' εὐθύς μετὰ τοὺς γάμους δοκιμασθεὶς ἐνεκάλουν καὶ λόγους ἀπήτουν καὶ πάντων ἀποστερούμενος τὰς δίκας ἐλάγχχανον ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρχοντος. After a few more sentences he produces some evidence of his assertions, and then proceeds: μετὰ τοίνυν τοῦτον τὸν ἄρχοντα (Polyzelus) Κηφισόδωρος, Χίων, ἐπὶ τούτων ἐνεκάλουν δοκιμασθεὶς, ἔλαχον δὲ τὴν δίκην ἐπὶ Τιμοκράτους.

Mr Clinton conceives that these statements of Demosthenes are wholly irreconcilable with the date of the Pseudo-Plutarch, and thinks that Corsini, who defends it, has for that purpose resorted to *an extraordinary mode of computing*. Corsini's words are (Fast. Att. P. i. Dissert. xi. §. 6.): Demosthenis ortus ad exeuntem Sciophorionem Ol. 98. 2. [June B.C. 384] referri debet; ut nimirum Sciophorione mense Ol. 103. 2 [June B.C. 366] octavum decimum ætatis annum absolveret. Quod si Demosthenes ipse testatus se vivente patre septennium, decennium vero defuncto patre sub tutoribus egisse, observari facile poterit tum septem tum decem etiam annos illos ita completos vel integros esse potuisse, ut ex utrisque una conjunctis integra octodecim annorum summa conficeretur. On which Mr Clinton remarks: *By what powers of computation this is to be accomplished it is difficult to imagine*. But the difficulty which Mr Clinton finds seems to lie only in the words of Corsini, and not in their meaning. The words may perhaps be construed into the proposition that seven and ten make eighteen: but it is manifest that what Corsini meant was, that the two numbers used by the orator in speaking of his age at his father's death, and of the period of the guardianship, were round numbers, and each some months short of the real time, and that the sum of these fractions might have amounted to a whole year: and thus interpreted the language of Demosthenes is certainly consistent with the statement that he was born in the year of Dexitheus. Neither does the supposition itself



appear to be at all absurd or extravagant. A later writer (Schoemann *De comitiis Atheniensium*) likewise adopts it, though he does not carry it to the same extent. He observes (p. 77): *rotundos numeros ponit, cum haud dubie et aliquot mensibus major fuerit septennio, cum patre orbatus est, et sub tutela fuerit itidem mensibus aliquot diutius, quam decennium.* But the real nature of Corsini's argument cannot be understood from the passages quoted by Mr Clinton, and if his reasoning is weak, his error certainly does not consist in miscalculation. His object is to prove against Sigonius, that the age at which an Athenian citizen became an Ephebus, and, if an orphan, was admitted into possession of his estate, was not eighteen but nineteen, and that the previous examination and enrolment took place on the completion, not in the course of the eighteenth year. His argument, if I am not mistaken, is in substance this: Demosthenes, according to his own account, became master of his estate in the last month of Polyzelus: this must have happened immediately after he had attained the legal age: but this could not be less than eighteen complete, because he himself speaks of two periods of seven and of ten years, each of which must be taken to be something short of the real time, which he had no need to express more exactly: he was therefore born in the last month of Dexitheus, and thus by his own testimony confirms the date given by the Pseudo-Plutarch.

The validity of this argument depends on the truth of the assumptions on which it is founded. It assumes in the first place that the two whole numbers mentioned by Demosthenes are each less, not greater than the real time: secondly, that this minority ended in the year of Polyzelus, and thirdly that it ended as soon as he had completed his eighteenth year. Now all these are certainly questionable propositions, and Mr Clinton denies every one of them.

In the first place as to the two periods, Mr Clinton observes, that *in these detached numbers of Demosthenes we are not to take the sum of the two, or to suppose seventeen years complete*: but he admits that the phrase *ἐπ' ἐτῶν ὄντα* is ambiguous, and only contends that the hypothetical case put by the orator (in *Aphob.* p. 833): *εἰ κατελείφθην μὲν ἐνιαύσιος, ἐξ ἑτη δὲ προσετροπεύθην,* does not necessarily



*imply that the seven years were complete.* But with regard to the other term, of ten years, the ambiguity is by no means so potent, and in fact among all the passages in which it occurs, there is only one where the expression seems at all to countenance Mr Clinton's conclusion, that the tenth year was not completed. This is that which he cites last in a note where he has collected most of them; they are the last words of the Oration ag. Aphob. 1: "Ἀφοβὸν δὲ μήδ' ἣν ἔλαβε προῖκ' ἐθέλοντα ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ ταῦτ' ἔτει δεκάτῳ. On the other hand there are others where the completion of the term seems at first sight to be unequivocally exprest: as in the phrase δέκα ἐτῶν διαγενομένων, p. 833. and still more strongly in the question: οὐχ ὅλοις ἔτεσι πρότερον δέκα τὰμὰ λαβὼν εἶχεν ἐκεῖνος ὧν ὠφλε τὴν δίκην, ἢ κηδεστήν σοι γενέσθαι; which alludes to the marriage contracted in the last month of Polyzelus, immediately after which Demosthenes informs us that he was admitted to his estate<sup>1</sup>. But Mr Clinton contends that "in the statement of the ten entire years of guardianship it was evidently the orator's interest and purpose to make the most of the amount of time. The whole period of guardianship was no more than ten years: and at the time of that marriage Demosthenes was yet in his minority. Hence it is manifest that the space expressed by ὅλα δέκα ἔτη was less than ten years complete." This argument does not seem to me convincing. The exact time was undoubtedly well known, and appears never to have been a subject of dispute between the litigants. Demosthenes mentions it as the basis of his calculations of the interest of sums due to him. But he as much as possible avoids the appearance of demanding anything more than is due to him upon the most moderate computation: he is content with a lower rate of interest on his mother's portion than the law allows him (in Aphob. 1. p. 819): he is ready to make the most liberal deduction for the outlays of his guardians (p. 825. τὸ περιὸν τὰς ἐπτακοσίας προστίθῃμι

<sup>1</sup> Corsini by a singular oversight speaks of this marriage as that of the sister of Demosthenes: and, which is still more remarkable, Boeckh (Ueber die Zeitverhaeltnisse der Rede gegen Meidias, p. 78) commits the same mistake.



αὐτοῖς, καὶ τούτῳ πλείω εἰμὶ τεθεικώς.—ἐγὼ δ' ὑπερβαλὼν τοῦτο ποιήσω τριάκοντα μνᾶς, ἵνα πρὸς ταῦτα μὴδ' ἀντειπεῖν ἔχωσιν). It seems therefore very doubtful, whether the pleader would have thought it expedient to name a term longer than that which had really elapsed, in order to found upon it a claim of more than was due to him, rather than to support the character of equity and moderation which he assumes, by confining his demand somewhat within the limits of his strict right. At the same time it would certainly be very improbable that the period of his wardship should have much exceeded the time he mentions, because he then would not have failed to call the attention of the judges to so extraordinary a proof of forbearance. Mr Clinton however upon the strength of this argument thinks himself at liberty to make a supposition very different from Corsini's, as to the real periods signified by the terms of seven and ten years. He assumes that Demosthenes had only just entered his seventh year at his father's death, and that the ten following years of his minority expired, not in the archonship of Polyzelus, but in the beginning of that of his successor Cephisodorus: so that the ὅλα δέκα ἔτη were strictly nine years and ten months, and he was born in the first month of Evander, which is consistent with the dates of Gellius and Libanius. It would certainly be difficult to shew, that Mr Clinton is not as well entitled to make these assumptions as Corsini those which he has adopted, if they are to be tried merely by the language of Demosthenes: for the objections we have suggested as to the term of ten years may perhaps in the judgment of many readers seem to be of no force at all, and undoubtedly are not decisive. With regard also to the interpretation of the words from which Corsini inferred that Demosthenes was admitted to his estate in the last month of Polyzelus, Mr Clinton's opinion will probably to many appear preferable. For Corsini has not shewn any good reason for limiting the time signified by the phrase εὐθὺς μετὰ τοὺς γάμους to the month in which the marriage took place. On the contrary the subsequent passage, where, after naming the archons who followed Polyzelus, the orator says: ἐπὶ τούτων ἐνεκάλουν δοκιμασθεῖς, has been thought by other writers (as by Schoemann in the



abovequoted passage), to prove that his minority ended in the year of Cephisodorus.

On the third of Corsini's assumptions, that the period of minority lasted exactly eighteen years, it was needless for Mr Clinton formally to express his dissent, since according to his own calculation the length of that period was no more than sixteen years. But this difference of two years with regard to so remarkable and important an epoch as the legal maturity of the Athenian citizen, while it places the controversy itself in its most interesting point of view, also seems to present a better prospect of arriving at a satisfactory decision between the conflicting dates, than has been afforded by any of the arguments we have hitherto examined. And here it is that Mr Clinton, while he has successfully combated the error of Petitus, who maintained that the legal age of manhood began at Athens in the citizen's twentieth year, and while he no less justly vindicates the character of Demosthenes from an imputation which Mr Mitford had too hastily brought forward under the shelter of an extraordinary oversight, seems not sufficiently to have noticed the difficulties involved in his own supposition. These difficulties indeed are not quite so great as those which would arise if we adopted the date of Dionysius, but as this date is not very wide of Mr Clinton's, both are liable, though not in an equal degree, to the same objection. Corsini argues against that of Dionysius on the supposition that Demosthenes came of age in the year of Polyzelus, when, if he was born under Demophilus, he could only have been in his fifteenth year. But Mr Clinton has shown that this is an arbitrary supposition, and that if Demosthenes was admitted to his estate under Cephisodorus, he might consistently with the date of Dionysius have entered upon his sixteenth year at the time, that is, if he was born early enough in the year of Demophilus. Still even this is an earlier commencement than any author appears ever to have assigned to the age of maturity: for Mr Clinton himself interprets the words of Didymus in Harpocratio (*ἐπὶ δέτετες ἡβῆσαι. Δίδυμός φησιν· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐὰν ἐκκαίδεκα ἔτῳ γενόμενοι*) to mean that minors were admitted to their estates in their seventeenth year. But we should certainly need no authority to convince us that the Athenian law could not have



been such as is implied by the chronology of Dionysius, even according to Mr Clinton's construction. The case of Demosthenes alone would be sufficient to shew the absurdity of imagining that a boy just entering into his sixteenth year could have been expected to struggle against such difficulties as those which Demosthenes represents himself to have encountered in asserting his rights. But we may also ask whether it is probable that a boy only one year older should have been held qualified for such a task, and should for this purpose have been pronounced a man (*ἀνὴρ εἶναι δοκιμασθεὶς*). For at this age it was, according to Mr Clinton's calculation, that Demosthenes began to call his guardians to account, and it seems to have been only by their artifices and evasions that he was so long prevented from bringing them into court. He might have done so as soon as his minority expired: and it is possible that *he* might then have been able to plead his own cause: but it is difficult to believe that the law, which supposed that every litigant did so<sup>2</sup>, should have placed a boy of sixteen in a situation that required it.

The question then is, at what age the young Athenian underwent that examination (*δοκιμασία*) after which he was declared a man, admitted to the enjoyment of his estates, if an orphan, and subjected to all the dangers and difficulties that might often attend the vindication of his rights. This subject was discussed by Boeckh in one of his *Academical Proœmia*, published in 1819, where he arrives at the conclusion, that this event happened in the eighteenth year of an Athenian's life. His reasoning is founded not so much on a comparison of the express testimonies of the ancients on the point, as on a review of the various leading epochs that marked the citizen's progress toward political maturity. Passing over the religious rites with which he was admitted in his infancy into the *φρατρία* and the *γένος* to which he belonged, we find that at about fifteen he was subjected to an examination, probably in a similar assembly and at the same time of the year, for the purpose of ascertaining his age. This appears from the words of Aristotle quoted by the scholiast on the *Wasps* 576: 'Αριστοτέλης δέ

<sup>2</sup> Quintilian II. 15. 30.



φησιν ὅτι ψήφῳ οἱ ἐγγραφόμενοι δοκιμάζονται οἱ νεώτεροι, εἰ μὴ ἐτῶν ιε εἶεν. This is probably the same occasion on which the sacrifice called *κούριον* was offered for the boys, and that called *γαμηλία* for the girls: of which Pollux says (VIII. 107.): καὶ εἰς ἡλικίαν προελθόντων ἐν τῇ καλουμένῃ Κουρεωτίδι ἡμέρα ὑπὲρ μὲν τῶν ἀρρένων τὸ κούριον ἔθνον, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν θηλειῶν τὴν γαμηλίαν. The age now attained seems to have been called *ἥβη*, and lasted two years, at the end of which the youth was said *ἐπιδιετὲς ἥβῃσαι*: he then underwent a second examination, but in a different assembly, that of his *δῆμος*, which gave him admission to his estate, after which he entered upon a second period, that of *ephebia*. This also lasted two years; and at its close he was entitled to take part in the popular assembly, and was liable to military service abroad. At one of these epochs it is certain that his name and age were recorded in a register, called the *ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον*: but it is not agreed when this was done. The testimonies of the grammarians on this subject are conflicting: some state the time of registration to have been the beginning, others the termination of the *ephebia*. But there are two passages of the orators themselves, which at first sight appear decisive in favour of the former date. Æschines (Timarch. p. 14. 36) says: ἐπειδὴ ἐνεγράφη Τίμαρχος εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον καὶ κύριος ἐγένετο τῆς οὐσίας: and Lycurgus seems to speak still more distinctly to the same effect, when he reminds his hearers (Leocrat. p. 157.): ὑμῖν γὰρ ἔστιν ὄρκος, ὃν ὀμνύουσι πάντες οἱ πολῖται, ἐπειδὴ εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον ἐγγραφῶσι καὶ ἔφηβοι γένωνται. The oath here alluded to is that which was taken in the temple of Agraulus, according to one grammarian (Ulpian ad Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 264 ed. Par.) at the beginning of the *ephebia*, according to another (Pollux VIII. 105.) at its close. All these passages are cited by Mr Clinton. It is manifest that if the expressions of the two orators are not sufficient to determine the time of this registration, nothing can be proved about it from the grammarians who use similar language; for they might have founded their statements on these very passages of the orators. It therefore adds little weight to this side of the question to produce testimony such as that of the Scholiast



on Æschines, quoted by Boeckh, who remarks (in Ctesiph. p. 259 Bekk.): πολλάκις ἔγνωμεν, ὅτι ἀπὸ ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἑτῶν ἐνεγράφοντο εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι: and again (in Timarch. p. 723 Reisk.): ἐνεγράφοντο δὲ (εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον) ἀπὸ ἑτῶν ιη, καὶ δύο ἔτη εἰς τοὺς ἐφήβους ἐτέλουν. It is of more importance to inquire on what grounds Mr Clinton rejects the conclusion which others have drawn from the language of the orators. His reasons are contained in the notes to p. 350 and 352. He contends that the words both of Lycurgus and Æschines are used in a lax and general sense, and are not intended to convey a precise definition: and he produces two arguments in support of this assertion. One is, that the term ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον is derived, not as has been generally supposed from τὸ τῶν λήξεων ἄρχειν, because those who were registered in it became masters of their estates, but, according to an etymology given in Photius and Suidas, from ἡ λῆξις τῶν ἀρχῶν, because it contained the names Ἀθηναίων τῶν ἐχόντων ἡλικίαν ἄρχειν. The second argument assumes the correctness of the author's inference from the language of Demosthenes, and that of a general proposition which he has founded upon it: that minors were admitted to their estates at sixteen, and the ephebi called to military service at home at eighteen. Hence he says: *it is evident from Demosthenes, who emerged from his minority in his seventeenth year, that the register of the name in the ληξιαρχικὸν γρ. was not the period for the admission of the ward to the estate.* But as this latter argument would fall to the ground, if Demosthenes was in his eighteenth year at the time mentioned, and as this is one of the points in dispute, we cannot use this supposition in order to construe the expressions of Æschines and Lycurgus in a sense which is not certainly the plain and natural one. But the argument drawn from the object of the lexiarchich register, and the meaning of the term, deserves to be attentively examined. Mr Clinton objects to the derivation which connects it with λῆξις in the sense of κλῆρος and οὐσία, because this meaning would only refer to the case of orphans, whereas every male Athenian of the age of twenty (according to the supposition he adopts) whether in the lifetime of the father or otherwise was inscribed in that register.



But it seems the less possible to lay any stress upon this objection, because even if twenty was the age of registration, it is extremely doubtful, to say the least, whether an Athenian was at that age capable of holding any office; and on the other hand the register might very well be named from the most important qualification it bestowed, though all who were inscribed in it could not immediately reap any benefit from it. The question however does not depend upon a disputable etymology: there is another ground on which it seems clear that the registration took place not in the twentieth year, but at the beginning of the ephebia, and at the same time with the δοκιμασία by which the citizen became capable of succeeding to an estate. In the same passage of Pollux (VIII. 105) to which Mr Clinton appeals as an authority to prove that the registration took place in the twentieth year, it is mentioned that at the same period the ephebi took the celebrated oath in the sanctuary of Agraulus, by which they bound themselves not to disgrace their arms, not to desert their comrades and their post, to fight even single-handed for their altars and hearths &c. (εἰκοστῷ ἐνεγράφοντο τῷ ληξιαρχικῷ γραμματείῳ, καὶ ὦμνον ἐν Ἀγραύλῳ, Οὐ καταισχυνῶ τὰ ὅπλα κ. τ. λ.) In this point therefore Pollux agrees with Lycurgus in the passage quoted above, and the only question is, when this oath was taken: when this is determined, we have also ascertained the time of the registration. Now as to the epoch of the oath, it seems scarcely possible to doubt, when we consider the time at which the military service of the Athenian citizen began. All authors agree that he spent two years, the period of his ephebia, under arms, though in home-service, traversing the country, garrisoning the forts, and performing any other duties that might be imposed on him for the protection of Attica. So Pollux in the last quoted passage: περίπολοι ἑφήβοι περιήεσαν τὴν χώραν φυλάττοντες ὥσπερ ἤδη μελετῶντες τὰ στρατιωτικά καὶ εἰς μὲν τοὺς ἑφήβους εἰσήεσαν ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη γενόμενοι, δύο δὲ εἰς περιπόλους ἡριθμοῦντο. Aristotle, quoted by Harpocratio (περίπολοι), gives a fuller description of the same thing: Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν Ἀθηναίων πολιτείᾳ περὶ τῶν ἑφήβων λέγων φησὶν οὕτως· τὸν δεύτερον ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκκλησίας ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ γενομένης, ἀποδεξάμενοι τῷ δήμῳ περὶ



τὰς τάξεις<sup>3</sup>, καὶ λαβόντες ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ παρὰ τοῦ δήμου, περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν, καὶ διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις. We shall by and by notice a difficulty which this passage raises: at present we need only observe the inference which it seems irresistibly to force upon us. Can it be imagined that, if a service was to be performed such as Pollux and Aristotle describe, and if an oath was also to be taken such as the former reports, the oath was taken at the end of this service, and not at the beginning of it? Had not the young soldier frequent opportunities in the course of this period, either of nobly using, or of disgracing the arms entrusted to him? At what juncture could the oath be expected to make so strong an impression on his mind as at the outset of his career! Or rather how preposterous would it have been to pass over this occasion, when military duties were to be actually performed, and to reserve the oath for another, when there was only an indefinite and uncertain prospect of them! For though it could only be through some extraordinary accident that the youth was exempted from the duties of a περίπολος, many years might elapse before he was called upon for foreign service. This argument gains additional force when we combine it with the fact, that the military age is spoken of as one undivided period, beginning at the eighteenth, and ending with the sixtieth year of life. (Harpocr. Ἐπώνυμοι.) Hence Aristotle quoted by Photius (στρατιὰ ἐν τοῖς ἐπωνύμοις: from his Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία), to explain τίς ἦν ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἐπωνύμοις στρατιά: εἰσὶν γὰρ, φησὶν, ἐπώνυμοι, δέκα μὲν οἱ τῶν φυλῶν, δύο δὲ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα οἱ τῶν ἡλικιῶν· οἱ δ' ἔφηβοι ἐγγραφόμενοι πρότερον μὲν εἰς λελευκασμένα γραμματεῖα ἐνεγράφοντο· καὶ ἐπεγράφοντο αὐτοῖς ὁ τε ἄρχων ἐφ' ὃν ἐπεγράφησαν, καὶ ἐπώνυμος ὁ τῷ προτέρῳ ἐπιδεδημηκῶς· νῦν δὲ εἰς τὴν βουλὴν ἀναγράφονται. These archons, whose names marked the ages of all the citizens liable to military service, were called ἐπώνυμοι τῶν ἡλικιῶν; they were also called ἐπώνυμοι τῶν λήξεων<sup>4</sup>: which seems very decisively to prove that the

<sup>3</sup> These words are perhaps corrupt. Boeckh omits them, as *sensu cassa*, and wanting in Suidas and Photius. Platner (Beitr. p. 178) interprets them "having received orders from the people as to the posts they were to occupy."

<sup>4</sup> I am obliged to leave this assertion resting on the authority of Boeckh, who makes



anonymous author in Photius was mistaken about the origin of the word *ληξιαρχικόν*: though when he adds *ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν γραμματείων κληροῦσι τὰς ἀρχας*, he may be speaking either from good information as to one of the uses of the register, or from a conjecture founded on his erroneous etymology.

We have observed that the difference between Mr Clinton's account of the age of Demosthenes at the time of his admission to his estate and Corsini's, amounts to exactly two years. This arises from a supposition which both of them have tacitly assumed as one of the bases of their calculation: that the ward was admitted as soon as he had attained the legal age, according to Corsini, eighteen, according to Mr Clinton, sixteen years complete. But this supposition is so far from being certain, that, although perhaps it cannot be proved to be erroneous, it seems to be the least probable of those which have been made on the subject. For it may certainly be imagined, with at least equal shew of reason, that, as the examination which determined the age of puberty took place on a certain day of the year for all, so that which marked the commencement of the next biennial period, the *ephebia*, took place once for all at a stated time in the year. Boeckh conceives that this was the fact, and he endeavours to ascertain the time. He observes that in two cases of adoption (Demosth. in Leochar. p. 1092. 12. Isæus de Apollod. hered. p. 178) the registration in the *ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον* is said to have taken place at the *ἀρχαιρεσίαι*. If we might draw any inference from these cases as to the general rule, and if we might also suppose that the elections took place at the end of the year, we should certainly have in these casual notices an undesigned coincidence with the statement of Demosthenes taken in the strictest sense, which would imply that he was admitted in the last month of Polyzelus. But it must be allowed that too many of the elements in this calculation are unknown or uncertain, to permit us to consider it as anything more than a conjecture, though the general fact that the admission took place at a certain day in the year may still appear the most probable. Indeed it is so far from clear that cases of adoption warrant any con-

it without any reference: and so it is repeated by Platner (p. 179): I have not yet been able to find an example.



clusion as to the ordinary time of registration, that we might draw a contrary inference from a fact mentioned in the same oration of Isæus (p. 65) where we find that the adopted son was introduced to the assembly of the *γεννήται* and *φράτορες* and enrolled in their register (the *κοινὸν γραμματεῖον*), not at the Apaturia in the fourth month (see above, p. 397) but at the Thargelia in the eleventh, which appears from the orator's words to have been the stated time (*ἐπειδὴ Θαργήλια ἦν, ἣγαγέ με ἐπὶ τοὺς βωμοὺς εἰς τοὺς γεννήτας τε καὶ φράτορας*). Meursius (*Græcia Feriata*, p. 148) remarked this distinction between natural and adopted children, which however may have arisen from principles not applicable to any business transacted in the purely political assemblies of the demes.

As the military oath of the ephebi was taken in the sanctuary of Agraulus, so the occasion was, it may be presumed, no other than the festival of the Agraulia, which honoured the memory of the daughter of Cecrops<sup>5</sup>. By a comparison of this festival with the Cyprian Agraulia, Corsini has shown that it was most probably celebrated in Boedromion (*F. A. T.* II. p. 297). If therefore the enrolment in the lexiarchic register was made in Scirophorion, it preceded the oath by more than two months. A seeming difficulty however arises from the well known passage of Æschines, in which he speaks of the ancient custom of arming the orphan sons of citizens who had fallen in war at the public expense, and of making a solemn proclamation of the honour conferred on them, in the theatre at the Great Dionysia; while the language of Aristotle, above quoted from Harpocratio (*περίπολοι*), may seem to imply that this was also the practice in all cases. It is however most probable that either, as Boeckh suggests, Aristotle himself described that as the ordinary usage, which was really confined to a particular case, or, which seems more likely, that Harpocratio gave too large a meaning to his words. The words however raise another question which embarrassed Harpocratio himself; he observes that in the expression *τὸν*

<sup>5</sup> Boeckh adds "ephebos sese patriæ devovisse, quemadmodum ipsa sese Agraulus olim devoverat." I have not been able to find the legend here alluded to, which is certainly not the common one. Was the author thinking of the daughter of Erechtheus?



δεύτερον ἐνιαυτὸν, Aristotle contradicts Æschines, who, speaking of his own education, mentions that he had himself served two years as *περίπολος τῆς χώρας* (Fals. Leg. p. 50) whereas according to Aristotle this duty only began in the second year of the ephebia. The lexicographer suggests that the orator may have exaggerated his own merits, by boasting that he had voluntarily spent two years in the service for which only one was required by law. This explanation, absurd enough in itself, appears to be founded on a misunderstanding of Aristotle's meaning; for the second year of which he spoke was probably calculated not from the final probation but from the age of puberty, and the examination at the festival of Cureotis, by which this was legally determined. If this took place in the boy's sixteenth year, the oath taken in Boedromion would fall in the second year, a few months after the registration in the lexiarchic books, and at the time when according to all accounts the service of the *περίπολοι* began.

But according to this construction of Aristotle's words it would appear that he made the ephebia to begin from the age of puberty. This appearance may indeed be deceptive, and may be merely owing to the manner in which his expressions have been reported. But there seem to be other indications that the terms *ephebus* and *ephebia* were used in two senses, a larger and a narrower one, the one referring to the time of life, the period of adolescence following that of boyhood, which began in the sixteenth year from the Apaturia: the other to the legal maturity which qualified the citizen to become master of his estate, and which began in the eighteenth year, and perhaps in a certain month: the last, if Boeckh is right in his conjecture, of the civil year. It is in the latter sense that the term is used by Ulpian (on Demosth. *περὶ Π.* p. 117 Wolf.) when he says: οἱ ἐξιόντες εἰς τοὺς ἐφήβους ἐκ παίδων μετὰ πανοπλιῶν ὥμνον ὑπερμαχεῖν ἄχρι θανάτου. But it is probably in the former that we ought to understand it in an interesting passage of the Socratic dialogue Axiochus, where the author after mentioning the various kinds of tyranny to which the boy is subject in the course of his education from a multitude of masters, proceeds: ἐπειδὴν δὲ εἰς τοὺς ἐφήβους ἐγγραφῇ, κοσμήτης καὶ φόβος χείρων, ἔπειτα Λυκεῖον καὶ Ἀκαδημία καὶ γυμνασι-



αρχία καὶ ῥάβδοι καὶ κακῶν ἀμετρίαι· καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοῦ μεираκίσκου χρόνος ἐστὶν ὑπὸ σωφρονιστὰς καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς νέους αἵρεσιν τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς. Boeckh indeed applies this description to the later, legal ephebia<sup>6</sup>, supposing ἐγγραφῇ to allude to the ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον, which he thinks is confirmed by the numerous Attic inscriptions of the gymnastic class (see his *Corpus Inscr. P.* II. Cl. v. n. 265) containing lists of ephebi with the names of their demes annexed. But Platner (*Beitraege zur Kenntniss des Attischen Rechts*) objects, that it is scarcely credible that youths who were already entrusted with the use of arms, with the defense of their country, and the management of their estates, who might be fathers of families, should have been still subject to such a rigorous and degrading discipline, which is similarly described by Teles in Stobæus (*Flor. T.* 98. 72): ἔφηβος γέγονεν ἔμπαλιν τὸν κοσμήτην φοβεῖται, τὸν παιδοτρίβην, τὸν ὀπλόμαχον, τὸν γυμνασίαρχον. Ὑπὸ πάντων τούτων μαστιγούται, παρατηρεῖται, τραχηλίζεται. This author indeed adds: ἐξ ἐφήβων ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδὴ εἴκοσι ἐτῶν, ἔτι φοβεῖται, καὶ παρατηρεῖ καὶ γυμνασίαρχον καὶ στρατηγόν. But, as Boeckh observes, Teles, who appears to have drawn his description from the Axiochus, is of no greater authority as to the time than Harpocratio or Suidas: so that perhaps it is not necessary, in order to save his credit, to read with Valckenær ταξίαρχον for γυμνασίαρχον. The context of the passage in the Axiochus seems strongly to confirm Platner's opinion: for the author, in describing the miseries to be encountered in the next stage of life, uses expressions which may be very aptly referred to the new condition of the young man who at the end of his gymnastic education was admitted to his estate, and within a few months afterward sent

<sup>6</sup> He observes (*comment. 1. de ephebis*): ephebi conditio (τὸ ἐφηβεύειν) duo maxime munera complexa est, gymnasiorum laborem et militiæ rudimenta; et in gymnasiis quidem paruere gymnasiarchis, sophronistis, cosmetis, anticometis, gymnastis, sive pædotribis, toti gregi magistrorum: and hence he is inclined (though Terence's imperfect acquaintance with Athenian usages renders it unsafe to attach any definite value to his expressions on these subjects) to explain *Andr.* i. l. 24 is postquam excessit ex ephebis, *Liberius* vivendi fuit potestas: nam antea Qui scire posses aut ingenium noscere Dum ætas metus magister prohibebant. In the *Eunuch*, as Boeckh observes, there is a manifest confusion of ideas, or want of information: there, v. l. 8, Chærea is described as *ephebus*: *iv.* 4. 25 *annos natus sedecim*: yet he is (*ii.* 2. 59) *custos publice* in Piræus.



out upon military duty into the country : ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἀπολυθῇ τούτων, φροντίδες ἀντικρυς ὑπέδυσαν καὶ διαλογισμοί, τίνα τις τοῦ ζῆν ὁδὸν ἐνστήσεται· καὶ τοῖς ὕστερον χαλεποῖς ἐφάνη τὰ πρῶτα παιδιά, καὶ νηπίων ὡς ἀληθῶς φόβητρα· στρατεῖαι γὰρ καὶ τραύματα καὶ συνεχεῖς ἀγῶνες. As to the inscriptions Platner observes that the addition of the deme is not conclusive, since it might have been annexed by way of distinction before the names were inscribed in the register. Perhaps it may also be worth remarking that Attic inscriptions of the Roman period can hardly be considered as good authority on this question. For it seems by no means improbable that after Attica lost its independence, the institution of the περίπολοι became obsolete. The gymnastic exercises may then have been prolonged so as to fill up the period once occupied with military service: but it does not follow that the ephebi were, throughout the whole of it, subject to the kind of discipline described in the Axiochus.

The mistake of the grammarians who held that the lexicarchic registration took place in the twentieth year, admits of a very natural explanation. It is probable that they confounded the ληξιαρχικὰ γράμματα with the πίνακες ἐκκλησιαστικοί, which contained the names of the citizens who were of age to take a part in the proceedings of the popular assembly. That this right commenced only with the expiration of the two years of home service, and not with the preceding registration, is in itself highly probable, and is almost demonstrated by a passage of Philostratus quoted by Boeckh (Vit. Soph. II. 1. 5. of Herodes Atticus): μετεκόσμησε δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐφήβους εἰς τὸ νῦν σχῆμα, χλαμύδας πρῶτον ἀμφιέσας λευκάς· τέως γὰρ δὴ μελαίνας ἐνημμένοι τὰς ἐκκλησίας περιεκάθηντο καὶ τὰς πομπὰς ἔπεμπον. Such seems to have been the shadow that then survived of the old institution: but we may collect from it, that the περίπολοι had no vote in the popular assemblies.

It appears then that there is no necessity for imputing to Æschines, Lycurgus, and Hyperides<sup>7</sup>, a laxity of expres-

<sup>7</sup> Harpocrat. (Ἐπιδιετὲς ἡβῆσαι) Ὑπερίδης ἐν τῷ πρὸς Χάρητα ἐπιτροπικῷ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐνεγράφη ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ νόμος ἀποδέδωκε τὴν κομιδὴν τῶν καταλειφθέντων τῇ μητρὶ: a passage which seems clearly to refute the doctrine which the Lexicographer means to prove by it.



sion which would be scarcely consistent with common sense, and which can never safely be presumed even in an orator, unless some motive for it can be pointed out in the cause he is pleading; that on the contrary the most inconvenient consequences would result from such an interpretation, and that it is therefore by their expressions, taken in their natural sense, that we ought to construe the meaning of Demosthenes, and to correct the statements of the grammarians. It follows that Demosthenes was born either in the archonship of Dexitheus, or in the early part of the following year.

We must not however conceal a new objection arising out of a mark of time first noticed by Boeckh, in a Memoir on the chronology of the oration against Midias in the Berlin Transactions of 1818, where the same sagacity which detected the difficulty is employed in removing it. Demosthenes mentions (in Aphob. i. p. 817) that his father was no sooner dead than his guardian Aphobus proceeded to take possession of the house, and to raise the portion which he was to have with the widow. This it is said he did when on the point of sailing as a trierarch to Corcyra (*ἐπειδὴ εἶχεν, ἐκπλεῖν μέλλων εἰς Κέρκυραν τριήραρχος.*) The question is, to what expedition this trierarchy relates. There are two which fall in the childhood of Demosthenes, and it must have been to one of them that he alludes. The first is that in which Timotheus reduced Corcyra under Athenian dominion, which Diodorus (xv. 36) places in Ol. 101. 1. The second commanded by Iphicrates is related by Diodorus under Ol. 101. 3, which is confirmed by Demosth. in Timoth. p. 1186, where the archonship of Socratides is mentioned as the date of the expedition: and this is consistent with the account which fixes the birth of Demosthenes in Ol. 99. 4. The time of the first expedition on the other hand will not conform to the chronology for which Boeckh contends, if it be placed in the spring of Ol. 101. 1., which is the date that Dodwell assigns to it. If however we suppose that Diodorus, as is not unusual with him, comprehended an event which belonged to the latter end of Ol. 100. 4, within the following Olympic year, and that the father of Demosthenes died in the winter or early in the spring of Ol. 100. 4, we may still retain the archonship of Dexitheus as the date of the orator's



birth, who would then have been  $7\frac{1}{2}$  or  $7\frac{3}{4}$  at his father's death; and this date for the first expedition is more conformable with Xenophon's narrative, which connects the conquest of Corcyra with the attempt of Sphodrias on the Piræus, which was made in Ol. 100. 3, though Diodorus relates it also under Ol. 100. 4. So far perhaps this solution of the difficulty may appear satisfactory: but the author has not been equally successful with regard to another date, which stands in the way of the foregoing calculation, that of the battle of Naxos. He has seen the necessity of placing this event also a year earlier than the time which Dodwell assigns to it, Boedromion of Ol. 101. 1: for it happened in the autumn preceding the expedition to Corcyra. But he has not explained how his own date, Ol. 100. 4, is to be reconciled with Xenophon's narrative (Hell. v. 4. 50), which, as Mr Clinton observes (F. A. p. 106), clearly implies that the battle was fought in the autumn following the spring in which Cleombrotus was frustrated in his attempt to invade Bœotia (Ol. 100. 4). The allusion to Corcyra therefore still requires some further explanation to reconcile it with Boeckh's opinion, and if referred to the first expedition must at present be considered as a confirmation of Mr Clinton's.

If however the arguments derived from the Athenian institutions have any weight, they cannot be overthrown by a single obscure allusion which appears to contradict them: and we may therefore still with unabated confidence proceed to examine, whether the account which Demosthenes gives of his own age in the oration against Midias, can be reconciled with the conclusion to which they have led us. The orator there says (p. 564), that he is thirty-two years old: *δύο καὶ τριάκοντα ἔτη γέγονα*. According to Dionysius he wrote these words in the year of Callimachus Ol. 107. 4, which is conformable to the date Ol. 99. 4, for the orator's birth, or rather is evidently the ground of it. Wolf (Proleg. ad Lept. p. cviii), though he differs from Dionysius by four years as to the orator's birth, and Mr Clinton, adopt the same date for the oration, and on the same ground: that it contains allusions to an event which occurred in the archonship of Callimachus, the Olynthian war. Both suppose the orator, in describing his age, to speak as if the facts of the case were



recent, though according to Wolf they really happened four years before, whereas Mr Clinton thinks it may be proved that two years only had elapsed between the commission of the offence complained of in the speech and its composition, and accordingly that Demosthenes was thirty-two (that is in his thirty-second year) in the archonship of Thessalus, Ol. 107. 2, which agrees with the date of Gellius and Libanius for his birth.

The first point to be ascertained is, at what time the facts which are the subject of the oration occurred, the next, when it was composed and to which date the orator's account of his age is to be referred. Beside the allusion to an expedition to Olynthus, the oration mentions one to Eubœa, the events of which are of some celebrity, though its precise date has been hitherto a subject of dispute. It was that in which Phocion commanded, and defeated the tyrant Plutarchus at Tamynæ, and it occurred at the same time with the occasion of the prosecution of Midias (p. 567). The critics who preceded Mr Clinton, including Boeckh, had fixed their attention on a passage of Dionysius, in which it was evident that he had spoken of this engagement, and had mentioned its date, but that his words had been mutilated by his transcribers. In this passage (Dinarch. p. 665), according to the corrupt reading, he is made to ground an argument concerning the date of an oration (Demosth. *πρὸς Βοιωτὸν περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος*) on an allusion contained in it to a recent expedition *εἰς Πύλας*, and to state that this expedition took place *ἐπὶ Θουμήδου ἄρχοντος*. The oration itself (p. 999) left no doubt that for *Πύλας* we ought to read *Ταμύνας*, and this correction had been proposed by Corsini. But as to the name of the archon, Demosthenes gives no light, and Corsini thought himself at liberty to conjecture *Θεοφίλου*, which would bring the action down to Ol. 108. 1. Wolf and Boeckh also adopted this conjecture: while Weiske (*De Hyperbole errorum in Historia Philippi A. F. commissorum genitrice* III. p. 37) proposes to read *Εὐδήμου*, and to date the action Ol. 106. 4. But all these learned writers overlooked another passage of Dionysius, in which he records the date of the oration *περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος*, and consequently of the expedition to Tamynæ (p. 656. *ὁ γὰρ Δημοσθένης περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος*



λόγος κατὰ Θέσσαλον ἢ Απολλόδωρον ἄρχοντα τετέλεσται.) This was first pointed out by Mr Clinton, and it overthrows a hypothesis which Boeckh had made very plausible: that Dionysius had deduced his date for the action at Tamynæ from that which he too hastily adopted for the oration against Midias. It is now clear that he founded it on some other ground, which may have been a good authority: and therefore we are bound to admit it until some reason can be shown for rejecting it.

A great part of Boeckh's arguments are intended to prove, that the expedition to Olynthus alluded to in the orat. ag. Midias (p. 566, 578), cannot have taken place in the celebrated Olynthian war which began in the archonship of Callimachus, though it was probably on the contrary opinion that Dionysius built his chronology with regard to Demosthenes. He observes that the orator speaks of this expedition (p. 566) as having preceded the campaign in Eubœa during which he suffered the outrage from Midias: and even if it could be supposed that, while writing as if the occasion of the speech was recent, he had introduced allusions to events of a subsequent period, he could not have represented these as occurring before the epoch at which he feigned himself speaking. Our want of information about the expedition really mentioned cannot weaken this conclusion. Both the Eubœan and the Olynthian expeditions must have occurred at or before a time of which the orator could say, that he was then either in his thirty-second or his thirty-third year. This argument however only proves that there is no necessity for supposing that the speech was not composed before Ol. 107. 4: it does not affect Mr Clinton's proposition, that the facts which occasioned the prosecution took place in Ol. 107. 2. But in his *Public Economy of Athens* (II. p. 109) Boeckh had already brought forward another argument, which, though it applies with greater force to the chronology of Dionysius, must be considered as a very powerful objection to Mr Clinton's. Demosthenes relates (Mid. p. 540) that while his cause with his guardians was pending (μελλουσῶν εἰσιέναι τῶν δικῶν εἰς ἡμέραν ὥσπερ εἰ τετάρτην ἢ πέμπτην—therefore in the year of Timocrates), he received an insult from Midias, for which he afterwards brought an action



against him (δίκη κακηγορίας). In this action the defendant suffered judgement to go against him by default (δίκην τούτω λαχὼν ὕστερον τῆς κακηγορίας εἶλον ἐρήμην· οὐ γὰρ ἀπήντα.) The plaintiff then proceeded to bring another action upon the judgement (δίκην ἐξούλης); but he complains that, up to the time at which he is speaking, he had been prevented by his adversary's chicanery from bringing this cause into court, and he brings witnesses to prove that he had been thus put off for *eight years* (οἶδαμεν Δημοσθένη κρίσιν λελογχότα Μειδία ἐξούλης καὶ ἤδη τῇ κρίσει ἐκείνη διαγεγονότα ἔτη ὀκτώ). If Dionysius had been right in his calculation, it would have followed that the second action was brought Ol. 105. 4. But after making every reasonable allowance for legal delays, it seems utterly impossible to account for the interval which would on this supposition have intervened between the decision of the first cause and the institution of the second. This difficulty is not indeed so great on Mr Clinton's computation, which makes the interval two years shorter: but still there remains enough to throw great doubt on the date he adopts for the engagement of Tamynæ, even setting all other considerations aside.

Such then appears to be the present state of this somewhat intricate question. We cannot conclude this review of its history without expressing a hope, that the English and the German author, to whose industry and sagacity we are chiefly indebted for the light that has been hitherto thrown upon it, may investigate it still further, and that their combined researches may finally bring it to a solution, which will remove all doubt as to the many interesting subjects which, we have seen, are so intimately connected with it.

C. T.



## ANECDOTA BAROCCIANA.

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THE following inedited fragment occurs in the Baroc-  
cian MS. 76. fol. 302. It appears to be a truncated portion  
of the end of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth Book  
of some large grammatical work, not improbably the treatise  
of Herodian *περὶ κλίσεως ὀνομάτων*, the first Book of which  
is cited by Steph. Byz. under the word *Βρίγες*. There are  
other excerpta from the same Grammarian in the MS. from  
which the fragment is taken, and the internal evidence it affords  
seems to favour the supposition that he is likewise the author  
of it.

Ζητοῦμεν καὶ τὴν τοῦ "Αρης, "Αρεος γενικὴν πῶς εὔρηται  
διὰ διφθόγγου λέγομεν "Αρενος, "Αρενι<sup>1</sup>.

μίξαν δὲ ἀλλήλοισιν "Αρενα<sup>2</sup>.

ἡ κλητικὴ

"Αρεν δι' ὁ φόβος διακτῆρ<sup>3</sup>  
καὶ ἀπορήκασι περὶ τῆς κλίσεως πόθεν ἄρα ἡ δίφθογγος· τὰ  
γὰρ εἰς  $\overline{\epsilon\upsilon\varsigma}$  παρ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς "Ιωσι διὰ τοῦ  $\eta$ · καὶ τοιαύτην  
λύσιν ἐπινοοῦμεν τὸ ἀκόλουθον "Αρης· ἔθος Αἰολεῦσι τοῦ  
πλεονάζειν φωνήεντος ἐπιφερομένου ἢ τοῦ  $\overline{\rho}$ · ναὸς ναὸς·  
ἄος αὐὸς· ἐάλωκεν εὐάλωκεν· ἄρρηκτον αὔρρηκτον· ἐρράγη  
ἐρραύγη· ἔδωκαν οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ "Αρης τὸν πλεονασμὸν  
τοῦ  $\overline{\upsilon}$ · εἶτα ἐγένετο "Αρηνος ἡ γενικὴ· καὶ εὐρίσκεται ἡ  $\overline{\eta\upsilon}$   
δίφθογγος· αὕτῃ δὲ ἐστὶ κακόφωνος· καὶ ἐν κλίσει ῥημα-

<sup>1</sup> MS. ἄρεβι.

<sup>2</sup> Bekker Anecd. Gr. Ind. v. "Αρεus from Chærobosc. ad Theodos. *μίξαντες ἀλλή-  
λοισιν "Αρενα*.

<sup>3</sup> This should probably be "Αρεν δι' ὦ φόβος δαῖκτῆρ. Æsch. S. c. Theb. 918  
*δαῖκτῆρ γόος*. If *διακτῆρ* is right it may be made from *διάγνυμι* "to break through"  
but the word has no authority to support it that I am aware of. The quotation is  
perhaps from an Ode of Alcæus. In Greg. Con. p. 613. The Æolic vocative "Αρης  
is said to be "Αρες which form occurs frequently in Homer. Eustathius adduces the  
authority of Herodian in regard to the Æolic declension of this noun.



τικῇ θέλει ὁρᾶσθαι· ἡϋλὲι καὶ ἡϋχεὶ καὶ ἡϋδα· καὶ περὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν θέλει ἀνατρέπεσθαι· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ γραῦς τροπὴν παθὸν τοῦ  $\bar{\alpha}$  εἰς  $\bar{\eta}$  γέγονε γρηῦς ἵνα μὴ γένηται ἀκατάλληλος, τροπικῶς διηρέθη καὶ γρηῦς ἐγένετο· καὶ ἐπὶ ἐπιρρημάτων· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐφ' ἐκατέρας λέξεως καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνων καταλαμβάνων ταί· ἐστὶν ἡϋτε· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ γένηται ἡ διαίρεσις ἡϋτε, γίνεται ἡ τροπὴ εϋτε· ὁμοίως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἄρενος· ὁ πλεονασμὸς γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν δίφθογγον· ἐνθαυτα οὖν τροπὴ ἵνα ἀποστή ἡ κακοφωνία τῆς διφθόγγου.

Ἰστέον ὅτι τοῦ Ζήν, Ζηνὸς ἐφύλαξαν οἱ παλαιοὶ Ἰωνες τὴν κλίσιν οἶον

ἐπεὶ δ' ἴσχε Ζηνὸς ὑψηρεφῆς δόμοισιν Ἄρης<sup>4</sup>  
μεταγενέστεροι Αἰολεῖς ἔτρεψαν Ζανὸς καὶ Ζάν· καὶ ἔτι μεταγενέστεροι οἱ Ἰωνες διὰ τοῦ Ζάν· τῷ Λύκανι<sup>5</sup>.

Κλῦθι μοι Ζανός τε κουρη Ζάν τ' Ἐλευθερίε<sup>6</sup>

Πάλιν ἄπορον πῶς παρ' Ἰωσι τὸ  $\bar{\alpha}$  εἰς  $\bar{\eta}$  τέτραπται τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον τὸ  $\bar{\alpha}$  εἰς  $\bar{\eta}$  τρέπουσι τὸ Ζανὸς Ζηνὸς εἰρήκασι· λέγω δὴ ὅτι οὐκ ἔτρεψαν ἀλλ' ἐμιμήσαντο μεταγενεστέρους Αἰολεῖς.

Πόθεν τὸ Τυδῇ καὶ βασιλῇ παρ' Ὀμήρῳ; φαμέν ὅτι παρὰ Δωριεῦσιν ἐστὶν ἡ κλίσις καὶ γοῦν ὑπάρχει βασιλῇ, βασιλῆα αἰτιατικὴ καὶ κατὰ συναλοιφήν βασιλῇ· ὥσπερ Κηφέα, Κηφῇ· οἱ μέντοι Βοιωτοὶ διὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\iota}$  κλίνουσι οἶον βασίλιος καὶ διὰ τῆς εἰ διφθόγγου, βασιλεῖ, ὅταν γὰρ τοῦ βασίλιος ἦ, τοῦ βασιλέος τροπῇ· τὸ γὰρ  $\bar{\eta}$  το παρὰ τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν εἰς τὴν  $\bar{\epsilon}$  δίφθογγον τρέπουσιν. Δεῖ δὲ γινώσκειν ὅτι συναλείφουσιν οἱ Ἀττικοὶ τῶν εἰς  $\bar{\omega}$  γενικῶν πτώσεων τὸ  $\bar{\epsilon}\omega$  εἰς  $\bar{\omega}$ · οἶον Ἑρετριέος, Ἑρετριῶς· Πειραιέος, Πειραιῶς καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν ὁπόταν καθαριεύῃ· ὅταν δὲ μὴ καθαριεύῃ, τῷ  $\bar{\epsilon}$  παραλήγεται· οἶον ἀλιέα, ἀλιῇ· εὐκλέα, εὐκλεῇ· ὁμοίως καὶ ἀλιέως, ἀλιῶς· τὸ δὲ δυϊκὸν, εἰς τὴν  $\bar{\omega}$  δίφθογγον συναλείφουσιν· οἶον ἀλιέοιν, ἀλιοῖν· πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ γενικῆς πληθυντικῶν. Οἱ δὲ Δωριέων, Δωριῶν,

<sup>4</sup> This should be either ὑψηρεφέοι or ὑψηρεφέαι δόμον.

<sup>5</sup> This writer is probably the same as Lycnon or Lycon of Troas a Peripatetic philosopher who flourished under the kings of Pergamum Diog. Laert. v. 66. He is mentioned by Plutarch in the opening of his treatise de Aud. Poet. Bekker Anecd. Gr. Ind. v. Ἄλας. Fabr. Bibl. Gr. t. II. p. 304.

<sup>6</sup> MS. κουρηξαντελευθερίω.



καὶ ἔστιν ἡ μὲν εἰς τὸ ἡ συναλοιφή Δωριεῶν ἡ δὲ εἰς τὸ  $\bar{\alpha}$  Ἀττική.

Ἰστέον ὅτι ἔχομεν τινὰ εἰς  $\bar{\epsilon}\varsigma$ <sup>7</sup> λήγοντα ὀνόματα· λέγω δὲ τὸ παῖς καὶ τὸ δαῖς θηλυκὸν καὶ τὸ σταῖς οὐδέτερον· ὅπερ δαῖς ὄνομα ἐν συνθέσει κοινόν τι γίνεται ἀρσενικὸν καὶ θηλυκὸν οἶον ὁμόδαις· τὸ μέντοι σταῖς εὗρηται παρὰ Εὐκῶριδι<sup>8</sup> καὶ Ἡροδότῳ· καὶ ταῦτα μὲν εἰς  $\bar{\alpha}\iota\varsigma$  λήγουσι μόνον παρ' ἡμῶν<sup>9</sup> παρὰ δὲ Ἀιολεῦσι πολλὰ, οἶον μέλαις, Θόαις, Ὀρέσταις· τὸ μέντοι παῖς διὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\alpha}$  λέγεται μόνον πάις· ὅπερ ἐν συναλοιφῇ παῖς· ἔχομεν δὲ καὶ χαρακτῆρα εἰς  $\bar{\iota}\varsigma$  οἶον πόσις· κάσις· ὄφισ· ἔχισ· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον τὸ παῖς εἰς τοῖς εἰς  $\bar{\alpha}\iota\varsigma$  περισπώμενόν ἐστιν· ἐκ τοῦ πάις βαρυνομένου συναλοιφέν· τὸ γὰρ δαῖς ὀξύτονόν ἐστι, κλίνεται δὲ διὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\tau}$ , δαῖς, δαιτὸς· ἐπεὶ παράκειται αὐτῷ τὸ δαίτη· ἐσχημάτισται δὲ παρὰ τὸ δαίω ὃ σημαίνει τὸ μερίζω,, ὅθεν καὶ δαιτρὸς ὁ διαμερίζων· καὶ δαίμων· ἔνθεν τὸ “μοίρας δαισάμενοι” ὁ μέλλων αὐτοῦ, δαίσω καὶ δαίσομαι, ἀπὸ γοῦν τὸ δαίω δαῖσα τὸ ῥηματικὸν ὄνομα καὶ αῖσα ἡ μεμερισμένη ἐκάστω· καὶ γὰρ μοῖρα παρὰ τὸ μεμερίσθαι γέγονε δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ δαίω δαῖς, καὶ συναλοιφῇ δαῖς ὀξυτονεῖται καὶ ἐπὶ ἀπὸ ὀξυτόνου· ἴσως ὀξυτονήθη πρὸς ἕτερον σημαινόμενον· ἐστι γὰρ δαῖς περισπώμενον ἐπὶ τῆς μάχης· ἔνθεν αἰτιατικῇ

εἰς δαῖν ὀπλισμένων ἵππων ἀργὸς<sup>10</sup>,

ἔχει Καλλίμαχος· καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ δαίω τοῦ σημαίνοντος τὸ μερίζω, ὅτι μεμερίσται παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ εὐωχία· ἔνθεν καὶ “δαιτὸς εἴσης”· Τὸ γοῦν σταῖς σπάνιον ἐκ τοῦ στέας, στάς· καὶ μετὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\iota}$  σταῖς· τὸ ἤδη πιος· καὶ στέας, στέατος· τὰ γὰρ τοῦ  $\bar{\alpha}\varsigma$  οὐδέτερα διὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\tau}$  κλίνεται· κέρας, κέρατος· πέρας, πέρατος· εἴτα γενόμενον στάς καὶ σταῖς διὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\tau}$  πάλιν κλιθήσεται· τὰ γὰρ τῆς μετοχῆς τοῦ στάντος παρεσχηματισμένα οὐδέτερα οὐδέποτε ἰδία κλίσει κέχρηται ἀλλὰ

<sup>7</sup> r. εἰς  $\bar{\alpha}\iota\varsigma$ .

<sup>8</sup> We should read Εὐπόλιδι. Etym. M. p. 422, 43. ὡς παρ' Εὐπολι r. Εὐπόλιδι. εἰ μὴ κόρη δεύσειε τὸ σταῖς ἡίθεος. Theognost. Cod. Barocc. 50. Can. 805. δαῖς ὀξυτονεῖται μόνως θηλυκὸν· καὶ τὸ σταῖς, περισπᾶται μόνως οὐδέτερον δηλοῖ δὲ τὴν ζύμην.

<sup>9</sup> See the Etym. M. v. v. Παῖς Δαῖς.

<sup>10</sup> This fragment is differently quoted by the Venetian Scholiast Il. Ξ. 387. He reads εἰς δαῖν ὀπλισμὸν ἵππειον see Bishop Blomfield's Callimachus Frag. 470.



τῇ τοῦ ἀρσενικοῦ ——— ἐνθεν ἂν τις σοι προτείνειν<sup>11</sup> οὐδέ-  
τερον παρεσχηματισμένον τὴν κλίσιν τοῦ ἀρσενικοῦ ἐπι-  
ζητήσον· καὶ τοῦτο μάλιστα εὐχρηστον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀμφιβόλων·  
λέγει τις σοι κλίνον τὸ πλείον· μὴ προπετῶς κλίνης· ἀλλ'  
ἐξέτασον ποῖον τὸ παρακείμενον· τὸ πλείος ἢ τὸ πλείων·  
δεῖ γὰρ πρῶτον τὸ ἀρσενικὸν κλιθῆ καὶ τὸ οὐδέτερον καὶ  
θηλυκόν· δῆλον ὅτι εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ πλείος, πλείου καὶ πλείον·  
εἰ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ πλείων πλείονος καὶ τὸ πλείον τοῦ πλείονος  
ἔσται· οὕτως δὴ ἐπὶ πάντων μεμνήσθαι τῶν ἀμφοτέρων  
πρὸς τὸ πλανῆσαι ἕτερον ἢ πρὸς τὸ μὴ πλανηθῆναι· ὁμοίως  
καὶ ἐπὶ μετοχῶν τὰ οὐδέτερα τὴν τῶν ἀρσενικῶν κλίσιν δέ-  
χονται· τὸ μέντοι πᾶν ἐπὶ μόνου τοῦ θεοῦ Πανὸς λέγεται  
καὶ κλίνεται· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ οὐδετέρου παντός· ἐπεὶ καὶ πᾶς,  
παντός· ἐπεὶ εἰ σοι προτείνῃ τις τὸ πᾶς κλίνει· πύθου εἰ  
μὲν τὸ κοινόν· εἰ δὲ παρ' Αἰολεῦσι παντός· οἱ γὰρ Αἰολεῖς  
λέγουσι πᾶς παῖς ὁ χώρος “ἵνα ἴδωμεν ὅτι πάντα”——

\* \* \* \* \*

\* \* \* ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ τοῦ εἰ ἢ διὰ τοῦ αἰ· οἶον Ποσειδέων καὶ  
Ποσειδάων οὐκ ἄρα περισπᾶται ——— πάλιν τῶν εἰς  
ω̄ περισπωμένων ὁμόχρονον ἢ ἡ κλητικὴ τῇ εὐθείᾳ· ὁ Ξενο-  
φῶν ὡ̄ Ξενοφῶν· ὁ Κτησιφῶν, ὡ̄ Κτησιφῶν· τοῦ Ποσει-  
δάωνος δὲ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἡ κλητικὴ, ὁ Ποσειδῶν γὰρ καὶ ὡ̄  
Πόσειδον διὰ τοῦ ο̄ μικροῦ· ὥστε οὐ περισπώμενον· καὶ  
πάλιν τὰ εἰς ω̄ν περισπώμενα, οὐδέποτε τὸ ω̄ εἰς αἰ τρέπει  
παρὰ Αἰολεῦσι· τὸ δὲ Ποσειδῶν ἐγένετο Ποσειδάν, οὐκ ἄρα  
περισπώμενον· ἰδοὺ οὐκ κατὰ ἐξ τρόπους καὶ κανόνας δείκνυται  
τὸ Ποσειδῶν μὴ περισπώμενον· λέγω δὴ ἀπὸ ληγούσης· ἀπὸ  
κλίσεως· ἀπὸ παραληγούσης· ἀπὸ ἀποκοπῆς· ἀπὸ κλητικῆς· ἀπὸ  
διαίρέσεως καὶ ἀπὸ διαλέκτου· εἰ μὴ περισπώμενον δηλόνοτι  
ὀξύτονον, καὶ γὰρ εἰς δῶν πολλὰ ὀξύτονα· Καλυδῶν<sup>12</sup>· Μυρμι-  
δῶν· τὰ εἰς δῶν λήγοντα ὀξύτονα διὰ τοῦ ο̄ κλίνεται· εἰ δὲ  
καὶ τοῦ ω̄ τοῦτο ὁμωνυμεῖ· πολυμειδῶν, πολυμειδῶνος· ὀδῶν,  
ὀδῶνος· εἰ πάλιν οὖν<sup>13</sup> ὀξύτονον τὸ Ποσειδῶν ἔδει διὰ τοῦ  
ο̄ κλίνεσθαι· οὐ κλίνεται δὲ, οὐκ ἄρα ὀξύτονον· ἔφημεν  
δὲ ἐν τῷ κανόνι ὅτι εἰ δέ τι διὰ τοῦ ω̄ τοῦτο ὁμωνυμεῖ  
διὰ τοῦ Εἰδῶν, Εἰδῶνος τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἥρωος, καὶ Καλύδων,  
'Αμύδων· τί οὖν ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν περὶ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος; ἐπι-

<sup>11</sup> γ. προτεῖνοι or supply ἔχοι.

<sup>12</sup> MS. κωλυδῶν.

<sup>13</sup> MS. εἶπεν οὖν.



δειχθῆτω περισπώμενον καὶ δειχθήσεται τὰ ἐναντιούμενα· δεῖ οὖν ἡμᾶς γνῶναι πρῶτον τὴν ἔτυμολογίαν· ἔτυμολογεῖται δὲ παρὰ τὸ δέω· ἢ τοι τὸ ἐπιδημάω· ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνδέω. Πλάτων μὲν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἡγεῖται ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσμέω τοὺς πόδας ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάσσης, ἀφικόμενοι γὰρ ἐκεῖ οὐκ ἔτι δυνάμεθα βαδίζειν· εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ παρὰ τὴν πόσιν μὴ διδούς· ἵνα ἀπὸ τοῦ ποτίμου ἢ ἔτυμολογία· εἴδωμεν οὖν λοιπὸν τὸ τῆς φωνῆς παρὰ τὸ δέω Ποσειδέης· τοῦτο δὲ ἔχει χρήσεις πολλὰς παρὰ τοῖς ποιηταῖς· ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Ποσειδέης, Ποσειδέων καὶ Ποσειδέωνος· οὕτω παρ' Ἰωσιν κατὰ συναλοιφὴν Ποσειδιέων· καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Ποσειδέων μὲν Ποσειδῶν· ἐκ τοῦ Ποσειδέωνος δὲ Ποσειδῶνος· ἐκ ταύτης τῆς συναλοιφῆς δέικνυται περισπώμενον· ἢ γὰρ ὀξεῖα καὶ βαρεῖα εἰς περισπωμένην συνέρχονται· διατὶ οὖν μακρᾷ παραλήγεται· αἰτία ἐστὶν ἢ συναλοιφὴ αὐτῇ γὰρ ἐποίησε πλησιάσαι τῇ ληγούσῃ τὴν μακρὰν· ἢ μέντοι κλητική ἐστὶν ὦ Πόσειδον διὰ τοῦ ὦ καὶ εἰ ἄρα ἐπὶ τῶν εἰς ὦν<sup>14</sup> βαρυτόνων ἢ παραλήγουσα τῆς γενικῆς, λήγουσα γίνεται τῆς κλητικῆς· σῶφρονος, σῶφρον· τλήμονος, τλήμον· Πλάτωνος, Πλάτων, διατὶ Πόσειδον οὐ Ποσειδῶν διὰ τοῦ ὦ μεγάλου· μήποτε οὖν ἐπειδὴ οἱ Δωριεῖς Ποσειδᾶν εἶπον ὀξυτόνως, μετεδίωξαν τὸν τύπον τοῦ ὀξέως τόνου καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διὰ τοῦ ὦ· οἱ γὰρ Δωριεῖς τρέπουσι τὸ ὦ εἰς ᾱ· πρῶτος, πρᾶτος· ἐπρίω, ἐπρία· ἄκρων, ἄκραν· καὶ φυλάσσουνσι τὸν τόνον πλὴν τῶν πληθυντικῶν. Οὐδὲν εἰς βῶν πλὴν τοῦ Χαρναβῶν<sup>15</sup>· οὐδὲν εἰς θῶν πλὴν τοῦ Δεξιθρῶν<sup>16</sup> καὶ γὰρ τὸ Ποσειδῶν αἰεὶ λέγει ὁ ποιητῆς Ποσειδάων· καὶ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ διὰ τοῦ ἰ Ποσιδαίων· Ἰωνες Ποσειδέων· Δωριεῖς Ποσειδᾶν βαρυτόνως ἢ καὶ Ποτίδας· Αἰολεῖς Ποτιδᾶν ὀξυτόνως· τοσαῦτα ἔχομεν λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ. Οὕτως ποιοῦνται τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος τὴν λήγουσαν πόσαι διάλεκτοι· καὶ ὁ ποιητῆς· Ἰωνες· Δωριεῖς· Αἰολεῖς· Βοιωτοί.

Τὰ εἰς ἧς σπονδιακά, ἐν θέσει μακρὰ μὲν ὡς κύρια μονογενῇ ἀρσενικὰ ἐν θέσει δὲ μακρὰ, καὶ μὴ τῇ κοινῇ ἐπὶ γενικῆς, εἰς ὦν· Φαλήκης, Φαλήκου, Λύξης Λύξου πατήρ Ηρο-

<sup>14</sup> MS. εἰς σῶν.

<sup>15</sup> The same observation occurs in the treatise of Herodian *περὶ μονήρους λέξεως* p. 9. 29. where a passage from the Triptolemus of Sophocles is quoted in which the word occurs.

<sup>16</sup> r. οὐδὲν εἰς κρῶν πλὴν τοῦ Δεξικρῶν. Herodian. *περὶ μον.* λ. *ibid.* Etym. M. p. 684, 49: Δεξιχρῶν and Δεξιρῶν.



δότου<sup>17</sup> Ξέρξης· Κίξης· Κέρβης ὀνόματα ποταμῶν· Παύδης καὶ ὅσα θέσει μακρὰ· πλὴν τοῦ Ὀπλης, Ὀπλητος· Πίγρης, Πίγρητος· Νάης, Νάητος· Μένδης, Μένδητος· Πάρνης, Πάρνηθος καὶ τὸ Μόργης καὶ μάσθλης.

Τὰ εἰς ἡς βαρύτονα ἀρσενικὰ ἰσοσυλλάβως κλίνεται· Χρύσης, Χρύσου· Βρίσης, Βρίσου· Νίσης, Νίσου· Ἀγχίσης, Ἀγχίσου<sup>18</sup>. ἔχεται δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐργονίσης· καὶ εἴ τι ἕτερον ἀρσενικὸν εἰς οὐ πλὴν τοῦ τηλαυγῆς, τηλαυγοῦς· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡμαρτηῆσθαι τὸ ὄνομα.

Τὰ εἰς ἡς βαρύτονα ἀρσενικὰ ἰσοσυλλάβως κλίνεται· Τὰ εἰς σύνθετα παρὰ θηλυκῶν γιγνόμενα ὀνόματα ὑπεσταλμένων τῶν παρὰ τοῦ κῆ ἐπὶ γενικῆς εἰς οὐ· δική. Ἑλληνοδίκης<sup>19</sup> Ἑλληνοδίκου· γυνή, μισογύνης<sup>20</sup> μισογύνου, αἰχμή, Πυραίχμης, Πυραίχμου· καὶ πάντα πάλιν τὰ παρὰ τῶν εἰς ἡ θηλυκῶν παρηγμένα· εἶπεν οὖν τὸ αὐγῇ, τηλαυγῆς· πῶς· οὐκ ἐς ———— εἶπομεν ὑπεσταλμένων τῶν παρὰ τὸ κῆ· τούτων γὰρ εἰς οὐς ἡ γενικὴ· οἶδν τανυήκης, τανυήκους· ἀμφήκης, ἀμφήκους<sup>21</sup>. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὀξύτόνων εἰς οὐς. τύχη, εὐτυχῆς<sup>22</sup> εὐτυχοῦς· πάλῃ, ἰσοπαλῆς<sup>23</sup> ἰσοπαλοῦς· ἄλκη· ἑτεραλκῆς, ἑτεραλκοῦς· Ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ἀλκὴν ὀνόματα διαφοροῦνται· πῇ μὲν εἰς οὐ πῇ δὲ εἰς οὐς· Μενάλκης γὰρ Μενάλκου· Σιτάλκης μὲν Σιτάλκου<sup>24</sup> πῇ δὲ Σιταλκέω, πῇ δὲ Σιταλκοῦς· ὥστε ὁπόταν μὲν εἰς ας παρὰ ῥῆμα ἐστὶ τὸ ἀλκῶ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔχει τὴν σύνθεσιν· ὅθεν τὸ ἡλαλκεν· ὁπότε δὲ εἰς οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἀλκὴν· καὶ πρὸς διάφορον σύνθεσιν διάφορος καὶ ἡ κλίσις· περὶ δὲ τοῦ τηλαυγοῦς εἶπομεν ὅτι ἔχει ἀφορμὴν τὴν ἀπὸ ὀξύτόνων τῶν εἰς ἡς συνθέτων βαρυνθέντα, τὴν αὐτὴν κλίσιν φυλάττει. Πολυνίκους<sup>25</sup> Εὐρυσθένους· παγκράτους· παντροποῦς· ἦν οὖν τηλαυγῆς. καὶ τῷ λόγῳ τῶν ὀξυνομένων ἔσχε τὴν γενικὴν· γεγόμενον δὲ καὶ κύριον τὴν μὲν κλίσιν ἐφύλαξε τὸν δὲ τόνον μετέβαλεν· ἦν μὲν οὖν τηλαυγῆς, τηλαυγοῦς ὀξύτόνως πάλιν δὲ καὶ τηλαύγης, τηλαύγου βαρυτόνως. Τὸ μέντοι Αἴδης

<sup>17</sup> MS. αὔξης αὔξου.

<sup>19</sup> MS. Ἑλληνοδίκη.

<sup>21</sup> MS. ἀμφίκης, ἀμφίκους.

<sup>23</sup> MS. om.

<sup>25</sup> MS. πολινίκους.

<sup>18</sup> MS. om. Νίσης and Ἀγχίσης.

<sup>20</sup> MS. γυνή, μισο———

<sup>22</sup> MS. om. εὐτυχῆς.

<sup>24</sup> MS. Σιταλίκης μὲν Σιταλίκου.



δύο κλίσεις ἀνεδέξατο ὅτε ἐπιθετικὸν Ἀΐδης, Ἀΐδους· ἐπειδὴ πέπτωκεν εἰς χαρακτήρα πατρωνυμικοῦ ὅμοιον ἐγένετο τοῦ Ξουθίδης· Κρονίδης.

Τὰ εἰς  $\bar{\omega}$ ν ὀξύτονα διὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\omega}$  κλίνεται πλὴν τοῦ κανῶν κανόνος· δαφνῶν, δαφνῶνος καὶ παρθενῶν<sup>26</sup> παρθενῶνος.

Τὰ εἰς  $\bar{\eta}$ ν ἀπὸ ἀπλῶν γινόμενα τὴν τοῦ ἀπλοῦ κλίσιν ἔχει· ὑψαύχην, ὑψαίχενος· ἐριαύχην, ἐριαύχενος· εὐρυλίμην εὐρυλίμενος.

Τὰ εἰς  $\bar{\eta}$ ν λήγοντα μονοσύλλαβα μὴ ὄντα μόνως θηλυκὰ διὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\nu}\sigma$  κλίνεται μὴν μηνός· σπλὴν σπληνός· σφὴν σφηνός· ῥὴν ρηνός· πτὴν<sup>27</sup> πτηνός· μόνως θηλυκὰ διὰ τὸ φρὴν φρενός· κατὰ τι δὲ μόνως θηλυκὰ, ὅτι καὶ τὸ χὴν ἐστὶ θηλυκόν.

Τὰ εἰς  $\xi$  μονοσύλλαβα μετὰ διφθόγγου διὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\kappa}$  κλίνεται· προῖξ προίκος· γλαυῖξ γλαυκός· δαυῖξ δαυκός<sup>28</sup>· οὐχ ὑγιῶς δὲ τὸ Γραιῖξ Γραικός· ὑγιῶς ἄρα τὸ ῥαῖξ ραικός· οὐχ ὁμῶς δὲ τὸ αῖξ αἰγός ἐπειδὴ μονὰ ἀπὸ φωνήεντος ἦρξατο· παράλλαξαν δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἄρχουσαν, ἥλλαξε καὶ κατὰ τὴν κλίσιν.

Τὰ εἰς  $\xi$  μονοσύλλαβα· μὴ μετὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\gamma}$  ἔχοντα τὸ  $\bar{\alpha}$  συνεσταλμένον διὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\kappa}$  κλίνεται· δρᾶξ δρακός· σάρξ, σαρκος· πτᾶξ πτακός σημαίνει τὴν πτῆσιν, πρᾶξ πρακός<sup>29</sup>· πᾶξ πακός· ἀναλόγως ἄρα τὸ πλᾶξ πλακός· παραλόγως δὲ τὸ γλᾶξ γλακός· ἐστὶ δὲ βοτάνη γάλακτος ἀνζητική· ὠρισαμεθα δὲ μὴ μετὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\gamma}$ · διὰ τὸ στράγξ συνεσταλμένον καὶ διὰ τὸ ῥᾶξ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς σταφυλῆς.

Τὰ εἰς  $\xi$  λήγοντα μονοσύλλαβα ἔχοντα ἐν τι τῶν φύσει μακρῶν διὰ τοῦ  $\kappa$  κλίνεται· πτῶξ πτωκός ὁ λαγῶός· ὦλξ ὠλκός· πρῶξ πρωκός· βῶξ βωκός· κῆξ κηκός· παρὰ τοῦτο καὶ σφῆξ σφηκός· ἡμάρτηται ἄρα το βῆξ βηχός διὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\chi}$ · τινὲς δὲ εἶπον καὶ βηκός ἀλλ' οὐχ εὖρηται ἐν χρήσει· δεῖ δὲ κατὰ πάντα τὰς τῆς χρήσεως φωνὰς τηρεῖν.

Τὰ εἰς  $\xi$  λήγοντα μονοσύλλαβα ἔχοντα ἐν τι τῶν φύσει βραχέων διὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\kappa}$  κλίνεται· κρέξ κρεκός· βὸρξ βορκός<sup>30</sup>

<sup>26</sup> MS. om. παρθενῶν.

<sup>27</sup> MS. πτήης.

<sup>28</sup> This word does not occur in the Lexicons.

<sup>29</sup> This word is new.

<sup>30</sup> I am not aware of any other authority for this word.



κρόξ κροκὸς ἔνθεν ἡ αἰτιατική “ πολλὴν κρόκα<sup>31</sup>” πρόξ προκὸς· τί οὖν τὸ φλόξ· οὐκ ἔστι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ λέξ, λεγὸς· ἐπεὶ ταῦτα ῥηματικά εἰσι· τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ φλέγω· τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγω· ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ῥήματα διὰ τοῦ γ εἰσὶν ὁμοίως καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα· ἢ καὶ ἄλλως· ἐπεὶ τὸ λ ἔχουσιν, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ λ εἶχεν, ὥς τε οὖν κατὰ δύο τρόπους παραλλάσσονται ἢ ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἢ ἀπὸ στοιχείου διὰ τοῦ λ.

Βύβλος έ.

Ενταῦθα ζητοῦμεν διὰ τί τὰ εἰς  $\eta\varsigma$  εἰς  $\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  ἔχοντα τὴν γενικὴν ὀνόματα ἔχουσι τὴν κλητικὴν εἰς  $\epsilon\varsigma$ · οἷον Εὐρυσάκης, Εὐρυσάκους ὦ Εὐρύσακες· πλὴν τοῦ τείχους· οὐδέτερόν ἐστιν εἰς  $\omicron\varsigma$ , λέγομεν ὅτι Ἀττικῶ ἔθει· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ διχῶς ἐπιφέρονται τὴν κλητικὴν· ὦ Ἀπολλογένη καὶ ὦ Ἀπολλόγενης· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν αἰτιατικὴν διχῶς· τὸν Τισαφέρνην<sup>32</sup> καὶ τὸν Τισαφέρνη ἀκόλουθον ὑπάγουσι κλητικὴν τῇ Τισαφέρνῃ, τὴν ὦ Τισαφέρνην· ἀναβιβάζεται καὶ ὁ τόνος ἐπεὶ τὰ εἰς  $\eta\varsigma$  κύρια σύνθετα ἔχοντα κλητικὰς εἰς  $\epsilon\varsigma$  ἀναδρομὴν ποιοῦνται τόνου, ὁ Δημοσθένης ὦ Δημοσθένης· τὸ μεντοὶ Εὐρύσακες κατὰ δύο τρόπους ἀνεβίβασε τὸν τόνον· τῶ λόγῳ τῶν οὐδετέρων καὶ τῶ λόγῳ τῶν κυρίων.

Ζητοῦμεν δὲ πῶς δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι λειῶδες ἢ λειῳδες· εἰ τὰ εἰς  $\eta\varsigma$  σύνθετα ἔχοντα κλητικὴν εἰς  $\epsilon\varsigma$  ἀναβιβάζει τὸν τόνον ὀφείλει ἀναγινώσκεισθαι λειῶδες· ἀλλὰ μὴ δῶμεν αὐτὸ σύνθετον ἀλλὰ παράγωγον, σχηματίζουσι δὲ αὐτὸ τινὲς οὕτως· λειωάδης λειώδης ἐν συναλοιφῇ ὁ τοῖς λαοῖς ἀρέσκων· εἰς οὖν τοῦτο δῶμεν μέλλομεν ζητεῖν καὶ πλεῖα· παρὰ τὸ λείον οὖν τὸ ἀπαλὸν ὥς καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς ὧδε πῇ<sup>33</sup>.

μετὰ χειρας ἀνέλκων

Ἀτρίπτους ἀπαλὰς.

λείος οὖν ὁ λειώδης· πόθεν οὖν αὐτὸ δῶμεν παράγεσθαι; ἀπὸ γενικῆς<sup>34</sup> ἢ ἀπὸ πληθυντικῆς; ποτερόν οὖν ὦ ὀνώδης<sup>35</sup> ἢ ὄνων ὀνώδης· ἔχομεν ἀποδείξαι ὅτι ἀπὸ γενικῆς<sup>36</sup> ἀλλ’ οὐ περὶ τούτου οὖν λειώδης<sup>37</sup> ὕδατος ὕδατώδης· βοὸς βοώδης

<sup>31</sup> Hesiod Op. II. 157. Στήμονι δ’ ἐν παύρῳ πολλὴν κρόκα μῆρύσασθαι.

<sup>32</sup> MS. Τιμαφέρνην all through.

<sup>33</sup> Hom. Od. Φ. 150. πρὶν γὰρ κάμε χειρας ἀνέλκων, &c.

<sup>34</sup> Read ἐνικῆς.

<sup>35</sup> Read ὄνου ὀνώδης.

<sup>36</sup> Read ἐνικῆς.

<sup>37</sup> MS. ἡλειῳδες.







original author, it seems right to exhibit these fragments, though of little intrinsic value, in their primary form.

Ηρωδιανού περὶ παραγωγῶν γενικῶν  
ἀπὸ διαλέκτων

Cod. Barocc. 76. fol. 284.

Αἱ Θετταλικαὶ γενικαὶ εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ περισπωμένων κοινῶν γενικῶν ὥσι προπερισπῶνται· οἶον καλοῖο σοφοῖο· ἀπὸ δὲ βαρυτόνων, προπαροξύνονται οἶον Πριάμοιο φίλοιο.

Ἀπὸ Ἀττικῶν γενικῶν κατὰ πλεονασμὸν τοῦ ὁ γενόμεναι· εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ ὀξύτόνων γενικῶν ὥσι προπερισπῶνται οἶον Πετέω, Πετεῶο· Στερέω Στερεῶο· Ταλάω Ταλαῶο· εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ βαρυτόνων προπαροξύνονται οἶον τοῦ Μίνω τοῦ Μίνωο· τοῦ Ἀνδρογέω τοῦ Ἀνδρογέωο· τοῦ τόνου καταλεχθέντος διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι πρὸ τριῶν συλλαβῶν πίπτειν τόνον.

Αἱ διὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\epsilon}\omega$  Ἰωνικαὶ γενικαὶ εἰ μὲν ἀπο βαρυτόνων γενικῶν κοινωνοῦσι προπαροξύνονται· οἶον Ατρείδεω· Ὁρέστω· ἀπαθεῖς δηλονότι οὔσαι, πάσχουσαι δὲ, πρὸ μιᾶς ἔχουσι τὸν τόνον· Ἑρμείου, Ἑρμειέω καὶ ἐν συγκοπῇ Ἑρμείω.

Ἦρης, Ἑρμείωτε, καὶ Ἠφαίστοιο ἄνακτος (Il. O. 214.) εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ περισπωμένων τινῶν γενικῶν ὥσι παροξύνονται· αὐλητοῦ, αὐλητέω· Καυσοῦ, Καυσέω· ὄνομα κύριον.

Αἱ διὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\alpha}\omega$  ἀπὸ μὲν βαρυτόνων βαρύνονται· ἀπὸ δὲ περισπωμένων περισπῶνται· Ἀτρείδου Ἀτρείδαο· ἀργέστου ἀργέσταο· Τὸ μὲν προσηγορικὸν συστέλλει τὸ  $\bar{\alpha}$ , καὶ διὰ καθαροῦ τοῦ  $\bar{\sigma}$  κλίνεται· τὸ δὲ κυρίως ἐκτεταμένον ἔχει τὸ  $\bar{\alpha}$  ὡς ἰσοσυλλάβως κλίνονται κατ' ἀποβολὴν τοῦ  $\bar{\sigma}$ · οἶον λᾶα· ὡς κλίνεται τὸ μέγας· τὸ μὲν κυρίως ἐκτεταμένον ἔχει τὸ  $\bar{\alpha}$  καὶ ἀποβολῇ τοῦ  $\bar{\sigma}$  ποιεῖ τὴν γενικὴν· οἶον ὁ μέγας τοῦ μέγα· τὸ δὲ ἐπίθετον συστέλλει τὸ  $\bar{\alpha}$ · καὶ ὀφείλει διὰ καθαροῦ τοῦ  $\bar{\sigma}$  κλιθῆναι οἶον τοῦ μέγας, ἀλλὰ γίνεται ἑτερόκλιτον καὶ κλίνεται τοῦ μεγάλου.

Διατὶ εἶπεν ὁ τεχνικὸς πᾶσα γενικὴ εἰς  $\bar{\sigma}$  λήγουσα τροπῇ τοῦ  $\bar{\sigma}$  εἰς  $\bar{\iota}$  τὴν δοτικὴν ποιεῖ· ἄτοπον γάρ ἐστι τὰ σύμφωνα εἰς φωνήεντα τρέπεσθαι· Ἰστέον ὅτι ἡ τροπὴ πενταχῶς γίνεται· ἐστι γὰρ τροπὴ κατὰ πάθος· ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐλαφοβόλος ἐλαφηβόλος· ἐστι τροπὴ κατὰ παραγωγὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ νέμω νόμος· λέγω λόγος· ἐστι τροπὴ κατὰ διάλεκτον ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄναρος ὄνειρος Αἰολικῶς· ἐστι τροπὴ κατὰ



πάθος ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐλαιόφυτον<sup>48</sup> ἐλαιόφυτον· ἔστι τροπή κατὰ κλίσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ Αἴαντος Αἴαντι· τροπή οὖν κλίσεως καὶ τὰ φωνήεντα εἰς σύμφωνα τρέπονται· καὶ τὰ σύμφωνα εἰς φωνήεντα· καὶ τούτου χάριν εἶπε τροπή τοῦ ὄς εἰς ἰ.

Διατὶ ἐν τοῖς δυϊκοῖς συνεζευγμέναι εἰσὶν αἱ πτώσεις ἐν δὲ τοῖς πληθυντικοῖς οὐκ εἰσὶ· ἐπειδὴ δυικὰ τὰ δύο πρόσωπα σημαίνουσι· καὶ τούτου χάριν δύο πτώσεις ἐν μιᾷ φωνῇ ζήτουσι· τὰ δὲ πληθυντικὰ πολλὰ πρόσωπα σημαίνουσι καὶ οὐ δύνανται εἶναι συνεζευγμένα.

Διατὶ ἐν τοῖς δυϊκοῖς ἡ εὐθεία μετὰ αἰτιατικῆς συνεζεύγνυται· ἡ δὲ γενικὴ μετὰ δοτικῆς· ἐπειδὴ συγγένειαν ἔχει ἡ αἰτιατικὴ πρὸς τὴν εὐθείαν· καὶ ἡ δοτικὴ πρὸς τὴν γενικὴν ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τόνον ἀνεδέξατο· οἷον ὁ ἄνομος, τὸν ἄνομον, τοῦ ἀνόμου, τῷ ἀνόμῳ.

Διατὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν δυϊκῶν καὶ τῶν πληθυντικῶν, ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ὀρθὴ καὶ κλητικὴ· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐνικοῖς οὐκ ἐστὶ· ἐπειδὴ τῆς γενικῆς μήτηρ ἐστὶν ἡ εὐθεία ἡ δὲ γενικὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ μήτηρ· ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐν τοῖς δυϊκοῖς καὶ τοῖς πληθυντικοῖς ἡ γενικὴ εἰς  $\bar{\nu}$  λήγει διὰ τοῦτο ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ὀρθὴ καὶ κλητικὴ· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐνικοῖς ἡ γενικὴ διαφορὰν τελικὴν ἔχει· ποτὲ γὰρ τὸ  $\sigma$ . ποτὲ δὲ τὸ  $\nu$ . ποτὲ δὲ τὸ  $\alpha$ · διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ αἰεὶ ἐστὶν ὀρθὴ καὶ κλητικὴ.

Διατὶ οὐ κλίνομεν ὁ κοχλίας τοῦ κοχλίῳ ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοχλίῳ· ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γενικὴ ἰσοσυλλάβως κλινομένη μακροκαταληκτεῖσθαι θέλει· ὡς κλίνει ἐκάστη διάλεκτος τὸ Αἰνείας· οἱ μὲν Δωριεῖς Αἰνείας Αἰνειᾶ κλίνουσιν· οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ Αἰνείας Αἰνείας· οἱ δὲ Ἰῶνες, Αἰνείας Αἰνειέω· οἱ δὲ κοινοὶ Αἰνείας Αἰνείου.

Διατὶ Αἰνείας μακρὸν ἔχει τὸ  $\alpha$ · ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γενικὴ ὀνόματος εἰς φωνῆεν λήγουσα καὶ περιττοσυλλαβοῦσα τῆς ἰδίας εὐθείας ἢ ἐκτείνει τὴν παραλήγουσαν καὶ συστέλλει τὴν λήγουσαν οἷον καλοῖο σοφοῖο· ἢ συστέλλει τὴν παραλήγουσαν καὶ ἐκτείνει τὴν λήγουσαν οἷον Ἀτρειδέω, Πηλειδέω, Πριαμιδέω· εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ Αἰνείας οὐκ ἐξέτεινε τὴν τελευταίαν συλλαβὴν ἀναγκὴ τὴν παραλήγουσαν ἐκτείνει.

Διατὶ μὴ προσγράψωμεν τὸ ἰ ἐν τῇ εὐθείᾳ τῶν δυϊκῶν· διὰ τὸ μὴ εὐρίσκεσθαι ἐν τοῖς δυϊκοῖς ἄλλο τελικὸν πλὴν τοῦ  $\alpha$  καὶ  $\epsilon$ . καὶ  $\omega$ . καὶ  $\eta$ · τούτου χάριν οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἀνεκφώνητον

<sup>48</sup> MS. ἐλοιόφυτον.



ἰ τῆς δοτικῆς· ἐπεὶ ἔμελλε λέγεσθαι καὶ τό ἰ τελικὸν τῆς ευθείας ὦν τῶν δυικῶν.

Τί ἐστὶ συγκοπή· καὶ τὶ αποκοπή καὶ τὶ ἀφαίρεσις· συγκοπή ἐστὶ πάθος περὶ τὸ μέσον γινόμενον· οἶον ἐξαίρετος ἔξαιτος· ἀρμόσαντες ἄρσαντες· ἀποκοπή δὲ πάθος ἐν τῷ τέλει γινόμενον οἶον ἰδρῶτα ἰδρῶ· δῶμα δῶ· ἀφαίρεσις δὲ πάθος ἐν τῇ ἀρχούσῃ οἶον σῦς ὕς· λείβω εἴβω· γαῖα αἶα.

Ὁ Γράς τοῦ Γρά πόθεν; ο κανὼν· τὰ εἰς ᾱς μονοσύλλαβα περισπώμενα κοινὰ μὴ ἔχοντα οὐδέτερον ἀποβολῇ τοῦ σ ποιεῖ τὴν γενικὴν· οἶον ὁ λās, τοῦ λā· ὁ Δās, τοῦ Δā ὄνομα ποταμοῦ· ὁ θās, τοῦ θā· ὁ Χnās, τοῦ Χnā· ὁ πās, τοῦ πā· σημαίνει δὲ τὸν πρᾶον· εἰ δὲ ὀξύνονται περιττοσυνλλάβως κλίνονται οἶον ὁ Ζās τοῦ Ζάντος· Πράς, Πράντος· φās, φάντος· φθās, φθάντος· κράς, κρίντος ταῦτα δὲ ὀξύνησαν ὡς μέτοχικά.

Ὁ δρῆς τοῦ δρῆ· πόθεν; ὁ κανὼν· τὰ εἰς ῆς μονοσύλλαβα εἰ μὲν περισπῶνται ἀποβολῇ τοῦ σ ποιεῖ τὴν γενικὴν· οἶον ὁ τρῆς τοῦ τρῆ ὁ δρῆς τοῦ δρῆ· εἰ δὲ ὀξύνεται διὰ τοῦ σ κλίνεται οἶον σῆς σήτος· βλῆς βλήτος· γνῆς γνήτος· Κρῆς, Κρήτος· Διατὶ μὴ κλίνωμεν ὁ δρῆς τοῦ δροῦ· καὶ ὁ τρῆς τοῦ τροῦ· ὡς ὁ Ἑρμῆς τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ· ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα μονοσύλλαβος εὐθεία ἰσοσυνλλάβως κλινομένη ἀποβολῇ τοῦ σ ποιεῖ τὴν γενικὴν οἶον ὁ Γράς τοῦ γρά· ὁ χnās τοῦ χnā· ὁ ροῦς τοῦ ροῦ· οὕτως οὖν καὶ ὁ δρῆς τοῦ δρῆ.

Πῶς κλίνεται τὸ μύκης μύκου καὶ μύκητος· καὶ πόσα σημαίνει; τέσσερα· τὰ κάρβουνα τὰ ἐπικείμενα τοῖς λύχνοις ὡς παρὰ Καλλιμάχῳ Ἑκάλη<sup>49</sup>

ὥς ποτε λύχνος

δαιόμενος<sup>50</sup> πυρόεντες ἄδην ἐγένοντο μύκητες.

καὶ τοὺς ἀμανίτας τοὺς περὶ τὰ δένδρα γινομένους· ὡς παρὰ Ἀντιμάχῳ “φάγε δ’ ὀπτὰ μύκητας πρινίνους<sup>51</sup>” καὶ τὸ μέρος

<sup>49</sup> MS. Ἑκαβη.

<sup>50</sup> Υ. λύχνου δαιομένου.

<sup>51</sup> Chæroboscus, who is cited by Bekker Anecd. Gr. Ind. v. μύκης, assigns this fragment to Aristophanes. σημαίνει δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀμανίτας τοὺς περὶ τὰ δένδρα γινομένους, ὡς παρὰ Ἀριστοφάνει· ὀπτὰς μύκητας πρίνιν δύο. Dindorf has followed this authority in his edition of the fragments of that poet, Fr. 496, and reads ὀπτοὺς μύκητας πρινίνους, but the Baroccian MS. 159. agrees with ours in assigning the citation to Antimachus. If this is so, the word φάγε has been metamorphosed into the termination of the great comic poet’s name. But did Antimachus make the penultimate of πρινίνους long? [ἐπτὰ μ. π. Ed.]



τῆς λαβῆς τοῦ ξίφους ἔνθα κρατεῖ τις· σημαίνει δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰδοῖον τοῦ ἀνδρός· ὅπερ καὶ ἰσοσυλλάβως ἔκλινεν ὁ Ἀρχίλοχος<sup>52</sup> εἰπὼν ἀλλ' ἀπερρώσι μυκέω πάν<sup>53</sup>.

Σαφῆς τοῦ σαφοῦς πόθεν· ὁ κανὼν· τὰ εἰς  $\sigma$  λήγοντα ἔχοντα οὐδέτερον εἰς  $\epsilon\sigma$ , εἰς  $\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  ἔχει τὴν γενικὴν, κ' ἂν βαρύτονα, κ' ἂν ὀξύτονα, κ' ἂν ἀπλά, κ' ἂν σύνθετα· οἷον σαφῆς, σαφοῦς, σαφές καὶ τὰ ὅμοια.

Πῶς κλίνεται τὰ εἰς  $\eta\varsigma$  περισπώμενα. εἰ μὲν εἰσὶ παρά τὸ κλέος εἰς  $\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  ἔχει τὴν γενικὴν· οἷον Σοφοκλῆς Σοφοκλοῦς· Περικλῆς Περικλοῦς· Ἡρακλῆς Ἡρακλοῦς· εἰ δὲ ὥσιν ἀπὸ συναιρέσεως τῶν εἰς  $\eta\varsigma$  εἰς  $\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  ἔχει τὴν γενικὴν, οἷον Θαλῆς Θαλοῦ· Ἑρμῆς Ἑρμοῦ.

Διατὶ τὸ Κράτης Κράτητος ἔχον ἐν τῇ εὐθείᾳ τὸ  $\tau$  εἰς  $\tau\omicron\varsigma$  ἔχει τὴν γενικὴν· ἐπειδὴ τὸ  $\tau$  ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος ἔχει τὰ γὰρ εἰς  $\eta\varsigma$  ἱαμβικὰ ἔχοντα τὸ σύμφωνον τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος εἰς  $\tau\omicron\varsigma$  ἔχουσι τὴν γενικὴν· οἷον χαίρω Χάρης Χάρητος· λείβω λέβης λέβητος· τρέμω Τρόμης Τρόμητος· οὕτως οὖν κρατῶ Κράτης Κράτητος. Καὶ πῶς τὸ θύτης καὶ πλύτης οὐχ ἔχουσι τὴν γενικὴν εἰς  $\tau\omicron\varsigma$ · ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος τὸ  $\tau$ · ὁ γὰρ ἐνεστῶς, θύω καὶ πλύνω ἐστί, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἠκολούθησε τῇ κλίσει τοῦ Κράτητος.

Ποσαχῶς κλίνεται τὸ κόμης; διχῶς· κλίνεται γὰρ ὁ κόμης, τοῦ κόμου, ἐξ οὗ καὶ κόμειω Ἰωνικῶς· ὥσπερ Ἀτρεΐδης Ἀτρεΐδου Ἀτρεϊδέω κλίνεται δὲ καὶ διὰ τοῦ  $\tau\omicron\varsigma$ · ἐπὶ τῆς ἀξίας, τῷ λόγῳ τῶν ἱαμβῶν· οἷον ὁ κόμης τοῦ κόμητος· κόμης κόμου πόθεν; ὁ κανὼν· τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς  $\eta$  θηλυκῶν εἰς  $\eta\varsigma$  γινόμενα βαρύτονα μὴ ἔχοντα οὐδέτερον εἰς  $\epsilon\sigma$ , εἰς  $\omicron\upsilon$  ἔχει τὴν γενικὴν. οἷον λέσχη Λέσχης Λέσχου· γυνὴ μισογύνης μισογύνου οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ κόμη κόμης κόμου· τὸ δὲ κόμητος ἐπὶ τῆς ἀξίας τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ἱαμβικῷ ἐπηκολούθησε. Καὶ διατὶ οὐ γράφεται τὸ Λάχης Λάχητος διὰ τοῦ  $\iota$ . [ $\sigma$ ] ἐπειδὴ οὐδέποτε ἀρσενικὴ γενικὴ διὰ τοῦ  $\tau\omicron\varsigma$  κλινομένη τῷ  $\iota$  [ $\sigma$ ] παραλήγεται· οἷον λέβητος· Δάρητος· προσκεῖται ἀρσενικὴ διὰ

<sup>52</sup> MS. Ἀντίλοχος.

<sup>53</sup> The Baroccian MS. 159. cited by Prof. Gaisford Archil. Fr. 92. reads ἀλλ' ἀπερρώγασι μυκέω πάν'. Chæroboscus ad Theodos. Bekker Anecd. Gr. Ind. v. μύκης, ἀλλ' ἀπερρώγασι μύκew τένοντες.



τὰ παρὰ Δωριεῦσι θηλυκὰ· τὸ γὰρ θέμις θέμι[σ]τος λέγουσιν·  
ὅθεν παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ

Ζεὺς δὲ Θέμιστα<sup>54</sup> κέλευσε (Π. Υ. 4)

κατὰ πλεονασμὸν τοῦ σ̄.

Γράδης Γράδου· πόθεν; ὁ κανὼν· τὰ εἰς ἡς πατρωνυμικὰ ἢ καὶ τύπου πατρωνυμικοῦ ὄντα εἰς οῡ ἔχει τὴν γενικὴν· πατρωνυμικὰ μὲν οἶον Ἀτρείδης Ἀτρείδου· Πηλείδης Πηλείδου· τύπου δὲ πατρωνυμικοῦ οἶον Εὐριπίδης Εὐριπίδου· Θουκυδίδης Θουκυδίδου· Ἡρώδης Ἡρώδου· τὸ δὲ Γράδης πατρωνυμικόν ἐστὶ· τὸν γὰρ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Γρά̄ σημαίνει. Καὶ τί διαφέρει τὰ πατρωνυμικὰ τοῦ τύπου τῶν πατρωνυμικῶν· διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, ὅτι τὰ πατρωνυμικὰ εἰς τὸ υἱὸς καὶ ἐγγονος διαλύονται· οἶον ὁ Ἀτρείδης ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Ἀτρέως· Ἀιακίδης ὁ ἐγγονος τοῦ Ἀιακοῦ· τὰ δὲ τύπου πατρωνυμικοῦ ὄντα οῡ διαλύονται εἰς υἱοὺς καὶ ἐγγόνους· οἶον Ἡρώδης Θουκυδίδης· ταῦτα γὰρ οῡ σημαίνουσι τινὸς υἱὸν ἢ ἐγγονον· ἀλλ' ὀνόματα εἰσὶ κύρια.

Χαλκοκράς Χαλκοκράτος, πόθεν; ὁ κανὼν· τὰ εἰς σ̄ λήγοντα ὀξύτονα ὄντα σύνθετα ἀπὸ παρακειμένου καὶ φυλάττοντα μίαν συλλαβὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ παρακειμένου κ'ὰν εἰς ας, κ'ὰν εἰς ἡς, κ'ὰν εἰς ῶς, διὰ καθαροῦ τοῦ τος κλίνεται· οἶον κέκραται, χαλκοκράς· ἐστὶ δὲ ὁ χαλκοῦ κεκερασμένος· βέβληται ἀβλῆς· πέπτωκα ἀπτῶς· τέτρωται ἀτρῶς ὁ ἄτρωτος.

Ἀργῆς ἀργῆτος πόθεν; ὁ κανὼν· τὰ εἰς γ̄ης λήγοντα, ἔχοντα πρὸ τοῦ γ̄ τὸ σ̄ ἢ τὸ ρ̄ διὰ τοῦ τος κλίνονται· οἶον Μίσγης Μίσγητος· Μόργης Μόργητος· Μίργης Μίργητος· σεσημείωται τὸ Ἀργῆς Ἀργου.

Μάσθλης μάσθλητος πόθεν; ὁ κανὼν· τὰ εἰς ἡς λήγοντα δισύλλαβα κατὰ πλείστον διὰ τοῦ τος κλίνονται· οἶον μήλλης μήλλητος· πόλλης πόλλητος· μέσβλης μέσβλητος· μάσθλης μάσθλητος σημαίνει δὲ τὸν μεμαλαγμένον λῶρον.

Κούρης Κούρητος· πόθεν; ὁ κανὼν· τὰ εἰς ἡς τῇ οῡ<sup>55</sup> διφθόγγῳ παραληγόμενα διὰ τοῦ τος κλίνεται· οἶον Μούρης Μούρητος· Κούρης Κούρητος.

Ναίης Ναίητος πόθεν; ὁ κανὼν· τὰ εἰς ἡς βαρύτονα

<sup>54</sup> MS. θέμιτα.

<sup>55</sup> MS. τὰ εἰς οῡς τῇ εἰ διφθόγγῳ.



ιαμβικὰ μὴ ἔχοντα ἐπ' εὐθείας τὸ  $\tau$  εἰς  $\tau\omicron\varsigma$  ἔχει τὴν γενικὴν·  
Ναίης Ναίητος· Γλοίης Γλοίητος· διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὴν  $\alpha\iota$  καὶ  $\omicron\iota$   
ἀντιβραχείαν.

Ἐσθῆς ἔσθῆτος· πόθεν; ὁ κανὼν· τὰ εἰς  $\eta\varsigma$  θηλυκὰ  
μονογενῇ διὰ τοῦ  $\tau\omicron\varsigma$  κλίνεται οἷον ποτῆς ποτῆτος· σημαίνει  
δὲ τὴν πόσιν· Πάρνης Πάρνητος καὶ κατὰ μετάθεσιν τοῦ  $\tau$   
εἰς  $\theta$  Παρνηθος· προσκεῖται μονογενῇ διὰ τὸ ὁ νημερτῆς τοῦ  
νημερτοῦς ἔχει γὰρ οὐδέτερον τὸ νημερτές.

Ποσαχῶς κλίνεται τὸ Ἄρης; ἐπταχῶς· κλίνεται γὰρ  
Ἄρης, Ἄρητος· ἐξ οὗ πατρωνυμικὸν Ἀρητιάδης· κλίνεται καὶ  
Ἄρης Ἄρου τῷ λόγῳ τῶν ἀπὸ ῥήματος συνθέτων· ἀπὸ γὰρ  
τοῦ ῥῶ τὸ λέγω γίνεται ἄρης ὁ ἐστερημένος τοῦ λέγειν· ἐν  
γὰρ πολέμῳ οὐ λόγου ἀλλὰ πράξεως χρεία· κλίνεται καὶ  
Ἄρευς Ἄρεος κοινῶς καὶ Ἄρεως Ἀττικῶς καὶ Ἄρηος Ἰωνικῶς·  
καὶ Ἄρευος Ἀιολικῶς.

Ἀγκυλοχείλης ἀγκυλοχείλου πόθεν; ὁ κανὼν· τὰ ἀπὸ  
τῶν εἰς  $\omicron\varsigma$  εἰς  $\eta\varsigma$  ὀνόματα βαρύτερα εἴτε ἀπλᾶ εἴτε παρα-  
σύνθετα εἰς  $\omicron\upsilon$  ἔχουσι τὴν γενικὴν· οἷον Ἀραζος Ἀράζης  
Ἀράζου· Λάπιθος Λαπίθης Λαπίθου· ὑπνήλος ὑπνήλης ὑπνή-  
λου<sup>56</sup>· ἐπτάπους<sup>57</sup> ἐπτάποδος ἐπταπόδης ἐπταπόδου· εὐπατρὶς  
εὐπάτριδος εὐπατρίδης εὐπατρίδου· οὕτως οὖν χεῖλος ἀγκυ-  
λόχειλος· ἀγκυλοχείλης ἀγκυλοχείλου.

Ποσαχῶς συναιρεῖται τὸ  $\epsilon$  καὶ  $\omicron$ ; τριχῶς· παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ  
παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εἰς τὴν  $\omicron\upsilon$  οἷον Δημοσθένης Δημοσθένους·  
καὶ εὐσεβέος εὐσεβοῦς παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν καὶ τοῖς Ἰωσιν  
εἰς  $\epsilon\upsilon$ · οἷον Ἰδομενέος Ἰδομενεῦς· οἷον

Ἰδομενεῦς μὲν οὐ λῆγε μένος μέγα<sup>58</sup>

ἀντὶ τοῦ Ἰδομενέος· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εὐρίσκεται τὸ  $\epsilon$   
καὶ  $\omicron$  εἰς τὴν  $\epsilon\iota$  δίφθογγον κιννῶμενον· οἷον πλέον πλεῖν· δέον  
δεῖν.

Πότε κιννᾶται ἐπὶ τῆς αἰτιατικῆς τῶν ἐνικῶν τὸ  $\epsilon$  καὶ  $\alpha$   
εἰς  $\alpha$  μακρόν, καὶ πότε εἰς  $\alpha$ ; ἡνίκα εὐρεθῇ τὸ  $\epsilon$  καὶ  $\alpha$  ἔχον  
προηγούμενον φωνῆεν τότε εἰς  $\alpha$  μακρόν κιννᾶται οἷον τὸν  
εὐφυέα καὶ εὐφυῇ καὶ εὐφυᾶ· τὸν ὑγιέα καὶ ὑγιῇ καὶ ὑγιᾶ·  
ἡνίκα δὲ πρὸ τοῦ  $\epsilon$  καὶ  $\alpha$  εὐρεθῇ σύμφωνον· τότε εἰς  $\eta$  μόνον

<sup>56</sup> MS. ὑπνίλος ὑπνίλης ὑπνίλου.

<sup>57</sup> MS. ἐπτάπτευς.

<sup>58</sup> Il. N. 424 Ἰδομενεῦς δ' οὐ λῆγε.



κιρνᾶται· οἶον Δημοσθενέα Δημοσθένη· εὐγενέα εὐγενῇ· πλή-  
ρεα πλήρη.

Διατὶ ἐν τοῖς δυϊκοῖς τὰ δύο εἰς ἡ κιρνᾶται· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς  
πληθυντικοῖς εἰς τὴν εἰ δίφθογγον· ἐπειδὴ τὰ δυϊκὰ μείζονα  
χρόνον θέλουσιν ἔχειν τῶν πληθυντικῶν· τὸ δὲ ἡ μείζων ἐστὶ  
τῆς εἰ διφθόγγου ὡς παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον τὴν μακρότητα· ἡ δὲ  
δίφθογγος ἐκ τῶν δύο φωνηέντων· καὶ γὰρ εἰς στρατιώτης  
δύο στρατιωτῶν δύναμιν ἔχων τιμιώτερος ἐστί.

Διατὶ τοῦ Δημοσθένους ἡ δοτικὴ τῶν πληθυντικῶν συναι-  
ρεῖται; διὰ τὸ εὐρίσκεσθαι ἀναμεταξὺ τῶν δύο φωνηέντων  
σύμφωνον τὸ σ· οὐδέποτε δὲ τὰ φωνήεντα δύνανται συναίρεσιν  
ἐπιδέξασθαι ἔχοντα μεταξὺ σύμφωνον εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἀποβλη-  
θῇ· ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ κρείττονα κρείττω κρείττω· οὐ δύναται δὲ  
ἀποβληθῆναι τὸ σ· ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα δοτικὴ πληθυντικὴ εἰς ἰ  
ἐκφωνούμενον λήγουσα θέλει πρὸ τοῦ ἰ ἔχειν τὸ σ ἢ δυνάμει  
ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ· δυνάμει οἶον φοῖνιξιν· ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ λέβησι.

Διατὶ ἡ αἰτιατικὴ τῶν πληθυντικῶν συναιρουμένη εἰς εἰ  
δίφθογγον συναιρεῖται· ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα εὐθεία πληθυντικῶν εἰς  
σ λήγουσα συναιρουμένη ἐστί· καὶ τὴν αἰτιατικὴν ὁμότονον καὶ  
ὁμόγραφον ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κλητικὴν· οἶον ὁ βότρυσ τοῦ βότρυος·  
ὦ βότρυσ· οἱ βούς τοὺς βούς ὦ βούς.

Πότε τὰ εἰς σ λήγοντα φυλάττουσιν ἐν τῇ συνθέσει τὴν  
τάσιν τοῦ ἀπλοῦ; ἡνίκα εὐρεθῶσιν ὑπὲρ μίαν συλλαβὴν· οἶον  
ἐρανιστῆς ἀνχερανιστῆς· εὐρετῆς ἐφευρετῆς· ἐραστῆς παιδερασ-  
τῆς· χωρὶς τοῦ κριτῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τῇ συνθέσει  
βαρύνονται οἶον δικαιοκρίτης· φιλαλήθης· καὶ χωρὶς τῶν μονο-  
συλλάβων οἶον Κρῆς Ἐτεόκρης γυνῆς ἱγνης· πᾶν γὰρ ὄνομα  
μονοσύλλαβον ἐν τῇ συνθέσει ἀναβιβάζει τὸν τόνον οἶον χθὼν  
αὐτόχθων· παῖς βούπαις· Θραῦξ σακόθραξ<sup>59</sup>· χωρὶς τοῦ πτώξ  
πολυπτώξ.

Διατὶ τὸ κριτῆς ἐν τῇ συνθέσει βαρύνεται· ἐπειδὴ παρά-  
λογός ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἀπλότητι ἡ ὀξεῖα· τὰ γὰρ εἰς ὅς ἀρσενικὰ  
φύσει δυσύλλαβα βαρύνονται· οἶον πλύτης δίψης· χάρτης·  
ψάλτης· τοῦτο δ' ἡ μὲν κοινὴ βαρύνει ἡ δὲ Ἀτθὶς ὀξύνει.  
Καὶ διατὶ τὸ ἀληθῆς ἐν τῇ συνθέσει βαρύνεται; ἐπειδὴ τὰ διὰ  
τοῦ ἠθῆς σύνθετα παρώνυμα βαρύνεσθαι θέλουσιν· ἦθος συνή-

<sup>59</sup> Read Σαμόθραξ with Chæroboscus Bekkr. Anecd. p. 1191.



θης· εὐήθης· καλοήθης· κακοήθης· ἀήθης· οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς φιλαλήθης.

Διατὶ τὸ τίς συστέλλει τὸ  $\bar{\iota}$ ; ἐπειδὴ κανὼν ἐστὶν ὁ λέγων ὅτι τὰ κατὰ ἀποβολὴν τοῦ  $\bar{\sigma}$  ποιῶντα οὐδέτερον συνεσταλμένον ἔχουσι τὸ δίχρονον· οἷον μέγας μέγα· ταχὺς ταχὺ· οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ τίς τί.

Πῶς κλίνεται τὸ ζεῦξις· ἡνίκα μὲν προσηγορικόν ἐστι διὰ καθαροῦ τοῦ  $\bar{\omega}$ <sup>60</sup> κλίνεται· οἷον ἡ ζεῦξις τῆς ζεύξεως· ἡνίκα δὲ κυρίως διὰ καθαροῦ τοῦ  $\bar{\delta}$ ος κλίνεται· οἷον ὁ Ζεῦξις τοῦ Ζεύξιδος<sup>61</sup>.

Πῶς κλίνεται τὸ Ξοῖς καὶ Σαῖς καὶ Δμῶϊς καὶ Ταμιάθις; διὰ καθαροῦ τοῦ  $\bar{\sigma}$ ς· ἐπειδὴ ὀνόματα εἰσὶ πόλεων Αἰγυπτίων· τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα τῶν πόλεων τῆς Αἰγύπτου, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον διὰ καθαροῦ τοῦ  $\bar{\omega}$ ς κλίνεται· χωρὶς τοῦ Μέμφις Μέμφιδος· Βούσιρις Βουσίριδος· Ὅσιρις Ὀσίριδος.

Ποῖα εἰσὶν ἃ λέγει ὁ τεχνικὸς ἐν τῷ ἐβδόμῳ κανόνι· τὰ ἐν τοῖς θηλυκοῖς σεσημειωμένα ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν· το Χάρυβδις καὶ Σάρδις· ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ ἐκλίθησαν διὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\delta}$ ος διὰ τὴν ἐπαλληλίαν τοῦ  $\bar{\delta}$ · καὶ τὸ σκήψις ἐπίσκεψις Λάχεσις Νέμεσις<sup>62</sup> ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμωφωνήσαντα προσηγορικοῖς θηλυκοῖς τὴν τῶν προσηγορικῶν κλίσιν ἀνεδέξαντο· καὶ τό Ξοῖς καὶ Δμῶϊς· καὶ Σαῖς<sup>63</sup> καὶ Ταμιάθις· ταῦτα γὰρ Αἰγύπτια ὄντα καὶ κλίνονται διὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\delta}$  τὰ γὰρ Ἀιγύπτια ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον διὰ καθαροῦ τοῦ  $\bar{\omega}$ ς κλίνονται οἷον Καλλιπολις Καλλιπόλεως.

Διατὶ μὴ κλίνωμεν πόλις πόλῃος διὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\eta}$ ; ἐπειδὴ εἰ γέγονεν οὕτως εὐρίσκεται ἡ παραλήγουσα τῆς περιττοσυλλάβου γενικῆς μείζων τῆς ληγούσης τῆς ἰδίας εὐθείας ὅπερ ἄτοπον. Καὶ πῶς κλίνεται παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ

ἀπ' ἀγροῦ νόσφι πόλῃος

διὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\eta}$  κλιθέν; ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι οὕτω τὸ πόλῃος οὐκ ἐστὶν Ἰωνικὸν ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ πόλιος<sup>64</sup> τοῦ διὰ τὸ  $\bar{\iota}$  γέγονε κατὰ τροπὴν τοῦ  $\bar{\iota}$  εἰς  $\bar{\eta}$  ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀψιμύθιον<sup>65</sup>.

Διατὶ ἀπέλιπε τῆς Ἀττικῆς<sup>66</sup> τῶν ἐνικῶν ἡ χρῆσις τῆς  $\bar{\alpha}$

<sup>60</sup> MS.  $\frac{\omega}{os}$ .

<sup>62</sup> λάχουσιν ὁ νέμεσις.

<sup>65</sup> Chærobosc. Bekker. Anecd. p. 1193. ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ψιμμύθιον φημύθιον.

<sup>66</sup> Υ. τῆς αἰτιατικῆς.

<sup>61</sup> MS. ἡ Ζεῦξις τῆς Ζεύξιδος.

<sup>63</sup> MS. σοῖς.

<sup>64</sup> MS. πολῃος.



οἶον τὸν ὄφεα· ἐπεὶ δὴ παντὰ τὰ εἰς  $\overline{\iota\sigma}$  λήγοντα διὰ καθαροῦ τοῦ  $\overline{\sigma}$  κλινομένα εἰς  $\overline{\nu}$  μόνον ἔχουσι τὴν αἰτιατικὴν.

Διατὶ τὸ εἰς  $\overline{\epsilon\nu\sigma}$  περισπᾶται; ἐπεὶ δὴ τὰ εἰς  $\overline{\sigma}$  λήγοντα ὀνόματα κοινολεκτούμενα ἔχοντα οὐδετέρου παρασχηματισμὸν ἀποστρέφονται τὴν ὀξεῖαν τάσιν.

Διατὶ τὸ εἰς  $\overline{\epsilon\nu\sigma}$  οὐ κλίνεται διὰ τοῦ  $\overline{\nu\tau}$  κατὰ μίμησιν τῶν οὐδετέρων ἔχόντων; ἐπεὶ δὴ δασύνεται ἡ εὐθεία· εἰ δὲ ἐγένετο ἡ γενικὴ εντος ἔμελλε ψιλοῦσθαι ἡ εὐθεία· τὸ γὰρ  $\overline{\epsilon}$  καταλήγον εἰς  $\overline{\nu}$  ἐπιφερομένου συμφώνου τῆς τρίτης συζυγίας τῶν βαρυτόνων, καὶ ἐν ῥήματι μήτε ἐπιρρήματι ψιλοῦσθαι θέλει οἶον ἔνδον ἔνθα ἐντὸς· τούτου χάριν ἀπέβαλε τό  $\overline{\tau}$  καὶ ἐγένετο ἐνός.

Ποσαχῶς κλίνεται τὰ εἰς  $\overline{\epsilon\nu\sigma}$  ὀνόματα; ἑξαχῶς· κλίνεται γὰρ κοινῶς διὰ τοῦ  $\overline{\epsilon\sigma}$  οἶον Ἀχιλλέος·<sup>67</sup> καὶ διὰ τοῦ  $\overline{\epsilon\omega}$  Ἀττικῶς οἶον Ἀχιλλέως· κλίνεται δὲ διὰ τοῦ  $\overline{\eta}$  (καὶ  $\overline{\omicron}$ ) παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, Ἰωσι, καὶ Αἰολεῦσιν· οἶον Ἀχιλλῆος· ἀλλὰ καὶ Αἰολεῖς προπαροξύνουσι· κλίνεται δὲ καὶ διὰ τοῦ  $\overline{\iota\sigma}$  παρὰ τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς· κλίνεται δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς  $\overline{\epsilon\nu}$  διφθόγγου παρὰ τοῖς Δωριεῦσι καὶ τοῖς Ἰωσι· οἶον Ἀχιλλεῦς περισπωμένως ἀντὶ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως.

Κατὰ ποίαν διάλεκτον γίνεται τὸ Ζεὺς Διὸς; κατὰ Βοιωτούς· κλίνεται δὲ καὶ διὰ τοῦ  $\overline{\iota\sigma}$  οὐχ ὡς νομίζουσι τινὲς ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας εὐθείας κειμένης παρὰ<sup>68</sup>.

The same Baroccian MS. contains also the following unedited grammatical Scholia, f. 254.

Νῦξ, νυχὸς κατὰ τὸν κανόνα· ὅτι τὰ εἰς  $\overline{\nu\zeta}$  λήγοντα ὀνόματα ἀπὸ ῥημάτων μελλόντων γινόμενα κατὰ ἀποβολὴν τοῦ  $\overline{\omega}$  ἔχουσιν ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ τῆς γενικῆς τὸ σύμφωνον τῆς τελευταίας συλλαβῆς· ἢ τοῦ ἐνεργητικοῦ παρακειμένου ἐκείνου τοῦ ῥήματος ἀφ' οὗ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα γέγονε καὶ μετεχόντες τὸ τοῦ ἐνεργητικοῦ παρακειμένου σύμφωνον· ἔστω σοι παράδειγμα τὸ πτύξ πτυχὸς ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν θύραν· γίνεται δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πτύσσω τὸ ἀσφαλίζω· τῶν δὲ ἔχόντων βουπλήξ βουπλήγος· κατὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν κανόνα ἐκλήθη καὶ νῦξ νυχὸς· λαβοῦσα κατὰ τὴν γενικὴν τὸ τοῦ ἐνεργητικοῦ παρακειμένου σύμφωνον· εἶτα πλεονάσαντος τοῦ  $\overline{\tau}$  γέγονε νυχτὸς·

<sup>67</sup> MS. Ἀχιλλέως.

<sup>68</sup> Chærobosc. Bekker. Anecd. p. 1194. τινὲς δὲ καὶ τὴν Διὸς γενικὴν ἀπὸ τῆς Δίς εὐθείας θέλουσι λέγειν τῆς εὐρημένης παρὰ τῷ Πίνθωνι.



ἐπεὶ δὲ ψιλὰ ψιλῶν ἡγεῖται ἢ προηγεῖται καὶ δασέα δασέων, μετεβλήθη τὸ δασὺ  $\chi$  εἰς ψιλὸν  $\kappa$ . καὶ γέγονε νυκτὸς. ἵνα προηγῇσθαι τοῦ ψιλοῦ  $\tau$  ἕτερον ψιλὸν  $\kappa$ . ὅμοιον δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἄναξ ἄνακτος· γέγονε δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνάσσω ἀνάξω ἀποβολῇ τοῦ  $\omega$  ἄναξ ὁ βασιλεὺς, καὶ κλίσσει ἄναχος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνεργητικοῦ παρακειμένου εἶτα πλεονάσαντος τοῦ  $\tau$  καὶ τροπῇ τοῦ  $\chi$  εἰς  $\kappa$  ἄνακτος γέγονε.

Κανόνισον εἶκω τὸ θέλω καὶ τὸ ὑποχωρῶ καὶ ὑποτάσσομαι καὶ βλέπω καὶ ὁμοιῶ· εἶζω· ὁ ἀόριστος εἶξα ὁ δεύτερος εἶκον· ἡ μετοχὴ ὁ ἐκὼν· ὥφειλε ψιλογραφεῖσθαι· ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ὁ κανὼν ὁ λέγων, τὸ  $\epsilon$  πρὸ τοῦ  $\kappa$  εἰ μὴ ἀπὸ ληκτικῆς ἐκτάσεως εἶη δασύνεται, οἷον ἐκάς· ἐκάεργος· ἐκαστος· Ἐκάτη ἡ σελήνη· καὶ ἔτι εἴρηται εἰ μὴ ἀπὸ ληκτικῆς ἐκτάσεως εἶη, διὰ τὸ ἐκαρτέρησα· ἔκειρα ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔκοψα· ἐκλεπτον· ἐκαινοτόμουν· ἐκοπτον καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια.

Καρδία  $\epsilon$ . τὸ σωματικὸν μόριον· τὸ βαθὺ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου ὡς τὸ “διατὶ ἀναλογισμοὶ ἀναβαίνουνσιν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν;” τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς τὸ καρδίαν καθαρὰν κτίσον ἐν ἐμοὶ  $\omega$  Θεός<sup>69</sup>· τὴν γνώμην ὡς τὸ, ἡ καρδία αὐτῶν πόρρῳ ἀπέχει ἀπ' ἐμοῦ” καὶ τὴν εὐδοκίαν καὶ ἀρέσκειαν ὡς τὸ “εὖρον Δαβὶδ τὸν τοῦ Ἰεσσαὶ ἄνδρα κατὰ τὴν καρδίαν μου.

Βίος  $\varsigma$ . τὴν τέχνην ὡς τὸ “βίον ἐμπορικὸν ἢ φιλόσοφον ζῆν.” τὸν τρόπον ὡς τὸ “χρηστοῦ βίου ἐστὶ” τὸν παρόντα κόσμον, τὸν ἐνὸς ἐκάστου χρόνον· τὴν τῆς ζωῆς περιουσίαν· ὡς τὸ “πολὺς ἦν αὐτῷ βίος” καὶ τὰς πρὸς τὸ ζῆν συντεινούσας τροφάς.

Τὰ παρὰ τὸ κέρας καὶ γέρας συντιθέμενα ὀνόματα διὰ τοῦ  $\omega$  μᾶλλον γράφεται οἷον εὐκερως<sup>70</sup>· τὰ παρὰ τὸ γήρας οἷον εὐγήρως· πολυγήρως· κακογήρως· κλίνεται δὲ κατ' ἀποβολὴν τοῦ  $\sigma$ · συντάττεται δὲ καὶ τὰ παρὰ τὸ χρέος συγκείμενα διὰ τοῦ  $\omega$  μεγάλου· χρέος γὰρ μόνη διὰ  $\sigma$  μικροῦ, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ μεγάλου· οἷον ὑπόχρεως· κακόχρεως· ἀξιόχρεως.

Διδάσκω καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν διδάσκομαι· τὰ εἰς  $\kappa\omega$  λήγοντα ῥήματα ὅσα ἐνδέχεται ἀναδιπλασιασμὸν μέλλοντα οὐ δέχεται.

Βουλὴ  $\gamma$ · τὴν ἄθροισιν

Βουλὴν δὲ πρῶτον μεγαθύμων ἶξε γερόντων (Il. B. 53.)  
τὴν γνώμην

<sup>69</sup> MS. ὁ θεός.

<sup>70</sup> MS. εὐκαιρως.



Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλὴ (Il. A. 5.)  
καὶ τὴν θέλησιν

Θέτιδος δ' ἐξήνυσε βουλὰς (Il. Θ. 370.)

Πέττω τὸ πίπτω ἄχρηστον, καὶ παντὰ ἐνεργητικὰ ὁ μέλλων πέσῃ· καὶ Δωρικῶς πεσῶ· καὶ ὁ μέσος μέλλων πεσοῦμαι· πεσῇ· πεσεῖται

Λέγω ὅτι εὖρηται θέλω καὶ ἐθέλω· τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ θέλω γίνεται ὁ παρακείμενος “τεθέλησθαι” ἀπὸ συμφώνου ἀρχόμενος· καὶ τὸν ἐνεστώτα θέλει ἔσχεν ἀπὸ συμφώνου ἀρχόμενον· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐθέλω τρισυλλάβου γίνεται τὸ ἤθελα· μηδεὶς οὖν οἶεσθω γίνεσθαι τὸ θέλω δισυλλάβον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐθέλω τρισυλλάβου, ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ  $\bar{\epsilon}$ · τὸ ἐθέλω δὲ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ θέλω· τοῦ  $\bar{\epsilon}$  πλεονάσαντος ἐπεὶ κανὼν ἐστὶν ὁ λέγων· τὰ εἰς  $\bar{\omega}$  [ $\bar{\lambda\omega}$ ] λήγοντα ῥήματα τῷ  $\bar{\epsilon}$  παραληγόμενα ὑπερβαίνοντα τὴν δισυλλαβίαν εἰ μὴ καὶ ἕτερον  $\bar{\lambda}$  προηγούμενον ἔχει, περισπῶνται· οἷον ὠφελῶ· ἀμελῶ· συντελῶ· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὑπερβαίνουνσι τὴν δισυλλαβίαν, βαρύνονται· οἷον θέλω· μέλλω καὶ τὰ ὅμοια.

Ἐπὶ τῶν μεγάλων προσώπων ἐφ' ὧν ἐδόκει βαρὺ τὸ φανερώς προστάττειν ἐχρῶντο οἱ Ἀττικοὶ εὐκτικῶ μετὰ τοῦ  $\bar{\alpha}\nu$  ὡς Εὐριπίδης ἐν τῷ  $\beta^{\omega}$  δράματι.

Κλύοις  $\bar{\alpha}\nu$  Φοῖβε προστατήριε <sup>71</sup>  
ἀντὶ ἐπάκουε.

Ὅτι εἰσὶ παρακείμενοι οἵτινες ἐπισημείωσιν ἐνεστώτων λαμβάνονται αἰεὶ, ὡς ὁ δέδορκα· δέδοικα· πέφρικα· εἰσὶ δὲ ἄλλοι οἵτινες αἰεὶ ἐπὶ παρεληλυθότος λαμβάνονται· ὡς τὸ πέπονθα καὶ πεποίηκα· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι οἵτινες ἐνίστε μὲν ἐπὶ ἐνεστώτος ἐνίστε δὲ ἐπὶ παρεληλυθότος.

Ἀλλὰ ἐνίστε μὲν συμπλεκτικὸν λέγεται ἐπὶ ἀναιρέσει τινὸς καὶ συστάσει ἑτέρου· οἷον οὐκ ἐστὶ τόδε ἀλλὰ τόδε· καὶ ὅτε ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ ἑτερον ἐπάγεται νοούμενον ἑτέρας ἀναιρέσεως· ἐστὶν τόδε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τόδε· καὶ ἀπλῶς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλῶς γινομένων· ὡς ἔχει τὸ “ἄσπιδα, φρῦνον, ὄφιν καὶ Λαδικεὺς· ἀλλὰ τὰς πινακίδας ἄθλιος ὁ Λαδικεὺς ἔχει λαβὼν” <sup>72</sup>. ἐνίστε δὲ ὁ ἀλλὰ ἐστὶ συλλογιστικὸς καὶ λέγεται ἐπὶ βεβαιώσει πράγματος ὡς ἐνταῦθα τοῦ Σοφοκλέους· “ἀλλ' ἢ μέμηνας” <sup>73</sup> καὶ ἀλλὰ μὴν τόδε ἐστίν.

<sup>71</sup> The quotation is from the *Electra* of Sophocles, v. 637 κλύοις  $\bar{\alpha}\nu$  ἤδη, Φοῖβε προστατήριε.

<sup>72</sup> This seems to be a quotation from some comic writer.

<sup>73</sup> From the *Electra*, v. 879.



Before we restore the MS. from which we have made the above extracts, to its shelf, we may observe that it has other excerpta from Herodian, (fol. 355.) on the declensions of nouns and the conjugations of verbs; the same which Professor Hermann has published in his *Rat. Emend. Gr.* and which we know from Baridini's Catalogue to exist in the Florence Library. Fol. 310. Κανόνες ἄρρενικῶν καὶ θηλυκῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων ὀνομάτων ἐκ τῶν τοῦ Ἀπολλωνίου καὶ ἐτέρων σοφῶν συλλεχθέντες. These appear to be extracts from the Etymologicon M. They begin with the words Ἀβλῆτα. Ἀγαν. Ἀγη. Ἀγυιὰ Ἀγχι. Ἀδολέσχης. &c. the last in the letter A is ἀψὶς. The first in B is Βαλανεῖον which word is very different from that in the Etym. M. The extracts conclude with Βελλεροφόντης. Fol. 342. Phrynichus Eclog. Φρύνιχος Κορνηλιανῶ εὖ πράττειν ἐκοντὴν οὐ χρὴ λέγειν, and ending with αἰχμαλωτισθῆναι τοῦθ' οὕτως ἀδόκιμον ὥς μήδε Μένανδρον αὐτῷ χρήσασθαι· διαλύων οὖν λέγε αἰχμάλωτος γενέσθαι<sup>74</sup>. Fol. 272. A small portion of the Lexicon of Harpocraton, beginning with Ἀβαρις and ending with Ἀνεχαίτισε. Fol. 244. We have the πάθη λέξεως Τρύφωνος. Fol. 247. ἕτερα πάθη λέξεως and Fol. 248. τοῦ Τρύφωνος περὶ τρόπων, which latter treatise is very different from that published under the same grammarian's name in the first volume of the Cambridge Museum Criticum; and subsequently under the title of Anonymi de Tropis, by Passow and Schneider in the Museum Criticum Vratislaviense 1825. The following extracts will serve to shew this.

Τοῦ Τρύφωνος περὶ Τρόπων

Τοῦ λόγου εἰς εἶδη μεριζομένου, τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ κυριολογία, τὸ δὲ τρόπος· κυριολογία μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ἡ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν λέξεων τετυχυῖα φράσις· τότε γὰρ οἰκείως προσφέροντο ἂν τις ὅταν μὴ παρατραπή τοῦ κυρίως λεγομένου· οἷον· πύξ μὲν ἐνίκησα Ἰφικλον δὲ πόδεσσι παρέδραμον ἐσθλὸν ἑόντα.

<sup>74</sup> The Baroccian MS. 159 contains among other extracts from Phrynichus the two following glosses which do not appear in the printed editions. Πάπυρος· τὸ ἀφράτ· οὕτω λέγουσιν Αἰγύπτιοι· ἡμεῖς δὲ βύβλον ἐρουῦμεν ὅθεν καὶ βύβλους τῶν γραφῶν λέγομεν ὅτι πρότοῦ εὐρεθῆναι τοὺς χαρτοὺς ἐν τοῖς παπύροις ἔγραφον οἱ παλαιοί.

Πυρία· τοῦτο τάσσουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ βαλανείῳ πυέλου· ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐτυμολογίαν ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρούσθαι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐστὶ δόκιμον, πυέλους γὰρ οἱ Ἀττικοὶ καλοῦσιν ἀλλ' οὐ πυρίας.



Τρόπος δέ ἐστι λέξεως φράσις ἐκ τῆς καθ' ἑαυτὴν ὅπως οὖν ιδιότητος μετατροπὴν εἰληφυῖα· διὸ καὶ τρόπος καλεῖται· παρείληπται δὲ ἦτοι χρείας ἔνεκα ἢ κόσμου περὶ τὴν φράσιν· τρόποι δὲ εἰσιν εἰκοσί ἑξ· Ἀλληγορία· Μεταφορὰ· Κατάχρησις· Μετάληψις· Ὑπερβατὸν· Ἀναστροφὴ· Συνεκδοχὴ· Ὀνοματοποιΐα· Μετωνυμία· Περίφρασις· Πλεονασμὸς· Παραπλήρωμα· Ἐλλειψις· Ὑπερβολὴ· Εἰρωνεία· Σαρκασμὸς· Ἀστεϊσμὸς· Ἀντίφρασις· Ἐναντίωσις· Ἀντωνομασία· Ἀμφιβολία· Σύλληψις· Αἶνιγμα· Ἐπαύξησις· Ἐξοχή· Ὑστερολογία.

Ἀλληγορία ἐστὶ φράσις ἕτερον μὲν τοι δηλοῦσα· ἕτερον δὲ ἔννοιαν παριστῶσα· τότε δὲ καταχρῶνται δεόντως τῇ Ἀλληγορίᾳ· ὅταν ἢ δι' εὐλάβειαν ἢ δι' αἰσχύνην οὐ δύνωνται φανερώς ἀπαγγεῖλαι· ὃν τρόπον παρὰ Καλλιμάχῳ ἐν Ἰάμβοις· τὸ πῦρ ὅπερ ἐνέκαυσας πολλὴν πρόσω κέχρηκε φλόγα· ἴσχε δὲ δρόμον μαργοῦντας ἵππους· ταῦτα γὰρ οὐ κυρίως εἴρηται· οὐ πυρὸς οὐ δὲ ἵπποδρομῖος ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ αἰδούμενος ἐκδήλως ἥλλαξε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς θρασυτήτος.

It appears from the notes to Bp Blomfield's Callimachus, that the Leyden MS. from which he gives the above fragment nearly agrees with the Baroccian<sup>75</sup>. Omitting the sections on Metaphor, Catachresis and Metalepsis, the examples of which are almost all taken from Homer, though different from those of the Cambridge MS., I pass on to the Hyperbaton for the sake of the quotation from Simonides.

Ὑπερβατὸν ἐστὶ φράσις ἀναμέσον τῶν ἐξῆς ἔχουσα, γίνεται δὲ τὰ ὑπερβατὰ, ἐν εἴδεσι δυσὶν· εἴτε ἐν λέξει οἶον· πάντα περίτροχος ὀρώρει θεσπιδᾶες, πῦρ, λάϊνον<sup>76</sup> τὸ γὰρ ἐξῆς οὕτως ἔχει· πάντα γὰρ περίτροχος ὀρώρει θεσπιδᾶες πῦρ λάϊνον· ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν συνθέτοις λέξεσιν Ὑπερβατὰ γινόμενα· οἶον

Νήπιοι, οἱ κατὰ βούς Ὑπερίονος Ἡελίοιο

Ἡσθιον; (Od. A. 8.)

ἀντὶ τοῦ κατήσθιον· τὰ δὲ ἐν λόγῳ γινόμενα ἔχει οὕτω παρ' Ὀμήρῳ.

<sup>75</sup> The Leyden MS. reads μὲν τι for μέντοι; δύνονται for δύνωνται; προσακέχρηκε for πρόσω κέχρηκε; μαργοῦντος ἵππου for μαργοῦντας ἵππους; ἐστὶ λόγος for ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος; ἐκδηλοῦν ἤλεγξε for ἐκδήλως ἥλλαξε.

<sup>76</sup> Il. M. 177. Πάντη γὰρ περὶ τεῖχος ὀρώρει θεσπιδᾶες πῦρ  
Λάϊνον.



Ὡς ἔφατ' Ἀργεῖοι δὲ μέγ' ἰαχον, ἀμφὶ δὲ νῆες  
 Σμερδαλέον κονάβησαν ἀϋσάντων ὑπ' Ἀχαιῶν  
 Μῦθον ἐπαινέσαντες Ὀδυσσῆος θείοιο. (Il. B. 333.)

τὸ γὰρ ἐξῆς οὕτως ἀποδίδοται ὡς ἔφατ' Ἀργεῖοι δὲ μέγ' ἰαχον μῦθον ἐπαινέσαντες. Ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ ἐν συλλαβαῖς Ὑπερβατὰ πεποιήκασιν ὡς καὶ Σιμωνίδης ἐν ἐπιγράμμασιν. “Ἐρμῆν τόνδ' ἀνέθηκε Δημήτριος ὄρθια δ' οὐκ ἐν προθύροις”<sup>77</sup> ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐκ ὄρθια δέ.

Αἰνιγμά ἐστι φράσις διάνοιαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην καὶ σύνθετον πειρωμένη ποιεῖν ὡς τὰ παρ' Ἡσιόδῳ παρὰ [περὶ] τῆς κύλικος λεγόμενα

Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δαιτὸς μὲν εἴσης ἐξ ἔρον ἔντο  
 οἶον “οὐ μητέρα μητρὸς ἄγοντο ἄζαλέην καὶ ὀπταλέην” ἐπεὶ  
 δοκεῖ πρῶτον μὲν ξηραίνεσθαι εἶτα ὀπτᾶσθαι· ἐφ' ἐτέροισι  
 τέκεσι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ τέκνοισι· λέγει δὲ τοῖς ξένοισι [ξύλοισι] τὸ  
 δὲ τεθνάναι καθὸ δοκεῖ ἐκ τῆς ὕλης ἐκκεκόφθαι. This fragment without the aid of the Leyden or other MSS. must I fear remain in every sense of the word an enigma.

I. A. C.

<sup>77</sup> The quotation ought seemingly to stand thus :

Ἐρμῆν τόν δ' ἀνέθηκε [Δημήτριος] ὄρθια δ' οὐκ ἦν  
 ἐν προθύροις.



## ON ANCIENT GREEK MUSIC.

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IT is perhaps not far from correct to say, that Greece, as in many other points, so especially in the arts, was set forth as a pattern to mankind. For in no country has the love of beauty been so extensively predominant, or the true principles of art so generally exemplified; and here first in the history of the world sprung up those germs of excellence in all that ennobles and refines our nature, which the great spirits of succeeding ages have ever been employed in developing. And as in the first birth of every thing else, so here also, there is a peculiar beauty to which no after imitation can attain: and a native charm that may never be renewed. We have built upon the foundations which were then laid, and have raised some goodly structures: but I think we have found that the nearer we approach the primitive and severe magnificence, the nearer we also approach true principles of art—that in proportion as we strictly and religiously adhere to the old patterns and rules, just in that proportion we attain to the stature of the ancient worthies by whom those patterns were given; and succeed in imitating the simple beauty and fitness of the masterworks from which those rules were formed.

Now in almost all the arts this has been attempted, and with various success. The success has been various because the proper course has not been always undeviatingly pursued: and because the materials, and likewise the genius of the artists, have been various. In some arts also the attempt has been carried further than in others, according as the peculiar nature of each seemed to admit it. And I think I may safely say that those arts which have been most, and most successfully followed up in this way, have been the most prolific in masterworks of beauty. The artist has taken his stand upon the ancient and excellent simplicity,



and from thence as a starting-post has followed the dictates of his genius. And one of the great advantages of this is, that he is rendered independent of all those circumstances which have at various periods tended to corrupt and deprave his art: he does not view it through the medium of these, but goes to its best and purest development, and learns it there. Now I find that of all the arts music is the one which has been least treated in this spirit. When this first struck me, I naturally became anxious to enquire whether it had arisen from any thing inherent in the art itself which has distinguished it from others in unfitting it for this treatment, or whether it be not from some culpable and unartist-like neglect in ourselves, that we have not followed in our musical studies those rules by which all other art is guided.

I think I have satisfied myself in the investigation, which of these two is the right answer as far as the ancient Greek music is concerned. In order to satisfy our readers also, it will be necessary for me to justify, in this particular branch of art, the principles which I have laid down concerning art in general; to shew that this is of the same kind and to be treated according to the same laws: and to make it at least probable that the proficiency of the ancient Greeks in music was such as might have been expected from their excellence in the other arts.

As the enquiry whether the ancients were acquainted with counterpoint, i. e. playing and singing in parts, closely concerns my present subject, I hope I may be excused if I enter somewhat at length into its bearings, and endeavour to justify the conclusion at which I have myself arrived.

In the absence of any treatise which can be supposed to lay down rules for playing or singing in parts, the advocates of the affirmative side of the question have grounded their opinion on some scattered passages which seem to imply a knowledge of counterpoint.

One of the most important occurs in Plato de Legg. lib. VII. § 16.

Τούτων τοίνυν δεῖ χάριν τοῖς φθογγοῖς τῆς λύρας προσχρῆσθαι, σαφηνείας ἕνεκα τῶν χορδῶν, τὸν τε κιθαριστὴν καὶ τὸν παιδευόμενον, ἀποδιδόντας πρόσχορδα τὰ φθέγματα τοῖς φθέγμασι· τὴν δὲ ἑτεροφωνίαν καὶ ποικιλίαν τῆς λύρας, ἄλλα



μὲν μέλη τῶν χορδῶν ἰεισῶν, ἄλλα δὲ τοῦ τήν μελωδίαν ξυνθέντος ποιητοῦ, καὶ δὴ καὶ πυκνότητι μανότητι καὶ τάχος βραδύτητι καὶ ὀξύτητα βαρύτητι ξύμφωνον καὶ ἀντίφωνον παρεχομένους, καὶ τῶν ῥυθμῶν ὡσαύτως παντοδαπὰ ποικίλματα προσαρμόττοντας τοῖσι φθόγγοις τῆς λύρας· πάντα οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ προσφέρειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐν τρισὶν ἔτεσι τὸ τῆς μουσικῆς χρήσιμον ἐκλήψεσθαι διὰ τάχους.

Now in order to understand this passage it will be necessary to ascertain as nearly as we can, the precise meaning of the terms made use of in it. *ἑτεροφωνία* is explained by being opposed to *πρόσχορδα τὰ φθέγματα τοῖς φθέγμασι*, and clearly indicates that the sounds of the voice and lyre were different, the nature of which difference is determined by what follows, “the strings uttering one *strain*, and the composer who arranged the song another:” it therefore cannot mean merely the repetition of the same strain in different octaves. *ποικιλία* is explained by *πυκνότης*, “frequency of notes” sounding together with *μανότης*, “infrequency,” i. e. the striking of notes here and there on the lyre during a continued strain of the voice; by quick notes in the one answering to slow in the other, and high notes in one to low in the other. To *ποικιλία* also are referred the *παντοδαπὰ ποικίλματα τῶν ῥυθμῶν*, “all sorts of subtle combinations of the cadences<sup>1</sup>;” I would then take *ποικιλία* to include all the ornaments, such as appoggiaturas, &c. which the performer on the lyre introduced while the voice sung the simple strain.

There is a paper on this passage in the *Histoire de l'Academie des Inscriptions*, Vol. III. p. 118, by M. Burette, who contends that what we call counterpoint is not intended here. He says this *ἑτεροφωνία* and *ποικιλία* might take place in four ways; 1. By the performer on the lyre sounding the same strain as the voice, but playing in a flowery and artificial style. 2. By the voice singing in a different *mode* from that in which the lyre was playing, as for instance the lyre playing in the Lydian mode and the voice singing in the Dorian, which was a third above. 3. By the lyre and voice being pitched in different octaves. 4. By the voice

<sup>1</sup> ῥυθμός ἐστι σύστημα ἐκ χρόνων κατὰ τινα τάξιν συγκειμένων. Aristides Quintilianus, lib. I. p. 31. Ed. Meibom.



and lyre answering one another alternatively, either with the same or different strains, as in our preludes, ritornellos, and rondos<sup>2</sup>.

Now with respect to the first of these, I do not think the distinction which Plato makes between the μέλη will allow it. For μέλος certainly means the strain or air of the song, which Plato says was different in the lyric and vocal music, but which M. Burette's first supposition makes to be the same. The like objection applies in some measure to his second; for although the lyre and voice would sound in different modes, the strains would be essentially the same, by which sameness of strain I mean that the notes would be synchronous, and would proceed by the same intervals. But there are other and weightier objections to it: for Meibomius (p. 35) quotes passages which shew that "not only did not the ancients employ the thirds and sixths<sup>3</sup> as a part of their antiphonia<sup>4</sup> or their paraphonia, but that even so late as Bryennius and Psellus, writers of the middle ages, they had not come into use." Now as a concert in two modes, one a third above the other, implies both these concords, I do not see how the ἑτεροφωνία can be interpreted in this manner. Of his third hypothesis I have disposed already. His fourth may undoubtedly be true, but it is not all the truth: for if it were, what does Plato mean by joining ζύμφωνον with ἀντίφωνον<sup>5</sup>?

From all these considerations it seems to me that the passage must be interpreted to imply something very analogous to our counterpoint. On this explanation the πυκνότης

<sup>2</sup> I should not have noticed M. Burette's suppositions after Burney's remarks on them (Vol. i. pp. 137—143) had not I seen their untenableness in a somewhat different light, and had not some mistakes of Burney's (as for example that respecting ἀντίφωνος in p. 143) made me desirous to refute them upon what I considered more correct grounds.

<sup>3</sup> μελωδεῖται μὲν γὰρ τοῦ διὰ τεσσάρων ἐλάττω διαστήματα πολλὰ, διάφωνα μέντοι πάντα· τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐλάχιστον κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φωνῆς φύσιν ὥρισταί. Aristoxenus Harmon. p. 20. Ed. Meibom.

<sup>4</sup> He means symphonia. See note 5.

<sup>5</sup> Besides which M. Burette has mistaken the meaning of ἀντίφωνον. For Aristotle, Prob. xxxix. 19, says τὸ μὲν ἀντίφωνον σύμφωνον ἐστὶ διὰ πασῶν· ἐκ παίδων γὰρ, νέων, καὶ ἀνδρῶν γίνεται τὸ ἀντίφωνον· i. e. Antiphony is symphony, by octaves; for it arises from (the mingled voices of) children, youths, and men. So that it bore no resemblance to the antiphonies of the Romish church service, which are responsive strains, sung alternately by the priest and the people.



μανότητι, τάχος βραδύτητι, and ὀξύτης βαρύτητι ξύμφωνος καὶ ἀντίφωνος, become very simple of explanation: the first alluding to the sounding of a continuous strain by one part, while another struck in here and there at intervals; the second and third to the sounding of a long fundamental note in one part, the base for instance, while the treble uttered a strain of quick notes in consonance to it.

Almost all the other passages which are quoted on this side of the question may, I think, be satisfactorily explained upon the supposition that the performers sung and played in different octaves; and cannot therefore be brought to bear on either side<sup>6</sup>.

But there are one or two remarkable expressions in the Problems of Aristotle which appear to me decisive. One is in the problem quoted in Note 5:

διὰ τί ηἰδιὸν ἐστὶ τὸ σύμφωνον τοῦ ὁμοφώνου; ἢ καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀντίφωνον, σύμφωνόν ἐστι διὰ πασῶν· ἐκ παίδων γὰρ, νέων καὶ ἀνδρῶν, γίνεται τὸ ἀντίφωνον· οἱ διεστᾶσι τοῖς τόνοις, ὡς νήτη πρὸς τὴν ὑπάτην. συμφωνία δὲ πᾶσα, ἡδίων ἀπλοῦ φθόγγου· δι' αὐτὴν δὲ εἴρηται, καὶ τούτων ἢ διὰ πασῶν ἡδίστη.

Here we have a clear distinction between symphony in general and that by octaves in particular; and because that by octaves was the most agreeable of all symphonies, he says that the *μαγαδῖς*, which was a treble instrument, two strings of which were played in concert, was tuned in octaves rather than in any other intervals.

It appears then that the consonances of the Greeks were confined to that of the octaves (τὸ διὰ πασῶν) that of the fifths (τὸ διὰ πέντε) and that of the fourths (τὸ διὰ τεσσάρων). Now all musicians know that two consonances of fifths in succession are intolerable to the ear, as also are two of

<sup>6</sup> Such are the passages of Longinus de Sublim. c. xxiv.; the lines of Horace,

Sonante mistum tibiis carmen lyrâ

Hac Dorium, illis Barbarum.

ΕΡΟΔ. ix. 5.

(the Hyperphrygian and Hypodorian modes being octaves to one another); the passages quoted by Sir J. Hawkins from Aristotle, Vol. i. p. 267.

μουσική δὲ ὀξεῖς ἅμα καὶ βαρεῖς, μακροὺς τε καὶ βραχεῖς φθόγγους μίξασα, ἐν διαφόροις φωναῖς μίαν ἀπετέλεσεν ἁρμονίαν.

καθάπερ δὲ ἐν χορῷ κορυφαίου κατάρξαντος, συνεπηχεῖ πᾶς ὁ χόρος ἀνδρῶν ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ γυναικῶν ἐν διαφόραις φωναῖς ὀξυτέrais καὶ βαρυτέrais μίαν.



fourths, although the effect of the latter is somewhat less harsh than that of the former. The introduction of consecutive fifths or fourths in a composition would be a great bar in the way of a musician's fame.

How imperfect then must that harmony have been, which using only these consonances besides the octave, was forbidden by a correct ear to employ either of them twice successively; and how still more imperfect that which in defiance of the dictates of the natural ear, played strains in consecutive fourths and fifths. Well indeed might Aristotle enquire (Prob. XIX. § 16) *διὰ τί ἡδίων τὸ ἀντίφωνον* (symphony by octaves), *τοῦ συμφώνου* (symphony by fourths and fifths), whichever of the two last-mentioned methods of concert their harmonists adopted.

It seems then pretty evident that we are not to look for the skill of the Greeks, or the effects recorded of their music, in counterpoint, or the mingling of consonant sounds, but in the themes or airs of musical passages. And I find that it is to these that the attention is principally directed in their musical treatises.

While modern notions of proficiency are almost wholly confined to the knowledge of the laws of harmony, the ancient musicians studied rather how to become masters of musical sentiment and expression. Which of these two is the true artist-like method of cultivating music I need hardly enquire<sup>7</sup>. That both ought to unite in an excellent musician, of course

<sup>7</sup> That the ancients really did consider the subject in this way will appear by the following quotations from Aristoxenus; Harmonic, p. 39.

οὐ γὰρ ὅτι πέρας τῆς ἀρμονικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶν ἡ παρασημαντικὴ, ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ μέρος οὐδέν. εἰ μὴ καὶ τῆς μετρικῆς, τὸ γράψασθαι τῶν μέτρων ἕκαστον. εἰ δ' ὥς περ ἐπὶ τούτων οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, τὸν δυνάμενον γράψασθαι τὸ ἱαμβικόν, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μελωδουμένων. οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν γραψάμενον τὸ φρύγιον μέλος, καὶ εἰδέναι τί ἐστὶ τὸ φρύγιον μέλος.

And p. 40, speaking of persons who held *πέρας τῆς ἀρμονικῆς ἐπιστήμης εἶναι τὴν παρασημαντικὴν*, after having said that if they held it through ignorance, that ignorance must be *ἰσχυρά τις καὶ μεγάλη*, he adds:

εἰ δὲ συννορῶντες ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ παρασημαίνεσθαι πέρας τῆς εἰρημένης ἐπιστήμης, χαριζόμενοι δὲ τοῖς ἰδιώταις, καὶ πειρώμενοι ἀποδιδόναι ὀφθαλμοειδές τι ἔργον, ταύτην ἐκτεθείκασιν τὴν ὑπόληψιν· μεγάλην αὐθις αὐτῶν ἀτοπίαν τοῦ τρόπου καταγνοίην. πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι κριτὴν οἶονται δεῖν κατασκευάζειν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν τὸν ἰδιώτην. κ.τ.λ.

The whole of this part of the treatise is very interesting. See also on this subject Sir Joshua Reynolds, Disc. IV. p. 49. (Sharpe's edit.)



I do not deny: but surely the results of the one course of study are mean and insignificant when compared with those of the other; and this will more especially appear if we consider, that the effects produced on those who hear astonishing specimens of harmonical skill tend universally to produce admiration of the composer; whereas in listening to beautiful strains, we forget the artist, and are acted on by the admiration of beauty—to accomplish which is the true end of all art. The musician in the former case seems to me to resemble a sculptor, who, because the position of every statue must agree with the laws of statical equilibrium, should so frame his group as that the wonder should be how the whole was supported; whereas in the latter case the artist throws all subordinate things into the background (no matter how much of his labour and skill may be thus lost on his spectators), and studies to make beauty, and beauty alone, appear in his performance.

Let us then examine the Grecian music in this point of view.

Of the effects universally ascribed to the ancient Greek music it will be needless to speak at any length, for they are well known, and recorded as well by judicious and sober historians<sup>8</sup> as by authors who might have been inclined to magnify them. I shall therefore content myself with one quotation from the remaining musical works of Euclid, which tends particularly to shew of what nature those effects were, and how they were produced<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>8</sup> See especially the digression on the Cynætheans in the fourth book of Polybius.

<sup>9</sup> Out of about thirty Greek musical treatises enumerated by Fabricius, only seven have come down to us. Among these, it is true, we have three of the principal and most valued: that of Aristoxenus, a disciple of Aristotle, that of Euclid the geometer, and that of Nicomachus the Pythagorean. The first person who collected these very valuable works, and brought their text to a readable degree of purity, was the learned Meibomius, who flourished in Sweden in the middle of the 17th century.

The opening of Meibomius's preface is worth quoting:

“I have endeavoured to restore in these authors the ancient music, which from its very name and its antiquity deserves our veneration. Whoever admires the profound contemplation of the ancients and their divine inventions in the other arts, may here look for new specimens of the same. I am well aware that the very title of my work will deter from the perusal the common herd of musicians, who seek not ancient authors on music, but new ones: and find, in sooth, enough of them—enough patchers together of new-fangled errors and monstrous opinions—which particularly appears when they



Euclid has left two musical treatises, one on Harmonics, the other on the Canon. Both these are characteristic of the author of the Elements; with however this difference—that the purely mathematical nature of the Elements kept out of view any prominent marks of an individual mind, whereas in these treatises we see things subjected to the rule of systematized opinion—concerned indeed with definitions and axioms and postulates, but from the nature of the subject, less precise and restricted than the Elements. The following passage occurs in the Harmonics:

Κατὰ δὲ μελοποιίαν γίνεται μεταβολή, ὅταν ἐκ διασταλτικοῦ ἤθους εἰς συσταλτικόν, ἢ ἡσυχαστικόν, ἢ ἐξ ἡσυχαστικοῦ εἰς τι τῶν λοιπῶν ἢ μεταβολὴ γένηται. ἐστὶ δὲ διασταλτικόν μὲν γένος μελοποιίας, δι' οὗ σημαίνεται μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ διάρμα ψυχῆς ἀνδρῶδες, καὶ πράξεις ἡρωϊκαί, καὶ πάθη τούτοις οἰκεῖα. χρῆται δὲ τούτοις μάλιστα μὲν ἢ τράγωδία, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ ὅσα τούτου ἔχεται τοῦ χαρακτῆρος. συσταλτικόν δὲ, δι' οὗ συνάγεται ἢ ψυχὴ εἰς ταπεινότητα καὶ ἄνανδρον διάθεσιν. ἀρμόσει δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον κατὰστημα τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς πάθεσι καὶ θρήνοις, καὶ οἰκτοῖς καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις. ἡσυχαστικόν δὲ ἡθὺς ἐστὶ μελοποιίας, ᾧ παρέπεται ἡρεμότης ψυχῆς, καὶ κατὰστημα ἐλευθέριόν τε καὶ εἰρηνικόν. ἀρμόσουσι δὲ αὐτῷ ὕμνοι, παιᾶνες, ἐγκώμια, συμβουλαί, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια. p. 21. Ed. Meibom.

Now this passage, coming as it does from a book which is not speculative or fanciful but purely scientific, shews I think very plainly in what way the art of music was at that time studied, and what were the effects attributed to it by men who were not fable-makers or compilers of marvellous stories, but close and judicious reasoners.

Now if any one should suspect that these effects and the like of them, were not so likely to be produced by the bare sounding of so many notes which were exactly alike and in unison, as by the interweaving of many parts, and the mazing and dazzling power of a rich system of harmonies, I can only refer him to the times when such effects have

set about explaining the work of the ancients. For when with the utmost stretch of their genius they cannot comprehend them, they call them, after the modern fashion, barbarians. And if any one happens to think that the ancients were elegant and well skilled in every part of music, he is accounted by them inelegant, and a foolish enthusiast in admiration of the Greeks."



been produced on himself, and appeal to him to say whether it has not generally been by old and simple melodies: whether the poet who has recorded in strains that never can be forgotten, how he “won his bright and beauteous bride,” did not well when he

“played a soft and doleful air  
And sung an old and moving story,  
An old rude song”——

I would ask such persons whether the parts of pieces of music which are most powerful over their minds are not those in which some *air* is brought prominently forward which takes hold on their memories—and whether those strong associations, by which things far distant and various are bound fast in one, are not called forth by the bare hearing of (it may be) but two or three notes of the air, in which the connecting spirit lies. I think they cannot deny this: and if so they must admit that the powerful agent in these matters is the musical sentiment, and not (if I may so call it) the musical machinery. I cannot forbear quoting as mighty authority in these points, the words of Marcello, one of the greatest and truest musicians that the world has seen. He says, in the preface to his Psalms;

“With regard to my music, it is adapted to a subject which requires principally the expression of the words and the sentiments; hence it is for the most part composed for two voices only, in order to produce more happily the effect intended. It was for the same purpose, and to move the passions and affections only, that music was made use of by the ancients in unisons simply, particularly by the Hebrews, Phœnicians and Greeks. And though it was sung by many and various kinds of voices, yet till the time of Guido Are-tino, who lived about the eleventh century, the air was one and the same through all the parts; sometimes accompanied with one instrument, sometimes with another; which sounded the air or vocal part itself; and both the vocal and instrumental were no otherwise diversified than by taking the tone or pitch above or below; it should be also observed that harmony, which is understood by the moderns to imply a various mixture of voices and instruments, was anciently no other than a progression of sounds, various indeed in respect



of their simple or compound intervals, yet the *same* considered in unison. Such was their Melopœia. But in our days the ear being accustomed to the harmonic arrangement of many parts, the attempts to approach too nearly to that most happy and simple melody of the ancients might prove no less difficult than dangerous, it was therefore judged not improper to compose for two, sometimes for three and four parts, as may be seen in the following volumes.

“After all, it must be confessed, this kind of composition, which may be rather termed an ingenious counterpoint than natural melody, is more likely to excite the admiration of the learned enquirer who examines it in writing, than to affect the heart and move the passions of those who hear it in the performance. And this arises, as well from the perpetual conflict of fugues or imitations in the different parts, as from the multiplicity of mixed harmonies which accompany them in order to fill and complete the chorus; and these in fact are not<sup>10</sup> real harmonies, according to the undeniable geometric and arithmetical experiments made by the ancient Greek philosophers, who have discovered a profound skill in investigating whatever is truly excellent in this science. On the other hand it is most certain that during a long series of time new laws both in theory and practice were continually added; to which at this time we must entirely submit, although far different from those ancient rules which produced in their music those marvellous effects fully attested by historians both sacred and profane; who inform us likewise of the magnificent uses and sacred purposes to which it was applied.

“Those who imagine that simplicity was a defect in the ancient music are greatly deceived; since it was in fact one of its noblest perfections. It cannot indeed be doubted that by multiplying instruments and voices we have rendered our compositions, in comparison with those of the ancients, full of ornament and beauty of another kind: more laboured, by reason of the many subjects of which they are composed; more harmonious by the diversity of voices and the various combinations of concords and discords which must neces-

<sup>10</sup> See below, note 11.



sarily follow in their construction; and more full and sonorous by the many different instruments united in concert which accompany them. But the simple and unadorned music of the ancients, which according to the divine Plato consisted not in harmony but in unisons, did produce in a better manner its proper effect of moving the passions: for the philosopher judged that the graces and affected delicacies of harmony enervated and broke the manliness and strength of the art; and that therefore this plain and simple music was more agreeable to nature.

“If the ancients, as it is said, had various instruments and various kinds of voices which proceeded according to the various properties of their systems and genera (one of which genera<sup>11</sup>, the most powerful to excite the passions, and the most perfect ornament of them all, is quite lost in the present harmonic construction of music) it must however be supposed that their songs, voices, and instruments did not confound the words or perplex the sense; and though they sung in a numerous chorus, and sometimes in harmony, yet was each word distinctly pronounced by each singer at the same moment; nor were there heard any confused repetitions in vain passages; every interval or note, in its minutest difference, being sensibly felt and enjoyed; nor was one made ever mixed with another but with the utmost care and art, lest one passion might be raised instead of

<sup>11</sup> Marcello alludes to the *Enharmonic*, which ascended and descended by the interval of a *Diesis* or quarter-tone; an interval which very few ears now-a-days can distinguish, and no voice can accurately divide. It is evident then that we must have lost much of the distinctive power in melody which the ancients had; and this appears to me to have been occasioned by accustoming our ears to hear with complacency chords which contain what ought to be intolerable discords. My musical readers will better understand my meaning by an example.

In the common chord of C, we have sounding together C, E, and G. Now as every note vibrates, together with itself, its twelfth and seventeenth, we have sounding together, the twelfth and seventeenth of C, which are G and E two octaves above; those of E, which are B and G  $\sharp$  likewise two octaves above; and those of G, which are D and B likewise two octaves above. Thus we have in the fundamental chord of C the following intolerable discords; G and G  $\sharp$  together, C and D together, D and E together and B and C together. I have recognized the presence of the G and G  $\sharp$  frequently, by listening intently to a common chord on an organ.

Aristoxenus says of this genus even in ancient times,

. . . . τρίτον δὲ καὶ ἀνώτατον, τὸ ἐναρμόνιον· τελευταίῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ μόλις  
μετὰ πολλοῦ πόνου συνεθίζεται ἢ αἰσθησις. Har. p. 19.



another; each particular passion having its proper mode, or melody, assigned to it. Now whoever seriously considers this will doubtless own that all these circumstances must concur to produce all the great effects of music; namely, to delight the ear, affect the heart, and to enliven and recreate the mind.

“But how far the present music may be destitute of these powers, either by the introduction of new laws, or perhaps by our negligence in the use and application of the powers themselves, may be easily perceived, when its *real* effects are compared with these mentioned above; for though it is copious in its harmonies and pleasing in its various movements, yet does it not even in the lowest degree produce any of the effects of the ancient music.

“This upon the whole is certain, that since those happy days, these internal passions have been raised and still are raised by music; but this is rather the effect of *melody* than of a combined and full harmony. We cannot however in any case expect these effects without an awakened attention in the hearer, and a mind free from tumultuous and unruly passions: now from the application and frequent use of this excellent cause, we may clearly derive the wonderful effects of ancient music. To attain the same end, we have found it necessary to use the same means in our present labours, as far as the received taste of our times would allow us. Thus much may be said, as well for the sake of truth, as for obtaining, if not some praise, at least some favourable excuse, that we have not in this work always introduced the present fashionable airy style (though we would not be thought to take upon us to reform it;) and that to support in some measure the true simplicity and manly gravity of the ancient style, we have sometimes transgressed against the elegancies of the modern.

“Men’s prejudices against music do not arise merely from the art itself, but it is often debased by mean and trivial words, which, instead of rendering it a subject of philosophical speculation by its magnificence and sublimity, produce a contrary effect, of little or no estimation—however pleasing it may be to some. And this abuse is not wholly confined to the theatre; but has even intruded into places



of sacred worship; where it is sometimes rather fitted to excite the soft and effeminate passions, than to fill the mind with an honest and calm delight—to regulate the manners—to revive courage—and to inspire us with an awful veneration for the Most High and his sacred laws. And for these purposes was this art learned and cultivated by the ancients; who by applying it to the great end for which it was given us by the Almighty, tasted in its utmost perfection. And to this we must attribute those wonderful effects mentioned above, when they sung the actions of their illustrious men, their triumphs, their public laws, tragedies, moral instructions, and the praises of their Gods. In order therefore to restore music to its ancient dignity and service, we have chosen the divine subject of the Psalms; and to render it again if not of equal efficacy with that of the ancients by reason of its different laws, at least more conformable to the sacred use for which it was principally intended: namely the worship of the Deity.”

Such are the words of this great man; and his compositions fully bear out what he here says. Most modern musicians blame him for want of variety, poverty of harmony, and neglect of ornament; but I am happy to be able to justify by what little experience I have had, an observation which I have heard, that generally the older musicians become the more their admiration of Marcello’s music increases<sup>12</sup>. Such men are rare in these days—perhaps (and that in an inferior degree) Jackson, of Exeter, is the only parallel which we can furnish to him. Handel was almost contemporary with Marcello. We owe much to him in every way—but less perhaps in this particular province than to those who are second only to him, Haydn and Mozart.

But I am departing from my subject when I ought to be hastening to close it in. My only wish is that all my

<sup>12</sup> There are two works of his which I much wish to see, since I think it probable that he developed in them his ideas of what ancient music was. One is a poem by Abate Conti, entitled “*Il Timoteo*” and set by him to music, founded on Dryden’s *Alexander’s Feast*; and the other a poem by himself in which Casandra prophesies the destruction of Troy after the manner of the Casandra in the *Agamemnon*, and which he composed purposely to have the opportunity of expressing the deeper and more unusual passions in musical language.



readers were musicians, that we might join and do our utmost to restore, as far as may be, this divine art to its old and pristine dignity.

But no one can hope to do much in the present degraded state of music. Till it is allowed its proper place in general education, it will not I fear be found desirable to restore it to its ancient simplicity. Musicians are, perhaps deservedly, held in a qualified contempt among us: the practice is discouraged, the study almost forbidden: the cultivation of a musical ear, even among those who are otherwise most anxious to cultivate all their faculties, is neglected and despised; our music is overladen with a multitude of burdensome and extraneous ornaments, variations, and accompaniments; and where are we to look for those simple and severe melodies which may appeal to the natural ear and the natural soul—where are we to find the means of “re-creating<sup>13</sup> and composing our travail’d spirits with the solemn and divine harmonies of musick heard or learnt, which if wise men and prophets be not extremely out, have great power over dispositions and manners to smooth and make them gentle from rustick harshness and distempered passions?” I own it appears to me that this can only be done by applying with energy to the study of the ancient music, of our own and of other nations, and especially that of the Greeks. And I hope I have not altogether failed in shewing that in so doing we shall not be unprofitably employed<sup>14</sup>.

<sup>13</sup> Milton, Letter on Education.

<sup>14</sup> There are very few specimens of the ancient Greek music extant; I would refer those who wish to satisfy themselves concerning the nature of its *strains* to one upon which I am content to rest all my chance of convincing them of its beauty; the original music of the opening of the first Pythian Ode of Pindar, set in modern notes in Burney’s Hist. of Music Vol. I. p. 106. Sir J. Hawkins’s Hist. of the Science and Practice of Music, Vol. I. p. 54. and in Boeckh’s Dissertation on the Metres of Pindar.



## DE SACERDOTIIS GRAECORUM AUGUSTI BOECKHII PROLUSIO ACADEMICA.

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IN religionibus veterum, imprimis Graecorum, pervestigandis quum studia doctorum ferveant quum maxime, neque ea res iis solis, qui antiquis litteris operam dant, videatur gravis esse, sed quisquis varium et multiplicem generis humani cultum, pietatis ac sapientiae incrementa et decrementa per aetatum vicissitudines saepe alternantia, cognoscere cupiat, philosophus, historicus, theologus, denique omnes, qui a liberali eruditione non alieni sunt, his quaestionibus advertant animos; haud metuendum videtur umbraticae doctrinae opprobrium, si aliquid nobis de Graecis sacerdotibus dicendum sumpserimus. Insignem enim quendam et hucusque parum cognitum sacerdotum constituendorum modum attulit vetustum monumentum, decretum publicum continens: quod antequam apponamus, quomodo vulgo apud Graecos constituti sacerdotes sint, paucis liceat praefari.

Igitur sacerdotia et sacra ministeria haud pauca, haud aliter ac regia dignitas, cui et ipsi sacerdotale sacrificiorum munus ex parte competebat, certis quibusdam gentibus ita fuerunt propria, ut non potuerit nisi ex illa gente sacerdos vel minister constitui: hujusmodi sacerdos dicitur *ἱερεὺς κατὰ γένος*, et *ἱερωσύνη* haec *πάτριος* et *πατρική*<sup>1</sup>. In quo genere notissimi sunt Athenis Eumolpidae et Ceryces ac Lycomidae<sup>2</sup>, ex quibus Eleusiniorum mysteriorum antistites et ministri, hierophantae, hieroceryces, daduchi lecti sunt, ut ex Phillidarum gente hierophantis creata est; Eteobutadae<sup>3</sup> qui Minervae Poliadis sacerdotem feminam, Thaulonidae, qui Diipoliorum popam (*βουτύπον*) praebebant; aliae Athenis

<sup>1</sup> Vide Plat. Legg. VI. p. 759. B. ubi cf. Ast. comment. ad Legg. VI, 7. p. 293.

<sup>2</sup> Horum stemma vide apud Müller. de Min. Poliad. p. 44 sqq. et in Corp. Inscr. Gr. T. I. p. 442.

<sup>3</sup> Stemma Eteobutadarum proponit Müller. l. c. p. 43.



gentes sacrae fuerunt Centriadae, Cynidae, Hesychidae, Phytalidae: Mileti clarissimi fuerunt Branchidae, Colophone Clarii Apollinis sacerdotes, certis e familiis, et ferme Mileto acciti<sup>4</sup>, in Cypro Cinyradae: omittimus multos, quorum passim mentio fit<sup>5</sup>. Et insigni cura horum sacerdotum conficiebantur stemmata et indices, non sine fabulis; adhuc supersunt hierophantarum Eleusiniorum aliquot stemmata vel potius stemmatum fragmina<sup>6</sup>, et ex Bröndstedii, Regis Danorum apud Pontificem Maximum legati, schedis ad nos missis ineditum tenemus Halicarnassiorum Neptuni Isthmii sacerdotum recensum, qui ab ipsius Neptuni filio progreditur<sup>7</sup>. Nimirum sive ea sacra, ut gentilicia, stirpibus illis accepta referebant civitates, sive ea inde ab initio publica universi populi fuerunt, sacerdotia nefas fuit transferri ab iis gentibus, quarum auctores numinis, quod illis colebatur caerimoniis, aut filii haberentur aut familiares; horum quin etiam posteri soli sacris legitimo ritu faciendis et perferendis ad deos mortalium precibus, donis, gratiarum actionibus idonei, soli ea videbantur indole natali et hereditaria praediti esse et divino quodam afflatu ingenito perfusi, longoque majorum usu ita periti, ut apti essent sanctissimis muneribus obeundis. Sic vatum ars sacerdotio conjunctissima a parentibus devolvebatur ad liberos; Telliadaeque et Clytiadae et Jamidae natura insitam et paternam vaticinandi peritiam habere visi; natura ortuque Daedalidae fuere sculptores, Asclepiadae medici, Eunidae citharistae vel citharoedi sacri, Lycomidae Cereris cantores: quid quod Spartae praecones et tibicines et coqui extiterunt, non qui artibus his praestare possent, sed quorum patres haec exercuissent ministeria, Orientali prorsus et Aegyptiaco more<sup>8</sup>? Enimvero quo longius repetimus antiquitatis memoriam, eo magis ho-

<sup>4</sup> Verba sunt Taciti Ann. II, 54.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Hüllmann. Urgeschichte des. Staats p. 91 sq.

<sup>6</sup> Corp. Inscr. Gr. n. 384. 385.

<sup>7</sup> Publice is, jubente populo, ex antiqua columella in novas erat tabulas transcriptus; placuerat enim μεταγράψαι [ἐκ τῆς ἀρχαίας σ]τήλης τῆς παρεστῶσης τοῖς ἀγά[λμασι τοῖς τ]οῦ Ποσειδῶνος τοῦ [Ἰ]σθμίου τοὺς γεγ[ενημένους] ἀπὸ τῆς κτίσεως κατὰ γένος ἱερεῖς τοῦ Πο[σειδῶ]νος τοῦ κατιδρυθέντος ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν ἀποικί[αν ἐκ] Τροι[ζή]νος ἀγαγόντων Ποσειδῶνι καὶ Ἀπόλλ[ωνι]. Additur: Εἰσὶν δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ ἱερεῖς τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος οἵδε: et scripta deinceps sacerdotum nomina sunt, appositis etiam annis, per quos quisque esset munere functus.

<sup>8</sup> Herodot. VI, 60.



mines optimum quidque ad naturae et generis, ex quo quisque natus, beneficium rettulisse intelligimus, nec pauca eorum, quae hinc manarunt, institutorum vestigia in cultissimam Graecae eruditionis aetatem propagata sunt. Et profecto hereditaria illa sacerdotia magnam partem et sanctiora ceteris fuerunt, et ad eas pertinuerunt religiones, quae ex summa tradita antiquitate interiores quasdam de rebus divinis et humanis sententias vel potius divinantium sensus, symbolorum involucris indutos, demonstrabant: inter quas facile prima sunt Eleusinia mysteria, in quibus etsi doctrinam nullam scientiae formulis comprehensam, qualem in illis unquam esse quaesitam mireris, traditam mystis et epoptis esse, neque arcae disciplinae custodes et dispensatores hierophantas fuisse optime ostendit Lobeckius in libro insigni, qui Aglaophamus inscriptus est; tamen ille non magis quam Io. Henr. Vossius id videtur effecisse, ut exulare jam e remotiore antiquitate symbola debeant, et ad novicios allegoretas reiicienda altior omnis fabularum et caerimoniarum interpretatio sit. Immo ea ipsa, quae in Eleusiniis esse repraesentata constat, et universa Cereris ac Proserpinae fabula, ab agrario deorum cultu prisco<sup>9</sup> profecta, non philosopha quidem ratione con-

<sup>9</sup> Quin priscus hic cultus fuerit, nemo dubitat: sed num mature clarus fuerit, a Lobeckio, viro praestantissimo, dubitatum est, qui Eleusinas caerimonias tum demum inclaruisset putat, quum Eleusis Athenis accessisset, Solonis vero aetate Eleusinem nondum firmiter cum Atheniensibus coaluisse collegit ex bello, quod commemorat Herodotus I, 30. (Agl. p. 214). Sed in hac re ab eo erratum esse monuit jam Müllerus (Dor. T. I. p. 176.); nihil quae est certius, quam illud bellum non inter Athenienses et Eleusinos gestum esse, sed prope Eleusinem inter vicinos Megarenses et Athenienses, qui tenebant Eleusinem: Solonis enim aetate notum est Megarenses plus semel dimicasse cum Atheniensibus. Et aliquatenus sua retractavit Lobeckius ipse (T. II. p. 1351.). Haud dubie autem Eleusis sicut reliqua Atticae oppida jam tum cum Athenis in unam coaluerat civitatem, quum adhuc regibus parerent Athenae: ut Theseo hanc oppidorum conjunctionem sublatis singulorum prytaneis tribuit fama optimis scriptoribus et ipsi Thucydidi probata; Eleusiniaque tum ipsum jam fuerunt Attica, et Athenarum rex Eleusinia curabat. Qua de re eo minus dubitandum, quod etiam in Ionia, et nominatim Ephesi, Codri posteris mandata Eleusinae Cereris sacra fuerunt (Strab. XIV. init.); quod neququam esset factum, nisi primi illi coloni, qui Codridis ducibus ex communi et uno Athenarum prytaneo egressi Ioniam occuparunt, secum attulissent sacra Eleusinia, regibusque haec ex eo inde tempore fuissent propria. Nam posthac, quum regia dignitas magis indies imminueretur, non auctae regum praerogativae sunt. Immo Athenis ipsis Eleusiniarum cura ea, quae apud Iones ad Codridas pertinebat, transierat ad regem, qui est inter novem archontes (Poll. VIII, 90. Harpocr. v. ἐπιμελητὴς τῶν μυστηρίων): hi vero inde ex prima institutione, hoc est ab Olymp. 24. non necessario fuere Codridae. Patet igitur, quod in Ionia Codridis



ceptam sed profundo sensu viribus naturae genitalibus tacto divinatum palingenesiam et mortalium immortalitatem liquido adumbrant, ex morte reviviscentium velut semina: quam sacerdotes viri feminaeque, “quibus quidem curae fuit earum rerum, quas tractabant, posse rationem reddere<sup>10</sup>,” quam Pindarus et Plato, credo etiam Isocrates et Cicero, ex illis collegerunt caerimoniis<sup>11</sup>.

Ceterum etiam in iis sacerdotiis, quae certarum gentium fuere propria, aut electioni aut sortitioni potuit locus esse: quemadmodum, postquam regum imperium abolitum est, ex certis nobilium gentibus archontes regionum sacrorum heredes legi coepti sunt, antequam summi magistratus capessendi jus vel cum omnibus optimo jure civibus vel cum ditioribus communicaretur, et simul sacra quaedam ad hos transirent sive sorte sive suffragiis creatos. Aut enim sacerdotium genti proprium a patre ad filium vel propinquos ab intestato heredes transiit, quod in solos perpetuos sacerdotes (*ιερείας διὰ βίου, αἰδίους, αἰωνίους*) cadit, quales sunt Haliarnassii illi Neptuni sacerdotes, de quibus supra monuimus, et Spartae sacerdotes Castorum Herculisque successores, aliique multi<sup>12</sup>; aut sacerdotes ministrique ex gente, penes

relicta est Eleusiniarum cura, id repetitum esse ex priore ante Olymp. 24. aetate, Eleusiniis in Ioniam translatis, quum eorum in Attica cura adhuc apud Codridas esset: atque ita Eleusis certe jam ante Olymp. 24. Atheniensis civitatis pars fuisse intelligitur. Sed fuit vel sub regibus ipsis diu ante illam Olympiadem.

<sup>10</sup> Haec Platonis verba sunt Menon. p. 81. D. qui etsi Eleusinia non nominat, vix tamen illa ad alios sacerdotes rettuleris. Calliae Hipponici f. daducho earum, quas tractabat, rerum rationem cordi non fuisse, facile largimur.

<sup>11</sup> Pind. Fragm. p. 625. cui ipse Lobeckius tribuit aliquantulum; Plat. l. c. quem etiam Phaedon. p. 70. C. ubi *παλαιὸν λόγον* de palingenesia affert, sacerdotalem iudices narrationem in mente habuisse, non Pythagoricam sapientiam. Nec spreverimus Isocratem Paneg. cap. 6. licet quae de Eleusiniis dicit, latiore posthac significato transtulerit in *Συμμαχικῶν* cap. 12. Ciceronis locus notus est Legg. II, 12. quem non videmus cur non ex Pindaro explicare liceat; eodemque pertinet, quod Tusc. I, 13. de vita defunctorum significatur obscurius. Ubi prudentissime simul addidit vir sapientior quam plurimis videtur: *Sed qui nondum ea, quae multis post annis tractari coepissent, physica didicissent, tantum sibi persuaserant, quantum natura admonente cognoverant; rationes et causas rerum non tenebant.* Videmus autem Odofr. Müllerum, qui tamen a vulgarium allegoretarum vanitate alienissimus est idemque minime credulus, non multum ac nos aliter sentire in Prolegg. Mythol. p. 255. Postremo etiam post Lobeckium Agl. T. II. p. 801 sqq. non omittendum videtur, Eumolpum illum fabulosum Thracem potissimum haberi, apud Thraces vero quosdam vel vulgi opinione mortem praelatam huic esse vitae.

<sup>12</sup> De Spartanis cf. Corp. Inscr. Gr. n. 1340. et ibi notata. Sic Scopelianus *ἀρχιερεὺς Ἀσίας αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι, παῖς ἐκ πατρὸς πάντες*, Philostr. Vit. Soph.



quam id juris erat, suffragio vel sortitione creati sunt: id quod necessarium fuit in annuis sacerdotiis aliisque sacris ministeriis<sup>13</sup>; quamquam sacerdotia gentibus certis propria haud dubie perpetua fuerunt plurima: sed hos quoque perpetuos sacerdotes et ceteros, qui perpetui quidem essent nec tamen ex certa gente, eodem modo constitui potuisse sponte patet<sup>14</sup>. Verum antequam Romana instituta latius per orbem terrarum propagata sunt, sacerdotes suffragio lecti (*αἵρετοὶ* s. *χειροτονητοὶ*) non multi videntur fuisse, licet hanc creandi rationem probasse Homerus perhibeatur<sup>15</sup>;

1, 21, 2. quem locum de hac re disserens attulit Spanhem. in Callim. Pallad. 34. Nec ficta lex, sed ad certa sacerdotia restringenda, quae obtinuisse hinc inde dicitur, τὰς ἱερωσύνας τοὺς παῖδας τῶν πατέρων διαδέχεσθαι (Hermogen. Partitt. c. 6. et Marcellin. ad Hermog. p. 71.)

<sup>13</sup> Cf. de ἱεραύλῃ Attico quae diximus Corp. Inscr. Gr. T. 1. p. 325. b sq. Daduchi perpetui quidem fuerunt, sed videntur plures munus per vices obisse, alius alio anno (cf. ad Corp. Inscr. Gr. n. 388. 394.)

<sup>14</sup> Huc rettuleris verba in prooemiis Demostheni tributis posita p. 1461. 5. ubi quod praetores fere perpetuo jidem sint, Athenienses dicuntur παντάπασιν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ὅνπερ τοὺς ἱερεῖς, καθιστάναι καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας.

<sup>15</sup> Schol. Iliad. ζ, 300. p. 191. Bekk. (ad verba τὴν γὰρ Τρῶες ἔθηκαν Ἀθηναίης ἱέρεϊαν): Οὐτε κληρωτοὺς οὐτε ἐκ γένους βούλεται τοὺς ἱερεῖς εἶναι, οὐτε ψήφῳ ἐνός, ἀλλ' οὓς πλήθος ψηφίζόμενον ἔλοιτο. Similia Eustathius. Aristotelis quidem locus Polit. IV, 12. 2. Schneid. ad quem provocant nonnulli, αἵρεσιν sacerdotum non evincit, quod ibi sacerdotum mentio ad solam vocem τοὺς κληρωτοὺς referri potest; αἵρετων tamen exempla supersunt, ut in decreto Deliaco Corp. Inscr. Gr. n. 2270. est sacerdos αἵρεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, Dearum ut videtur Eleusiniarum, sicut etiam Cereris Eleusinae hierophantis, Romana quidem aetate, sed more opinor prisco, suffragio creata est teste titulo Corp. Inscr. Gr. n. 434. εὐτέ με Κεκροπίδαι Διοῦ θέσαν ἱερόφαντιν: quae verba excludunt sortitionem. Dearum Eleusiniarum etiam ἱεροποιοὶ suffragio creati sunt (Demosth. in Mid. p. 552. 6.) et quattuor ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν μυστηρίων, qui certe specie quadam sacerdotii gaudebant: hi enim a populo creati manuum sublatione sunt, bini ex universis Atheniensibus, singuli ex Eumolpidis et Cerycibus. Neque aliter constituti *parasiti* sacris conjuncti, αἰρούμενοι, ut ait Crates (Athen. VI. p. 235. C. coll. p. 234. A.) Αἵρεσιν vero et χειροτονίαν in eligendis magistratibus non, ut vulgo putatur, differre, satis docent vel loci Aristotelis a Schömanno de comitt. p. 310. allati, consentiente Platonis genere loquendi Legg. VI. p. 755. B sqq. atque errant, qui ob Aeschinis verba in Ctesiph. p. 425. (quae sequitur auctor Arg. II. Dem. in Androt.) distinguunt χειροτονητοὺς et αἵρετοὺς, quasi hos legerint tribus tribuumque partes, illos populus. Quippe Aeschines verba legis, καὶ εἴ τινες ἄλλοι αἵρετοὶ ἡγεμονίαν δικαστηρίου λαμβάνουσι, docet non posse nisi de iis dicta esse magistratibus, quos tribus tribuumque partes crearint, quod demptis iis, quos lex jam supra commemorarat, χειροτονητοῖς et κληρωτοῖς, non supersint alii: at haec interpretatio quamvis justa non impedit, quominus et hi αἵρετοὶ fuerint χειροτονητοί, et illi χειροτονητοὶ fuerint αἵρετοί. Ceterum recentiores Graeci αἵρεσιν aliquando etiam latiore sensu pro καταστάσει dicunt.



sed quemadmodum Plato<sup>16</sup> sorte illos constitui jubet, ut eorum constitutio deo sortium rectori committatur, sic plurima sacerdotia, et maxime annua, vulgo erant κληρωτά, eo tamen adhibito temperamento, ut qui sortiri vellent, horum nomina cum praerogativa nobilitatis ederet eorum concio, ad quos pertinerent illae religiones<sup>17</sup>: neque aliter in Eleusiniis ὁ μνούμενος ἐφ' ἐστίας constitutus est<sup>18</sup>. Ex qua sortis sanctitate etiam illud repetendum videtur, quod Athenis certe, quum pylagori suffragiis crearentur, tamen hieromnemes sortito obtinebant munus, utpote sacerdotalis magistratus.

Hac igitur sortitione, quae licet religione ipsa excusata esset, non tamen potuit non efficere, ut sanctissima munera, eodem modo quo magistratus civiles gliscente populari imperio sortis fortunae commissi, in hominum levissimorum traderentur manus, vix negaveris sacerdotum auctoritatem, dignitatem, honorem, simulque et horum et ceterorum hominum pietatem esse imminutam. At multo damnosior et prorsus inhonesta consuetudo invaluit ea, cujus causa haec exponere instituimus. Sicut enim Simon Magus a Divis Apostolis oblata pecunia postulavit, ut cum ipso communicarent potestatem imponendis manibus Spiritum sanctum dandi, medioque, quod vocant, aevo Simonia magis magisque increbruit, “indignis quibuslibet et Simoniaco felle amaricatis ecclesias vendendo<sup>19</sup>; ita Dionysius Halicarnassensis<sup>20</sup> Numae de sacerdotibus creandis instituta laudans, qui nec *venalia sacerdotia* fecerit nec sorte distribuenda, queritur quod ceteri temere plerumque et inconsiderate designarint sacrorum antistites, et alii eos sorte constituerint, alii *super plus licentibus muneris honorem addixerint pecunia*.

<sup>16</sup> Legg. VI. p. 759. C.

<sup>17</sup> Hoc est προκριθῆναι ἐν τοῖς εὐγενεστάτοις κληροῦσθαι τῆς ἱερωσύνης ap. Demosth. adv. Eubulid. p. 1313. 20.

<sup>18</sup> Corp. Inscr. Gr. T. I. p. 445. b.

<sup>19</sup> Ut ait Henricus IV. Germanorum rex in litteris ad Gregorium VII. datis (Chronic. Virdun. in Labb. bibl. mss. T. I. p. 209.)

<sup>20</sup> Archaeol. II. p. 292. Ἐπειτα, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων φαύλως πως καὶ ἀπερίσκεπτως ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ ποιουμένων τὰς αἰρέσεις (hoc dixit p. καταστάσεις) τῶν ἐπιστησομένων τοῖς ἱεροῖς, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀργυρίου τὸ τίμιον ἀποκηρύττειν ἀξιούντων, τῶν δὲ κλήρω διαιρούντων τοὺς ἱερεῖς, ἐκεῖνος οὐτε ὠνητὰς χρημάτων ἐποίησε τὰς ἱερωσύνας οὐτε κλήρω μεριστὰς.



Quae non ita dicta esse, ut corruptori iis, qui sacerdotem legerent, clanculum pecunias largito datum sacerdotium perhibeatur, sed proprie atque ex vero, ac sacerdotalia munera, ut portoria et vectigalia auctione publica esse vendita, docet ejusdem civitatis, ex qua Dionysius oriundus, plebiscitum ineditum, idque pluribus nominibus memorabile, quod a Werninckio, centurione Britannico, ex marmore exceptum misit nobis Bröndstedius: hoc enim decreto Halicarnassiorum senatus et populus sacerdotium Dianae Pergaeae, cujus cultus per Asiam, superstitionum quarumlibet refertissimam, late propagatus est, tum quum has caerimonias reciperet, locandum proposuit, incerta quidem aetate, sed quantum ex scripturae genere conjicere licet, ante Octaviani Augusti imperium. Quod plebiscitum quum uberiore explicatione indigere non videatur, id satis habemus emendatum apposuisse, et devitato omni supervacaneae eruditionis apparatu breves infra addidisse notulas. Est igitur his verbis conceptum.

Ἐπὶ ν]εωποιοῦ Χαρμύ[λ]ου [τ]οῦ Διαγόρου, μηνὸς Ἡρα[κλεί]ου, πρυτανείας τῆς μετὰ Μενεκλεῦς τοῦ Φορμίωνος, [γρ]αμματεύοντος Διοδότου τοῦ Ἡ[δ]ονικοῦ, ἑ[δ]οξε [τῇ βουλ]ῇ καὶ τ[ῷ] δ[ή]μῳ, γνώμη<sup>21</sup> πρυτάνεων. πριαμ[ένη<sup>22</sup> τῇ]ν ἱερητείαν<sup>23</sup> τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος τῆς Περ[γα]ίας π[αρ]έξετα[ι] ἰ[έρειαν] ἀσπὴν ἐξ ἀσπῶν ἀμ[φ]οτέρων ἐπὶ [τρ]εῖς γενεὰς γεγεννημένην, καὶ πρὸς πατρὸς καὶ πρὸς μητρὸς· ἡ δὲ πριαμένη ἱεράσεται ἐπὶ [ζ]ωῆς τῆς αὐτῆ[ς], καὶ θύσει τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ δημοτ[ελέ]α<sup>24</sup> καὶ τὰ ἰδιωτικά, καὶ λήψεται τῶν θυομένων

<sup>21</sup> Γνώμη sine Iota subscr. exaratum manifesto primus casus est, ut in pluribus decretis publicis, de quibus alio loco dicemus. Idem videtur in iis decretis restituendus, qui apud Demosthenem leguntur, quamquam scimus esse quae contra dici queant.

<sup>22</sup> Hoc est πριαμένη τις. Articulus licet infra additus hoc loco de industria omissus est.

<sup>23</sup> De hac forma vide ad Corp. Inscr. Gr. n. 1603.

<sup>24</sup> Δημοτελέα dedimus, non δημοτικά, quod illud fere usitatum in hac re est; soluta forma potuit ex vetusto usu retenta esse, ut supra Μενεκλεῦς. Formulam ἱερὰ δημοτελεῖ illustravimus Oec. civ. Athen. T. I. p. 228. et Buttmannus ad Demosth. in Mid. p. 531. ubi eam Dodonaeo reddidit oraculo secundo, eximie ille in his oraculis emendandis versatus, nisi quod in fine prioris post tot egregias correctiones defecit fatigatus. Verba sunt: τῇ δὲ Διώνῃ βοῦν καὶ ἄλλα ἱερεῖα, καὶ τράπεζαν χαλκῇν· καὶ πρὸς, τὸ ἀνάθημα, ὃ ἀνέθηκεν ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων. In quibus ridicule infinitum est illud ἄλλα, ridicula ultima dictio καὶ πρὸς etc.



δημοσία ἀ[φ'] ἐκάστου ἱερείου κωλῆν καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ κωλῇ νεμόμενα καὶ τεταρτημο[ρ]ί[δ]α σπλάγχνων καὶ τὰ δέρματα, τῶν δὲ ἰ[δι]ωτικῶν λήψεται κωλῆν καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ κωλῇ νεμόμενα καὶ τεταρτημορίδα σπλάγχνων. τοὺς δὲ ταμ[ί]ας διδόναι τοῖς πρυτάνεσιν εἰς τὴν θυσίαν τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ἐντελές<sup>25</sup>, δραχμὰς τριά[κ]οντα. παρασκευάζειν δὲ τὴν [θ]υσίαν τὰς γυναῖκας τὰς τῶν πρυτάνεων, λαβούσας τὸ ἐκ [τ]ῆς π[όλ]εως διδόμενον, τῶν πρυτανευόντ[ω]ν τὸν μῆνα τὸν Ἡράκλειον. τὴν δὲ θυσίαν συντε[λ]εῖτω μηνὸς Ἡρακλείου δωδεκάτῃ, ἔστω δὲ [ἡ ἰ]έρεια ἰσόμοιρος [κα]ὶ ταῖς γυναῖξιν τῶν πρυτάνεων, τῶν θυομένων δημοσία. ποιείσθω δὲ ἡ ἰέρεια καθ' ἐκάστην νουμηνίαν ἐπικουρίαν ὑπὲρ πόλεως, λαμβάνουσα δραχμὴν. ἐν [ῶ δ]ὲ μηνὶ ἡ θυσία [σ]υντε[λ]εῖται ἡ δημοτελής, ἀγειρέτω πρὸ νήσου [τ]ὰς ἡμέρας τρεῖς, ἐπ' οἰκίαν μὴ πορευομένη<sup>26</sup>. ὁ δὲ ἀγερμὸς ἔστω τῆς ἱερείας. κατ[α]σκευά[σ]ται δὲ [τ]ῇ[ν] ἰέρει[αν] καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν οὗ ἂν βούληται<sup>27</sup>. κατασκευασάτω δὲ καὶ θησαυρὸν τῇ [θ]εῶ, ἐν[β]αλ[λ]έτωσαν δὲ οἱ θύ[ο]ντ[ε]ς ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ τελείῳ ὁ[β]ο[λ]οῦ[s] δύο, ἐπὶ δὲ γαλαθεινῷ ὀβολόν· ἀνοιγόντων δὲ οἱ ἐξετασται κατ' ἐνιαυτ[ὸ]ν τὸν θησαυρόν. Addita sunt etiam alia, sed temporis injuria ita mutilata, ut hoc ea loco omittenda censeamus.

Scr. Berolini d. x. m. Januar a. MDCCCXXX.

nam quod ἀνέθηκεν de donario dictum putatur nondum consecrato, sed posthac demum consecrando ex voto prius suscepto, ferri nequit: ἀνέθηκεν non unquam inter tot exempla dicitur nisi de donario jam posito et consecrato. Scribe: βoῦν καὶ ἄρνα ἱερεῖα, καὶ τράπεζαν χαλκῇν πρὸς τὸ ἀνάθημα etc. mensam apponendam ad id donarium, quod consecravit populus Atheniensis. Pulchre post victimas additur vox ἱερεῖα, ut illae distinguantur a mensa, quae ex alio prorsus est genere.

<sup>25</sup> Sc. ἱερεῖον καὶ δρ. etc.

<sup>26</sup> Non intrans aedes, ut ap. Demosth. de cor. p. 271. 13. ἐπ' οἰκίας βαδίζων. De stipis collectione (ἀγερμῶ) nota sunt omnia, maxime post Ruhnk. ad Tim. p. 9.

<sup>27</sup> Tum ipsum igitur Halicarnassi Dianae Pergaeae cultus primum institutus est, templumque nondum exstructum fuit.



DE TITULIS QUIBUSDAM SUPPOSITIS  
AUGUSTI BOECKHII PROLUSIO ACADEMICA.

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ANTE hos octo fere annos Radulphi Rochetti potissimum humanitate et litterarum propagandarum studio laudabili per cultissimas Europae terras innotuit monumentum vetus bilingue, in parietinis Cyrenarum, ut fertur, repertum Melitaequae servatum apud virum, quantum aestimare licebat, honestum, geometram et architectum militem Gallicum ex eo ordine, cui de ingenio nomen inditum: qui vir, testibus litteris a Rochetto ad nos tum datis, a sese transcriptum ex lapide exemplum Academiae Inscriptionum Parisinae miserat. Supra sunt Phoeniciae litterae quinque, tum currus alatus draconibus junctus, duabus insertis taedis ardentibus, ad modum insignium Eleusiniorum sive Cerealium; sub curru legitur Graece: Ὀλυμπ. ΠΔΔΔΓΙ ἔτος ΙΙΙ: sequuntur tres versus Phoenicii, quorum voces ternis punctis in trigonum compositis distinguuntur; interjectisque deinceps ter novenis punctis per tria juga dispositis adduntur Graeca, βουστροφηδὸν scripta litteris partim pervetustis, partim satis novae vel insolitae formae, antiquissimo interpunctionis genere (:) distinctis vocabulis. Verba haec sunt: Ἡ πασῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ γυναικῶν κοινότης πηγὴ τῆς θείας ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης εἰρήνη τε τελεία τοῖς τοῦ τυφλοῦ ὄχλου ἐκλεκτοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν, οὓς Ζαράδης τε καὶ Πυθαγόρας, τῶν ἱεροφαντῶν ἄριστοι, κοινῇ συμβιωτεῖν συνίεντο. Infra sculptus est serpens caudam mordens et tria trigona, productis in unoquoque omnibus lateribus in altero angulo inscriptisque singularibus punctis. Simul idem geometra aliam misit Cyrenaicam inscriptionem: in tabula modice fastigiata crux comparet circumdata litteris vocem *Osiris* continentibus et laureâ coronâ cincta; haec corona interposita est verbis Σίμων Κυραν(αῖος); sub ea ductibus partim antiquis aut



priori titulo similibus, partim multo recentioribus scripta, singularibus punctis inter bina quaeque vocabula interpositis, habentur haec: Θώθ, Κρόνος, Ζωροάστρης, Πυθαγόρας, Ἐπίκουρος, Μαεδάκης, Ἰωάννης, Χριστός τε καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι Κυραναῖκοι καθηγηταὶ συμφώνως ἐντέλλωσιν ἡμῖν, μηδὲν μὲν οἰκειοποιεῖσθαι, τοῖς δὲ νόμοις ἀρρήγειν, καὶ τὴν παρανομίαν καταπολεμεῖν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ τῆς δικαιοσύνης πηγὴ, τοῦτο τὸ μακαρίως ἐν κοινῇ ζῆν. Horum titulorum, qui multorum ingenia doctorum exercuerunt, prior quum multas ob causas et ob ipsam Olympici anni notationem veteribus insuetam et ante Timaeum Siculum prorsus incognitam non posset ei, quam simulat, aetati tribui; uno ore plerique omnes utrumque a Gnostica aliqua Cyrenis secta circa quintum vel sextum a Christiana epocha saeculum conditum esse statuerunt, priorem fortasse etiam paulo prius; de vetusta inscriptionum harum origine non dubitarunt interpretes et editores, *Gesenius*, qui de iis docte egit in commentatione Halae edita, easque Carpocratianorum haeresi tribuit, *H. A. Hamaker* in epistola ad Rochettum a. MDCCCXXV. publicata<sup>1</sup>, *Iac. Matter* in Historia Gnosticismi<sup>2</sup>, et qui nuperrime de interpungendi genere in Phoenicia inscriptione usurpato dixit *C. I. C. Reuvens*<sup>3</sup>, aliique complures. Indignum hercle, quod tot clarissimi theologi et philologi tamdiu decepti sunt fraude Melitensi, cui, quum primum ad nos missum tituli bilinguis exemplum esset, hunc ipsum deberi, in litteris ad Rochettum privatim datis eramus suspicati<sup>4</sup>; ne diutius decipiantur, paucis et quantum paginae huic prooemio concessae rei non simplicis explicationem patiuntur, Melitae cusos nuperrime hos titulos esse demonstrabimus, non iis utentes argumentis, quae ex scripturae forma, Graeco sermone, rerum et sententiarum novitate petieris: haec enim tanto libentius nunc mit-

<sup>1</sup> De hac cf. Gesenii censuram in *Ephem. litt.* Hal. 1826. n. 110 sqq. unde simul intelligitur, ex Spohnianis chartis, non quod Hamaker jecerat, a nobis Gesenium prioris tituli exemplum accepisse.

<sup>2</sup> T. II. p. 290.

<sup>3</sup> Epist. ad Letronn. II. p. 17.

<sup>4</sup> De eodem titulo dubitasse etiam Udalt. Frid. Koppium novimus. Nostri iudicii vestigium reperies in *Corp. Inscr. Gr.* T. I. Praef. p. xxx. ubi diximus, de industria alia atque ea, quae attulissemus, exempla inscriptionum antiquitus fictarum omissa esse, *utpote incerta*: distinctius loqui nolimus, quod modestia intempestiva diffidebamus nobis ipsi, postquam bilingui titulo accessit Simoneus, qui initio minus suspectus videbatur.



timus, quanto majore sollertia illa eludere effugio et excusationibus qualibuscunque didicerunt cupidi: sed eam fere viam ingrediemur, qua olim Petrizzopulum Graecum falsi convicimus. Docebimus eundem hominem alia finxisse; cum his componemus Cyrenaicos titulos, ut eos pateat ejusdem esse fabricae: nec jam dubitabitur, quin doctus Avenionensis et Melitenses duo consenserint inter se, ut pravae eruditionis fetibus istis monstrosis fucum facerent credulis, Josephi Vallae Melitensis, qui patriae ope linguae suppositis Livianis scriptis et codice Normannico famam suam contaminavit, populares et successores, ejusque si non poena certe ingenio dignissimi.

Anni MDCCCXXVIII. d. Jan. VII. vir scriptis haud paucis spectatus, *Marchio Agricola de Fortia d'Urban* Avenionensis, Societati Asiaticae Parisinae plura inscriptionis Phoeniciae exempla tradidit, quae esset Melitae effossa, de eaque paucis disseruit; uberiores mox in ejusdem Societatis consessu commentationem recitavit d. Febr. IV. qua de eadem inscriptione et aliis rebus cum illa conjunctis disputat<sup>5</sup>. Exemplum, quod ante oculos habemus, Engelmanni lithographi opera expressum est et Fortiae ipsi dedicatum; id ex lapide, ut fertur, perfecte servato, cujus tres dimensiones annotatae diligenter sunt, delineavit *Ge. Grongnet* Melitensis, olim geometra militaris Gallicus, qui in patria habitat insula. Supra sculptus est tridens et utrinque oculus cum delphino aquam ejiciente et aliis ornamentis minus insignibus; inter haec et circum septem stellae collocatae sunt, et stellis appositae singulae litterae Phoeniciae, quae a sinistra ad dextram sunt **I, E, H, O, Ω, OY, A**; neque enim incerta earum lectio est, quod universum alphabetum Phoenicium, ex quo desumptae tituli hujus litterae sunt, in tabula simul distributa exponitur. Paulo inferius juxta eundem tridentem ad sinistram est aries vel capricornus, ad dextram cancer; magnis deinceps litteris in media area scriptum nomen *Athlas*: reliqua inscriptio per XVIII series verticales στοιχηδόν disposita est et simul βουστροφηδόν, initio ab ima dextra facto; inter binos versus quosque ducta est linea, ibi interrupta,

<sup>5</sup> Prior commentatio edita est *Annal. de la Littérature et des Arts* T. XXX. Fasc. 379. altera ibid. Fasc. 384.



ubi ex altero in alterum transit lectio. In utroque inscriptionis latere habetur ancora et sub hac delphinus; inferior margo cingitur ornamento simili illis, quibus in vasis pictis Italicis insigniri margines solent<sup>6</sup>. Reliquam tabulam implet nota editoris<sup>7</sup>. Hunc igitur lapidem mense Maio a. MDCCCXXVI. *Josephum Felicem Galeam*, sacerdotem Melitensem, docemur invenisse Melitae inter fodiendum; testes sunt litterae duplices, quas lithographi forma expressas ante oculos habemus, Galeae utraeque, alterae eodem anno d. VII. Maii scriptae ad Grongnetum, quibus hunc, utpote Phoeniciae linguae studiosum, donat lapide ejusque ab illo interpretationem postulat<sup>8</sup>, alterae d. xxx. Augusti ad Marchionem datae, quibus sibi tantum inventum gratulatur, cujus praestantiam a Marchione juste aestimatam ipse quidem minime perspexerit. Neve auctor etiam antiquior desideretur, gravissimum lapidi conciliat Marchio illustrissimus. Scilicet a. u. c. DXXXVI. Tib. Sempronius Consul, qui tum Melitam ceperat<sup>9</sup>, haec Graeci, ut conjicitur, manu inscribenda lapidi curavit: *T. Sempron. Cos. hoc magni Athlantis et submersae Athlantidis reliquium vedit eidemque servari coeravit an. ur. DXXXVI. Olymp. CXL. an. III.* Carthaginienses vero quum recupeerassent insulam, defossum a Melitensibus hoc monumentum esse et latuisse, donec id bonus ecclesiasticus, parum ille harum rerum gnarus, ex fundo putei saxo incisi protraheret. Mirum vero, quod haec Consulis nota non simul cum Phoenicio titulo lithographi arte repraesentata est! Nempe frau-

<sup>6</sup> Talia vide ap. Grotefend. in Böttigeri Amalthea T. II. ad p. 90.

<sup>7</sup> Hanc quoque animi causa apponimus: "Cette précieuse découverte détermine enfin au juste la véritable position de l'ancienne Athlantide qui s'étendait depuis le Golphe de la grande Syrte jusqu'entre le Cap Bon d'Afrique, et le Cap Maretimo de Sicile, étant les Isles de Malte et de Goze les anciens sommets du fameux Mont Athlas qui s'élevait presque au milieu de l'Athlantide submergée l'an avant l'Ere Chrétienne 2298. Epoque du Déluge d'Ogyges." Epocham hanc in eum annum definierat Fortia in Historia antiqua orbis terrarum, de qua infra dicemus.

<sup>8</sup> Pars potissima haec est: "Vi do nuova, che nello demolire una stanza posta nel fondo del Cortile di Casa mia, nello scavo delle pietre del fondamento è stata trovata una grossa pietra coperta di caratteri antichi, che io credo essere Phenicj; e siccome voi vi dilettrate dello studio di questa lingua, io ve ne faccio un Dono, affinché poi spiegandola, mi direte il significato, che quei caratteri racchiudono." Subscripsit Grongnetus: "L'original de cette lettre est gardé par moi soigneusement, comme un écrit qui forme époque, et qui me constate la pleine propriété d'un aussi rare monument."

<sup>9</sup> Liv. XXI. 51.



dem fraude tegere auctor sustinet; posthac demum etiam Latina inscriptio fingenda visa. Nam ut hic paululum subsistamus, priusquam reliqua hominum lepidissimorum piacula persequamur, et dictio Latini tituli et anni notatio prodit suppositionem: non quisquam ea aetate aut ex urbis conditae aut ex Olympica epocha numeravit annos publice, nedum ex utraque ratione utcunque<sup>10</sup> comparata; ne doctos quidem sive Graecos seu Romanos in annalibus describendis credibile est epocha urbis conditae usos esse tum, quum M. Porcius Cato, antiquioris de ea epocha sententiae auctor, sedecim esset annos natus. Igitur postquam et hinc et ex ceteris, quae mox afferemus, non solum Atlanticum titulum, sed etiam Cyrenaicos ficticios esse intellexissemus, Gesenius de ea re a nobis certior factus examinavit Atlanticum. Hunc quid censetis repperisse? Non Phoenicia lingua scriptum Atlanticum titulum esse, sed Melitensi potissimum, hoc est corrupta dialecto nova Arabica! Etiam vir prudentissimus Silv. de Sacy, de quo magnopere queritur Fortia, fidem tituli addubitavit haud obscure<sup>11</sup>, licet modeste dixerit lapidem ipsum exspectandum esse, ut quid in illo vere scriptum, quid male lectum et explicitum ab interprete esset, dignosceretur: neque vero lapis unquam Parisios allatus videtur. Ceterum quae proposita a Fortia interpretatio est, eam non novimus; confecisse eam *Cannolus* Melitensis, linguae Chaldaicae professor, dicitur, qui jam prius Grongneto nomen Atlantis signaque caelestia arietis et cancri, stellasque, quae Pleiades sint, litterasque iis appositas Jehovae sanctum nomen continentes explicuerit. Ex Gesenii interpretatione necesse est tantum afferamus, quantum opus est, ut de iis judicari possit, quae statim narrabimus. Prima aliquis persona loquens inducitur, fortasse Atlas II. quem mox in scenam producemus: hic sese ait *adscendisse ad montem Atlantis et constitisse in medio; esse haec sepulcra magni regis Atlantis; ibi sese habitasse per septem circulos solis,*

<sup>10</sup> In Semproniano titulo comparatio congruit cum recepta hodie Varroniana ratione, factaque est duce *Arte data probandi*, ad quam provocat ipse Fortia.

<sup>11</sup> Hoc imprimis patet ex Societatis Asiaticae processu, quem dicunt, verbali ita concepto: "M. le Marquis de Fortia d'Urban donne communication d'une inscription qu'on dit Phénicienne, et qu'on dit trouvée à Malte."



et fuisse sub jussu regis Ogygis; ab hoc fastigio vidisse se gyrum splendidissimarum inter deas caeli Pleiadum, domum auream patris magni Neptuni et Ogygis honorati in vita sua, tres columnas Herculis, Eoam totam, quam late habitatur, et deas maris, Hispaniam totam, quae pro-  
cedit in finibus maris mediterranei et externi, et terram regis septimi Mejarataraph, et hujusmodi alia.

Nec vero his contentus portentis fuit auctor: *fallacia alia aliam trudit*. Nam forte fortuna Grongnetus, quem solum diligunt dii, a. MDCCCXXI. Melitae amicitiam sibi conciliavit *Domeni de Rienzi*, Valliclusani (de Valle clausa sibi notissima scripsisse Fortiam dicimus in transcurso): ille Rienzius cum *Aristone Samio*, noto ut fertur homine, per Graeciam et Africam iter fecerat; his contigerat, ut quum aliis rebus antiquis magni pretii potirentur, tum eo ipso anno in Creta insula invenirent codicem papyraceum sane quam vetustum, quo continebatur opus inscriptum sic: “Τοῦ Εὐμάλου Κυραινικοῦ Ἱστορία Λιβυκοῖ βιβλοι ΔΔΙΙΙ<sup>12</sup>.” Sextus liber (ΓΙ) de submersione Atlantidis agit: de ea tractaverat Fortia in uno ex decem voluminibus, quae de historia antiqua orbis terrarum conscripsit: quod opus quum Grongnetus Romae a Fortia acceptum Melitam secum attulisset, ut Fortiae commenta perdisceret, pretium ei visum est Eumalea cognoscere. Igitur *Pezxali* Pargiotae, vetustae Graecitatis gnaro, qui tum Melitae degebat, mandavit, ut sextum Eumalei operis librum verteret in Italicum sermonem. Mox Aristo diem supremum obiit; codicis heres Rienzius, quum Naupliam proficisceretur, spoliatur a praedonibus; postea videtur ad Satrapam Aegypti, hinc ad Indos Orientales profectus esse: codex igitur perditus esse judicandus est. Nae isti bene fecerunt, et Aristo, quod ad inferos rediit, ut umbris accederet umbra, et Rienzius, quod ad Indos evasit, unde nemo eum ad testimonium dicendum evocabit. Nos gratulemur nobismet, quod certe sexti Eumalei libri Italica superest translatio, quam Fortia jam in Gallicum sermonem transtulit. Legimus hanc Gallicam interpretationem

<sup>12</sup> Bonus vir volebat: Εὐμάλου Κυρηναίου ἱστορίας Λιβυκῆς etc. vel potius Κυραινικοῦ; in hac sola voce Dorismum adsciscit etiam Cyrenaicorum titulorum fabricator, excepta forma Dorica ἐντέλλωσιν; nisi hoc voluit pro vitio haberi, quo minus titulus videretur suspectus. *Eumeli* nomen auctor Atlanticae fabulae studiosissimus ex hac ipsa arripuisse videtur; cf. Platonem Critia, p. 114. B.



Libro quinto Eumalus de Libya ejusque rege Atlante (intellige Atlantem II.) disseruerat: hoc argumentum persequitur sexto libro, excerpta haec dicens ex Aristippi Cyrenaei, celebris philosophi, historia Libyca, cujus meminit Diogenes Laertius. Iniquus sit, qui postulet, ut totum istum inseramus libellum: sufficiet aliquot inde miracula enotasse. Reges olim Atlantidem simul habuerunt decem, quos inter divisum regnum universum<sup>13</sup>; unius ex his filius fuit *Atlas minor*, homo valde doctus et doctorum familiaris. Is ex amicis legit societatem philosophorum, qui Atlantici vocati sunt; *hi vixerunt communiter, et eorum praecipuum placitum hoc fuit, ut nihil proprium haberent, ne uxores quidem. Multo post Aristippus adoptavit haec praecepta; adhuc, ait Eumalus, prope Cyrenas conspicitur locus, ubi beati illi philosophi conveniebant, et vocatur Atlanteus. Illis vero institutis puram illi tranquillitatem et felicitatem nulla re turbatam parari judicabant.* Sed Atlas secundus Aristippo auctore discipulus fuit Nini Babylonii regis; Ninus Ogygem patrum nescio an avunculum habuit. *Ogyges*, quod nomen Phoenicia lingua Servatorem significat, ultimus rex Atlantidis fuit (regem regum intellige, sub quo erant novem minores, ut in Platonis Critia): eo regnante quum diluvio submergeretur Atlantis, ipse multo labore evasit cum quattuor filiis, *Cresso, Cadmo, Pelasgo, Jano*: dum per mare vagantur, Cressus Cretam condit pater-naque ibi mysteria instituit, Cadmus Thebas, ubi etiam porta Ogygia; mox Eleusis Cadmi filius avita mysteria Eleusine condit: Pelasgus consedit in Arcadia, Panisque eam mysteriis illustrat: Janus in Italia succedit Saturno, ac nominatur *Janus Saturnus*, et ipse mysteriorum auctor. Postremo Ogyges Phoenicen occupat et instituit mysteria eadem, quae Atlas minor, ille philosophus, in Libya; Ogyges deinceps *Noa* vocatus est; is apri ictu percussus quum perisset, Adonia instituta sunt. Hic autem Ogyges tertius est. Nam primus rex Atlantidis fuit *Atlas I.* Neptuni filius (ut in Platonis Critia): ab hujus initio ad Ogygem III. usque effluxerunt anni novies

<sup>13</sup> Hoc ex Platonis Critia p. 114. A. Platonis hoc opus Reipublicae conjunctum est, in qua de communione bonorum et mulierum praecipitur. Hinc natum universum hoc figmentum. Quamquam in vicinia Cyrenarum apud barbaras Libyae gentes mulieres quasi communes fuisse docent Herodotus et alii; sed hinc nemo Cyrenaicis istis commentis fidem addere audebit.



mille et novem, quos decem regum imperium explevit, a patre ad filium continua serie translatum (hoc quoque similiter atque apud Platonem). Hi praeter Atlantem sunt *Gadirus I. Ogyges I. Hooram, Debber, Ohannes*, cujus nomen significat *Miseriordem*, quippe qui magna mysteria communionis bonorum (ἀνιδιωτικά) instituerit, piscis formam ille vestitu imitatus, quoties celebraret mysteria<sup>14</sup>, *Ogyges II. Gadirus II. Lahem*, qui abolito connubio communionem mulierum, prius in mysteriis conclusam, fecit publicam, ultimo loco *Ogyges III*. Praeter eos, qui cum hoc Ogyge effugerunt diluvium, pauci Atlantici cum quattuor regulis pervenerunt in oram Libyae, quae *Tres columnae Herculis* vocantur, ubi *Atlas II*. ab illis est dux creatus: a quo bene distinguendus *Atlas I*. Neptuni filius, astronomiae peritissimus, qui in monte cognomini solebat stellas observare. “Haec igitur antiquissima et verissima philosophorum Atlanticorum et Cyrenaicorum Aristippeorum origo est,” ait Eumalus; “de qua quum jam sufficienter dictum sit, finio hic sextum hunc librum historiarum majorum nostrorum.” Festivam hanc de Eumali Libycis, iisque, quae illis contineri dicuntur, fabulam taedet refellere: nemo enim erit, quin eam temere et imprudenter, licet haud indocte, fictam esse pervideat: ita vero illa cum Atlantico lapide conspirat, ut monstrum utrumque ex eodem natum cerebello esse sponte pateat. Superest, ut quis potissimus harum facetiarum auctor sit, paucis quaeramus. De Cannolo, Rienzio, Aristone, Pezzale penes quemque iudicium esto; Fortia tantum abest, ut deceptus ab aliis existimari possit, ut histrionalis gregis patronum ducemque referre videatur. Profecto varia et multiplici et recondita eruditione opus erat, ut iis, quae hucusque consideravimus, atque, ut hoc occupemus, Cyrenaicis titulis fingendis suppeditaretur materia: cui rei num Grongnetus par fuerit, dubites merito. Non magnopere nota est illa numerorum signandorum ratio, quam Cyrenaicus titulus bilinguis et libri Eumalei offerunt: sed Fortiae certe non ignota fuerit, qui de arithmetica, de quadratura circuli,

<sup>14</sup> Haec ex Chaldaicis fabulis petita esse patet. Possemus etiam aliorum commentorum, quae non rettulimus, fontes aliquot demonstrare: nunc sufficiat dixisse, qui Eumaleum librum confinxit, eum non imperitum fuisse historiarum fabulosarum, quas ex Beroso, Philone Byblio, Joanne Malala, Chronico Paschali et libris similibus teneamus, easque eum imitatum esse.



de astronomia libros ediderit et Aristarchi opus de distantiiis solis et lunae Gallice verterit. In chronologia vero ita versatus est, ut unus ex auctoribus sit Artis data probandi (*L'art de vérifier les dates*). Tum vero geographica et historica scripsit permulta, etiam philologica, ut Hipparchum qui ferebatur Platonis transtulit Gallice. Sed imprimis huc pertinent ejus *Historia Atlantidis*<sup>15</sup> atque *Historia antiqua orbis terrarum*<sup>16</sup>, qua etsi etiam Grongnetus dicitur delectatus esse, non tamen probabile est auctoris deludendi causa Grongnetum haec ex illo potissimum libro finxisse omnia: propius vero, Marchionem illustrissimum suis commentis joculariter accommodasse haec ludibria. Nam in ea orbis historia diluvium Sinensis Yao, Noae, Ogygis, Atlanticum demonstratur unum idemque esse; cui rei octavum datur volumen et ex parte inserviunt falsa ista Atlantica; nonum volumen historiam et theoriam diluvii Ogygis et Noae et submersionem Atlantidis proponit; decimo exhibetur novum systema praeadamiticum: septimo Chaldaicas antiquitates, Berosum et Anonium Viterbiensem tractat, dignam aemulo materiam, et in qua perdiscere artem potuerit. Denique Romae de moenibus Saturniis et Cyclopiis scripsit, quae Phoenicum manibus condita perhibet: cui sententiae tuendae Janus iste Eumaleus succurrit. Hujus igitur viri clientes videntur Grongnetus et Galea esse; uterque illi Romae conciliatus est privati consuetudine, Grongnetoque usus est, ut is moenium illorum formas in ipsius delinearet usum. Sed Galea, quem in his rebus non versatum magnopere dicit, tantum falsas istas epistolas scripserit; Grongnetus haud dubie falsas delineavit inscriptiones, et Melitensis dialecti usum commodavit, neque eum tuebitur virorum splendidissimorum auctoritas, qua opem ferre adjutori conatur Marchio. Postremo Graeca, quae ex eadem prodiisse officiana judicamus, id fere genus dicendi redolent quo cultiores Graeci nunc utuntur, ex scriptoribus ecclesiasticis potissimum formatum: Graecum igitur aliquem a Grongneto esse in auxilium vocatum, non videtur dissimile veri.

Verum Atlanticas nugas nos quidem ab oblivione non

<sup>15</sup> In libro ejus "*Antiquités et monuments du département de Vaucluse*" T. II.

<sup>16</sup> "*Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire ancienne du globe terrestre*," Par. 1805—1809. 10 T. 12."



vindicassemus, nisi ex illis penderet iudicium de Cyrenaicis titulis ferendum: quo jam licebit breviter defungi. Et primum bilinguem idem Melita misit geometra militaris, qui Atlanticae fraudis socius est; eadem in illo insignium mysticorum insania, quae in Atlantico titulo. Nec mirum, quod Eleusiniis symbolis utitur societas philosophorum Cyrenaica; nempe Eleusinia condidisse Ogygis III. regis Atlantici nepotem, Cyrenaicae sectae auctorem fuisse Atlantem II. Ogygisque mysteria Phoenicia et Eleusinia esse eadem ac Cyrenaica Atlantica, docet Eumalus Cyrenaeus. Tum in Cyrenaica inscriptione bilingui supra est Olympicus annus notatus, prorsus ut in Atlantico Tib. Sempronii titulo; notarum numeralium in Cyrenaico adscitum idem genus est quod in libris Eumali numerandis ( $\Delta\Delta\text{III}$  et  $\Pi$ ), quum tamen his notis librarii post Christianam certe epocham non usi sint nisi in computandis versibus, quot quisque contine-  
ret liber<sup>17</sup>. Praeterea Atlantici monumenti stellis a sinistra ad dextram adscriptae litterae sunt **IEHOΩOYA** (*Jehoova*); Cyrenaico bilingui praefixum est **IEOYA** (*Jeova*): ita enim legendum esse, non *Juda*, quod Gesenius, nec *Jahu*, quod Hamaker putabant, docet nunc alphabetum a Fortia editum. Immo ex hoc alphabeto, quod Atlantici tituli causa proposuit Marchio, expediri demum Cyrenaici Phoenicii lectio potest, quae prius ambigua fuit; litterae enim in utroque fere eadem sunt. Quid quod Cyrenaicus quoque non Phoenicia, sed Melitensi dialecto eadem qua Atlanticus scriptus est? Quam rem denuo examinata inscriptione nuntiavit Gesenius, subditiciam nunc utramque Cyrenaicam iudicans nobiscum. Denique quae in Eumali libro Cyrenaicis tribuuntur praecepta de communione bonorum et mulierum et instituto communiter vivendi, purissimae tranquillitatis fonte, ea ipsa commendat titulus bilinguis atque a mystagogis repetit, ut Eumalus ad mystagogum Atlantem rettulit. Scilicet mysteria quaevis Atlanticae originis esse affatim docuit Eumalus. De altero Cyrenaico monumento, crucigero isto Simoneo, quid jam multis dicamus? Melita simul cum priori hujus exemplum misit idem geometra, haud immerito *Ingeniosorum* adscriptus cohorti; vellemus etiam *Simonista* esset. Dictionis

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Oecon. civ. Athen. T. II. p. 161.



eodem genere ac bilinguis inscriptio, hoc est recentiorum Graecorum eruditorum sermone, Simoneus iste titulus compositus est; doctrina in eo commendatur eadem, et Cyrenaicis antecessoribus tribuitur, quemadmodum fecit Eumalus; nec deest Saturnus mystagogus, quem nunc demum didicimus Ianum esse Atlanticum, Ogygiorum mysteriorum in Italia antistitem, hoc est eorundem, quae Atlas minor propagavit in Cyrenaicam.

*Nil spernat auris, nec tamen credat statim.*

Ser. Berolini d. VIII. m. Jan. a. MDCCCXXXII.

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## MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS.

### I.

*On a passage of the Philoctetes of Sophocles.*

FROM THE GERMAN OF WELCKER.

Ὑπν' ὀδύνας ἀδαής, Ὑπνε δ' ἀλγέων,  
εὐαῆς ἡμῖν ἔλθοις  
εὐαίων, εὐαίων, ὦναξ·  
ὄμμασι δ' ἀντέχοις τὰνδ' αἴγλαν  
ἀ τέταται τανῦν.

THE very different and very forced interpretations which the last but one of these lines has occasioned, without having been ever rightly explained, have arisen solely from an oversight as to a meaning of the word αἴγλα, which is wanting in the modern lexicons except the new edition of Stephanus, though the Greek lexicons give it, and which nobody knew or guessed. The only meaning hitherto thought of has been that of *splendour*. So the Scholiast conceives that the sleep into which Philoctetes has dropt, is splendour and light to him: perhaps as something salutary: though this would contradict what he had said before; for that it is the same grammarian who is proceeding with his explanation, is clear from the transition τοιαύτην δὲ αἴγλην. It is scarcely possible for an interpretation to be more obscure, puzzled, and faulty, than the one he gives; and it is annexed to another which is likewise erroneous. Ἡ κάτεχε τὸ ὁρατικὸν (τὰνδ' αἴγλαν) ὅπερ νῦν ἠπλωται καὶ διαχεῖται (τέταται) τῇ τοῦ ὕπνου ἀχλὺ. τοιαύτην δὲ αἴγλην ἥτις νῦν τέταται ἀντέχοις τοῖς ὄμμασι. λέγει δὲ τὸν ὕπνον τὸν γεγνημένον αὐτῷ παραχρῆμα, ὅς ἐστιν αὐτῷ αἴγλη καὶ φῶς. Musgrave too has explained αἴγλη by *levamen*, *solatium*, which is sometimes the



meaning of φῶς. Solger gives a good sense, but one which is not contained in the words: *Turn aside from the sleeper's eyes this light which is now poured out over them.* Buttmann also understands the light of day, comparing Homer's ἄλλ' ἐπὶ νύξ ὅλοη τέταται δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσι. According to him the chorus desires the Genius of sleep, as dwelling in the eye, to withstand the light and ward off its glare. To this it has already been objected that τανῦν added to a word expressing day-light would be superfluous, and that ὄμμασι would require a præposition. It may be added that the image is not sufficiently natural. For if Sleep is dwelling in the eye, it is already closed against the light: and it is not from within that the light is kept back: Sleep repels it from without with his outspread wings, or in some other like manner. So in the *Iliad* xiv. 359: ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ἐγὼ μαλακὸν περὶ κῶμ' ἐκάλυψα: and νήδυμος ἀμφιχυθείς, v. 253. Hermann retracts his original conjecture, which may be seen in Erfurdt's edition, and translates: *keep before his eyes the glare which is now spread over them*: that is, no glare, but darkness: and this explanation has satisfied Seidler, Wunder, and Schneider. The conception, which is the same that Wakefield and Erfurdt sought to express by writing ἀχλύν, is certainly the right one: but the sense given to the words would not suit the present case, if for no other reason, because the sight of Philoctetes overpowered by sleep could not give the chorus occasion either for jest or bitter irony: and one of these is always coupled with such a mode of expression. As to its being playful, Hermann himself (in v. 1429) in objecting to a signification defended as *per acumen*, observes: *acumen illud non esse seriæ orationis.* Beside which, the language of the chorus, instead of being witty, like the words in the *Phineus* of Sophocles: βλέφαρον κέκλεισται γ' ὡς καπηλείου θύραι: or those in the *Philoctetes* 849, ἀλλ' ὡς τις Ἀἰδᾶ παρακείμενος ὄρα, would be only affected, and in fact tame. Expressions like μελαμφαῆς ἔρεβος, ἀνήλιος λάμπα, τυφλὸν φέγγος, have a different character. It is more correct to compare them with ἐν σκότῳ ὀψοίατο, *Œd. R.* 1274, of a blind man. Whereas they evidently ought to be distinguished from εὐφημος βοή, *Electr.* 620. by which it is impossible to understand *silentium*: unless



we are to give the same sense to the passage in the *Choeph.* 573: ὑμῖν δ' ἐπαινῶ γλῶσσαν εὐφημον φέρειν, σιγᾶν δ' ὅπου δεῖ καὶ λέγειν τὰ καίρια. What can be clearer than the meaning of Clytemnestra, who wishing to offer her sacrifice, breaks off the dispute and will not listen any longer to the words of Electra (οὐκ εὐφημα), but only to εὐφημον γλῶσσαν, and reproaches her with not suffering this to be heard.

All the obscurity of our passage disappears as soon as we observe that αἴγλη signifies a band, which is supposed to be drawn over the eyes of the sleeper; for this is an image naturally suggested by the common and literal phrase of shutting the eyes, *tegere lumina somno*. Αἴγλη does not signify a band in general: but primarily an ornamental band, one glittering with gold and pearls (Plin. xxxiii. 12) or other precious materials, especially for the arm or the foot, just as χλιδών derived its name from the luxurious affluence indicated by it, though in common speech the derivation was forgotten. The lexicographers give the following explanations of αἴγλη. Lex. Sangermann. (Bekk. Anecd. Gr. p. 354): αἴγλη—καὶ τοῦ ζυγοῦ τὸ περίμεσον—καὶ χλιδῶν δέ τις οὕτως ἐκαλεῖτο ἔνιοι δέ φασι σημαίνει καὶ τὸν περιπόδιον κόσμον ἢ τὸν ἀμφιδέα ἢ ἀπλῶς ψέλλιον. σημαίνει δέ καὶ τὴν πέδην ἢ αἴγλη ὡς παρ' Ἐπιχάρμῳ. Pollux v. 100, of articles of female dress: ἰδίως δέ καὶ περὶ τοῖς ποσὶ, περισφύρια, περιπέζια, πέζας, καὶ αἴγλην καὶ πέδην καὶ περισκελίδας. Hesych. Αἴγληχίδων. Σοφοκλῆς Τηρεῖ χιτῶν, καὶ πέδη παρὰ Ἐπιχάρμῳ ἐν Βάκχαις. From what has been already said it is clear that this has been rightly altered into αἴγλη, χλιδών, and that the reading χιτῶν arose through mistake out of χίδων, and ought therefore to be corrected χλιδών, though it has been very lately repeated after Brunck in three different reprints of the fragments of Sophocles, none of which is worthy of the present state of literature. Pollux observes that there were several expressions in use signifying at once a band for the arm, and a band for the foot; and he specifies ἀμφιδεύς and χλιδών; which is natural enough, since the meaning of these terms is general, not confined like that of βραχιόνιον, πέδη, &c. Αἴγλη belongs to the same class, and this is the reason why Sophocles was



able to transfer it to a band for the eyes. At the same time usage is always capricious in things of this sort: and the gloss in Hesychius, unless *χλιδών* has been repeated by accident, seems to imply that *αἴγλη* was used in the *Tereus* of Sophocles for a bracelet, while Epicharmus gave the same name to a band for the leg. It is enough to know that the general meaning of *αἴγλη* is established by express testimony on the authority of Sophocles.

The explanation we have given of *αἴγλη* affects that of the epithet *εὐαής*. For when we have Sleep set before us in a personal shape and attitude, laying his band over the eyes of the sufferer, and according to the wish of the chorus keeping it fixed there, we cannot let the epithet *εὐαής* retain the general signification of *εὐμενής*, benevolent, which is given to it in the Scholia, and has only been adopted for want of a better. Its proper sense, *εὐπνους*, *εὐήνεμος*, *leniter spirans*, will now involuntarily remind us of winged Sleep, Virgil's *volucris Somnus*. In representations of Sleep which exhibit him as he is here conceived, as the dispenser of slumber, we find wings, of the butterfly or the eagle<sup>1</sup>, on his shoulders, and his temples are sometimes fledged as well as his shoulders, and sometimes they alone. Zoega, who in his *Bassirilievi Tav.* 93 has treated the various conceptions of sleep with a diligence that nothing escapes, and at the same time with the most luminous discrimination, and in the most pleasing order, adduces the works of this class at p. 207—210. He is inclined to consider what have been taken for butterfly's wings as those of the bat, and hence to refer them to night: I should rather believe that they contain an allusion to the ordinary conception of Psyche, and intimatè that the soul continues to stir even in sleep. Elsewhere, in a dissertation not yet printed on the winged deities (in answer to Winkelman), Zoega explains the wings of Sleep generally, like those of Night, from the property of covering and concealing. Goethe, in his *Iphigenia*, attributes shadowing wings to the dim state of uncertainty:

<sup>1</sup> Those of the eagle probably refer to the universal dominion of Sleep, who is *πανδαμάτωρ*, and therefore has *Πασιθέα* for his consort.



Speak plainer, that my thoughts be task'd no longer.

Uncertainty in ever-thickening folds

Waves her dark pinions round my beating head<sup>2</sup>.

I am not sure that different ideas may not have been associated with the wings of Sleep. I do not however make this remark on account of the passage in the *Philoctetes*, since Sophocles as a poet was not confined to the sphere of plastic art. Or may we expect to find winged Muses in sculpture or painting, because in Pindar the Victor is born aloft on the wings of the Pierides? or shall we believe that Dice and Themis or *Ædos* were painted with wings, because various poets designated the rapidity of their operation by a like image. It is possible that Sophocles, in speaking of the gentle breath with which Sleep is invoked to approach and bless Philoctetes (*εὐαίωv*), may only have been thinking of the burning pangs which Sleep, as he floated over the sufferer, was to fan away with the cooling motion of his wings. This is very delicately intimated. But it is a peculiarity of Sophocles, that he not unfrequently half conceals his images in this manner under the conciseness of his diction, and compels the imagination to supply them, as other writers make a like demand on the logical or grammatical understanding. In many passages of this difficult poet, which might serve to shew how far we are from having brought the interpretation of his works to its full maturity, this peculiarity constitutes the knot which still awaits a satisfactory solution.

<sup>2</sup> Act III. Sc. 1. Sprich deutlicher, dass ich nicht laenger sinne.  
Die Ungewissheit schlaegt mir tausendfaeltig  
Die dunkeln Schwingen um das bange Haupt.



II.

*On the Months of the Roman Lunar Year.*

MACROBIUS, *Saturnalia* I. 13. states, that Numa, through a superstitious reverence for odd numbers, made the lunar year of the Romans to consist of 355 days; and for the same reason made each of the months, except February, to consist of an odd number of days. Numa, in honorem imparis numeri secretum hoc et ante Pythagoram parturiente natura unum adjecit diem quem Januario dedit; ut tam in anno quam in mensibus singulis præter unum Februarium impar numerus servaretur. He then gives the number of days in each month: in March, May, July, October, 31 each; in February, 28; and in each of the rest 29. Now it appears to me that by investigating the number of days in each month of the old Roman year, we may arrive at the explanation of the division of the months by Calends, Nones, and Ides, which seems at first sight so arbitrary and puzzling.

That the four months named above had always 31 days, and so two days more than the other months of the year, appears from the circumstance that their Nones and Ides were placed two days later than the Nones and Ides of the other months. Their Nones were on the 7th day; their Ides on the 15th. In the remaining months, the Nones were on the 5th; the Ides on the 13th. Even in the other months, to which 31 days were assigned in the Julian Calendar, January, August, and December, the Nones continued to be on the 5th; the Ides on the 13th: beyond doubt because they used to be so before. In the lunar year therefore, or in Numa's Calendar, as it was called, there was in every month an interval of 8 days from the Nones to the Ides; and a complete period of 16 days from the Ides to the end of the month: except that in February this last period wanted one day. Now the religious year, which the early Romans borrowed from the Etruscans, and which is called the year of Romulus, consisted of 304 days, and was divided into 38 periods of 8 days each: and the last days of these periods were marked as public days of peculiar solemnity (see Niebuhr, Vol. I. p. 273.) I conceive



that the division of the months by Nones, Ides, and Calends, arose from the attempt to preserve this ancient division in combination with lunar months and a lunar year. Each month was supposed to contain four periods of 8 days; but as this would have made the months too long, the first of the four periods, from the Calends to the Nones, was arbitrarily shortened; in March, May, July, and October, by one day; in the rest of the months by three days. Nevertheless, the last day of the first period retained its significant name, *Nonæ*, the *ninth* day; that is, according to the Latin idiom, by which both extremes of any period are counted in. This curtailment affords the reason of the solemnity, the account of which is preserved by Macrobius (Sat. i. 15); that the pontiffs, after observing the new Moon (*Jana Novella*), gave notice to the people on what day the Nones were to be reckoned. They knew the length of the other constant periods without notice.

With respect to the Romulian year, which is said to have been divided into ten months, I would utterly reject, as Niebuhr seems to do (Vol. i. p. 273), the account of Macrobius and Solimus, by which they make out the 304 days by assigning 31 days to the four months already named, and 30 days to each of the others. This allotment is inconsistent with a division into eight day periods. If the religious year were divided into months at all, they probably consisted in general of 32 days; and then, there must either have been one of only 16 days, or two of 24 days each. Plutarch, Numa c. 18. says that some months consisted of fewer than 20 days, while some were extended to 35, and others even to more.

Before I quit the subject, I will observe that there was a certain symmetry in the mode in which the months of 29 days in the old lunar year were lengthened out in Julius Cæsar's solar year; which will be best understood by inspection.

January		31 days.
April	30 days.	
June	30	
August		31
September	30	
November	30	
December		31



III.

*Notice of the third Volume of Niebuhr's Roman History.*

THE lovers of Roman history and admirers of Niebuhr<sup>1</sup> had looked forward with lively interest to that portion of his work, which was to embrace the period following that with which the second volume of the first edition closed. The elaborate and abstruse investigations which traced the early history of the constitution were not adapted to the taste of all readers; yet many who either felt little concern in their results, or could not command the patience necessary for following them, would have been very thankful for the new light which the author's sagacity and learning might have been expected to throw on those parts of his subject, with which they were more familiar, or which appeared to them more attractive: while those who had no less keenly enjoyed the researches themselves by which he had been led to his immortal disco-

<sup>1</sup> I trust that these two classes of persons may still be coupled together without impropriety, though the critic who reviewed Niebuhr's work in the 102nd number of the Edinburgh Review appears to intimate that a reverence for Roman story and Roman institutions is not consistent with a similar feeling toward Niebuhr. But perhaps the writer did not mean this to be taken seriously, at least by everybody. It seems more probable that as he more than once betrays a lurking consciousness of his own incompetence for the task he had undertaken—of which a pretty strong proof, though a very minute specimen, was given in No. 1 of this Museum, p. 197—he intended nothing more by his concluding paradox than a playful confession, which those who knew him would easily understand, and which might even be divined by others without any extraordinary sagacity. Thus interpreted, he may be supposed to say: “Niebuhr is said to have devoted the greater part of his life to the study of Roman history; and it is droll enough that I, who care nothing about the subject, and know nothing about his work except what I have picked up in skimming over a few pages of a translation, should have been pronouncing a judgment upon both!” In suggesting this explanation, however, I do not mean to defend the writer's conduct: which, though it may have been a source of amusement to his friends who were in the secret, was not respectful, nor indeed just toward the public. Nor should I have alluded to a production of which it is scarcely possible to speak with gravity, but that I wished to offer a word of praise and congratulation to the Editor of the Edinburgh Review. Every person in his situation, when he orders a piece of criticism, is liable to be now and then taken in by a counterfeit article. In the present case the Editor has made the most honourable and satisfactory amends for the imposition which he was the involuntary instrument of practising upon the public. He has put the same subject into the hands of a totally different person: one who, beside the great advantage of having read the work he professes to review, possesses the capacity of understanding it and appreciating its merits: and who has thus been enabled, instead of a frothy declamation, to give the public a clear and instructive account of its contents.



veries, than the precious fruits produced by them, still anticipated with eagerness a new kind of pleasure and instruction, in accompanying him through the remaining stages of his career. They longed to see how the same great master, who, with such wonderful art, had so often restored the obliterated form of institutions and events by the help of scanty and widely scattered fragments, would work up the rich materials with which the later period supplied him: how he who had shown so vivid a perception of the beauty of the ancient legends, would conceive and reproduce the grandeur of Rome's authentic history: how the same pencil which gave life to the minutest objects that it touched, would portray persons and scenes fitted by their native dignity and importance to rouse even the most torpid imagination: and they desired to hear the same voice which had drawn so many salutary warnings from the struggles of Rome's infant liberty, read the great lessons contained in the story of its decay and its extinction. The author himself sympathized with this feeling of his most enlightened admirers: and in the consciousness of powers which had not yet found full room for their noblest kind of exercise, became almost impatient to enter upon the broader and brighter field that lay before him: where he should meet Machiavel and Montesquieu upon their own ground. He expresses this eagerness in his last preface, where after mentioning the different proportion that his narrative was to bear to his dissertations in the ensuing volume, which was to go down to the second Punic war, he adds: "having felt interested and animated by what I had already written I rejoiced, at the time when it seemed that the completion of the remainder could not be far off, in the prospect of having hereafter to represent and portray men and events."

Under the calamity which overclouded this prospect and disappointed so many wishes, it was still a consolation to learn that some remains of this mighty genius were left behind, which might at least enable posterity in some degree to estimate the nature and extent of the loss they had sustained in his premature departure. The translators of the last edition were authorized to inform the public, that there had been found among Niebuhr's manuscripts a continuous history from the dictatorship of Publilius, where the original



second volume closed, down to the beginning of the first Punic war, written out for the Press ten or twelve years ago: and that this, along with the corrections made in the latter part of the original second volume, embracing the period from the promulgation of the Licinian laws to the dictatorship of Publilius, had been placed in the hands of Savigny, and was expected to be speedily published.

The third volume arrived in this country some weeks back: but the editor's preface has not yet been received. When it appears it will be accompanied by an index which has perhaps been the cause of the delay. It will probably afford some interesting information about the state of the author's manuscripts, which appear to contain more than was at first expected. In the mean time a brief account of the contents of the third volume may be not unacceptable to many of our readers. It will be confined to two points: a statement of the relation in which that part of the volume which corresponds to the latter half of the second in the first edition, stands to the original: and an enumeration of the subjects peculiar to the new volume, which may enable the reader to judge of the proportion which the narrative bears to the antiquarian disquisitions.

The volume opens with a chapter on the Licinian bills. The original chapter on the same subject was interrupted by one on the agrarian institutions, which is now omitted for the reasons mentioned in Vol. II. p. 617 (Transl.) In the description of the bills themselves, that relating to the domain is now placed second, instead of being preceded, as in ed. 1, by that concerning the Keepers of the Sibylline books, which is distinguished as a preparatory measure from the three principal bills, and is set in a new and a clearer light. The refutation of the vulgar story, which attributed the conduct of Licinius to the influence of female vanity, has been retouched and strengthened. The wisdom shown in the comprehensive character of his legislation is more distinctly pointed out: and the nature of the difficulties which he had to encounter, and of the causes that contributed to his success, is now for the first time fully and luminously explained. The advantages of the consular over the decemviral form of government for the interest of the plebeians are also made more palpable. On the other



hand Niebuhr, though restless in the pursuit of truth, was not tormented with the feverish fastidiousness of a *κακιζότεχνος*. The argument with which he supplies Licinius to meet Livy's partial objection, could scarcely have been made more forcible either in thought or expression, and accordingly it has undergone no other alteration than the transposition of a few sentences. The provisions of the agrarian bill are repeated with scarcely any change, but with some additional confirmation, and some interesting illustrations derived from the author's personal familiarity with the existing state of agriculture in the Roman territory. Still more deserving of attention are some remarks on the change of circumstances through which the same measure which in the time of Licinius was purely wise, just, and beneficent, became in the hands of a far more virtuous patriot, the elder Gracchus, doubtful in its policy, calamitous in its consequences. The view taken in the first edition of the third bill, that relating to the adjustment between debtors and creditors, remains in substance the same: only the opinion originally expressed that no laws had hitherto been enacted against usury is now retracted on grounds subsequently explained. But there is a very important variation in the description of the struggle by which the bills at length became law: a fragment of the Capitoline Fasti suggests an entirely new explanation of the threatened fine which overcame the opposition of Camillus.

The next chapter, *On the new curule dignities of the year 384*, contains several important enlargements and corrections of that which discussed the same subject in the first ed.; and in particular Livy's account of the curule ædileship's being thrown open to both orders is shown by the strongest evidence to be altogether erroneous. The following chapter *On the domestic history down to the complete establishment of the plebeian consulship*, has undergone few alterations: the most important is the distinction now introduced between the opposition of the senate and that of the Patres to the plebeian cause. The original chapter, *On the uncial rate of interest*, has been incorporated with the following one which related the occasion and consequences of the insurrection or mutiny of 408 (413). With regard to the former subject the statement of Tacitus is now admitted



and reconciled with Livy's: in other respects the argument and conclusion are unchanged: but the history of the mutiny has been remodelled, and its causes are more clearly explained. In the next chapter which embraces the Military history from 384 (389) to 406 (411), Livy's account of the Gallic inroads at the end of the fourth and the beginning of the following century is more decidedly preferred to that of Polybius: and the history of the Hernican and Etruscan wars of the same period is enriched with some additional facts. Much more important additions and corrections have been introduced into the chapter on the confederation between Rome and Latium, which gives a totally different account of the extent of the new Latin state, and a new explanation of the obscure allusion in Livy VIII. 5: *colonias quoque vestras Latinum Romano prætulisse imperium*. The dissertation originally included in this chapter, *On the ancient form of the Roman legion*, is now separated from it and stands in an entirely new shape by itself under the title: *On the earliest constitution of the manipular legion*. In the following narrative of the first Samnite war the most material change consists in the description of the Samnite constitution, and the explanation of the causes of enmity between Capua and the Samnite mountaineers. The history of the war itself, a beautiful specimen of Niebuhr's powers in this kind of writing, has received but a few slight touches: but we now read with a melancholy interest a note, written, as the editor informs us, in the summer of 1829, in which the long and glorious military career of M. Valerius is compared with that of the Nestor of German poetry, to whom Niebuhr expresses a hope that he may still be able to dedicate his finished history: little foreboding that before this tribute of gratitude and veneration should meet the public eye, the lips which offered it as well as the ears for which it was intended would be closed in death.

In the next chapter, *On the Latin war*, the substance of the narrative remains unaltered: but the supposition that the Volscians were included in the Latin confederation before the conclusion of the Samnite war having been abandoned, the original account of the commencement of the Latin war which was founded upon it has been corrected: the relations in which the various Volscian states henceforth stood to Rome



and Latium are now differently stated: and the feelings excited at Rome by the Latin claims are more clearly explained. Another interesting alteration is the correction of Livy's erroneous statement (VIII. 14.) as to the franchise conferred on Aricia, Nomentum, and Pedum. This, with the communication of a topographical discovery made by the author at Rome, which determines the position of the Rostra nova, and leads to some interesting conclusions with regard to the form of the old Rostra, is the principal fruit we reap from the new chapter on this subject. But the following one, *On the Publilian laws*, has been entirely remodelled, and retains little more than the title of the original one. It appears from a note of the editor in a subsequent page to represent the author's latest views of this obscure and important question.

Here then, at page 174, that portion of the new volume which relates to subjects treated of in the first edition ends. With respect to the remainder we cannot perhaps communicate the information which it is the object of this notice to give, better than by exhibiting at one view the titles of the chapters, with the number of pages occupied by each, and then subjoining a few explanatory remarks.

Domestic History down to the Caudine peace, p. 174.

Alexander of Epirus 181.

Foreign relations down to the second Samnite war 196.

The second Samnite war 214.

Relations between Rome and the nations bordering on Samnium after the peace 309.

The Etruscan wars down to the beginning of the third Samnite war 320.

Domestic history from the Caudine peace down to the third Samnite war 338.

Cn. Flavius 367.

The Censorship of Q. Fabius and P. Decius 374.

The Ogulnian law 409.

Various occurrences of the same period 413.

The third Samnite war, and the others of the same period 416.

Domestic history from the beginning of the third Samnite war down to the Lucanian 476.



Various occurrences of the same period 495.

The Etruscan and Gallic wars 497.

The Lucanian, Bruttian, fourth Samnite, and Tarentine wars 506. Epirus and Pyrrhus 525.

The Roman and Macedonian Tactics 543.

The war with Pyrrhus 553.

Entire subjugation of Italy, and the political rights of the Italian allies 611.

Domestic history and miscellaneous occurrences of the period from the Lucanian to the first Punic war 641.

The first Punic war 657—732.

On the greater part of the titles in this list we need say nothing for the purpose of rousing the reader's curiosity, and indeed our limits confine us to the simple object already announced. We may however express our belief, that Niebuhr will be found to rise with his theme, and that the present volume contains specimens of historical eloquence which will bear a comparison with the masterpieces of ancient and modern times. These have probably lost little or nothing in not having received the author's finishing touches. What is much more to be deplored is, that the narrative is not complete down to the end of the period which it comprehends. There is a chasm in the history of the first Punic war, which in fact ends with the occupation of mount Hercte (Monte Pellegrino) by Hamilcar: on the remaining years of the war we have only the heads of the intended narrative. It is however a great consolation for this loss, that we have the conclusion of the chapter, including remarks on the general consequences of the war, and on the constitution of Sicily as a Roman province, together with a short sketch of the relations in which the Italian allies stood to Rome at the end of the war. This last is the more valuable on account of another chasm which occurs at the close of the chapter on the political rights of the Italian allies, where the author broke off just as he was about to enter upon a description of their constitution—the most mortifying blank, as the editor truly observes, in the whole work. On the other hand in the chapters relating to the domestic history we have great reason to regret that they did not receive the corrections and enlargements which would have represented Niebuhr's last views on



many interesting points. Thus for instance in the chapter on the domestic history from the beginning of the second Samnite war to the Lucanian, we find it observed that the import of the Publilian laws can scarcely be determined with any degree of certainty from the sources of information at present known to us: an expression which, as the editor observes, would undoubtedly have been modified in a revision of the chapter, since a more decided and precise opinion is given on the subject both in the second volume (in the chapter entitled, *The first year after the restoration of freedom*) and in the chapter of the present volume *On the Publilian laws*. The views there proposed are the same, we are informed, that Niebuhr had been in the habit of unfolding in his lectures: and this remark is interesting, as it suggests a hope, which can scarcely prove altogether fallacious, that even for those parts of his subject on which no fragments are found among his manuscripts, his history has not altogether died with him: and that those treasures of learning which he so freely scattered among his academical audiences, have not been wasted and will not long lie buried, but will in due time, though not in the form which the author himself would have given to them, be added to the public store of literature. In the mean while the literary world has cause to rejoice in the addition which the third volume has made to knowledge, the friends of the author in the new monument it has raised to his fame.

C. T.



## ON THE IRONY OF SOPHOCLES.

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SOME readers may be a little surprised to see *irony* attributed to a tragic poet: and it may therefore be proper, before we proceed to illustrate the nature of the thing as it appears in the works of Sophocles, to explain and justify our application of the term. We must begin with a remark or two on the more ordinary use of the word, on that which to distinguish it from the subject of our present enquiry, we will call *verbal irony*. This most familiar species of irony may be described as a figure which enables the speaker to convey his meaning with greater force by means of a contrast between his thought and his expression, or to speak more accurately, between the thought which he evidently designs to express, and that which his words properly signify. The cases in which this figure may be advantageously employed are so various as to include some directly opposite in their nature. For it will serve to express assent and approbation as well as the contrary. Still as a friend cannot be defended unless against an enemy who attacks him, the use of verbal irony must in all cases be either directly or indirectly polemical. It is a weapon properly belonging to the armoury of controversy, and not fitted to any entirely peaceable occasion. This is not the less true because, as the enginery of war is often brought out, and sham fights exhibited, for the public amusement in time of peace, so there is a sportive irony, which instead of indicating any contrariety of opinion or animosity of feeling, is the surest sign of perfect harmony and goodwill. And as there is a mode of expressing sentiments of the utmost esteem and unanimity by an ironical reproof or contradiction, so there is an ironical self-commendation, by which a man may playfully confess his own failings. In the former case the speaker feigns the existence of adversaries whose language he pretends to adopt: in the latter



he supposes himself surrounded, not as he really is by indulgent friends, but by severe judges of his actions, before whom it is necessary for him to disguise the imperfections of his character. But where irony is not merely jocular, it is not simply serious, but earnest. With respect to opinion it implies a conviction so deep, as to disdain a direct refutation of the opposite party: with respect to feeling, it implies an emotion so strong, as to be able to command itself, and to suppress its natural tone, in order to vent itself with greater force.

Irony is so inviting an instrument of literary warfare, that there are perhaps few eminent controversial writers who have wholly abstained from the use of it. But in general even those who employ it most freely reserve it for particular occasions, to add weight and point to the gravest part of the argument. There is however an irony which deserves to be distinguished from the ordinary species by a different name, and which may be properly called *dialectic irony*. This, instead of being concentrated in insulated passages, and rendered prominent by its contrast with the prevailing tone of the composition, pervades every part, and is spread over the whole like a transparent vesture closely fitted to every limb of the body. The writer effects his purpose by placing the opinion of his adversary in the foreground, and saluting it with every demonstration of respect, while he is busied in withdrawing one by one all the supports on which it rests: and he never ceases to approach it with an air of deference, until he has completely undermined it, when he leaves it to sink by the weight of its own absurdity. Examples of this species are as rare as those of the other are common. The most perfect ever produced are those which occur in Plato's dialogues. In modern literature the finest specimens may be found in the works of Pascal, and of Plato's German translator, who has imbibed the peculiar spirit of the Platonic irony in a degree which has perhaps never been equalled. One of the most unfortunate attempts ever made at imitating this character of the Platonic dialogue, is Bishop Berkeley's Minute Philosopher. Examples of a more superficial kind, where the object is rather ridicule than argument, will readily present themselves to the reader's recollection. The highest triumph of irony consists not in refutation and



demolition. It requires that, while the fallacy is exposed and overthrown by the admissions which it has itself demanded, the truth should be set in the clearest light, and on the most solid ground, by the attempts made to suppress and overwhelm it.

Without departing from the analogy that pervades the various kinds of verbal irony, we may speak of a *practical irony*, which is independent of all forms of speech, and needs not the aid of words. Life affords as many illustrations of this, as conversation and books of the other. But here we must carefully distinguish between two totally different kinds, which, though they may often outwardly coincide, spring from directly contrary feelings. There is a malignant, or at least a wanton irony, in the practical sense, by which a man humours the folly of another, for the purpose of rendering it more extravagant and incorrigible, whether it be with the further aim of extracting materials for ridicule from it, or of turning it to some still less liberal use. Specimens of this kind are perpetually occurring in society, and ancient and modern comedy is full of them. But this same irony has a darker side, which can excite only detestation and horror, as something belonging rather to the nature of a fiend than of a man. Such is the flattery which, under the mask of friendship, deliberately cherishes passions, and panders to wishes, which are hurrying their unconscious slave into ruin. Such is the spirit in which Timon gives his gold to Alcibiades and his companions, and afterwards to the thieves: though in the latter case he is near defeating his own purpose by the irony of his language, which compels one of the thieves to say: "He has almost charmed me from my profession by persuading me to it." Such is the irony with which the weird women feed the ambitious hopes of Macbeth, and afterward lull him into a false "security, mortals' chiefest enemy," when they have been commanded to

"raise such artificial sprites

As by the strength of their illusion

Shall draw him on to his confusion."

Till "He shall spurn fate, scorn death, and bear

His hopes 'bove wisdom, grace, and fear."



Such, but more truly diabolical, is the irony with which in *Faust* the Spirit of Evil accompanies his victim on his fatal career, and with which, by way of interlude, he receives the visit of the young scholar.

But there is also a practical irony which is not inconsistent with the highest degree of wisdom and benevolence. A man of superior understanding may often find himself compelled to assent to propositions which he knows, though true in themselves, will lead to very erroneous inferences in the mind of the speaker, because either circumstances prevent him from subjoining the proper limitations, or the person he is addressing is incapable of comprehending them. So again a friend may comply with the wishes of one who is dear to him, though he foresees that they will probably end in disappointment and vexation, either because he conceives that he has no right to decide for another, or because he thinks it probable that the disappointment itself will prove more salutary than the privation. Such is the conduct of the affectionate father in the parable, which is a type of universal application: for in every transgression there is a concurrence of a depraved will, which is the vice of the agent, with certain outward conditions, which may be considered as a boon graciously bestowed, but capable of being perverted into an instrument of evil, and a cause of misery. It must have occurred to most men, more especially to those of sanguine temperament, and whose lives have been chequered with many vicissitudes, now and then to reflect how little the good and ill of their lot has corresponded with their hopes and fears. All who have lived long enough in the world must be able to remember objects coveted with impatient eagerness, and pursued with long and unremitting toil, which in possession have proved tasteless and worthless: hours embittered with anxiety and dread by the prospect of changes which brought with them the fulfilment of the most ardent wishes: events anticipated with trembling expectation which arrived, past, and left no sensible trace behind them: while things of which they scarcely heeded the existence, persons whom they met with indifference, exerted the most important influence on their character and fortunes. When,



at a sufficient interval and with altered mood, we review such instances of the mockery of fate, we can scarcely refrain from a melancholy smile. And such, we conceive, though without any of the feelings that sometimes sadden our retrospect, must have been the look which a superior intelligence, exempt from our passions, and capable of surveying all our relations, and foreseeing the consequences of all our actions, would at the time have cast upon the tumultuous workings of our blind ambition and our groundless apprehensions, upon the phantoms we raised to chase us, or to be chased, while the substance of good and evil presented itself to our view, and was utterly disregarded.

But it is not only in the lives of individuals that man's shortsighted impatience and temerity are thus tacitly rebuked by the course of events: examples still more striking are furnished by the history of states and institutions. The moment of the highest prosperity is often that which immediately precedes the most ruinous disaster, and (as in the case not only of a Xerxes, a Charles the Bold, a Philip the second, and a Napoleon, but of Athens, and Sparta, and Carthage, and Venice,) it is the sense of security that constitutes the danger, it is the consciousness of power and the desire of exerting it that causes the downfall. It is not however these sudden and signal reverses, the fruit of overweening arrogance and insatiable ambition, that we have here principally to observe: but rather an universal law, which manifests itself, no less in the moral world than in the physical, according to which the period of inward languor, corruption, and decay, which follows that of maturity, presents an aspect more dazzling and commanding, and to those who look only at the surface inspires greater confidence and respect, than the season of youthful health, of growing but unripened strength. The power of the Persians was most truly formidable when they first issued from their comparatively narrow territory to overspread Asia with their arms. But at what epoch in their history does the Great King appear invested with such majesty, as when he dictated the peace of Antaleidas to the Greeks! And yet at this very time the throne on which he sat with so lofty a port, was so insecurely based, that a slight



shock would have been sufficient, as was soon proved, to level it with the dust.

It was nearly at the same juncture that Sparta seemed to have attained the summit of her power: her old enemy had been reduced to insignificance: her two most formidable rivals converted into useful dependants: her refractory allies chastised and cowed: in no quarter of the political horizon, neither in nor out of Greece, did it seem possible for the keenest eye to discover any prognostics of danger: her empire, says the contemporary historian, appeared in every respect to have been now established on a glorious and solid base. Yet in a few years the Spartan women saw for the first time the smoke of the flames with which a hostile army ravaged their country in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital: and a Spartan embassy implored the pity of the Athenians, and pleaded the magnanimity with which Sparta in her day of victory had preserved Athens from annihilation, as a motive for the exercise of similar generosity toward a fallen enemy. The historian sees in this reverse the judgement of the gods against treachery and impiety. But when we inquire about the steps by which the change was effected, we find that the mistress of Greece had lost—nearly a thousand of her subjects, and about four hundred of her citizens, at the battle of Leuctra.

It would be impertinent to accumulate illustrations which will present themselves uncalled to every reader's mind: we might otherwise find some amusement in comparing the history of great cities with that of their respective states, and in observing how often the splendour of the one has increased in proportion to the weakness and rottenness of the other. The ages of conquest and of glory had past, before Rome began to exhibit a marble front; and the old consuls who in the wars of a century scarcely quelled the Samnite hydra, and who brought army after army into the field to be destroyed by Hannibal, would have gazed with wonder on the magnificence in the midst of which the master of the empire, in anguish and dismay, called upon Varus to restore his three legions. Yet Rome under Augustus was probably less gorgeous than Byzantium under Constantine, whose city was



no unapt image of the ill which Dante deplored, as the consequence, though not the effect, of his conversion<sup>1</sup>. But instead of dwelling on the numerous contrasts of this kind which history suggests in illustrating the fragile and transitory nature of all mortal greatness, we shall draw nearer to our main point, and shall at the same time be taking a more cheering view of our subject, if we observe, that, as all things human are subject to dissolution, so and for the same reason it is the moment of their destruction that to the best and noblest of them is the beginning of a higher being, the dawn of a brighter period of action. When we reflect on the colossal monarchies that have succeeded one another on the face of the earth, we readily acknowledge that they fulfilled the best purpose of their proud existence, when they were broken up in order that their fragments might serve as materials for new structures. We confess with a sigh that the wonders of Egypt were not a mere waste of human labour, if the sight of them inspired the genius of the Greeks. But we should have been more reluctant to admit that this nation itself, which stands so solitary and unapproachable in its peculiar excellence, attained its highest glory, when, by the loss of its freedom and its power, it was enabled to diffuse a small portion of its spirit through the Roman world: had it not been that it was the destiny of this Roman world to crumble into dust, and to be trampled by hordes of barbarians, strangers to arts and letters. Yet we can believe this, and things much more wonderful, when we contemplate that new order of things, which followed what seemed so frightful a darkness, and such irretrievable ruin.

We must add one other general remark before we proceed to apply the preceding. There is always a slight cast of irony in the grave, calm, respectful attention impartially bestowed by an intelligent judge on two contending parties, who are pleading their causes before him with all the earnestness of deep conviction, and of excited feeling. What makes the contrast interesting is, that the right and the truth lie on neither side exclusively: that there is no fraudulent purpose, no gross imbecility of intellect, on either: but both have plausible

<sup>1</sup> Inf. xix. Ahi, Costantin, di quanto mal fu matre, Non la tua conversion, ma quella dote Che da te prese il primo ricco patre.



claims and specious reasons to alledge, though each is too much blinded by prejudice or passion to do justice to the views of his adversary. For here the irony lies not in the demeanor of the judge, but is deeply seated in the case itself, which seems to favour each of the litigants, but really eludes them both. And this too it is that lends the highest degree of interest to the conflicts of religious and political parties. For when we believe that no principle, no sentiment, is involved in the contest, but that each of the rival factions is equally selfish, and equally insincere, we must look on with indifference or disgust, unless some other interests are likely to be affected by the issue. Our attention is indeed more anxiously fixed on a struggle in which right and wrong, truth and falsehood, virtue and vice, are manifestly arrayed in deliberate opposition against each other. But still this case, if it ever occurs, is not that on which the mind dwells with the most intense anxiety. For it seems to carry its own final decision in itself. But the liveliest interest arises when by inevitable circumstances, characters, motives, and principles are brought into hostile collision, in which good and evil are so inextricably blended on each side, that we are compelled to give an equal share of our sympathy to each, while we perceive that no earthly power can reconcile them; that the strife must last until it is extinguished with at least one of the parties, and yet that this cannot happen without the sacrifice of something which we should wish to preserve. Such spectacles often occur in human affairs, and agitate the bystanders with painful perplexity. But a review of history tends to allay this uneasiness, by affording us on many such occasions, a glimpse of the balance held by an invisible hand, which so nicely adjusts the claims of the antagonists, that neither is wholly triumphant, nor absolutely defeated; each perhaps loses the object he aimed at, but in exchange gains something far beyond his hopes.

The dramatic poet is the creator of a little world, in which he rules with absolute sway, and may shape the destinies of the imaginary beings to whom he gives life and breath according to any plan that he may choose. Since however they are men whose actions he represents, and since it is human sympathy that he claims, he will, if he understands



his art, make his administration conform to the laws by which he conceives the course of mortal life to be really governed. Nothing that rouses the feelings in the history of mankind is foreign to his scene, but as he is confined by artificial limits, he must hasten the march of events, and compress within a narrow compass what is commonly found diffused over a large space, so that a faithful image of human existence may be concentrated in his mimic sphere. From this sphere however he himself stands aloof. The eye with which he views his microcosm, and the creatures who move in it, will not be one of human friendship, nor of brotherly kindness, nor of parental love; it will be that with which he imagines that the invisible power who orders the destiny of man might regard the world and its doings. The essential character therefore of all dramatic poetry must depend on the poet's religious or philosophical sentiments, on the light in which he contemplates history and life, on the belief he entertains as to the unseen hand that regulates their events.

If any of these remarks should appear questionable as a general proposition, we may at least safely assume their truth as beyond doubt, when they are applied to Sophocles. Not even the most superficial reader of his works can fail to observe, that they are all imprest with a deep religious character, that he takes every opportunity of directing the attention of his audience to an overruling Power, and appears to consider his own most important function to be that of interpreting its decrees. What then was the religion of Sophocles? what was his conception of this Power whom he himself represents in conducting the affairs of his ideal world? On the answer we give to this question must evidently depend our apprehension of the poet's main design, and our enjoyment of the art he has exerted in its execution. Unquestionably the religion of Sophocles was not the religion of Homer, and the light in which he viewed destiny and providence was not that in which they are exhibited by the Homeric poems. In the interval which separated the maturity of epic and dramatic poetry, the human mind had taken some great strides: and men of a vigorous and cultivated intellect could no longer acquiesce in the simple theology of the Homeric age. The dogma which to the hearers of the old bard seemed



perhaps the best solution that could be found for their moral difficulties, that the father of gods and men was, like the humblest of his children, subject to the sway of an irresistible fate, against which he often might murmur in vain: this dogma was suppressed or kept in the back ground, and on the other hand the paramount supremacy of Jupiter was brought prominently forward<sup>2</sup>. The popular mythology indeed still claimed unabated reverence, even from the most enlightened Greeks. But the quarrels of the gods, which had afforded so much entertainment to their simplehearted forefathers, were hushed on the tragic scene: and a unity of will was tacitly supposed to exist among the members of the Olympian family, which would have deprived Homer of his best machinery. The tendency of these changes was to transfer the functions of Destiny to Jupiter, and to represent all events as issuing from his will, and the good and evil that falls to the lot of mortals as dispensed by his hand. It is evident that, so far as this notion prevailed, the character of destiny was materially altered. It could no longer be considered as a mere brute force, a blind necessity working without consciousness of its means or its ends. The power indeed still remained, and was still mysterious in its nature, inevitable and irresistible in its operation; but it was now conceived to be under the direction of a sovereign mind, acting according to the rules of unerring justice. This being the case, though its proceedings might often be inscrutable to man, they would never be accidental or capricious.

How far these ideas had acquired clearness and consistency in the mind of Sophocles, it is impossible precisely and certainly to determine. But it seems indisputable that indications of them appear in his works, and it is interesting to observe the traces of their influence on his poetry. It has indeed been often supposed that some of his greatest masterpieces were founded on a totally different view of the subject from that just described: on the supposition that mankind were

<sup>2</sup> See *Antigon.* 600. *τεάν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τίς ἀνδρῶν ὑπερβασία κατάσχοι, τὰν οὔθ' ὕπνος αἰρεῖ ποθ' ὁ παντογῆρως κ.τ.λ.* *Æd. C.* 1035. *ὡς παντάρχε θεῶν, παντόπτα Ζεῦ.* *El.* 174. *μέγας ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς, ὃς ἐφορᾷ πάντα καὶ κρατύνει.* *Æd. T.* 897. *ἀλλ' ὦ κρατύνων, εἴπερ ὄρθ' ἀκούεις, Ζεῦ πάντ' ἀνάσσω.* The thought is still more forcibly expressed in *Philoct.* 979. *Ζεὺς ἔσθ', ἔν' εἰδῆς, Ζεὺς ὁ τῆσδε γῆς κρατῶν, Ζεὺς, ᾧ δέδοκται ταῦθ'.*



either subject to an iron destiny, which without design or forethought steadily pursued its immutable track, insensible of the victims which in its progress it crushed beneath its car: or else that they were at the mercy of reckless and wayward deities, who sported with their happiness, and sometimes destroyed it merely to display their power. We do not deny that the former at least of these suppositions may be adapted to the purposes of dramatic poetry, and that the contrast between man with his hopes, fears, wishes, and undertakings, and a dark, inflexible fate, affords abundant room for the exhibition of tragic irony: but we conceive that this is not the loftiest kind, and that Sophocles really aimed at something higher. To investigate this subject thoroughly, so as to point out the various shades and gradations of irony in his tragedies, would require much more than the space which can here be devoted to it. We shall content ourselves with selecting some features in his compositions which appear most strikingly to illustrate the foregoing remarks. One observation however must be premised, without which the works of Sophocles can scarcely be viewed in a proper light. That absolute power which we have attributed to the dramatic poet over his creatures, may be limited by circumstances: and in the Greek theatre it was in fact restricted by peculiar causes. None but gods or heroes could act any prominent part in the Attic tragedy; and as the principal persons were all celebrated in the national poetry, their deeds and sufferings were in general familiar to the audience. The poet indeed enjoyed full liberty of choice among the manifold forms which almost every tradition assumed: and he was allowed to introduce considerable variations in subordinate points. But still he was confined within a definite range of subjects, and even in that he could not expatiate with uncontrolled freedom. Now the legends from which his scenes were to be drawn, were the fictions, at least the tales, of a simple but rude age: the characters of his principal persons were such as had struck the vigorous but unrefined imagination of a race who were still children of nature: their actions were such as exhibited the qualities most esteemed in the infancy of society; and their fate corresponded to the view then entertained of the manner in which the affairs of the world are directed by



natural or supernatural agency. While the poet's materials were thus prescribed for him, it was scarcely possible that he should infuse his spirit equally into all, and so mould and organize them, as never to betray the coarseness of their original texture. Duly to estimate the art of Sophocles, and rightly to understand his designs, we must take into account the resistance of the elements which he had to transform and fashion to his purposes. When we consider their nature we shall not perhaps be surprized to find that he sometimes contents himself with slight indications of his meaning, and that everything does not appear exactly to harmonize with it. We shall rather admire the unity that pervades works framed out of such a chaos, and the genius which could stamp the ancient legends with a character so foreign to their original import.

The irony in which Sophocles appears to us to have displayed the highest powers of his art, is not equally conspicuous in all his remaining plays, though we believe the perception of it to be indispensable for the full enjoyment of every one of them. We shall for this reason be led to dwell less upon some of his greatest masterpieces, than upon works which are commonly deemed of inferior value. But we shall begin with those in which the poet's intention is most apparent, and shall thus perhaps be enabled to find a clue to it where it is less clearly disclosed. We are thus led in the first place to consider two of those founded on the Theban legends.

Though it is not certain whether *Œdipus King* and *Œdipus at Colonus* were parts of one original design, it is at least probable that the contrast by which the effect of each is so much heightened entered into the poet's plan. Each indeed is complete in itself, and contains every thing requisite for the full understanding and enjoyment of it; and yet each acquires a new force and beauty from a comparison with the other. We shall therefore consider them successively.

The opening scene of the first *Œdipus* exhibits the people of Cadmus bowed down under the weight of a terrible calamity. A devouring pestilence is ravaging its fields, and desolating its city. The art of man has hitherto availed nothing to check its progress: the aid of the gods has been implored in vain.



The altars have blazed, and the temples reeked with incense: yet the victims of the Destroying Power continue to fall on every side, frequent as ever. The streets are constantly resounding with the pæan: but its strains are still interrupted by the voice of wailing. In this extremity of affliction however a gleam of hope shoots from one quarter through the general gloom. The royal house has been hitherto exempt from the overwhelming evil. The king, happy in the affection of his consort, and surrounded by a flourishing family, seems alone to stand erect above the flood of evils with which his people are struggling, and under which they are ready to sink. To his fortune and wisdom the afflicted city now looks for deliverance. It has not been forgotten that, on a former occasion, when Thebes was smitten with a scourge almost equally grievous, the marvellous sagacity of Œdipus solved the enigma on which its fate depended. There is therefore good ground for hoping that his tried prudence, aided by the favour of the gods, may once more succeed in penetrating to the mysterious cause of the present calamity, and may contrive means of relief. With this belief a throng of suppliants of all ages, headed by the ministers of the temples, has come in solemn procession to the royal palace, and has seated itself on the steps of the altars before its vestibule, bearing the sacred ensigns with which the miserable are wont to implore succour from the powerful. Informed of their approach, the king himself comes forth to hear their complaints, and receive their requests. His generous nature is touched by the piteous spectacle, and though himself unhurt, he feels for the stroke under which his people suffers. The public distress has long been the object of his paternal cares: already he has taken measures for relieving it: he has sent a messenger to the oracle which had guided his steps in other momentous junctures by its timely warnings, and had brought him to his present state of greatness and glory: the answer of the Delphic god is hourly expected, without which even the wisdom of Œdipus himself can devise no remedy.

At the moment the envoy arrives with joyful tidings. Apollo has revealed to him the cause of the evil and the means of removing it. The land labours under a curse drawn upon it by the guilt of man: it is the stain of blood that



has poisoned all the sources of life; the crime must be expiated, the pollution purged. Yet the oracle which declares the nature of the deed is silent as to the name of the criminal; he is denounced as the object of divine and human vengeance; but his person is not described, his abode is not disclosed, except by the intimation that the land is cursed by his presence. The sagacity of *Œdipus* is still required to detect the secret on which the safety of his people depends; and he confidently undertakes to bring it to light. The suppliant multitude, their worst fears quieted, better hopes revived, withdraw in calm reliance on the king and the god; and the Chorus appearing at the summons of *Œdipus*, cheered yet perplexed by the mysterious oracle, partially soothed by its promises, but still trembling with timid suspense, pours forth a plaintive strain, in which it describes the horrors of its present condition, and implores the succour of its tutelary deities.

During this pause the spectator has leisure to reflect, how different all is from what it seems. The wrath of heaven has been pointed against the afflicted city, only that it might fall with concentrated force on the head of a single man; and he who is its object stands alone calm and secure: unconscious of his own misery he can afford pity for the unfortunate: to him all look up for succour: and, as in the plenitude of wisdom and power, he undertakes to trace the evil, of which he is himself the sole author, to its secret source.

In the meanwhile the king has deliberated with his kinsman Creon, and now appears to proclaim his will and publish his measures. To the criminal, if he shall voluntarily discover himself, he offers leave to retire from the country with impunity: to whoever shall make him known, whether citizen or stranger, large reward and royal favour: but should this gracious invitation prove ineffectual, then he threatens the guilty with the utmost rigour of justice; and finally, should man's arm be too short, he consigns the offender by a solemn imprecation to the vengeance of the gods. The same curse he denounces against himself, if he knowingly harbours the man of blood under his roof, and a like one against all who refuse to aid him in his search. The Chorus, after protesting its innocence, offers advice. Next to Apollo the blind seer



Tiresias is reputed to possess the largest share of supernatural knowledge. From him the truth which the oracle has withheld may be best ascertained. But Ædipus has anticipated this prudent counsel, and on Creon's suggestion has already sent for Tiresias, and is surprized that he has not yet arrived. At length the venerable man appears. His orbs of outward sight have long been quenched: but so much the clearer and stronger is the light which shines inward, and enables him to discern the hidden things of heaven and earth. The king conjures him to exert his prophetic power for the deliverance of his country and its ruler. But instead of a ready compliance, the request is received with expressions of grief and despondency: it is first evaded, and at length peremptorily refused. The indignation of Ædipus is roused by the unfeeling denial, and at length he is provoked to declare his suspicion that Tiresias has been himself, so far as his blindness permitted, an accessory to the regicide. The charge kindles in its turn the anger of the seer, and extorts from him the dreadful secret which he had resolved to suppress. He bids his accuser obey his own recent proclamation, and thenceforward as the perpetrator of the deed which had polluted the land, to seal his unhallowed lips. Enraged at the audacious recrimination, Ædipus taunts Tiresias with his blindness: a darkness, not of the eyes only, but of the mind; he is a child of night, whose puny malice can do no hurt to one whose eyes are open to the light of day. Yet who can have prompted the old man to the impudent calumny? Who but the counsellor at whose suggestion he had been consulted? The man who, when Ædipus and his children are removed, stands nearest to the throne? It is a conspiracy—a plot laid by Creon, and hatched by Tiresias. The suspicion once admitted becomes a settled conviction, and the king deploras the condition of royalty, which he finds thus exposed to the assaults of envy and ambition. But his resentment, vehement as it is, at Creon's ingratitude, is almost forgotten in his abhorrence and contempt of the hoary impostor who has sold himself to the traitor. Even his boasted art is a juggle and a lie. Else, why was it not exerted when the Sphinx propounded her fatal riddle? The seer then was not Tiresias but Ædipus. The lips then closed by the consciousness of



ignorance have now been opened by the love of gold. His age alone screens him from immediate punishment: the partner of his guilt will not escape so easily. Tiresias answers by repeating his declaration in still plainer terms; but as at the king's indignant command he is about to retire, he drops an allusion to his birth, which reminds Œdipus of a secret which he has not yet unriddled. Instead however of satisfying his curiosity, the prophet once again, in language still more distinct than before, describes his present condition and predicts his fate.

This scene completes the exposition that was begun in the preceding one. The contrast between the real blindness and wretchedness of Œdipus and his fancied wisdom and greatness can be carried no further, than when he contemptuously rejects the truth which he is seeking and has found, and makes it a ground of quarrel with a faithful friend. The Chorus, in its next song, only interprets the irony of the action, when it asks, who is the guilty wretch against whom the oracle has let loose the ministers of vengeance? Where can be his lurkingplace? It must surely be in some savage forest, in some dark cave, or rocky glen, among the haunts of wild beasts, that the miserable fugitive hides himself from his pursuers. Who can believe that he is dwelling in the heart of the city, in the royal palace! that he is seated on the throne!

It does not belong to our present purpose to dwell on the following scenes, in which the fearful mystery is gradually unfolded. The art with which the poet has contrived to sustain the interest of the spectator, by retarding the discovery, has been always deservedly admired. It has indeed been too often considered as the great excellence of this sublime poem, the real beauty of which, as we hope to shew, is of a very different kind, and infinitely more profound and heartstirring than mere ingenuity can produce. But the attentive reader who shall examine this part of the play from the point of view that has been here taken, will not fail to observe, among numberless finer touches of irony with which the dialogue is inlaid, that the poet has so constructed his plot, as always to evolve the successive steps of the disclosure out of incidents which either exhibit the delusive security of Œdipus in the



strongest light, or tend to cherish his confidence, and allay his fears. Thus the scene with Jocasta in which his apprehensions are first awakened, arises out of the suspicion he has conceived of Creon, which, unjust and arbitrary as it is, is the only refuge he has been able to find from the necessity of believing Tiresias. The tidings from Corinth, by which he and Jocasta are so elated as to question the prescience of the gods, leads to the discovery which fixes her doom. Still more remarkable is the mode in which this is connected with the following and final stage of the solution. *Œdipus* has reason to dread that the arrival of the herdsman may confirm his worst fears as to the death of *Laius*. Yet he forgets this as a slight care in his impatience to ascertain his parentage: hence the Chorus bursts out into a strain of joy at the prospect of the festive rites with which *Cithæron*—a spot to be henceforth so dear to the royal family—will be honoured, when the happy discovery shall be made: and *Œdipus* presses the herdsman on this subject with sanguine eagerness, which will bear no evasion or delay, and never ceases to hope for the best, until he has extorted the truth which shews him the whole extent of his calamity.

No sooner has the film dropped from his eyes than he condemns himself to perpetual darkness, to the state which, but a short time before, had been the subject of his taunts on *Tiresias*. The feeling by which he is urged thus to verify the seer's prediction, is not the horror of the light and of all the objects it can present to him, but indignation at his own previous blindness. The eyes which have served him so ill, which have seen without discerning what it was most important for him to know, shall be for ever extinguished<sup>3</sup>. And in this condition, most wretched, most helpless, he enters once more, to exhibit a perfect contrast to his appearance in the opening scene, and thus to reverse that irony, of which we have hitherto seen but one side. While he saw the light of day, he had been ignorant, infatuated, incapable of distinguishing truth from falsehood, friend from foe. Now he clearly perceives all that concerns him; he is conscious of the differ-

<sup>3</sup> Hermann's correction and interpretation of the passage here alluded to, v. 1271—1274, seem indispensably necessary, and restore one of the most beautiful touches in the play.



ence between his own shrewdness and the divine intelligence: he is cured of his rash presumption, of his hasty suspicions, of his doubts and cares: he has now a sure test of Creon's sincerity, and he finds that it will stand the trial. Creon's moderation, discretion, and equanimity, are beautifully contrasted in this scene, as in that of the altercation, with the vehement passion of Ædipus. The mutual relation of the two characters so exactly resembles that between Tasso and Antonio in Goethe's *Tasso*, that the German play may serve as a commentary on this part of the Greek one. And here it may be proper to remark that Sophocles has rendered sufficiently clear for an attentive reader, what has nevertheless been too commonly overlooked, and has greatly disturbed many in the enjoyment of this play: that Ædipus, though unfortunate enough to excite our sympathy, is not so perfectly innocent as to appear the victim of a cruel and malignant power. The particular acts indeed which constitute his calamity were involuntarily committed: and hence in the sequel he can vindicate himself from the attack of Creon, and represent himself to the villagers of Colonus as a man more sinned against than sinning<sup>4</sup>. But still it is no less evident that all the events of his life have arisen out of his headstrong, impetuous character, and could not have happened if he had not neglected the warning of the god. His blindness, both the inward and the outward, has been self-inflicted! Now, as soon as the first paroxysm of grief has subsided, he appears chastened, sobered, humbled: the first and most painful step to true knowledge and inward peace, has been taken; and he already feels an assurance, that he is henceforward an especial object of divine protection, which will shield him from all ordinary ills and dangers.

Here, where the main theme of the poet's irony is the contrast between the appearance of good and the reality of evil, these intimations of the opposite contrast are sufficient. But in *Ædipus at Colonus* this new aspect of the subject becomes the groundwork of the play. It is not indeed so strikingly exhibited as the former, because the fate of Ædipus is not the sole, nor even the principal object of attention, but

<sup>4</sup> 266. τὰ γ' ἔργα μου Πεπονθότ' ἐστὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεδρακότα.



is subordinate to another half political, half religious interest, arising out of the legends which connect it with the ancient glories and future prospects of Attica, and with the sanctuary of Colonus. Still the same conception which is partially unfolded in the first play is here steadily pursued, and, so far as the Theban hero is concerned, is the ruling idea. In the first scene the appearance of Œdipus presents a complete reverse of that which we witnessed at the opening of the preceding play. We now see him stript of all that then seemed to render his lot so enviable, and suffering the worst miseries to which human nature is liable. He is blind, old, destitute: an outcast from his home, an exile from his country, a wanderer in a foreign land: reduced to depend on the guidance and support of his daughter, who herself needs protection, and to subsist on the scanty pittance afforded him by the compassion of strangers, who, whenever they recognize him, view him with horror. But a change has likewise taken place within him, which compensates even for this load of affliction. In the school of adversity he has learnt patience, resignation, and content. The storm of passion has subsided, and has left him calm and firm. The cloud has rolled away from his mental vision, and nothing disturbs the clearness and serenity of his views. He not only contemplates the past in the light of truth, but feels himself instinct with prophetic powers. He is conscious of a charmed life, safe from the malice of man and the accidents of nature, and reserved by the gods for the accomplishment of high purposes. The first incident that occurs to him marks in the most signal manner the elevation to which he has been raised by his apparent fall, and the privilege he has gained by the calamity which separates him from the rest of mankind. He has been driven out of Thebes as a wretch polluted, and polluting the land. Yet he finds a resting place in the sanctuary of the awful goddesses, the avengers of crime, whose unutterable name fills every heart with horror, whose ground is too holy for any human foot to tread. For him there is no terror in the thought of them: he shrinks not from their presence, but greets them as friends and ministers of blessing. He is, as he describes himself, not only a pious but a sacred person<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>5</sup> 287. ἦκω γὰρ ἱερὸς εὐσεβὴς τε.



But the arrival of Ismene exhibits him in a still more august character. Feeble and helpless as he appears, he is destined to be one of Attica's tutelary heroes: and two powerful states are to dispute with one another the possession of his person and the right of paying honours to his tomb. The poet on this occasion expresses the whole force of the contrast, which is the subject of the play, in a few emphatic lines. *Œd. How speaks the oracle, my child? Ism. Thou shalt be sought by them that banished thee, Living and dead, to aid the common weal. Œd. Why, who may prosper with such aid as mine? Ism. On thee 'tis said, the might of Thebes depends. Œd. Now, when all's lost, I am a man indeed. Ism. The gods now raise the head they once laid low*<sup>6</sup>. In the following scenes the most prominent object is undoubtedly the glory of Attica and of Theseus. The contest indeed between the two rivals for the possession or the friendship of the outcast, the violence of Creon and the earnest supplication of Polynices, serves to heighten our impression of the dignity with which Œdipus is now invested by the favour of the gods. But still, if the poet had not had a different purpose in view, he would probably have contented himself with a less elaborate picture of the struggle. As it is, Creon's arrogance and meanness place the magnanimity of the Attic hero in the strongest relief. It is not quite so evident what was the motive for introducing the interview with Polynices, which seems at first sight to have very little connexion either with the fate and character of Œdipus, or with the renown of Theseus. In this scene Œdipus appears to modern eyes in a somewhat unamiable aspect: and at all events it is one which will effectually prevent us from confounding his piety and resignation with a spirit of Christian meekness and charity. But to the ears of the ancients there was probably nothing grating in this vindictive sternness, while it contributes a very important service to the poet's main design. That the resolution of Œdipus should not be shaken by the

<sup>6</sup> 388. Οἰδ. τί δὲ τεθέσπισται τέκνον; Ισμ. Σὲ τοῖς ἐκεῖ ζητητὸν ἀνθρώποις ποτὲ θανόντ' ἔσεσθαι ζῶντά τ' εὐσείας χάριν. Οἰδ. Τίς δ' ἂν τι τοιοῦδ' ἀνδρὸς εὖ πράξειεν ἄν; Ισμ. Ἐν σοὶ τὰ κείνων φασὶ γίγνεσθαι κράτη. Οἰδ. "Ὅτ' οὐκ ἔτ' εἰμί, τηνικαῦτ' ἄρ' εἶμ' ἀνὴρ. Ισμ. Νῦν γὰρ θεοὶ σ' ὀρθοῦσι, πρόσθε δ' ὠλλυσαν.



solicitations of Creon, backed by threats and force, was to be expected; we now see that his anger is not to be softened by the appeal which Polynices makes to his pity and his parental affection. He is for ever alienated from his unnatural sons and from Thebes, and unalterably devoted to the generous strangers who have sheltered him. Their land shall retain him a willing sojourner, and in his tomb they shall possess a pledge of victory and of deliverance in danger. Nothing now remains but that he should descend into his last resting place, honoured by the express summons of the gods, and yielding a joyful obedience to their pleasure. His orphan daughters indeed drop some natural tears over the loss they have sustained: but even their grief is soon soothed by the thought of an end so peaceful and happy in itself, and so full of blessing to the hospitable land where the hero reposes.

We have already remarked that the irony we have been illustrating is not equally conspicuous in all the plays of Sophocles. In the two *Œdipuses* we conceive it is the main feature in the treatment of the subject, and is both clearly indicated by their structure, and unequivocally exprest in numberless passages. On the other hand, in the *Electra* it may appear doubtful whether anything is gained by considering the plot from this point of view, and whether we are justified in attributing it to Sophocles. The poet's object may seem to have been merely to exhibit the heroine in a series of situations, which successively call forth the fortitude, the energy, the unconquerable will, and the feminine tenderness, which compose her character. This object however may not be inconsistent with others: and the arrangement of the action seems to point to an ulterior design; which we shall very briefly suggest, as there are no marks which absolutely compel the reader to recognize it. The lamentations of Electra at her first appearance are protracted to a length which can scarcely be considered necessary for the purpose of an exposition of her character and situation, and we are therefore rather led to connect them with the scene which precedes them: and so regarded they certainly assume an ironical aspect. In the former our attention was directed to the bloodstained house of the Pelopids, the scene of so many crimes, where guilt has been so long triumphant, where all



is still hushed in secure unsuspecting repose. But already the Avenger is standing near its threshold, ready to execute his errand of retributive justice, his success ensured by all the aids of human prudence, and by the sanction of the god. The friends concert their plan in a manner which leaves no doubt in the mind of the spectator that the righteous cause will speedily prevail. After this Electra's inconsolable grief, her despondency, and complaints, are less suited to excite our sympathy, than to suggest a reflexion on the contrast between that apparent prosperity and security of the guilty which she in her ignorance deploras, and the imminent danger with which we see them threatened by the divine vengeance. And this contrast becomes still stronger when, by the device of Orestes, the last fear which restrained the insolence of the criminals is removed, the last hope which cheered Electra's drooping spirit is extinguished; at the same time that the punishment of the one, and the deliverance of the other, are on the point of accomplishment<sup>7</sup>. Clytemnestra's sophistical vindication of her own conduct also assumes a tone of self mockery, which is deeply tragical, when we remember that, while she is pleading, her doom is sealed, and that the hand which is about to execute it is already lifted above her head. Finally, it is in the moment of their highest exultation and confidence, that each of the offenders discovers the inevitable certainty of their impending ruin<sup>8</sup>.

Of all our poet's remaining works, that which stands lowest in general estimation appears to be *The Trachinian Virgins*. Its merit has been commonly supposed to consist in the beauty of detached scenes or passages: but so inferior has it been thought, as a whole, to the other plays of Sophocles, that a

<sup>7</sup> This scene affords a very happy illustration of the difference between practical and verbal irony. The poet makes Clytemnestra use what she conceives to be language of bitter irony, while she is really uttering simple truth: 795. El. ὑβριζε. νῦν γὰρ εὐτυχούσα τυγχάνεις; Cl. οὐκ οὖν Ὀρέστης καὶ σὺ παύσετον τάδε; El. πεπαύμεθ' ἡμεῖς, οὐχ ὅπως σε παύσομεν. According to the punctuation and accentuation adopted by Brunck and Hermann, in l. 796, Clytemnestra only taunts Electra without any irony. For the purpose of an illustration, it is not material how Sophocles meant the line to be spoken; but in spite of Triclinius we prefer either οὐκ οὖν with an interrogation (as Aj. 79) or οὐκοῦν, without one (as Antig. 91): and of these the former.

<sup>8</sup> This is the meaning of the taunt, 1481: καὶ μάντις ὧν ἄριστος ἐσφάλλον πάλλαι; see Hermann's note.



celebrated critic has not scrupled to express a doubt as to its genuineness, and to conjecture that it ought to be ascribed to the poet's son Iophon. This conjecture Hermann (Præf.) rejects with great confidence, founded on his long and intimate acquaintance with the poetical character of Sophocles. It would seem however as if his opinion was formed in consideration rather of the particular features of the play, in which he recognizes the master's hand, than of the entire composition, which, according to his view of it, is defective in some very important points. The interest, he conceives, is so unfortunately divided between Hercules and Dejanira, that though the fate of the hero was intended by the poet to be the main spring of the spectator's fear and pity, his sympathy is insensibly transferred to the unhappy victim of conjugal affection, who thus becomes in reality the principal personage. Hence when her fate is decided, the spectator's suspense is at an end: the last act appears superfluous; and the sufferings of Hercules, now that the heroine is gone to whom all his vicissitudes had been referred, can no longer excite any deep concern. This defect, Hermann thinks, would have been remedied, if the hero's sufferings had been exhibited in the presence of Dejanira, so as to aggravate her affliction: and he can scarcely understand what could have led Sophocles to neglect an arrangement so clearly preferable to that which he has adopted, unless it may have been the wish to introduce a little variation in the treatment of a somewhat hacknied argument.

To Hermann's judgement on the genuineness of the piece we most cordially assent; but for this very reason we cannot embrace his opinion of its supposed imperfections, and at the risk of being thought superstitious admirers of a great name, we are inclined to infer from his objections to the composition, not that Sophocles was on this occasion either deficient in invention, or willing to sacrifice beauty to the affectation of originality—a species of vanity which his other works afford no ground for imputing to him: but that his design was not exactly such as the critic conceives. It appears to us that in fact Hermann has overlooked one of the most important features of the subject, which, if duly considered, satisfactorily accounts for all that according to his view dis-



turbs the unity and symmetry of the drama. The fate of Hercules is undoubtedly the point on which the interest of the play was meant to turn. To it our attention is directed from beginning to end. Compared with Hercules, Dejanira is a very insignificant person: not indeed in the eyes of a modern reader, of whom Hermann's remark may be perfectly true, that the sympathy of the spectators is directed more to her than to the hero. In her we find much to admire, to love, and to pity: in him we see nothing but a great spirit almost overpowered by the intensity of bodily suffering. But the question is, was this the light in which they were viewed by the spectators for whom Sophocles wrote. Now it seems clear that to them Hercules was more than a suffering or struggling hero: he was a deified person, who had assumed a blessed and immortal nature<sup>9</sup>, had become an object of religious adoration, and was frequently invoked for aid and protection in seasons of difficulty and danger. It was from the funeral pile on the top of Œta that he ascended, as Sophocles elsewhere describes<sup>10</sup>, all radiant with fire divine, to enjoy the company of the gods above. The image of his earthly career could never be contemplated by his worshippers without reference to this, its happy and glorious termination. And therefore it cannot be contended that the poet did not take this feeling into account, because in the play itself he has introduced no allusion to the apotheosis. It does not follow because there Hercules himself, according to Hermann's observation, is described as quitting life with reluctance, like one of Homer's heroes, whose soul descends to Orcus bewailing its fate, and the vigour and youth which it leaves behind<sup>11</sup>, that therefore the spectators were expected to forget all their religious notions of him, or to consider him abstracted from the associations with which he was habitually connected in their thoughts. But in fact his blissful immortality is mani-

<sup>9</sup> Od. Λ. 602, αὐτὸς μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν ἑρπύεται ἐν θαλίῃς, καὶ ἔχει καλλίσφυρον Ἥβην.

<sup>10</sup> Phil. 726. ἵν' ὁ χάλκασπις ἀνὴρ θεοῖς πλάθει πᾶσιν, θείῳ πυρὶ παμφαῆς, οἷτας ὑπὲρ ὄχθων.

<sup>11</sup> 1262. ὥς ἐπίχαρτον τελέουσ' ἀεκούσιον ἔργον. "Quamvis enim fortis anima, tamen invita ad Orcum abit, ὃν πότμον γοώωσα, λιποῦσ' ἀδρότητα καὶ ἥβην." Herm.



festly implied in that consummation of his labours, that final release from toil and hardship, which was announced to him by the oracle, the meaning of which he did not understand till he was experiencing its fulfilment. This mysterious prediction it is, which at the beginning of the play calls up Dejanira's hopes and fears into conflict, and the marvellous mode of its accomplishment is the subject of the ensuing scenes.

The opening scene, which, though less artificial than those of the other plays of Sophocles, ought not to be confounded with the prologues of Euripides, while it unfolds to us the anxiety and gloomy forebodings of Dejanira, places her character in the point of view which is necessary to the unity of the piece. Her happiness, her very being, are bound up in that of Hercules. The most fortunate event of her life had once seemed to her the issue of the struggle by which Hercules won her for his bride. Now indeed, on looking back to the past, she is struck with the melancholy reflexion, that this union, the object of her most ardent wishes, had hitherto been productive of scarcely anything but disappointment and vexation. The hero, for whom alone she lived, had been almost perpetually separated from her by a series of hazardous adventures, which kept her a prey to constant alarm and disquietude. Short and rare as his visits had always been, the interval which had elapsed since the last had been unusually long; she had been kept in more than ordinary ignorance of his situation: she begins to dread the worst, and is inclined to interpret the ambiguous tablet, which he left in her hands at parting, in the most unfavorable manner. The information she receives from her son, while it relieves her most painful fears, convinces her that the momentous crisis has arrived, which will either secure, or for ever destroy her happiness with that of her hero. A last labour remains for him to achieve, in which he is destined either to fall, or to reap the reward of his toils in a life unembittered by pain or sorrow. Soon however she hears that the crisis has ended happily, and for a moment joy takes undivided possession of her breast. But the glad tidings are quickly followed by the announcement of a new calamity, the danger of losing the affections of Hercules, or of sharing them



with another. He has reached the goal: but by the same turn of fortune she is removed farther than ever from the object of her desires: the same gale which has wafted him into the haven of rest, has wellnigh wrecked her hopes. Still even against this evil she has long had a remedy in store, which, if it succeeds, will unite her lot to that of Hercules by indissoluble bonds: no woman shall again dispute his love with her. But now the irony of fate displays itself in the cruellest manner: all her wishes shall be granted, but only to verify her worst fears. The labours of Hercules are at an end: she herself has disabled him from ever undertaking another. No rival will henceforward divert his love from her: his eyes will soon be closed upon all earthly forms. But all this is but a bitter mockery: in truth she has made him in whose wellbeing her own was wrapt up, supremely wretched; she has converted his affection for herself into deadly hatred. She, who was able to ruin him, has no means of saving him: the only proof she can give of her fidelity and love is, to die.

That the death of Dejanira is indispensably necessary, every one will acknowledge; but those who think, as Hermann, that with it the play really ends, will perhaps agree with him in his opinion, that it ought to have been reserved to a later period in the action. According to the view we have here taken of the poet's design, he could not have chosen a more seasonable time for it. Had it been longer postponed, it would merely have disturbed the effect of the last scene without any compensating advantage. This scene, if we are not mistaken, is so far from a superfluous and cumbrous appendage, that it contains the solution of the whole enigma, and places all that goes before in its true light. Hercules appears distracted not only by his bodily torments, but also by furious passions: by the sense of an unmerited evil, perfidiously inflicted by a hand which he had loved and trusted. The discovery of Dejanira's innocence likewise reveals to him the real nature and causes of his situation: it exhibits his fate, though outwardly hard and terrible, as the fulfilment of a gracious and cheering prediction. Henceforth his murmurs cease, his angry passions subside. He himself indeed does not yet penetrate into the depth of the mystery; but when, as by a prophetic impulse, he directs Hyllus to transport him to the summit of



Æta, and there, without tear or groan, to apply the torch to his funeral pile, he leads the spectators to the reflexion which solves all difficulties, and melts all discords into the clearest harmony. Dejanira's wishes have been fulfilled, not indeed in her own sense, but in an infinitely higher one. The gods have decreed to bestow on Hercules not merely length of days, but immortality; not merely ease and quiet, but celestial bliss. She indeed has lost him, but only as she must have done in any case sooner or later; and instead of forfeiting his affection, she has been enabled to put the most unequivocal seal upon her faith and devotedness.

That this last scene should appear tedious to a modern reader, is not surprising: but this may be owing to causes which have nothing to do with its dramatic merits. We are accustomed to view Hercules either through the medium of the arts, as a strong man, or through that of some system of mythology, as a political or ethical personification, or it may be as a mundane genius, a god of light. But it is probable that a very different impression was produced by his appearance on the Athenian stage, and that a representation of the last incidents of his mortal state, was there witnessed with lively sympathy. This interest may have extended to details which in us cannot produce the slightest emotion, and hence the introduction of the concluding injunction about Iole, which is the most obscure as well as repulsive passage in the whole piece, may have had an adequate motive, which we cannot fully comprehend. It certainly ought not to prevent us from enjoying the beauty of the whole composition, which though perhaps inferior to the other works of Sophocles, is not unworthy of the author of the greatest among them.

In the *Ajax* the poet may seem to have made a singular exception to his own practice as well as to that of all other great dramatic writers, by distinctly expounding the moral of his play, and that not at the end, but at the beginning of it. If we should suppose him to have done so, we must also believe that he at the same time determined the point of view from which he meant the whole to be considered. The irony of Minerva first draws Ajax into a terrible exhibition of his miserable phrenzy, and she then takes occasion from it to pronounce a solemn warning against the arrogance which had



involved so great a hero in so dreadful a calamity. The following scenes down to the death of Ajax, might appear to have been intended merely to enforce this impression, by representing the language and the effects of his despair when restored to the consciousness of his real situation. The concluding part, that which follows the main catastrophe, would according to this view have been introduced with as little necessity as the part corresponding to it in the play last examined, though it might be allowed possible to find some excuse for the addition in national opinions and feelings foreign to our own. If however this were the correct view of the tragedy, it would certainly deserve to be considered as the most faulty in its composition of all the remaining works of Sophocles. The fault would lie not merely in the want of unity between the two portions, which would be only accidentally connected with one another and would have no interest in common, but also in the dramatic anticlimax, in the gradual abatement of the terror and pity which the opening of the play so powerfully inspires. For Ajax has no sooner recovered his senses than the thought of death occurs to him as absolutely necessary. But he contemplates it, not as an evil, but as a certain remedy and refuge. He finds consolation in the consciousness of his unalterable resolution not to survive his shame, and in the conviction that no human power can prevent the execution of his purpose. The nearer his end approaches the more collected and tranquil he becomes: so that we are led to view him in a new light, and forget the awful lesson inculcated by the goddess in the opening scene.

It would perhaps be presumptuous to assert that the taste of Sophocles was too pure, to admit an episode at the end of a play such as that of *Johannes Parricida* which disfigures Schiller's *Wilhelm Tell*. But on the other hand we ought not to impute such a defect to any of his compositions, without carefully examining whether the parts which seem to hang loosely together, may not be more intimately united under the surface. On the other point we may venture to speak more confidently, and to maintain that Sophocles could never have meant to concentrate the whole moral effect of a tragedy in the first scene, so that it should be gradually softened and weakened as the action proceeded, and that a construction of



any of his works which implies such a conclusion must have mistaken his design. In the present instance it seems possible to shew that the poet's thought, when rightly conceived, leads to a point of view from which nothing appears either superfluous or misplaced in the piece.

The hero's first appearance exhibits him in the lowest depth of his humiliation. The love of glory is his ruling passion, and disappointment in the pursuit of honour has goaded him to phrenzy. Through the interposition of the gods his vengeance has been baffled in a manner which must for ever expose him to the derision of his enemies. The delight and exultation which he expresses at his imaginary triumph serve to measure the greatness of his defeat, and the bitterness of the anguish which awaits him with the return of reason. Ulysses himself cannot witness so tremendous a reverse, so complete a prostration, even of a rival, without pity. But the reflexions which the spectacle suggests to him and Minerva, tend to divert our thoughts from what is peculiar and extraordinary in the situation of Ajax, and to fix them on the common lot of human nature. All mortal strength is weakness, all mortal prosperity vain and transient, and consequently all mortal pride is delusion and madness. When man is most elated with the gifts of fortune, most confident in his security, then is his fall most certain: he is safe and strong only while he feels and acknowledges his own nothingness. Ajax in the contrast between his fancied success and his real calamity, is only a signal example of a very common blindness. The design of these reflexions was probably not to extract a moral from the scene, which needed not the aid of language to convey its lesson, but to prepare us for the contemplation of the other side of the subject, which is immediately presented to us. For in the next scene the hero's position is totally changed. The past indeed is immutable, the future affords not a glimpse of hope; but now he has awoken from his dream, he is healed of his phrenzy: he knows the worst that has befallen him, and that can befall. The discovery, it is true, is attended, as Tecmessa says, with a new pain, one from which his madness had till now protected him: but it is likewise a medicine which restores him to new health, and the pain itself a symptom of his recovery from the long disease, of which his late phrenzy



had been only the last and most violent paroxysm: it gives him a treasure which he never possessed before, that self-knowledge and self-control which Minerva's last words declared to be the condition and earnest of the favour of the gods.

It is possible that many readers will think this a very exaggerated, if not a totally false description of the state of mind and feeling which Ajax discloses in the progress of the play. It has been very commonly supposed that the poet's aim was to exhibit in his character untameable pride and inflexible obstinacy, hardened and strained to the utmost by despair: a spirit which will not yield even to the gods, and instead of bowing beneath the stroke of their displeasure, rises the higher by the recoil, and asserts its own freedom and dignity by a voluntary death. If this be so, the first scene must present a totally different aspect from that in which we have hitherto considered it; it will be nothing more than the occasion which enables the hero to display this unconquerable energy of soul; and the more we sympathize with his stern and lofty nature, the less can we be affected by the moral reflexions of Ulysses and the goddess, which would thus appear to be either unmeaning commonplace, or to be designed not to indicate, but to counteract the impression which the whole action is calculated to produce. This however may be looked upon as a slight objection: the main question is, whether the language and demeanor of Ajax after his recovery justifies the common view of the temper and sentiments attributed to him by the poet, and the inferences that have been drawn from them as to the general design of the play. And on this it must be observed, that though it soon becomes apparent that the purpose of self-destruction is irrevocably fixed in the mind of Ajax, though he steadily resists both the friendly counsels of the Chorus, and the pathetic intreaties of Tecmessa; and though that which determines his resolve, is his quick sense of honour, and his impatience of a degrading submission, still there is nothing in his words or conduct, either in the scenes with Tecmessa and the Chorus, or in his concluding soliloquy, that indicates a hard, cold, sullen mood. On the contrary, when he has learnt from Tecmessa the whole extent of his calamity, he breaks out for the first time of his life into



wailings which express the keenness of his grief: and again the sight of the Chorus draws from him a strain of piteous exclamations on the cruelty of his fate. After this transient burst of passion indeed he recovers his firmness and composure, gives directions for the fulfilment of his last wishes with calmness, and though inflexibly adhering to his purpose, repels all the attempts made to divert him from it without heat or violence. But so far is he from having retired into the stronghold of a selfish pride, and shut himself up from all human sympathy, that in the midst of his unalterable resolution his thoughts are more occupied with care for others than with his own fate. His parental affection rushes in a full stream into his heart, as he contemplates his approaching separation from its object, and expresses itself in that tender address, in which, while he provides for the security of his child, and rejoices in the prospect of leaving behind him an heir worthy of his shield and of his fame, who shall avenge his wrongs, he dwells with delight on the image of its early years, when the young plant, sheltered from every rude blast,<sup>12</sup> shall enjoy its careless existence, and gladden the heart of the widowed mother, and on the consolation and support it will afford to the declining age of his own parents, so soon to be bereft of their natural stay. Throughout the whole of this speech, though two occasions occur which lead him to mention his enemies, all angry and revengeful feelings are absorbed by the softer emotions of the parent and the son:<sup>13</sup> and even the appearance of harshness with which at the close of this scene he cuts short the importunity of Tecmessa, is a sign of anything rather than coldness and insensibility. Again, when the fatal sword is already fixed in the ground, his last thoughts are turned to Salamis, to the grief of his father and mother, which alone he bewails, to the beloved

<sup>12</sup> An image ludicrously disguised in Francklin's translation: "May the breath of life meantime nourish thy tender frame," as if Eurysaces could grow up to manhood unless it did.

<sup>13</sup> Even the lines (556) ὅταν δ' ἴκη πρὸς τοῦτο, δέῃ σ' ὅπως πατὴρ Δείξεις ἐν ἐχθροῖς, οἷος ἐξ οἴου τράφης, on which the Scholiast remarks, ἀντὶ τοῦ δέῃ σε ἐκδικῆσαι τὸν πατέρα, do not seem to imply any definite prospect of revenge, so much as a hope that the glory of Eurysaces might in time silence and confound his father's enemies.



scenes and friends of his youth: even the parting look which he casts on the Trojan plains, and their familiar springs and streams, is one of tenderness: his last words an affectionate farewell.

All this is so evident, that it must have been at least partially felt by every intelligent reader, and it would probably have produced a greater effect than it seems to have done on the judgements that have been formed on the play, if a strong impression of an opposite kind had not been made on most minds by the intermediate scene, in which, after the Chorus has deplored the inflexible stubbornness with which Ajax has rejected the intreaties of Tecmessa, the hero in a single speech announces the intention with which he finally quits the camp to seek a solitary spot on the seashore. Till within a few years all critics, from the Greek scholiast downwards, had agreed in their general view of the object of this speech, which they have supposed to be an artifice by which Ajax dissembles his real feelings and purpose. They have been equally unanimous on another point, of no great importance in itself, but interesting from its bearing on the former: they imagine that, after the scene with the child, both Ajax and Tecmessa retire from the stage, and that the former comes out of the tent after the Chorus has ended its mournful strain. And now, according to the common opinion, in order to pacify his friends, and to secure himself from interruption in the deed he is about to perform, he affects to have been softened by the prayers of Tecmessa, and to have consented to spare his life: in signifying this change of mind, he at the same time declares his resolution of proceeding to purify himself from the stain of his frantic slaughter, and to make his peace, if possible, with the offended goddess, and of paying due homage in future to the Atridæ, whom he acknowledges as his legitimate superiors. He then dismisses Tecmessa into the tent, and leaves the Chorus to give vent to its delight in a strain of rapturous joy. This speech, if considered as ironical, undoubtedly indicates not merely immovable firmness of resolution, but a spirit of haughty defiance, a bitter disdain of all restraints, human or divine, which would prove that, if any change had taken place in



his sentiments, it was only one by which his pride had been raised, and his ferocity hardened: and such appears to have been the inference which has been almost universally drawn from it.

But a few years back this portion of the play was placed in an entirely new light by Professor Welcker, who has made the Ajax the subject of an elaborate essay in the *Rheinisches Museum*, 1829; which, after all that has been written on this branch of literature, may be considered as one of the most valuable contributions that have yet been made to the study of the Greek drama. Beside a most learned discussion on the sources from which Sophocles drew his materials, and on the peculiar motives which guided him in the selection of them, it contains the author's reasons for rejecting the current opinion on the two points just mentioned. He conceives in the first place, that Ajax remains on the stage during the song of the Chorus which follows his dialogue with Tecmessa, inwardly absorbed in thought, and together with her and the child presenting to the spectators what they would perhaps have looked upon as a group of sculpture, and we should call a living picture. The strongest argument for this supposition is, that no sufficient motive appears or can be assigned, which should have induced Ajax to re-enter the tent, after he had bidden Tecmessa retire into it and withdraw her grief from the public eye. As little should we be able to understand why, if she had once obeyed his injunction, she should have come out again with him. On the other hand, dumb shew, exhibiting the principal person of a piece in an expressive attitude, was a contrivance by no means unusual in the Greek theatre, as is proved not only by the celebrated examples of the Niobe and the Achilles of Æschylus, but also by the practice of Sophocles himself, who for instance allows Antigone to remain silent on the stage during a choral song of considerable length<sup>14</sup>; and in this very play keeps

<sup>14</sup> Welcker therefore conceives that Creon's command (Antig. 760) is obeyed forthwith: and certainly this opinion seems to be confirmed by v. 769 τὰ δ' οὖν κόρα τὰδ' οὐκ ἀπαλλάξει μόνον. But perhaps it is not necessary to imagine the sister's present, and both the last words of the Chorus, 804, and those of Antigone at the beginning of her next speech, rather indicate that she had just made her appearance. He also refers to the silence of Pylades in the Electra, and to that of Tecmessa when deceived by the speech of Ajax.



Tecmessa and the child for a long time in a studied posture near the corpse. The difficulty that may seem to arise from the Chorus in our play, which according to this hypothesis speaks of Ajax in his presence without addressing him, disappears if we imagine that the silent group occupied the back ground, which would in itself be the most natural position for it; nor is the language of the song itself such as called for any answer. But the more important question is, whether the subsequent speech of Ajax is designed to conceal his real sentiments and to deceive the hearers. Welcker contends that though couched in language which is here and there ambiguous, it merely expresses the speaker's feelings, and that it is only through the eagerness with which men usually interpret all they see and hear according to their wishes, that Tecmessa and the Chorus misunderstand its meaning. He thinks that the artifice which the common construction attributes to Ajax is inconsistent, not only with the generosity but with the strength of his character, and that none of the purposes which have been supposed to explain it are sufficient to account for it; and that it involves consequences which destroy all the unity of the play, and render the poet's design unintelligible.

In order to understand the points on which this question hinges, we must observe that both Tecmessa and the Chorus are actually deceived by the speech of Ajax, and consequently that the ambiguity which deceives them was undoubtedly designed on the part of the poet. And this fact not only renders the occasion of the prevailing opinion independently of its truth very conceivable, but raises a strong prejudice in its favour, and throws the burden of the argument on those who reject it. It does not, however, necessarily follow that the deception produced by the speech was intentional on the part of the speaker; and to determine whether the poet meant it to be so considered, we must examine the speech both by itself, and in connexion with the rest of the play. The first inquiry is, whether it contains any expressions which Ajax could not have used without intending to mislead his friends. But it would not be a fair way of trying this question, to consider whether he speaks exactly as he might have done if he had not been conscious of their presence. It might



be admitted that he purposely avoids the use of direct and unequivocal terms in announcing what he knew to be dreadful and afflicting to them, without granting that he wished to disguise his intentions from them. Natural and common humanity would have forbidden him to shock the feelings of persons to whom his life was so dear, by a distinct declaration of his final resolution. On the other hand, to ask why then he touches on the painful subject at all, would be unfairly to call in question the undoubted conventional privileges of the dramatic poet. Ajax must give vent to the thoughts and feelings under which he is about to act: but he may be expected to do so with a considerate reserve dictated by his situation. If after making this necessary allowance we proceed to examine his language, we shall perhaps find that though it is certainly adapted to raise hopes that he has abandoned his design of self-destruction, it implies nothing but what he may be believed really to have thought and felt. The beginning indeed speaks of a marvellous change which has taken place within him: his iron soul has been unmanned by pity for Tecmessa. This change would seem to have been wrought during the interval occupied by the song of the Chorus: for at the close of the preceding scene he had resisted all the attempts to soften him with an obstinacy which appeared to be only exasperated by her importunity. Hence most critics have imagined that Tecmessa is supposed to have renewed her intreaties within the tent, and that Ajax, instead of silencing them as before with a peremptory refusal, now affects to be overcome by them. This however is a mere conjecture, and we are equally at liberty to suppose that during the pause in which he has remained silently wrapt in thought, the workings of conjugal affection have made themselves felt so as to cost him a painful struggle, though without being able to move him from his purpose. It does not however seem necessary to consider this in the light of an abrupt and almost præternatural inward revolution. It would be very consistent with human nature, of which Sophocles everywhere shews a fine and intimate knowledge, to interpret those replies to the supplications of Tecmessa, which sound so rough and hard, as signs of awakened sympathy, which Ajax had endeavoured to suppress by assuming a harsher



tone, but which, after it ceased to be enforced from without, had gained new strength in his heart. Welcker regards the change as more sudden, though perfectly natural, as the excitement of a feeling which had hitherto slept in the hero's breast, and had at length been roused by the shock with which the gods had humbled his pride, and had finally been called into distinct action by the contagion of female tenderness. He compares it to the effect produced on the temper of Achilles by the loss of his friend. The prayers of Tecmessa are not indeed the cause, but the occasion: yet they decide the mood in which Ajax henceforth contemplates his relations to the gods and to mankind, and in which he ends his life. He considers his blood as a libation with which he is about to appease the wrath of the offended goddess, and to atone for the violence he had meditated against legitimate authority. The hearers naturally mistake the nature of this purifying bath. The mode in which he mentions his purpose of burying his sword may perhaps seem more difficult to reconcile with this view, and Welcker's remark, that the alledged motive, the calamitous operation of an enemy's gifts, was a current opinion which Ajax again expresses in his last speech, seems hardly sufficient to remove the appearance which this passage at first sight presents of a deliberate intention to mislead. Ajax designing to fall upon his sword, speaks only of hiding it as an illfated weapon in the ground. Could he, it may be asked, but for the sake of deception, have raised an image so different from the act which he was meditating. The sword might indeed be said to be concealed, when the hilt was fixed in the ground and the blade lodged in his body: but since this hiding produced the most fatal consequences instead of averting them, would he have selected this mode of describing his intended deed, if he had not foreseen that it would be misunderstood? This seems scarcely possible if it had been only the fatality of the weapon that he had in his thoughts. But perhaps it may be more easily conceived, if we suppose him to have reflected on it rather as having been once the object of his pride, a tribute of respect to his valour from a respected enemy, and afterward the instrument of his shame. He was now about to expiate his pride, and to wipe off his shame: in both respects he might be truly said to hide his sword in



the most emphatic sense, when he sheathed it in his own body. The last objection that the speech suggests to the view proposed by Welcker, arises from the professions which Ajax appears to make of his intention in future to yield to the gods and pay due reverence to the Atridæ, and in general to regulate his conduct by maxims of moderation and discretion. These professions would certainly be mere dissimulation if they referred to anything but the approaching termination of his career, whereas they seem to imply a prospect of its continuance. Yet, if Ajax contemplated his death as a satisfaction both to divine and human justice, his manner of describing the lesson he had learnt and which he would thenceforth practise, is not unnatural, but strongly emphatic.

On the other hand the objections which the speech raises to the common opinion are very difficult to remove. If the aim of Ajax is to deceive his friends, admitting the contrivance to be worthy of his character, and consistent with his previous conduct, he cannot reasonably be supposed more in earnest in one part of the speech than another. It would imply in himself and would create in the reader an intolerable confusion of ideas and feelings, to imagine that he really pitied the condition of Tecmessa, and nevertheless only expressed his sentiments for the purpose of deceiving her. And yet who that has witnessed the scene of the parting from his child, can believe that he felt no pity for the mother. If so, since he couples her widowhood with its orphanhood, we should be forced to infer that he was equally indifferent to both. On the same principle if the passages relating to the anger of the goddess and the submission due to the gods are to be taken as ironical, we must consider Ajax in the light of a Capaneus or a Mezentius, who not only disregards but insults the gods. That he should be sincere in his professions of reverence for them, and yet use his piety for a cloak, would be a contradiction not to be endured. But in no part of the play is Ajax represented as an audacious blasphemer and contemner of the gods, though in the pride of his heart he sometimes has forgotten what was due to them. His last speech, where his sentiments continue the same and are exprest without disguise, breathes not only piety but confidence in the divine favour, grounded on the consciousness not indeed of perfect innocence, but of great wrongs suffered, and of



ample reparation made for a slight transgression. So though it may seem natural that he should speak with bitter disdain of the Atridæ, against whom we find him retaining his resentment to the last, it would be incredible that he should have made his profession of respect for their station if it was insincere, an occasion of introducing such a series of general reflexions as that which follows, in which he appears to be reconciling himself to the thought of obedience, by considering it as a universal law of nature. All this evidently proceeds from the depth of his heart, and so viewed is beautiful and touching: whereas if it be taken as a trick, to make his assumed change of mood more credible, nothing can easily be conceived more repulsive in itself, and less appropriate to the character of Ajax. Finally his parting directions to Tecmessa and the Chorus are so little like those of a person who was anxious to conceal his design, that as Welcker truly observes, one might rather be disposed to complain of the improbability that their meaning should have been mistaken: if it were not that a prejudice once caught is known to be capable of blinding us to the clearest intimations of the truth.

On the whole then we adopt with entire conviction Welcker's general view of this speech, which indeed harmonizes so well with that which has here been taken of one great feature in the poetical character of Sophocles, that we have thought it necessary to weigh the arguments on each side as cautiously as possible. Still if any one should find it impossible to believe that Ajax could be unconscious of the effect that his words were producing, we should not be unwilling to admit that he perceived the ambiguity of those expressions which bear a double meaning, so long as we are not called upon to give up the opinion that he is throughout and thoroughly in earnest. Before we quit the subject we will notice one or two passages, which either appears to contradict this conclusion, or have been so interpreted. The curse which Ajax, when on the point of death, pronounces against the Atridæ and the whole army, may at first sight seem to be inconsistent with those sentiments of reverence for their authority which he expresses in the former scene, and thus to prove that they were not genuine. It seems however no more difficult to conceive that Ajax, while he acknowledged the debt which he owed to justice for a breach of social order,



might still consider himself as an injured man, and invoke the Furies to avenge his wrongs, than that he might believe himself an object of divine favour, notwithstanding the offences against the gods which he was about to expiate. The curse itself, after the example of Œdipus, will not be thought an indication of peculiar ferocity. Only that it should have been extended to the whole army, may seem an excess of vindictive cruelty, and in fact this has proved a stumbling block to several critics. But it must be remembered, in the first place, that the army had sanctioned and shared the iniquity of its chiefs, in withholding from Ajax the honours he had earned in their service; and next, that the ruin of the king involves the calamity of the people. So Achilles can not distinguish between Agamemnon and the Greeks<sup>15</sup>. With the exception of this curse, which however answers the purpose of recalling the hero's wrongs to our recollection, and thus strengthening our sympathy with his sufferings, the whole speech is highly pathetic, so that any expression of arrogant impiety would jar most offensively with its general tenor. And hence it is of some importance to observe, that there is nothing at all savouring of such a character in the address to Jupiter, where Ajax speaks of his petition as requesting no great boon (*αἰτήσομαι δέ σ' οὐ μακρὸν γέρας λαχεῖν*). Mr Campbell, in his Lectures on Poetry, has entirely mistaken the force of this expression, where he says that *we recognize the self dependence and stubbornness of his pride, when he tells the chief of the gods that he had but a slight boon to implore of him*. Not

<sup>15</sup> These considerations seem sufficient to remove the difficulty which Hermann finds in the common construction of the words (844) *γεύεσθε, μὴ φείδεσθε πανδῆμον στρατοῦ*, which, if *γεύεσθε* is referred to *στρατοῦ*, appear to him to breathe the most atrocious inhumanity. The construction he proposes, referring *γεύεσθε* to the Atridæ, is so harsh that one is glad to dispense with it, and yet is of very little use in softening the alledged atrocity of the imprecation. Another difficulty which has perplexed the commentators in this passage is less connected with our present subject. The curse manifestly contains a prediction which was meant to conform to the event: yet the words *πρὸς τῶν φιλίστων ἐκγόνων ὀλοίατο*, cannot be reconciled with history without great violence, as by distinguishing between *φιλίστων* and *ἐκγόνων*, in the manner proposed by Musgrave. Hermann's interpretation is intolerably strained and perplexed. There is no necessity for supposing that Ajax has Ulysses in view at all. From him he had received a provocation indeed, but no peculiar *wrong*, which he should call upon the Furies to avenge. Welcker thinks that the easiest solution of the difficulty is to suppose that a line has dropt out after *αὐτοσφάγεις*, containing an allusion to Clytemnæstra's crime and punishment.



to mention how unseasonable such pride would have been, when Ajax was actually supplicating a favour to which, though little for Jupiter to grant, he himself attached great importance, and how inconsistent with the reverence exprest for Jupiter's majesty in the address: "Thou first, O Jove"—it is clear that the words in question contain nothing more than a touching allusion to the extremity in which he was now placed, when the only thing left for him to desire of Jupiter, was that his body might not be deprived of the rites of burial, Mr Campbell could scarcely have overlooked this, if he had not been prepossessed with the common opinion about the character of Ajax, as exhibited in the previous speech, which he too considers as a *feint*, and endeavours to explain, but without perceiving the main difficulties which the supposition involves. He sees nothing in the tragedy but an exhibition of "the despair and suicide of a proud soldier, who has lived but for martial honor, and cannot survive the loss of it." Though we think this conception of the subject so inadequate as to miss what is most essential in the poet's design, we must do Mr C. the justice to observe, that he has shewn a lively sense of some of the beauties of the play, which is the more meritorious, as we learn from him that the English translators have been insensible to them. He complains with great reason that Sophocles should have fallen into the hands of persons so little capable of relishing him, as not even to be struck with the sublimity of the opening scene of the Ajax: though, since such perceptions are the gift of nature, we do not understand why they are called *illiberal critics*. We collect however one rather melancholy inference from this fact, and from Mr Campbell's lectures: that the study of the poet's works with a view to the pleasures of the imagination, has not kept pace with the diligence bestowed on them as objects of philological criticism.

Most critics have felt a great difficulty in explaining the reasons which induced Sophocles to protract the action after the death of Ajax, with which, according to modern notions the interest expires. What has been said on this subject has for the most part been proposed in the language of apology, and in a tone which now and then raises a suspicion that the advocate is not thoroughly convinced of the goodness of his cause. Thus Hermann faintly defends the concluding scenes



with arguments which in substance condemn them : and though Mr Campbell assures us that “the interest does not at all flag in the remainder of the tragedy,” we want some better explanation of the grounds of this opinion, than is to be found in the remark : “that the Greeks attached an awfully religious importance to the rites of burial,” which would apply equally to many other tragedies which do not end in like manner : or in the assertion : that “we feel the hero’s virtues to be told with the deepest effect when his widow and child kneel as suppliants to heaven and human mercy, beside his corps : when his spirited brother defies the threats of the Atridæ to deny him sepulchral honors : and when Ulysses with politic magnanimity interposes to prevent the mean insult being offered to his fallen enemy.” The celebration of a hero’s virtues after his death is surely not a legitimate object of tragedy : nor is it true that those of Ajax are more effectually told by his widow and child when they kneel beside his corps, than when they cling to him during his life : or by Teucer and Ulysses when they interpose in his behalf, than they had previously been in the first scene by the admission of an enemy, and afterward by the attachment and admiration exprest by his friends. Still less can the conclusion of the piece be defended on the ground that “it leaves our sympathies calmed and elevated by the triumph of Ulysses in assuaging the vindictiveness of Agamemnon, and attaching the gratitude of Teucer.” Our sympathies with Ajax have already been calmed and elevated by the serenity and majesty of his departure : with Ulysses we have none sufficiently powerful to keep up our interest during the following scenes : if we had, this would imply a want of unity, which would be as great a defect as that which has been made the subject of complaint. In order to justify the poet by shewing the connexion between these scenes and the preceding part of the play, it is absolutely necessary to take into account a circumstance which Welcker, though not the first to notice it, has placed in a clearer light than any former writer : that Ajax was an object, not merely of human interest, but of religious veneration, with the audience for whom Sophocles wrote. The Athenians were proud of him as one of their heroes, who, since Clisthenes, gave his name to a tribe which was distinguished by some pecu-



liar privileges.<sup>16</sup> They claimed his sons as their adopted citizens, the ancestors of their noblest families and some of their most illustrious men. But the hero's title to those religious honours which were paid to him in the time of Sophocles, commenced only from his interment: and hence no subject could be more interesting to the Athenians in general, and more particularly to the tribe which bore his name,<sup>17</sup> than the contest on the issue of which his heroic sanctity depended. Welcker very happily remarks that Menelaus and his brother fill the part of an *Advocatus Diaboli* at a process of canonization. On the other hand the injury which Ajax had planned against the army and its chiefs, was one which according to primitive usage, in ordinary cases, would have justified the extreme of hostility on their part, and consequently the privation of funeral rites. This was not in the eyes of the Greeks *a mean insult*, but a natural and legitimate mode of vengeance; though the violence and arrogance with which it is prosecuted by the Spartan king is exhibited in an odious light, undoubtedly for the sake of suggesting to the Athenian audience a political application to their rivals, which was especially happy in a piece dedicated to the honour of an Attic hero, and which they would not fail to seize and enjoy. But this strenuous opposition serves to exalt the character of Ajax, and to enhance the glory of his triumph. And thus the contrast between the appearance and the reality is completed, as in the second *Œdipus*. At the beginning we saw the hero in the depth of degradation, an object of mockery and of pity: this was the effect of his inordinate self esteem, of his overweening confidence in his own strength. But out of his

<sup>16</sup> See the honours of the *Æantidæ* in Plut. Symp. 1. 10. 2. 3. They were peculiarly connected with the glory of Marathon. Marathon itself belonged to them: they occupied the right wing in the battle: they numbered the polemarch Callimachus among their citizens: Miltiades was a descendant of Ajax (Marcellin. Vit. Thuc.): the decree for the expedition was made under their presidency. At Plataea too they acquitted themselves so nobly, that they were appointed to conduct the sacrifice to the Sphragitides on Cithæron. Their chorusses were never to take the last place. Plutarch thinks that this was not so much the reward of merit, as a propitiation of the hero, who could not brook defeat. One may compare the use made of this topic by the rhetorician whose funeral oration is printed among the works of Demosthenes: οὐκ ἐλάνθανεν Αἰαντίδας, ὅτι τῶν ἀριστείων στερηθεὶς Αἴας ἀβίωτον ἐαυτῷ ἡγήσατο τὸν βίον.

<sup>17</sup> To which Welcker with great probability refers the allusion in the line (861) κλειναί τ' Ἀθῆναι καὶ τὸ σύντροφον γένος. If the tribe furnished the chorus, the local application would be still more pointed.



humiliation, his anguish, and despair, issues a higher degree of happiness and renown than he had ever hoped to attain. He closes his career at peace with the gods : his incomparable merit is acknowledged by the rival whose success had wounded his pride : he leaves a name behind him which shall be remembered and revered to the latest generations.

We have already observed that the length of our remarks would not be regulated by the value of the pieces to be examined. The *Antigone* and the *Philoctetes*, though perhaps neither of them is inferior in beauty to the *Ajax*, will detain us a much shorter time.

In the *Antigone* the irony on which the interest depends, is of a kind totally different from that which has been illustrated by the preceding examples. It belongs to that head which we have endeavoured to describe as accompanying the administration of justice human and divine, of that which decides not merely the quarrels of individuals, but the contests of parties and of principles, so far as they are clothed in flesh and blood, and wield the weapons of earthly warfare. The subject of the tragedy is a struggle between Creon and Antigone, not however as private persons maintaining their selfish interests, but as each asserting a cause which its advocate holds to be just and sacred. Each partially succeeds in the struggle, but perishes through the success itself : while their destruction preserves the sanctity of the principles for which they contend. In order to perceive this, we must guard ourselves against being carried away by the impression which the beauty of the heroine's character naturally makes upon our feelings, but which tends to divert us from the right view of Creon's character and conduct : a partiality, to which modern readers are not the less liable, on account of the difficulty they find in entering into the train of religious feeling from which the contest derives its chief importance. In our admiration for Antigone we may be very apt to mistake the poet's irony, and to adopt the sentiments which he puts into her mouth, as his own view of the question, and the parties, while he is holding the balance perfectly even. But to consider the case impartially, it is necessary to observe, in the first place, that Creon is a legitimate ruler, and next, that he acts in the exercise of his legitimate authority. He had received the supreme power by the right of succession, and



with the full consent of his subjects, whom he had preserved from their foreign invaders.<sup>18</sup> Hæmon does not mean to dispute his sovereignty, but only to signify the conditions under which it ought to be exercised, when in reply to Creon's question, whether any but himself is governor of the realm, he says, that it is no city which belongs to one man (737). Creon's decree is the law of the land. Ismene, remonstrating with Antigone on her resolution, declares herself incapable of acting in opposition to the will of her fellowcitizens<sup>19</sup>. And Antigone herself in her concluding appeal admits that she has so acted (907). Nor was the decree a wanton or tyrannical exertion of power. Creon himself professes to consider it as indispensable to the wellbeing of the state, which is the sole object of his care (188—192), as a just punishment for the parricidal enterprise of Polynices. And this is not merely Creon's language, whom however we have no reason to suspect of insincerity: it is also evidently the judgement of the Chorus, whose first song, which presents so lively a picture of the imminent danger from which Thebes has just been rescued, seems to justify the vengeance taken on its author. The reflexions contained in the next song, on the craft and ingenuity of man, are pointed at the secret violation of Creon's ordinance, as an instance in which the skill of contrivance has not been coupled with due respect for the laws and obligations of society: and the Chorus deprecates all communion with persons capable of such criminal daring<sup>20</sup>. Antigone herself does not vindicate her action on the ground that Creon has overstept the bounds of his prerogative, but only claims an extraordinary exemption from its operation, on account of her connexion with the deceased. She even declares, that she would not have undertaken such a resistance to the will of the state, for the sake either of children or husband (907): it was only the peculiar relation in which she stood to Polynices, that justified, and demanded it. This too is the only ground which Hæmon alledges for the general

<sup>18</sup> 1162. σώσας μὲν ἐχθρῶν τήνδε Καδμείων χθόνα Λαβών τε χώρας παντελή μοναρχίαν: that is, as he himself says, (174) γένους κατ' ἀγχιστεῖα τῶν ὀλωλότων.

<sup>19</sup> 79. τὸ δὲ Βία πολιτῶν δρᾶν, ἔφυν ἀμήχανος.

<sup>20</sup> σοφόν τι τὸ μηχανόεν τέχνας ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ' ἔχων, ποτὲ μὲν κακὸν, ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἔσθλόν ἐρπει· νόμους παρείρων χθονός, θεῶν τ' ἐνόρκων δίκαν, ὑψίπολις· ἄπολις, ὅτῃ τὸ μὴ καλὸν ξύνεστι, τόλμας χάριν· μήτ' ἐμοὶ παρέστιος γένοιτο, μήτ' ἴσον φρονῶν, ὅς τὰδ' ἔρδει.



sympathy exprest by the people with Antigone: and in relying on this, he tacitly admits that the same action would have deserved punishment in any other person. His general warnings against excessive pertinacity are intended to induce his father to give up his private judgement to the popular opinion. Creon on the other hand is bent on vindicating and maintaining the majesty of the throne and of the laws. No state can subsist, if that which has been enacted by the magistrate, on mature deliberation, is to be set aside because it thwarts a woman's wishes, (672—678) or because it is condemned by the multitude (734). Obedience on the part of the governed, firmness on the part of the ruler, are essential to the good of the commonwealth. These sentiments appear to be adopted by the Chorus. Notwithstanding its good will toward Antigone, and its pity for her fate, it considers her as having incurred the penalty that had been inflicted on her by an act, which, though sufficiently fair and specious to attract the praises of men and to render her death glorious, was still a violation of duty, and brought her into a fatal conflict with eternal Justice; a headstrong defiance of the sovereign power, sure to end in her destruction<sup>21</sup>. It has appeared to several learned men, not without a considerable show of probability, that the numerous passages in this play which inculcate the necessity of order, and submission to established authority, may have had great weight in disposing the Athenians to reward the poet with the dignity of strategus, which we know did not necessarily involve any military duties, though Sophocles happened to be so employed, but which would still have been a singular recompense for mere poetical merit<sup>22</sup>.

Nevertheless the right is not wholly on the side of Creon. So far indeed as Polynices is concerned, he has only shewn a just severity sanctioned by public opinion, and perhaps required by the interest of the state. Early however in the action we

<sup>21</sup> The Chorus first attempts to console Antigone by reminding her of her fame (817): οὐκοῦν κλεινὴ καὶ ἔπαινον ἔχουσ' Ἐς τόδ' ἀπέρχῃ κεῖθος νεκύων: and then answers her complaints by suggesting her fault (853): προβᾶσ' ἐπ' ἔσχατον θράσους ὑψηλὸν ἐς Δίκας βάθρον προσέπες, ὦ τέκνον, πολὺ· and again (872) σέβειν μὲν εὐσέβειά τις· κράτος δ' ὅτῳ κράτος μέλει, παραβατὸν οὐδαμῇ πέλει, σὲ δ' αὐτόγνωτος ὦλεσ' ὀργά.

<sup>22</sup> Mr Campbell very needlessly and groundlessly conjectures that Sophocles possessed considerable military experience when he was elected to the office.



have an intimation that in his zeal for the commonwealth, and for the maintenance of his royal authority, he has overlooked the claims of some other parties whose interests were affected by his conduct. The rights and duties of kindred, though they might not be permitted to alter the course prescribed by policy and justice, were still entitled to respect. If Antigone had forfeited her life to the rigour of the law, equity would have interposed, at least to mitigate the punishment of an act prompted by such laudable motives. The mode in which the penalty originally denounced against her offense was transmuted, so as to subject her to a death of lingering torture, added mockery to cruelty. But the rites of burial concerned not only the deceased, and his surviving relatives; they might also be considered as a tribute due to the awful Power who ruled in the nether world; as such they could not commonly be withheld without impiety. Hence Antigone, in her first altercation with Creon, urges that her deed, though forbidden by human laws, was required by those of Hades, and might be deemed holy in the realms below<sup>23</sup>. Hæmon touches on the same topic, when he charges his father with trampling on the honours due to the gods, and says that he pleads not on behalf of Antigone alone, but of the infernal deities (745-749). Creon, in pronouncing his final sentence on Antigone, notices this plea, but only to treat it with contempt. "Let her implore the aid of Hades, the only power whom she reveres: he will perhaps deliver her from her tomb; or at least she will learn by experience, that her reverence has been ill bestowed." We must not however construe these passages into a proof that Creon, in his decree, had committed an act of flagrant impiety, and that his contest with Antigone was in effect a struggle between policy and religion. It is clear that his prohibition was consistent with the customary law, and with the religious opinions of the heroic ages, as they are represented not only by Homer, but in other works of Sophocles himself. The determination of Achilles to prevent Hector's burial, and his treatment of the corps, are related as extraordinary proofs of his affection for Patroclus, but still as a legitimate exercise of the rights of war. In the deliberation of the gods on the subject, the only motive assigned for the

<sup>23</sup> 519. *Αντ.* "Ὁμῶς ὁ γ' "Αἰδῆς τοὺς νόμους τούτους ποθεῖ. *Κρ.* 'Αλλ' οὐχ ὁ χρηστός τῷ κακῷ λαχεῖν ἴσος. *Αντ.* Τίς οἶδεν, εἰ κάτωθεν εὐαγὴ τάδε;



interference of Jupiter, is Hector's merit and piety. Juno, Neptune, and Minerva, are so far from finding any thing impious in the conduct of Achilles, that they oppose the intervention of the powers friendly to Troy on behalf of the deceased. So the dispute about the burial in the *Ajax* turns entirely on the merits of the hero, without any reference to the claims of the infernal gods. And as little does Electra seem to know any thing of them, when she desires Orestes, after killing Ægisthus, to expose him to such interrers as befit a wretch like him, that is, as the Scholiast explains it, to the birds and hounds<sup>24</sup>. Hence in the *Antigone* it must not be supposed that any of the speakers assume as a general proposition, that to refuse burial to a corps is absolutely and in all cases an impious violation of divine laws, though they contend that the honours paid to the dead are grateful, and therefore in general due to the infernal gods. Hitherto therefore Creon can only be charged with having pursued a laudable aim somewhat intemperately and inconsiderately, without sufficient indulgence for the natural feelings of mankind, or sufficient respect for the Powers to whom Polynices now properly belonged. He has one principle of action, which he knows to be right; but he does not reflect that there may be others of equal value, which ought not to be sacrificed to it. It is not however before the arrival of Tiresias that the effects of this inflexible and indiscriminate consistency become manifest. The seer declares that the gods have made known by the clearest signs that Creon's obstinacy excites their displeasure. He has reversed the order of nature, has entombed the living, and disinterred the dead. But still all may be well: nothing is yet irretrievably lost; if he will only acknowledge that he has gone too far, he may retrace his steps. The gods below claim Polynices, the gods above Antigone: it is not yet too late to restore them. But Creon, engrossed by his single object, rejects the prophet's counsel, defies his threats, and declares that no respect even for the holiest of things, shall induce him to swerve from his resolution. Far from regarding the pollution of the altars, he cares not though it should reach the throne of Jove himself: and glosses over his profaneness with the sophistical plea, that he knows,

<sup>24</sup> 1487. κτανὼν πρόθεσ Ταφεῦσιν, ὧν τόνδ' εἰκὸς ἐστὶ τυγχάνειν.



no man has power to pollute the gods. The calamity which now befalls him, is an appropriate chastisement. Already the event had proved his wisdom to be folly. The measures he had taken for the good of the state had involved it in distress and danger. His boasted firmness now gives way, and on a sudden he is ready to abandon his purpose, to revoke his decrees. But they are executed, in spite of himself, and in a manner which for ever destroys his own happiness. Antigone dies, the victim whom he had vowed to law and justice: but as in her he had sacrificed the domestic affections to his state-policy, her death deprives him of the last hope of his family, and makes his hearth desolate. She, on the other hand, who had been drawn into an involuntary conflict with social order by the simple impulse of discharging a private duty, pays indeed the price which, she had foreseen, her undertaking would cost: but she succeeds in her design, and triumphs over the power of Creon, who himself becomes the minister of her wishes.

The character and situation of the parties in this play rendered it almost necessary that the contest should be terminated by a tragical catastrophe, even if the poet had not been governed by the tradition on which his argument was founded: though to the last room is left open for a reconciliation which would have prevented the calamity. In the *Philoctetes* the struggle is brought to a happy issue, after all hopes of such a result appeared to have been extinguished: and this is not merely conformable to tradition, but required by the nature of the subject. Our present object is only to exhibit the works of Sophocles in a particular point of view, and we therefore abstain from entering into discussions, which, though very important for the full understanding of them, are foreign to our immediate purpose. We cannot however help observing, that the *Philoctetes* is a remarkable instance of the danger of trusting to a first impression in forming a judgement on the design of an ancient author: and that it ought at the same time to check the rashness of those who think that in such subjects all is to be discovered at the first glance, and to raise the confidence of those who may be apt to despair that study and investigation can ever ascertain anything in them, that has once been controverted. The *Philoctetes* en-



gaged the attention of some of the most eminent German critics, a Winkelmann, a Lessing, a Herder, for a long time in an extraordinary degree. Yet there are probably few points on which intelligent judges of such matters are more unanimous, than that these celebrated men were all mistaken on the question which they agitated, and that it is only in later times that it has been placed on a right footing and clearly understood. The bodily sufferings of Philoctetes are exhibited by the poet for no other purpose than to afford a measure of the indignation with which he is inspired by his wrongs, and of the energy of his will. It is no ordinary pain that torments him, but of a kind similar to that which extorted groans and tears from Hercules himself. Yet in his eagerness to escape from the scene of his long wretchedness, he makes an almost superhuman effort to master it, and conceal it from the observation of the bystanders. The difficulty of the exertion proves the strength of the motive: yet the motive, strong as it is, is unable to bear him up against the violence of the pain. He loses his self-command, and gives vent to his agony in loud and piteous exclamations. But all he had hoped for from Neoptolemus, when he strove to stifle his sensations, was not to be cured of his sore, but to be transported to a place where his sufferings might be mitigated by the presence and aid of compassionate friends. When he discovers the fraud that had been played upon him, he is at the same time invited to return to Troy, by the prospect of recovering health and strength, and of using them in the most glorious of fields. But long as he had sighed for deliverance from his miserable solitude, intolerable as are the torments he endures, ambitious as he is of martial renown, and impatient of wasting the arrows of Hercules on birds and beasts, there is a feeling stronger than any of these which impels him to reject the proffered good with disdain and even loathing, and to prefer pining to his life's end in lonely, helpless, continually aggravated wretchedness. This is the feeling of the atrocious wrong that has been inflicted on him: a feeling which acquires new force with every fresh throb of pain, with every hour of melancholy musing, and renders the thought of being reconciled to those who have so deeply injured him, and of lending his aid to promote their



interest and exalt their glory, one from which he recoils with abhorrence. At the time when his situation appears most utterly desperate, when he sees himself on the point of being abandoned to an extremity of distress, compared with which his past sufferings were light, while he is tracing the sad features of the dreary prospect that lies immediately before him, and owns himself overcome by its horrors, the suggestion of the Chorus, that his resolution is shaken, and their exhortation that he would comply with their wishes, rekindles all the fury of his indignation, which breaks forth in a strain of vehemence, such as had never before escaped him<sup>25</sup>: a passage only inferior in sublimity to the similar one in the *Prometheus* (1045), inasmuch as *Prometheus* is perfectly calm, *Philoctetes* transported by passion.

The resentment of *Philoctetes* is so just and natural, and his character so noble and amiable, he is so open and unsuspecting after all his experience of human treachery, so warm and kindly in the midst of all his sternness and impatience, that it would seem as if *Sophocles* had intended that he should be the object of our unqualified sympathy. Yet it is not so: the poet himself preserves an ironical composure, and while he excites our esteem and pity for the suffering hero, guards us against sharing the detestation *Philoctetes* feels for the authors of his calamity. The character of *Ulysses* is contrasted indeed most forcibly with that of his frank, generous, impetuous enemy; but the contrast is not one between light and darkness, good and evil, between all that we love and admire on the one hand, and what we most hate and loath on the other. The character of *Ulysses*, though not amiable, is far from being odious or despicable. He is one of those persons whom we cannot help viewing with respect, even when we disapprove of their principles and conduct. He is a sober, experienced, politic statesman, who keeps the public good steadily in view, and devotes himself entirely to the pursuit of it. Throughout the whole of his proceedings, with regard to *Philoctetes*, he maintains this dignity, and expresses his consciousness of it. He is always ready to avow and justify the grounds on which he acts. From the beginning he has been impelled by no base or selfish motive;

<sup>25</sup> 1197. οὐδέποτε, οὐδέποτε, ἴσθι τόδ' ἔμπεδον, κ. τ. λ.



but on the contrary, has exposed himself to personal danger for the public service. He had never borne any illwill to Philoctetes: but when his presence was detrimental to the army, he advised his removal; now that it is discovered to be necessary for the success of the expedition, he exerts his utmost endeavours to bring him back to Troy. He knows the character of Philoctetes too well, to suppose that his resentment will ever give way to persuasion (103), and the arrows of Hercules are a safeguard against open force. He therefore finds himself compelled to resort to artifice, which on this occasion appears the more defensible, because it is employed for the benefit not only of the Grecian army, but of Philoctetes himself, who, once deprived of his weapons, will probably consent to listen to reason. Neoptolemus, though his natural feelings are shocked by the proposal of Ulysses, is unable to resist the force of his arguments, and suffers himself to be persuaded that, by the step he is about to take, he shall earn the reputation not only of a wise, but a good man<sup>26</sup>. It is true that he retains some misgivings, which, when strengthened by pity for Philoctetes, ripen into a complete change of purpose. But Ulysses never repents of his counsels, but considers the young man's abandonment of the enterprize as a culpable weakness, a breach of his duty to the common cause. In his own judgement this cause hallows the undertaking, and renders the fraud he has practised pious and laudable<sup>27</sup>. And hence when assailed by Philoctetes with the most virulent invectives, he preserves his temper, and replies to them in a tone of conscious rectitude. "He could easily refute them, if this were a season for argument; but he will confine himself to one plea: where the public weal demands such expedients, he scruples not to use them; with this exception, he may boast that no one surpasses him in justice and piety." Such language accords so well with the spirit of the Greek institutions, according to which the individual lived only in and for the state, that from the lips of Ulysses it can raise no doubt

<sup>26</sup> 117. Οδ. ὡς τοῦτο γ' ἔρξας, δύο φέρει δωρήματα. Νε. Ποίω; μαθὼν γάρ, οὐκ ἂν ἀρνοίμην τὸ δρᾶν. Οδ. Σοφός τ' ἂν αὐτὸς κάγαθὸς κεκλῇ ἅμα.

<sup>27</sup> Hence with the god of craft he invokes the goddess of political prudence, his peculiar patroness: (133) "Ἑρμῆς δ' ὁ πέμπων Δόλιος ἡγήσαιο νῶν, Νίκη τ' Ἀθάνη Πολιάς, ἥ σώζει μ' αἰεί.



of his sincerity. We see that he has adopted his principles deliberately, and acts upon them consistently.

But the doctrine that the end sanctifies the means, though in every age it has found men to embrace it, has never been universally and absolutely admitted. Ulysses has convinced himself by his own sophistry, but he cannot pervert the ingenuous nature of Neoptolemus, whose unprejudiced decision turns the scale on the side of truth. The intervention of Neoptolemus is not more requisite for the complication of the action, than for the purpose of placing the two other characters in the strongest light. He cannot answer the fallacies of Ulysses, but he more effectually refutes them by his actions. The wily statesman has foreseen and provided against all the obstacles that might interfere with the execution of his plan—except one: he has not reckoned on the resistance he might find in the love of truth, natural to uncorrupted minds, and which, in his young companion, has never been stifled by the practise of deceit. He had calculated on using Neoptolemus as an instrument, and he finds him a man. And hence the unexpected issue of the struggle renders full justice to all. Philoctetes is brought to embrace that which he had spurned as ignominy worse than death; but by means, which render it the most glorious event of his life, and compensate for the sufferings inflicted on him by the anger of the gods. The end of Ulysses is attained, but not until all his arts have been baffled, and he has been compelled to retire from the contest, defeated and scorned. Neoptolemus, who has sacrificed every thing to truth and honour, succeeds in every object of his ambition to the utmost extent of his desires. The machinery by which all this is effected is indeed an arbitrary symbol, but that which it represents may not be the less true.

We are aware how open the subjects discussed in the foregoing pages are to a variety of views, and how little any one of these can be expected to obtain general assent. We can even anticipate some of the objections that may be made to the one here proposed. According to the opinion of a great modern critic, it will perhaps appear to want the most decisive test of truth, the sanction of Aristotle. And undoubtedly if it is once admitted that no design or train of thought can be attributed



to the Greek tragic poets which has not been noticed by Aristotle<sup>28</sup>, this little essay must be content to share the fate of the greater part of the works written in modern times on Greek tragedy, and to pass for an idle dream. We would however fain hope either that the critic's sentence, investing Aristotle as it does with a degree of infallibility and omniscience, which, in this particular province, we should be least of all disposed to concede to him, may bear a milder construction, or that we may venture to appeal from it to a higher tribunal. Another more specific objection may possibly be, that the idea of tragic irony which we have attempted to illustrate by the preceding examples, is a modern one, and that instead of finding it in Sophocles, we have forced it upon him. So far as this objection relates to our conception of the poet's theology, we trust that it may have been in some measure counteracted by the distinction above drawn between the religious sentiments of Sophocles, and those of an earlier age. This distinction seems to have been entirely overlooked by a German author, who has written an essay of considerable merit on the *Ajax*, and who in speaking of the attributes of Minerva, as she appears in that play, observes: "the idea that the higher powers can only interpose in the affairs of mankind for the purpose of making men wiser and better, is purely modern<sup>29</sup>." That which he

<sup>28</sup> "Hodie plerisque fati usus in Græcorum tragœdia necessarius videtur: de quo quum nihil ab Aristotele traditum sit, apparet, quamvis in plerisque tragœdiis Græcorum fato suæ sint partes, tamen scriptores illarum fabularum non cogitavisse de fato." Hermann. Præf. ad Trachinias, p. 7. A little further on he observes: "Qua in re autem illi tragœdiæ naturam positam esse statuerint optime ex Aristotele cognosci potest, qui et ætate iis proximus fuerit, et, ut ipse Græcus, Græcorum more philosophatus est." And so again in the Preface to Philoctetes, p. 11. "Tragici Græcorum eam habebant animo informatam notionem tragœdiæ, quæ est ab Aristotele in libro de arte poetica proposita." Had they then all the same notion of it, and was there no difference between that of Æschylus and those of Sophocles and of Euripides? And if they had, was it sufficient, in order to comprehend it, to be a Greek of nearly the same age, and a philosopher? How many contradictory theories have been proposed on Goethe's poetry by contemporary German metaphysicians! Even Hermann himself has not been universally understood in his own day. Many persons are still persuaded that his treatise *De Mythologia Græcorum antiquissima* is mere poetry, while the author himself protests that it is plain prose. But, joking apart, if Lord Bacon had written a treatise on the art of poetry, who would now think his judgement conclusive on Shakespeare's notion of tragedy, or on the design and spirit of any of his plays?

<sup>29</sup> Immermann. *Ueber den rasenden Ajax des Sophocles*, p. 23: at p. 18. he observes: "the way in which a superior Being steps in, and determines the hero's



conceives to be repugnant to modern ideas in the theology of Sophocles is, that Minerva is represented as inspiring the phrenzy of Ajax: an agency which appears to him inconsistent with the functions of the goddess of wisdom. According to the view we have taken of the play, this inconsistency would be merely nominal. But even according to his own, it is an inconsistency which need not shock a modern reader more than an ancient one. We are familiar with a magnificent passage, in which it is said of "our living Dread, who dwells In Silo, his bright sanctuary," that, when about to punish the Philistines, "Among them he a spirit of phrenzy sent, Who hurt their minds." Minerva at all events does no more, and according to our view she interposes for a purely benevolent, not a vindictive purpose. Whether Sophocles would have scrupled to introduce her as an author of absolute uncompensated evil, is a question with which we are not here concerned. But the idea of a humbling and chastening Power, who extracts moral good out of physical evil, does not seem too refined for the age and country of Sophocles, however difficult it may have been to reconcile with the popular mythology.

As we have had occasion to refer to the *Samson Agonistes*, we are tempted to remark that few plays afford a finer specimen of tragic irony: and that it may be very usefully compared with the *Ajax* and the second *Ædipus*. We leave it to the reader to consider, whether the poet, who was so deeply imbued with the spirit of Greek tragedy, was only imitating the outward form of the ancient drama, or designed to transfer one of its most essential elements to his work.

On the other hand we admit that it is a most difficult and delicate task, to determine the precise degree in which a dramatic poet is conscious of certain bearings of his works, and of the ideas which they suggest to the reader, and hence to draw an inference as to his design. The only safe method of proceeding for this purpose, so as to avoid the danger of going very far astray, and at the same time to ensure some gain, is in each particular case to institute an accurate examination of the whole and of every part, such as Welcker's of the *Ajax*, which

destiny, is irreconcilable with our presumptions (Ahnungen) about the supreme government of human affairs."



may be considered as a model of such investigations. We are conscious how far this essay falls short of such a standard: and if we are willing to hope that it may not be entirely useless, it is only so far as it may serve to indicate the right road, and to stimulate the curiosity of others to prosecute it in new directions.

C. T.

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SCHLEIERMACHER  
ON THE  
WORTH OF SOCRATES AS A PHILOSOPHER.

(FROM THE BERLIN TRANSACTIONS OF 1815.)

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THAT very different and even entirely opposite judgements should be formed by different men, and according to the spirit of different times, on minds of a leading and peculiar order, and that it should be late, if ever, before opinions agree as to their worth, is a phenomenon of everyday occurrence. But it is less natural, indeed it seems almost surprising, that at any one time a judgement should be generally received with regard to any such mind, which is in glaring contradiction with itself. Yet, if I am not mistaken, it is actually the case with Socrates, that the portrait usually drawn of him, and the historical importance which is almost unanimously attributed to him, are at irreconcilable variance. With Socrates most writers make a new period to begin in the history of Greek philosophy; which at all events manifestly implies that he breathed a new spirit and character into those intellectual exertions of his countrymen, which we comprehend under the name of philosophy, so that they assumed a new form under his hands, or at least that he materially widened their range. But if we inquire how the same writers describe Socrates as an individual, we find nothing that can serve as a foundation for the influence they assign to him. We are informed, that he did not at all busy himself with the physical investigations which constituted a main part even of Greek philosophy, but rather withheld others from them, and that even with regard to moral inquiries, which were those in which he engaged the deepest, he did not by any means aim at reducing them into a scientific shape, and that he established



no fixed principle for this, any more than for any other branch of human knowledge. The base of his intellectual constitution, we are told, was rather religious than speculative, his exertions rather those of a good citizen, directed to the improvement of the people, and especially of the young, than those of a philosopher; in short, he is represented as a virtuoso in the exercise of sound common sense, and of that strict integrity and mild philanthropy, with which it is always associated in an uncorrupted mind; all this, however, tinged with a slight air of enthusiasm. These are no doubt excellent qualities; but yet they are not such as fit a man to play a brilliant part in history, but rather, unless where peculiar circumstances intervene, to lead a life of enviable tranquillity, so that it would be necessary to ascribe the general reputation of Socrates, and the almost unexampled homage which has been paid to him by so many generations, less to himself than to such peculiar circumstances. But least of all are these qualities which could have produced conspicuous and permanent effects on the philosophical exertions of a people already far advanced in intellectual culture. And this is confirmed, when we consider what sort of doctrines and opinions are attributed to Socrates in conformity with this view. For in spite of the pains taken to trick them out with a shew of philosophy, it is impossible after all to give them any scientific solidity whatever: the farthest point we come to is, that they are thoughts well suited to warm the hearts of men in favour of goodness, but such as a healthy understanding, fully awakened to reflexion, cannot fail to light upon of itself. What effect then can they have wrought on the progress, or the transformation of philosophy? If we would confine ourselves to the wellknown statement, that Socrates called philosophy down from heaven to earth, that is to houses and marketplaces, in other words, that he proposed social life as the object of research in the room of nature: still the influence thus ascribed to him is far from salutary in itself, for philosophy consists not in a partial cultivation either of morals or physics, but in the coexistence and intercommunion of both, and there is moreover no historical evidence that he really exerted it. The foundations of ethical philosophy had been laid before the time of Socrates, in the doctrines of the Pythagoreans, and after him it only kept its place



by the side of physics, in the philosophical systems of the Greeks. In those of Plato, of Aristotle, and of the Stoics, that is, of all the genuine Socratic schools of any importance, we again meet with physical investigations, and ethics were exclusively cultivated only by those followers of Socrates who themselves never attained to any eminence in philosophy. And if we consider the general tendency of the abovenamed schools, and review the whole range of their tenets, nothing can be pointed out, that could have proceeded from a Socrates, endowed with such qualities of mind and character as the one described to us, unless it be where their theories have been reduced to a familiar practical application. And even with regard to the elder Socratics, we find more satisfaction in tracing their strictly philosophical speculations to any other source rather than to *this* Socrates; not only may Aristippus, who was unlike his master in his spirit as well as his doctrines, be more easily derived from Protagoras, with whom he has so much in common, but Euclid, with his dialectic bias, from the Eleatics. And we find ourselves compelled to conclude, that the stem of Socrates, as he is at present represented to us, can have produced no other shoot than the Cynical philosophy, and that, not the cynism of Antisthenes, which still retains many features which we should rather refer to his earlier master Gorgias, but the purer form, which exhibits only a peculiar mode of life, not a doctrine, much less a science: that of Diogenes, the *mad Socrates*, as he has been called, though in truth the highest epithet due to him is that of *Socrates caricatured*. For his is a copy in which we find nothing but features of such an original: its approximation to the selfcontentedness of the deity in the retrenchment of artificial wants, its rejection of mere theoretical knowledge, its unassuming course of going about in the service of the god to expose the follies of mankind. But how foreign all this is to the domain of philosophy, and how little can be there effected with such means, is evident enough.

The only rational course then that seems to be left, is to give up one or other of these contradictory assumptions. Either let Socrates still stand at the head of the Athenian philosophy, but then let those who place him there undertake to establish a different notion of him from that which has been long prevalent: or let us retain the conception of the wise and amiable



man, who was made not for the school but wholly for the world : but then let him be transferred from the history of philosophy to that of the general progress of society at Athens, if he can claim any place there. The latter of these expedients is not very far removed from that which has been adopted by Krug<sup>1</sup> ! For as in his system Socrates stands at the end of the one period, and not at the beginning of the next, he appears not as the germ of a new age, but as a product and aftergrowth of an earlier one ; he sinks, as an insulated phenomenon, into the same rank with the sophists, and other late fruits of the period, and loses a great part of his philosophical importance. Only it is but a half measure that this author adopts, when he begins his new period with the immediate disciples of Socrates as such ; for at its head he places the genuine Socratics, as they are commonly called, and above all Xenophon, men of whom he himself says, that their only merit was that of having propagated and diffused Socratic doctrines, while the doctrines themselves do not appear to him worth making the beginning of a new period.—Ast had previously arrived at the same result by a road in some respects opposite.<sup>2</sup> With him Plato is the full bloom of that which he terms the Athenian form of philosophy, and as no plant begins with its bloom, he feels himself constrained to place Socrates at the head of this philosophy, but yet not strictly as a philosopher. He says, that the operation of philosophy in Socrates was confined to the exercise of qualities that may belong to any virtuous man, that is to say, it was properly no philosophy at all ; and makes the essence of his character to consist in enthusiasm and irony. Now he feels that he cannot place a man endowed with no other qualities than these at the head of a new period, and therefore he ranges the sophists by his side, not indeed without some inconsistency, for he himself sees in them the perverse tendency which was to be counteracted by the spirit of the new age ; but yet he prefers this to recognizing the germ of a new gradation in Socrates alone, whose highest philosophical worth he makes to consist in his martyrdom, which however cannot by any means be deemed of equal moment in the sphere of science, as in that of religion or politics. Though in form this course of Ast's is opposite to Krug's, in substance it is the same : its result is likewise to

<sup>1</sup> *Gesch. der Philos. alter Zeit.*

<sup>2</sup> *Grundriss einer Gesch. der Philos.*



begin a new period of philosophy with Plato. For Ast perceives nothing new or peculiar in the struggle Socrates made against the Sophists, only virtue and the thirst after truth, which had undoubtedly animated all the preceding philosophers; what he represents as characteristic in the Athenian philosophy, is the union of the elements which had been previously separate and opposed to each other; and since he does not in fact shew the existence of this union in Socrates himself, and distinctly recognizes their separation in his immediate disciples, Plato is after all the point at which according to him that union begins.

But if we choose really to consider Plato as the true beginner of a new period, not to mention that he is far too perfect for a first beginning, we fall into two difficulties. First as to his relation to Aristotle. In all that is most peculiar to Plato, Aristotle appears as directly opposite to him as possible; but the main division of philosophy, notwithstanding the wide difference between their modes of treating it, he has in common with Plato, and the Stoics with both; it fits as closely, and sits as easily on one as the other, so that one can scarcely help believing that it was derived from some common origin, which was the root of Plato's philosophy as well as theirs. The second difficulty is to conceive what Plato's relation to Socrates could really have been, if Socrates was not in any way his master in philosophy. If we should suppose that Plato's character was formed by the example of Socrates, and that reverence for his master's virtue, and love of truth, was the tie that bound him, still this merely moral relation is not a sufficient solution of the difficulty. The mode in which Plato introduces Socrates, even in works which contain profound philosophical investigations, must be regarded as the wildest caprice, and would necessarily have appeared merely ridiculous and absurd to all his contemporaries, if he was not in some way or other indebted to him for his philosophical life. Hence we are forced to abide by the conclusion, that if a great pause is to be made in Greek philosophy, to separate the scattered tenets of the earlier schools from the later systems, this must be made with Socrates; but then we must also ascribe to him some element of a more strictly philosophical kind than most writers do, though as a mere beginning it needs not to have been carried



very far toward maturity. Such a pause as this, however, we cannot avoid making: the earlier philosophy which we designate by the names of Pythagoras, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, &c. has evidently a common type, and the later, in which Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno are the conspicuous names, has likewise one of its own, which is very different from the other. Nothing can have been lost between them, which could have formed a gradual transition: much less is it possible so to connect any of the later forms with any of the earlier, as to regard them as a continuous whole. This being so, nothing remains to be done, but to subject the case of Socrates to a new revision, in order to see whether the judges he has met with among posterity have not been as unjust, in denying his philosophical worth, and his merits in the cause of philosophy, as his contemporaries were in denying his worth as a citizen, and imputing to him imaginary offences against the commonwealth. But this would render it necessary to ascertain somewhat more distinctly, wherein his philosophical merit consists.

But this new inquiry naturally leads us back in the first instance to the old question, whether we are to believe Plato or Xenophon in their accounts of what Socrates was; a question, however, which only deserves to be proposed at all, so far as these two authors are really at variance with each other, and which therefore only admits of a rational answer, after it has been decided whether such a variance exists, and where it lies. Plato nowhere professes himself the historian of Socrates; with the exception perhaps of the *Apology*, and of insulated passages, such as the speech of Alcibiades in the *Banquet*. For it would certainly have been in bad taste, if here, where Plato is making contemporaries of Socrates speak of him in his presence, he had exhibited him in a manner that was not substantially faithful, though even here many of the details may have been introduced for the sake of playful exaggeration. On the other hand, Plato himself does not warrant any one to consider all that he makes Socrates say in his dialogues, as his real thoughts and language; and it would be rendering him but a poor service to confine his merit to that of having given a correct and skilful report of the doctrines of Socrates. On the contrary, he undoubtedly means his philosophy to



be considered as his own, and not Socrates'. And accordingly every intelligent reader is probably convinced by his own reflexions, that none but original thoughts can appear in such a dress; whereas a work of mere narrative—and such these dialogues would be, if the whole of the matter belonged to Socrates—would necessarily shew a fainter tone of colouring, such as Xenophon's conversations really present. But as on the one hand it would be too much to assert that Socrates actually thought and knew all that Plato makes him say: so on the other hand it would certainly be too little to say of him, that he was nothing more than the Socrates whom Xenophon represents. Xenophon, it is true, in the *Memorabilia*, professes himself a narrator; but, in the first place, a man of sense can only relate what he understands, and a disciple of Socrates, who must have been well acquainted with his master's habit of disclaiming knowledge, would of all men adhere most strictly to this rule. We know however, and this may be admitted without being harshly pressed, that Xenophon was a statesman, but no philosopher, and that beside the purity of his character, and the good sense of his political principles, beside his admirable power of rousing the intellect, and checking presumption, which Xenophon loved and respected in Socrates, the latter may have possessed some really philosophical elements which Xenophon was unable to appropriate to himself, and which he suffered to pass unnoticed; which indeed he can have felt no temptation to exhibit, for fear of betraying defects such as those which his Socrates was wont to expose. On the other hand, Xenophon was an apologetic narrator, and had no doubt selected this form for the very purpose, that his readers might not expect him to exhibit Socrates entire, but only that part of his character which belonged to the sphere of the affections and of social life, and which bore upon the charges brought against him; everything else he excludes, contenting himself with shewing, that it cannot have been anything of so dangerous a tendency as was imputed to Socrates. And not only *may* Socrates, he *must* have been more, and there must have been more in the background of his speeches, than Xenophon represents. For if the contemporaries of Socrates had heard nothing from him but such discourses, how would



Plato have marred the effect of his works on his immediate public, which had not yet forgotten the character of Socrates, if the part which Socrates plays there stood in direct contradiction with the image which his real life had left in the reader's mind? And if we believe Xenophon, and in this respect we cannot doubt the accuracy of the contemporary apologist, that Socrates spent the whole of his time in public places, and suppose that he was always engaged in discourses which, though they may have been more beautiful, varied, and dazzling, were still in substance the same with these, and moved in the same sphere to which the *Memorabilia* are confined: one is at a loss to understand, how it was that, in the course of so many years, Socrates did not clear the marketplace, and the workshops, the walks, and the wrestling-schools, by the dread of his presence, and how it is that, in Xenophon's native Flemish style of painting, the weariness of the interlocutors is not still more strongly exprest, than we here and there actually find it. And still less should we be able to comprehend, why men of such abilities as Critias and Alcibiades, and others formed by nature for speculation, as Plato and Euclid, set so high a value on their intercourse with Socrates, and found satisfaction in it so long. Nor can it be supposed, that Socrates held discourses in public such as Xenophon puts into his mouth, but that he delivered lessons of a different kind elsewhere, and in private; for this, considering the apologetic form of Xenophon's book, to which he rigidly confines himself, he would probably not have passed over in silence. Socrates must have disclosed the philosophical element of his character in the same social circle of which Xenophon gives us specimens. And is not this just the impression which Xenophon's conversations make? philosophical matter, translated into the unphilosophical style of the common understanding, an operation in which the philosophical base is lost; just as some critics have proposed, by way of test for the productions of the loftiest poetry, to resolve them into prose, and evaporate their spirit, which can leave nothing but an extremely sober kind of beauty remaining. And as after such an experiment the greatest of poets would scarcely be able exactly to restore the lost poetry, but yet a reader of moderate capacity soon observes what has been



done, and can even point it out in several passages, where the decomposing hand has grown tired of its work: so it is in the other case with the philosophical basis. One finds some parallels with Plato, other fragments are detected in other ways: and the only inference to be drawn from the scarcity of these passages is, that Xenophon understood his business; unless we choose to say, that as Aristotle is supposed to have held his philosophical discourses in the forenoon, and the exoteric in the afternoon (Gellius N. A. xx. 5), Socrates reversed this order, and in the morning held conversations in the marketplace with the artisans, and others who were less familiar with him, which Xenophon found it easier to divest of their philosophical aspect: but that of an evening, in the walks, and wrestlingschools, he engaged in those subtler, deeper, and wittier dialogues with his favorites, which it was reserved for Plato to imitate, embellish, and expand, while he connected his own investigations with them.

And thus, to fill up the blank which Xenophon has manifestly left, we are still driven back to the Socrates of Plato, and the shortest way of releasing ourselves from the difficulty, would be to find a rule by which we could determine, what is the reflex, and the property, of Socrates in Plato, and what his own invention and addition. Only the problem is not to be solved by a process such as that adopted by Meiners, whose critical talent is of a kind to which this subject in general was not very well suited. For if in all that Plato has left we are to select only what is least speculative, least artificial, least poetical, and hence, for so we are taught, least enthusiastic, we shall indeed still retain much matter for this more refined and pregnant species of dialogues, to season Xenophon's tediousness, but it will be impossible in this way to discover any properly philosophical basis in the constitution of Socrates. For if we exclude all depth of speculation, nothing is left but results, without the grounds and methodical principles on which they depend, and which therefore Socrates can only have possessed instinctively, that is without the aid of philosophy. The only safe method seems to be, to inquire: What may Socrates have been, over and above what Xenophon has described, without however contradicting the strokes of character, and the practical



maxims, which Xenophon distinctly delivers as those of Socrates: and what must he have been, to give Plato a right, and an inducement, to exhibit him as he has done in his dialogues? Now the latter branch of this question inevitably leads us back to the historical position from which we started; that Socrates must have had a strictly philosophical basis in his composition, so far as he is virtually recognized by Plato as the author of his philosophical life, and is therefore to be regarded as the first vital movement of Greek philosophy in its more advanced stage; and that he can only be entitled to this place by an element, which, though properly philosophical, was foreign to the preceding period. Here however we must for the present be content to say, that the property which is peculiar to the post-Socratic philosophy, beginning with Plato, and which henceforward is common to all the genuine Socratic schools, is the coexistence and intercommunion of the three branches of knowledge, dialectics, physics, ethics. This distinction separates the two periods very definitely. For before Socrates either these branches were kept entirely apart, or their subjects were blended together without due discrimination, and without any definite proportion: as for instance ethics and physics among the Pythagoreans, physics and dialectics among the Eleatics; the Ionians alone, though their tendency was wholly to physics, made occasional excursions, though quite at random, into the region both of dialectics and of ethics. But when some writers refuse Plato himself the honour of having distinguished and combined these sciences, and ascribe this step to Xenocrates, and think that even Aristotle abandoned it again; this in my opinion is grounded on a misunderstanding, which however it would here lead us too far to explain. Now it is true we cannot assert, that Socrates was the first who combined the characters of a physical, ethical, and dialectic philosopher in one person, especially as Plato and Xenophon agree in taking physics out of his range; nor can it be positively said that Socrates was at least the author of this distribution of science, though its germ may certainly be found from the *Memorabilia*. But we may surely inquire whether this phenomenon has not some simpler and more internal cause, and whether this may not be found in Socrates. The



following observation will, I conceive, be admitted without much dispute. So long as inquirers are apt to step unwittingly across the boundaries that separate one province of knowledge from another, so long, and in the same degree, does the whole course of their intellectual operations depend on outward circumstances: for it is only a systematic distribution of the whole field that can lead to a regular and connected cultivation of it. In the same way, so long as the several sciences are pursued singly, and their respective votaries contentedly acquiesce in this insulation, so long, and in the same degree, is the specific instinct for the object of each science predominant in the whole sphere of intellectual exertion. But as soon as the need of the connexion and co-ordinate growth of all the branches of knowledge has become so distinctly felt, as to express itself by the form in which they are treated and described, in a manner which can never again be lost; so far as this is the case, it is no longer particular talents and instincts, but the general scientific talent of speculation, that has the ascendant. In the former of these cases it must be confessed, that the idea of science as such is not yet matured, perhaps has not even become the subject of consciousness, for science as such can only be conceived as a whole, in which every division is merely subordinate, just as the real world to which it ought to correspond. In the latter case, on the contrary, this idea has become a subject of consciousness; for it can have been only by its force that the particular inclinations which confine each thinker to a certain object, and split science into insulated parts, have been mastered. And this is unquestionably a simpler criterion to distinguish the two periods of Greek philosophy. In the earlier period, the idea of science as such was not the governing idea, and had not even become a distinct subject of consciousness: and this it is that gives rise to the obscurity which we perceive in all the philosophical productions of that period, through the appearance of caprice which results from the want of consciousness, and through the imperfection of the scientific language, which is gradually forming itself out of the poetical and historical vocabulary. In the second period, on the other hand, the idea of science has become a subject of consciousness. Hence the main business



everywhere is to distinguish knowledge from opinion, hence the precision of scientific language, hence the peculiar prominence of dialectics, which have no other object than the idea of science; things which were not comprehended even by the Eleatics in the same way as by the Socratic schools, since the former still make the idea of *being* their starting-point, rather than that of *knowledge*.

Now this waking of the idea of science, and its earliest manifestations, must have been, in the first instance, what constituted the philosophical basis in Socrates; and for this reason he is justly regarded as the founder of that later Greek philosophy, which in its whole essential form, together with its several variations, was determined by that idea. This is proved clearly enough by the historical statements in Plato, and this too is what must be supplied in Xenophon's conversations, in order to make them worthy of Socrates, and Socrates of his admirers. For if he went about in the service of the god, to justify the celebrated oracle, it was impossible that the utmost point he reached could have been simply to know that he knew nothing; there was a step beyond this which he must have taken, that of knowing what knowledge was. For by what other means could he have been enabled to declare that which others believed themselves to know, to be no knowledge, than by a more correct conception of knowledge, and by a more correct method founded upon that conception? And every where, when he is explaining the nature of non-science (*ἀνεπιστημοσύνη*), one sees that he sets out from two tests: one, that science is the same in all true thoughts, and consequently must manifest its peculiar form in every such thought: the other, that all science forms one whole. For his proofs always hinge on this assumption: that it is impossible to start from one true thought, and to be entangled in a contradiction with any other, and also that knowledge derived from any one point, and obtained by correct combination, cannot contradict that which has been deduced in like manner from any other point; and while he exposed such contradictions in the current conceptions of mankind, he strove to rouse those leading ideas in all who were capable of understanding, or even of divining his meaning. Most of what Xenophon has preserved for us may be referred to this object, and the same endeavour is indicated clearly



enough in all that Socrates says of himself in Plato's *Apology*, and what Alcibiades says of him in his eulogy. So that if we conceive this to have been the central point in the character of Socrates, we may reconcile Plato and Xenophon, and can understand the historical position of Socrates.

When Xenophon says (*Mem.* iv. 6. 15.): that as often as Socrates did not merely refute the errors of others, but attempted to demonstrate something himself, he took his road through propositions which were most generally admitted: we can perfectly understand this mode of proceeding, as the result of the design just described; he wished to find as few hindrances and diversions as possible in his way, that he might illustrate his method clearly and simply; and propositions, if there were such, which all held to be certain, must have appeared to him the most eligible, in order that he might shew in their case, that the conviction with which they were embraced was not knowledge; since this would render men more keenly sensible of the necessity of getting at the foundation of knowledge, and of taking their stand upon it, in order to give a new shape to all human things. Hence too we may explain the preponderance of the subjects connected with civil and domestic life in most of these conversations. For this was the field that supplied the most generally admitted conceptions and propositions, the fate of which interested all men alike. But this mode of proceeding becomes inexplicable, if it is supposed that Socrates attached the chief importance to the subject of these conversations. That must have been quite a secondary point. For when the object is to elucidate any subject, it is necessary to pay attention to the less familiar and more disputed views of it, and how meager most of those discussions in Xenophon are in this respect, is evident enough. From the same point of view we must also consider the controversy of Socrates with the Sophists. So far as it was directed against their maxims, it does not belong to our present question; it is merely the opposition of a good citizen to the corrupters of government and of youth. But even looking at it from the purely theoretical side, it would be idle to represent this contrast as the germ of a new period of philosophy, if Socrates had only impugned opinions which were the monstrous shapes into which the doctrines of an earlier school had degenerated, without having established any in their



stead, which nobody supposes him to have done. But for the purpose of awakening the true idea of science, the sophists must have been the most welcome of all disputants to him, since they had reduced their opinions into the most perfect form; and hence were proud of them themselves, and were peculiarly admired by others. If, therefore, he could succeed in exposing their weakness, the value of a principle so triumphantly applied would be rendered most conspicuous.

But in order to shew the imperfection of the current conceptions both in the theories of the Sophists, and in common life, if the issue was not to be left to chance, some certain *method* was requisite. For it was often necessary in the course of the process to lay down intermediate notions, which it was necessary to define to the satisfaction of both parties; otherwise, all that was done would afterwards have looked like a paltry surprise; and the contradiction between the proposition in question, and one that was admitted, could never be detected without ascertaining what notions might or might not be connected with a given one. Now this method is laid down in the two problems which Plato states in the *Phædrus*, as the two main elements in the art of dialectics, that is, to know first how correctly to combine multiplicity in unity, and again to divide a complex unity according to its nature into a multiplicity, and next to know what notions may or may not be connected together. It is by this means that Socrates became the real founder of dialectics, which continued to be the soul of all the great edifices reared in later times by Greek philosophy, and by its decided prominence, constitutes the chief distinction between the later period and the earlier; so that one cannot but commend the historical instinct which has assigned so high a station to him. At the same time this is not meant to deny, that Euclid and Plato carried this science, as well as the rest, farther toward maturity; but it is manifest that in its first principles, Socrates possessed it as a science, and practised it as an art, in a manner peculiar to himself. For the construction of all Socratic dialogues, as well of those doubtfully ascribed to Plato, and of those attributed with any degree of probability to other original disciples of Socrates, as of all those reported in the *Memorabilia*, hinges without any exception on this point. The same inference results from the testimony of Aristotle (*Metaph.*



I. 6. XIII. 4.): that what may be justly ascribed to Socrates, is that he introduced induction and general definitions; a testimony which bears every mark of impartiality and truth. Hence there is no reason to doubt that Socrates taught this art of framing and connecting notions correctly. Since however it is an *art*, abstract teaching was not sufficient, and therefore no doubt Socrates never so taught it: it was an art that required to be witnessed and practised in the most manifold applications, and one who was not firmly grounded in it, and left the school too early, lost it again, and with it almost all that was to be learnt from Socrates, as indeed is observed in Plato's dialogues. Now that this exercise and illustration was the main object of conversations held by Socrates even on general moral subjects, is expressly admitted by Xenophon himself, when, under the head: what Socrates did to render his friends more expert in dialectics, he introduces a great many such discourses and inquiries, which so closely resemble the rest, that all might just as well have been put in the same class.

It was with a view therefore to become masters in this art, and thereby to keep the faster hold of the idea of science, that men of vigorous and speculative minds formed a circle round Socrates as long as circumstances allowed, those who were able to the end of his life, and in the mean while chose to tread closely in their master's steps, and to refrain for a time from making a systematic application of his art in the different departments of knowledge, for the more elaborate cultivation of all the sciences. But when after his death the most eminent among them, first of all at Megara, began a strictly scientific train of speculation, and thus philosophy gradually ripened into the shape which, with slight variations, it ever after retained among the Greeks: what now took place was not indeed what Socrates did, or perhaps could have done, but yet it was undoubtedly his will. To this it may indeed be objected, that Xenophon expressly says (Mem. i. 1. 11.): that Socrates in his riper years not only himself gave up all application to natural philosophy, but endeavoured to withhold all others from it, and directed them to the consideration of human affairs; and hence many hold those only to be genuine Socratics, who did not include physics in their system. But this statement must manifestly be taken in a sense much less general, and



quite different from that which is usually given to it. This is clearly evinced by the reasons which Socrates alledges. For how could he have said so generally, that the things which depend on God ought not to be made the subject of inquiry, before those which depend on man have been despatched, since not only are the latter connected in a variety of ways with the former, but even among things human there must be some of greater moment, others of less, some of nearer, others of more remote concern, and the proposition would lead to the conclusion that before one was brought to its completion, not even the investigation of another ought to be begun. This might have been not unfairly turned by a sophist against Socrates himself, if he had dragged in a notion apparently less familiar, in order to illustrate another; and certainly this proposition, taken in a general sense, would not only have endangered the conduct of life, but would also have altogether destroyed the Socratic idea of science, that nothing can be known except together with the rest, and along with its relation to all things beside. The real case is simply this. It is clear that Socrates had no peculiar talent for any single science, and least of all for that of physics. Now it is true that a merely metaphysical thinker may feel himself attracted toward all sciences, as was the case with Kant; but then this happens under different circumstances, and a different mental constitution from that of Socrates. He on the contrary made no excursions to points remote from his centre, but devoted his whole life to the task of exciting his leading idea as extensively and as vividly as possible in others; his whole aim was, that whatever form man's wishes and hopes might take, according to individual character and accidental circumstances, this foundation might be securely laid, before he proceeded further. But till then his advice was, not to accumulate fresh masses of opinions; this he for his part would permit only so far as it was demanded by the wants of active life, and for this reason he might say, that if those who investigated meteoric phenomena had any hope of producing them at their pleasure, he should be more ready to admit their researches: language, which in any other sense but this would have been absurd. We cannot therefore conclude from this that Socrates did not wish that physics should be cultivated, any more than we are authorised to suppose, that he fancied it



possible to form ethics into a science by sufficiently multiplying those fragmentary investigations into which he was drawn in discussing the received opinions on the subject. The same law of progression was involuntarily retained in his school. For Plato, though he descends into all the sciences, still lays the principal stress on the establishment of principles, and expatiates in details only so far as they are necessary, and so much the less as he has to draw them from without: it is Aristotle who first revels in their multiplicity.

This appears to me as much as can be said with certainty of the worth of Socrates as a philosopher. But should any one proceed to ask, how far he elaborated the idea of science in his lessons, or in what degree he promoted the discovery of real knowledge in any other province by his controversial discussions, and his dialectic assays, there would perhaps be little to say on this head, and least of all should I be able to extricate any thing to serve this purpose from the works of Plato taken by themselves. For there in all that belongs to Plato there is something of Socrates, and in all that belongs to Socrates something of Plato. Only if any one is desirous of describing doctrines peculiar to Socrates, let him not, as many do in histories of philosophy for the sake of at least filling up some space with Socrates, string together detached moral theses, which, as they arose out of occasional discussions, can never make up a whole, and as to other subjects, let him not lose sight of the above quoted passage of Aristotle, who confines Socrates' philosophical speculations to principles. The first point therefore to examine would be, whether some profound speculative doctrines may not have originally belonged to Socrates, which are generally considered as most foreign to him, for instance, the thought which is unfolded by Plato in his peculiar manner, but is exhibited in the germ by Xenophon himself (*Mem.* i. 4. 8.), and is intimately connected with the great dialectic question as to the agreement between thought and being: that of the general diffusion of intelligence throughout the whole of nature. With this one might connect the assertion of Aristocles (*Euseb. Præp.* xi. 3), that Socrates began the investigation of the doctrine of ideas. But the testimony of this late Peripatetic is suspicious, and may have had no other foundation than the language of Socrates in the *Parmenides*.



But whether much or little of this and other doctrines belonged to Socrates himself, the general idea already described cannot fail to suggest a more correct mode of conceiving, in what light it is that Plato brings forward his master in his works, and in what sense his Socrates is to be termed a real, or a fictitious personage. Fictitious, in the proper sense, I hold, he is not, and his reality is not a merely mimic one, nor is Socrates in those works merely a convenient person who affords room for much mimic art, and much cheerful pleasantry, in order to temper the abstruse investigations with this agreeable addition. It is because the spirit and the method of Socrates are everywhere predominant, and because it is not a merely subordinate point with Plato to adopt the manner of Socrates, but is as truly his highest aim, that Plato has not hesitated to put into his mouth what he believed to be no more than deductions from his fundamental ideas. The only material exceptions we find to this (passing over several more minute which come under the same head with the anachronisms) occur in later works, as the *Statesman* and the *Republic*; I mean doctrines of Plato foreign to the real views of Socrates, perhaps indeed virtually contradicting them, and which are nevertheless put into his mouth. On this head we must let Plato appeal to the privilege conferred by custom. But on the whole we are forced to say, that in giving Socrates a living share in the propagation of that philosophical movement which took its rise from him, Plato has immortalized him in the noblest manner, that a disciple can perpetuate the glory of his master; in a manner not only more beautiful, but more just, than he could have done it by a literal narrative.

C. T.



# SCHLEIERMACHER'S INTRODUCTION

TO HIS TRANSLATION OF

## PLATO'S APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

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I HAVE already observed, in the general Introduction to this translation of Plato, that the reader is not to conclude, because certain works are placed in an appendix, that by this I mean to deny or to call in question with regard to all of them, that they are writings of Plato. My only reason for assigning such a place to the following work, which has been at all times loved and admired for the spirit that breathes through it, and the image it presents of calm moral dignity and beauty, was in the first instance that it contents itself with its particular object, and makes no pretensions to the title of a scientific work. It is true that the Euthyphron likewise has unquestionably an apologetic reference to the charge brought against Socrates; but on the other hand its connection with the notions started in the Protagoras, clearly entitled it to be subjoined to that dialogue. But the Apology is so purely an occasional piece, that it can find no place in the series of its author's philosophical productions. Yet there is certainly one sense, in which, let not the reader be startled, one might perhaps say that it is not a work of Plato's. I mean that it can scarcely be a work of his thoughts, a thing which he invented and fabricated. For if we attribute to Plato the intention of defending Socrates, we must first of all distinguish the times at which he might have done it, either during his process, or subsequently, no matter how soon or how late, to his execution. Now in the latter case Plato could only have proposed to vindicate the principles and sentiments of his friend and master. But this vindication he, who was so fond of combining several ends in one work, might easily have coupled with his scientific views: and accordingly



we not only find detached intimations of this kind scattered over his later writings, but we shall soon be introduced to an important work, one which cannot be denied to be closely enough interwoven with his scientific speculations, in which a collateral object, but one made distinctly prominent, is to place the conduct and virtue of Socrates as an Athenian citizen in a clear light. Now this is intelligible enough: but Plato could scarcely have found any inducement at a later period to compose a work which merely confronts Socrates with his actual accusers. It must have been then during the process that he wrote this speech. But for what purpose? It is manifest that he could have rendered his master no worse service, than if, before he had defended himself in court, he had published a defense under his name, just as if to help the prosecutors to the arguments which it would be their business to parry or to elude, and to place the defendant in the difficult situation of being reduced either to repeat much that had been said before, or to say something less forcible. Hence the more excellent and the better suited to the character of Socrates the defense might be, the more harm it would have done to him. But this is a supposition which will scarcely be maintained.

After the decision of the cause there were two purposes which Plato might have had, either that of making the course of the proceedings more generally known at the time, and of framing a memorial of them for posterity, or that of setting the different parties and their mode of proceeding in a proper light. Now if we inquire about the only rational means to the latter of these ends: all will agree that the speech should have been put into the mouth, not of Socrates, but of some other person defending him. For the advocate might have brought forward many things, which the character of Socrates rendered improper for him to urge, and might have shewn by the work that, if the defendant's cause had only been pleaded by a person who had no need to disdain resources which many men of honour did not think beneath them, it would have had a very different issue. Now if there were any foundation for an anecdote, not indeed a very probable one, which Diogenes Laertius has preserved from an insignificant writer, Plato's most natural course would have been, to publish the speech which he would himself have made on the same occasion, if he had not



been hindered<sup>1</sup>. He would then have had an opportunity of exemplifying those great precepts and expedients of rhetoric, the force of which he had himself first disclosed; and undoubtedly he might have applied them with great truth and art to the charges concerning the new deities and the corruption of youth. And so it would have been far better for him to have used any other person's name for the purpose of retorting on the accusers of Socrates, and to have spoken of his merits in a different tone. Whereas in a speech put into the mouth of Socrates himself, yet different from that which he really delivered, he can have had no other object than to shew what Socrates voluntarily neglected or involuntarily let slip, and how his defense should have been framed so as to produce a better effect. Now not to mention that this would have been scarcely possible without departing from the character of Socrates, it is evident that the defense we now have was not framed with this view. For how could such a speech have been followed by the address after the verdict, which implies an issue not more favorable than the real one? The only supposition then that remains is, that this work was designed simply to exhibit and record in substance the real proceedings of the case, for those Athenians who were not able to be hearers, and for the other Greeks, and posterity. Now are we to believe that, in such a case and under such circumstances, Plato was unable to resist the temptation of fathering upon Socrates a work of his own art, which in all but the outline was perhaps entirely foreign to him, like a boy who has a theme set him to declaim on. This we cannot believe, but must presume that in this case, where nothing of his own was wanted, and he had entirely devoted to himself to his friend, especially so short a time before or after the death of Socrates, as this work was undoubtedly composed, he considered his departing friend too sacred to be disguised even with the most beautiful of ornaments, and his whole form as so faultless and majestic, that it was not right to exhibit it in any dress, but, like the statue of a god, naked, and wrapt only in its own beauty. And so in

<sup>1</sup> "See Diog. Laert. II. 41. where it is related that Plato was prepared to defend Socrates, but in the first sentence of his speech was interrupted by the petulance of the jurors, and compelled to descend from the bema. But this anecdote is too little attested and too improbable in itself to build upon." Schleiermacher.



fact we find he has done. For a critic who should undertake the task of mending this speech would find a great deal in it to alter. Thus the charge of misleading the young is not repelled with arguments by any means so cogent as it might have been, nor is sufficient stress by a great deal laid on the fact, that Socrates had done everything in the service of Apollo, for defending him against the charge of disbelief of the ancient gods: and any one with his eyes only half open may discover other weak points of the like kind, which are not so grounded in the character of Socrates that Plato should have been compelled to copy them.

Nothing therefore is more probable, than that in this speech we possess as faithful a transcript of Socrates' real defense, as Plato's practised memory enabled him to make, allowing for the necessary difference between a written speech and one carelessly spoken. But perhaps some one may say: If Plato, supposing him to be the author of this work, did nothing more than record what he had heard: what reason is there for insisting on this fact, or how can it be known, that it was he, and not some other among the friends of Socrates who were present at the trial? Such an objector, if he is familiar with the style of Plato, need only be referred to the whole aspect of the *Apology*, which distinctly shews that it can have proceeded from no pen but Plato's. For in it Socrates speaks exactly as Plato makes him speak, a manner in which, so far as we can judge from all we have left, he was not made to speak by any of his other scholars. And this resemblance is so indisputable, that it may serve as a foundation for a remark of some importance. For it suggests the question: Whether certain peculiarities of the Platonic dialogue, particularly the imaginary questions and answers inserted in a sentence, and the accumulation of several sentences comprehended under one, and often expanded much too amply for this subordinate place, together with the interruption almost inevitably arising from this cause in the original structure of the period: whether these peculiarities, seeing that we find them so predominant here, ought not properly to be referred to Socrates. They occur in Plato most frequently where he is imitating Socrates closest; but nowhere so frequently, and so little clear of their accompanying



negligencies, as here and in the following dialogue (the Crito), which is probably of like origin. All this together renders it a very natural conjecture, that these forms of speech were originally copied from Socrates, and are therefore to be numbered among the specimens of the mimic art of Plato, who endeavoured in a certain degree to copy the style of the persons whom he introduces, if it had peculiarities which justified him in so doing. And any one who tries this observation by applying it to Plato's different works, especially in the order in which I have arranged them, will find it very strongly confirmed by the trial. The cause why such an imitation was not attempted by other disciples of Socrates, was probably this: that on the one hand it really required no little art to bend these peculiarities of a careless colloquial style under the laws of written discourse, and to amalgamate them with the regular beauty of expression, and on the other hand, it called for more courage to meet the censure of minute critics than Xenophon probably possessed. But this is not the place for entering further into this question.

One circumstance however must still be noticed, which might be alledged against the genuineness of this work, and with more plausibility indeed than any other: that it wants the dress of the dialogue, in which Plato presents all his other works, and which he has given even to the Menexenus, though in other respects that like this consists of nothing more than a speech. Why therefore it may be asked, should the Apology, which so easily admitted of this ornament, be the only work of Plato that is destitute of it? Convincing as this sounds, the weight of all other arguments is too strong not to counterbalance this scruple, and we reply to the objection as follows. In the first place it is possible that the dialogic form had not then become so indispensable with Plato as it afterwards was: which may serve as an answer for those who are inclined to set a great value on the dress of the Menexenus; or Plato himself distinguished this work from his other writings too much to think of subjecting it to the same law. Besides it would in general be very unworthy of Plato, to consider the dialogue, even in those works where it is not very intimately blended with the main mass of the composition, as nothing more than an ornament arbitrarily appended to them: it always has its mean-



ing, and contributes to the conformation and effect of the whole. Now if this would not have been the case in the present instance, why should Plato have brought it violently in? Especially as in all likelihood he wished to hasten the publication of this speech as much as possible, and might not think it advisable at that time to hazard a public declaration of his sentiments on the issue of the cause, which, if he had clothed the speech in the form of a dialogue, it would have been difficult to avoid, without rendering the form utterly empty and unmeaning.

C. T.

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## SOCRATES, SCHLEIERMACHER, AND DELBRUECK.

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THE two little pieces which have just been laid before the reader were intended, in some degree, to redeem a kind of promise made in a preceding number (i. p. 532.), where I had occasion to touch on some of the subjects discussed in them. The first of them, though small in bulk, perhaps deserves to be considered as one of the most important contributions made in modern times to the study of Greek philosophy, and I am not without hopes that, notwithstanding the disadvantages of its foreign dress, it may be able to make its way to the understanding and convictions of some of the persons who take an interest in the subject, and that it may in time supersede or at least materially modify the notion that has hitherto prevailed, as far as I know without any exception, in all English works on the history of ancient philosophy, with respect to the character of Socrates as a philosopher. Independently of this peculiar value of its contents it would have deserved a place here, if it had been only for the sake of giving a specimen, which is perhaps one of the most characteristic that could be found within the same compass, of the author's powers; and thus of making some amends, if not to him, to ourselves, for the treatment he has received in a work which has recently disgraced our literature—the so-called translation of Tennemann. The ignorance and incapacity of the person who has disguised that useful compendium in an English dress, have been sufficiently exposed in an article of the *Edinburgh Review*, which is only defective in not laying quite sufficient stress on the other prominent feature of the work, its wilful, deliberate, shameless dishonesty. Schleiermacher is one of the persons in whose case the translator has immolated justice and truth to something which he takes, or would have taken, for religion: for this is the name under which he covers frauds and forgeries, such as we are apt to



imagine confined to the worst school of the worst time of the Jesuits.

The Introduction to the Apology, though interesting enough in itself, and in some points bearing on the former essay, would hardly have claimed a place by its side, if it had not been connected with the subject of a little work of Mr Delbrueck's, which I noticed in the article already referred to, and in a manner which would have been scarcely fair, if I had not intended to return to it. Mr Delbrueck's *Reflexions on Socrates* turn entirely upon Plato's Apology, and his difficulties in a great measure arise out of Schleiermacher's view of it, which he adopts as his own. As the reader now has this view before him, he is fully prepared to understand the nature of the difficulties which it has raised in Mr Delbrueck's mind, and which certainly do not the less deserve to be stated because Mr D. has been fortunate enough to find a solution of them, which, as has already been intimated, may not suit the case of ordinary persons. Mr D. opens the subject with some reflexions on the famous answer of the Delphic oracle, mentioned in the Apology as exercising such an important influence on the destiny of Socrates. He is surprised (p. 14.) that this oracle and its effect upon Socrates have been hitherto so seldom made a subject of investigation, and laments that even among the admirers of Socrates in our day, there should be many who, like some of his contemporaries and his judges, take the oracle for a fiction, and his appeal to it for irony. With as much reason, Mr D. thinks, might Thomas a Kempis, or Pascal, or Fenelon, be suspected of an affectation of humility, when they confirm their convictions on sacred subjects by quotations from the Bible. Like them, Socrates was in the best sense of the word a Mystic (p. 18.): and the answers of the Delphic oracle exercised an influence on the weal and woe of Greece, similar to that which the Bible exerts on the destinies and the proceedings of Christendom (p. 25). The death of Socrates was the most important event in his history: with it began the happier life which he has ever since lived in the memory of mankind (p. 41). But this was only the close of a series of phenomena which had their origin in the answer of the Delphic oracle; so that again Mr D. cannot contain his surprise, that this answer should have attracted so little attention (p. 42). It may indeed be thought



that the fault lies in some measure with Socrates himself, and that he did not act well in withholding the knowledge of the oracle from his contemporaries until he had occasion to publish it at his trial. His silence however was necessary to prevent expectations which the disclosure of it might have raised, and which he, who could only detect error without imparting wisdom, would not have been able to satisfy. Unfortunately the consequence was, that when at last he revealed the secret to his judges, he was not believed, and instead of listening to his witnesses of the fact, or sending an embassy to Delphi to ascertain the truth, they treated his appeal to the God as an ironical feint. But the time soon came when they were punished for their profane incredulity, by the stings of remorse, and in bitter grief applied the verses of Euripides, which reproached the Greeks for the murder of Palamedes, to their own deed. But still more sensibly is the same misunderstanding avenged at this day, inasmuch as those who take the main thought on which the whole apology turns for irony, deprive not only this speech, but the life of Socrates, of all its sublimity, and its edifying virtue. No one can sincerely admire, and cordially love, both the life of the sage, and this vindication of it, who does not perceive in the words of Socrates the unfeigned language of pious enthusiasm (p. 46).

But Mr D. had at the outset (p. 2.) intimated that there were three passages in the Apology which seemed to him to form an exception to its general character, and to these he now proceeds to direct our attention. It is not without a kind of reluctance and great diffidence, that he ventures to express his opinion of them; for as Schleiermacher only remarks in general terms, that there are weak points in the speech, which any one may easily discover, if he only half opens his eyes, Mr D. fears that he may have been the first person who has felt the passages in question to be not merely weak, but offensive, and who has marked them as utterly unworthy of Socrates. Should this be the case, his modesty leads him to apprehend, that he has either mistaken the sense and spirit of the whole work, or has misunderstood these parts of it; if there is any other alternative he does not know how to describe it.

The first of the offensive passages is the plea which Socrates sets up against the charge of corrupting the young, in the ad-



mission which he extorts from Meletus, that bad men are hurtful to their neighbours, good men useful to them: from which he draws the conclusion, that if he has made men worse, it must have been involuntarily, and through ignorance, which called not for public punishment, but for private admonition, and instruction. This plea Mr D. considers as a piece of sophistry, false in substance, and only coloured by the ambiguity of the Greek word *ἐκῶν*, which may denote the direction of the will to an object, either as a mean, or as an end. In the latter sense of the word Socrates, Mr D. thinks, might truly say, that he could not have corrupted the young, *ἐκῶν*, for the sake of spoiling them without any ulterior object: but then, this would equally serve as a defense for the most shameless of the Sophists, who most deliberately instilled the most mischievous doctrines into the minds of their hearers. It was only in the other sense of the word, in which it signifies no more than consciously, or wittingly, that it could be properly used to meet the charge of Meletus; but in this sense the general proposition, that no one makes men worse, *ἐκῶν*, with a distinct consciousness of doing so, is glaringly false, and therefore can avail Socrates nothing. What then, Mr D. asks, are we to suppose? That Socrates perceived the ambiguity of the word, but knowingly concealed it, in order to perplex his adversaries, and deceive his judges? Or, that he deceived himself with a fallacy which he mistook for a sound argument? In the former case we must rank him among the Sophists, with whom he was his whole life through in conflict: in the latter we should have to deplore, that Socrates, the sage who had applied all his thoughts and faculties to the investigation of moral and political truth, and who was supposed, under the divine assistance, to have succeeded in clearing his mind from delusion and prejudice on these subjects, should have made so little progress as to be unable to distinguish between two notions so different as those just mentioned, and should thus, on the point of death, have been led to make assertions which belied the whole tenor of his former life. In either case, the passage discussed is not merely weak, but scandalous, offensive, and unworthy of Socrates (p. 58).

All these qualities Mr D. finds united, if possible, in a still greater degree, in another passage. This is the reply which



Socrates makes to the charge of not acknowledging the deities acknowledged by the state, but some new supernatural powers or agencies. Socrates is represented in the *Apology* as first complaining of the ambiguity of the charge, and asking Meletus, whether he means to accuse him of believing in gods different from those of the state, or of absolute atheism: and Meletus is made to say that he charges him with not believing in any gods whatever. To repel this charge Socrates, in the passage of which Mr D. complains, endeavours to shew, that the very word which Meletus has used in his indictment, to describe the new objects of belief, which Socrates has substituted for those recognised by the state, (*δαιμόνια*) implies a contradiction of the charge. For one who holds the existence of things pertaining to dæmons (*δαιμόνια*), must believe in the beings to whom they pertain (*δαίμονες*); and Meletus is brought to admit that all beings of this class are either gods, or the offspring of gods, whence it follows that no one who acknowledges their existence can deny that of the gods. This argument, Mr D. conceives, contains a complication of fallacies. In the first place a belief in the existence of divine things does not imply belief in the existence of any deity: there is no analogy between the mutual relation of the terms man and human, and the terms deity and divine; for experience informs us, that both in individuals and in communities the notion of a something divine precedes and gives birth to that of a deity; and in fact the great glory of Socrates consisted in this: that he was able to distinguish that which belonged to the former notion in the religion of his countrymen, its sacred and unchangeable foundation, which is everlastingly grounded in the nature of man, from the light and worthless superstructure of legends and ceremonies, which chance, ignorance, and superstition, had grounded upon it. This pure faith, Mr D. thinks, it would have become Socrates to confess before his judges. He might have admitted that he did not in all points agree with the poets, the priests, and the soothsayers, with respect to divine things: but he might at the same time have maintained that his creed, instead of being new, was eternal as deity itself, and was the primæval faith revealed to every member of the human race, who would listen to the voice of his own heart: that it was not inconsistent with the religious institutions of his country, which he had always re-



vered, with a piety which was incontestably proved by the obedience he had shown to the Delphic god (p. 65).

But, independent of the fallacy just exposed, there is another in this argument so glaring that Mr D. can scarcely believe Socrates to have been in earnest: for, in Meletus' charge, the word on which Socrates plays has not the meaning which he induces Meletus to assign to it. In many passages of Homer, with which Socrates was perfectly familiar, it means nothing more than superhuman in general: the signification to which Socrates confines it was of later origin, and arose after a new class of beings had been distinguished from the gods under the name of dæmons: and the earlier sense, to which the argument of Socrates does not apply, is manifestly that which Meletus really intended, though he let himself be surprised into an admission which overturned his charge. But an impartial hearer might justly have censured Socrates for descending to such a paltry shift, and relying upon his adversary's weakness and shortsightedness, instead of meeting the charge with a manly avowal, and a philosophical explanation, such as Mr D. would have put into his mouth. But we must pass over the many severe things which the court might have said, if it had been usual so to interrupt the prisoner's defense (p. 68), that we may proceed to the third of the obnoxious passages, which scandalizes Mr D. as much as either of the former.

It is contained in the concluding address, which follows the final sentence. Socrates endeavours to calm the regret which those who had voted in his favour might feel at the issue of the trial, by some reflexions on the nature of death and the prospects of a future state. Death is either a mere privation of sense, or it is a transfer of the soul from one place to another. On the former of these suppositions it resembles a dreamless sleep, and so considered it would be a great gain to man. For if any one were to compare a night spent in such a sleep, with all the other nights or days of his life, and were to consider how many among them he has spent better or more pleasantly than this night, the number would bear a very small proportion to the rest, even if it were not a private man, but the Great King himself, who instituted the inquiry. So that as the eternity after death



would be no more than one such night, most men would have reason to desire it. On this view of the matter Mr D. remarks, that for his own part he can see nothing desirable in a dreamless sleep, except as it refreshes the body and mind, and prepares them for new exertions; but that if an everlasting sleep were so great a good as Socrates represents, it would follow that men had reason to prefer darkness to light, privation to existence, nothing to something, and the gloomy song of the Chorus, who declare, that for man never to have been born is the first of blessings, the next, which leaves all others far behind, to return as quickly as he may to the night from which he sprung, (*Æd. Col.* 1225.) would become a philosophical truth. But dark as was the shade thrown over all the brilliant variety of Grecian life, by the void in the prospects of futurity, which was the source of so many lamentations over the lot of mortals, Sophocles would never have uttered in his own person such a sentiment as he puts into the mouth of the Chorus, and would only have defended it on the ground of the dramatic situation. And as in Socrates the sentiment itself is unnatural and false, so the mention of the Great King is unworthy of a philosopher; since it implies that it is outward prosperity that gives life its value. If for the Great King we substitute the Wise Man, it will be impossible to repeat the assertion without blushing (p. 79).

The contemplation of these passages had seriously disturbed Mr D.'s peace of mind, even while he continued to regard the *Apology* as a work of Plato's, and the main thought, the appeal to the oracle, as ironical. But when he began to perceive its real import, and recognised in it the language of pious enthusiasm, and was convinced that the speech expressed the very mind of Socrates, his uneasiness rose to a painful degree of intensity. He saw himself reduced to the alternative, of either giving up his faith in the character of Socrates, or else assuming that the offensive passages do not convey his thoughts, but were interpolated by Plato. In support of the latter conjecture, he adduces the passages in Xenophon's *Apology* which bear on the same points; and in these he observes there is no trace of dissimulation, false subtilty, or exaggeration, so that one is inclined to believe that every-



thing which savours of these qualities in Plato's work ought to be rejected as spurious. Then indeed the question is shifted to a different ground, and it is Plato, whom his style betrays as the author of the whole speech, that must answer for having inserted these offensive parts, in which he must at his own discretion have filled up some gaps, which Socrates, who spoke unprepared, left in his argument. As Plato cannot now defend himself Mr D calls up an advocate for him<sup>1</sup>, who however only brings his client into fresh difficulties, for which he is soundly rated by Mr D. According to Xenophon, whom Mr D. believes to be the author of the Apology which bears his name, Socrates was really desirous of escaping from life by the quiet and easy death which the law inflicted as the punishment of his imputed offense. In this feeling Xenophon finds a natural explanation of the lofty tone he maintained at his trial, which might otherwise appear rather foolish than admirable (Xenoph. Apol. 1). But as if this had been the case Socrates would have been guilty of mean hypocrisy, in concealing his real wishes, and affecting to be heroically unconcerned at the thought of parting with life, when in fact he was weary of it; Plato, if he was acquainted with the secret motives of Socrates, would have practised a wilful fraud upon posterity, in suppressing them, and attributing to magnanimity what was in fact an effect of weakness. And though the advocate assigned to Plato by Mr D. may have pleaded his cause injudiciously, there seems but little hope that one of even greater skill would succeed in shewing, that the same passages which, if they are supposed to be the real language of Socrates, are a grievous blot upon his character, would not affect Plato's in nearly the same degree, if he invented them. So that still it seems impossible to save the honour of the master, except at the expense of his most illustrious scholar. And if the offense itself is not lessened by being shifted from Socrates, there is evidently no reason for transferring it to Plato. Such appears to have been the result to which Mr D. was led in the first instance by these reflexions: for they left him for some time a prey to a deep melancholy, which, as he informs us, arose from the thought: Who can rely upon himself, or on

<sup>1</sup> In speaking of Mr D.'s work (I. p. 535) I meant to allude to this passage, where, I see, I have inadvertently written the name of Socrates for Plato.



any one else, if he no longer trusts in the wisdom and virtue of Socrates? (p. 104).

Happily for Mr D., his distress has been long relieved, and his peace restored so effectually, that it seems it will be his own fault if he ever relapses into his former disquietude (p. 101). But the mode in which his trouble was allayed, and a new view of the subject presented to his mind, in which all his difficulties vanished, it would be presumptuous in any one else to attempt relating, since he himself considers it as mysterious (p. 102), nor would it be of much use to do so, since the same effect can never be again produced in the same manner. In general the reader's curiosity may be satisfied with learning, that it was the result of an interchange of confessions between Mr D. and a person whom he saw but once in his life and whose name he never knew, but who seem to have succeeded better than any one else has ever done, in making him a convert to his own opinions. A more important question, which the reader will be tempted to ask, is, what these opinions were, and what was that new, consolatory, and tranquillizing view, which the mysterious stranger imparted, and which we may hope Mr D. still holds fast. Unfortunately it would be still more difficult to satisfy this curiosity, natural as it is, without rashly intruding upon secrets which Mr D. has thought fit to keep to himself, or has disclosed only by some broken hints, which at the utmost afford room only for general and uncertain conjectures. If there is any inference which one might venture to draw, with some degree of confidence, from the narrative, it is this: that whereas at the beginning of the conference Mr D. was painfully perplexed through his veneration for Socrates, and his reluctance to admit any opinion which was at variance with that feeling, he has since been enabled to receive such opinions with indifference, because his faith now rests on a better and surer ground than the character of Socrates, or Plato, or Xenophon (p. 137).

Heartily as Mr D.'s personal friends must rejoice, if this is the case, in so happy a termination of his inward struggles, it is evidently one with which we have nothing to do in examining a question which affects the character of Socrates or his disciples, for it must always be presumed that we enter upon such inquiries in a state of mind which enables us to



weigh the evidence calmly, and to decide impartially. Nor would it perhaps indicate the spirit best fitted for conducting such investigations, that we felt the less interest in them because our personal comfort was not affected by the issue. Those therefore who come to the same conclusion with Mr D. on the questions which he raises with respect to the *Apology*, may possibly be edified by his narrative; but others who would have no need of such consolation may still take a great interest in the questions themselves. And it is for this reason that they have here been stated at some length.

The reluctant diffidence with which, as we have seen, Mr D. propounds these questions, under the impression that he was the first person to whom they had occurred, was probably founded on a mistake. For two or three years before his book was published, similar objections to the same parts of the *Apology* had been brought forward, in a very different manner indeed, and with a different object, by another German author. This was Mr Ast, who in 1816 published a work on Plato's life and writings<sup>2</sup>, which obtained considerable celebrity. It had probably not fallen in Mr D.'s way in November 1818, when he sent his little treatise to the press, as he has not mentioned it. He however informs the reader in his preface, that he had written the work four years before; but having just resumed his functions of professor at Bonn, he was induced to send it into the world, by way of greeting to distant friends.

It is always instructive to compare the opinions of two persons who have, independently of each other, turned their thoughts, nearly at the same time, to the same subject: and as it is not so much Mr Delbrueck's work as the *Apology* itself in which we are interested, it will be very proper to consider Mr Ast's view of it. With the rest of his book we are not at present concerned. But yet it is fit that the reader should be apprised, that Mr Ast has distinguished himself by the boldness with which he has attacked several of Plato's most celebrated works. Among the whole number only fourteen have escaped the stroke of his criticism; and in the condemned list, among a crowd of the smaller dialogues, stand the *Laws* and the *Apology*, separated however by a very wide interval, which

<sup>2</sup> *Platon's Leben und Schriften: von Frederick Ast.*



is designed, as the author expressly informs us (p. 379.), to mark the inferior degree in which the latter work approximates to the genius of Plato. It must be added that Mr Ast's attempt has not been favorably received by the most eminent German scholars. One of the most celebrated of them, Frederic Thiersch, in a review of the book which appeared in the *Wiener Jahrbuecher* for 1818, the year before Mr Delbrueck published his reflexions, describes the general character of Mr Ast's criticism in a passage which is worth quoting. "Schleiermacher, whose works first introduced a right understanding of Plato's peculiar turn and method, had divided Plato's dialogues into two classes: greater works of the first rank, the genuineness of which is ascertained by internal evidence and by Aristotle's quotations and remarks, and secondary works, some of which prepare the way for those of the first rank, or supply their omissions, while others arose from accidental occasions. But Mr Ast has not only condemned as spurious all works of the latter class without exception, but also several of those which in Schleiermacher's arrangement had been described as necessary parts of Plato's doctrine. Now while his great predecessor found much that was praiseworthy in the contents and form of the subordinate dialogues, our author has undertaken the unenviable task of saying all imaginable ill of them; so that any one who should read his harsh and unsparing criticism, without being acquainted with the work he assails, would in many cases be extremely surprised, how it should have been possible for any man of common intelligence to attribute productions so very wretched to any writer of celebrity, and above all to Plato."

On the other hand candour requires us to add, that Mr Ast is very generally acknowledged to be a man of learning, abilities, and independent thought; and certainly however he may be chargeable with rashness and intemperance in his criticism, he scarcely deserved such humiliation as the praise of Weisse, who has applauded him for his worst deeds, in a passage which, if the context did not prove it to be a seriously absurd paradox, would have been taken for a ludicrously satirical caricature<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> It occurs in a book which, with many indications of a vigorous mind, contains an inordinate quantity of extravagant conceits, delivered with the dogmatism natural to a



Against the *Apology*, it seems, Mr Ast had long harboured a peculiar degree of polemical bitterness, which has vented itself in terms of the harshest censure in the work we are speaking of. Yet the *Apology* and its author have been gainers by this virulence; for it has drawn forth a defense of them from Thiersch in the abovementioned review, which much more than compensates for any injury they can have received from Mr Ast's attack. Mr Ast's mode of proceeding exhibits a striking contrast with Mr Delbrueck's diffidence. While the latter was approaching the *Apology* with modest reverence, and scarcely ventured to give utterance to the unfavorable impression which some parts of it made upon his mind, fearing to stand alone in his disapprobation of them, Mr Ast was actually engaged in making an impetuous assault upon the whole, to tear it down, without exception or reserve, from the place which it has occupied for ages in the estimation of all men whose opinions on such matters are worth knowing<sup>4</sup>. He considers it as a forgery, which by its very nature, as well as its contents, betrays itself as the production of a mere rhetorician, who has failed most signally both in his attempt to imitate the style of Plato, and to represent the character of Socrates.

The first is a fundamental objection, which, if it had any weight, would supersede the necessity of any other. Mr Ast contends, that a set speech, like the *Apology*, was utterly inconsistent with the character of Socrates, who disdained all rhetorical arts, and with the principles of Plato, who disapproved of them. In confirmation of this remark he appeals to

person who feels that he is not likely to make any converts by argument (Ueber das Studium des Homer, p. 22. foll). His praise of Mr Ast's sagacity, as manifested in the rejection of the *Law's*, is qualified with wonder at his infatuation, in still retaining the *Timæus* and the *Critias* in the list of Plato's works.

<sup>4</sup> Mr Ast has produced, in favour of his own opinion, the solitary judgement of Cassius Severus, who pronounced the *Apology* unworthy both of Plato and Socrates (Senec. Excerpt. Controv. III. p. 397. Bip.): eloquentissimi viri Platonis oratio, quæ pro Socrate scripta est, nec patrono nec reo digna est. Thiersch justly observes that such a partisan must do more hurt than good to Mr Ast's cause, for this is the same Cassius whose incurable greediness of defamation is branded by Tacitus (Ann. I. 72. IV. 21), and whose natural rhetorical talent was rendered powerless by the ungovernable violence of his malevolent passions (De Causs. Corr. Eloqu. c. 26). The opinion of such a man on such a subject might very naturally be opposed to that of Cicero (Tusc. Qu. I. 42.); and Montaigne, who (Essais. III. c. 12.) expresses the effect which the *Apology* produces on a mind open to its impressions, in very lively terms. See particularly p. 217 and 219 of Tom. IV. Didot's small edition.



the *Gorgias* (p. 521.), where indeed the rhetoric, which works by flattery and falsehood, is condemned as unworthy of a wise man. But it cannot be inferred from this that Socrates would have scrupled to defend himself in a continuous speech; any more than from the anecdote, to which we are likewise referred, that he refused to avail himself of an oration composed for him by Lysias. It was not its form but its contents that he is said to have thought degrading to him. All therefore must still depend on the character of the *Apology*, and on the degree in which it answers to Xenophon's description of the defense which Socrates really made, as singularly distinguished by its truth, frankness, and justice. (Mem. iv. 8. 1.) Mr Ast indeed thinks it clear, that Socrates did not observe the ordinary forms of public speeches, but interrupted the continuity of his address to the court, by interrogating his accusers. Since however this is exactly what we find him doing in the *Apology*, and it is impossible to estimate the exact proportion between the dialogue and the other part of his defense, this argument rather weighs in favour of the controverted work than against it. For that his whole defense should have consisted of a series of questions, is incredible in itself, and is more than Mr Ast himself ventures to assert; though he has not observed that nothing short of this is required for his inference. Indeed throughout the whole of his remarks on this subject he seems not sufficiently to have borne in mind, that we have to consider not merely what Socrates preferred and approved of, but what the situation in which he was placed enabled him to do. It is certainly most probable that if Meletus had brought the same charge against him in a private circle, where he was left to act at his own discretion, he would have declined to give any direct reply, and would have brought the question to an issue entirely by means of a series of questions. But the numerous tribunal before which he was called upon for his public defense was composed of persons, who had a very quick and fine taste for oratory but very little for dialectic subtilty, and who expected a regular speech on such occasions, not merely to instruct them in the merits of the case, but also as a part of their habitual entertainment. Socrates must have been aware, that unless he meant to exasperate his audience, and indeed if he wished to secure a hearing, it would be necessary to begin by addressing them in



the usual way, and then to take such opportunities as he could find, of drawing from his accuser a confession of his ignorance and injustice. And such is the course which we find him actually pursuing. It is therefore unnecessary to proceed to inquire with Mr Ast, whether, if Socrates had as might be expected conducted his defense in a dialogue, it is likely that Plato would have put the substance of it into the form of a continuous oration: a supposition, which, he thinks, the passage in the *Gorgias* sufficiently refutes. The question itself is absurd; since we see that the author of the *Apology* has not in fact adopted such a form, but has retained or introduced colloquial passages of considerable length, which it would have been just as easy for him to transform into the ordinary style of the bar as the rest of the speech.

It appears then that this general objection is so far from stopping us in the outset of our inquiry, that upon examination it rather raises a presumption in favour of the *Apology*, and we have still to consider how far this is supported or rebutted by its contents. Mr Ast makes his next attack with a two-edged argument: a weapon, which notoriously requires to be handled with great delicacy, and may do great injury to the person who wields it, if he does not perceive its nature. Now this appears to be the case in the present instance with Mr Ast. Xenophon had described Socrates' defense by the three characteristics of truth, frankness, and justice (τὴν δίκην ἀληθέστατα καὶ ἐλευθεριώτατα καὶ δικαιοτάτα εἰπών) which Montaigne has expressed by saying, that *the Apology* is *un plaidoyer véritable, franc et juste, au dela de tout exemple*, adding (perhaps for Xenophon's μεγαληγορία) that it is *d'une hauteur inimaginable*. The counterfeit Plato has, according to Mr Ast, fixed his eye upon these traditional qualities of the real defense (which by the way it is extremely difficult to understand if applied to a dialogue), and has endeavoured to convey a like impression by his imitation. For more than two thousand years he has succeeded in imposing upon the world, so far as to make his readers believe that they perceived all these qualities in his work. This is certainly no proof that the effect has not been an illusion; but yet it shews that the author, whoever he was, went carefully and thoughtfully to work, and understood what



it was that Plato would have done if he had undertaken the same task. But unfortunately, in Mr Ast's judgement, though the design was judicious, he has failed in the execution, partly by going beyond the mark, and partly by falling short of it. Thus he makes Socrates profess his intention of confining himself to the simple truth, and declare that he had uttered nothing else. In this Mr Ast discovers the hand of an exaggerating rhetorician. From which we are to infer that, though it became Socrates to speak the truth, he would have overstepped the bounds of modesty if he had asseverated the truth of what he said. So again the author of the Apology "has paid careful attention to the quality expressed by Xenophon's ἐλευθεριώτατα, but has exaggerated it, and so frustrated his aim." He has confounded the noble pride of conscious innocence, roused to repel calumny, with the vanity which affects humility, in order the more effectually to display its pretensions. One instance of this false humility occurs at the very opening, where the speaker deprecates the title of an expert orator, unless such expertness consists in speaking the truth; then indeed he allows that he is an orator not to be measured with his adversaries: for nothing will be heard from him but the simple, unadorned, truth. This, Mr Ast observes, contains a covert intimation, that he is a real genuine orator, the rest on the contrary mere mock orators. Mr Ast has neglected to point out, in what manner it was possible for Socrates to have expressed himself on this point so as not to expose himself to such an imputation. He certainly, by more than a covert intimation, claims a superiority over his accusers, if truth is admitted as the standard: but was there ever a defendant in a court of justice who did not tacitly or expressly make the same claim? and though he might think naked truth more honorable than varnished falsehood, he surely could not expect that it would be sufficient to raise him, in the opinion of his hearers, as an orator, above his adversaries. Another specimen of spurious irony, in which Mr Ast discovers ostentation lurking under the mask of humility, is the detailed description given of the investigation which Socrates instituted to prove the truth of the oracle. Not that he might not have mentioned the fact, but he would not have given so full an account of his proceedings.



Yet it does not appear why the general assertion that he had ascertained the oracle to be true, would have been less gratifying to selfcomplacency than the particular illustrations of it: especially as the order in which they follow one another (statesman, poets, artisans) exhibits the successive triumphs in a decreasing series. But to an ordinary reader who is tolerably familiar with the part which Socrates takes in Plato's dialogues, these illustrations will probably appear so characteristic, that they at least shew the learning and judgement of the imitator. After this we are less surprised to find Mr Ast objecting, that Socrates is made to lay claim to wisdom for himself, and ironically to depreciate that of the Sophists (unfortunately I have not an edition which enables me to verify Mr Ast's references, but see p.20.) to assert that he is a benefactor to the state, and on that account envied and calumniated. Here it is impossible, or useless, to refute: we can only express astonishment at the obliquity of the organs which could distort all this into the language of affectation and self-conceit, and must recommend every one to read and judge for himself. But it is still more extraordinary to find Mr Ast grounding another argument on the frequent requests which the speaker makes for a patient hearing. The necessity for such requests indicates indeed the vicious constitution of the Athenian courts of justice. But we know that it frequently occurred, and can very easily conceive how it might arise more frequently than usual in a case so singular as that of Socrates. In fact Mr Ast himself remarks that these petitions for silence were grounded on the fact, which is mentioned in the Apology ascribed to Xenophon, that Socrates was often interrupted by impatient murmurs. Yet to deprecate such interruption is a mark of unmanly timidity, by which the rhetorician has betrayed his own incapacity for comprehending that noble intrepidity which he designed to represent. He has contrived to make Socrates at once a covert braggart, and an avowed coward. He does but poorly dissemble his timidity, when he affects to dissuade the people for their own sake, from putting him to death (p. 31. A). Who, says Mr Ast, does not see the rhetorical turn of this passage? The prayer for mercy disguised in the shape of disinterested advice. The question might perhaps be truly answered, if we should say: Nobody



before or since Mr Ast. But at all events it must be allowed, that the rhetorician has displayed at least as much dexterity in concealing the pusillanimity of Socrates from the eyes of his readers, as dulness in not discerning it himself.

We have perhaps dwelt too long on these points: for they are of such a nature, that a man ought scarcely to be listened to, who ventures to assert that mankind has been for ages labouring under a gross delusion on them. We quit this part of the subject with two remarks. One is, that every step of Mr Ast's argumentation increases the difficulty we find, in imagining what the conception can be which he has formed of Socrates' real defense. The other is, that he seems never to have paused to reflect upon the question: whether human language affords any terms for innocence and virtue to use, which malice or prejudice may not wrest into signs of affectation and hypocrisy.

We now proceed to consider some objections of a more tangible kind, and which interest us the more, because they rest on ground which is common to Mr Ast with Mr Delbrueck. Widely as their views diverge on other points, they agree in considering the pleas which Socrates is made to set up against the main charges brought against him, as frivolous and sophistical: such as neither he could have used, nor Plato have invented for him, unless one or the other is to forfeit our admiration and respect. Mr Ast was not obliged to consider this alternative: Mr Delbrueck appears to be steeled against it. We cannot contemplate it with so much equanimity: but above all we desire to know whether it is inevitable.

Mr Ast despatches the first question much more briefly than Mr D., but in a very different manner, and he certainly does not appear to have considered it with equal attention. He agrees with Mr D. in saying, that the argument designed to prove that Socrates did not voluntarily corrupt the young is empty sophistry; but does not enter into any discussion of it. He then observes, that no reply is given to the charge in the sense in which it was meant by the prosecutors, which is explained by Xenophon in the *Memorabilia* i. 2. 9., where it is said that Socrates was accused of elating the youth of Athens with an arrogant contempt of their hereditary



institutions, and of making them prone to violence. Mr Ast, however, puts a most singular construction on this charge<sup>5</sup>. He thinks it was meant particularly to refer to Alcibiades, and that the offense of which Socrates had been guilty with respect to him in the eyes of the Athenians, was that of rivalling them in his affections, and attempting to withdraw him from public affairs to philosophical contemplation. In this sense he was accused of seducing and corrupting their youth. Another branch of the same charge was, as Mr Ast infers from a passage in the *Gorgias* (521 A. 522 A.), that Socrates perplexed the understanding of his young hearers by his subtilties.

That the defense in the *Apology* does not expressly meet the charge in this sense, must be acknowledged. But it remains to be proved, or rendered probable, that Socrates so understood it. What Xenophon specifies was probably alleged by the prosecutors in explanation and support of the more general terms of the indictment. Whether they put the same construction with Mr Ast on the intimacy between Socrates and Alcibiades, we are not informed. If they did, it would be a surprising coincidence. But the main question is, whether Mr Ast is correct in his assertion, which is in substance the same with Mr Delbrueck's, that the *Apology* does not go to the point, but leaves this part of the accusation unrefuted. And here it must be admitted, that to a certain degree both have truth on their side: for the passage which they single out, as containing the pith of the argument, is certainly not a satisfactory plea. But on the other hand, why are we bound to consider it by itself, and to stake this part of the cause upon it? If the questions put to Meletus answer no other purpose than that of perplexing him, and Socrates had been satisfied with this triumph over his adversary, and had said nothing further on the subject, he would indeed have evaded the charge instead of refuting it. But if he has on the whole completely vindicated himself, what right have we to complain because in this particular passage he has directed his aim more toward the person than the case? Now the real and

<sup>5</sup> Mr Ast finds an allusion to this charge in the *Politicus* p. 296. C. D. E. 297. A. because it is there argued that a statesman is justified in using compulsion for beneficial purposes, even against the letter of the laws.



decisive answer to the charge of corrupting the young, is contained in the description Socrates gives of his pursuits and habits, which were a matter of public notoriety, and in the testimony which he was ready to produce of the parents and friends of those who had experienced the influence of his society. But the admission which he draws from Meletus, though not sufficient of itself to prove his innocence, was still an important step toward that end, which is completed in the context. For though, as Mr Delbrueck observes, it would have served to acquit the worst of the Sophists as well as Socrates, what is here left wanting to distinguish his case from theirs is elsewhere abundantly supplied. The Sophists could not have pleaded that, because no man can be impelled by the simple desire of making his neighbours worse, therefore they could not voluntarily have corrupted their hearers; because the answer would immediately have presented itself: that their wickedness was not gratuitous, but stimulated by the prospect of reputation and gain. But Socrates could confidently appeal to that depth of poverty (*μυρία πενία*) in which he had voluntarily passed his life, and to the hatred and persecution which he had incurred, and to the very situation in which he then stood, as so many proofs, that, if he had misled or corrupted any one by his conversation, it must have been unwittingly. So that if Meletus had been able to draw that distinction between the two meanings of *ἐκών*, which Mr Delbrueck has explained to us, he might have brought the question a step nearer to the issue, but the issue must still have been decided against him, and not on any verbal subtilty, but on the justice of the case. And hence it does not seem necessary to suppose, either that Socrates was himself deceived by the ambiguity of the word, or that he designed to deceive others. It may indeed be said that this dialogue, since by itself it proves nothing, is superfluous, and then it would be a weak point, such as Schleiermacher admits the work contains: but there will be nothing in it to offend or distress us so deeply as Mr Delbrueck. Was it however so trivial an advantage, or so unworthy of Socrates, to shew the emptiness and feebleness of the man who had undertaken to decide on the tendency of his life and doctrines? And



may it not be possible that, if we had the speech of Meletus before us, we might find in it a key to the tone in which Socrates addresses him?

But we proceed to examine the manner in which the author of the Apology endeavours to repel the second charge, that of impiety and unbelief. The charge itself consists of two heads. Socrates is accused of rejecting the gods acknowledged by the state, and of substituting for them a different object, of which we shall speak presently. Schleiermacher has observed, that the first part of the charge is not answered so forcibly as it might have been: and the defect which he points out is exactly similar to that which we have noticed in the preceding branch of the defense. An answer is given, but it is not formally and directly applied to the question. Socrates declares, that the greater part of his life has been spent in the service of the Delphic god: but he draws no inference from this fact against the charge of impiety. It may be said that his assertion was no proof of the fact; but it was as strong a one as his accusers could have brought against him, and as the nature of the case admitted. For his religious convictions could only be known to himself, and his conformity to the worship of the state, which is the argument used in Xenophon's Apology, 11, was no less equivocal evidence.

A much more difficult question arises on the second branch of the charge, as to the meaning attached by the prosecutor himself to the terms he used, and the sense in which they are taken by the defendant. Mr Ast states the charge to be, that Socrates introduced new gods in the room of those worshipped by his countrymen: and he censures the author of the Apology for having mistaken the meaning of the word *δαίμόνια*, and Schleiermacher for having suffered himself to be misled by this mistake. In the Apology the word is used adjectively, and it is on this use of it that the argument turns. Mr Ast undertakes to correct this error, by explaining the real meaning of the word. But we are afraid his explanation will not be thought to throw much light on the subject: for he begins by informing us, that *δαίμόνιον* is *neither simply an adjective, so that it should be necessary to supply ἔργον, σημείον, or the like, nor yet a substantive denoting a particular or peculiar being* (he refers to Lennep on Phalaris, p. 338). In-



stead of this, according to him, it has two significations, one, that which is divine in general, that is, the divine nature, the gods, or simply the deity; the other, that which is divine, as the work or revelation of the gods. These two significations, however, we are told are so closely allied, that it is scarcely possible to distinguish them, and in fact neither of them excludes the other, though it is sometimes one and sometimes the other that predominates. So far as we can find our way in this truly dæmonian twilight, which Mr Ast has selected as the most proper medium for viewing this mysterious subject, we feel inclined to suspect that he has seen an object double, which, upon closer inspection, will turn out to be simple, and that he has been deceived by an appearance on the confines between adjective and substantive, which a little consideration will prove to be a nonentity. He concludes by asking, whether in the expression of the indictment, ἑτέρα καὶ δαιμόνια, the last word must not be taken substantively? and observes, that the sense is required by the contrast between these καὶ δαιμόνια and the gods of the state. In the mean while he has not produced a single other passage to justify the rendering, new deities, and the argument which he draws from the terms of the indictment is very far from convincing. Since the gods of the state might have been described collectively as τὸ θεῖον, or τὸ δαιμόνιον, so as merely to express the supernatural or divine, abstracting from the distinction between a person or agent, and a thing, there seems to be no impropriety in opposing ἑτέρα καὶ δαιμόνια to them in an equally general sense.

Schleiermacher, in a note to his translation of the *Apology* observes, that it appears from the *Memorabilia* i. 1. 2. 3, that Socrates himself can never have considered that which, under the phrase τὸ δαιμόνιον, he described as his inward monitor, in the light of a specific supernatural being. For Xenophon there speaks of it as something resembling in kind the ordinary instruments of divination, as birds, voices, omens, sacrifices. And in this same passage he mentions his conjecture, that this was the origin of the charge brought against Socrates of religious innovation: Καὶ μαντικῇ χρώμενος οὐκ ἀφανὴς ἦν· διετεθρύλλητο γὰρ, ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης, τὸ δαιμόνιον εαυτῷ σημαίνειν. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι



καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν. Ὁ δὲ οὐδὲν καινότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι μαντικὴν νομίζοντες οἰωνοῖς τε χρώνται καὶ φήμαις καὶ συμβόλοις καὶ θυσίαις. According to this opinion of Xenophon, which was probably also that of Socrates, it was extremely natural for the latter to interpret the language of the indictment as he is made to do in our Apology. At the same time it is not necessary to suppose that Meletus either himself had any clear and definite notion on the subject, or wished to convey any. He adopted an expression of the greatest possible latitude, not particularly caring perhaps what conceptions it suggested, so long as they were such as would excite the rage of bigotry and fanaticism against Socrates; and for this he sufficiently provided by the two accompanying epithets, ἑτέρα, and καινά. It mattered little what it was that Socrates had introduced, so long as it was proved to be something connected with religion, which was *new*, and *different* from the received opinions.

Mr Ast's next objection has even less appearance of force. He contends that our author has entirely mistaken the nature of the supernatural sign by which Socrates was guided, when he represents it as exerting a merely restraining power, and Cicero who, de Divinat. i. 54, has adopted the same view of it, loses in consequence all credit for discernment with Mr Ast. A passage in the Phædrus, which gives exactly the same account of the supernatural sign, (p. 242. B. ἀεὶ δέ με ἐπίσχει, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν,) is for no other reason supposed to be interpolated. Mr Ast conceives that it is in itself incredible, that the divine intimation should never have manifested itself except in warning or deterring; a point on which, until we obtain some more accurate information about its nature, it will perhaps be safer not to pronounce an opinion. He also contends that the contrary is stated by Xenophon in several passages of the Memorabilia, where the sign is said to have announced to Socrates, as well what he was to do as what to avoid: for instance, i. 1. 4. iv. 8. 1. But there is really no inconsistency between these and similar passages and the assertion in our Apology, and in the Phædrus. For it is evident that a sign which only forbade might, by its absence, shew what was permitted, and thus a positive kind of guidance might not improperly be ascribed to it: as in the case before



us it might have been truly said, that Socrates was inwardly encouraged to present himself before his judges, because the warning voice had given no signal of any approaching evil. Thiersch has some excellent remarks on the steps by which this divine voice or sign was gradually elevated in the imagination of later writers into a supernatural being, the genius of Socrates. But this is an inquiry foreign to our present subject.

It appears then that we have no reason to think that our Apologist mistook anything that was intelligible in the charge of irreligion and new religion which was brought against Socrates. But still we have to inquire whether his attempt to refute the latter charge is not, as Mr Delbrueck contends, a mere sophistical evasion. Mr Ast likewise condemns it as not merely sophistical and absurd, but, if that is anything more, idle and groundless. But his manner of proving it to be so seems to partake very largely of the same qualities; for he assumes that the work is a counterfeit, and that Meletus meant to charge Socrates not with absolute atheism, but only with introducing new deities. Since however we cannot yet consent to this assumption, we must take it for granted that in the course of the trial Meletus, being questioned about his meaning, gave the answer which we find reported in the Apology, and which he probably thought would be most injurious to Socrates, or most difficult for him to refute, or the easiest for himself to defend: that he believed no gods at all. This then was the charge which Socrates had to meet. But Mr Delbrueck objects that instead of meeting it fairly, by a confession of his religious principles according to the model he himself proposes, Socrates again contents himself with a miserable triumph over the simplicity of Meletus, who is entrapped into a declaration contrary to his own meaning, about the equivocal word *δαιμόνια*. Mr Delbrueck will have it that Meletus in his indictment used the word, not, as Mr Ast supposes, in a very narrow sense, but in the most general of all, and so as to exclude all relation to *δαίμονες* as personal beings. But little as we can feel any partiality for Meletus, justice is due to him as well as to his adversary, and it really seems to be taking too great a liberty with him, to impute to him a degree of stupidity almost worthy of Melitides, merely that Socrates may take a contemptible advan-



tage of it. How does Mr D. know what Meletus meant by his indictment? and why may not Xenophon have been right in his conjecture, that it may have been suggested to him by the reports that were spread about the peculiar kind of divination which Socrates professed? If so, it would not have been likely that he should have answered Socrates by saying that *δαιμόνια* meant something which did not imply the existence of any kind of supernatural beings, and he would have entangled himself in a difficulty from which an abler disputant would scarcely have been able to extricate himself, if he had attempted to define a class of supernatural agents which did not fall under the denomination either of *θεός* or *δαίμων*. On the other hand, if Socrates, as he is made to say at p. 31 D., was reminded by the indictment of his own supernatural warnings, and was in the habit of referring them to a higher power, he had no inducement to combat the charge, as if it had imputed to him disbelief of all personal existence of beings superior to man. It seems very doubtful whether any Greek could have given a better answer than Meletus: for Aristotle in alluding to it, expressly in one passage of the *Rhetoric* (III. 18.), and tacitly, but distinctly, in another (II. 23), manifestly considers the argument as a legitimate one, from which there was no escape. And indeed what could it be that guided or warned Socrates, in the most momentous epochs of his life, but something endowed with intelligence and will? Meletus therefore when pressed upon this point, could scarcely help retracting his charge of atheism, which nevertheless, without a great deal more either of candour or of forethought than we are called upon to attribute to him, he was very likely to make. From whatever side the charge of irreligion was examined, it was sure to prove a base, malignant, calumny. Socrates began at a point from which he was soon led to detect the confusion of his adversary's ideas, and hence to drop the inquiry: but both the negative and the positive part of the charge, in the sense which Meletus assigned to them, are substantially answered in our *Apology*. On the other hand the declaration which Mr Delbrueck wishes Socrates to have made, would certainly have been unintelligible to the great majority of his hearers, even if he would have understood it himself; but all that is in it really



applicable to his case, is much more forcibly expressed in his own speech.

If we might hope that we have despatched Mr Delbrueck's first two objections, we should proceed with great confidence to meet the remaining one, which relates to the language of Socrates on the subject of death. The former passages, when they are torn from the context undoubtedly present an appearance of difficulty: but the third seems to carry its meaning so clearly on its face that it requires some ingenuity to misinterpret it. Whoever the author of the *Apology* was, he was certainly not a person of such contemptible understanding as to make Socrates express contradictory sentiments in the course of the same passage. When therefore we find him speaking with transport of the hope of a future life, we cannot suppose that he had just before been describing annihilation as a thing in itself better than existence. The mention of the Great King, which is so peculiarly offensive to Mr Delbrueck, seems to suggest a natural explanation of the sentiment, which renders it perfectly worthy and characteristic of Socrates. Assuredly he who had lived so long in the extreme of poverty, and yet was conscious of having enjoyed the highest happiness that man can taste on earth, did not mean to represent the condition of the Persian king as supremely desirable. But he may have meant to indicate that, according to the use which most men make of life, and according to their ideas of its value, the good and evil are so nearly balanced, as to neutralize each other, and frequently to render the loss of it a gain. Certainly if, as Mr Delbrueck suggests, the wise and good man had been mentioned instead of the Great King, it must have been for a very different purpose. But if Socrates could have alluded to his own particular case, he might perhaps have consoled his friends with the remark: that to him death was a gain, as it enlarged and perpetuated the moral influence of his life; or, as Mr D. says, because his truly happy life began with and arose out of his death.

Surely these are not difficulties which need drive a man to despair, or which ought to embitter his solitary hours with melancholy, or from which he can reasonably hope to be relieved by a special dispensation of Providence. It is a case in which



if we put our shoulders to the wheel we shall be able to extricate ourselves from our scruples, and to pursue our journey with ease and cheerfulness. We have only one observation to add before we quit this subject, on which we may appear to some to have dwelt too long. Mr Delbrueck's opening reflexions on the effect which the oracle produced upon Socrates are pleasing and interesting, but they appear to us to contain a mixture of truth and error. It may be readily conceived, and seems to be confirmed by several authentic accounts, that Socrates really considered himself as fulfilling a divine mission by his life and labours. But that this idea was first suggested to him by the Delphic oracle is, to say the least, extremely improbable; though such an accidental occurrence (for who but a sincere Pagan can believe it to have been more) may have contributed to confirm the impression, and may have given it a definite form in his mind. But surely his character and pursuits had been already fixed, before Chærephon could have ventured to inquire, whether any man better deserved the title of wise. No additional dignity is imparted to his selfdevotion, by considering it as the effect of such a casual inspiration. It was the spontaneous, necessary, result of his moral and intellectual constitution, and needed not to be connected with the eternal order of Providence by a tie so frail as a perishable superstition.

C. T.



## SIMPLICIUS DE CŒLO.

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MOST scholars are aware that the Greek text of the commentary of Simplicius on Aristotle's treatise de Cœlo first published by Aldus at Venice in 1526, is spurious; having been printed from a strangely garbled version or paraphrase of the genuine work. This circumstance was first made known to the learned by Mons<sup>r</sup> Amedée Peyron, of Turin, who discovered in the Royal Library of that city a MS. containing the true text of Simplicius, and published some specimens of it, together with the corresponding passages in the Venetian edition; so as to leave no doubt whatever respecting the fact he was desirous of establishing<sup>1</sup>. It still remains however to be explained by what singular accident Aldus came to pitch upon the spurious MS. from which he published his edition. I term it a singular accident because I apprehend that the interpolated text is much more scarce than the genuine one; and had Aldus collated any other copy he must have discovered his error. The Florence Library contains another copy of the spurious Simplicius<sup>2</sup>; but the University of Oxford possesses no less than four MSS. containing either the whole or considerable portions of the genuine work. The most valuable and perfect of these is a MS. belonging to Corpus Christi College. It is a large folio of 341 leaves, written on paper by different hands, with few abbreviations, about the middle of the fifteenth century<sup>3</sup>, and with the exception of some trifling lacunæ, contains the entire treatise of Simpli-

<sup>1</sup> Empedoclis et Parmenidis Fragmenta ex Codice Taurinensis Bibliothecæ restituta et illustrata ab Amedeo Peyron in Taurin. Acad. LL. Orient. Professore Vices Gerente. Simul agitur de genuino Græco Textu Commentarii Simplicii in Aristotelem de Cœlo et Mundo. Lips. 1810. 8vo.

<sup>2</sup> Bibl. Medic. Laurent. Catal. Cod. 27. Plut. 85. noticed by Prof. Peyron.

<sup>3</sup> At the bottom of the first leaf is the following note: Hic liber emptus fuit ab heredibus Gulielmi Grocim Anno Domini 1501 pro Collegio Corporis Christi Claimondo Præsidente.



cius. By the kindness of the President and Fellows of the Society to which it belongs, I have been enabled to make some extracts from it, which I shall lay before the reader in conjunction with the corresponding passages in the Venetian edition of 1526, that he may be enabled to compare the two texts together, and form his own explanation of this literary curiosity. Mons<sup>r</sup> Peyron was inclined to think that the spurious text was a retranslation of the Latin version of William de Moerbeke, who was Archbishop of Corinth about 1280 A. D. This version was first published at Venice in 1540, and Mons<sup>r</sup> Peyron has certainly proved that there exists a remarkable coincidence between it and the spurious Simplicius; but his hypothesis leaves one important phenomenon unexplained, namely, the agreement of the false with the genuine text, in so many instances that it can hardly be doubted that the interpolator must have had access to the original work. My own opinion is, that the interpolated text ought rather to be looked upon as a paraphrase made from the genuine treatise of Simplicius; that this formed the basis of de Moerbeke's translation, and having fallen into the hands of the Venetian printer, was published by him as the original commentary on Aristotle's treatise de Cælo. It is certain that paraphrases were very common in the middle ages, especially among the commentators of Aristotle, and Simplicius himself held a sufficiently distinguished rank among the interpreters of that philosopher, to deserve that his work should be made the subject of a similar exercise. The paraphrase in question is not without its value in a critical point of view, as it often leads to the true reading where the MSS. of the genuine text are defective.

In making the following extracts, my wish has been principally to exhibit those portions of the work of Simplicius, which contain passages from writers now lost, especially the fragments of Parmenides and Empedocles, in which the readings of the Corpus MS. are in many instances preferable to those of the Turin copy published by Professor Peyron.

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Fol. 1 a. Ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος, τὸν σκοπὸν ἐν τούτοις ποιούμενον περὶ τοῦ οὐρανίου καὶ θείου σώματός φησι περιλαμβάνειν καὶ τὴν περὶ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου θεωρίαν, ὡς δὴ περιεχομένην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κατ' οὐσίαν, καὶ ὑπέεικονσαν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς γενέσεως. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις δυνάμεων, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα πάντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἐξήρτηται, καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ περιϋόντων. Συριανὸς δὲ ὁ μέγας καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτὸν ἡκολουθηκότες αὐτῷ, περὶ τοῦ καλουμένου κυρίως οὐρανοῦ, τουτέστι περὶ τοῦ αἰδίου καὶ κύκλου σώματος τὴν πραγματείαν εἶναι φασί· τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν ὡς ὁράται ἀκούοντες, καὶ οὐ παραδεχόμενοι Ἀλέξανδρον λέγοντα τὸν σκοπὸν εἶναι περὶ κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν σωμάτων.

Fol. 1 b. Δι' ὃ καὶ Νικόλαος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ κατ' εἶδος ποιεῖται λόγον· ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ βιβλίῳ ταύτης τῆς πραγματείας, περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πραγματεία εἰρημένων ἐν κεφαλαίῳ διασαφῶν, καὶ τῷ προοιμίῳ τῶν Μετεωρολογικῶν οὐτε ἀλλαχοῦ περὶ κόσμου φησὶν εἰρῆσθαι, οὐθ' οὕτως περὶ οὐρανοῦ ὡς περὶ κόσμου.

Fol. 3 a. Ἔστι δὲ ἄξιον ἐπισημῆνασθαι ὅτι παρὰ τὸ σύννηθες ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης Πυθαγορικαῖς πιθανότησιν εἰς τὴν δεῖξιν ἐχρήσατο.

Ibid. Ὁ δὲ θαυμάσιος Πτολεμαῖος ἐν τῇ μονοβύβλῳ περὶ διαστάσεως καλῶς ἀπέδειξεν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶ πλείους τῶν τριῶν διαστάσεων.

Fol. 3 b. Τούτων δὲ τῶν ὑποθέσεων καὶ Πλωτῖνος ἐν τῷ περὶ κόσμου μέμνηται· βουλόμενος γὰρ κατὰ Πλάτωνα δεῖξαι τὴν αἰδιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλει μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴη πόνος, εἴτις αὐτοῦ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς περὶ τοῦ πέμπτου σώματος ὑποδέξοιτο, ταύτας λέγων· τούτων γὰρ οὕτως ἐχόντων ἔπεται ἡ αἰδιότης κατ' ἀριθμόν· καὶ ὁ Πλάτων δὲ ἑτέραν δοκεῖ οὐσίαν ἀποδιδόναι τῷ οὐρανίῳ· εἰ γὰρ κατ' εἶδος πέντε στοιχεῖα τῶν πέντε σωμάτων νομίζει, καὶ τότε δωδεκάεδρον διαγραφὲν ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν διώρισται, καὶ πᾶν ἕτερον τοῦ οὐρανίου φησὶν ὑπάρχειν παρὰ τὴν πυραμίδα, καὶ τὸ ὀκτάεδρον καὶ τὸ εἰκοσάεδρον, καὶ τὸν κύκλον, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ κατ' αὐτὸν ἕτερόν ἐστι κατ' οὐσίαν. καὶ ὅτι καὶ Πλάτων ὀρίζειται πέντε εἶναι τὰ ἀπλᾶ σώματα



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Fol. 1 r. Ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος τὸν σκοπὸν περὶ τοῦ οὐρανίου καὶ θείου σώματος ἐν τούτοις ποιησάμενον περιλαβεῖν· καὶ φησὶ καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ὅλου θεωρίαν ὡς περιεχομένην ἐν αὐτῇ κατ' οὐσίαν καὶ δουλεύουσιν αὐτῇ πρὸς ἐργασίαν γενέσεως· οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις ἐνυπαρχουσῆς δυνάμεως. ἐπειδὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ εἴρηται καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν περιόντων. Συριανὸς δὲ ὁ μέγας καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτῷ ἀκολουθοῦντες αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ κυρίως οὐρανοῦ τουτέστι αἰδίου καὶ κυκλοφορητικοῦ σώματος τὴν πραγματείαν εἶναι φασίν· εἰς τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν ὡς ἔοικεν ἀποβλέποντες· καὶ οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι περὶ κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν τοῦ κόσμου σωμάτων λέγοντα τὸν σκοπόν.

Fol. 2 r. Ἀμέλει καὶ Νικόλαος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς εἴτι μέμνηται περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιγράφας περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ κατ' εἶδη ποιεῖται τὸν λόγον· ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ βυβλίῳ ταύτης τῆς πραγματείας περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ λεγομένων συνηρημένως ἐκθέμενος, καὶ ἐν τῷ τῶν Μετεωρολογικῶν προοιμίῳ οὐδετέρωθι περὶ κόσμου φασίν εἰρηκέναι.

Fol. 4 r. Ἐπιστῆσαι δὲ ἄξιον ὅτι παρὰ τὸ σύνηθες ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ταῖς Πυθαγορικαῖς ἐνδείξεσιν εἰς ἀπόδειξιν ἐχρήσατο.

Fol. 4 s. Ὁ δὲ θαυμαστὸς Πτολεμαῖος ἐν τῷ περὶ διαστάσεως μονοβύβλῳ καλῶς ἀπέδειξεν ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶ πλείονες τῶν τριῶν διαστάσεων.

Fol. 5 s. Τούτων δὲ τῶν ὑποθέσεων καὶ Πλωτῖνος ἐν τῷ περὶ κόσμου ἐμνημόνευσε· βουλευθεὶς γὰρ κατὰ Πλάτωνα ἀποδείξαι τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αἰδιότητα φησὶν· Ἀριστοτέλει μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν πρᾶγμα εἴη εἴτις αὐτοῦ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τοῦ πέμπτου παραδέχεται σώματος ταύτας λέγων· ὅτι τούτων οὕτως ἔχουσῶν ἔπεται ἢ αἰδιότης ἢ κατ' ἀριθμόν· καὶ Πλάτων δὲ ἄλλην ἔοικεν οὐσίαν ἀποδιδόναι τῷ οὐρανῷ εἰ γὰρ εἰδοποιὰ τὰ πέντε σχήματα τῶν πέντε σωμάτων νομίζει, καὶ τῷ δωδεκαέδρῳ διεζωγραγεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὥρισμένον τὸ πᾶν φησὶν ἄλλῳ ὄντι παρὰ τὴν πυραμίδα, καὶ τὸ ὀκτάεδρον καὶ τὸ εἰκοσάεδρον καὶ τὸν κύβον δῆλον ὅτι καὶ κατ' αὐτὸν ἄλλο τὴν οὐσίαν ἐστί· καὶ ὅτι Πλάτων πέντε εἶναι τὰ ἀπλᾶ σώματα νομίζει κατὰ τὰ πέντε σχήματα



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κατὰ τὰ πέντε σχήματα ἀρκέσει Ξενοκράτης ὁ γνησιώτατος τῶν ἐκείνου ὁμιλητῶν. ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ Πλάτωνος βίῳ γράφων ταῦτα. “τα μὲν οὖν ζῶα οὕτω διήρηται εἰς ιδέας καὶ μέρη πάντα διαιρῶν μεχρι οὗ ἐπὶ τὰ πέντε στοιχεῖα ἀφίκειτο· ἃ δὴ πέντε σχήματα καὶ πέντε σώματα ὠνόμασεν, αἶθερα καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ αἶρα.”

Fol. 4 a. Ὡσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Ξένάρχος ὁμολογεῖ γράφων οὕτως· “ἔστω τι τετράγωνον καὶ τοῦτο περιαχθήτω κύκλῳ μένοντος τοῦ ἐνὸς πλευροῦ ὅπερ γίνεται ἄξων τοῦ κυλίνδρου· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς περιαχθείσης παράλληλου ἤχθω σημείον τι καὶ ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ τό τε σημεῖον διελθέτω τήνδε τὴν γραμμὴν καὶ τὸ παραλληλόγραμμον εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπανήχθω πάλιν, ὅθεν ἤρξατο φέρεσθαι· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸ μὲν παραλληλόγραμμον κύλινδρον, τὸ δὲ ἐνεχθὲν σημεῖον ἐπὶ τῆς εὐθείας, ἑλικά.”

Fol. 5 b. Ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι ὁ Πτολεμαῖος ἐν τῷ περὶ στοιχείων βυβλίῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὀπτικοῖς καὶ ὁ μέγας Πλωτῖνος καὶ Ξένάρχος ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τὴν πέμπτην οὐσίαν ἀπορίαις, τὰς ἐπ’ εὐθείας κινήσεις τῶν στοιχείων, γινομένων τε ἔτι καὶ ἐν τῷ παρὰ φύσιν ὄντων τόπῳ, καὶ οὕπῳ ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπέλαβον εἶναι.

Ibid. Ἀλλ’ αὕτη ἡ ἀπορία ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ξενάρχου προτεθεῖσα μετ’ ὀλίγα λυθήσεται.

Ibid. in fin. Ὁ δὲ Ξένάρχος δευτέραν ἀπορίαν ἐπαπορεῖ περὶ τὴν πέμπτην οὐσίαν μετὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν γραμμῶν ἀπορίαν, πρὸς τὸ ὅτι τοῦ ἀπλοῦ σώματος ἀπλὴ ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις· φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι οὐδενὶ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων ἤδη ὑπάρχοντι κατὰ φύσιν ἔσται ἢ ἐπ’ εὐθείας κίνησις· ἀλλ’ ἐν μόνῳ τῷ γίνεσθαι· τὸ δὲ γινόμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπλῶς· ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κινούμενον. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐστὶ μεταξὺ τοῦ ληφθησομένου τόπου καὶ τοῦ προκατεχομένου· καὶ ἔστιν ἡ γένεσις συγγενὴς τῇ κινήσει μεταβολή τις οὐσα καὶ αὕτη· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ φερόμενον ἄνω πῦρ οὐ φάμεν κυρίως εἶναι πῦρ· ἀλλὰ φέρεσθαι ἀφικνούμενον εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον τόπον, ὑπεραναβὰν δὲ τὰ ἄλλα καὶ ἡρεμήσαν, τότε γέγονε κυρίως πῦρ· εἰδοποιεῖται γὰρ ταύτῃ τῇ θέσει κοῦφον· καὶ ἡ γῆ τότε κυρίως ἐστὶ γῆ, ὅτε ὑφίσταται τοῖς ἄλλοις· τὸν δὲ μέσον τόπον ἐπέσχει τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ ὁ ἀήρ· τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ ὅτε ἐφι-



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ἀρκεῖ Ξενοκράτης ὁ γνησιώτατος αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀκροατῶν ἐν τῷ περὶ Πλάτωνος βίῳ τάδε γράφων· “Τὰ μὲν οὖν ζῶα, οὕτω διηρεῖτο εἰς ἰδέας τε καὶ μέρη πάντα τρόπον διαιρῶν ἕως εἰς τὰ πάντων στοιχεῖα ἀφίκετο τῶν ζώων ἃ δὴ πέντε σχήματα καὶ σώματα ὠνόμαζεν εἰς αἴθερα καὶ πῦρ, καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, καὶ αἶρα.”

Fol. 6 r. Ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Ξέναρχος ὁμολογεῖ γράφων οὕτως· “ἔστω τι τετράγωνον, καὶ τοῦτο περιαγέσθω κύκλῳ μενούσης μιᾶς πλευρᾶς ἥτις ἄξων τοῦ κυλινδρικοῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτην παραλλήλου περιφερομένην φερέσθω τι σημεῖον, καὶ ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ τοῦτο τὸ σημεῖον ταύτην διεξίτω τὴν γραμμὴν· αποκαθιστάσθω πάλιν ἐκεῖ ὅθεν ἤρξατο φέρεσθαι· ποιεῖ γὰρ οὕτως τὸ μὲν παραλληλόγραμμον κύλινδρον, τὸ δὲ φερόμενον σημεῖον ἐπὶ τῆς εὐθείας ἑλικά.”

Fol. 8 s. Ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι ὁ Πτολεμαῖος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν στοιχείων βυβλίῳ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὀπτικοῖς καὶ Πλωτῖνος ὁ μέγας καὶ Ξέναρχος ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τὴν πέμπτην οὐσίαν ἀπορίαις τὴν μὲν ἐπ’ εὐθείας κίνησιν τῶν στοιχείων γινομένην, ἔτι καὶ ἐν τῷ παρὰ φύσιν ὄντων τόπῳ ἀλλὰ μήπω τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀπειληφότων εἶναι φασίν.

Ibid. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἄπορον μετ’ ὀλίγον ὥς τοῦ Ἐξάρχου προβαλλομένου διαλύσομαι.

Fol. 9 r. Ὁ δὲ Ξέναρχος δευτέραν ἀπορίαν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πέμπτην οὐσίαν ἀπορημένοις μετὰ τὴν τῶν ἀπλῶν γραμμῶν ἀπορεῖ· πρὸς τὸ τοῦ ἀπλοῦ σώματος ἀπλὴν εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν κίνησιν· οὐδενὶ γάρ φησι τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων ἢ διότι κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπ’ εὐθείας κίνησις, ἀλλὰ γινομένων μόνον· τὸ δὲ γινόμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τε εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μεταξύ· καθάπερ καὶ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐν κενῷ τοῦ τε ἐπιλαμβανομένου τόπου καὶ τοῦ προκατεχομένου· καὶ ἔστι συγγενὲς ἢ γένεσις τῇ κινήσει μεταβολή τις οὐσα καὶ αὕτη καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἀναφέρεσθαι λεγόμενον πῦρ οὐ φασίν εἶναι κυρίως πῦρ ἀλλὰ γινόμενον ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον τόπον καὶ ἐπιπολάσαν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἡρεμῆσαν, τότε γίνεσθαι κυρίως· εἰδοποιεῖσθαι γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ’ ὅσον ἐστὶ κοῦφον τῇ θέσει ταύτῃ· καὶ ἢ γῆ τότε κυρίως ἐστὶ γῆ ὅταν ὑποστή τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τὸ μέσον ἐπισχῇ τόπον καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ ὁ αἶρ· καὶ τὸ μὲν



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ζάνει μὲν τῇ γῇ· ὑφίσταται δὲ τῷ ἀέρι· ὁ δὲ ἀὴρ ὅτε ἐφίζάνει τῷ ὕδατι ὑφίσταται δὲ τῷ πυρί· φησὶ τοίνυν ὅτι τοῦ ἀπλοῦ σώματος ἀπλὴν εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν κατὰ φύσιν, ψευδὲς ἀποδείκνυται· οὐ γὰρ τῷ ὑπάρχοντι, ἀλλὰ τῷ γινομένῳ συμβεβηκός ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις· εἰ τοίνυν δεῖ καὶ τοῖς ἤδη ὑπάρχουσιν ἀποδιδόναι τινα κίνησιν ἀπλὴν, τὴν κύκλῳ ἀποδιδόναι δεῖ· εἴπερ αἱ δύο αὗται μόναι ἀπλαῖ ἢ τε κύκλῳ καὶ ἡ ἐπ' εὐθείας· ἡ δ' ἐπ' εὐθείας τῶν γινομένων ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τεσσάρων· οὐκ ἀπεικότως οὖν ἀποδώσει τις τῷ μὲν πυρί τὴν κύκλῳ τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις τὴν ἡρεμίαν.

Fol. 6 a. Ἀπορεῖ δὲ πάλιν ὁ Ξέναρχος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι λέγων, εἰ τοῖς ἀπλοῖς καὶ φυσικοῖς σώμασιν ἡ φύσις ἀπέδωκεν ἀπλᾶς κινήσεις οἰκείας καὶ συγγενεῖς, διὰ τοῦτο ἤδη καὶ ταῖς ἀπλαῖς κινήσεσιν ἀποδεδόσθαι ἀπλᾶ φυσικὰ σώματα· οὐδὲ γὰρ σύνθετα τῆς συνθέτοις ἀπέδωκεν. ἦν γὰρ ἂν αὐτῶν πλῆθος ἄπειρον· ἄπειροι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ σύνθετοι κινήσεις.

Fol. 6 b. Ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ἐνστάσεις τοῦ Ξενάρχου καὶ τίθησι καὶ λύει ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος· λέγει δὲ καὶ ἄλλην ὁ Ξέναρχος τοιαύτην· τὴν κύκλῳ κίνησιν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀπλοῦ σώματος κατὰ φύσιν· ἐπειδὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς σώμασιν ὁμοιομερέσιν οὖσιν, ἰσοταχῇ δεῖ εἶναι πάντα τὰ μέρη. ἐν δὲ τῷ κύκλῳ τὰ πρὸς τὸ κέντρον μέρη βραδύτερά ἐστιν τῶν πρὸς τὴν περιφέρειαν εἴπερ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἐπὶ ἐλάττονος διαστήματος κινεῖται· κἂν τῇ σφαίρᾳ δὲ οἱ περὶ τοὺς πόλους κύκλοι βραδύτερον τῶν πορρωτέρω κινουῦνται· τάχιστα δὲ πάντων ὁ μέγιστος τῶν παραλλήλων.

Ibid. Ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Ξέναρχος ἀντέθηκε πρὸς τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους ληφθείσας· τῶν νέων δὲ τις δόξης, ὡς δοκεῖ, θηρευτῆς, ἐνστάσεις τινὰς τοῦ Ξενάρχου ὑπελθὼν καὶ τινὰς ἐτέρας τοιαύτας προσεταιρισάμενος, τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους κατήγορος ἀνεφάνη, τὸν μὲν σκόπον ἅπαντα ἐνστησάμενος ὡς φησιν ἀποδείξαι τὸν κόσμον φθαρτὸν, ὥσπερ ἄθλόν τι μέγα παρὰ τοῦ κτίστου ληψόμενος, εἰ κτίστην αὐτὸν μόνων τῶν φθαρτῶν ἀποδείξαι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀφθάρτου· διὰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἔφεσιν τοῖς ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους ἐνταῦθα λεγομένοις ἀντιλέγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ, διὰ μακρῶν βυβλίων ἐλπίζων οὐ μόνον τῷ πλήθει τοὺς ἀναισθήτους ἐκπλήξειν, ἀλλ' ὡς οἶμαι πλείστους ἀποστρέφων καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς πεπαιδευμένους ἀπὸ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως



Cod. C. C. C.

ὕδωρ ὅτε ἂν ἐπιπολάζῃ μὲν τῇ γῇ· ὑφίσταται δὲ τῷ πυρὶ τὸ οὖν τοῦ ἀπλοῦ σώματος φησὶν ἀπλὴν εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν κίνησιν, ψεῦδος ἐστίν· δέδεικται γάρ, ὥς οὐ τῷ ὄντι ἀλλὰ τῷ γινομένῳ συμβεβηκός ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις· εἰ δὲ ἄρα χρή καὶ τοῖς εἶδη οὖσιν ἀποδίδοναι τινὰ κίνησιν, καὶ ταυτὴν ἀπλὴν, τὴν ἐγκύκλιον ἀποδίδοναι χρή. εἴπερ δύο μόναι αὐταὶ ἀπλαὶ ἢ τε κύκλῳ καὶ ἢ ἐπ' εὐθείας γινομένων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄντων τῶν τεσσάρων, οὐκ ἂν οὖν ἀτοπῶς ἀποδοίῃ τις τῷ πυρὶ τὴν ἐγκύκλιον· τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις τρισι, τὴν ἡρεμίαν.

Fol. 9 s. Ἀπιστεῖ δὲ πάλιν Ἐξάρχος οὐκ ἀνάγκην εἶναι λέγων εἰ τοῖς ἀπλοῖς φυσικοῖς σώμασιν ἀπλὰς ἀποδέδωκε τὰς οἰκείας καὶ συγγενεῖς κινήσεις ἢ φύσεις, ἥδη διὰ τοῦ καὶ ταῖς ἀπλαῖς κινήσεσιν ἀπλὰ ἀποδεδωκέναι τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα· οὐδὲ γὰρ σύνθεσιν τοῖς συνθέτοις ἀποδέδωκεν· ἦν γὰρ ἂν ἄπειρον αὐτῶν τὸ πλῆθος· ἄπειροι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ σύνθετοι κινήσεις.

Fol. 10 s. Ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ἐνστάσεις τοῦ Ἐξάρχου ἐν τούτοις καὶ τίθησιν καὶ διέλυσεν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος· λέγει δὲ καὶ ἄλλην ὁ Ξένάρχος τοιαύτην· τὴν κύκλῳ κίνησιν ἀδύνατον ἀπλοῦν σῶμα εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν· εἴπερ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς σώμασιν ὁμοιομερέσιν οὖσιν ἰσοταχῇ πάντα τὰ μέρη ἐστίν, ἐν δὲ τῷ κύκλῳ τὰ πρὸς τῷ κέντρῳ αἰὲν βραδύτερα τῶν πρὸς τῇ περιφερείᾳ ἐστίν, εἴπερ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἐλάττονα κινεῖν τῶν πόρρωθεν, καὶ τάχιστα πάντων ὁ μέγιστος τῶν παραλλήλων.

Fol. 11 r. Ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Ξένάρχος ἀντήρηκεν πρὸς τὰς τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους παραληφθείσας ὑποθέσεις· τῶν δὲ τις ἐφ' ἡμῶν δόξης ὥς ἔοικε θηρατῆς, τῶν τοῦ Ξενάρχου τινὰς ἐνστάσεις ὑποβαλόμενος, καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας ἀθροίσας, κατηγοροῦς ἀνέδν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους· σκοπὸν μὲν τὸν ὅλον ἐνστησάμενος ὥς φασὶν φθαρτὸν ἀποδείξαι τὸν κόσμον, ὥς ἔπαθλόν τι μέγα παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ληψόμενος εἰ δὲ φθαρτοῦ<sup>1</sup> μόνον αὐτὸν ἀποδείξῃ τὸν δημιουργόν, μηδενὸς δὲ ἀφθάρτου· διὰ ταυτὴν δὲ τὴν προθυμίαν, τοῖς ἐνταῦθα λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἀντιλέγειν προτίθεται διὰ

<sup>1</sup> Cod. φθαρτὸν.



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τῶν τοιούτων λήρων. ὥς ἂν ἀνεξέταστα μένοντα τὰ ἐν τοσούτοις γραφέντα χάρταις, ἐκ τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν μόνον πρὸς τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους δόξαν, σοφίας ἀντιποιήσῃται τῷ συγγραφεῖ. ἐγὼ δὲ οἶδα τὰς τοιαύτας προπετείας ὥσπερ τοὺς καλουμένους Ἀδώνιδος κήπους ἀνθεῖν παρὰ τοῖς ἀναισθήτοις καὶ νομισθείσας εἶναί τι ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἀποσβέσθαι. καὶ μοι τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους πραγματείαν διασαφήσασθαι προθεμένῳ ἔδοξε τὰ δυνατὰ μὴ παριδεῖν τὰς ἐνστάσεις τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐνοχλούσας τῶν πεπαιδευμένων μὲν οὐδένα, τῶν δ᾽ ἀπαιδευτῶν τοὺς αἰετοῖς νέοις χαίροντας καὶ χαλεπαίνοντας ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν δόξαις· ἔτι δὲ τοὺς ἡγουμένους τιμᾶν τὸ θεῖον, εἰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὥς φασι γενόμενον πρὸς ὑπηρεσίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, μηδὲν νομίζωσιν ἔχειν ἐξαίρετον πρὸς τὰ τῆδε, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως αὐτὸν τούτοις φθαρτὸν ἡγῶνται· οὗτοι γὰρ τῇ ἐαυτῶν περὶ θεοῦ δόξῃ συμβαίνειν τὰς ἐνστάσεις νομίζοντας, διὰ μεγάλης ἄγουσι τιμῆς, οὐδὲν μὲν οὔτε τούτων εἰδότες οὔτε τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους, πρὸς ἃ τολμῶσι τὰς τοιαύτας ἐνστάσεις ἐπάγειν· ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ταλαντεύοντες, καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς καυχώμενοι, ὅτι τὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀνατέτραπται δόγματα. τούτων οὖν χάριν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐχόντας ἀκοὴν ῥάω, καὶ ἴν' ἡ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ οὐρανοῦ πραγματεία, καὶ ἡ θεοσεβῆς περὶ τοῦ καθόλου ἔννοια ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας ἐνδόξου γνώμης ἀνέλεκτος μείνειεν, ἔδοξέ μοι καὶ ταύτας τὰς ἐνστάσεις προθεῖναι καὶ λῦσαι κατὰ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ δύναμιν· πρεπωδέστερον γὰρ ἐδόκει συμβιβάσκειν μετὰ τῶν τῆς πραγματείας ὑπομνηματιστῶν καὶ τὰς ἐνστάσεις καὶ τὰς λύσεις αὐτῶν. εἰδέ που δόξω κατὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τούτου ἀποτομώτερον χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ, μὴ ἀπαξιούτῳ μηδέις· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστι μοι ἀηδία τίς πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα, ὃν οὐδὲ ὄψει ἔγνων ποτε· ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν ἀκριβῆ κρίσιν ἄξιον ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ μεμαθηκότι παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους, καὶ τῶν ἐκείνου ὑπομνηματιστῶν, εἴ τι που παρ' ἐκείνων ἐμάθομεν· οὐδὲ ἀπὸ Μενάνδρου καὶ Ἡρωδιανοῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀφίκετο ἡμῖν ἀκριβέστερον τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους τὴν περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀλήθειαν παιδευθεὶς, καὶ οὐκ ἐυλαβηθεὶς περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους γράφειν· ὃν τῆς τέχνης αὐτῆς ἔδραν μᾶλλον καὶ πατέρα καλῶν τις οὐκ ἂν ἀμαρτη. καὶ ὅτι τεχνώτερον ἦν ἐπισκιάσαι τῇ τῶν παραλογισμῶν ὁμίχλῃ τὸ ἀληθές· καὶ ὅτι τῇ ποικιλίᾳ τῶν λύσεων ἐπιτήδειος Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπισκιάσαι τὸ ἀληθές πολλάκις



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πολυστοίχων βυβλίων οὐ μόνον τῷ πλήθει καταπλήττειν ἐλπίσας τοὺς ἀνοήτους ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποτρέπειν οἶμαι τοὺς πλείστους καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς καθαριωτέρους τῆς τῶν δίωφλυγίων<sup>2</sup> φληναλφῶν ἐντεύξεως ὥστε ἀνεπίκριτα μέιναντα τὰ γραφέντα ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην μόνον ἀντειπεῖν τοσαύτας σελίδας· δόξαν σοφίας παρασχέσθαι τῷ γράφοντι· ἐγὼ δὲ οἶδα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν τολμημάτων ὥσπερ τοὺς Ἀδώνιδος καλουμένους κήπους ἀνθεῖν<sup>3</sup> παρὰ τοῖς ἀνοήτοις δόξαντα, ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἀποσβεσθέντα. καὶ τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ οὐρανοῦ πραγματείαν σαφηνίσαι προθεμένῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἔδοξε μὴ παριδεῖν τὰς τοῦδε τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐνστάσεις ἐνοχλούσας τῶν μὲν πεπαιδευμένων οὐδένα, τῶν δὲ ἀπαιδευτῶν τοὺς τε αἰεὶ ξένοις χαίροντας καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν τῇ εὐκλείᾳ βαρυνομένους· καὶ ἔτι μέντοι τοὺς θεοσεβεῖν οἰομένους εἰάν τὸν οὐρανὸν πρὸς ὑπηρεσίας ὥς φασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γεγονότα μηδὲν ἐξαίρετον ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ ὑπὸ σεληνὴν νομίζωσιν καὶ φθαρτὸν καὶ αὐτὸν ὁμοίως τούτοις ὑπολαμβάνωσιν<sup>4</sup>. οὗτοι γὰρ οὐνήγοροι αὐτῶν τῇ περὶ θεοῦ δοξῇ τὰς ἐνστάσεις ταύτας οἰόμενοι διὰ μεγάλης ἄγουσι τιμῆς· οὐδὲν μὲν οὐδὲ τούτων εἰδότες οὐδὲ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους· ἔτι μᾶλλον πρὸς αὐτὸν τολμῶσιν αὐταὶ ἐνίστασθαι· ἀλλήλοις δὲ θρυλλοῦντες καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς νεανιενόμενοι ὅτι τὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀνατέτραπται δόγματα· τούτων οὖν εἵνεκα καὶ τῶν εὐκολοτέραν ἔχόντων τὴν ἀκοήν, καὶ τὴν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ οὐρανοῦ πραγματείαν, καὶ τὴν θεοσεβῆ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἐννοίαν ἐπὶ τῆς παλαιᾶς εὐκλείας μένειν ἀνέλεγκτον, ἔδοξέ μοι καὶ ταύτας προσθῆναι τὰς ἐνστάσεις καὶ διαλύσαι κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δύναμιν· οἰκειότερον γὰρ ἐφάνη τὸ τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι τῆς πραγματείας συντετάχθαι, καὶ τὰς ἐνστάσεις καὶ τὰς λύσεις αὐτῶν· εἰ δὲ που φανείην πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον τραχύτερον ἀπορρίπτειν λόγον, μὴ νεμεσῇ τις, οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα φιλονεικία ὃν οὐδὲ θεασάμενος οἶδα πώποτε, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν ἐμμελὴ δίκην ἄξιον ἐπιτιθέναι τούτῳ τῷ παρ' Ἀριστοτέλους μὲν καὶ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν αὐτοῦ μαθόντι εἶπερ τί ἄρα περὶ τούτων μεμάθηκεν· οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ Μενάνδρου καὶ Ἡρωδιανοῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἦλθεν ἡμῖν ἀκριβέστερον Ἀριστοτέλους τὰ περὶ

<sup>2</sup> This should be διωλυγίων φληνάφων.<sup>3</sup> Cod. εὐθεῖν.<sup>4</sup> Cod. ὑπολαμβάνουσιν.



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φησὶν, ἵνα καὶ σοφότερος αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν ἐκείνου δοξάσθῃ.

Fol. 8 a. Οἱ γὰρ περὶ Εὐδοξον καὶ Κάλιππον ὑποπθέντες σφαίρας ἀνελιπτούσας ὁμοκέντρους τῷ παντὶ, δι' ἐκείνων ἐπεχείρουν σώζειν τὰ φαινόμενα περὶ τὸ κέντρον μὲν τοῦ παντός λέγοντες κινεῖσθαι πάσας τὰς σφαίρας· τῶν δὲ ἀποστάσεων καὶ προποδισμῶν, καὶ τῶν φαινομένων στηριγμῶν καὶ ἀναποδίσμῶν, καὶ ἀνωμαλιῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς φαινομένων, τὰς αἰτίας μὴ δυνάμενοι κατὰ τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἐκείνας ἀποδιδόναι· διὰ τοῦτο περὶ τὸν Ἰππαρχον, καὶ εἴτις ἐκείνῳ σύγχρονος, καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν ὁ Πτολεμαῖος ἐκκέντρους σφαίρας καὶ ἐπικύκλους ὑπέθεντο, διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν οὐράνια πάντα περὶ τὸ τοῦ παντός κέντρον μὴ βουλόμενοι, τῶν δ' εἰρημένων πρότερον τὰς αἰτίας ὑπ' ἐκείνων παραληφθείσας, οὗτοι κατὰ τὰς ὑποθέσεις ταύτας ἀποδιδόντες.

Fol. 10 b. Ὁ δὲ νέος οὕτως κόραξ μᾶλλον δὲ κολοῖος, ἄκραντα γαρύων ὡς ἀληθῶς Διὸς πρὸς ὄρνια θεῖον κατὰ Πίνδαρον, καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἐνταῦθα ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους εἰρημένα χωρῶν, πρώτην ἐνστασιν ἐπάγει τὴν τοῦ Ξενάρχου τρίτην ὑποτιθεῖς.

Fol. 12 b. Καὶ τὴν Ξενάρχου ἐτι ἐνστασιν προφέροντος.

Fol. 16 a. Ὁ τοίνυν θειότατος Πλάτων τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πάντα ζῶντα στοχαζόμενος, καὶ ἔφεσιν ἔχοντα τῶν οἰχείων ἀγαθῶν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰς οἰκείας ὁλότητας, καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄριστα τῶν πλησιαζόντων αὐτοῖς σωμάτων φυσικῶς καὶ οὐ κατὰ προαίρεσιν γινομένην, ὁμοίως ἔγνω καὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὸ πῦρ πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα ἐφετὰ κινούμενα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι ἕκαστον πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖόν φησιν· γίνεσθαι γὰρ ἐνθα ῥέπει φαμέν.

Fol. 16 b. Καὶ πῶς καλῶς ἂν δόξειε λέγειν· οὕτως ὁ Πλάτων· τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω οὐ κυρίως ἐν τῷ καθόλου λέγεσθαι νομίζων· δι' ὃ καὶ τὸ κοῦφον ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ βαρὺ ἀπείπεν. καὶ ὁ Θεμίστιος καὶ τοι τοῖς πλείστοις Ἀριστοτέλει προσκείμενος, ἐν τούτῳ γεμὴν τῶν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ῥημάτων



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φύσεως τῶν ὄντων πεπαιδευμένος· καὶ ὅμως οὐκ αἰδουμένος περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους γράφειν ὃν αὐτῆς ἀφίδρυμα τῆς δεινότητος· μᾶλλον δὲ ματέρα καλῶν τις, οὐκ ἂν ἀμάρτοι· καὶ ὅτι δεινὸς συσκιᾶσαι τῇ ἀχάνι<sup>5</sup> τῶν παραλογισμῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν<sup>6</sup>, πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ὁ σοφώτατος αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν αὐτοῦ βρενθύεται.

Fol. 14 s. Οἱ γὰρ περὶ Εὐδοξον καὶ Κάλιππον καὶ μέχρι Ἀριστοτέλους τὰς ἀνελιπτούσας σφαίρας ὑποθέμενοι ὁμοκέντρους τῷ παντὶ δι' ἐκείνων ἐπειρῶντο σῶζειν τὰ φαινόμενα, περὶ μέντοι τὸ τοῦ παντὸς κέντρον πάσας λέγοντες κινεῖσθαι τὰς σφαίρας· τῶν δὲ ἀπογείων καὶ περιγείων καὶ τῶν δοκούντων προποδισμῶν καὶ ὑποδισμῶν<sup>7</sup> καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσι φαινομένων ἀνωμαλίων τὰς αἰτίας οὐκ ἰσχύοντες κατ' ἐκείνας τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀποδιδόναι, διάτοι τοῦτο, οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἰππαρχον καὶ εἴτις περὶ τοῦτον, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ Πτολεμαῖος τὰς ἐκείνου σφαίρας καὶ τοὺς ἐπικύκλους ὑπέθετο διὰ τούτων· τὸ μὲν περὶ τὸ τοῦ παντὸς κέντρον, πάντα κινεῖσθαι τὰ οὐράνια παραδιδόντες· τῶν δὲ εἰρημένων πρότερον τὰς αἰτίας τὰς ὑπ' ἐκείνων παραλειφθείσας οὗτοι κατ' αὐτὰς τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀποδιδόντες.

Fol. 19 s. Ὁ νεαρὸς ἡμῖν οὗτος κόραξ· μᾶλλον δὲ “κολοῖος ἄκραντα γαρνόμενος Διὸς πρὸς ὄρνιχα θεῖον” κατὰ τὸν μεγαλορρήμονα Πίνδαρον· καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἐνταῦθα τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει ρηθέντα παρεκδυνόμενος πρῶτην μὲν ἐνστασιν ἐπαγει τὴν τοῦ Ξενάρχου τρίτην ὑποβαλλόμενος.

Fol. 23 r. Καὶ τοῦ Ἐξάρχου δὲ ἐνισταμένου.

Fol. 30 r. Ὁ τοίνυν θειότατος Πλάτων ζῶντα πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ θεάμενος, καὶ ἔφεςιν τῶν οἰκείων ἀγαθῶν ἔχοντα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ῥοπήν ἐπὶ τὰς οἰκείας ὁλότητας ἦτοι τὰ χρήσιμα τῶν πλησιαζόντων αὐτοῖς αὐτοφυῆ σώματα καὶ οὐ κατὰ προαίρεσιν γινόμενα, ὁμοίως οἶδε καὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐπὶ οἰκείᾳ ἐφετὰ φερόμενα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο βαρεῖν ἕκαστον πρὸς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ φησὶν, βαρεῖν γὰρ ὅπου ῥέπειν φαμέν.

Fol. 30 s. Καὶ πῇ καλῶς ἂν ἡγοῖτο λέγειν· οὕτως ὁ

<sup>5</sup> r. with the New Coll. MS. τῇ ἀχλύι.

<sup>6</sup> In the margin ὅτι τῷ ποικίλῳ τῆς συμπλοκῆς δεινὸς Ἀριστοτέλης συνεσκίασεν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

<sup>7</sup> Should be ὑποποδισμῶν.



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ἀποδέχεσθαι μᾶλλον δοκεῖ. ἔδει δ' ὡς οἶμαι καὶ πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ῥήματα ἀφορῶντα συνιέναι, ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν ἡ διαφορὰ.

Ibid. Τὶ τοίνυν αὐτῷ συνέβαλεν εἰς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ σκοπὸν ἡ τοιαύτη τῶν Θεμιστίου ῥημάτων πρόθεσις συμφώνως τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει νομίζοντος τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ καθ' ὅλον καὶ κατὰ μέρη ἀπὸ πάσης ῥοπῆς ἐλεύθερον εἶναι.

Fol. 20 a. Ὁ δὲ Πλάτων πάντα μὲν τὸν κόσμον ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων συνεστάναι φησὶ, τὸ μὲν ὄρατὸν ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς ἔχοντα, τὸ δὲ ἀπτόν ἐκ τῆς γῆς, τῶν δὲ μέσων γενομένων στοιχείων εἰς σύναψιν ἀρμονικὴν τῶν ἐσχάτων.

Fol. 26 a. Καλῶς γὰρ φησι καὶ Μελίσσος, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τρισμυριοστῷ χρόνῳ ἀλλοιούμενον, κατ' οὐσίαν δηλονότι ἀπολοῖτ' ἂν ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ χρόνῳ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἀλλοιουῖσθαι λέγοι τις τὰ οὐράνια ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, οὐ κατὰ πάθος φαίη ἂν γίγνεσθαι τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν ταύτην, ἀλλὰ τελειοτικὴν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀλλοιουῖσθαι λέγοιτ' ἂν ἐνθουσιῶσα.

Fol. 27 a. Ἴσω δὲ νῦν τὴν ἀπάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπόληψιν τοῦ εἶναι θεοὺς παρήγαγεν εἰς μαρτύριον, ὅτι πάντες ἄνθρωποι οἵτινες ἡγοῦνται θεοὺς εἶναι, διὰ τοὺς Ἰππῶνας καὶ Διαγόρας, καὶ εἶπον εἰσὶ τινες ἐν τόποις ἡμῖν ἀγνωστοῖς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον κακοδαίμονες.

Fol. 31 a. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ Παρμενίδης, πρῶτος ὧν ἴσμεν φήμη, τὸν λόγον τοῦτον ἐρωτήσας ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι περὶ τοῦ τὸ ὄν εἶναι, ἀγέννητον ἔγραψε τοῦτο· οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ὄντος δυνατὸν ἂν γενέσθαι αὐτὸ, ἦν γὰρ καὶ πρότερον· οὐτ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ῥηθείη οὐδὲ νοηθείη ποτέ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ῥητὸν οὐδὲ νοητὸν τὸ πάντῃ μὴ ὄν.

Fol. 32 a. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ παρ' Ἰουδαίοις προφήτης Δαυΐδος περὶ οὐρανοῦ λέγων, “ἐν τῷ ἡλίῳ” φησὶν “ἔθετο σκὴνῳμα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ χρόνου τινὰ τοῦτον ἐνοικεῖν οἶεται δημοῖ λέγων, “ὁ θεμελιῶν τὴν γῆν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν αὐτῆς· οὐ κλιθήσεται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος.”



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Πλάτων τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω μὴ κυρίως ἐπὶ τοῦ παντός λέγεσθαι νομίζων. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ κοῦφον ἐπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ βαρὺ, παρητήσατο, καὶ ὁ Θεμιστίος καίτοιγε ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις τὸν Περίπατον προισχόμενος, ἐν τούτῳ τοῖς Πλάτωνος ἀρέσκεσθαι δοκεῖ μάλλον· ἐχρὴν δὲ οἶμαι καὶ πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ῥήματα ἀποβλέποντα ἐννοεῖν ὡς οὐ περὶ πραγμάτων ἀλλὰ περὶ ὀνομάτων ἐστὶν ἐν τούτοις ἢ τῶν φιλοσόφων διαφορά.

Fol. 31 r. Ἔτι οὖν τοῦτο συνετέλεσε πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον σκοπὸν ἢ διωλύγιος τοῦ Θεμιστίου παράθεσις ἀνδρὸς συμφώνως τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ καθ' ὅλον καὶ τὰ μέρη πάσης ῥοπῆς ἐξηρῆσθαι νομίζοντος.

Fol. 37 r. Ὁ δὲ γε Πλάτων πάντα μὲν τὸν κόσμον ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων συνεστάναι φησί. τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς ἔχοντα τὸ δὲ ἀπτόν ἐκ τῆς γῆς· τῶν δὲ μέσων στοιχείων εἰς ἐναρμόνιον σύνθεσιν<sup>8</sup> τῶν ἄκρων γεγεννημένον.

Fol. 49 r. Καλῶς γὰρ καὶ ὁ Μέλισσος ὅτι τὸ τρισμυρίοις ἔτεσιν ἑτεροῖον γινόμενον<sup>9</sup> κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δηλονότι ὀλοῖτο<sup>10</sup> ἂν ἐν τῷ παρόντι χρόνῳ· ὥστε εἰ καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι λέγει τίς τὰ οὐράνια ὑπ' ἄλληλα μὴ κατὰ πάθος γίνεσθαι λεγέτω τὴν αλλοίωσιν ταύτην· ἀλλὰ τελεσιουργὸν ὡς καὶ ψυχὴ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι λέγοιτο ἐνθεάζουσα.

Fol. 50 s. Μήποτε δὲ νῦν περὶ τοῦ εἶναι θεοὺς ὑπόληψιν μαρτύρεται πάντων ἀνθρώπων· ὅτι πάντες ἄνθρωποι ὅσοι νομίζουσιν εἶναι θεοὺς, διὰ τε τοὺς Ἰππωνας, Διαγόρας καὶ εἶπον τινὲς ἂν ἀγνώστοις ἡμῖν τόποις εἰσὶ τοῦτο δυστυχοῦντες.

Fol. 51 s. Καὶ γὰρ Παρμενίδης ὁ πρῶτος ὧν ἀκοῇ ἴσμεν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι περὶ τοῦ ἀγέννητον εἶναι τὸ ὄν τὰδε γέγραφε

——— τίνα γὰρ γεννὰν διζήσεαι αὐτοῦ

Πῇ πόθεν αὐξηθὲν· οὔτε ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἐάσω<sup>11</sup>

Φράσθαι ἂ οὐδὲ νοεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητὸν

Ἔστιν ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν.

Fol. 60 s. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ παρὰ Ἰουδαίοις προφήτης Δαὶδ περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ λέγων· “ἐν τῷ ἡλίῳ” φησὶν “ἔθετο τὸ

δεσιν

<sup>8</sup> MS. σύνθε.

<sup>9</sup> MS. ἑτεροῖο γινόμενον.

<sup>10</sup> MS. ολεῖται οἱ ολεῖτο.

<sup>11</sup> MS. ἐάσεω.



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Fol. 32 b. Ταῦτα δὴ μακρότερα ἐξέθηκα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχοντα τὸν ἔλεγχον ὥσπερ οἱ τὸν ἀνάρμοστον κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν περιφέρουσιν Ἡρακλῇ.

Fol. 33 b. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ ὄνοι φησὶ Διογένης κατ' εὐθείαν ἅμα τροφήν λαμβάνουσι καὶ ποτόν.

Fol. 35 b. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πάλιν ὕς ἔγρυξε κατὰ τὸν μελωδὸν Ἀλκαῖον.

Fol. 38 b. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἐν τῷ εἰστάς κατηγορίας ὑπομνήματι ἔγραφε ταῦτα. Ὑπάρχει μὲν οὖν ταῖς οὐσίαις τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς εἶναι ἐναντίον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐναντία ὑφ' ἐν αἰὲν γένος τέτακται. ἡ δὲ οὐσία οὐδὲν ἔχει ἐπαναβεβηκὸς γένος ὑφ' ὃ τέτακται. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐναντία σχέσιν ἔχει πρὸς ἀλλήλα. ἡ δὲ οὐσία ἄνευ σχέσεώς ἐστιν. καὶ οὐ χρήζει τῆς κατ' ἐναντίωσιν σχέσεως. ἔτι τὰ μὲν ἐναντία ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἀπονεύει. ἡ δ' οὐσία καθ' αὐτὴν ὥριται. ἔτι δ' αὐτὸς καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς τῶν πρώτων καὶ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν δείκνυσι μηδὲν εἶναι αὐτῇ ἐναντίων. καὶ μετ' ὀλίγα ἔγραφε ταῦτα. ἠπόρησαν δέ τινες πῶς τὸ λογικὸν ζῶον τῷ ἀλόγῳ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐναντίον. ἡμεῖς δ' ἐροῦμεν. ὥς μὲν ἄλλως διαφοραὶ τὴν ἐνυπάρχουσαν διαφορὰν τῶν ἐναντίων ἔξουσιν. ὅλον δὲ ὅλω οὐκ ἐστὶ ἐναντίον. λόγος δὲ καὶ τοῦδε τοιοῦτος. τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν ἐναντίων αὐτὸ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐναντίον. εἰ γὰρ ἐπικρατηθεῖ ὑφ' ἐνὸς τῶν ἐναντίων, οὐκ ἂν δυιηθεῖ ἐπιτηδεύως πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν θατέρου παρασκευασθῆναι. ὥσπερ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ ἄτομοι οὐσῖαι καὶ αἱ δεύτεραι οὐσῖαι. εἴπερ ἐπιδέχονται τὰ ἐναντία. οὐκ ἐστὶ αὐτὰ ἐναντία. ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰ διαιρεθεῖ τι εἰς τὰ ἐναντία, ὥσπερ τὸ ζῶον οὐκ ἐστὶ τι ἐναντίον. εἰ δεόντως περιέχει τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων διαίρεσιν. οὐ δὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστὶ ἐναντίον. γνώμη δ' ἂν τις αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων. πλείστον γὰρ δήπου κεχωρισμένα εἶναι ταῦτα ἀλλήλων διορίζεται. ὥς δὲ νῦν λέγεται περὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ζώου συνυπάρχει. ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸ πῦρ τῷ ὕδατι. τῇ δὲ γῇ τὸν ἀέρα ἐναντία φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης κατὰ τὰς εἰδοποιούσας διαφοράς. ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ἡ οὐσία οὐκ εἰσὶ. τὸ μὲν οὖν ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ὑπάρχει. αἱ δὲ οὐσῖαι



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σκήνωμα αὐτοῦ·” καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς πρὸς<sup>12</sup> χρόνον τινὰ αὐτὸν εἰσοικισθῆναι νομίζει δηλοῖ λέγων· “ὁ θεμελιώσας τὴν γῆν πρὸς τὸ μὴ κλισθῆναι εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τῶν αἰώνων.”

Fol. 61 r. Ταῦτα μακρότερα παρεθέμην ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχοντα τὸν ἔλεγχον ὡς οἱ τὸν ἄτοπον Ἐυρυκλέα περιφέροντες κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν.<sup>13</sup>

Fol. 63 s. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ ὄνοι<sup>14</sup> φησὶ Διογένης κατὰ τὰς εὐθείας ἐπὶ τὴν τροφήν ἀπίασι καὶ τὴν πόσιν.

Fol. 67 r. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ πάλιν ὅς<sup>15</sup> παρορίνει κατὰ τὸν μελοποιὸν Ἀλκαῖον.

Fol. 72 s. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἐν τῷ εἰς τὰς κατηγορίας ὑπομνήματι τάδε γέγραφεν· “Ὑπάρχει μὲν οὖν ταῖς οὐσίαις τὸ μηδὲν ἐναντίον εἶναι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐναντία ὑφ’ ἐν γένος αἰεὶ ὑποτάττεται ἢ δὲ οὐσία οὐδὲν ἔχει ἀνώτερον γένος ἐν, ὑφ’ ὃ ταχθήσεται· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐναντίαν σχέσιν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἢ δὲ οὐσία ἄσχετος<sup>16</sup> ἐστί· καὶ οὐ προσδεῖται τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἐναντίωσιν σχέσεως· ἔτι τὰ μὲν ἐναντία πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπονεύει. ἢ δὲ οὐσία καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ὥριστα· αὐτὸς γε μὴν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς τῶν πρώτων καὶ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν, τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐναντίον αὐτῇ κατασκευάζει.” καὶ μετ’ ὀλίγα τάδε γέγραφεν· “Ἀποροῦσι δὲ τινες πῶς τὸ λογικὸν ζῶον τῷ ἀλόγῳ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐναντίον· ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐροῦμεν· ὡς μὲν τινὶ διαφορᾷ τὴν ἐνυπάρχουσαν διαφορὰν, ἐναντίον· τὸ δὲ ὅλον τῷ ὅλῳ οὐκ ἐστὶ ἐναντίον· λόγος δὲ τούτου τοῦ ὄντος· τὸ ἐπιδεχόμενον τὰ ἐναντία, οὐκ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ἐναντίον· εἰ γὰρ κατέχοιτο ὑφ’ ἐνὸς τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἐτέρου καταδοχὴν ἐπιτηδεύως κατασκευάσθαι· οἷον ψυχὴν, σῶμα, αἱ ἄτομοι<sup>17</sup> οὐσίαι, καὶ δεύτεραι οὐσίαι, εἴπερ ἐπιδέχοιντο τὰναντία, οὐκ ἐστὶ αὐτὰ ἐναντία ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ εἰ διαιροῖτο τὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ὥσπερ τὸ ζῶον, οὐδὲ οὕτως ἐστὶ ἐναντίον εἰ κοινῶς γε περιέχει τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων διαίρεσιν, ὥστε οὐ δὲ τούτων ἐστὶ ἐναντίον. Γνοίη δὲ ἂν τις καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅρου τῶν ἐναντίων τοῦτο· πλείστον γὰρ κεχωρίσθαι αὐτὰ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων ἀφορίζόμεθα· ὡς δὲ νῦν λέγεται περὶ τὴν

<sup>12</sup> MS. πρὸ.<sup>13</sup> Plat. Soph. p. 252. ὥσπερ τὸν ἄτοπον Εὐρυκλέα περιφέροντες αἰεὶ πορεύονται. Cf. Walz Arsen. Violet. p. 245—6.<sup>14</sup> MS. οἶνοι.<sup>15</sup> MS. ἴς.<sup>16</sup> MS. ἄσχητος.<sup>17</sup> Cod. ἄτομαι.



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πρὸς ὅλας τὰς οὐσίας οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐναντιώσεις. κ' αν τῇ αὐτῇ  
 ὕλῃ συνυπάρχουσιν.

Fol. 46 a. Διὰ γὰρ ταύτην οἱ μὲν ἓνα καὶ πεπερασμένον  
 ἔλεγον τὸν κόσμον ὅσοι οὐκ ἐδέχοντο τὸ ἄπειρον ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ  
 ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Πλάτων οἱ δὲ ἓνα ἄπειρον. ὡς Ἀναξιμένης  
 αἶρα ἄπειρον τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι λέγων· οἱ δὲ καὶ τῷ πλήθει  
 ἀπείρους κόσμους· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀναξίμανδρος ἄπειρον τῷ μεγέθει  
 τὴν ἀρχὴν τιθεῖς, ἄπειρον οὕτω καὶ τὸν κόσμον ἔλεγεν. οἱ  
 δὲ περὶ Δημόκριτον ἀπείρους τῷ πλήθει τιθέντες τὰς ἀρχάς,  
 ἀπείρους τῷ πλήθει καὶ τοὺς κόσμους ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κένῳ, ἐξ  
 ἀπείρων τῷ πλήθει ἀτόμων συνίστασθαι φασι. καὶ εἴη ἂν  
 λέγων ἀρχὴν πασῶν τῶν ἐναντιώσεων ὑποθέσθαι τι ἄπειρον  
 ἢ μὴ ὑποθέσθαι, ὅτι τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐναντιώσεις  
 πάσας συνέχει. καὶ ἔτι διὰ ταύτην τὴν διαφωνίαν, οἱ  
 μὲν ἀναιροῦσι γένεσιν, διακρίσει ὑφίσταναι λέγοντες πάντα,  
 ὡς Ἀναξαγόρας· οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἐνὸς τὰ πάντα φασι γίνεσθαι,  
 κατὰ ἔκκρισιν, ὡς Ἀναξίμανδρος καὶ Ἀναξιμένης. οἱ δὲ γένεσιν  
 εἶναι φασι. καὶ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσιν ποιοῦσιν, τὴν θατέρου  
 γένεσιν θατέρου φθορὰν ὀρῶντες. ὡς οἱ πεπερασμένας τὰς  
 ἀρχάς λέγοντες· τὸ δὲ δοκοῦν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς μικρὸν παρόραμα,  
 προιοῦσι χιλιοπλάσιον δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐξ ὑπαγωγῆς ἔδειξε καὶ  
 ἐκ λόγου. ἐξ ὑπαγωγῆς μὲν ὅτι Δημόκριτος ἢ ὅστισιν  
 ἀρχάς ὑπέθηκε μικρά τινα ὑποτιθέντες ἀρχάς, καὶ ἐλάχιστα  
 μεγέθη, διὰ τὸ μεγίστην δύναμιν ἔχειν ὡς ἀρχάς, πλημμε-  
 λούντες περὶ ταύτας, τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ ἐκίνησαν·  
 δηλονότι τὸ τὰ μεγέθη διαίρετα ἐπ' ἄπειρον εἶναι. διὸ καὶ  
 τὴν δοθεῖσαν εὐθείαν εἰς δυὸ δυνατόν τέμνειν· καὶ χαριέντως  
 ἐλάχιστον παρόραμα ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ ἐλάχιστον μέγεθος  
 ὑποθέσει, διὰ τὸ ἔχειν ὡς ἀρχὴν μεγίστην δύναμιν, ὡς τῶν  
 μεγίστων ἀμαρτημάτων γεόμενον αἴτιον δείκνυσι.

Fol. 56 b. Δείξας ὅτι οὐδὲν σῶμα φυσικὸν ἀπλοῦν καὶ  
 συνεχές, ὅποιά ἐστι τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἄπειρον. οἷόν τε εἶναι, δεί-  
 κνυσιν ἐπομένως ὅτι οὐδ' ὡς τὰ διωρισμένα ἄπειρα τῷ πλήθει  
 οἷόν τε εἶναι τὰ κύκλῳ σώματα, ὡς οἱ περὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ



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αὐτὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ζώου συννύπαρχει· ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸ πῦρ τῷ ὕδατι καὶ τὸν ἀέρα τῇ γῇ ἐναντία λέγει ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης κατὰ τὰς εἰδοποιούς· δηλονότι διαφορὰς φήσομεν αἱ τινες οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐσίαι· τὸ μὲν οὖν ψυχρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ὑπάρχει αἱ δὲ ὅλαι οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰς ὅλας οὐσίας οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐναντιώσεις ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς συνεφεστήκασιν.

Fol. 89 r. Οἱ μὲν ἓνα κόσμον πεπερασμένον ἔλεγον ὅσοι μὴ ἐδέχοντο τὸ ἄπειρον ἐν ἀρχῇ ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Πλάτων· οἱ δὲ ἓν ἄπειρον ὡς Ἀναξίμενης ἀέρα ἄπειρον τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι λέγει· Οἱ δὲ τῷ πλήθει ἀπείρους κόσμους ὡς Ἀναξίμανδρος μὲν ἄπειρον τῷ μεγέθει τὴν ἀρχὴν θέμενος ἀπείρους ἐξ αὐτοῦ τῷ πλήθει κόσμους ποιεῖν<sup>18</sup> δοκεῖ. Λεύκιππος δὲ καὶ Δημόκριτος ἀπείρους τῷ πλήθει τοὺς κόσμους ἐν ἀπείρῳ τῷ κενῷ καὶ ἐξ ἀπείρων τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἀτόμων συνίστασθαι φησί· καὶ εἴη ἂν λέγειν ἀρχὴν πασῶν τῶν ἐναντιώσεων τὸ ὑποθέσθαι τὸ ἄπειρον ἢ μὴ ὑποθέσθαι· ὅτι οἱ κόσμοι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐναντιώσεις πάσας περιέχουσι· καὶ μέντοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν διαφωνίαν οἱ μὲν ἀναιροῦσι τὴν γένεσιν ἐν κρίσει πάντα ὑφίστασθαι λέγοντες· ὥσπερ Ἀναξαγόρας· οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα γίνεσθαι λέγουσιν<sup>19</sup> καθ' εὐθείαν ὡς Ἀναξίμανδρος καὶ Ἀναξίμενης· οἱ δὲ καὶ γένεσιν εἶναι λέγουσι καὶ ἐξ ἀλλήλων τὴν γένεσιν ποιοῦσι τὴν ἄλλου φθοράν, ἄλλου γένεσιν ὁρῶντες ὡς οἱ πεπερασμένοι τὰς ἀρχὰς λέγοντες· ὅτι δὲ πάλιν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ἐλάχιστον δοκοῦν παρόραμα προϊοῦσι μυριοπλάσιον<sup>20</sup> φαίνεται· καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς ἐπιστώσατο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου· ἐκ μὲν τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς, ὅτι Δημόκριτος ἢ ὅστις ἂν οὕτως ὑπόθοιτο μικρὰ τινὰ ὑποθέμενος τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ ἐλάχιστα μεγέθη διὰ τὸ μεγίστην δύναμιν ὡς ἀρχὰς ἔχειν, ἀμαρτύνοντες περὶ αὐτὰ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν γεωμετρίας ἐκίνησαν· τότε ἐπ' ἄπειρον εἶναι τὰ μεγέθη διαιρετὰ· διὸ καὶ τὴν δοθεῖσαν εὐθείαν δίχα τέμνειν δυνατόν· καὶ χαριέντως τὸ ἐλάχιστον παρόραμα ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἐλάχιστον μέγεθος ὑποθέσεως διὰ τὸ μεγίστην δύναμιν ὡς ἀρχὴν ἔχειν· ὡς μεγίστων αἴτιον ἀμαρτημάτων γινόμενον ἔδειξαν.

Fol. 106 r. Δείξας οὖν ὅτι οὐδὲν σῶμα φυσικὸν ἀπλοῦν συνεχές οἷα περ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐστὶν ἄπειρον εἶναι δυνατόν, δείκ-

<sup>18</sup> MS. ποιεῖ.<sup>19</sup> MS. λέγει.<sup>20</sup> MS. μυριοπλάσιον.



ED. VENET.

Λεύκιππον ὑπετίθεντο οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ γενόμενοι, καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν Ἐπίκουρος. ἔλεγον γὰρ αὐτοὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπείρους εἶναι τῷ πλήθει, ἅτινα καὶ ἀτόμους καὶ ἀδιαίρετα ὦντο καὶ ἀπαθῆ, διὰ τὸ στερεὰ καὶ ἀμερῇ εἶναι ἐν τῷ κενῷ, καὶ κατὰ τὸ κενὸν εἰσδύμενα, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἔλεγον γίνεσθαι. τὰς δὲ ἀτόμους ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κενῷ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων κεχωρισμένας καὶ διαφερουσης σχήματι καὶ μεγέθει καὶ θέσει καὶ τάξει, φέρεσθαι ἐν τῷ κενῷ καὶ συλλαμβανομένας ἀλλήλαις συμπιλεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἀνόμοιον ὅπως ἂν ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι. συνιζάνειν δὲ ταύτας ἀλλήλαις κατὰ τὴν τῶν μεγεθῶν καὶ σχημάτων καὶ θέσεων καὶ τάξεων συμμετρίαν, καὶ ταύτη συμβαίνειν τὴν τῶν συνθέτων γένεσιν τελειοῦσθαι.

Fol. 63 a. Ἀρκεῖ δὲ ἀφθόνως καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος παιδευτῆς Ἀμμώνιος ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ βυβλίῳ τούτῳ δεικνύς, ὅτι οὐ μόνον τελικὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιητικὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ κόσμου ἔγνω τὸν θεὸν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης.

Fol. 69 a. Τὸ κοινὸν τῆς ἀντιθέσεως τῶν προτέρων λέγων, ἐπάγει τὴν διαφορὰν· περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ γενητὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον πάντας συμφωνεῖν φησι τούσ τε θεολόγους καὶ τοὺς φυσικοὺς· καὶ τῶν λεγόντων ἔτι γενητὸν αὐτὸν οἱ μὲν αἰδιόον φασιν ὡς Ὀρφεὺς καὶ Ἡσίοδος καὶ μετ' αὐτοὺς Πλάτων· ὡς φησιν Ἀλέξανδρος, οἱ δὲ τῶν γενητον λεγόντων καὶ φθαρτὸν φασι. διπλῶς δὲ τοῦτο· οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὕτω γθαρτὸν, ὡς ὅτισιν ἄλλο τῶν συνεστώτων ἀτόμων· ὥσπερ Σωκράτῃ φθαρτὸν δηλοῇ καὶ οὐκετι ἐπανήκοντα· οἷδ' ἀμοιβαδὸν γένεσθαι τε καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ αὖθις φθείρεσθαι φασιν. καὶ αἱ δὼν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην διαδοχὴν· καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φιλίαν καὶ νεῖκος λεγὼν ἐκ μέρους κρατοῦντα, τὴν μὲν συγκρίνειν πάντα εἰς ἓν καὶ φθείρειν τὸν τοῦ νείκους κόσμον, καὶ ποιεῖν ἐξ αὐτοῦ σφαῖρον· τὸ δὲ νεῖκος διακρίνειν αὖθις τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ ποιεῖν τοιοῦτον κόσμον. Ταῦτα δ' Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δηλοῖ λέγων· ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλία συνέρχεσθαι εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα. ἄλλοτε δ' αὖθις καθ' αὐτὰ ἕκαστα φέρεσθαι τῇ τοῦ νείκεος ἔχθρᾳ τῆς μὲν αὖθις εἰσιούσης ἐνὸς πλείῳ ἀποτελείται. οὕτω δὴ τοι γίνεται καὶ οὐκ ἐμποδίζεται αὐτῶν ἡ αἰδιότης. ταύτης δ' αὖ μεταλλαχθείσης κύκλῳ· οὐδέποτε πάνονται οὕτω δ' αεὶ γίνονται ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον. καὶ ὁ Ἡρά-



Cod. C. C. C.

νυσιν ἐφεξῆς ὅτι οὐδὲ εὗρισμένα ἄπειρα τῷ πλήθει δυνατόν εἶναι τὰ στοιχειώδη σώματα, ὡς οἱ περὶ Λεύκιππον καὶ Δημόκριτον ὑποτίθεντο πρὸ αὐτοῦ γεγονότες, καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν Ἐπίκουρος· οὗτοι γὰρ ἔλεγον ἀπείρους εἶναι τῷ πλήθει τὰς ἀρχὰς· ἅς καὶ ἀτόμους καὶ ἀδιαιρέτους ἐνόμιζον καὶ ἀπαθεῖς· διὰ τὸ ναστὰς εἶναι καὶ ἀμοίρους τοῦ κενοῦ· τὴν γὰρ διαίρεσιν κατὰ τὸ κενὸν τὸ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἔλεγον γίνεσθαι ταύτας δὲ τὰς ἀτόμους ἐν ἀπείρῳ τῷ κενῷ κεχωρισμένας ἀλλήλων καὶ διαφερούσας σχήμασι καὶ μεγέθεσι, καὶ θέσει καὶ τάξει φέρεσθαι ἐν τῷ κενῷ καὶ ἐπικαταλαμβανούσας ἀλλήλας συγκρούεσθαι, καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀποπαλλεσθαι ὅποι ἂν τύχωσιν, τὰς δὲ, περιπλέκεσθαι ἀλλήλαις κατὰ τὴν σχημάτων καὶ μεγεθῶν καὶ θέσεων καὶ τάξεων συμμετρίαν· συμβαίνειν καὶ οὕτω τὴν τῶν θέσεων γένεσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι.

Fol. 129 s. Ἀρκεῖ δὲ ἱκανῶς καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος καθηγεμῶν Ἀμμώνιος ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ βυβλίῳ δεικνὺς ὅτι οὐ τελικὸν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιητικὸν οἶδε τοῦ κόσμου τὸν θεὸν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης.

Fol. 128 s. Τὸ κοινὸν τῆς τῶν προτέρων δόξης εἰπὼν οὕτως ἐπάγει τὴν διαφορὰν· καὶ γὰρ περὶ μὲν τὸ γεγονέναι τὸν κόσμον πάντας ὁμογνωμόνας φησὶ τούστε θεολόγους καὶ τοὺς φυσικοὺς· τῶν δὲ γεγονέναι λεγόντων αὐτὸν οἱ μὲν αἰδίων λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ Ὀρφεὺς καὶ Ἡσίοδος καὶ μετ' αὐτοὺς ὁ Πλάτων ὡς φησὶν Ἀλέξανδρος· τινὲς τῶν γενητὸν λεγόντων καὶ φθαρτὸν λέγουσι· διχῶς δὲ τοῦτο· οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὕτω φθαρτὸν ὥσπερ ὅτιοῦν ἄλλο τῶν συνισταμένων ἀτόμων· οἷον Σωκράτης φθειρόμενον ἅπαντα αὐτὸν καὶ πάλιν φθείρεσθαι λέγει· καὶ αἰδίων εἶναι τὴν τοιαυτὴν διοδοχὴν· ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὴν φιλίαν λέγει καὶ τὸ νεῖκος παρὰ μέρος ἐπικρατοῦντα· τὴν μὲν συνάγει τὰ πάντα εἰς ἓν καὶ φθείρειν τὸν τοῦ νεῖκος κόσμον, καὶ ποιεῖν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸν σφαῖρον· τὸ δὲ νεῖκος διακρίνειν πάλιν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ ποιεῖν τὸν κόσμον· ταῦτα δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς σημαίνει λέγων

Ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότῃτι συνερχόμενον εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα

Ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχα ἕκαστα φορούμενα νεῖκος ἔχθαι

Ἡ δὲ πάλιν διαφύντος ἐνὸς πλέον ἐκτελέθουσιν

ΓιγνONTαίτε καὶ οὐ σφισιν ἔμποδος αἰὼν·

Ἡ δὲ διαλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμοῦ λήγει· ποτὲ μὲν ἐκπυροῦσθαι λέγει τὸν κόσμον· ποτὲ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ



ED. VENET.

κλειτος δὲ πότε μὲν ἐξάπτεσθαι φησι τὸν κόσμον· ποτὲ δὲ ἐκ πυρὸς αὐθις συνίστασθαι αὐτὸν κατὰ τινας περιόδους χρόνων. ἐν οἷς φησι μέτρα ἀνάπτων καὶ μέτρα οβεννύς· ταύτης δὲ τῆς δόξης ὕστερον ἐγένοντο οἱ Στωικοὶ· ἀλλ' οὐ τοι μὲν ἐάσθων· ὅτι δὲ οἱ θεολόγοι οὐχ ὡς ἀπὸ χρονικῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπὸ μόνης ποιητικῆς φασὶ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ ταύτην μυθικῶς ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δῆλον· ὁ δ' Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὅτι δύο κόσμους συνίστησι τὸν μὲν ἡνωμένον καὶ νοητὸν, τὸν δὲ διακεκριμένον καὶ αἰσθητὸν, καὶ ὅτι καὶ τούτῳ τῷ κόσμῳ τὴν ἔνωσιν ὁρᾷ καὶ τὴν διάκρισιν, ἐν ἄλλοις ὡς οἶμαι μετρίως ἐκ τῶν ῥημάτων αὐτοῦ δέδεικται· ὁ γὰρ λέγων ὡς δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως καὶ ταῦτα ἔγραψεν. τὸν κόσμον τοῦτον οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε τις ἀνθρώπων· ἐποίησεν ἀλλ' ἦν αἰεὶ.

B. II. Fol. 91. Ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν ὁ περὶ τοῦ Ἀτλαντος μῦθος οὐδεμίαν ὠρισμένην ἀναγκὴν ἐπάγει, καὶ ὅτι οἱ συστήσαντες αὐτὸν ἔδοκοῦν καὶ αὐτοὶ νομίζουσιν βάρος γήϊνον τὰ οὐράνια ἔχειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χρήζειν ἀνάγκης τινος ἐμψύχου ἐπικρατούσης αὐτὰ δῆλον· εἰ τοίνυν δέδεικται μήτε βαρύτητα μήτε κουφότητα ἔχοντα τὰ οὐράνια δηλόνοτι παρέλκων ἂν εἴη ὁ μῦθος ὁ διὰ τὴν τοῦ βάρους πεπλασμένος· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πλάσμα ἀνθρώπινον τὸ κατὰ τὸν Ἀτλαντὰ ἐστίν, ἐκ τῆς τοῦ βάρους ὑπονοίας πλασθὲν ἐξήλεγκται κατὰ ἀλήθειαν παρέλκων ἐκ τοῦ μήτε βαρύτητα μήτε κουφότητα τοῖς οὐρανίοις ἀποδεδείχθαι· εἰ δὲ μῦθος ὢν θεῖόν τι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀποκρύπτει καὶ σοφὸν, λεγέσθω ὅτι ὁ μὲν Ἀτλας εἷς ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὸς τῶν περὶ Διόνυσον ταρταρίων εἰρημένων· οἱ διὰ τὸ μὴ τελείως προσέχειν αὐτῷ, τουτέστι μὴ κατὰ μόνην τὴν ταρτάρειαν σύγκρισιν ἐνεργεῖν περὶ τὴν Διονυσιακὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλ' ἐπικλίνειν ὅπως οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὴν διῶον συνοχὴν, ἄμφω τὰς ιδιότητας ἐνεργοῦσι· καὶ οὗτος δὴ εἷς ὢν αὐτῶν κατ' ἄμφω ταῦτα ἐνεργεῖ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα μέρη τοῦ κόσμου, διακρίνων μὲν καὶ ἀνέχων τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ὡς μὴ συγχέοιτο τὰ ἄνω τοῖς κάτω.

Fol. 91 b. Καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὸν Ἰξίονα μῦθος φησὶν ἐπιθέσθαι τοῖς τῆς Ἥρας γάμοις τὸν Ἰξίονα· νεφέλην δὲ μεμορφωμένην καθ' αὐτὴν πλησιασαι αὐτῷ· μιχθέντος δὲ αὐτοῦ τῇ νεφέλῃ γεννηθῆναι τὸν Κένταυρον· Ζεὺς δὲ γνούς περὶ



Cod. C. C. C.

πυρὸς συνίστασθαι πάλιν αὐτὸν· κατὰ τινὰς χρόνων περιόδους· ἐν οἷς φησὶ μέτρια ἀπτομένος καὶ μέτρια συνήμενος· ταύτης δὲ τῆς δόξης ὕστερον ἐγένοντο καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ· ἀλλ' οὗτοι μὲν ἐάσθωσαν· ὅτι δὲ οἱ θεολόγοι οὐχ ὡς ἀπὸ χρονικῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπὸ αἰτίας ποιητικῆς λέγουσι τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μυθικῶς ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πρόδηλον· Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ ὅτι δύο κόσμους ἐνδείκνυται τὸν μὲν ἡνωμένον καὶ τὸν νοητὸν· τὸν δὲ διακεκριμένον καὶ αἰσθητὸν· καὶ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κόσμῳ τὴν ἔνωσιν ὁρᾷ καὶ τὴν διάκρισιν ἐν ἄλλοις οἷμαι μετρίως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν δεδειχέναι ῥημάτων· καὶ Ἡράκλειτος δὲ δι' αἰνιγμάτων τὴν ἐαυτοῦ σοφίαν ἐκφέρων, οὐ ταῦτα ἅπερ δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς σημαίνει· ὁ γοῦν ἐκεῖνα εἶπε περὶ γενέσεως ὡς δοκεῖ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τάδε γέγραφε·

Κόσμον τὸν δε οὔτέ τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν  
Ἄλλ' ἦν αἰεί.

<sup>21</sup> B. II. Fol. 159 s. Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν περὶ τοῦ Ἄτλαντος καὶ ὅτι μῦθος οὐδεμίαν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἀναγκὴν εἰσάγει· καὶ ὅτι οἱ συστήσαντες αὐτὸν ἐώκεσαν καὶ αὐτοὶ νομίζειν βάρος ἔχειν γενηρὸν<sup>22</sup> τὰ οὐράνια καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖσθαι τινος ἀνάγκης ἐμψύχου τῆς ἀνεχούσης αὐτὰ· εἰτοί νῦν δέδεικται μήτε βάρος ἔχοντα μήτε κουφότητα τὰ οὐράνια δῆλον ὅτι παρέλκων ὁ μῦθος ἂν εἴη διὰ τὴν τοῦ βάρους ὑποψίαν πλασθεῖς· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πλάσμα τι ἀνθρώπινον τὸ κατὰ τὸν Ἄτλαντα τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ βάρους ὑποψίας πλασθὲν, εἰλήλεκται τῷ ὄντι περιττὸν ἐκ τοῦ μήτε βάρος μήτε κουφότητα τοῖς οὐρανίοις ὑπάρχοντα ἀποδεδεῖχθαι· εἰ δὲ μῦθον ὄντως ἐστὶ θεῖον τί κρύπτει ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ σοφὸν, λεγέσθω ὅτι Ἄτλας εἰς μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὸς τῶν περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον Τιτάνων ὃς διὰ τὸ μὴ τελείως ἐξαμαρτεῖν εἰς αὐτὸν τουτέστι μὴ κατὰ τὴν Τιτανικὴν μόνην διάκρισιν ἐνεργῆσαι περὶ τὴν Διονυσιακὴν δημιουργίαν, ἀλλ' ἀποκλίνειν πῶς καὶ πρὸς τὴν δῖον συνοχὴν κατ' ἄμφω τὰς ιδιότητας· ἐνεργεῖ περὶ τὰς μεγίστας τοῦ κόσμου μερίδας· διακρίνων μὲν καὶ ἀνέχων τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ὡς μὴ ἐπισυγχεῖσθαι τὰ ἄνω τοῖς κάτω.

Fol. 160 s. Καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὸν Ἰξίονα μῦθος ἐπιθέσθαι λέγει τῷ γάμῳ τῆς Ἥρας τὸν Ἰξίονα· τὴν δὲ νεφέλην μορ

<sup>21</sup> The preface and a small portion of the 2d B. is wanting in the C. C. MS.

<sup>22</sup> MS. δεηρὸν.



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τῆς Ἡρας τῷ τροχῷ προσέδρησε τὸν Ἰξίονα ὥστε ἀπαύστως ἐπ' αὐτοῦ φερέσθαι· ἴσως δὲ σημαίνοι ἂν ὁ μῦθος ἐπιθέσθαι μὲν πολιτικῇ καὶ βασιλικῇ τινι προνοίᾳ τὸν Ἰξίονα· ἡρωϊκὸν δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος· ἀνάξιον δὲ φανέντα καθ' ὁμοίωσιν τῷ τῆς Ἡρας εἰδώλῳ τινὶ ὑλικῷ καὶ ἀμαυρῷ τῆς τοιαύτης βασιλείας περιπεσεῖν· ὅπερ ἡ νεφέλη ἐμφαίνει ἀὴρ ὑπάρχουσα ἀμαυρός τε καὶ ὑλικώτερος· τούτῳ δὲ συμπεπλέχεται μὲν τὰ βαρύτατα τὴν φύσιν εἶη τῶν λογικῶν καὶ ἀλόγων ἐνεργειῶν· προσδέδεται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν πᾶσι διανεμόντος δημιουργοῦ θεοῦ τῷ τῆς μοίρας τροχῷ καὶ τῆς γενέσεως· ὃν ἀδύνατον μεταλλάξαι κατ' Ὀρφέα τὸν μὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐλεήσαντας οἷς ἔταξεν ὁ Ζεὺς ἀλιταίνουσι ποικιλεσθαι καὶ ἐγκαλινδεῖσθαι τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας ψυχάς.

Fol. 97 a. Καὶ Νικόλαος δὲ ὁ Περιπατητικὸς παράφρασιν ποιούμενος τῶν ἐνταῦθα λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους λεγομένοις ἔθηκε τὴν ἔννοιαν διατὶ οὐν οὐχ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος τοιοῦτος· ὅτι ἀνάγκη μένειν τι περὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ κύκλῳ φερομένου, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τοιοῦτο σῶμα οὔτε μένειν ἐδύνατο οὔτε περὶ τὸ μέσον εἶναι.

Fol. 105 a. Ἐκ τοῦ ἐκ διαιρέσεως εἰληφθαι τὴν δεῖξιν καὶ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὁ Ἀφροδισιεὺς Ἀλέξανδρος προσεσχηκέναι· τὴν γὰρ προτέραν ἐξήγησιν δηλονότι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖά ἐστιν ἢ εἰς ἀπείρον ἄνεσις ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀναλαμβάνον τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ πρῶτου κινούντος, καὶ ἀνακτώμενον τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος παρ' Ἑρμίνου φησὶν ἀκηκόεσθαι ὥσπερ ἦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Ἀσπασίου ῥήμασι γεγραμμένον.

Fol. 106 b. Ὑπάρχειν μὲν τινὰς ἐναντίας ποιότητας ἐχούσας πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἐναντίωσιν κατὰ τὸ χρῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος ἴσως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα, καὶ γὰρ εὐθύγραμμα σχήματα ἔστι ἐν τοῖς οὐρανίοις σχηματισμοῖς οἷον τρίγωνα καὶ περιφερῆ, οἷον ὁ στέφανος, ὑπάρχειν μὲν οὐν ταύτας τὰς ἐναντιότητας ἐκεῖ χωρὶς τινος δυσχερείας καὶ φθαρτικοῦ πάθους ἀποδέξαιτ' ἂν τις Ἀλεξάνδρου.



Cod. C. C. C.

φωσασαν ἀνθ' ἑαυτῆς αὐτῷ προτείνει· μιχθέντος δὲ αὐτοῦ τῇ νεφέλῃ γεννηθῆναι τὸν Κένταυρον· γνόντα δὲ τὸν Δία περὶ τῆς Ἥρας τροχῷ τὸν Ἰξίονα ἐνδῆσαι ὥστε ἀπαύστως ὑπ' αὐτοῦ φέρεσθαι· τάχα δὲ ἂν σημαῖνοι ὁ μῦθος ἐπιθέσθαι μὲν πολιτικῇ καὶ βασιλικῇ τινὶ προνοίᾳ τὸν Ἰξίονα· ἡρώϊον δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος· ἀνάξιον δὲ διαφανέντα κατὰ δίκην τῆς Ἥρας εἰδῶλω τινὶ ἐνύλῳ καὶ τεθολωμένῳ τῆς τοιαύτης προστασίας περιπεσεῖν· ὅπερ ἡ νεφέλη δηλοῖ ἀήρ οὐσα θολώδης καὶ ὑλικώτερος· τούτῳ οὖν συμπλακέντα τῷ εἶδει γεννηῖναι μὲν σύμφυρσιν λογικῆς τε καὶ ἀλόγων ἐνέργειαν· ἐνδεθῆναι δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν πᾶσιν ἀφορίζοντας δημιουργοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ τῆς εἰμαρμένης τε καὶ γεννέσεως τροχῷ οὐπερ ἀδύνατον ἀπαλλαγῆναι κατὰ τὸν Ὀρφέα· “μὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐκείνους ἰλεωσάμενον οἷς ἐπέταξεν ὁ Ζεὺς κύκλου τ' ἀλλάξαι καὶ ἀμψύξαι κακότητος τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας ψυχάς.”

Fol. 173 r. Καὶ Νικόλαος δὲ ὁ Περιπατητικὸς παραφράζων τὰ ἐνταῦθα λεγόμενα ἐν τοῖς περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους φιλοσοφίας οὕτω τέθεικε τὴν λέξιν· “διάτι οὖν οὐχ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος τοιοῦτος; ὅτι ἀνάγκη μένειν τὶ περὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ κύκλου φερομένου· τὸ δὲ πέμπτον σῶμα οὔτε μένειν ἡδύνατο οὔτε ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι.”

Fol. 191 s. Καὶ ἔοικε τούτῳ τῷ ἐκ διαιρέσεως εἰληφθαι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὁ Αἰσχυρίνης Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπιστῆσαι· τὴν γοῦν προηγουμένην ἐξήγησιν τοῦ ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι τὴν ἐπ' ἀπείρον ἄνεσιν διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ ἀναληψόμενον τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ πρώτου κινούντος καὶ διορθῶσον τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ὡς Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Αἰγαίου<sup>23</sup> παρατίθεται. Ἑρμίνου δὲ φησιν ἤκουσα καθὰ ἦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἀσπασίου φερόμενον.

Fol. 194 s. Τὸ μὲν ὑπάρχειν τινὰς ἐν τοῖς οὐρανίοις ποιοτήτας ἐχούσας πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἐναντιώσιν κατὰ τε χρῶμα καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος, ἴσως δὲ καὶ κατὰ σχῆμα· καὶ γὰρ εὐθύγραμμα σχήματα ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανίοις σχηματισμοῖς ὡς τὸ δελτωτὸν καὶ ἐπιφερόγραμμα<sup>24</sup> ὡς ὁ στέφανος· τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς ἐναντιώσεις ἐκεῖ χωρὶς θνητῆς δυσχερείας καὶ φθοροποιοῦ πάθους ἀποδεξαιτο ἂν τις τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου.

<sup>23</sup> Alexander Ægeus. See Fabr. B. G. t. II. p. 273.

<sup>24</sup> γ. περιφερόγραμμα.



ED. VENET.

Fol. 113 a. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος διδάσκαλος Ἀμμώνιος ἐμοῦ παρόντος ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ παρατηρήσας διὰ σωματικοῦ ἀστρολάβου τὸν ἀστέρα ἀρκτοῦρον, εὔρεν πρὸς τὴν κατὰ Πτολεμαῖον ἐποχὴν αὐτοῦ τοσοῦτον πλεόν κινηθέντα, ὅσον ἔδει κατὰ ἑκατὸν ἐνιαυτοὺς μίαν μοῖραν συγκινηθῆναι.

Fol. 114 b. Ἡ δὲ ἀποδοθεῖσα αἰτία τοῦ μὴ ἀκούειν ἡμᾶς, λέγουσα διὰ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ ἔθος θαυμάζω εἰ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις συγχωρηθεῖη, διηγουμένοις τὸν Πυθαγόραν ἀκηκοέναι ποτὲ τοιαύτην ἁρμονίαν, καὶ τοι κακείνῳ σύντροφα ἦν ταῦτα, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις· ἴσως οὖν κατὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν φιλοσοφίαν λυτέον τὴν ἐνστασιν λέγοντας, ὅτι οὐ πάντα ἐστὶν ἀλλήλοις σύμμετρα· οὐδὲ πᾶν παντὶ αἰσθητὸν, οὐδὲ παρ' ἡμῖν· ἐμφαίνουσι δὲ οἱ κύνες ὁσφραινόμενοι τὰ ζῶα μακρόθεν, ἅτινα οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ὁσφραίνονται· πόσῳ δὴ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῶν τοσοῦτον τῇ φύσει ἀφισταμένων, ὅσον τὰ ἀφθάρτα τῶν φθαρτῶν καὶ τὰ οὐράνια τῶν γήινων, ἀληθὲς λέγειν ὅτι ὁ τῶν θείων σωμάτων ἦχος ταῖς γήϊναις ἀκοαῖς οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀκουστός, εἰ δέ τις καὶ τοῦτο τὸ γήϊνον σῶμα ἐξηρημένον καὶ τὸ αὐγοειδὲς αὐτοῦ οὐράνιον καθέδραν, καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ αἰσθήσεις κεκαθαρμένας ἔχει, ἥτοι δι' ἀγαθὸν κλῆρον, ἢ διὰ βίου καλοκαγαθίας, ἢ δι' ἱερατικὴν τελείωσιν, οὗτος ἂν ἴδοι τὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀόρατα, καὶ ἀκούσαι τὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνήκουστα· οἷος λέγεται Πυθαγόρας· τῶν δὲ θείων καὶ αὐλῶν σωμάτων εἰ γένοιτό τις ἦχος, οὐτὲ πληκτικὸς οὐτ' ἀναιρετικὸς γίνεται ἀλλὰ τῶν γενητικῶν ἤχων διεγείρει τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὴν σύστοιχον αἰσθησιν τελειοῖ· καὶ ἀναλογίαν μὲν τινα ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἦχον τὸν συντρέχοντα τῇ κινήσει τῶν γήινων σωμάτων, ἐνέργεια δὲ τίς ἐστὶν ἢ τῆς κινήσεως ἐκείνων τοῦ ἀπαθοῦς ψόφου ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν γενόμενος, διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀέρος ἡχητικὴν φύσιν· εἰ τοίνυν ἐκεῖ ἀῆρ παθητικὸς οὐκ ἐστὶ, δηλονότι οὐδ' ἂν ἦχος εἴη· ἀλλ' εἰκοιεν ὁ Πυθαγόρας οὕτω λέγειν τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἐκείνην ἀκηκοέναι ὡς καὶ τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἁρμονικὰς ἀναλογίας νοῶν, καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀκουστὸν ἀκούειν ἔλεγεν.

Fol. 119 a. Καὶ πρῶτος Ἑλλήνων Εὐδόξος ὁ Κνίδιος ὡς Εὐδήμος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῆς ἀστρολογικῆς ἱστορίας ὑπεμνημάτισεν καὶ Σωσιγένης ἀπὸ Εὐδήμου τοῦτο λαβὼν λέγεται ἀφασθαι τῶν τοιούτων ὑποθέσεων τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὡς φησι



Cod. C. C. C.

Fol. 209 s. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος καθηγεμὼν Ἀμώνιος ἐμοῦ παρόντος ἐν τῇ Ἀλεξάνδρου τηρήσας διὰ τοῦ στερεοῦ ἀστρολάβου τὸν ἀρκτοῦρον εὔρε πρὸς τὴν κατὰ Πτολεμαῖον ἀποχὴν αὐτοῦ τοσοῦτον ἐπικινηθέντα ὅσον ἐχρῆν κατὰ ἑκατὸν ἔτη μίαν μοῖραν ἀντικινούμενον.

Fol. 214 r. Ἡ μὲν τοι τοῦ μὴ ἀκούειν ἡμᾶς ἀποδοθεῖσα αἰτία ἢ διὰ συντροφίαν καὶ συνήθειαν λέγουσα, θαυμάζω εἰ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ἐπιτρέπει· τὸν Πυθαγόραν ἱστοροῦσιν ἀκοῦσαί ποτε τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρμονίας· καίτοι καὶ ἐκείνῳ σύντροφος ἦν ὥσπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις· μήποτε οὖν κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνδρῶν φιλοσοφίαν λυτέον τὴν ἔνστασιν, λέγοντας ὅτι οὐ πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶ σύμμετρα· οὐδὲ παντὶ αἰσθητὸν οὐδὲ παρ' ἡμῖν· δηλοῦσι δὲ οἱ κύνες ὁσφραϊνόμενοι τῶν ζώων πόρρωθεν· οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ὁσφραίνονται· πόσω δὴ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῶν τοσοῦτον τῇ φύσει διεστηκότων ὅσον τὰ ἀφθαρτα τῶν φθαρτῶν καὶ τὰ οὐράνια τῶν ἐπιγείων· ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ὁ τῶν θείων σωμάτων ἦχος ταῖς ἐπικήροις ἀκοαῖς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀκουστός· εἰ δέ τις καὶ τοῦτο τὸ σωμα τὸ ἐπίκηρον ἐξηρτημένος τὸ αὐτοειδὲς αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐράνιον ὄχημα καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ αἰσθήσεις κεκαθαρμένας σχοίῃ, ἢ δι' εὐμοίριαν, ἢ δι' εὐζωίαν, ἢ πρὸς τούτοις δι' ὁρατικὴν τελεσιουργίαν, οὗτος ἂν ἴδοι τὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀόρατα· καὶ ἀκούσοι τῶν<sup>25</sup> τοῖς ἄλλοις μὴ ἀκουομένων· ὥσπερ ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἱστορεῖται· θείων τὲ καὶ αὐλῶν σωμάτων καὶ εἰ γένοιτό τις ψόφος οὔτε πληκτικὸς οὔτε ἀποκναίων γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν τε γενεσιουργῶν ἤχων διεγείρει τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας· καὶ τὴν σύστοιχον αἰσθησιν τελειοῖ· καὶ ἀνάλογον μὲν ἔχει τινὰ πρὸς τὸν ψόφον τὸν συνεδρεύοντα τῇ κινήσει τῶν ἐπικέρων σωμάτων· ἐνέργεια δὲ τίς ἐστὶν τῆς ἐκείνων κινήσεως ἀπαθὲς τοῦ ψόφου παρ' ἡμῖν γινομένου διὰ τὴν ἡχητὴν τοῦ αἵματος φύσιν· εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖ ἀπὸ παθητικὸς οὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ ψόφος ἂν εἴη· ἀλλ' εἴκειν ὁ Πυθαγόρας οὕτω λέγεσθαι τῆς ἀρμονίας ἐκείνης ἀκούειν ὥσει καὶ τοῖς ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἀρμονικοῦς λόγους ἐννοῶν· καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀκουστὸν ἀκούειν ἔλεγε τῆς ἀρμονίας·

Fol. 223 s. Καὶ πρῶτος τῶν Ἑλλήνων Εὐδόξος ὁ Κνίδιος ὡς Εὐδημός τε ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῆς ἀστρολογίας ἱστορίας



ED. VENET.

Σωσιγένης πρόβλημα τοῦτο ποιούντος τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζουσι, τίνων ὑποτεθεισῶν ὁμαλῶν καὶ τεταγμένων κινήσεων, σώζονται ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς κινήσεις τῶν πλανήτων φαινόμενα; εἰ τοίνυν ὑποθέσεις εἰσὶ πλείους καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν πλανωμένων, τοῦ πλείους ὑπάρχειν τοῖς σώμασι πλείοσιν οὖσι κινήσεις, καὶ οὐ κατ' ἀλήθειαν οὕτως ὑπάρχουσαι δείκνυνται, ὥς σημαίνει τὸ ἄλλον ἄλλως αὐτὰς ὑποτίθεσθαι τίς ἢ ἀνάγκη ὥς κατ' ἀλήθειαν πλειόνων ὑπαρχόντων σωμάτων περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν πλανωμένων καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πλειόνων κινήσεων, οὕτω τὸ αἴτιον ζητεῖν, διατὶ οἱ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἀπλανοῦς πλάνητες πλείους φέρονται φοράς ἢ οἱ ἔσχατοι; ἴσως δὲ εἰ δεῖ τολμᾶν ὅλως ἡμᾶς τοιαύτας ποιεῖν συγκρίσεις, οὐ πρὸς τὰς τῶν τόπων διαφοράς τὰ ἀξιώματα αὐτῶν διορίσασθαι ἀνάγκη· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ φάναι ἕκαστον τετάχθαι ἐνθα προσῆκον ἦν τῷ παντί. τῶν οὖν ὑπὸ σελήνην οὐχ ἔχόντων οἰκείον φῶς ἀλλ' ἔξωθεν φωτιζομένων, εἰκότως φαίη ἂν τις, ὅτι τὰ δύο τοῦ κόσμου φῶτα ὑπὲρ αὐτὸν προσεχῶς τεταγμένα ἐστὶ, τὴν ἀπλότητα ἴσως τῶν κινήσεων κατὰ τὸ ἄμεινον τοῦ συνθέτου ἔχοντα.

Fol. 120 a. Λέγει τοίνυν ὅτι ἡ σφαῖρα ἢ τὸ ἄστρον ἔχουσα τὸ πλανᾶσθαι λεγόμενον, ἐν πολλαῖς σφαίραις ἀνελιττούσαις καλουμέναις, ἢ ὥς ὁ Θεόφραστος αὐτὰς καλεῖ δηλονότι ἡστρωμένας, ἐνδεδεμένη φέρεται.

Fol. 120 a. Εἴρηται δὴ πρότερον ὅτι ὁ Πλάτων ταῖς οὐρανίαις κινήσεσι τὸ κυκλοτερές καὶ ὁμαλὸν καὶ τεταγμένον ἀδιαλείπτως ἀποδιδούς, πρόβλημα τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς προὔφηνεν· τίνων ὑποτεθέντων δι' ὁμαλῶν καὶ κυκλοτερῶν καὶ τεταγμένων κινήσεων, δύναται σώζεσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς πλανωμένας φαινόμενα; καὶ ὅτι πρῶτος Εὐδόξος ὁ Κνίδιος ἐνέπεσεν εἰς τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς δι' ἀνελιττουσῶν καλουμένας σφαιρῶν. Κάλλιπος δὲ ὁ Κυζικηνὸς παρὰ Πολύναρχον<sup>26</sup> τὸν τοῦ Εὐδόξου γνώριμον πεφοιτηκῶς, μετ' ἐκείνον Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος, Ἀριστοτέλει συνδιέτριψε, τὰ ὑπ' Εὐδόξου εὑρεθέντα μετ' Ἀριστοτέλους διορθῶν καὶ ἀναπληρῶν. Ἀριστοτέλει γὰρ νομίζοντι δεῖν πάντα τὰ οὐράνια περὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ καθόλου κινεῖσθαι ἤρεσεν ἢ ὑπόθεσις τῶν ἀνελιττουσῶν

<sup>26</sup> Fabricius had corrected this in his Index to Simplicius.



Cod. C. C. C.

ἀπεμνημόνευσε καὶ Σωσιγένης παρ' Εὐδήμου τοῦτο λαβὼν, ἄψασθαι λέγεται τῶν τοιούτων ὑποθέσεων· Πλάτωνος ὡς φησὶ Σωσιγένης πρόβλημα τοῦτο ποιησαμένου τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα ἐσπουδακόσι· τίνων ὑποτεθεισῶν ὁμαλῶν καὶ τεταγμένων κινήσεων διεσώθη<sup>27</sup> τὰ περὶ τὰς κινήσεις τῶν πλανωμένων φαινόμενα· εἰ οὖν ὑποθέσεις εἰσὶν αἱ πλείονες καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν πλανωμένων πλειόνων οὔσαι σωμάτων κινήσεις καὶ οὐχ ὡς κατὰ ἀλήθειαν οὕτως ἔχουσαι ἀποδείκνυνται· ὡς δηλοῖ τὸ ἄλλον ἄλλως αὐτὰς ὑποθέσθαι· τίς ἀνάγκη· ὡς κατ' ἀλήθειαν πλειόνων ὄντων τῶν σωμάτων περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀπλανῶν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πλειόνων κινήσεων οὕτως αἰτίαν ζητεῖν· διὰ τὶ οἱ προσεχεῖς τῇ ἀπλανεῖ πλάνητες πλείονας φέρονται φοράς τῶν ἐσχάτων· μήποτε δὲ εἰ χρὴ τολμᾶν ὅλως ἡμᾶς τοιαύτας ποιεῖσθαι συγκρίσεις, οὐ πρὸς τῶν τόπων διαφορὰν τὰς ἀξίας αὐτῶν ἀφορίζειν ἀνάγκη· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ λέγειν ἕκαστον τετάχθαι ἔνθα λυσιτελεῖ τῷ παντί. τῶν οὖν ὑπὸ σελήνην μὴ ἔχόντων οἰκεῖον φῶς ἀλλ' ἔξωθεν φωτιζομένων, εἰκότως φαίη ἂν τις ὅτι οἱ δύο τοῦ κόσμου φωστῆρες ὑπὲρ αὐτὰ προσεχῶς ἐτάχθησαν· τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἴσως τῶν κινήσεων κατὰ τὸ κρεῖττον ἔχοντες τοῦ συνθέτου.

Fol. 225 r. Λέγει οὖν ὅτι ἡ σφαῖρα ἡ τὸ ἐν ἄστρον ἔχουσα, τὸ πλανᾶσθαι λεγόμενον, ἐν πολλαῖς σφαῖραις ταῖς ἀνελιττούσαις καλουμέναις· ἢ ὡς ὁ Θεόφραστος αὐτὰς καλεῖται ἀνάστροις ἐνδεδέμενη φέρεται.

Fol. 226 r. Καὶ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον ὅτι ὁ Πλάτων τοῖς οὐρανίαις κινήσεσι τὸ ἐγκύκλιον καὶ ὁμαλὲς καὶ τεταγμένον ἀνενδοιάστως ἀποδιδούς πρόβλημα τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς προτεῖνε· τίνων ὑποτεθέντων δι' ὁμαλῶν καὶ ἐγκυκλίων καὶ τεταγμένων κινήσεων δυνήσεται διασωθῆναι τὰ περὶ τοὺς πλανωμένους φαινόμενα. καὶ ὅτι πρῶτος Εὐδόξος ὁ Κνίδιος ἐπέβαλε ταῖς διὰ τῶν ἀνελιττούσων καλουμένων σφαιρῶν ὑποθέσεσι· Κάλλιππος δὲ ὁ Κυζικηνὸς Πολεμάρχῳ συσχολάσας τῷ Εὐδόξῳ γνωρίμῳ καὶ μετ' ἐκείνον εἰς Ἀθήνας ἐλθὼν, τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει συγκατεβίω· τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Εὐδόξου εὑρεθέντα σὺν τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει διορθούμενος τε καὶ προσαναπληρῶν. τῷ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλει νομίζοντι δεῖν τὰ οὐράνια πάντα περὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ παντὸς κινεῖσθαι ἤρκεσεν ἡ τῶν



ED. VENET.

ὑποτιθεμένη ὁμοκέντρους τῷ παντὶ τὰς ἀνελιπτούσας οὐκ ἐκκέντρους. ὥσπερ ὕστερον. τῷ τοίνυν Εὐδόξῳ καὶ τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐδόκει ὁ ἥλιος τρεῖς κινεῖσθαι κινήσεις, τὴν τε δηλονότι τῆς ἀπλανοῦς σφαίρας κίνησιν ἀπ' ἀνατολῶν ἐπὶ δυσμὰς περιηγόμενος καὶ αὐτὸς ἐξ ἐναντίας διὰ τῶν δώδεκα ζωδίων κινούμενος, καὶ τρίτην τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ διὰ μέσου τῶν ζωδίων ἐπὶ τὰ πλευρὰ ἀπόρροϊαν.

Fol. 121 a. Οὕτε δὲ τὸ τοῦ Καλλίππου εὔρηται τὸ βυβλίον· ὅπερ φαίη ἂν τὸ αἴτιον τῆς προσθέσεως τῶν σφαιρῶν, οὐθ' ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης αὐτὴν προσέθηκεν· ὁ δὲ Εὐδημος διὰ βραχέων αὐτὸν λέγειν, ὅτι εἶπερ οἱ μεταξὺ τῶν τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἰσημερίων χρόνοι τοσοῦτον διαφέρουσιν ὅσον τῷ Ἀλμαίῳ<sup>28</sup> καὶ τῷ Μέμνονι<sup>29</sup> ἐδόκει, οὐκ ἐξαρκούσιν αἱ τρεῖς σφαῖραι ἑκατέρω πρὸς τὸ σώζειν τὰ φαινόμενα, διὰ τὴν φαινομένην δηλονότι ἀνωμαλίαν ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν ἐκείνων.

Fol. 122 b. Ὡν τινὰ καὶ Κάλλιππος ὁ Κυζικηνὸς ἐπειράθη σώζειν, τοῦ Εὐδόξου μὴ δυνηθέντος εἶπερ ἴσως ἔσωσεν· ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τῇ ὄψει φανερόν, οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν μέχρις Αὐτολύκου τοῦ Πυθναίου ἐπέθετο διὰ τῶν ὑποθέσεων δεῖξαι· καίτοι οὐδ' αὐτὸς Αὐτόλυκος ἐδυνήθη· φανερά δ' αὐτοῦ ἡ διαφορὰ πρὸς Ἀριστόθεον.

Fol. 124 b. Καὶ οὕτω μὲν αὐτὸς τὰ τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἐξέλαβεν· οἱ δὲ γνησιέστερον αὐτῶν μετασχόντες, τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ φασί, τὴν δημιουργικὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ὅλην τὴν γῆν τρέφουσιν, καὶ τὸ ψυχόμενον αὐτῆς ἀνεγείρουσιν. δι' ὃ οἱ μὲν Ζηνὸς πύργον αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν· ὡς αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς Πυθαγορείσις διηγήσατο· οἱ δὲ Διὸς φυλακὴν, ὡς ἐν τούτοις· οἱ δὲ Διὸς θρόνον, ὡς ἄλλοι φασίν, ἄντρον δὲ τὴν γῆν ἔλεγον, ὡς ὄργανον καὶ αὐτὴν τοῦ χρόνου, ἡμερῶν γὰρ ἐστὶν αὕτη καὶ νυκτῶν αἰτία· ἡμέραν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον μέρος φωτιζόμενον, νύκτα δὲ τὸ πρὸς τὸν κῶνον τῆς σκιάς τῆς γινομένης ὑπ' αὐτῆς· ἀντίχθονα δὲ τὴν σελήνην ἐκάλουν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ αἰθέριον γῆν, καὶ ὡς ἐπιπροσθουσιν τῷ ἡλιακῷ φωτί· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἴδιον τῆς γῆς, καὶ ὡς ὀρίζουσιν τὰ οὐράνια, ὥσπερ ἡ γῆ τὰ ὑπὸ σελήνην.

<sup>28</sup> Fabr. thought this should be Ἀλκμαίῳ.<sup>29</sup> Corr. by Fabr. rightly.



Cod. C. C. C.

ἀνελιπτουσῶν ὑπόθεσις ὡς ὁμοκέντρους ὥσπερ οἱ ὕστερον<sup>30</sup>. Εὐδόξω τοίνυν καὶ τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ τρεῖς ὁ ἥλιος ἐδόκει κινεῖσθαι κινήσεις· τῇ τε τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖρα, ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν ἐπὶ δυσμὰς συμπεριαγόμενος· καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν ἐναντίαν διὰ τῶν δώδεκα ζωδίων φερόμενος· καὶ τρίτον ἐπὶ τοῦ διὰ μέσων τῶν ζωδίων εἰς τὰ πλάγια παρεκτρεπόμενος.

Fol. 228 r. Οὔτε δὲ Καλίππου φέρεται σύγγραμμα τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν προσθετέων τούτων σφαιρῶν λέγον, οὔτε Ἀριστοτέλης αὐτὴν προσέθηκεν· Εὐδήμος δὲ συντόμως ιστόρησε, τούτων φαινομένων ἕνεκα, ταύτας προσθετέας εἶναι τὰς σφαῖρας ὥετο· λέγει γὰρ αὐτὸν φησὶν ὥσπερ οἱ μεταξὺ τροπῶν τε καὶ ἰσημεριῶν<sup>31</sup> χρόνοι τοσοῦτον διαφέρουσιν ὅσον Εὐκτήμωνι<sup>32</sup> καὶ Μέτωνι ἐδόκει· οὐχ ἱκανὰς εἶναι τὰς τρεῖς σφαῖρας ἑκατέρω πρὸς τὸ σῶζειν τὰ φαινόμενα διὰ τὴν ἐπιφαινομένην δηλονότι ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὐτῶν ἀνωμαλίαν.

Fol. 231 s. Ἐνια καὶ Κάλιππος ὁ Κυζικηνὸς Εὐδόξου μὴ δυνηθέντος ἐπειράθη διασῶσαι· εἶπερ ἄρα καὶ διέσωσεν ἀλλ' αὐτόγε τοῦτο ὅπερ καὶ τῇ ὄψει πρόδηλόν ἐστιν οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν μέχρι καὶ τοῦ Αὐτολύκου<sup>33</sup> τοῦ Πιταναίου ἐπεβάλετο διὰ τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἐπιδειῖξαι· καίτοι οὐδὲ αὐτὸς Αὐτόλυκος ἠδυνήθη· δηλοῖ δὲ ἡ πρὸς Ἀριστόθην<sup>34</sup> αὐτοῦ διαφορά.

Fol. 235 s. Καὶ οὕτω μὲν αὐτὸς τὰ τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἀπεδέξατο· οἱ δὲ γνησιώτερον αὐτῶν μετασχόντες πῦρ μὲν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ λέγουσι τὴν δὲ δημιουργικὴν ταύτην δύναμιν τὴν ἐκ μέσου πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ζωογονοῦσαν· καὶ τὸ ἀπέψυγμένον αὐτῆς ἀναθάλλουσιν· διὸ οἱ μὲν “Ζανὸς πύργον” αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν ὡς αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς Πυθαγορικοῖς ιστόρησεν· οἱ δὲ “Διὸς φυλακὴν,” ὡς ἐν τούτοις· οἱ δὲ “Διὸς θρόνον” ὡς ἄλλοι φασὶν· ἄστρον δὲ τὴν γῆν ἔλεγον ὡς ὄργανον καὶ αὐτὴν χρόνου· ἡμερῶν γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ νυκτῶν αἰτία· ἡμέραν μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ πρὸς τῷ ἡλίῳ μέρος καταλαμπομένη· νύκτα δὲ κατὰ τὸν κῶνον τῆς γινομένης ἀπ' αὐτῆς σκιᾶς· ἀντίχθονα δὲ τὴν σελήνην ἐκάλουν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι· ὥσπερ καὶ αἰθερίαν γῆν καὶ ὡς ἀντιφράττουσαν καὶ ἐπιπροσθοῦσαν τῷ ἡλιακῷ φωτί· ὅπερ ἴδιον γῆς· καὶ ὡς ἀποπερατοῦσαν τὰ οὐράνια· καθάπερ ἡ γῆ τὸ ὑπὸ σελήνην.

<sup>30</sup> ἐδόκουν is probably understood here.

<sup>31</sup> MS. ἰσημερρ.

<sup>32</sup> Euctemon, an Athenian astronomer, cotemporary of Meton, Fabr. B. Gr. t. II. p. 84.

<sup>33</sup> MS. αὐστολύκου.

<sup>34</sup> I find no account of this author.



ED. VENET.

Fol. 127 a. ἀγνόω δὲ τοῖς τοῦ Φιλοζένου ῥήμασι τοῖς περὶ τούτων οὐκ ἐντυχών.

Fol. 127 b. ὥσπερ πεπείραμαι καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ Βόρρα ποταμῷ.

We now come to the notable fragment of Empedocles preserved by Simplicius, which I shall exhibit from the Corpus MS. without comparing it with the paraphrase of the Venetian edition, as, that has been already done by Mons<sup>r</sup> Peyron, but I shall note by the way the various readings of the Turin MS. as they have been published by him; whence the reader may judge of the superiority of the Oxford text †.

Fol. 244 r. Καὶ τάχα οὐδὲν κωλύει παραθέσθαι τινα τῶν τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους ἐπῶν τοῦτο δηλοῦντα.

Αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ παλίνορσος ἐλάσομαι<sup>35</sup> εὐπόρον<sup>36</sup> ὕμνων  
τὸν πρότερον κατελέξα λόγῳ λόγον ἐξοχετεύων<sup>37</sup>  
κεῖνον· ἐπεὶ νεῖκος μὲν ἐνέρτατον ἵκετο βένθος  
δίνης<sup>38</sup>· ἐν δὲ μέσῃ φιλότης στροφάλιγγι γένηται  
ἐν τῇ δὲ<sup>39</sup>· τὰδε πάντα συνέρχεται ἐν μόνον εἶναι  
<sup>40</sup> τοῦ κάφαρ ἀλλὰ θέλημα συνεστάκεν· ἄλλοθεν ἄλλα  
τῶν δέ τε μισγομένων χεῖτ' ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν  
πολλὰ δ' ἄμικτ' ἔστηκε κερααμένοισιν ἐναλλάξ<sup>41</sup>  
ὅσσ' ἔτι νεῖκος ἔρυκε μετάρσιον οὐ γὰρ ἀμεμφέως  
πῶ πᾶν ἐξέστηκεν ἐπ' ἔσχατα τέρματα κύκλου.  
ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν<sup>42</sup> τ' ἐνέμιμνε μελέων τὰδ' ἐξεβεβήκει<sup>43</sup>

† These extracts were in the press before I had discovered that Dr Gaisford had already published the fragments of Empedocles and Parmenides quoted by Simplicius with the readings of the Corpus and N. Coll. MSS. in the Append. to the 1st Vol. of his Poet. Min. Gr. p. xli—xlvi. In one or two instances, especially in l. 6. I see that I have read the C. C. MS. differently from that eminent scholar.

<sup>35</sup> Tur. MS. p. 27. Peyr. ἐλεύσομαι.

<sup>36</sup> ἐς πόρον.

<sup>37</sup> ὑποχετεύων.

<sup>38</sup> δίνῃσιν δὲ μέσῃ.

<sup>39</sup> ἐν τῇ, ἢ δὲ.

<sup>40</sup> οὐκ ἄφορ' ἀλλ' ἐθέλημα συνιστάμεν' ἄλλοθεν ἄλλα. It is easy to see from the Corp. MS. that the true reading is οὐκ ἄφαρ. The New Coll. MS. reads οὐκ ἄφορα ἀλλὰ θέλημα συνιστάμεν.

<sup>41</sup> This and the two following verses are very corruptly given in the Turin MS.:

Πολλὰ δὲ ἅμα κατεστήκει κεραιζομένοισιν  
ἐλλάξ· ὅσσ' ἔτι νεῖκος ἔρυκε μετάρσιον· οὐ γὰρ  
ἀμφαφέως τὸ πᾶν ἐξέστηκεν ἐπ' ἔστατα κύκλου.

N. C. MS. ἐπ' ἔστατα τεύματα κύκλου, and above κεραιομενοῖσιν ἐναλλάξ.

<sup>42</sup> Tur. MS. τὸ τέν.

<sup>43</sup> ἐξεβεβλήκει.



Cod. C. C. C.

Fol. 240 s. ἀγνοῶ δὲ ἐγὼ τοῖς Ξενοφάνους ἔπεισι τοῖς  
περὶ τούτου μὴ ἐντυχῶν.

Fol. 242 r. ὡς ἐπειράθην καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ τὸν Βορὰν  
ποταμόν.<sup>44</sup>

ὅσον<sup>45</sup> δ' αἰὲν ὑπερπροθέσι<sup>46</sup> τόσον αἰὲν ἐπήει  
ἠπιόφρων<sup>47</sup> φιλότητος<sup>48</sup> ἀμεμφέος<sup>49</sup> ἄμβροτος ὁρμὴ  
αἶψα δὲ θνήτ'<sup>50</sup> ἐφύοντο τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ' εἶναι.  
ζωράτε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα διαλλέξαντα<sup>51</sup> κελεύθους.

\* \* \* \* \*

ἐξ ὧν ὄμματ' ἐπηξεν ἀτειρέα δι' Ἀφροδίτη.

\* \* \* \* \*

γόμφοις ἀσκήσασα καταστόργοις Ἀφροδίτη.

\* \* \* \* \*

Κύπριδος ἐν παλάμησιν ὅτε ζυμπρώτ'<sup>52</sup> ἐφύοντο.

\* \* \* \* \*

εἰ δ' ἔτι σοι<sup>53</sup> περὶ τῶνδε λιπόξυλος ἐπλετο πίστις  
πῶς ὕδατος, γαίης τε καὶ αἰθέρος ἠελίου τε  
κιρναμένων εἶδητὲ γενοίατο χροιάτε θνητῶν  
τοῖα ὅσα νῦν γεγάασι συναρμοσθέντ' Ἀφροδίτη.

\* \* \* \* \*

ὡς δὲ τότε χθόνα Κύπρις ἐπείτ' ἐδίνεν<sup>54</sup> ἐν ὄμβρῳ  
ἢ δὲ ἀποπνέουσα<sup>55</sup> θωδ'<sup>56</sup> πυρὶ δέδωκε<sup>57</sup> κρατύναι.

\* \* \* \* \*

τῶν δ' ὅσ'<sup>58</sup> ἔσω μὲν πυκνά, τάδ' ἐκτόθι μανὰ<sup>59</sup> πέπηγε  
Κύπριδος ἐν παλάμησι<sup>60</sup> πλάδης τοιῆςδε τυχόντα.

<sup>44</sup> οσσον.

<sup>45</sup> ὑπεκπροθέοι.

<sup>46</sup> The Borrus or Borrás is a river of Persia on the confines of India (Plin. vi. 25); but as it is very unlikely that Simplicius went so far into that country, I should propose reading Χαβοράν. The New College MS. seems to favor this conjecture, as it reads Ἀβοράν.

<sup>47</sup> ἠπιόφρων.

<sup>48</sup> φιλότης.

<sup>49</sup> ἀμφεῦσσον.

<sup>50</sup> δ' ἔθνεάτ' ἐφύοντο.

N. C. ἀμφεσσον.

<sup>51</sup> διαλλάξαντα.

<sup>52</sup> ζῦ πρωτ'.

N. C. ζύμπρωταις.

<sup>53</sup> εἰ δέ τισι.

<sup>54</sup> ἐδείκνυεν.

N. C. ἐδείκνυεν ἐν ὄμβρῳ.

<sup>55</sup> ἀποπνείουσα.

<sup>56</sup> θωῶ.

<sup>57</sup> δῶκε.

<sup>58</sup> ὅσσ'.

<sup>59</sup> ἔκτοθεν.

<sup>60</sup> παλάμησιν.



ED. VENET.

Fol. 136 b. Ὁ γὰρ Ἐρατοσθένης τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὑψηλοτάτων ὁρῶν πρὸς τὰ ὑφειμένα πίπτουσιν κάθετον δείκνυσι διὰ τῆς διόπτρας ἀναμετρήσας ἐκ τῶν ἀποστημάτων, ὑπάρχουσιν σταδίων δέκα.

B. III. Fol. 138 a. Τριχῇ διαιρουμένων τῶν περὶ γενέσεως δοξῶν, καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν παντάπασιν γενέσιν ἀφαιροῦνται, πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀγέννητα λέγοντες, διὰ τὸ τῶν γεννητῶν καὶ φθαρτῶν μὴ εἶναι γινώσιν, παραρρέόντων αὐτῶν, ὡς Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος ἐδόκουν λέγειν, οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτοις, ὡς Ἡσίοδος καὶ τὴν μάλιστα ἀρχὴν τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ γενέσθαι λέγων, πρῶτον μὲν Χάος ἐξεγένετο, οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν γινεσθαί φασιν, ἐν δὲ μόνον δηλονότι τὸ κοινὸν ὑποκείμενον ἀγέννητον εἶναί φασιν, ἀφ' οὗ τ' ἄλλα γίνεται ὥσπερ Ἡράκλειτος· οἱ δὲ οὐδὲν σῶμα ἀγέννητον εἶναί φασιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα γινεσθαι ἐξ ἐπιπέδων συντιθέμενα.

The Corpus MS. exhibits some various readings in the fragments of Parmenides which may be worth noticing.

Fol. 259 r. ———— χρεὼ δὲ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι  
εἰ<sup>61</sup> μὲν ἀληθείης, εὐκύκλεος<sup>62</sup> ἀτρεμές ἦτορ  
ἢ δὲ βροντῶν δόξαν<sup>63</sup>, τῆς<sup>64</sup> οὐκ ἐν πίστις ἀληθῆς  
ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεται ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα  
χρὴν δοκίμους εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περ ὄντα<sup>65</sup>.  
\* \* \* \* \*

ἐν τῷ σοι παύσω πιστὸν λόγον ἡδὲ νόημα  
ἀμφι ἀληθεῖς<sup>66</sup> δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας  
μανθάνε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων  
παραδοὺς δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν διακόσμησιν ἐπήγαγε πάλιν οὕτω.

Fol. 138 b. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Μέλισσος κεφαλαιωδέστερον γράφων σαφεστέρον ἔτι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ περὶ τούτων γνώμην ἀπεφώνησε δι' ὅλου τοῦ λόγου. οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις· εἰπὼν γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος, ὅτι ἐν καὶ ἀγέννητον

<sup>61</sup> Cod. Taur. ἦ.<sup>62</sup> Cod. T. εὐπείθεος.<sup>63</sup> Cod. T. ἢ δὲ βροτῶν δόξας.<sup>64</sup> Cod. T. ταῖς.<sup>65</sup> Cod. T. χρὴ δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περὶ ὄντα.<sup>66</sup> Cod. T. ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης.



Cod. C. C. C.

Fol. 255 s. Ὁ γὰρ Ἐρατοσθένης τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὑψηλοτάτων ὀρώων ἐπὶ τὰ χθαμαλώτερα πίπτουσιν κάθετον δείκνυσι διὰ τῶν ἐξ ἀποστημάτων μετρουσῶν διόπτρων σταδίων οὖσαν δέκα.

Fol. 258 r. Τετραχῇ διεΐλε τὰς περὶ γενέσεως δόξας· καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν τελέως τὴν γένεσιν ἀναιροῦσιν. πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀγέννητα λέγοντες· διὰ τὸ τῶν γενητῶν καὶ φθαρτῶν μὴ εἶναι γνῶσιν· αἰεὶ ρεόντων αὐτῶν, ὡς Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος ἐδόκουν λέγειν· οἱ δὲ ἀπεναντίας τούτων ὡς Ἡσίοδος, καὶ τὸ πρῶτιστον τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ γενέσθαι λέγων. ἐν δὲ μόνον τὸ κοινὸν ὑποκείμενον ἀγέννητον φασὶν ἐξ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα γίνεται, ὥσπερ Ἡράκλειτος· οἱ δὲ οὐδὲν ἀγέννητον σῶμα λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἐπιπέδων μέντοι συντιθέ-  
ενα.

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τὸ κατὰ δόξαν<sup>67</sup> ἔφν τάδε καὶ νῦν ἔασι<sup>68</sup>  
καὶ μετ' ἔπειτα πότε οὐδε τελευτήσουσι γράφοντες<sup>69</sup>  
τοῖς δ' ὄνομ' ἄνθρωποι κατέθεντο ἐπίσημον ἐκάστω<sup>70</sup>.

\* \* \* \* \*  
τῷ γένεσιν μὲν ἀπὲς βεσται καὶ ἄπαιστος ὄλεθρος<sup>71</sup>.  
\* \* \* \* \*

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πῶς γαῖα καὶ ἥλιος ἡδὲ σελήνη  
αἰθήρ τε ξυνὸς, γάλατ' οὐράνιον, καὶ Ὀλύμπιος  
ἔσχατος, ἡδ' ἄστρον θερμῶν<sup>72</sup> μένος ὠρμήθησαν  
γίνεσθαι.

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Fol. 259 r. Ἀλλὰ καὶ Μέλισσος ὡς καταλογάδην γράψας, σαφέστερον ἔτι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ περὶ τούτων γνώμην ἐξέφηνε· δι' ὅλου μὲν τοῦ λόγου, καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὲ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοῖς ῥητοῖς· εἰπὼν γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ὅτι ἐν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀγέννητον

<sup>67</sup> Cod. T. οὕτω τοι κ. δ.<sup>68</sup> Cod. T. νῦν τε ἔασι.<sup>69</sup> Cod. T. καὶ μετέπειτ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε τελευτήσουσι γραφέντα.<sup>70</sup> Cod. T. τοῖς δ' ὄνομ' ἄνθρωπος κατέθεντ' ἐκάστω ἐπίσημον.<sup>71</sup> Cod. T. ἄπυστος ὄλ.<sup>72</sup> Cod. T. θερμὸν.



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καὶ ἀκίνητον, καὶ κενῷ οὐδαμῇ ἐναπειλημμένον, ἀλλ' ὅλον ἐν  
 ἑαυτῷ ἐμπλεων, προστίθουσιν· μέγιστον μὲν οὖν σημείον οὗτος  
 ὁ λόγος ὅτι ἐν μόνον ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τάδε σημεία· εἰ  
 γὰρ ἦν πολλὰ τοιαῦτα, ἔδει καὶ αὐτὰ εἶναι ὁποῖον καὶ ἐγώ  
 φημι τὸ ἐν εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ ἦν γῆ, καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀήρ καὶ  
 σίδηρος καὶ χρυσὸς καὶ πῦρ, καὶ τὸ μὲν ζῶον τὸ δὲ θνητόν,  
 καὶ μέλαν καὶ λευκόν, καὶ τ' ἄλλα ὅσα φασὶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι  
 εἶναι ἀληθῆ, εἰ δὴ ταῦτά ἐστι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀληθῶς ὁρώμεν καὶ  
 ἀκούομεν, εἶναι δεῖ ἕκαστον τοιοῦτον, ὁποῖον πρῶτον ἐδόκει  
 ἡμῖν, καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν, μὴ δὲ γίνεσθαι ἕτερον· ἀλλ' αἰεὶ  
 εἶναι ἕκαστον ὁποῖόν περ ἐστὶ· νῦν δὲ φαμέν κρατεῖν, ὁρᾶν,  
 καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ νοεῖν. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡμῖν τὸ ψυχρὸν θερμὸν γί-  
 νεσθαι, καὶ τὸ θερμὸν ψυχρὸν· καὶ τὸ ἀδρὸν ἀπλόν, καὶ τὸ  
 ζῶον θνήσκειν καὶ οὐκ ἐκ ζῶντος γίνεσθαι· καὶ ταῦτα πάντα  
 ἀλλοιοῦσθαι καὶ ὅτι ἦν τε καὶ ὅτι νῦν οὐδὲν ὁμοῖον εἶναι  
 ἀλλ' ὁ σίδηρος στερεὸς ὑπάρχων, τῷ δακτύλῳ πιέζεται ἅμα  
 ῥέων καὶ ὁ χρυσὸς, καὶ ὁ λίθος καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἴσως δοκεῖ εἶναι  
 πᾶν. ὥστε συμβαίνει μήτε ὁρᾶν, μήτε τὰ ὄντα γινώσκειν ἐξ  
 ὕδατος εἰ γένοιτο γῆ καὶ λίθος· οὐκ οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀλλήλοις  
 συμφωνεῖ· τοῖς λέγουσι γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ καὶ αἰδία καὶ εἶδη  
 καὶ ἰσχὺν ἔχοντα πάντα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἡμῖν δοκεῖ, καὶ μεταλ-  
 λάττειν ὁσημέραι φαίνεται. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐωρᾶ-  
 μεν· οὐ δὲ ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολλὰ ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἂν  
 παρήλλαττον εἰ ἀληθῆ ἦν· ἀλλ' ἦν ἂν ὁποῖον ἐδόκει ἕκαστον  
 τοιοῦτο· τοῦ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι ὄντος οὐδὲν βέλτιον· τὸ δὲ πα-  
 ραλλάττον μέσον ὃν ὥχετο· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὃν γενητόν ἐστίν·  
 οὕτως εἰ πολλὰ ἦν ταῦτα ἔδει εἶναι ὁποῖόν περ τὸ ἐν.

Fol. 139 a. ὥς μὲν ὁ εὐλαβέστατος τῶν τοῦ Πλάτωνος  
 φίλων χαριέντως ἐπεσημήνατο, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς τοῦ Ἑκ-  
 τορος μάλιστ' ἂν ἐπεθύμει εἰς ὁμιλίαν ἀφικέσθαι.

C. C. MS. Fol. 273 r. καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησὶν ἐπὶ τῆς  
 φιλότητος λέγων

ἢ πολλαὶ μὲν κόρσαι ἀναύχενες ἐβλάστησαν

\* \* \* \* \*



Cod. C. C. C.

καὶ ἀκίνητον, καὶ μηδενὶ κενῷ διειλημένον, ἀλλ' ὅλον ἑαυτοῦ  
 πλήρες ἐπάγει. μέγιστον μὲν οὖν σημεῖον οὗτος ὁ λόγος·  
 ὅτι ἐν μόνον ἐστὶ· ἀτὰρ καὶ τάδε σημεία· εἰ γὰρ ἦν πολλὰ  
 τοιαῦτα, χρὴ αὐτὰ εἶναι οἷόν περ ἐγὼ φημὶ τὸ ἐν εἶναι·  
 εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀήρ, καὶ σίδηρος· καὶ χρυσὸς,  
 καὶ πῦρ· καὶ τὸ μὲν ζῶον τόδε τεθνηκὸς· καὶ μέλαν· καὶ  
 λευκὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα φασὶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι εἶναι ἀληθῆ, εἰ  
 δὲ ταῦτα ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὀρώμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν· εἶναι  
 χρὴ ἕκαστον τοιοῦτον οἷόν περ τὸ πρῶτον ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν· μὴ  
 δὲ μεταπίπτειν, μὴ δὲ γίνεσθαι ἑτεροῖον· ἀλλ' αἰεὶ εἶναι ἕκα-  
 στον οἷόν περ ἐστὶ· νῦν δὲ φαμέν ὀρθῶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν  
 καὶ συνιέναι· δοκεῖ δὲ ἡμῖν τότε θερμὸν ψυχρὸν γίνεσθαι·  
 καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν θερμὸν· καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν μαλακὸν καὶ τὸ μα-  
 λακὸν σκληρὸν· καὶ τὸ ζῶον ἀποθνήσκειν, καὶ ἐκ μὴ ζῶντος  
 γίνεσθαι καὶ ταῦτα πάντα ἑτεροιοῦσθαι· καὶ ὅτι ἦν τὲ καὶ  
 ὁ νῦν οὐδὲν ὅμοιον εἶναι· ἀλλ' ὁ τε σίδηρος σκληρὸς ἐὼν τῷ  
 δακτύλῳ κατατρίβεσθαι ὁμοῦ ῥέων καὶ χρυσὸς καὶ λίθος· καὶ  
 ἄλλο ὅτι ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶν. ὥστε συμβαίνει μήτε ὁρᾶν  
 μήτε τὰ ὄντα γινώσκειν. ἐξ ὕδατός τε γῆ καὶ λίθος γί-  
 νεσθαι. οὐ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογεῖ. φαμένοις γὰρ  
 εἶναι πολλὰ αἰδία· καὶ εἴδητε καὶ ἰσχὺν ἔχοντα πάντα, ἑτε-  
 ροιοῦσθαι ἡμῖν δοκεῖ, καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἐκ τοῦ ἐκάστοτε  
 ὀρωμένου· δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐωρώμεν οὔδε ἐκείνα  
 πολλὰ ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέπιπτεν εἰ ἀληθῆ  
 ἦν, ἀλλ' ἦν οἷόν περ ἐδόκει ἕκαστον τοιοῦτον. τοῦ γὰρ,  
 εἶντος ἀληθινοῦ κρείσσον οὐδέν· ἦν δὲ μεταπέση τὸ μέσον  
 ἀπώλετο· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὼν γέγονεν· οὕτως οὖν εἰ πολλὰ εἴη,  
 τοιαῦτα χρὴ εἶναι, οἷόν περ τὸ ἐν.

Fol. 260 s. ὥς μὲν ὁ πολυτίμητος τῶν Πλάτωνος φύλων,  
 χαριέντως ἀπέσκωψεν

αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς

Ἐκτορος ἄντα μάλιστα λιλαίετο δύναι ὄμιλον.

γυμνοὶ δὲ ἐπλάζοντο<sup>73</sup> βραχίονες εὐνίδες ὤμων  
 ὄμματα δὲ οἷα ἐπλανᾶτο πενητεύοντα μετώπων·  
 ἐν ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ καταστάσει μονομελῇ ἔτι τὰ γυῖα ἀπὸ  
 τῆς τοῦ νείκους διακρίσεως ὄντα ἐπλανᾶτο.

<sup>73</sup> Cod. Taur. ἐμπλάζοντο; but Simplicius remarks, τὸ γὰρ πλανᾶσθαι καὶ τὸ  
 πλάζεσθαι ἄτακτον κίνησιν δηλοῖ.



ED. VENET.

Fol. 147 b. ὡς ὁ Ζοῦθος ἔλεγεν.

Fol. 148 a. Ὅτι δὲ διακρίνεται τὸ πῦρ ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς ὁ μὲν Θεόφραστος ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τὰς φλόγας κεχωρίσθαι διηγεῖται. Μεγέθιος ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ἰατρὸς ἐμοὶ διεγήσατο, ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς ἰσχιαδικοῦ πῦρ ἐξελθεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰσχίου, καὶ κατακαῦσαι τὰς ὀψεις,<sup>74</sup> ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἔπαυσε τὸ πάθος· ἐμφαίνουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν ἀνθράκων διαθέσεις ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς γινόμεναι· καὶ οἱ καύσωνες πυρετοὶ· ἀπὸ ξύλων δὲ πῦρ ἐκβάλλουσι, θάτερον τῶν ξύλων ὡς τέρετρον ἐν θατέρῳ περιστρέφοντες· ὅτι δὲ γῇ ἐνυπάρχει τούτοις, σημαίνει ἡ μετὰ τὸν ἐμπρησμόν τέφρα· καταφανὴς δὲ καὶ ἡ κεχωρισμένη ὑγρότης· καὶ ὁ ἐξατμιζόμενος ἀήρ.

Fol. 157 a. Καὶ δὴ καὶ Πρόκλος ὁ ἐκ Λυκίας ὃς τις ἦν ὀλίγον πρὸ ἐμοῦ τοῦ Πλάτωνος διάδοχος, βυβλίον συνέγραψεν, τὰς ἐνταῦθα τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐνστάσεις διαλύων, ἔδοξε μοι καλῶς ἔχειν διὰ βραχέων ὡς οἶόν τε, τὰς λύσεις ἐκείνας ταῖς ἐνστάσεσιν παρασυνάψαι.

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The next of the Oxford MSS. in value is that of New College; for the inspection of which I feel indebted to the Warden and Fellows of that Society. It is a folio of 368 leaves, and contains the whole work, with the exception of a small portion of the Fourth Book. It is more elegantly written than the Corpus MS., but probably of the same age. The readings which it exhibits much more nearly resemble those of the Turin copy, without however being precisely the same. I have noted some of these variations in the verses of Empedocles. Should any scholar ever contemplate another edition of the commentary of Simplicius, he could not have recourse to better materials than those afforded by these two Oxford MSS<sup>75</sup>.

The Bodleian Library has a MS. of Simplicius Auctar. T. III. 20, in folio, of the 16th century, but it contains only the first Book without the preface. In the Saville Collection,

<sup>74</sup> The Paraphraser must have read ὄμματα for στρώματα.

<sup>75</sup> The Libraries of Corpus and New College are besides both rich in MSS. of the other Aristotelian commentators.



## COD. C.C.C.

Fol. 279 a. ὡς ὁ Ξοῦθος ἔλεγεν.

Fol. 280 r. Ὅτι δὲ ἐκκρίνεται πῦρ ἐκ σαρκὸς Θεόφραστος μὲν ἀπὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἀνθρώπου φλόγα ἐκκριθῆναι ἱστορεῖ. Μεγέθιος δὲ ὁ Ἀλεξανδρεὺς ἰατρὸς ἐμοὶ διηγήσατο τεθεᾶσθαι ἰσχιαδικοῦ ἀνδρὸς, πῦρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰσχίου ἐξελθόν, καὶ καῦσαι τὰ στρώματα· ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ ἐπαύσατο τὸ πάθος· δηλοῦσι δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν ἀνθράκων ἰσχάρες ἀπὸ πυρὸς γενόμεναι· καὶ οἱ διακαεῖς πυρετοὶ ἀπὸ δὲ ξύλου πῦρ ἐκβάλλουσι· τὸ στερεὸν ξύλον ὡς τρύπανον ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ περιστρέφοντες· ὅτι δὲ γῇ τοῦτοις ἐνεστι, δῆλοι ἢ μετὰ τὴν καῦσιν ὑπολειπομένη τέφρα· δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐκκριναμένη ὑγρότης, καὶ ὁ ἐξατμιζόμενος ἀήρ.

Fol. 297 s. Πρόκλος δὲ ὁ ἐκ Λυκίας ὀλίγον πρὸ ἐμοῦ γεγονώς, τοῦ Πλάτωνος διάδοχος, βιβλίον ἔγραψε τὰς ἐνταῦθα τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐνστάσεις διαλύων, καλῶς ἔχειν ἔδοξέ μοι, συντόμως ὡς δυνατόν ταῖς ἐνστάσεσι τὰς λύσεις ἐκείνου ὑποτάξαι.

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Catal. Bodl. 6553.6, is another MS. of the same age, which has the second Book with the proem. Since the Turin copy, according to Mons<sup>r</sup> Peyron, is not earlier than the middle of the 15th century, it appears that all the MSS. of Simplicius of which we have any account, are comparatively of a recent date. Harles (Fabr. Bibl. ix. p. 549.) notices from Montfaucon two other MSS. of the Commentary de Cælo, one at Paris in the Royal Library, another at Rome in the Library of St. Mauro.

I. A. C.

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## VICO.

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THE name of Giambattista Vico, the author of the *Scienza Nuova*, of whose life and writings it is proposed in this paper to give some account, is so little known in England, that perhaps the majority of the readers of the Philological Museum may now hear of him for the first time. The remoteness of the country in which he wrote, the singularity of his works, and his utter disregard, not only of the graces of style, but even the virtues of perspicuity and method, will explain the ignorance of his historical writings which still prevails among us: we are besides of all literary nations the most incurious respecting the productions of foreigners. It is much more wonderful that the *Scienza Nuova* was unknown in Germany nearly a century after its publication. After Wolf had published his *Prolegomena to Homer*, he received from Cesarotti, the venerable translator of Homer and Ossian, a copy of this work of Vico, with the remark that he would find in it an anticipation of his own dreams; and he gave an account of it, as a literary curiosity, in his *Museum*, Vol. i. p. 555. seq.

The scanty materials for the life of Vico, which was marked by few vicissitudes or incidents, are found in a memoir written by himself, prefixed to the *Scienza Nuova*, with some additions subsequently made by him and his son, which are contained in the publication of his works by the Marquis of Villa Rosa in 1818. He was born at Naples in 1688; the only memorable event which he has recorded of his early years is that he fractured his skull by a fall at the age of seven, an incident which the surgeon predicted would deprive him of his understanding, but which as he says confirmed a propensity to melancholy in his temper. Such a temper is indeed very strongly marked in the striking portrait prefixed to the Milan edition of the *Scienza Nuova*,



but it was hereditary, and aggravated by the disappointments of his life. His father was a bookseller in humble circumstances; his education was conducted by the Jesuits, or rather by himself under their nominal superintendence, for his mind was not formed to yield to the guidance of others. His studies were chiefly directed to metaphysical philosophy, languages and jurisprudence, and he must have made extraordinary proficiency in the last, since at sixteen he successfully defended an action which had been brought against his father<sup>1</sup>. But he could not be tempted to plunge in the bustle of the forum; his health was infirm, and he accepted the offer of the Bishop of Ischia to undertake the instruction of his nephews in jurisprudence. In the salubrious seclusion of the castle of Vatolla, where he spent nine years, he recovered his health and pursued his studies without interruption, especially those of the Canon Law and Theology: the first conception of his work on the principles of Natural Law was the result, he tells us, of his endeavours to attain the true Catholic medium between the extremes of Calvinism and Pelagianism on the subject of Grace<sup>2</sup>. The assiduous study of Cicero, whom he used in order to correct the influence of the barbarous phraseology of the jurists, gave him that command of style which is displayed in his treatises and orations in the Latin language. His taste growing more and more severe, he abandoned the modern literature of his country for the great fathers of Italian poetry and prose, Petrarca, Boccaccio, and above all Dante, whose serious and melancholy character seems to have harmonized best with his own. Returning to Naples, with tastes and opinions formed in ancient schools, he found himself a stranger among his countrymen. Instead of Plato, whom Vico had chosen for his master, and whom the Italian scholars of the 15th century had worshipped, Des Cartes reigned in the schools of philosophy; although poetry had abandoned the vicious model of Marini and his school, it had not returned to that of the great men whom alone Vico honoured. Not accustomed to conform to popular taste, he was only the more confirmed in his admiration of the ancients; to preserve the purity of

<sup>1</sup> Vita di G. B. Vico, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p. 10.



his Latin style he meditated at last to renounce even the study of the Greek,<sup>3</sup> refused to learn French, and as he had observed that the appearance of commentators and lexicographers in literature was simultaneous with the loss of purity, he determined to read the classics without the aid of either, using only the Nomenclator of Junius for technical terms. These things are characteristic of that love of independence, and that selfreliance, to which his principal works owe their peculiarities both of matter and of form. “Per tutte queste cose il Vico benedisse non aver lui avuto maestro nelle cui parole avesse egli giurato e ringraziò quelle selve, fralle quali, dal suo buon genio guidato, aveva fatto il maggior corso de' suoi studj, senza niuno affetto di setta, è non nella Città, nella quale come moda di vesti si cangiava ogni due o tre anni gusto di lettere<sup>4</sup>.”

In 1697 Vico was chosen to the Professorship of Rhetoric, a post of small emolument, of which he eked out the scanty receipts by giving instruction in Latin. It gave him, however, the opportunity of promulgating from time to time his views on various topics of literature and philosophy. In an oration delivered in 1708, at the commencement of the course of studies in the University, he contrasts the ancient mode of cultivating all sciences in common, as exemplified by Plato, with the modern method of pursuing each branch as if independent of all the rest, and recommends that all divine and human knowledge should form one body, and be animated with one spirit. The same principle was applied to Jurisprudence in his works, *De Universi Juris uno Principio*, and *De Constantia Jurisprudentialis*, published in 1720, and on which he was then employed. After the publication of these works, and after so long and disinterested a fulfilment of the duties of his office, Vico thought himself entitled to become a candidate for a vacant chair of jurisprudence in the University; but notwithstanding the applause which attended the lecture which he gave as a specimen of his powers, not being able to stoop to the personal applications which other candidates used, he found that he should be unsuccessful, and retired from the contest. That he deeply felt the dis-

<sup>3</sup> Vita di G. B. Vico, p. 26.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.



appointment is evident, for from this time, he says, he concluded that his country would not allow him to serve her, but his only revenge was to apply himself to the completion of the work which he meditated. He would not forget that she was his parent, though she was a stern one who never caressed her child<sup>5</sup>. In the year 1725 accordingly he published the *Scienza Nuova*, in which the principles which he had exhibited indistinctly and without order in his former works were at length presented in a systematic form. The remainder of his days was past in poverty and domestic sorrow; one of his children to whom he was tenderly attached, and to whose education he had devoted much of his time, languished in a tedious and severe disorder; and another, by the irregularities of his conduct, compelled him to demand his confinement. But Vico's was a spirit, which calamity could not long or wholly overcloud; in his deep religious feeling and his conviction that he had established by his writings the proof of a wise and benevolent Providence controuling the course of human affairs, he had a source of consolation which never failed him, while his intellect remained. "Providence," says he in a letter written soon after the publication of the *Scienza Nuova*, "even when it seems to our feeble view only a severe justice, is really kindness and love. Since I have completed my great work, I seem to have put on a new man. I am no longer tempted to declaim against the bad taste of the age, since by refusing me the office which I sought, it has led me to compose the *Scienza Nuova*. The composition of this work, if I am not deceived, has filled me with an heroic spirit, which places me above the fear of death and the calumny of my rivals. I feel myself on a rock of adamant, when I think on the judgement of God, who does justice to genius by the esteem of the wise<sup>6</sup>." On the accession of the house of Bourbon to the throne of Naples in 1735, his condition was in some respects improved; he was named historiographer to the king, and his son Gennaro succeeded him in his professorship; but these marks of favour came too late to give much pleasure to Vico, whose powers were already exhausted, and after remaining fourteen

<sup>5</sup> Vita di G. B. Vico, p. 60, with a sonnet of Vico's quoted by Michelet, p. 64.

<sup>6</sup> Michelet, Discours sur le Systeme et le Vie de Vico, p. 47.



months in a state of insensibility in which he did not know even his own children, he expired on the 20th of January, 1744.

Vico had published a second edition of the *Scienza Nuova* in 1730, but by the more synthetic form which he gave to it, he rendered it more obscure in this edition than in its original state. The third edition was published a short time before his death, and while he was in the deplorable condition which we have already described. The additions which were made probably by Gennaro Vico from his father's MSS. without venturing to alter any thing, only aggravated the obscurity by interrupting the connexion. It is from this edition, as having received the author's latest additions that the subsequent reprints have been made. With the life of Vico the interest of the Italians in his system appears to have ceased, and no other edition of the *Scienza Nuova* was published during the 18th century. Since 1801 it has been several times reprinted; it was translated into German by Weber in 1822, and a *Redaction* of it under the title of *Principes de la Philosophie de l' Histoire*, traduits de la *Scienza Nuova* de J. B. Vico, was published at Paris, 1827, by M. Michelet, Professor of History in the College of St Barbe. It is not a translation of either of the Italian editions, the editor taking from each what was necessary for his purpose of giving a clear and intelligible view of the system, retrenching the tautologies and restoring the dislocated parts to their places. Whoever is not in love with difficulty for its own sake, will do well to seek his knowledge of Vico's system in M. Michelet's work; for Vico himself is the Heraclitus of modern philosophers. His *Opuscoli* were published in four volumes at Naples in 1818 by the Marquis de Villa Rosa. From the additions made to Vico's autobiography, by his son, in the first volume of this collection, some particulars mentioned above have been derived, through the medium of Michelet's book.

The object of the *Scienza Nuova* is to show, that the history of the human race is determined by laws as certain in their operation, as those by which the material world is governed. The harmony and simplicity of these laws had been demonstrated by natural philosophy, and



Vico thought that there must be in human nature, and the order of Providence, principles not only equally certain in their operation, but equally capable of demonstrative proof.

As, according to Plato, there was in the Divine Mind an Idea, antecedent to the existence of a material world, and being its archetype, so there must exist an eternal Idea of the history of mankind in the Divine Intellect, which is made sensible in actual events, and never exceeded or departed from in all the variety of human affairs. The first glance at history seems to contradict the supposition, that any such regularity exists, but more closely examined it will be found, that there is order in the seeming confusion, and a great cycle of changes always returning into itself. The discovery of this order is the *New Science*; new, because no one had yet demonstrated its existence; a science, because its subject is intellectual, universal and eternal. Vico desired to obtain as firm a basis for his favourite studies of jurisprudence and history, as the philosophy of external nature had already received, and the principles of his new science are promulgated in the form of axioms, which occupy the greater part of his first book.

No philosophy of human nature can be sound or useful, which either attempts to eradicate the passions, or abandons man to their corrupt influence. The Stoics committed the first error, the Epicureans the second; neither system, therefore, can be the foundation of the New Science; neither of them recognizes Providence, the Stoics substituting Fate for it, and the Epicureans, Chance. The Platonic philosophy on the other hand agrees with all lawgivers, in recognizing three truths, that there is a Providence, that human virtue consists in the moderation of the passions, and that the soul is immortal. The passions which tend to the destruction of Society, moderated by the influences to which Providence subjects man, are the virtues which hold society together and promote the welfare of its members. In laying down these axioms, Vico has evidently had in view the system of Hobbes, which had alarmed the friends of morality and freedom throughout Europe. He had represented society as kept together only by the power of the magistrate, repressing



that selfishness which would lead every individual, if he had the power, to snatch what another possessed: Vico makes this very selfishness, under the restraint of religion, the source of civilization and humanity<sup>7</sup>.

Thus the elements of Law exist among all nations, and it is an error to regard it as taught by one to another, by Egypt to Greece, by Athens to Rome; it originated independently in each, and it was only by wars, embassies and commercial intercourse, that such a communication took place, as to form at length a Law of Nations. The notions which thus expand and unite to become a general system of law are derived from the *Common sense of mankind*, an irreflective judgment of necessity or utility, common to a people, a nation, or to the whole human race. Man is essentially a social creature, for nothing can long remain in a state which is not natural.

The accounts which nations give of their own early state must not be implicitly believed; all have been misled by vanity to attribute to their own ancestors the commencements of civilization, and to suppose that they could carry up their annals to the origin of the world. The vanity of the learned too has led them to suppose, that what they knew had been known also in remote ages, to attribute a surprising knowledge of philosophy to Zoroaster, Hermes Trismegistus, Orpheus, Pythagoras; to find a mystical meaning in the Egyptian hieroglyphics, and philosophical allegories in the poems of Homer. It is a principle of human nature, to magnify what is remote, and make itself the model of everything that is unknown. Popular traditions, when preserved by whole nations and for a great length of time, must have some motive of truth, but this, by lapse of time and change of language, becomes so buried under falsehood, that a chief labour of the new science is to extricate it. Languages are the most certain witnesses of the ancient customs of a people, and each of the great changes which they have undergone has

<sup>7</sup> Sc. N. Vol. I. 202. L'uomo nello stato bestiale ama solamente la sua salvezza; presa moglie e fatti figliuoli ama la sua salvezza con la salvezza della Famiglia; venuto a vita civile ama la sua salvezza con la salvezza della Città; distesi gl' imperj sopra piu popoli ama la sua salvezza con la salvezza delle Nazioni; unite le nazioni in guerre, paci, alleanze, commerzj, ama la sua salvezza con la salvezza di tutto il Gener Umano.



been accompanied by a peculiar modification of their language.

These are the most important of Vico's philosophical and philological axioms. The history of one of the great cycles of human affairs is thus traced by him. After the Deluge the condition of mankind, with the exception of the people of God, was that in which Homer describes the Cyclops of Sicily; their stature was gigantic, like that of the Patagonians, they abused their bodily strength in governing tyrannically their families and households, but had no laws or social union. They lived at first without religion, but the terrific display of divine power awakened in their minds the idea of a supernatural Being. This triumph of religion, over minds in which hitherto brutal passion had reigned, is the destruction of the giants by the thunder of Jupiter, almost every nation having its giants and its Jupiter. As men can conceive of the unknown, only by assimilating it to the known, when once the idea of a God was suggested to the mind, all natural phenomena were explained by the presence and agency of the gods. This is the *divine* age, when the gods (of whom Varro reckoned thirty thousand among the Latins) lived upon the earth. As the deaf and dumb supply their want of speech by signs, so the rude men of this age, not having yet acquired an articulate language, helped themselves out by signs, which gave rise to hieroglyphics. These have been falsely supposed to be a contrivance of the priests, to conceal their knowledge from the vulgar; they were really the result of the imperfection of speech. Language was poetical; for imagination was excited before reason was cultivated; and musical; for those who stammer assist themselves by singing.

To the divine succeeded the *heroic* age; as Polyphemus is the model of the men of the first, so is Achilles, fierce and passionate, but magnanimous and affectionate, of those of the second. The characteristic of the heroes is energy, exerted for the protection of the feeble and the overthrow of the oppressor. Such was preeminently Hercules, whom we find in so many countries, because their condition was similar; many noble and royal races of Greece deduced themselves from him. The commencement of the communities of men was that those who suffered from the oppression of the fero-



cious fled to the asylum which the heroes offered them<sup>8</sup>. They did not however thus obtain equality of rights; they purchased protection by becoming slaves. Thus society began in a rigid aristocracy. The early ages of Rome answer to the heroic age of Greece, and are characterized by aristocratic ascendancy. There must have existed on the banks of the Tiber a Greek colony of which history has not preserved the name or memory, which the Romans destroyed, receiving the vanquished into the city, where they formed the plebs. As the aristocracy would not yield to one another, they constituted themselves into a senate, in which all were equal; they possessed exclusively the sacerdotal and military power; they were the only *Quirites* or citizens, of them the *comitia curiata* were composed. But as they would have been left without subjects to command, if they had not relaxed something of their rigour, they were compelled to concede to the revolted plebeians at first only the *bonitary* dominion of their lands, i. e. the power of using them liable to perpetual revocation. The royal dominion was at first very feeble; Tacitus says, "*Urbem Romani a principio reges habuere*," using the least expressive of the three words by which the jurists denote possession, *habere, tenere, possidere*<sup>9</sup>.

The characters of the heroic age are not real personages, but representatives of general ideas, one name having drawn to itself the attributes of a multitude of the same class. A child sees an object and gives it a name; when he sees another of the same kind he bestows the same name upon it; men in early ages did the same, and we must consider a single name as representing many individuals, and even several generations. The Egyptians, says Jamblichus, attributed everything to Hermes Trismegistus; so did the Greeks to Orpheus, the Persians to Zoroaster. Romulus and Theseus are types of heroic sovereigns and legislators; Homer himself is not a single poet, but the representative of the poets of the heroic times.

Law in the divine age had been theocratic, every thing being supposed to depend on the will of the Gods, who con-

<sup>8</sup> "*Vetus urbes condentium consilium*," says Livy, I. 8. of the asylum opened by Romulus. This is one of Vico's *luoghi d' oro*, and the foundation of his system.

<sup>9</sup> Sc. N. Vol. III. p. 100.



demned or absolved, and declared their pleasure by oracles. In the heroic age force was law, but force tempered by religion. The early jurisprudence of the Romans was characterized by the rigid observance of the legal formulæ, agreeably to the rigid and inflexible temper of its aristocracy; the *actus legitimi*, or symbolical legal acts, were a remnant of the hieroglyphic language of the preceding age.

The third age is the *human*, or the age of certain history, in Greece marked by the æra of the Olympiads, nearly coincident with that of the foundation of Rome. It is evident, however, that Vico by no means regards history as becoming certain from the time of these two events; in Greece it hardly deserves this character till the generation preceding the Peloponnesian war; it is not till the second Punic war, that Livy declares himself able to write with confidence the history of Rome. This uncertainty of the ancients themselves justifies, according to Vico, the boldness with which he has rejected the history of preceding ages, on the ground of its intrinsic absurdity. In the human age hieroglyphical and symbolical characters had been exchanged for alphabetical, poetry for prose, the figurative language of men of passion and imagination, for one which was the production of the understanding. The law of this age is characterized by a regard to reason and natural equity; it becomes more humane, as the popular influence in its decisions becomes greater<sup>10</sup>. This effect is visible in the history of the Roman government, which from a strict and exclusive aristocracy, became more popular, by the increasing power of the plebs. It is an error to suppose that this popular liberty was founded by Junius Brutus; *that* was merely an aristocratic liberty; the census, as originally instituted by Servius Tullius, was aristocratic, it was a tax paid by the plebeians for the lands which they held, but

<sup>10</sup> In connexion with this subject Vico makes a remark equally original and profound, III. 48. "that by means of language free nations are masters of their laws, and compel the powerful to adopt their sense of them." The ideas annexed to words are necessarily determined by the majority of those who use them, and with new *ideas* new *sentiments* find their way into the minds of the smaller number, without the violence of controversy. Language thus becomes a powerful but quiet instrument for producing harmony of feeling, among the different orders in a state, and preparing those changes of opinion, of which changes in law and government are the effect and indication.



about forty years after the expulsion we find the Census again mentioned, and treated with disdain by the nobility, because now it was a popular institution, the money being paid into the treasury, and not to the nobles. Fabius at length founded upon the Census the distribution of the Romans into senators, knights and plebeians, substituting the democratic standard of wealth, for the aristocratic one of birth. Gradually the plebeians obtained complete equality with the patricians, and popular liberty began to degenerate into tyranny. The people, being equal, wished to be masters; the poor desired to enrich themselves at the expence of their superiors; unjust laws were proposed and force resorted to in order to carry or to resist them; and hence it became necessary that the people should obtain repose, by placing themselves under the power of a single sovereign. Monarchy is thus the natural result of the excesses of democracy. The remains of aristocratic power are thus destroyed, the condition of the lower orders improved, the burthens of the slaves lightened by the absolute power of the emperors. The right of citizenship, which in earlier times had been restricted with so much jealousy, was profusely bestowed. Aristocracies are by their nature limited; democracies are adapted for making conquests, monarchies for consolidating them. The Roman emperors, however, became depraved, and a second age of barbarism was brought about by the invasion of the northern hordes; one great cycle of history was accomplished, and another began, in which the same succession may be traced with marvellous correspondence.

The Christian religion having triumphed over Paganism, and orthodoxy over Arianism, the *divine age* returned; kings assumed a sacred character and the title of sacred majesty, clothed themselves with the garments of ecclesiastics, founded orders of a mixed military and religious character, and placed the cross upon their banners. Judgements of God were substituted for trials by form of law; duels, though forbidden by the Canon Law, were one species of these judgements. Religion appeared to be the only means, by which the tempers of men, grown savage by war, could be mollified; and those who dreaded violence took refuge under the protection of bishops and abbots, and placed themselves, their families, and



their goods, under the safeguard of the church. Cities and towns hence arose, as in ancient times from the asylums, which Livy calls "*vetus urbes condentium consilium*." As there was no language which the conquerors and the conquered could employ in common, and the use of the vulgar characters was scarcely known, men returned to hieroglyphics in emblems, armorial bearings, &c. To this *divine* or *theocratic* age, succeeded the *heroic*, that is, the feudal age. The *vassalli rustici* (tenants in villenage?) whose service was at first personal, answer to the clients at Rome from the time of Romulus to that of Servius Tullius. To these succeeded vassals holding real fiefs by payments (*reali pesi*) answering to the condition of the plebeians after Servius had granted them the *dominium bonitarium* of their lands, on paying the census to the treasury. These plebeians, called *nexi* till the passing of the Petilian law, answered to the liegemen (*homines ligati*) of the feudal age. Allodial tenure corresponds to the holding *ex jure optimo* in the Roman law. Conquered kings in the Roman times were nearly in the condition of those who held sovereign fiefs in the middle ages. In the assemblies of armed knights and barons, we see the Quirites of ancient Rome, who alone enjoyed legislative rights, and derived their name from their weapon (*quiris* a spear). As the patricians in Rome kept the knowledge of law to themselves, and lost their power when this knowledge became diffused among the people, so the revival of the study of law in modern Europe was the downfall of the feudal aristocracy. As the Roman government was first aristocratic, then popular, then monarchical, so have been the governments of Europe. The latter two forms are both adapted to a civilized people, and may be exchanged one for the other, but there can be no return to aristocracy. When the plebeians have once asserted their own equality with the nobles, they will not resign it, but they may enjoy this equality in a popular government or in a monarchy. Hence aristocratic governments have almost disappeared, and those which survive, as Venice, Lucca, Genoa, Nuremberg, have an anxious and precarious existence.

Such, according to the *Scienza Nuova*, is the eternal circle in which history revolves, under the guidance of Providence, which thus secures the government of states to the *best*,



i. e. to those who in each of their successive conditions are best qualified to preserve it<sup>11</sup>. It is not my intention to enter into an examination of its principles, or its historical proofs. Vico indeed gave himself little concern about historical proofs; he rarely quotes an authority, and never specifically, but certain *luoghi d' oro*, as he calls them, passages in the ancient authors which he regards as favourable to his system, and which he derives indifferently from Homer or Iamblichus, are reiterated to satiety. To do any justice to the profound and original thoughts which are scattered through his work, it is necessary to strip them of the paradoxical garb which he has given them, and place them on a more solid foundation; truth itself often looks like falsehood, from the strange company in which it is found. The general idea, that government has its origin in force, and is gradually tempered by religion, sympathy, and the perception of utility, when detached from its connexion with the fanciful theory of an age of Polyphemi, is much more probable than the doctrine of original compacts and voluntary conventions. The resemblance between the institutions of Europe in the middle ages, and those of the ancient world, especially of Rome, is a fact which in Vico's time had been scarcely noticed; Niebuhr has since drawn from it many striking illustrations of the Roman history; but this resemblance is greatly exaggerated, when modern history is made to be nothing but a renewal of the same circle of changes as mankind had already gone through. Yet the conception of such a law was original and grand, however faulty its demonstration may be; had there been, as Seneca represents, and historians have very generally admitted, "*perpetua in omnibus rebus lex, ut ad summum perducta, rursus ad infimum velocius quam ascenderant relabantur*," it would be a consolation to know, that this law was not enacted, as the Stoic declared, by the malignity of Fate, but as Vico teaches, by the wisdom of Providence<sup>12</sup>. The existence of such a law of decline and corruption may indeed be justly called in question; there is

<sup>11</sup> Sc. N. III. 143.

<sup>12</sup> Questo che fece tutto cio fur pur *Mente*; perchè 'l fecero gli nomini con *intelligenza*: non fu *Fato*; perchè 'l fecero con *elezione*: non *Caso*, perchè con perpetuità sempre così facendo escono nelle medesime cose. Sc. N III. p. 153.



no reason to believe that there is any inherent principle of decay in states, against which wisdom and virtue would contend in vain.

Without entering further into the merits of the *Scienza Nuova*, as a Philosophy of History, I shall point out some of those remarkable anticipations of subsequent discoveries which are to be found in it. The first of these is the opinion that the hieroglyphic characters were not an invention of the priests or philosophers of Egypt, to conceal a sublime doctrine from the knowledge of the vulgar, or keep them in subjection by maintaining a monopoly of science. Warburton in his *Divine Legation*, B. iv. Sect. 4, speaks of this as being in his time an universal mistake, and his exposure of it, by deducing hieroglyphics from picture writing, and showing the analogy between these modes of writing and the figurative and dramatic speech of early times, is one of the most valuable parts of that now nearly forgotten work. It is curious, that both Vico and Warburton quote the story of Idanthyrus, the king of Scythia, who sent to Darius a mouse, a frog, a bird, and five arrows, to intimate a threat of destruction, as an example of a kind of material hieroglyphic, and a proof that the principle was widely diffused. According to Vico the symbolical character of the Egyptians succeeded to the hieroglyphic, and answered to the *σήματα* which Homer mentions in the story of Bellerophon, and the epistolographic was an alphabet. He had observed the similarity of the epistolographic character of the Egyptians with the alphabet of the Phœnicians, but supposed the latter nation to have been the inventors.

A still more remarkable coincidence is that which appears between the opinions of Vico on Homer, and those which have made the name of F. A. Wolf so celebrated. The third book of the *Scienza Nuova* is entitled "Discovery of the real Homer." After showing with how little reason the character of a philosopher had been attributed to him, he proceeds to inquire, whether the author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were the same, and decides the question in the negative, on the ground that a poet whose native country was Asia Minor, where the author of the *Iliad* was evidently born, could not have spoken of Eubœa, as the author of the *Odyssey* does,



as the ultima Thule of the Grecian world. He therefore probably lived on the western side of Greece. The traces of refinement and luxury are chiefly found in the *Odyssey*. Even in the *Iliad* they are such as to be inconsistent with the supposition that the author lived near the time of the Trojan war, and when the warrior still retained so much ferocity as the heroes of the *Iliad* manifest. The inference is, that these poems have past through and been worked up by several hands<sup>13</sup> in several ages. As the means of discovering who the real Homer was, he observes, that the earliest history of all nations, of the Greeks and Romans no less than the barbarians, was consigned to verse, that Homer, as Josephus assures us, left no written work behind him, and never mentions alphabetical writing in his poems, that his verses were sung in detached portions by the *ῥαψωδοί*, to whose name *Ὅμηρος* (*ὅμουν εἶπειν*) answers; and that the Pisistratidæ at Athens divided and arranged the Homeric poems, which shews that they had been previously a confused mass. Aristarchus corrected the text of Homer, yet there still remain varieties of dialect and speech which must have been the peculiarities of different nations of Greece, to say nothing of the licences of metre. The extreme disparity between the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, Longinus endeavours to explain by the supposition that the poet wrote one in his youth and the other in his old age, but this must be a gratuitous hypothesis in regard to an author, whose country and life are wholly unknown to us. Not absolutely denying therefore the real existence of Homer, Vico considers him “as an idea or an heroic character of the Greek nation, in as far as they related their history in poetry;” meaning, we presume, that to one person, who really lived (he elsewhere says about the time of Numa), the whole conception of the heroic poets of Greece has been transferred. Thus all difficulties are cleared up; so many cities claimed him as their own, because in this sense each of them had a Homer; the age in which he lived was variously assigned; for in this sense Homer lived in the mouths and memories of the Greeks for 460 years, from the war of Troy to the time of Numa. He was said

<sup>13</sup> “Sembrano tai poemi essere stati per più età e da più mani lavorati e condotti.”  
Sc. N. III. 13.



to be poor and blind, because such was really the condition of the *ῥαψωδοί*. The Iliad was produced in the youthful age of Greece, when pride, passion and vengeance were its characteristics, as exhibited in Achilles; the Odyssey, when reflexion had cooled the passions, and the calm sagacity of Ulysses was an object of admiration.

Notwithstanding the coincidence between the opinions of Vico and Wolf, respecting the mixed authorship and late arrangement of the Homeric poems, it is evident that they were led in very different ways to their conclusion. The germ of Wolf's speculations was no doubt the passage in which Bentley declares his opinion, that the Iliad and Odyssey were not reduced into an epic poem, till 500 years after their first composition<sup>14</sup>. To emulate the fame of the author of the Dissertation on the Epistles of Phalaris, and be deemed, in the higher criticism, the Bentley of his own age, was the great object of Wolf's ambition. Vico, regarding the time of the monarchy at Rome as answering nearly to the heroic age of Greece, was naturally led to place the lower limit of the Homeric school as late as possible; while, having adopted the common date of the war of Troy, he was compelled to extend it upwards four centuries and a half. By making Homer not an individual, but the representative of the genius of the heroic age, he extricates himself from this difficulty. Vico's most startling paradoxes will usually be found to arise from the obscure perception of some great truth. According to the common opinion of the learned in his time, all that was not pure history in the Iliad was the fiction of one individual, who had invented heroic poetry and brought it to perfection. There is however another way in which the absurdity of this opinion may be avoided, without contradicting Grecian belief and tradition so violently as Vico does. If the theme of the Trojan war had been long treated by the heroic poets of Greece, who had fixed its outlines, created a poetic vocabulary, and a system of harmonious versification, "the blind old man of Scio," who entered into the inheritance of their forgotten labours, may be allowed to retain his per-

<sup>14</sup> See the passage from Phileleutherus Lipsiensis, quoted in Wolf. Proleg. ad Hom. p. cxv.



sonality, and yet be fairly considered as representing the genius of several generations.

The resemblance between the opinions of Vico respecting the early constitution of Rome, and those of Niebuhr, must have been evident in the sketch already given. That all history originates in poetry, is a principle repeatedly laid down in the *Scienza Nuova*, and applied to the Roman history, though I do not remember that Vico any where alludes to the festive songs, which Niebuhr regards as the element of the epic lays, whence the annalists derived their materials. One coincidence is remarkable; Vico had observed, that the ancient Roman commanders who had obtained a triumph, recorded it in what has the air of an heroic verse; as L. Æ. Regillus,

Duello magno dirimendo, Regibus subjugandis,  
and Acilius Glabrio,

Fundit, fugat, prosternit maximas legiones.

Niebuhr thinks the inscriptions on the tombs of the Scipios, commemorative of their triumphs, to be in Saturnian measure. That the *populus* at Rome was at first an aristocratic body, that the *comitia curiata* were patrician assemblies, that the *plebs* were captives made in war, and not possessing any political right, much less the right of electing kings, are the fundamental positions of Niebuhr's history of the constitution, and at their first promulgation they came upon the world with the effect of perfect novelties; yet these are all distinctly contained in the *Scienza Nuova*. There are at the same time minor differences; Vico supposes that the plebs of Rome arose from the destruction of an old Greek town on the banks of the Tiber, whose population was thus reduced into the condition in which we find the original plebs; Niebuhr seems to regard the plebs as originating with the conquests of Ancus Martius; Vico speaks of the clients as belonging to the plebs, Niebuhr, against the testimony of Livy and Dionysius, denies this; Vico derives Quirites from *quiris*, a spear, and supposes it to describe the original aristocracy as alone bearing arms; Niebuhr first derived the name from Cære, afterwards from a town Quirium, which he supposed to have adjoined the original town of Romulus on the Palatine hill. The



subsequent parts of the history are only incidentally touched upon by Vico, and there is no other striking coincidence with Niebuhr than that which follows necessarily from their agreement as to the original form of the government. Of the Licinian law Vico speaks, as historians commonly had done before Heyne, as regulating the amount of landed property which any citizen might possess. The French editor, M. Michelet, speaks of Montesquieu and Niebuhr as having followed the opinions of Vico respecting the institutions of Servius Tullius<sup>15</sup> (p. 135). There are not many things in which Montesquieu and Niebuhr agree, and if by following is meant copying Vico, this is not one of them. The course of Niebuhr's investigations has been indicated by himself, and does not even run parallel with those of Vico. Indeed it is only necessary to have read the *Scienza Nuova*, to be convinced that it was impossible for an historical critic to borrow from it: every thing is so closely connected with his fanciful system of the progress and revolutions of society, and offered with such entire neglect of historical evidence, that no one who thought it requisite that his opinions should have a sound historical basis, could take them on the authority of Vico. He must at least have gone through the labour of *underpinning* the whole system, and building a new and sound foundation to support the parts which he wished to preserve. Now that Vico's conclusions have been reached by more legitimate reasoning, and established on probable or certain evidence, we look back with surprise on their singular anticipations; but there is no reason to believe that they guided or even suggested the trains of research which others have pursued. Even in Italy itself the *Scienza Nuova* seems to have been almost neglected, after the author's death, till the beginning of the present century, and beyond the Alps it has certainly become known only in consequence of its coincidences with modern discoveries.

<sup>15</sup> So the editor of the Milan edition says, "Montesquieu, che ne conobbe tutto il merito, trasportò nello Spirito delle Leggi molte idee del nostro Autore senza neppur nominarlo, e questi se ne dolse acerbamente; ciò non è cosa insolita fra gli oltremontani che approfittarono delle opere dei nostri insegna autori." To so vague a charge it is difficult to reply; but the systems of Vico and Montesquieu appear to be essentially different, and it is hard to conceive how the author of the *Esprit des Lois* should have got through a single book of the *Scienza Nuova*.



Without encroaching on the just claims of other men, to exalt the fame of Vico, we may safely pronounce him to have been one of the most original thinkers whom his country has produced. At the time at which he lived, it was perhaps impossible to do more than detect the falsehood of long-established opinions, to discover and demonstrate the truth which should be substituted for them, was necessarily the work of a succeeding age. But he who first shakes the foundation of an edifice of ancient error, should not be deprived of our gratitude, though he only leaves the ground encumbered with ruins, without being able to build up any thing in the room of what he has overthrown. Were he even as well qualified to construct as to destroy, he finds neither tools nor materials prepared for this second labour. Even the deep religious and moral feeling which engaged Vico in the attempt to demonstrate the law by which Providence governs the world, has probably led him into error by inducing him unconsciously to combine the facts of history and judge of their credibility, according to their apparent conformity with this law. The only method of avoiding similar errors in historical inquiries is, with singleness of purpose, to try everything by its own evidence, confident that whatever may become of opinion, truth can never be inconsistent with truth.

M. C. Y.

I. K.

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## REGIA HOMERICA\*.

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DOMUS omnis regis, vel principis alicujus viri, Homericis temporibus, in media area, muro circumsepta, sita erat; atque in eo muro janua exterior, *τρόθυρον*, sive *θύραι αὐλειαί*, duplici valva, *δικλίδεσι*, claudenda, ita patebat ut currus et equi commodè transire possent<sup>1</sup>.

Ei ex adverso erat janua interior, *θύρα* sive *θύρετρον*, viam in atrium præbens, quod, media ac præcipua pars domus, ad centenos simul et plures etiam convivas accipiendos aptum et idoneum; camino magno, qui simul omnibus pro culina erat, instructum<sup>2</sup>; parvisque et præaltis fenestris, *ὀρσοθύραις*, per quas lumen solis intraret, et lampadum fumus exiret<sup>3</sup>, in altum patebat usque ad tectum, quod, in hac parte, solarium fuisse oportet ut homines in eo dormitum irent, et pernoctarent ad frigus captandum, quomodo Elpenor in domo Circes<sup>4</sup>. Fueritne caminus in medio atrio, an in pariete, haud facile dixerim; sed usus simplicior et antiquior in medio fuisse potius suadet.

Duplici columnarum lignearum serie suffultum erat, in quas, et hastas innixas, et sellulas ponebant; nonnullas harum ita, ut ad focum etiam sedentes columnis simul inniterentur<sup>5</sup>; quod, unica et media duntaxat serie, in tanto spatio, fieri non poterat. Pavimentum erat nullum, ne glarea quidem, argilla, vel arena stratum; et solum ipsum tam parum complanatum

\* The above dissertation was written by Mr Payne Knight, and some copies of it privately distributed by him, a few years after the publication of his edition of Homer. As however he did not live to superintend a new edition of that work, and as the dissertation in question had received the author's last hand, there is no reason why it should not now be laid before the public. G. C. L.

<sup>1</sup> Il. Q. 161, 323. Od. A. 103. Δ. 20. H. 4. P. 265. Σ. 100. Φ. 389.

<sup>2</sup> Od. Z. 305. H. 154. Il. 248—253.

<sup>3</sup> Od. X. 126, &c.

<sup>4</sup> Od. K. 556.

<sup>5</sup> Od. A. 127. Z. 305. Θ. 66, 473. Ψ. 89.



et induratum, vel integra superficie conservatum, ut Telemachus nullo quasi negotio, et nullius incommodo, fossam in eo ad certamen sagittandi foderet<sup>6</sup>. Juxta tamen in area, ante fores, spatium erat complanatum, δάπεδον τυκτόν, lapidibus forte stratum, ad corpora inter epulas exercenda<sup>7</sup>.

Foribus hinc inde adjuncta, prolato domi tecto, erant vestibula, πρόδομοι, in quibus hospites, ut suo quisque comodo, quando vellent, nemine sollicitato, abire possent, pernoctabant; atque, super ea, porticus apertæ—αἴθουσαι—quibus soles hibernos, vel flatus æstivos, nocte dieque, quilibet captaret<sup>8</sup>.

Pone atrium erant cubicula et conclavia secretiora, θάλαμοι ἐν μυχῶ δώματος, in quibus pater et materfamilias, et ancillæ lectiores pernoctabant; et res pretiosiores conservantur et custodiebantur, et balnea calefiebant, igne extrinsecus subjecto; atque, super ea, alia cubicula et conclavia, ὑπερώια, in quibus puellæ, viduæ, et mulieres, quarum mariti aberant, sese cum ancillis secretas tenebant<sup>9</sup>; dum omnes alterius sexus servi, δρηστῆρες, foris, extra etiam murum exteriorem, ἔρκος αὐλῆς, pernoctasse videntur<sup>10</sup>.

Scalæ singulæ, quibus in cubicula et conclavia superiora, porticus apertas, et solarium, ascenderetur, extrinsecus ad parietes utrimque positæ videntur<sup>11</sup>; ita ut cuivis fœminarum descendere, et ad atrii fores venire, nullo obstante vel observante, ad libitum liceret<sup>12</sup>; at nemini tamen ex eo evadere, reclusa in cubicula et conclavia inferiora via, nisi perrupto pariete interiore, ligneo fortasse, vel cratitio et argillaceo, per cujus fragmina et foramen, ἀνὰ ῥῶγας μεγάροιο, Melanthius in conclave, quo arma deposita erant, ascendisse videtur<sup>13</sup>.

Non me quidem fugit voces, ὀρσοθύρην et ῥῶγας, obscuras admodum esse, et vexatissimas variis et discrepantibus interpretationibus: quas tamen recensere et discutere haud operæ pretium duxi; quum mihi persuasum sit, sensum, quem radices et elementa, primaria significatione, præbent, in omnibus veriorum esse, si sententiæ simul satis aptus sit.

<sup>6</sup> Od. Φ. 120.

<sup>7</sup> Od. Δ. 625. p. 169.

<sup>8</sup> Od. Γ. 399. Δ. 296—305. H. 345. Υ. 1, 92.

<sup>9</sup> Il. II. 184. Ω. 191. Od. Δ. 304. H. 946. Σ. 205. Φ. 5, 64.

<sup>10</sup> Od. Υ. 160.

<sup>11</sup> Od. K. 566.

<sup>12</sup> Od. Α. 330. Σ. 205. Τ. 600. Φ. 5.

<sup>13</sup> Od. X. 126—143, &c.



Culminis et solarii contignationes, extra parietes, quaquaversum prolatae esse videntur; atque trabes protrusae et extantes aliis columnis externis suffultae: Telemachus enim, aedes ingressurus, suam, ut jam ingressus, Minervae hastam columnae innixam ponit; et funem, e quo ancillae peccantes, suo quaeque laqueo, suspendantur, a *magna columna* extensum, circa tholum nectit<sup>14</sup>; quam columnam ad domum ipsam pertinuisse oportet quoniam omnis columna, quae singula et otiosa staret, neque aedem aliquam suffulciret vel sustineret, *στήλη* non *κίων* fuerat; quas male confudit Eustathius; et pejus interpretes ejus Ernesti *πέριξ* ad interiorem, non exteriorem, tholi superficiem retulit<sup>15</sup>.

Tholum hunc aediculam fuisse rotundam, lapidibus exstructam, inter domum et murum exteriorum, planè liquet: sed usum ejus, secretiorem forsitan et minus honestum, quum poeta non indicaverit, nullo modo nunc scire licet.

Similia formis fortasse, etsi majora, fuerunt cubicula illa, sibi invicem vicina, et separata tamen, et sub tectis singula singulis; quae principis filii et generi, cum sua quisque uxore, tenebant; haud aliter quam Afrorum interiorem, circa Nigrum fluvium, uxores, suum quaeque tugurium, juxta mariti communis aedes, hodie tenent<sup>16</sup>. Ejusmodi fuisse videtur Telemachi cubiculum<sup>17</sup>; necnon et illi sexaginta duo *θάλαμοι πλήσιοι ἀλλήλοις* circum Priami regiam constructi<sup>18</sup>. In ea tamen columnae nequaquam memorantur; et quum saxis dolatis vel asciatis, *ξεστοῖο λίθοιο*, parietes omnino exstructi essent, pilae, e lapide angulari, earum forte vice fungebantur, tam intrinsecus quam extrinsecus.

Separata ista aedificia, sive cubicula, sive tholos, culminibus fastigiatis tecta esse, forma rotunda suadet; atque ita forte extremas domus ipsius partes, atrio medio, utrimque junctas; ut in templis posthæc citandis; nam ejusmodi contignationes, in aedificiis etiam majoribus, poetæ et audientibus satis notas esse, e comparatione earum cum luctantibus Ajace et Ulysse, planè liquet<sup>19</sup>. In secretiore domus secessu dormiebant Menelaus et Helena<sup>20</sup>; at Ulysses et Penelope

<sup>14</sup> Od. A. 127. p. 29. X: 466.

<sup>16</sup> Parke's Journey.

<sup>18</sup> Il. Z. 242, &c.

<sup>20</sup> Od. Δ. 304—5.

<sup>15</sup> Vide Proleg. s. xlvii.

<sup>17</sup> Od. A. 425.

<sup>19</sup> Il. Ψ. 712.



foris, inter separatas ædiculas, cubiculum habuisse videntur; ancilla enim, lecto strato, domum, οἶκονδε, redibat<sup>21</sup>.

In porticibus, inter columnas externas et parietes, equi et jumenta ad præsepia, et currus parietibus innixi, πρὸς ἐνώπια, stetisse videntur; atque ubi nihil erat ejusmodi, ut in Ithaca, molæ versatiles; quibus, in Ulyssis ædibus, duodecim ancillæ triticum ad procos pascendos continuo molehant: vestibulo enim, quo pernoctabat ille, ita vicinæ erant, ut vocem precantis audire posset; et in loco sic aperto, ut molinaria relictæ cœlum circumspiceret; et sic simul ab imbre tectæ, ut opus nihil molestiæ vel impedimenti ab eo acciperet<sup>22</sup>.

Columnas, et internas et externas, striatas fuisse ut hastæ iis innixæ, aliaque ejusmodi, commodè et securè restarent, jampridem demonstrare conatus sum<sup>23</sup>; atque μεσόδμας spatia fuisse atrii media, inter utramque columnarum seriem, quum nomen ipsum, tum usus earum in navibus, vix dubitare sinit. In nave malus eum locum obtinebat, atque in æde forsitan caminus, pilis suffultus.

Ex hujusmodi ædificiis, tam rudi simplicitate, in usum et commodum communem et vulgarem hominum incultorum et agrestium, constructis, templa illa deorum, quæ posteri, tam sumptuosa magnificentia et exquisita elegantia, ubique condiderunt et ornarunt, formas primarias accepisse videntur: nam in tres partes, πρόδομον, νᾶον, et ὀπισθόδομον, perinde atque ædes principum antiquiorum, dividebantur; quarum media, νᾶος, quæ atrii locum tenebat, in majoribus plerisque, aperta ad cœlum, ὑπαίθρια, patebat, ut atrium solario tantum tegebatur; dum duas extremas, in utrisque, testudinatis tectas esse, ratio utilitatis in his, ut exempla extantia in illis, planè arguit<sup>24</sup>: lectarum enim fœminarum cubicula et conclavia cura atque opera majore a pluviis et frigoribus tuenda erant quam virorum triclinia, interdum tantum occupata. Distributio quoque columnarum, et intus et circa parietes, eadem in utrisque fuisse videtur; necnon et τέμενος sacrum, sive ἱερόν, eodem modo septum quo αὐλὴ Homérica.

In templis autem, testudinata tegulis marmoreis vel lateritiis obducta erant; dum in ædibus regiis priorum temporum,

<sup>21</sup> Od. Ψ. 291.

<sup>22</sup> Od. Υ. 105, &c.

<sup>23</sup> Proleg. s. xlvii.

<sup>24</sup> Vide Pæsti fan. maj. et alia Dorica antiqua.



et ea et solaria assibus tantum tabulata; atque altera illa cubicula, extrinsecus posita, culmis fortè vel stipulis tecta: nam, in ea inscitia rerum, neque calx, neque lateres coctiles noti omnino esse videntur; at facile semper et in promptu erat tabulas, resina et arena permixtis, conglutinare; et rimas et interstitia obturare et opplere.

His omnibus consideratis, mihi pro comperto est, Græcos veteres tam elegantias quam rudimenta artis ex utilitatis ratione et experientia omnino traxisse; neque ab Ægyptiis, aut Phœniciis, aut ulla alia externa gente, aliquid momenti aut didicisse, aut mutuum accepisse. Ædes hominum ad vitæ necessitudines et consuetudines, locorum commoditates, et cœli temperiem, aptatæ erant; atque deorum ædes ad earum similitudinem, structura duntaxat firmiore, materia stabiliore, et spatio ampliore, ut cœlestibus, immortalibus, et omnipotentibus convenirent, ædificatæ sunt; omnibus auctis, et quæ ligno facta erant, lapide exstructis; at forma tamen et distributione antiqua, ut in sacra e profanis translata, religiosè retenta.

Columnæ ipsæ magnitudine duntaxat et materia differabant; quippe antiquiores, quæ singulæ e singulis arborum truncis fiebant, et ligneam tantum contignationem parvi ponderis sustinebant, graciliores proculdubio pro altitudine erant, quam ullas ullius ordinis esse ratio artis adulta sineret: neque altitudinem earum ultra viginti pedum mensuram utilitas, quæ tunc omnia ejusmodi præfiniebat, productam esse patetur. Paxillorum igitur, quam columnarum, nomine digniores, hoc nostro æstimante seculo, haberentur.

Quum trabes ligneæ pro ἐπιστυλίοις iis imponendæ essent, non solum graciliores et tenuiores, sed rariores etiam, esse licebat, et magis a se invicem distare; cujus formæ et distributionis, in ligneis ædificiis elegantioribus, usum, Cæsaribus etiam imperantibus, haud prorsus exolevisse, ex Herculani picturis planè liquet<sup>25</sup>.

<sup>25</sup> Tab. xxxix, &c.



## OGYGES.

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THOUGH it would be quite contrary to the design and spirit of this Miscellany to make it a stage for controversy, it does not exclude amicable criticism on any part of its own contents. We need therefore offer no apology for the remarks we are about to make on one of the essays in our last number, which contains some opinions on a mythological question from which we find ourselves compelled to dissent. We do this with the less hesitation because on such subjects the only chance of approaching the truth, which is perhaps the utmost that is within our reach, is by investigating it in various directions, and examining it from many different points of view: and we feel sure that if in the present instance a comparison of the opinion we are about to propose or rather to defend with that to which it is opposed should throw any light on the subject, there is no one to whom the result will be more welcome than to the author of the abovementioned essay. We speak of the article *on the early Kings of Attica*, and of the hypothesis maintained in it on the name and history of Ogyges. We begin by taking common ground with J. K. on the main question concerning this personage, whom we also assume to be merely fabulous. In the mind of Raoul Rochette, and perhaps of many others, he is, we are aware, quite as much a historical person as Hugh Capet: and since, as it has been well observed, "we want certain acknowledged criteria, by which to distinguish between what is mythical and what is historical: and these, it will not be easy to find:" (Dr Arnold *Thucydides* Preface Vol. II. p. xiv.) it is possible that we may never be able to prove the contrary, any more than we can now. But as there is no saying how long we may have to wait for the decisive criteria, we take, as we freely give, the liberty of forming a provisional opinion on the subject, and presuming



king Ogyges to be a creature of fiction, we confine ourselves to the inquiry: what may have been the cause of his name having been placed at the head of the list of Attic Kings.

According to J. K. Ogyges, a lengthened form of Gyges, signifies a man of darkness, being derived from the noun γυγη which was equivalent to σκότος. This would appear indeed to be something more than conjecture, if we could rely on the present reading in Hesychius, in the words Γυγαιή νύξ, ἡ σκοτεινή. But we are rather surprised that J. K., who quotes another gloss of the same lexicographer, Ωλυγίων, σκοτεινων should not have been struck with the inference which it suggests against the genuineness of the word γυγαιή, for which the editors of Hesychius with one accord have proposed to substitute λυγαίη. Still it would not follow, if this connection is admitted, that Ὠγύγιος may not originally have signified *dark*. Who can say, if Alberti's suspicion is well founded, and we ought to read the gloss Γύη, γῆ, after γυγαιή, that γυγαιός may not have been derived from γύη, and have been equivalent to χθόνιος, which might answer J. K's purpose even better than the etymology which he adopts. But leaving this in its present uncertainty, we proceed to consider the arguments produced in confirmation of the lexicographer's very questionable evidence. Calypso's island was named Ὠγυγίη, and it was "situated on the furthest verge of the West, the region of the evening shades," and "the goddess herself appears from her name to have been originally a being presiding over darkness." From this it is inferred that the sense of *dark* suits very well the Homeric application of the name to Calypso's island. I must own that the force of this inference appears to me to be considerably weakened by the fact, that however near Homer may have imagined Calypso's island to have been to the region of the evening shades, he does not represent it as itself dark or gloomy: and whatever he may have thought of the proper functions of the nymph, he does not describe her as withdrawing her charms from view. To any eye but that of Ulysses Ogygia would have seemed a very cheerful place; for it is one on which even a god might gaze with delight, and which by its beauty arrests the steps of Hermes when he is bearing his message (Od. E. 75): and the hero is well aware how inferior his Penelope



is in personal attractions to Calypso (ibid. 216). To the poet of the Odyssey therefore the names of Ogygia and Calypso can scarcely have suggested the notion of darkness, or at least he did not intend they should do so to others. Still it may be conceived that, in the work of some elder poet, Ogygia had really been used to signify the dark island, and that Calypso was an invisible goddess, but that Homer, while he retained the names, transported the place and the person into the light of day. What it was that procured the name  $\Omega\gamma\acute{\upsilon}\gammaιον$  for the mountain mentioned by the writer of whom Apollodorus spoke, in illustrating the ignorance of geography and the tendency to fable which he found in authors later than Homer, we can now no more ascertain than the position in which it was placed: but it may have stood very close to the abode of the Gorgons and the Hesperides, without being wrapped in darkness: neither in this case nor in the other have we anything more than a bare possibility that the name Ogygian may once have been equivalent to *dark*. As little can we safely determine from a single feature in the legend of Gyges, what the one was to which he was indebted for his name. The son of  $\text{Οὐρανός}$  and  $\Gamma\eta$  mentioned in the Theogony was probably not  $\Gamma\acute{\upsilon}\gammaης$ , but  $\Gamma\acute{\upsilon}\etaς$ , *Membro*, as Hermann translates the name in his dissertation de Mythol. Græc. antiq. (Opusc. II. p. 176.) referring to Bentley's note on Horace Carm. II. xvii. 14. which shews the necessity of the emendation. Muretus (Var. Lect. vi. 13.) found  $\Gamma\acute{\upsilon}\etaς$  in several manuscripts of Hesiod, which he describes as *optimæ notæ*.

A great step however would be taken toward determining the primitive meaning of the word  $\acute{\omega}\gamma\acute{\upsilon}\gammaιος$ , if it could be shewn to have been used in the sense of *dark* by Æschylus and Pindar; for we could hardly hesitate to consider this as earlier than the other of *ancient*, which is commonly supposed to be the only one found at least in the poets after Homer. And it must be admitted that in the passage which J. K. cites from the Eumenides 1039, where the Furies are invited to go  $\gamma\acute{\alpha}s \acute{\upsilon}\pi\omicron \kappa\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\nu \acute{\omega}\gamma\upsilon\gamma\iota\omicron\iota\sigma\iota$ , the sense of *dark* is very applicable; but whether it is the only one that suits the context, or does so better than any other, remains to be seen. The same epithet is applied to the woody mountains of Phlius by Pindar Nem. vi.  $\alpha\sigma\kappa\iota\omicron\iota\varsigma \Phi\lambda\iota\omicron\upsilon\acute{\nu}\tau\omicron\varsigma \acute{\upsilon}\pi' \acute{\omega}\gamma\upsilon\gamma\iota\omicron\iota\varsigma$



ὄρεσι. Here however J. K. appears to think that it ought to be translated not *dark*, but *Ogygian*, that is connected with certain ancient institutions founded by Ogyges; for at Celeæ, near Phlius, were celebrated nocturnal rites, similar to those of Eleusis. Now it is to a supposed connexion between Ogyges and the Eleusinian mysteries that J. K. ascribes the place which he fills at the head of the kings of Attica. Darkness is the prominent character of the mysteries: hence their founder was an *Ogyges*, a man of darkness. I do not find it distinctly explained in J. K's essay, why, on this supposition, Ogyges was made the *first* king of Attica: since the introduction of the mysteries was according to all the legends of comparatively late date. Perhaps however the author considers this seeming inconsistency sufficiently reconciled by his remark, that Ogyges properly belonged not to Attica but to Bœotia, from which the mysteries themselves were imported to Eleusis: this we may suppose led the Attic mythographers to place Ogyges as far back as possible in their list.

The main question however is: what reason we have for connecting the name of Ogyges with the Eleusinian mysteries: for if Pindar could use the epithet Ogygian of the Phliasian mountains, because Eleusinian rites were celebrated in a neighbouring town, Ogyges must have been very intimately associated with these rites. The first trace of such an association which J. K. points out, is a genealogy of the hero Eleusis, whom the Eleusinians named as the founder of their city, and who, according to one account, was a son of Ogygus. Then the Eleusinian religion came from Bœotia—for in that country there was an ancient Eleusis, and out of it Eumolpus came into Attica—and Ogyges was king of Bœotia, or at least, as he gave his name to the Ogygian gate, of Thebes, the Ogygian city. But it must be observed that all this does not in the slightest degree connect Ogyges with the Eleusinian religion: for the Eleusinians themselves, though, with a licentiousness of fiction which even Pausanius cannot tolerate (I. 38. 7.), they made their hero Eleusis a son of Ogyges, still did not ascribe any share in the foundation of their mysteries either to Eleusis or his father; and if we inquire about the motive which suggested this fiction to them, none



certainly appears more probable than the wish to exalt the antiquity of their city by ascribing its origin to the son of the first king of Attica. But neither does the fact, if assumed, that the Eleusinian religion travelled out of Bœotia into Attica, raise so much as a shade of reasonable suspicion that any particular king, either of all Bœotia or of Thebes, was the author of the religion, or derived his name from its rites. If Ogyges was only king of Thebes, he would seem to be even positively excluded from all share in them: for their Thracian founders are not represented as having inhabited Thebes, nor is Ogyges connected with the Bœotian Eleusis, though if he had been, this would not bring him into any relation with the rites of Ceres, which are nowhere as far as I remember said to have been celebrated there. The allusion which Euripides, in the passage quoted by J. K. from the *Phœnissæ*, 694, appears to make to the worship of Ceres at Thebes, if that was the poet's meaning, does not bear upon the present question, since it is not accompanied by any mention of Ogyges. The case would indeed be different if Ogyges had ever been represented as the father of Proserpine; but though *Πραξιδίκη* is a title given to that goddess in an Orphic hymn, and though Panyasis sang of Tremilus that he married *Νύμφην Ὠγυγίην ἣν Πραξιδικὴν καλέουσι Σίβρῳ ἐπ' ἀργυρέῳ ποταμῷ παρὰ δινήεντι* (Steph. Byz. *Τρεμιλη*), this does not seem to establish an identity or even an affinity between the Lycian river-nymph and the daughter of Ceres, nor to connect the Theban Ogyges with either of them. The digression therefore in which J. K. proceeds to compare the name of Ogyges with that of Orpheus, and other founders of mystic rites, though it contains a number of ingenious combinations, is one into which we cannot accompany him, because we have not yet found any point to start from as the ground of the comparison. We still want some one piece of authentic evidence to warrant the conjecture, that Ogyges had anything to do with the Eleusinian mysteries, for which at present we cannot discover any kind of foundation.

The question then: how Ogyges came by his place in the list of the Attic kings, requires a different answer. That which we are about to propose or rather to defend has one advantage over the hypothesis just examined, in setting out from



certain acknowledged premises. We begin by inquiring what it is that Ogyges is renowned for in the mythical story of Attica. The great event with which his name is there connected is the most ancient deluge, long preceding that of Deucalion, and placed by those chronologers who contended that the most ancient epochs in Greek history were later than Moses, at the time of the departure of the Israelites out of Egypt: some Christian writers, who adopted the statement of Theopompus that the Athenians were an Egyptian colony, saw in the Attic deluge a visitation, by which the people of Attica suffered for the sins of their kinsmen in Egypt (Syncell. i. p. 121. Bonn.) With the nature, causes, and extent of this calamity however we have here no concern; there are only two points which we have to observe in it. In the first place this ancient flood seems to belong as much to Attica as to Bœotia, and there is no need for the hypothesis that it was strictly speaking confined to the Bœotian plains, but compelled their inhabitants to take refuge in the Attic highlands. In the next place, as indeed follows from the preceding remark, Ogyges in both countries is one and the same person: he is very correctly described as an ancient king of Attica, who gave his name to the Ogygian gate at Thebes, (Etym. M. Eudoc.) And this again ought not to tempt us to undertake accurately to define the extent of his dominions. It is not the land, but the water which covered it in his time that has made him known to us. Still we must not suppress a fact which is recorded of his reign, and which affords more countenance to J. K's hypothesis than some which he has produced for that purpose. According to some accounts Ogyges himself founded Eleusis. (Syncell. p. 119. Bonn.) We have however already stated the reasons which prevent us from laying any stress on this statement, which we conceive was only meant to enhance the glory of Eleusis, and not to unfold anything as to the character of Ogyges. At the same time it is proper to remark, for the sake of those persons who take an interest in this portion of ancient history, and who may be perplexed by the discrepancy of traditions relating to it, that the account which makes Ogyges founder of Eleusis is perfectly consistent with that mentioned by Pausanias. The king himself may have founded



the town, and have named it after the prince. For the present however we are proceeding on a different assumption: and while we wait for those criteria which may perhaps at some future time ascertain the historical reality of Ogyges, we venture to treat him as a mere creature of the imagination, and inquire into the process by which he acquired his name. If we are not mistaken in our view of his character, his name must have been derived not from any religious rites by which either Thebes or Eleusis were afterwards distinguished, but from the great convulsion which marked his reign. The proposition implied in his name is not, as it would be on J. K's hypothesis, that the Eleusinian mysteries were established from time immemorial in Attica: this would contradict the current legend without any adequate cause: it is, that the waters once covered the face of Attica, which at length emerged from them and became a habitable region. If this is what the name of Ogyges imports, its signification can be no other than that of *man of the flood*, and all that we have to consider is, whether its etymology or its affinities justify us in affixing this sense to it. And here it appears to us that without appealing to any doubtful text, we can shew that it suggests this meaning quite as naturally as that of darkness: and that if we deny the claim of Ogyges to any participation in the gloomy rites in which J. K. has initiated him, we make him ample amends by introducing him into a family of the highest antiquity, the members of which are all more or less connected with the humid element.

I have already intimated that it is not a new thought which I am here suggesting: on the contrary it may be considered as the received opinion, and all that I have to do is to explain and illustrate it, and to shew that it is in perfect harmony with all those facts and allusions which led J. K. to his hypothesis. The same view is adopted by Mr Keightley in his *Mythology*, p. 269. where he observes that Ogyges is *a personification of water*. If the plan of his excellent work had required or permitted him to dwell on this subject he would have discussed it in a manner which would have rendered the following remarks superfluous. But in another passage p. 250. he has pointed out the great family to which the name of Ogyges belongs and has mentioned some of its



members, at the same time that he gives the true explanation of the name of Calypso's island. He observes in a note: "Calypso signifies *the concealed*. Ogygia is a word of the same family with Oceanus or Ogenius, Ogyges, Ægæan Achelous, *acqua* &c.—all relating to *water*." With regard to the form of the name it is only necessary to observe that according to a conjecture of Buttmann's, the truth of which can scarcely be doubted, Ogyges is only a reduplication of the radical syllable which we find with slight variations in all the abovementioned names. Buttmann (Mythology i. 206.) compares ἔτυμος, ἐτήτυμος. ὄνημι ὀνίνημι. ὄπτω, ὀπιπτεύω. ἄταλός, ἀτιτάλλω. These instances are certainly sufficient to remove all objections that can be made on this score to the identity of Ogyges and Oceanus or Ogen, as the name is spelt in Hesychius: Ὠγήν, Ὠκεανός. In name Ogyges approaches even still nearer to the Carian god Ogoa, and, if the former is no other than Ocean, they seem also to agree in nature. For Ogoa must have been a marine God, as we learn from Pausanias (viii. 10. 4.) that there was a salt spring in his temple at Mylasa, as in the Erechtheum at Athens, and in the temple of *Poseidon* at Mantinea. It does not therefore seem necessary to suppose with J. K. that "a confusion of Ogyges with the Jupiter Ogoa of the Carians produced the genealogy mentioned by Steph. Byz. Ὠγυγία by which he was made the son of Termera." The genealogy may be explained without separating the two persons more widely than the Attic Ogyges, who reigns at the flood, from the god Ocean. In Asia as in Greece the king of the gods, as Ogyges is called by the Scholiast in Hesiod quoted by Buttmann, became king of the land. As such in Lycia he might be called a son of Termera, which amounts to little more than the title of αὐτοχθών in Attica. The Carian Ogoa and the Lycian Ogyges naturally remind us of the Lydian Gyges whom J. K. has enlisted in the service of his hypothesis. His name and story raise many difficult questions: but on the whole he seems as likely to prove a serviceable ally to the liquid as to the mystic race. Unfortunately it is not absolutely certain that he is the person of whom Plato relates the marvellous legend in the Republic p. 359. But if the resemblance between this and the story in Herodotus should seem to justify us, in opposition to the



reading of the manuscripts, in assigning the name of Ogyges to the fortunate shepherd who descended into the bosom of the earth when it had been reft by rain and earthquake, and there found the magic ring which rendered him invisible at pleasure, we perceive nothing in all this that might not well have happened to Ogyges himself. For not only do the flood and the earthquake properly belong to him; the power of becoming invisible is also an essential attribute of marine deities: and the hero of the legend only possesses this Protean quality, and is not wrapt in perpetual darkness.

Here however it may be proper to anticipate an objection which may possibly suggest itself to some readers, who are conversant with Homer, or who have read Mr Keightley's interesting chapter on Mythic cosmology. Homer speaks of Ocean as a river and according to the view which Mr Keightley has adopted (see his *Mythology* p. 35.) it was only by later poets that its waters were dilated into a sea. The writers however who have taken the greatest pains to explain Homer's cosmology have left it very uncertain how far his ideas were precisely fixed on this subject. He undoubtedly imagined the water on the edge of the earth to flow round in a perennial current<sup>1</sup> but whether it was in any other sense a river, or separated by a bank from the inner sea, is not clear. Nor does it seem certain that Homer conceived the water of Ocean to be incapable of mingling with any other streams or floods. For this is too much to infer from the description of the Titaresius, which because it is a branch of the Styx, itself a part of Ocean, floats like oil on the surface of the Peneus (*Iliad* II. 754.) I find no other proof of the proposition given in Voelcker's excellent work (*Homerische Geographie*). It seems probable that Calypso's island was called Ogygia because, though not in the current, it lay in the Ocean, and such also appears to have been the meaning of the epithet applied to the mountain in Apollodorus. But however this may be there can be no doubt that in the imagination of the Greeks, even before

<sup>1</sup> The reading τῶ Γύγῃ is recognized by Eudocia p. 99. In considering the character of Gyges we must not forget the perennial lake in Herodotus I. 93.—λίμνη τὴν λέγουσι Λυδοὶ αἰῖναον εἶναι· καλεῖται δὲ αὕτη Γυγαίη, nor that γύγῃς means a water fowl.



Homer, all parts of the world of waters were intimately connected together. From his inexhaustible fountain father Ocean fed the salt seas, and the fresh rivers: his streams trickled through subterraneous veins, and gushed out from the side of distant hills. Perhaps too his floods spread under the foundations of the earth, and made it quake with their surges. (Il. xxi. 196.) Hence both Calypso and Praxidice, though not Proserpine, are Ogygian nymphs, and we may add that when Eleusis was called by some the son of Ogyges, while others made him to be the son of Daira, this was only a difference of one step in the same genealogy, since Daira, as Pausanias informs us (i. 38. 7.), was herself the daughter of Oceanus.

It is scarcely necessary to observe that the transition from this notion of the epithet Ogygian with which it is applied to the island and the mountain, to that of *ancient*, is at least as simple and natural as that which J. K. suggests. Ogygian means that which is as old as the flood, the beginning of things. Still there may be some doubt about the precise reference of the epithet in the passages cited by J. K. and in some others. But it seems to be applied by Pindar to the mountains of Phlius in a sense very similar to that which must be given to it in the line of Dionysius 523, ὠγυγίη τε Θάσος, Δημήτερος ἀκτὴ: where it is to be hoped the mention of Ceres will not seduce any one to think of the Eleusinian mysteries<sup>2</sup>. It denotes a seat of ancient wealth and renown, as in the line of the Philoctetes (142), where it is applied to the hereditary dominion of Neoptolemus (κράτος ὠγύγιον). It may seem less clear why the poet gives the same epithet to the river Ladon (415). This might appear to be an application immediately derived from the primitive meaning of the word, rather than from the myth by which Eustathius explains it: that Daphne, the first mortal, sprang from Ladon and Earth. But until we have ascertained that Dionysius never used the word as an unmeaning ornament, it will not be safe to speculate on this point.

<sup>2</sup> Notwithstanding the remark in Eudocia: ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ τὴν Δήμητραν μεγάλῳς ἐτίμων. Eustathius is more rational: τὴν Θάσον ὠγυγίην λέγει καὶ Δήμητρος δὲ ἀκτὴν, διὰ τὸ εὐδαιμον τῆς νήσου καὶ εὐκαρπον.



If these conjectures are well founded, the name of Ogyges will suggest the notion of a physical event, which, by a process familiar to the human mind in all countries, has been transformed into a historical one. What we gain from the name however is not the knowledge of the fact, but merely of the belief which anciently prevailed about it. How this arose is a different question, which admits of many answers. On the other hand in attempting to exclude Ogyges from that class of persons in which J. K. has numbered him, we do not deny its existence, though the claim of each individual to be admitted into it must be tried on its own grounds. The proposition that so large a portion of the Greek mythology, as it would appear from J. K's hypotheses, was stamped with a mystic and sacerdotal character, is one that requires to be carefully examined before it is embraced. On this subject the reader will find some interesting remarks by Mr Keightley, p. 142, who in a short compass exhibits the main features of the antimystical view of the question. We regret that he has there assumed as an admitted fact an assertion of Lobeck's, which, if we remember right, has been corrected by Mueller, and which rests only on a misapprehension of the words of Herodotus, i. 37: that Eleusis and Athens were independent of each other till the time of Solon. But this is one of the few blemishes which we hope will speedily disappear in a second edition of his work.

C. T.

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## NIEBUHR ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANNALS AND HISTORY.

(FROM THE RHEINISCHES MUSEUM.)

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IT is well known that the definition of these two titles of historical works is one of the lexicographical problems which Gellius (v. 18.) has attempted to solve with more learning than thought. He may have been led to it by dipping in Verrius Flaccus, yet it is certainly no excess of refinement to conjecture that the inducement to it was supplied by the occurrences of his own day. From the manner in which he speaks of Fronto (xix. 8.) we are led to presume that he was no longer living when his warmhearted pupil set about expanding and trimming up his extracts into his amusing essays. If so, Lucius Verus had already returned from the Parthian war: consequently the flood of historical works which that war occasioned had already burst forth. It is impossible that Latin writers should not have had their full share in them: and of these some may have given the title of *Annals*, others that of *Histories*, to their works, without any cause known either to themselves or to their readers. But neither do I see any reason for doubting that Gellius had the writings of Tacitus in his eye: for as to his making no quotations from them, this resulted from the nature and contents of the *Noctes Atticæ*. It is possible that the two works of Tacitus which bear the abovementioned titles may have occasioned the inquiry: what the distinction was which they were meant to denote; and it followed from the nature of his studies, that he searched for the opinions of others on the words, without investigating the meaning of Tacitus.



Since the revival of literature this inquiry has often been renewed, and the answers proposed have generally been drawn from the remarks of Gellius coupled with an opinion delivered with a very authoritative air, in Servius (ad *Æn.* i. 373). All this is too well known and too obvious to be worth transcribing: but it may not be superfluous to shew why it is not satisfactory.

We shall leave wholly out of the question the observation of Sempronius Asellio: that he aimed at something higher in his memoirs than the Annals, which related nothing but wars and triumphs, and were ignorant of the causes of events, and silent about the policy of the government and the objects of the laws. It is true that the pontifical Annals could not go beyond this, nor could the sage Coruncanius himself have written otherwise: for who would have presumed, in tables exposed to public view, to pronounce judgement on the senate or the tribunes, and to weigh the laudableness and wisdom of their proceedings? But this jejuneness of the ancient annals is no reason for questioning the propriety of assigning the same title to those of Tacitus, notwithstanding the deep views they contain.

We should rather say that, as Gellius himself very clearly perceived, every narrative of events digested according to years may admit of this title in the larger sense: only it does not follow from this that a history like that of Tacitus should not observe the same arrangement, any more than that a narrative so distributed necessarily belongs in a peculiar sense to the class of annals, or that it always may be so named without doing violence to one's sense of propriety in language. Cæsar's Commentaries are not Annals, though the books and the years correspond to each other.

From the earliest times there have been two ways of transmitting the knowledge of events. In the one it is done progressively, by recording what takes place under the years in which it occurred: unconnectedly, without any combination with the past or any preparation for the future: by noting all that engages attention for the present, without paying any regard to its nature, or considering how soon it may become utterly immaterial. The other way is by comprehensive narratives, the subject of which is entire and complete: these do



not need any limitation of time, at least for the details, and reject it whenever it interferes with the main design: they exclude everything that is connected with their subject by no other link than unity of time; but as they embrace everything that is essentially germane to the matter, so they may be embellished with episodes, for which there is no room in the records of the other class. The latter confine themselves to the bare mention of the names of persons, nations, and cities, because the things they treat of are as familiar to countrymen and contemporaries for whose sake alone they are recorded, as to the authors themselves: but *Narratives* describe and explain, in order to present the distant, the past, and the unknown, clearly and vividly to the hearer's imagination.

Records such as those above described, are annals or chronicles: for narratives usage has not stamped any such precise term, but I will venture to appropriate the name of histories to them. It is only at the outset that the two kinds are distinctly opposed to one another: they are then separated by a great waste: no sooner however does literature begin to make progress, than cultivation is applied on both sides, and advances, until the confines of the two provinces become ambiguous. Chronicles sometimes rise up to an animated history, and even unfold and illustrate themselves in episodes; though they carefully limit every narration within the circle of a year, and throw together contemporaneous occurrences, however heterogeneous, in motley disorder. On the other hand a history, fully worthy of the name, like that of Thucydides or Polybius, may observe the annual periods very exactly. But it excludes whatever in its nature is alien to the subject, mere records, and all that is interesting only to contemporaries, no less necessarily than an epic poem.

Everywhere it begins as a species of epic poem, and then its province lies in the remote past. But in time the deeds of an early generation grow foreign to their refined and altered posterity, who deem themselves a superior race: while the present, as it is more clearly surveyed, acquires greater importance in their eyes, than that of their forefathers had in theirs: it then invites to descriptions intended for distant regions and afterages. It is long ere a man arises who contemplates great events with the purpose of writing a history of



them when the movement has come to an end. A narrative from which no one demands minute fidelity, which treats the traditional materials of a history with perfect freedom, like scenes in a painting, may be framed with as little art as a poem formed out of a mythological dream; and on the other hand its opposite, the genuine and accurate reflex of a period which the writer has lived through with thoughtful attention, is no less complete and copious. But if we ever make an attempt to relate the events of the times of our fathers and grandfathers, with scrupulous fidelity and minuteness, we find the colours fail, the outlines become unsteady: we miss that firm conviction which guides the hand of one who is describing what he has witnessed, and which, even when it is in error, produces something which hesitating indecision can never reach. Not that this is unattainable for one who, with the aid of an ample experience, transports himself by reflexion into the past: but it required a greater effort to write the *Jugurtha* than the *Catiline*.

A dim notion of this condition, without which a history cannot live and breathe, was the foundation of the definition in *Servius*, according to which history is a narrative of contemporary events: only it is a false contrast that is drawn from it, when it is said that annals relate the events of earlier times, and that *Livy's* work consisted of annals and history. Most writers perhaps have been satisfied with this explanation: among the rest *Gronovius* declares himself so: and even *Grotius* must have held it to be the only right one. For he divides his history of the Netherlands into *Annals* and *History*, and begins the latter from the time of his own birth: in the *Annals* he often does not distinguish the years at all, still less does he mention them in the narrative, so that if the numbers were not annexed in the margin, the reader would not know the dates: as to the other peculiar characteristics of this kind of narrative, which *Tacitus* observes, we find no trace of them in him: the unity of the commotion and insurrection in the Netherlands excludes everything beside.

It is probable that those who have defended the definition in *Servius*, have interpreted it in general according to the division here adopted by *Grotius*: and this great man would certainly not have suffered authority to prescribe to him in the



arrangement of his excellent work, unless his clear understanding had confirmed the correctness of this view. And in truth the time of independent observation and perception begins with our riper youth: childhood is not only unable to think for itself, but scarcely heeds even a general calamity, and quickly forgets it. But I conceive that with everyone there is an essential difference between public events which a man recollects, though only as in a dream, to have heard of at the time they occurred, and those which preceded his birth; the former we think of with reference to ourselves, the latter are foreign to us: the epoch and duration of the former we measure by our own life: the latter belong to a period for which our imagination has no scale. Thus in the former case, life and definiteness are imparted to all that we hear or read on the subject: above all with respect to the events of our boyhood, when every man, who is formed by nature to comprehend the occurrences of history, passionately embraces or loathes things which, as apprehended by a child, were indeed mere names: though it is such names that exercise a magic power, from which nothing but mature judgement can secure us.

Still the explanation is good for nothing as a general definition. For in what class should we reckon Sallust's *Jugurtha*, which in its construction is studiously opposed to the annalistic form? and in what the greater part at least of the history of Herodotus, even though a portion might be excepted, from the probability that he was born at the time of the expedition of Xerxes. On the other hand, the pontifical annals drawn up year by year, and all contemporary chronicles, are by this definition converted into histories.

Had the last books of the *Histories* of Tacitus, those in which he described Domitian's tyranny, come down to us, it would have been clear how he treated two periods of similar character, one in the *Annals*, the other in the *Histories*: the period contained in the books preserved of the latter work, admits of no comparison with that which is the subject of the *Annals*.

The *Histories* were the story of the Flavian line: they begin, not with the fall of Nero, but with the mutiny of the legions of Germany, which opened the series of events that



led Vespasian to declare himself. Here therefore is an epic unity: and it was a history devoid perhaps of great men, but in its early part full of mighty events, which made a deep impression on the youthful soul of Tacitus. A young man of his character was assuredly an ardent partisan of Vespasian, so long as the object was to extirpate the monsters of the court of Nero, and to remove a wretch like Vitellius; and in the dreary reality of the government finally established, he no doubt still clearly perceived that there was reason to thank heaven for deliverance from the misery of the preceding period; for though Domitian at last exercised a like tyranny, still the age was somewhat improved: it had sobered itself from the drunkenness of crime. For this narrative Tacitus needed neither to look to theories for a form, nor to seek long for a name: both presented themselves spontaneously.

When his work was completed, he may perhaps have felt a void, and have desired to produce another; and the people of that polite circle in the great world, which the letters of the younger Pliny place distinctly before our eyes, without inspiring us with any wish for their acquaintance, would never cease to press and intreat the great man who lived among them, not to be idle, and to write another history. As long as Trajan lived he could not wish to relate that which he had reserved for his old age: he decided on that of the half century from the death of Augustus to the beginning of his History.

If he had not completed the latter he would perhaps not have separated it any more than Livy from the narrative of the earlier period. But to have united the two, the beginning of the History must have been destroyed or altered; perhaps also many passages in the body of the work, and this without adequate cause. On the contrary, the form in which chance occasioned them to appear as two distinct works, was the most appropriate.

The difficulties which embarrass a historical narrative of times preceding that of the writer, were for those of Tiberius really insurmountable. Tiberius had succeeded, after Germanicus had quitted Germany, in reducing the world to a state of torpid stillness, and in overspreading it with the silence of the grave: its history is now confined to himself



and his unfortunate house, to the destruction of the victims of his tyranny, and the servitude of the senate. In this dreary silence we shudder, and speak in a whisper: all is dark, and wrapt in mystery, doubtful and perplexing. Was Germanicus poisoned? was Piso guilty? what urged him to his mad violence? did the son of Tiberius die of poison, Agrippina by the stroke of an assassin? all this was just as uncertain to Tacitus as to us.

For the history of a despot's reign, when it does not fall in times of great events, where his personal character is of little moment, biography is the most appropriate form; and to this Suetonius and his followers were led by the nature of the case. But perhaps Tacitus could not overcome the pain of degrading the history of Rome, in form as well as in substance, to a small part of the biography, not merely of a tyrant, who, though he had degenerated through vice, was designed by nature for great and salutary ends, and accomplished not a few, but of an unfortunate and depraved idiot, and of two monsters. It is also possible that the uniform usage of his predecessors, who seem all to have related the history of this period in the form of annals (*omnes annalium scriptores*, to whom are only opposed the memoirs of the younger Agrippina, Ann. iv. 53.); this form may have acquired such authority as the one best fitted to the period, that even the free mind of Tacitus decided without scrupulous consideration in its favour. But had he come to the execution of his plan, of writing the history of Augustus after the completion of the Annals, I have no doubt he would have chosen the form of biography for it. The passage in which he speaks of his intention evidently implies a complete work, not a continuation of Livy's, whose last books, a production of his old age, had rambled into inordinate diffuseness: and still, though what his generous spirit expressed, and what it kept back, excited the displeasure of the Ruler himself, he had not ventured to touch on the most important points. Tacitus had begun as a historian with a biography; he would then have ended with one, for he was probably never in earnest about his history of Trajan.

Now no one who reads the Annals from beginning to end, can fail to perceive in them the character of those which



originally bore this name; and this not as the result of accident, but most carefully preserved; with no more difference than between a Madonna of Cimabue and one of Raphael. Each year is kept strictly apart from the rest, so that the writer expressly declines mentioning occurrences which, according to the nature of the subject, would have found their proper place before the time when they happened (Ann. iv. 71): the course of events which occupy a longer period is always interrupted by the change of the year. In the compass of the year the most heterogeneous matters are recorded, often incidents of no moment, though still interesting for contemporaries: many which a *history* of the Romans and the Empire, if it did not entirely exclude them, would have placed in an episode. These manifold subjects are put side by side without any connexion: he rather avoids linking them together. No less deliberately does this great master of his art observe the character of the *record*, and preserve the distinction between it and a narrative which exhibits a comprehensive survey of its whole field. It is agreeably to this character that he gives only a partial account of events; sometimes omitting what the reader's thoughts may supply, sometimes, to avoid prolixity, singling out detached parts of that which, if given entire, would have taken up a large space. So much the clearer light does he endeavour to throw on the masses which he selects; this part of the Annals is like St Peter's seen under the illumination of the cross, where most parts of the building lie in darkness, and are invisible, while others are the more strongly delineated by the shadows which they bound: the history is rather recalled to our thoughts by the light of the sun, when it falls upon the same building through the great window of the tribune, and shews everything in broad day. It is true that even then this is not the clearness of objects seen under the open sky, in noontide brightness: as history is always less vividly coloured than a present reality, or the remembrance of it. The imperfection and hurry of the narrative in this work cannot always be defended, nor can it be denied that here Tacitus has sometimes erred. A painful effect, like that of a discord unresolved, is produced by his dropping the proceedings of the senate, before the decree on the power of Tiberius had put an end to their torment (Ann. i. 14); and



the campaigns of Germanicus, without any measure of time and place, float by us like a dream. In general, whatever censure may with any justice be passed upon him, affects these books: which are precisely those which his imitators have taken for their model. The *Histories* and the detached works seem to be proof against all objections.

The six books, beginning with the eleventh, are in the main free from these imperfections, but the character of *Annals* is less distinctly preserved in them: if I may pursue the preceding comparison, the dawn has already broken, and is growing brighter and brighter, so that the part which would have immediately touched upon the *History*, must have been in fact homogeneous with it. The lost books, between the two portions preserved to us, undoubtedly presented a transition maintained with a steady hand.

Now, as the narrative necessarily unfolded itself more and more freely as it approached the *Histories*, it is an unmeaning error to add the title of xvii. of the *Annals* to the first book of the *Histories*. That it is found in manuscripts is of the less importance, because, according to Lipsius, it appears there as an arrangement introduced by nameless hands (*secundum quosdam*); that is, by some sciolist of the fourteenth century, when philology was quite in its infancy. There is much better reason for conjecturing that the *Annals* contained full twenty books; more than four are not too many for the time that is wanting down to the commencement of the *History*. The occasion which has led many to adopt that absurd title, and which induced Querengo, cited by Fabricius, somewhat more considerately, to make the *Histories* begin with the eighteenth book of the *Annals*, is the wellknown passage of St Jerome, who states the number of the books from the death of Augustus to Nerva to be thirty. But Lipsius and Bayle have already observed, that the *Histories* must have contained far more books than the share of this number due to the *Annals* would leave for them. Bayle was very near a conjecture which I hold to be certain. It is probable that the *Histories* comprized thirty books, and that Jerome, by a very common oversight, mentioned the right number, but applied it erroneously to both works.



I conclude these remarks by asking, whether the title of the books of Livy: *historiarum ab urbe condita*, is founded on good manuscripts? The grammarians, Diomedes as well as Priscian, never cite otherwise than *Livius ab urbe condita libro*—and this would lead us to conjecture that the historian had added nothing more: perhaps that he might not use the title either of *annales* or *historiæ*: but as this inscription sounded very strange, it was filled up.

C. T.

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## HANNIBAL'S PASSAGE OVER THE ALPS.

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THE celebrated question of Hannibal's passage across the Alps has now for some years been suffered to sleep in this country, and it appears to be a pretty general persuasion that it has been finally set at rest. The result of General Melville's personal observations, illustrated by De Luc's learning, and confirmed by the investigations of an English traveller (the author of the Oxford *Dissertation on the Passage of Hannibal across the Alps*), was in 1825 repeated in the Edinburgh Review, and by the last writer (p. 182) is supposed to be placed beyond the reach of controversy. It is probable that the Reviewer, though he has certainly contributed less of argument to the cause than any of his predecessors, has produced more effect on the mind of the public than all of them put together, and that he has the chief merit in establishing the general conviction which seems at present to prevail, that Hannibal crossed the Alps by the passage of the little St Bernard. If the repose into which the controversy has subsided had been merely the result of weariness on the part of the disputants or of the public, we should have scrupled to add even a scrap to the enormous mass of literature which has been already piled upon this theme. But as those who have taken an interest in the question, and who are not wedded to the opinion they may have embraced, may like to know on what grounds arguments which to themselves had appeared decisive have not satisfied others, and by what means later inquirers have attempted to remove objections which they had thought fatal to a different view of the subject, we make no apology for reviving the discussion. Our design however is not to pursue the history of the controversy through the various works in which it has been carried on abroad since it has been dropped at home: an attempt for which we have neither space, means, nor inclination: we shall confine ourselves to a brief notice



of two hypotheses different from that which now enjoys the monopoly of public favour. One of these we are tempted to mention, rather by its singularity, than by its intrinsic merit, or by the force of the arguments employed in supporting it. The other deserves to be reconsidered, because it has been very lately defended with great ability by a writer whose opinion on the subject carries with it high authority, and in a work dedicated to the illustration of ancient geography. We must presume the reader to be sufficiently familiar with the principal points of the controversy to dispense with a great deal of preliminary explanation which may be found in a multitude of books, and which would detain us from the essential features of the question on which alone we have here room to dwell.

The first of the two hypotheses we are about to consider was proposed, we believe for the first time, in the *Wiener Jahrbuecher* for 1823, by a writer named Arneth, who at the same time examines at considerable length the opinions and arguments of the principal authors who had discussed the question before him. He recognizes the authority of Polybius as supreme in this inquiry, but contends that we cannot rely on the numbers which express the distances in stadia according to the present text. He quotes with approbation the remarks of the Oxford writer, who to get rid of the objection raised by Strabo's enumeration of the passes of the Alps according to Polybius, supposes, as Cluverius had done before, that the words ἣν Ἀννίβας διῆλθεν, which follow the mention of the pass διὰ Ταυρίνων, belong not to Polybius but to Strabo, and only express an opinion of the latter, which he had probably adopted from Livy. But he rejects the argument which De Luc draws from the later Roman roads across the Alps as fallacious. He observes that De Luc himself appears to acknowledge its weakness, when he admits that most of these roads were made in the time of the emperors. What inference, he asks, can be drawn, as to an event about the circumstances of which authors disagreed even at the time, from the existence of roads made some centuries later. The Edinburgh Reviewer rests his whole argument on this ground: for after mentioning the four roads which Strabo enumerates from Polybius, though without noticing the existence of the words, ἣν



Ἀρνίβας διήλθεν, he concludes that, as no one maintains that Hannibal crossed either by the Maritime or the Rhætian Alps, “the object of our search must ultimately be found to coincide either with Mont Genevre or the Little St Bernard.” It might have been asked: but why not with the Mont Cenis? De Luc replies that this is out of the question, because no Roman road passed over it. On which Arneth remarks, that by similar reasoning it might be shewn that it probably continues untrodden to the present day: for why should the ancients have adhered more constantly to the beaten tracks than the moderns? As Charlemagne led his armies across the Mont Cenis, without inquiring about the Roman roads, so the Romans might carry a road over the Little St Bernard, without troubling themselves about Hannibal’s route.

According to Arneth himself Hannibal crossed the Rhone near Pont St Esprit, and with the exception of the distance between Vienne and Yenne, where he took the shortest cut, never quitted the banks of that river till he reached the foot of the Simplon, by which passage he crossed the Alps, and descended into the territory of the Insubres near Milan. As this hypothesis diverges from General Melville’s still more widely than any that had preceded it, we are naturally curious to hear the grounds on which it rests. The author conceives that no other can be reconciled either with the circumstances of Hannibal, or with the statements of Polybius: in other words the course it points out was the most natural for Hannibal to take, and answers best to that which Polybius describes. The first of these assertions depends chiefly on a remark which had been made by the author of the *Dissertation*, but which Arneth thinks he has not consistently pursued to its legitimate consequences. The English writer observes: “the most rational and easy way to penetrate through a very extended chain of mountains is to trace the rivers which flow from them up to their sources, for subsistence and population are generally to be found on their banks, and the road is usually more easy and the ascent more gradual, &c.” true! exclaims the German reviewer, but why did not this remark lead the author to follow the course of the Rhone? Here he conceives is an insurmountable objection to the hypothesis which leads Hannibal across the Little St Bernard. It assigns no motive that



should have induced him to quit the basin of the Rhone: and hence he considers the route of the Great St Bernard as one step nearer to the truth. The former however labours under some other difficulties: as, the silence of Polybius about the Isere, the names of the tribes into whose territories it leads, which were not the Insubres, but either the Salassi, or the Lai and Lebecæ (Polyb. II. 17.) In the description of Polybius there are two features which strike him as the most important, and as affording a decisive criterion which no other hypothesis but his own will bear. In the first place Polybius describes the valley of the Rhone, and remarks that the plains of the Po are separated from it by the chain of the Alps, and adds that these were the mountains which Hannibal crossed from the country on the Rhone to enter into Italy (ἀκρώρειαι, ἃς τόθ' ὑπεράρας Ἀννίβας ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ῥοδανὸν τόπων ἐνέβαλεν εἰς Ἰταλίαν.) Hence it must have been from some point in the Valais that Hannibal effected his passage. This might indeed have been Martigny, if there had been no other objection to the Great St Bernard. But beside that the distances and features of the road do not correspond to the account of Polybius, and that Strabo informs us that this track was impassable for beasts of burden before the time of Augustus (Strabo says, IV. p. 205. ἡ διὰ τοῦ Ποινήνου λεγόμενου ζεύγεσιν οὐ βατὴ κατὰ τὰ ἄκρα τῶν Ἀλπεων), it would have brought Hannibal down into a different region from that which he sought, and found according to Polybius, who expressly states that after having accomplished the passage of the Alps in fifteen days, he came boldly down to the plains on the Po, and to the nation of the Insubres. This points to the neighbourhood of Milan, and thus confirms the conclusion already drawn from the direction in which the nature of the Transalpine regions tended to determine Hannibal's march.

But now the intelligent reader will naturally be tempted to inquire, as the author takes Polybius for his guide, how he reconciles his hypothesis with some other statements of the historian no less precise than those just adduced, and apparently very difficult to accommodate to the route here proposed. Polybius, after relating the assistance which Hannibal gave to the elder of the two brothers whom he found at war in the *Island*, proceeds to say that he marched eight hundred



stadia in ten days by the side of the river, and then began the ascent of the Alps (III. 50. Ἀννίβας ἐν ἡμέραις δέκα πορευθεὶς παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν εἰς ὀκτακοσίους σταδίους ἤρξατο τῆς πρὸς τὰς Ἀλπεὶς ἀναβολῆς. The German critic measures this ten days march from Vienne, where he conceives Hannibal arrived in four days after having crossed the Rhone (Polybius III. 49, says that he came in that time to the *Island*), and he makes it terminate somewhere near Thonon on the lake of Geneva. But unfortunately, satisfied with attempting to shew that on these suppositions the time occupied by the passage of the Simplon would agree with the numbers in Polybius, he has neglected to explain some other difficulties. For instance, it seems extraordinary that Polybius should assign ten days as the duration of Hannibal's march along the Rhone, if at the end of that time he still continued for several days to keep by the side of that river. And it is no less difficult to conceive why any point on the lake of Geneva should have been selected as a limit between the first and the last part of this march. If however the historian had wished to mark a difference in the nature of the country, without meaning to imply that the road now quitted the Rhone, one should rather have expected to be brought at the end of the ten days to St Jean Gingoulph, and to find a description of the entrance of the Valais. Polybius (III. 50) contrasts the march along the plain with the ascent of the mountains in a manner which clearly implies that the latter begins at the end of the ten days march. How can his description be adapted to the road between Thonon and Bryg? Arneth has neglected to answer this question, and though he objects to General Melville's hypothesis, that Polybius does not a second time mention the Isere, by the side of which the road mounts toward the pass of the Little St Bernard, he has not thought it necessary himself to explain the historian's silence as to the lake of Geneva, which, if Hannibal skirted its eastern shore, it would at any rate have been natural to mention, and which, if the ten days march ended there, it was scarcely possible to omit noticing. Until these difficulties and several others which we need not here point out are removed, this hypothesis will probably gain few adherents: and certainly the objections which the author has raised to some of those which he rejects are not so formidable



that they need drive us to such desperate expedients. If indeed Hannibal had been without guides or information about the country, there might be room to ask why he did not follow the valley of the Rhone, till he heard of a pass which would lead him into the part of Italy which he desired to reach. But if he had means of learning that by quitting the Rhone at Yenne he could effect his object with less difficulty and danger, the motive required is supplied. Still less weight can be attached to the argument drawn from the words of Polybius which describe Hannibal as crossing from the countries on the Rhone into Italy. This description will surely apply to any one point in the basin of the Rhone between its source and its mouth, or, as Polybius describes it, from the head of the Adriatic to Marseilles (III. 47.), as to another. The advantage which the pass of the Simplon possesses, of bringing Hannibal immediately into the territory of the Insubres, is of no moment until it is proved that no other answers the same condition: while the distance between Milan and the capital of the Taurini renders the expedition which he undertook against them less intelligible, than if he descended and rested his army on the borders of their territory.

But we turn to another view of the subject, which has much higher claims to our attention, both in the name of the author, and in the arguments with which he has supported his opinions. It is contained in an appendix which Uckert has annexed to the third volume of his elaborate work (*Geographie der Griechen und Roemer*, 1832). He has there defended a hypothesis which had been adopted by many learned men, and within these few years by a French author (Laranza, *Histoire critique du Passage des Alpes par Annibal*, 1826.) whose book I have not been able to meet with: that Hannibal crossed the Mont Ceni. Uckert has the advantage of coming last to the discussion of this question, with a thorough knowledge of all that has been done by his predecessors, and with all the light that profound geographical learning can throw upon it: so that a review of his arguments may exhibit, though not the history of the controversy, yet the latest stage which it has reached.

There are it is well known four main points on which



the whole controversy depends. 1. The passage of the Rhone. 2. The position of the *Island* and Hannibal's movements in it. 3. His march to the foot of the mountains. 4. The passage of the Alps. These we will consider in their order. We must however premise that Uckert takes a different view of the relative authority of Polybius and Livy from that which has been adopted by many, perhaps by most, preceding writers, and particularly by the advocates of General Melville's hypothesis. He observes that though the zeal with which Polybius laboured to ascertain the truth is indisputable, his means were not exactly proportioned to his good will. As the Alps in his time were inhabited by fierce and unconquered tribes, it was not in his power to explore them with the same calmness and undivided attention as the modern travellers who have visited them with his book in their hands. The dangers and difficulties which these regions opposed to such researches in early times are alluded to by Polybius himself, III. 59, and are indicated by Strabo, IV. c. 6, where he mentions repeatedly the ferocious character and predatory habits of the Alpine tribes. Amongst the rest he says of the Salassi, who inhabited the valley of Aosta, that till lately they had maintained their independence against the Romans, and had been in the habit of doing much harm to those who crossed the mountains through their country. Πολλὰ κατέβλαπτον τοὺς δι' αὐτῶν ὑπερβάλλοντας τὰ ὄρη, κατὰ τὸ ληστρικὸν ἔθος. Notwithstanding his travels, the geographical knowledge which Polybius had acquired was very imperfect: his conception of the direction of the Alps, and the course of the Rhone, erroneous: and his errors in this respect led him to say, that Hannibal after crossing the Rhone marched away from the sea eastward, as if he had been making for the midland parts of Europe (III. 47.); when, if he had been correctly informed, he would have spoken of the north. With regard to Livy's relation to Polybius, Uckert observes, that though the Roman frequently took the Greek author's description as the foundation of his own, yet, as the countries of which Polybius wrote were much better known in the time of Augustus, he also drew more accurate accounts from other sources, with which he supplied the defects of his predecessor, but sometimes without perceiving that he was framing his



narrative out of statements which were irreconcilably discordant. We now proceed to notice the author's views on the four abovementioned questions.

1. The passage of the Rhone. Instead of Pont St Esprit, or Roquemaure, the point selected by De Luc and his followers, Uckert conceives that Hannibal crossed the river considerably lower down, near Beaucaire. Polybius indeed says that the passage took place at about the distance of four days journey from the sea (III. 42. *σχεδὸν ἡμερῶν τεττάρων ὁδὸν ἀπέχων στρατοπέδῳ τῆς θαλάσσης*. There is no reason for rendering this four days *march*. According to the other meaning the distance will be somewhat greater; but this will suit the actual distance between Roquemaure and the mouth of the river perhaps better than the four days march.) Still this agreement can afford no safe criterion until we have ascertained the point from which Polybius began his measurement of the distance from the sea, which, as the mouths of the Rhone have experienced great changes, cannot now be determined, and also the direction in which he measured it: and this may have depended on the road which the state of the waters near the mouth of the river left practicable. When allowance is made for these considerations, Uckert thinks that Beaucaire might not be too near the sea to be so described. The motive for preferring it to other points higher up is, that it lay on the Roman road from Spain, which passed through Ruscino and Illiberis, two points, as we learn from Livy, in Hannibal's march. (Strabo, iv. p. 187. *Νέμανσος.....ἰδρύται κατὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἰβηρίας εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν.....διέχει δ' ἡ Νέμανσος τοῦ μὲν Ῥοδανοῦ περὶ ἑκατὸν σταδίου καθὼ ἐν τῇ περαίᾳ πολίχνην ἔστι Τάραςκων*.) According to the present text of Polybius (III. 39.), there was already in his time a measured and marked Roman road from Carthagera, or even from Gades, to the passage of the Rhone: for after stating the distance, he adds: *ταῦτα γὰρ νῦν βεβημάτισται καὶ σεσημείωται κατὰ σταδίου ὁκτὼ διὰ Ῥωμαίων ἐπιμελῶς*. But Uckert gives some strong reasons for suspecting that these words are a marginal note, which has been introduced into the text. The fact they state is itself, for the time of Polybius, highly improbable; and if it had been so he would not have qualified



his account of the distance, as he does in two instances, with the particle *περί*. But moreover, the length assigned in this remark to the Roman mile is not the same at which, as Strabo informs us, Polybius estimated it. (VII. p. 322. Πολύβιος προστιθεὶς τῷ ὀκτασταδίῳ δίπλεθρον, ὃ ἐστὶ τρίτον σταδίου.) Hence there is no reason to suppose that in the time of Polybius the distances he mentions had been precisely ascertained, nor can we safely draw any inference from them as to the point at which Hannibal reached the river. But on the other hand it is highly probable that the track which Hannibal pursued was the same along which the Roman road was afterwards carried. If so, he had no motive for deviating from it. As the arrival of the Roman army was unexpected, he could not alter his course for the purpose of avoiding the enemy. Nor is it likely that he should have been influenced by the passage of the Durance, which in the dry season presents no difficulties. The Roman road to Lyons always crossed this river, because the inconvenience it might sometimes occasion was compensated by the advantage of passing the Rhone lower down where its stream was less rapid. That the distance of the place, where Hannibal crossed, from the sea was not so great as has been supposed by De Luc, seems to follow from Scipio's march to the Carthaginian camp from the mouth of the river. He reached it in three days, if indeed this is not the time spent both in going and returning to his ships, as the language both of Polybius and Livy might be construed. (Pol. III. 49; Liv. XXI. 32.) We are not told that *he* crossed the Durance, which proves either that it did not lie in his way, or that it was not dangerous. Uckert also raises a question whether the vessels (λέμβοι) in which Hannibal transported his troops, and which were such as the natives used for sea voyages, could have ascended the river as high as Roquemaure. Polybius indeed remarks that Hannibal selected a part of the river, which was not broken by islands, for his passage. (III. 42. ἐνεχέειρει ποιέισθαι τὴν διάβασιν κατὰ τὴν ἀπλὴν ῥύσιν.) But it is not necessary on this account to seek for a place distant from every island, nor to reject Beaucaire because it lies opposite one. All that is implied by the description is that Hannibal crossed either above or below the island, most probably the former. The



description in Zonaras (VIII. 23.), implies that some islands were near.

2. *The Island.* From the place where he passed the Rhone, Hannibal marched in four days to the *Island*. Livy explains the direction he thus took by his wish to avoid the enemy. Polybius does not seem to be aware that it was a circuitous route: this Uckert ascribes to his incorrect conception of the course of the Rhone. The real motive he supposes to have been the wish to avoid the territories of hostile Ligurian tribes: the road was the same which the Celtic envoys had taken for the same reason. With respect to the position of the *Island*, Uckert admits it to be the tract which is bounded by the Rhone, the Isere, and the intervening mountains; but on almost every other point he is completely at variance with the partisans of General Melville. He does not allow that any alteration is required in the text either of Polybius or Livy where they describe the *Island*. As to the former, the assertion which the Edinburgh Reviewer (p. 182.) repeats after De Luc: that General Melville read 'Ισάρας for Σκάρας or Σκώρας in a Vatican MS. of Polybius, has been contradicted by Maio, who assured Lanza that he had examined all the manuscripts of Polybius in that library, and had found no such reading. Uckert thinks the change unnecessary, because he believes that Polybius did not know the true name of the Isere, and that he mistook it for the Rhone, and applied the name of Scaras or Scoras to the real Rhone. Neither Livy nor Polybius requires us to suppose that Hannibal *entered* the *Island*: at least with his whole army: he might have settled the dispute between the brothers which was referred to his arbitration, (Liv. XXI. 31. Hujus seditionis disceptatio quum ad Hannibalem rejecta esset, arbiter regni factus, quod ea senatus principum que sententia fuerat, imperium majori restituit), either by his authority, or by sending a small detachment of his army. (His personal presence certainly seems to be implied by the words of Polybius, III. 49. συνεπιθέμενος καὶ συνεκβαλὼν τὸν ἕτερον.) Hence it is not necessary to infer from the expression ἦκε πρὸς τὴν Νῆσον (ibid.), that in this four days march the Carthaginian army even reached the banks of the Isere: and consequently the six hundred stadia,



which according to Polybius were traversed in this march, do not compel us to fix the passage of the Rhone north of the Durance, though there were seven hundred stadia from that river to the Isere.

Polybius distinguishes the inhabitants of the *Island*, whom he merely terms barbarians without naming them, from the Allobriges, through whose territory Hannibal marched to the foot of the Alps, and from whose hostility the barbarians of the *Island* protected him (c. 50.) The Allobriges or Allobroges appear to have been driven northward from their original seats, in which they were known to Apollodorus as a most powerful nation (Steph. Byz. Ἀλλόβρυγες), and in the time of Livy to have been confined to the country north of the Isere. This state of things he has transferred to the time of Hannibal. *His* Allobroges inhabit the *Island* of the barbarians of Polybius, which is south of his own *Island*: *incolunt prope Allobroges*. Livy's *Island*, formed by the Rhone and the Saone (Arar), is described in a manner which will not apply to that of Polybius, even if the name Arar is altered to Isara. It is not a tract resembling the Delta of the Nile, but only a considerable district (*agri aliquantum*). But the kingdom about which the contest decided by Hannibal has arisen is that of the Allobroges: *they* become Hannibal's friends and allies. It is not however said that he marches through their territory: after he has composed their dissensions, he turns to the left toward the Tricastini, and meets with no obstacle till he reaches the Druentia: a description which, except with regard to the Druentia, agrees with that of Polybius, on the supposition that Hannibal did not cross the Isere, and that Polybius took this river for the Rhone. As an additional proof that Polybius did not conceive Hannibal to have marched through the *Island*, Uckert very sagaciously refers to the description of those difficult and almost inaccessible mountains (ὄρη δυσπρόσοδα καὶ δυσέμβολα καὶ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπρόσιτα) which formed its third side; and compares this with the vindication of Hannibal's prudence against those who exaggerated the difficulties of his passage: (τὰ περὶ τῆς ἐρημίας, ἐτι δ' ἐρυμνότητος καὶ δυσχωρίας τῶν τόπων, ἐκδηλον ποιεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος αὐτῶν. c. 48.)



3. According to Polybius, Hannibal is conducted through the territory of the Allobroges by the barbarians of the *Island* to the foot of the Alps. He performs this march, a distance of eight hundred stadia, in ten days, during which he kept by the side of the river. On the supposition we are now explaining, as the river is the Isere, there is no necessity for doing any violence to the words *παρὰ τὸν ποταμόν*, whereas De Luc and his followers are forced to suppose a deviation of several hundred stadia from the Rhone between Vienne and Yenne. In the direction of the march, Livy coincides with Polybius, when he makes Hannibal bend his course to the left toward the Tricastini, and then skirt the borders of the Vocontii toward the Tricorii. It is the same road as Bellovesus and his Gauls had formerly taken (Liv. v. 34). The expression, *ad lævam in Tricastinos flexit*, must be understood with reference to the previous words, *cum jam Alpes peteret*: when Hannibal had turned his front toward the Alps, the Tricastini and the Isere lay on his left. We have therefore only to measure the eight hundred stadia along the Isere: they will bring us to Montmeillan, and here on leaving the river we enter the mountains. But if this is the road by which Livy also leads us, how do we come to the Durance? It is the mention of this river which has subjected Livy to the charge of ignorance and carelessness from those who believed that he led Hannibal across the Mont Genevre, and yet adopted a description from Polybius which is only applicable to a different part of the Alps. Uckert thinks that this imputation is unfounded, and that Livy's Druentia is not the Durance. He observes that Druentia, like Doria, may have been the name of several Alpine streams, and that the Drac, which Hannibal would have to cross on the road to Montmeillan, answers perfectly to Livy's description of the Druentia. After this the road follows the valley of the Arc toward Mont Ceni. It has been urged that the valley of the Isere could alone supply the Carthaginian army with the means of subsistence. To this objection Uckert replies, that the Carthaginians in fact suffered from the want of provisions, (Pol. III. 60. *κακῶς ἀπὴλλαττε τῇ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων σπάνει*), that according to Livy, (c. 31.), they brought a stock with them, to which Polybius also alludes, (III. 60.), supplied



themselves for three days from the plunder of the town (c. 33), and afterwards received a fresh supply from the natives (c. 34). The motive for quitting the Isere at Montmeillan is sufficiently indicated by the map, which shews that the road from hence to Turin, compared with that by the Little St Bernard, is the chord of a great curve.

The combat with the mountaineers would take place in the defile between Aiguebelle and Argentil; the army encamped in the plain by Argentil, and hereabouts lay the captured town. On the fifth day it would encamp near St Jean de Maurienne, in a fruitful valley. But as our object is not to describe the march, but to explain the nature of the arguments by which Uckert supports his hypothesis, we need not enter into any further details on this part of the subject, and will only add one or two remarks on

IV. The Passage of the Alps. The λευκόπετρον, which General Melville believed he had discovered on the road of the Little St Bernard, appears to be still more strikingly represented on that of the Mont Cenis, or rather according to one of the latest travellers who has visited the country with a view to this question (Laranza), it is no where else to be found. Saussure had remarked it as one of the most singular features in this passage: Le Mont Cenis presente quelques singularités que je ne dois pas omettre de faire remarquer. D'abord ce grand amas de gypse du côté de la Savoie, &c. It is known by the name of Rocher blanc, or le plan de roche blanche. Its form and its position, for it overhangs the Arc on the right, while on the left the road passes by the foot of the precipices down which the natives may have rolled great stones on the Carthaginian army, exactly correspond to the historian's description.

The *plateau* of the Mont Cenis, where Hannibal would arrive between the 25th and 30th of October, and where if he passed over it he remained two days, is excellently suited for an encampment: it is sheltered by the surrounding ridges, and affords good pasture on the margin of its little lake. Snow had by this time fallen for some weeks, and having been turned into ice by the heat of the sun and the frost of the nights, might be taken for the remains of the former winter. (Polyb. III. 55. Liv. XXI. 36.) From the top of the ridge which



incloses the basin of the Hospice, Hannibal might have pointed out the plains of Piedmont to a part of his troops.

It was not to be expected that Livy should omit the opportunity which his subject supplied, of a rhetorical description of the horrors of the Alps. Accordingly he has painted them (xxi. 32.) in terms which as they are not applicable to the Mont Genevre, which it has been supposed he meant to describe, have subjected him to the reproach of ignorance or inconsistency. Uckert on the other hand observes that it is Polybius who has exaggerated the rigour of the climate at the top of the Alps, and that Livy, more accurately informed, has softened those features in his description which are too highly charged. The former, after mentioning that the elephants had suffered greatly from hunger before the road was opened for them in that part of the descent which detained the army for three days, adds, that the summits and the topmost sides of the Alps are all utterly destitute of wood and herbage (τελέως ἄδενδρα καὶ ψιλὰ) because the snow remains upon them constantly both summer and winter. Livy in describing the descent notices the existence of at least a scanty vegetation (c. 36. *virgulta ac stirpes circa eminentes*—c. 37. *nuda fere cacumina sunt, et, si quid est pabuli, obruunt nives*). With respect also to the celebrated expedient by which Livy represents Hannibal to have opened a road down the precipice which stopped his march, Uckert vindicates the Roman historian from the charge of gross credulity, which has frequently been brought against him; by none more confidently, or perhaps with less knowledge of the subject, than the Edinburgh Reviewer (p. 168), who in general throughout the article seems to have thought it necessary to make up for the want of originality, by the dogmatical tone with which he asserts the opinion he adopts, and the asperity with which he censures those who either contradict it, or involuntarily give evidence against it. The real foundation of the account about the fire and vinegar, is still matter of controversy among competent judges. The Reviewer, who does not seem to know that it was even thought to have had any, has certainly not entitled himself to pronounce that it was “doubtless intended as an embellishment.”

Still less is he justified, so far as Livy is concerned, in his



remark (p. 169), that “the radical error which has infected the speculations of all those who have turned their attention to this question, from the time of Livy to that of Mr Whitaker, appears to have consisted in their first adopting some hypothesis as to the shortest and most practicable road from Gaul into Italy, and *then* betaking themselves to the ancient writers—not to ascertain what road they fix upon, or if they differ to decide between them on the best evidence that the case admits of, but—to hunt for authorities in support of the hypotheses they had determined to maintain.” Whoever else may be liable to this charge, we cannot lay it upon Livy without imputing wilful falsehood to him. He professes to have been governed by the unanimous authority of all preceding writers, who admitted that Hannibal came down into Italy among the Taurini (In Taurinis in Italiam degressum quum inter omnes constet. c. 38), and from this he infers that Hannibal’s road cannot have crossed either the great or the little St Bernard, since in each case he would have come down not among the Taurini, but first among the Salassi and then among the Libui. If Strabo has not interposed his own opinion among the words of Polybius, which is a mere suspicion raised by the interest of a hypothesis, Polybius coincided with Livy’s other authors on this point. But it would not follow, as the Edinburgh Reviewer assumes (p. 171), that he led Hannibal over Mont Genevre, nor, as we have seen, is it certain that this was Livy’s meaning.

Still there is some difficulty in reconciling the statement which Strabo seems to attribute to Polybius, τὴν διὰ Ταυρίνων ἣν Ἀννίβας διῆλθεν, with his extant words in the passage where, after mentioning that Hannibal had spent fifteen days in crossing the Alps, he adds, that he descended boldly upon the plains near the Po, and among the nation of the Insubres (κατῆρε πολμηρῶς εἰς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδία καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἰσόμβρων ἔθνος). Uckert supposes Polybius to have been considerably mistaken about the course of the Po, to have placed it too far south, and to have assigned the country at the foot of the Alps almost from its sources for a great extent eastward to the Insubres. Through their territories Hannibal had to march into those of the Taurini, who are said to be πρὸς τῇ παρωρείᾳ κατοικοῦντες, where on his descent from the mountains he en-



camped (ὕπ' αὐτὴν τὴν παρώρειαν τῶν Ἀλπεων). This may be the correct view of the case ; but it seems also possible that the mention of the Insubres was meant in a less exact sense, and is to be qualified by the description of the Taurini, so that in fact the latter intervened for a short distance between the foot of the Alps and the Insubres, though these are named as Hannibal's most powerful ally.

A table of posts along the road between Montmeillan and Rivoli gives very nearly the distance of 1200 stadia, at which Polybius vaguely estimates the march across the Alps (περὶ χιλίους διακοσίους, c. 39).

This short sketch will we hope be sufficient to put the reader in possession of the author's views, and it will scarcely be denied that they deserve attention, and shew that General Melville's hypothesis has not yet been placed beyond the reach of controversy. On the other hand it must be admitted that they involve some propositions which are rather startling, and which ought not to be admitted without great circumspection. If Livy's Druentia is the Drac, was he acquainted with the Durance, or did he think it unnecessary to notice it? This however is a slight difficulty, compared with the mistake attributed to Polybius about the Isere and the Rhone. Was he led into this error by the information he received, or by the sight of the two rivers? Must it not have been corrected if he had followed either of them up toward its source? These are some of the questions which will no doubt suggest themselves to the reader, and which we must leave to better judges to decide.

C. T.

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## MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS.

### I.

#### *Emendations of Athenæus.*

ATHEN. II. p. 44 F. Ed. Dind. Εὐφορίων δὲ ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς οὕτω πον γράφει· Λασύρτας Λασιώνιος οὐδὲ προσεδεῖτο ποτοῦ καθάπερ εἰ ἄλλοι, οὔρον δὲ προΐετο καθάπερ πάντες ἄνθρωποι. Καὶ πολλοὶ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἐπεχείρησαν παρατηρῆσαι· καὶ ἀπέστησαν πρὸ τοῦ εὐρεῖν τὸ πραττόμενον. θέρους γὰρ ὥρα καὶ τριακονθήμερον προσεδρεύοντες, καὶ οὐδενὸς μὲν ὁρῶντες ἀπεχόμενον ἀλμυροῦ, τήν κύστιν δ' αὐτοῦ ἔχοντα, συνεπείσθησαν ἀληθεύειν.

It is clear that the words τήν κύστιν δ' αὐτοῦ ἔχοντα are corrupt, and Meineke (Euphor. Trag. p. 167.) observes, that no critic has been hitherto able to restore the passage. I imagine, however, that a slight attention would effect this. I would read τήν κύστιν δ' αὐτὸν εὖ ἔχοντα, and then the sense would be perfectly plain.

Athen. III. p. 111 B. Φερεκράτης Ἐπιλήσμονι

ᾧ ὦλεν ὀβελίαν σπόδιν. ἄρτου δὲ μὴ προτιμᾶν.

Dobree reads σποδεῖν, (Adv. t. II. p. 302.) which is doubtless right; but ὦλεν is also corrupt, and I would propose substituting X ὦλον, i. e. καὶ ὅλον.

Athen. v. p. 204 E. Τὸ δὲ σχῆμ' αὐτῆς οὔτε ταῖς μακραῖς ναυσὶν οὔτε ταῖς στρογγύλαις εἰκόσ, ἀλλὰ παρηλλαγμένον τε καὶ πρὸς τήν χρεῖαν τοῦ ποταμοῦ τὸ βάθος. Dindorf observes, "Nisi plura ex hoc loco exciderunt scribendum saltem, τοῦτε ποταμοῦ τὸ βάθος." I conceive that nothing is wanting, but we must read παρηλλαγμένον τι.

Athen. IX. p. 393 C. Ἰππαρχος ἐν τῇ Αἰγυπτίᾳ Ἰλιάδι

Οὐ μοι Αἰγυπτίων βίος ἤρεσεν οἶον ἔχουσι,

Χέννια τίλλοντες καλκατιάδαι σαλέοντα.



I propose reading in the second line,

Χέννια τίλλοντες καχ' ἀλάτια δεισαλέοντα.

These χέννια were small birds, salted and pickled. It must be allowed that we have no authority for δεισαλέω; but we have in Suidas δεισαλέος· κοπρώδης. Perhaps δεισαλόεντα might be preferred, as being more Homeric; the poem of this Hipparchus being probably a parody of the Iliad. Jacobs had already suggested that κακὰ entered into the corrupt word καλκατιάδει.

Athen. vii. p. 307 B. Εὐθύδημος δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, ἐν τῷ περὶ ταρίχων. “Εἶδη κεστρέων εἶναι σφηνέα καὶ δακτυλέα. καὶ κεφάλους μὲν λέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ βαρυτέραν τὴν κεφαλὴν ἔχειν, σφηνέας δὲ ὅτι λαγαροὶ καὶ τετραγωνοὶ· τὰ δὲ τῶν δακτυλέων τὸ πλάτος ἔχει ἔλασσον τῶν δυεῖν δακτύλων.” Schweighæuser in a note says, “διδακτυλέων edd. sed ne nunc quidem persanatus locus.” It would seem that the corrupt reading must have arisen from διὰ improperly coalescing with δακτυλέων. We ought therefore to read, “τὰ δὲ τῶν δακτυλέων διὰ τὸ πλάτος ἔχειν ἔλασσον τῶν δυεῖν δακτύλων.”

Athen. x. p. 430 D, xi. p. 481 A. A well-known fragment of Alcæus, variously attempted by several eminent critics, but as yet according to Matthiæ (Alcæi Frag. p. 32.) unsatisfactorily. Porson, Adv. p. 119, reads,

Πίνωμεν· τί τὰ λύχν' ἀμύμενομεν; δάκτυλος ἀμέρα·

Κάδδ' ἄειρε κυλίχναις μέγαις αἶ τα ποικίλλης.

and adds, “vulgo τὸν λύχνον. Secundum verum qui velit et possit corrigat.” A challenge from such a man, who may be called a “dead shot” at an emendation, is an awkward thing; nevertheless critics have been found in abundance, who would attempt what the great master has pronounced incurable. Matthiæ has enumerated about a dozen of these attempts, some by renowned scholars of the present day. Dindorf, in his edition of Athenæus, has adopted the very ingenious and simple correction of an anonymous critic in the Jena Lit. Journal for the year 1806, No. 249,

κάδδ' ἄειρε κυλίχναις, μεγάλαις, αἶτα, ποικίλαις,

but if, as Matthiæ remarks, (Alc. Frag. p. 33.) the second syllable in αἶτης is always long, the correction is invalid with respect to quantity. The field being therefore still open, I would venture to propose reading



κάδδ' ἄειρε κυλίχναις, μεγάλαις, ἀνατοπσικίλαις.

The handles of cups were called ὦτα, which the Æolians wrote αὔατα. The compound word οὔατοκοίτης, occurs in Nonnus Dionys. xxvi. p. 682, and xxx. p. 782. There is another fragment of Alcæus which has not less puzzled critics who have made the fragments of that Poet their particular study. It occurs in Hesychius under the word Ἐπιπνεύων· ἐπιβλέπων· Αἰολικῶς καὶ Ἀλκαῖος· ἥπου συναγανδρῶν δασμένον στρατὸν νομισμένοι πνέοισα. The different conjectures of the learned on this passage may be seen in Albertius' Notes to Hesychius, Bp Blomfield's and Matthiæ's editions of the Fragments of Alcæus. They all fail, I think, in having no noun to agree with πνέοισα, the principal word of the example. The following attempt is at least not liable to this objection :

Ἡπου συνᾶγεν ἀνδρῶν δυσμενέων στρατὸν  
Νέμεσις μένεϊ πνέοισα.

The gloss seems to require ἐπιπνέοισα, but perhaps the Grammarian only wished to point out the Æolic participles of πνέω, which occurred in Alcæus.

Athen. xiv. p. 645 A. Ἀμφιφῶν, πλακοῦς Ἀρτέμιδι ἀνακείμενος, ἔχει δ' ἐν κύκλῳ καόμενα δάδια. Φιλήμων ἐν Πτωχῇ ἢ Ῥοδία

Ἄρτεμι, φίλη δέσποινα, τοῦτόν σοι φέρω  
ὦ πότνι, ἀμφιφῶντα καὶ σπονδήσιμα.

The word σπονδήσιμα is acknowledged to be corrupt, and Coray in the Supplement to Schneider's Gr. Lexicon, proposes reading καὶ σπονδὰς ἅμα—perhaps it should be σποδήσιμον from σποδέω, to toast on the coals; whence bread so baked was called σποδίτης ἄρτος.

I. A. C.

## II.

### *Notice of Micali's History of the Ancient Nations of Italy.*

MICALI has recently published at Florence a *Storia degli antichi popoli Italiani*, in part founded on his former book, *l'Italia avanti il dominio dei Romani*, but for the most part a new work. Without adopting the historical system of Niebuhr with respect to the primitive inhabitants of Italy,



he has greatly profited by his researches: with the work of Müller he appears to have been only partially acquainted. Micali's work may be considered as occupying a middle space between popular and critical histories: it cannot be called a critical history, like those of the German writers, as the author does not appear to be a philologist, or to have paid particular attention to the ancient languages: nor is it composed after the manner of popular histories, as it is founded on original researches, and does not repeat as literal truths the fables and legends of ancient poets and mythologists. On this account it may be expected to diffuse a juster view of the nature of early historical accounts than investigations conducted with greater critical research, as there are many persons who might read the speculations of Micali with advantage, to whom Niebuhr or Müller would be a sealed book.

The following is the chief part of Mr Micali's abstract of his system annexed to his second volume:

“Aborigines (indigenous population): generic name of the primitive inhabitants and cultivators of Italy.

CENTRAL ITALY.

“I. Siculians. The most ancient of that name mentioned in history belonged to the race of the primitive Auruncians and Oscans: spread over many parts of the peninsula: were driven by the irruption of other nations into Sicily, to which they gave their own name.

“II. Umbrians. Ancient nation of Oscan race. Pressed and driven back by the foreigners occupying the shores of the Adriatic, they extend a long way, principally to the prejudice of the Siculians, as far as the other side of the Tiber and the Arno. Thence expelled by the

“III. Ra-senæ, another indigenous people: called by the Greeks Tyrsenians or Tyrrhenians, by the Romans Etruscans or Tuscans. They establish a firm dominion beyond the Arno and Tiber on the ruins of the Umbrians: thence they extend their rule over a large part of the peninsula, and found two new states; viz. 1. New Etruria, with twelve cities in Upper Italy. A large part of the Etruscans fly into Rhætia on account of the Gallic invasion in 153 U.C. 2. Southern Etruria, with twelve other cities in Opicia, afterwards called Campania Felix.



“IV. Oscans, Opicans, Auruncians ; principal branch of the great primitive Italian stock : called by the Greeks Ausonians : generic name of the indigenous tribes established as far as the extreme point of the peninsula. Fierce foreign nations of Illyrians, Liburnians, Pelasgo-Thessalians, pass from the opposite shore of the Adriatic to the coasts of Italy ; press the natives in many directions, and cause the wars which afterwards changed the abodes, names, and existence of many Italian tribes.”

From this outline it will be seen that Micali's views differ widely from those of Niebuhr : principally in his considering the aborigines to be the indigenous population of the whole of Italy, whereas Niebuhr, adhering more closely to the ancient accounts, restricts them to Latium : in his referring the Sicilians to the Oscan race, whereas according to Niebuhr they are Pelasgians : and in his making the Etruscans an aboriginal people, whereas Niebuhr believes that the Pelasgians or Pelasgo-Tyrrhenians were the earliest inhabitants of Italy known to history, and that the Etruscans or *Rasenæ* were a conquering tribe, which descended into Etruria from *Rhætia*. Whichever of these opposite opinions the progress of historical enquiry may tend to confirm, the Italian writer at least deserves credit for having freed himself from the system accredited by Lanzi and his followers, and for having recognized the entire dissimilarity of the Etruscan and Greek languages.

Speaking of the indigenous population of the inland parts of Italy, Mr Micali remarks that the mountaineers being essentially shepherds, were unwilling to occupy districts of unhealthy atmosphere, or marshes, or swamps, where the pasture was neither good of their kind nor sufficient in quantity : and undoubtedly the habits of their ordinary life kept them at a distance from the sea, and unaccustomed to it. The sea-shore was therefore generally uninhabited, uncultivated, and ill guarded by the natives. “And this (he continues) is in my opinion the chief reason why the strangers who first landed on the coasts of Italy were able to establish themselves there so easily with little or no opposition from the natives, who withdrew towards the interior, to their habitual and safer abodes in the mountains.” (Vol. i. p. 178–9.) Hence, having asserted that the establishment of the Lucanians in the south-



ernmost part of Italy must be considered of great antiquity, he argues against Niebuhr (Vol. i. p. 75) that the dominion of Sybaris over the country between the two seas before 242 U.C. and the foundation of Pyxus by Micythus in 280 U.C. do not exclude the possibility of the existence of Lucanians in those parts: as the Sybarites, like all the other Italiots, had no dominion in the mountains, and those to which Micythus led his Rhegian colony on the Lucanian territory was either uninhabited at that time on account of the unhealthiness of the place, or left uncultivated by the natives (Vol. i. p. 323).

Micali denies that Lucumones was the name of a class (Vol. ii. p. 76), and he thinks that the walls of the Etruscan cities do not bear the mark of having been built by serfs, and cannot be considered as proofs of the vassalage of a large part of the population; but that they appear to be the works of wise citizens, having nothing in their construction which exceeds the power of free though not large communities: especially as there was plenty of stone either on the spot or in the neighbouring mountains (Vol. i. p. 135). The singular buildings in Sardinia called *Nuraghi* (of which an account may be seen in the *Journal des Savans*, 1827, p. 206), by Niebuhr apparently attributed to the Tyrrhenians (Vol. i. p. 144), and by Letronne to the Etruscans, are considered by Micali as Carthaginian. He likewise thinks that they were not places of burial; but he does not indicate his own opinion as to their destination more distinctly than by saying that they were probably "for the public use." The construction of some of them, being high conical towers, surrounded by smaller towers connected with a wall containing a casemated passage, seems to shew that they were used for some purposes of defence (Vol. ii. p. 46—8.)

Micali remarks (Vol. i. p. 152. ii. 150) that Niebuhr, misled by some inaccurate account, cites the theatre of Fiesole as a colossal building of the Etruscans (Vol. i. p. 98, 107); but that the work is entirely Roman, and of no very ancient date. In the passages referred to, Niebuhr evidently appears to consider the theatre at Fiesole as an Etruscan work: he likewise uses it as an argument to prove that Greek dramas, either originals or translations, were performed at Fiesole (p. 111):



though it might have been built after the introduction of the Latin language into Etruria. Micali however (Vol. II. p. 215. n. 84) appears to object incorrectly to Niebuhr's substitution of *Volnius* for *Volumnius* in Varro de L. L. IV. 9. Ut Volumnius dicebat qui tragœdias Tuscas scripsit (Vol. I. n. 375), on the ground that the Volumnian family often occurs in inscriptions of Perugia; for Niebuhr distinctly states that *Volnius* is the reading of the Florentine MS. and that *Volumnius* is an unauthorized correction of the editors.

Mr Micali thinks that the *dualism*, or the existence of a good and evil principle, as in the Egyptian and Persian religions, was the basis of the Etruscan mythology (Vol. II. p. 125), and he derives from Egypt the ancient architecture and sculpture of the Etruscans (ibid. p. 250–7). On the great uncertainty of arguments which infer connexion from mere similarity of style, I refer Mr Micali to his own remarks on the relation between the ancient buildings of Greece and Italy. “Undoubtedly (he says) there is no foundation for the opinion that every building with polygonal stones is of vast antiquity; still less, for the strange hypothesis, that all the Italian buildings of that kind were left by the Pelasgians: chiefly, it is said, on account of the manifest resemblance which the buildings in Italy have to the walls of some cities in ancient Greece, called by a fancy of poets Cyclopedian, and also to those of Tiryns and Mycenæ: as if so rude a style of building had not been common to other nations, neither of Italy nor Greece, or had its workmanship alone any thing wonderful.” (Vol. I. p. 211.)

Against the introduction of foreign legends in the early Italian story, and the confusion of the Hellenic and Italian religions, Mr Micali has argued with much force, and he illustrates by many examples the spirit of servile imitation which transferred the names and attributes of Grecian to Roman deities, and engrafted the Hellenic on the Italian mythology (Vol. II. p. 175): but the argument which he would derive from the non-occurrence of Apollo in the Etruscan and early Roman mythology, against the presence of Pelasgians in Italy cannot avail any thing, if Müller's theory of the origin of the worship of Apollo among the Dorians is to be allowed (ibid. p. 143.)



The third volume of Mr Micali's work is devoted to an explanation of an atlas, which contains 120 folio engravings in copper-plate, arranged so as to form a tolerably complete *The-saurus* of Etruscan antiquities, under the heads of plans of cities, remains of architecture and art, both in sculpture and painting. These illustrations render the work very interesting to all students of Etruscan lore, and contribute greatly to increase the value of the investigations contained in the body of the history.

G. C. L.

### III.

*De Taciti loco, Hist. I. 52,  
Augusti Bæckii Prolusio Academica.*

QUOD ab artis dicendi doctoribus præcipitur, in oratore esse oportere inventionem, dispositionem, elocutionem, memoriam, pronuntiationem; idem, si a pronuntiatione discesseris iis solis necessaria, qui viva voce doceant, est omnibus litterarum generibus commune, quod, quamcunque tractamus disciplinam, et invenienda nobis argumenta sunt, et apte digerenda, et idoneis sententiis verbisque explicanda, et quas conceperis notiones, animo distincte imprimendæ firmiterque retinendæ. Ex quibus rebus ea, quam primo loco posuimus, materiam artibus parat; materiæ capitibus dispositio ordinem, elocutio formam conciliat. Quod nisi argumentum apta orationis forma conclusum est, id non habet perfectionem, rudeque et inconditum caret lumine; ac rursum ubi idoneam, quam auctor argumento exponendo adhibuerit, formam minus perspexeris, ne notiones quidem ea comprehensas prorsus intellexeris, propterea quod forma et materia uno sunt corpore conjunctæ, et altera ab altera definitur vicissim. Quamobrem hoc in artium studiis non minimum censendum, ut sententiis verbisque eloqui argumenta aliorumque elocutionem recte æstimare et intelligere discamus; veteribusque hæc est una ex primariis liberalis et elegantis eruditionis partibus visa, eximieque hanc olim provinciam ornavit rhetorice, nunc magna ex parte philologis solis relictam, qui quid quoque loco commode, quid non commode dictum sit, in tractandis



scriptoribus antiquis, optimis bene dicendi magistris, ita monstrant, ut ex hac disciplina elocutionis exempla petere studiosi queant. At quo quis scriptor est ingeniosior, magisque singulari ipsique quasi propria forma orationis, præsertim in sententiarum nexu et compositione utitur, eo difficilius quoque loco de ejus elocutione judicium: quin si vel minimum in illius verba irrepserit mendum, aut prava invaluerit sententiarum divisio et conjunctio, elocutionis præstantia ita obscuratur vel tollitur, ut balbutiat, qui alias soleat optime dicere. Neque hujusmodi vitia ratione mere grammatica aut inveniri aut removeri queunt, præsertim in auctore particularum aliquanto parciore, sed rhetorico potius sententiarum examine, spectato simul dicentis ingenio, quæ conjungenda, quæ separanda sint, exputandum est. Hoc nunc in Taciti loco quodam monstrabimus, in quo etsi unus et alter doctorum verum vidit, tamen quod illi id non enucleate neque additis justæ interpretationis causis explicuerunt, novissimæ editiones vitiosas usquequaque sententias offerunt, quibus nolis judicii subtilissimi auctorem deformari. Adderemus plura exempla ex eodem scriptore petita, eaque fortasse etiam insigniora, nisi, quamvis exile et minutum argumentum videatur, tamen qui persuadere legentibus vellet, non posset paucis defungi in singulis locis.

In Historiis igitur postquam Tacitus, quæ Vitellius exercitui in Germania inferiore præfectus recte fecerat, commemoravit paucis, addit deinceps hæc in recentissimis editionibus ita scripta (l. 52.): *Nec consularis legati mensura, sed in majus omnia accipiebantur. et Vitellius apud severos humilis. id comitatem bonitatemque faventes vocabant, quod sine modo, sine judicio donaret sua, largiretur aliena: simul aviditate imperandi ipsa vitia pro virtutibus interpretabantur multi in utroque exercitu, sicut modesti quietique, ita mali et strenui. sed profusa cupidine et insigni temeritate legati legionum, Alienus Cæcina et Fabius Valens etc.* Quod eloqui argumentum voluit, hoc est: qua fama, quo hominum judicio imperio destinatus Vitellius et a quibus potissimum instigatus et adjutus sit; id vero quomodo sententiis et verbis explicuit? Quæcunque grata militibus fecerat Vitellius, ait, non ut a consulari legato facta accipiebantur, sed tanquam a majore et qui principatui proximus esset. Cui sententiæ quæ



addita sunt, ea si Tacitus apte elocutus argumentum est, debent laudes Vitellio ab asseclis datas continere, quod priorem sententiam iis, quæ sequuntur, explicari et illustrari patet. At quod sequitur, “*Et Vitellius apud severos humilis*”, est vituperantis: itaque id prioribus non simpliciter et directe annecti potest, quod fit conjunctione *Et*; sed reprehensio, in quam apud severos incucurrerat Vitellius, debet oblique a scriptore intexta esse, ita ut contrarium statuisset laudatores intelligeretur, veluti si dixerit: “*Et quamquam Vitellius severorum hominum æstimatione humilis erat, quippe qui nimis in vulgus blanditiis et indecora familiaritate uteretur tamen faventes eam non humilitatem vocabant, sed comitatem bonitatemque*”. Accedit quod pronomen *id* ab Hug. Grotio et Io. Fr. Gronovio inductum longe est pessimum. Gronovius quidem hoc ad humilitatem rettulit, verba ita explicanda ratus: “*Id* (quod humilis Vitellius) comitatem faventes vocabant; quod vero sine modo et iudicio sua et aliena largiretur, vocabant bonitatem”. At hoc si voluisset Tacitus, voces *comitatem bonitatemque* non tam arcte conjunxisset et in unum quasi corpus conglutinasset, sed distinctis scripsisset vocabulis: “*Id comitatem faventes vocabant, et bonitatem, quod sine modo etc.*” Potius igitur *comitatem bonitatemque* conjunctim Tacitus de eo dixit, quod Vitellius erga omnes, nullo iudicio, munificus et liberalis esset: in qua re cum bonitate simul comitatem agnoscere faventes poterant, quod qui nimium comis est, sine iudicio et facilius obsequitur cuivis gratiam postulanti. Quapropter repudiamus Grotii Gronoviique rationem: in qua quum aliquid duri relinqui sensisset etiam Ernestius, tamen quod sibi persuaserat, *in tali scriptore*, ut ait, hoc esse ferendum neque perspexerat, nullum unquam auctorem diligentius et exactius quam Tacitum locutum esse, operam non dedit, ut verum quæreret. In libris quidem non istud *id*, sed pro eo *ita* habetur: Tacitus vero quum pro vulgaribus *Quamquam* et *tamen* soleat *Ut* atque *ita* dicere, ipsum illud *ita* eo ducit, ut in prægressis excidisse voculam *ut* statuamus: qua reposita lucramur eam, quam supra postulavimus, sententiarum juncturam. Atque illud *UT* quum inter *ET* ac *VITellius* facillime excidere potuerit, non dubitamus id ibi inserere: miramur vero quod nec Gronovius neque Ernestius obsecuti sunt Beato Rhenano, Acidalio,



Freinshemio, item ei, qui codicem Agricolæ correxit, uno consensu illud *ut* vel post nomen Vitellii vel ante id addendum censentibus. Jam eosdem illos, qui *faventes* comitatem bonitatemque in Vitellio vocabant id, quod medium inter vitium et bonum, aut vitio etiam propius, consentaneum est *simul ipsa vitia pro virtutibus interpretatos esse*: quare *faventes* esse subjectum verbi *interpretabantur* probabile est: qui Vitellii vitia pro virtutibus venditasse dicuntur *aviditate imperandi*, hoc est, non quod ab illo ipsis cupiebant imperari (quæ mira fuerit sententia), sed quod ipsi vellent imperii Vitelliani participes esse, ut alibi (Hist. iv. 25.): *Pleræque civitates adversus nos armatæ spe libertatis, et si exuissent servitium, cupidine imperitandi*. Verum quod probabile diximus, *faventes* esse subjectum verbi *interpretabantur*, id certum fiet considerantibus, quam absonum sit alterum subjectum, quod solum pro illo adscisci queat, istud dicimus miris verborum ambagibus prolatum, quod in noviciis editionibus cum voce *interpretabantur* conjungitur, “*multi in utroque exercitu sicut modesti quietique, ita mali et strenui*”. Nam qui Vitellii vitia pro virtutibus interpretabantur, nonne iidem ejus humilitatem comitatis et bonitatis nomine celebraverint? nonne iidem in faventibus numerandi fuerint? Cur igitur diviso subjecto comitatis bonitatisque laudes Vitellio a *faventibus* tributæ dicantur, vitia ejus autem pro virtutibus interpretati esse non illi faventes, sed nescio qui “*multi in utroque exercitu et modesti et mali?*” Num vero potuit verisimile haberi, *modestos et quietos* eodem quo malos et strenuos animo amplexos esse Vitellium, eadem ista, quam Tacitus nominat, *aviditate imperandi* qualicunque (neque enim in hac re judicanda interest, quomodo hanc dictionem explices) esse ductos et Vitellio obstrictos? Denique num, si illi *multi* subjectum vocis *interpretabantur* sunt, ulla est vis istius comparationis, *sicut modesti quietique, ita mali et strenui?* Immo perversa, absurda, sana ratione prorsus destituta est hæc sententiarum compositio, quam ne tironi quidem condones: “*Sicut modesti quietique Vitellii vitia pro virtutibus interpretabantur, ita etiam mali et strenui*”: ad quam interpretationem quum malos et strenuos, novarum rerum studiosos, procliviores bonis et quietis fuisse par sit, saltem inversa ratione dicendum erat: “*sicut mali et strenui,*



ita modesti quietique". Postremo quod Tacitus de legatis legionum judicium addidit, *Sed profusa cupidine et insigni temeritate legati legionum, Alienus Cæcina et Fabius Valens*, non ullo interiore nexu cum prioribus sententiis conjunctum est, si illa "*multi in utroque exercitu sicut modesti quietique, ita mali et strenui*" nihil sunt nisi subjectum verbi *interpretabantur*: tum demum hoc, quod diximus, de Cæcina et Valente judicium recte compositum cum prioribus erit, si Taciti de aliis præcesserit judicium, quibus deinde opponantur legati legionum. Et profecto nihil in Tacito magis spectandum quam interior sententiarum nexus, quem ille tanto servat diligentius, quanto sibi in particulis, quibus quæque jungantur, omittendis plus sumpsit libertatis. Ne multa: postquam Tacitus faventium de Vitellio judicia paucis proposuit, quinam huic in utroque exercitu potissimum dediti fuerint, quinam insigniter faverint, eumque ad audendum facinus impulerint, novam orsus rerum seriem explicat. Erant hi Valens et Cæcina; quorum audaciam et cupiditatem singularem ut extolleret *gradatione*, tribus verbis primum monuit, in duobus illis exercitibus, apud quos bona Vitellii fama erat, fuisse sane multos modestos quietosque, qui nihil molirentur novi, verum fuisse etiam *multos malos simul et strenuos*, qui ad Vitellium adjuvandum eique imperium tradendum essent prompti: quæ sententia sine particula conjunctiva infertur, quod, ut diximus, nova incipit argumentationis series: *sed in malis illis strenuisque potissimos fuisse duos legatos legionum* deinceps addit, utrumque eximia et cupidine, quæ malorum est, et temeritate, quæ strenuorum. Vides verba "*profusa cupidine et insigni temeritate*" nexu intimo referri ad illa præcedentia "*mali et strenui*"; atque etiam verba "*in utroque exercitu*", ideo apposuit quod insequens sententia priori arctissime conjuncta est: quippe Cæcina superioris, Valens inferioris exercitus legatus fuit. Quæ quum ita sint, apta Tacito elocutio redditur revocanda pristina distinctione, quam pessimi critici mutarunt; universus vero locus ita scribendus est: *Nec consularis legati mensura, sed in majus omnia accipiebantur. Et ut Vitellius apud severos humilis, ita comitatem bonitatemque faventes vocabant, quod sine modo, sine judicio donaret sua, largiretur aliena; simul aviditate imperandi ipsa vitia pro virtutibus interpre-*



*tabantur. Multi in utroque exercitu sicut modesti quietique, ita mali et strenui; sed profusa cupidine et insigni temeritate legati legionum Alienus Cæcina et Fabius Valens.*

Hæc paucula more a majoribus tradito, qui aliquid ex liberalis eruditionis orbe petitum indicibus scholarum præmitti voluerunt, de eo commentati scriptore, quo nullus non modo adolescentium, sed virorum atque ipsorum reipublicæ rectorum et ingeniis et moribus formandis merito habetur utilior, tribus verbis cohortamur Vos, Commilitones, ut ex immensa discendi materia, quæ Vobis hoc prælectionum recensu proponitur, ea deligatis, quæ Vestrum cujusque studiorum rationi maxime convenire aut ipsi jam peritiores intellexeritis, aut prudentes judicaverint consilarii, non qui victus quærendi causa tractandas litteras arbitrentur, et nihil censeant conducere, nisi quæ vulgaribus quotidianæ vitæ usibus inserviant, sed qui summam doctrinarum utilitatem in eo positam sciant, ut litteris erigantur et excolantur animi. Quodsi vera solidaque scientia mentes Vestræ imbutæ artibusque probe subactæ fuerint, verendum non est, ne reipublicæ et civibus non sitis aliquando utiles futuri.

Scr. Berolini d. xv. m. Junii a. MDCCCXXX.

#### IV.

##### *De Platonis in Republica loco, Augusti Boeckhii Prolusio Academica.*

PLATONIS de Republica opus, quod non solum veterum eruditissimis admirabile, novis Platoniceis divinum, M. Tullio Ciceroni ita insigne visum est, ut et multa inde in sua scripta transferret, et illud compositis de Republica libris æmularetur, et auctorem ejus in litteris ad Atticum datis<sup>1</sup> diceret “Deum illum nostrum Platonem,” sed etiam longius remotis orientalibus philosophis ita placuit, ut id in Arabicum atque in ipsam Hebraicam linguam verteretur, et ab ingeniosissimo inter nostros philosopho<sup>2</sup> in suo genere unicum vocatur merito, uno conatu duplex absolvit argumentum, justitiæ notionem et vim, atque optimam civitatis formam. Quæ res quum viderentur

<sup>1</sup> IV. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Schelling. Methodol. stud. acad. p. 232.



satis diversæ esse, mature quæsitum est, Platonici hujus operis finis utrum in justi natura exponenda an in reipublicæ explicatione constitutus sit: utriusque sententiæ summas rationes bene persecutus est Proclus in iis, quæ de Platonis Republica commentatus est<sup>3</sup>. Sed universi operis compositione examinata Morgensternius in elegante de Platonis Republica libro justitiæ potissimum tractandæ Platonem operam dare docet; nec tamen videtur ea removisse, quæ in contrariam partem a veteribus disputata sunt: immo Platonici in Republica et in Timæo Socratis ipsius auctoritatem ita pro utraque sententia pugnare intellexit Schleiermacherus noster<sup>4</sup>, sagacissimus Platonis interpres, ut cogeretur bicipitem Janum hunc vocare Socratem, qui quidem in Republica justitiam sermonis finem statuens retro spectet, sed prorsum in Timæo, de civitate actum perhibens. Nimirum Socratis et Platonis excusationi, quæ nihilo secius necessaria est, una relinquitur via, quam, sicut veteres harum rerum prudentissimos judices etiam in aliis scriptoribus deprehendimus, unus ex illis pridem demonstravit. Etenim Proclus, nisi magnopere fallimur, rectissime statuit, veram utramque rationem esse, non ita, ut quod Morgensternius statuit, plures operis fines sint: hoc enim fieri non posse, quia oratio, quæ quidem bonæ frugis sit, animali similis in partium omnium concentum perfectissimum formato, uno debeat fine contineri: sed ita, ut duplex ille finis sit unus idemque; in quam sententiam etsi Proclus non male disputavit, nec nobis videtur reprehendendus fuisse, quasi parum recte et accurate disseruerit<sup>5</sup>, tamen nunc, quod paucis rem expedire constituimus, præstat ad Platonis ipsius judicium et doctrinam provocare, qui longe distans ab illis, qui a republica gerenda secernunt justitiam, in Charmide<sup>6</sup> diserte definiat *politicen* esse *scientiam justi*. Et tantum abest, ut Plato ab initio operis duas illas res disjunxerit, ut inde a secunda primi libri parte justi et reipublicæ notiones consociarit: quippe ipsa, quæ in primo libro potissimum refutatur, Thrasy Machi Sophistæ ratio

<sup>3</sup> P. 349 sqq. in Plat. ed. Basil. pr. Hæc Muretus in proœmio, quod Commentariis in Reip. I. II. præmisit, Latine expressit, sed unde petita essent, non dixit. Omnino quæ de Platone Muretus scripsit, non respondent ejus famæ, quam nimium celebrant laudatores.

<sup>4</sup> In Plat. transl. P. III. T. I. p. 66.

<sup>5</sup> Morgenst. p. 65.

<sup>6</sup> P. 170. B.



non philosopha sed empirica, ex qua non sine magna veri specie, et iis, quæ in civitatibus vulgo instituuntur, convenienter justum id vocatur, quod potentiori utile sit, non aliena est ab illa justitiam et reipublicæ conjunctione, et Socrates jam in eodem libro<sup>7</sup> justitiam et injustitiam et in singulis hominibus et in civili plurium communione eandem habere vim significat. Quæ vero initio primi libri de solo justo, omissa de republica disputatione, Plato proponit, iis non sine joco removentur leviores quædam et vulgares de justo opiniones, instituta quasi velitatione et jucunda exercitatione, qua ad majora paretur aditus. Ex qua parte non nimium severa, quemadmodum jam olim aliquid ex Republica petitum procemii loco enarravimus, nunc decerpemus particulam, exiguum explicaturi vocem, de qua minus recte videtur judicatum esse.

Nam postquam Socrates demonstravit, non magnopere utilem esse justitiam, si illa, ut visum Polemarcho erat, ad custodiendum tantum apta sit, facete jam docet, quæ ars ad custodiendas res sit comparata, eandem etiam furando excellere<sup>8</sup>: Ἀρ' οὐχ ὁ πατάξαι δεινότατος ἐν μάχῃ. Plato inquit, εἴτε πυκτικῇ εἴτε τινι καὶ ἄλλῃ, οὗτος καὶ φυλάσσασθαι; Πάνν γε. Ἀρ' οὐν καὶ νόσον ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάσσασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν, οὗτος δεινότατος καὶ ἐμποιῆσαι; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν στρατοπέδου γε ὁ αὐτὸς φύλαξ ἀγαθός, ὅσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων κλέψαι καὶ βουλεύματα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις. Πάνν γε. Ὅτου τις ἄρα δεινὸς φύλαξ, τούτου καὶ φῶρ δεινός. Ἐοικεν. Εἰ ἄρα ὁ δίκαιος ἀργύριον δεινὸς φυλάττειν, καὶ κλέπτειν δεινός. Ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει. Κλέπτῃς ἄρα τις ὁ δίκαιος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀναπέφανται, et reliqua. Quibus verbis nihil potest verius dici: sicut enim homo simplex et aliorum consiliis eliciendis impar ne sibi quidem cavere potest, sed facile circumvenitur ab astutis et opprimitur, ita qui sibi prospicere et cavere sive natura sive arte didicerit, eadem calliditate ad alios fallendos et decipiendos optime instructus est: per quas artes magna reipublicæ pars geritur. Sed in illo loco λαθεῖν difficile visum interpretibus: quare Muretus ense nodum solvens delenda verba καὶ λαθεῖν censuit; Salvinius<sup>9</sup> conjecit ἀλθεῖν, quod fuit qui non improbaret, quum

<sup>7</sup> P. 351. A sqq.

<sup>8</sup> P. 333. E sqq.

<sup>9</sup> Misc. Obs. T. V., P. II. p. 279.



tamen vox hæc Hippocratica, quam Galeno facile concedemus, non obtrudi Platoni queat, atque insuper aoristus, non præsens desideretur. Sed Astius in secunda Reipublicæ editione ad infinitivum λαθεῖν primum supplet νοσῶν ex præcedenti νόσον, quod neutiquam fieri potest, deinde illi istud λαθεῖν νοσῶν est *clandestinum morbum habere et custodire*: at, quidquid ad hoc illustrandum attulit, non evicit hanc sententiam huic loco aptam esse, et præterea λαθεῖν νοσῶν nihil est nisi *clanculum ægrotare*: quo nihil minus Platonice orationi convenit. Quare nuper jam relicta hac interpretatione pro καὶ λαθεῖν conjecit μὴ λάβῃ. Præterimus, quod Steinbruechelius verbo λαθεῖν substituere volebat κλέπτειν, nullo id modo sententiæ accommodatum. Nos quam longo ex tempore verbi hujus interpretationem in scholis dedimus, eam non repeteremus, postquam non eandem quidem sed non multum dissimilem ante hos decem annos prodidit Io. Udalr. Faesius<sup>10</sup>, nisi neminem huic aurem præbuisse videremus. Nam quum Plato cum notione *sibi cavendi* mox composita altera *per astutias fallendi*, τῷ φυλάττειν opponat τό κλέπτειν, ita ut qui aptus sit *cavendo*, idem dicatur *consiliis alterum clanculum exuendo* (τῷ κλέπτειν) *et opprimendo* præstare; consentaneum est, jam in illis verbis, καὶ νόσον ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν, *clandestini* notionem menti scriptoris esse obversatam. Atqui ut κλέπτειν βουλευματα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις paulo post est *clanculum et fallendo capere alterum consiliis ejus surreptis et occupatis*, quod est agentis; ita sibi caventis, ad quem refertur illud νόσον λαθεῖν, hoc est, *ne capiatur, sed ut evadat et fallat periculum*. Et hoc ipsum est νόσον φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν, *cavere sibi a morbo morbumque fallere, devitare, latere, ne te capiat*: quæ formula non vulgo quidem usitata fuit, sed ex re præsentī a Platone composita est. In qua explicatione simplicissima consistendum erit, si nihil tribuendum evicerimus lectioni receptæ μὴ παθεῖν, quam ex codice chartaceo Monacensi (q) protulit Bekkerus noster, de Platone eximie meritis, et ex Florentino (b, fortasse potius β) enotavit Franc. de Furia. Quæ scriptura paulo pinguior et nimium expedita in ceterorum codicum sat multorum dissenſu eo est suspectior, quod a secunda manu in Florentinum illata est; examinatisque codicis

<sup>10</sup> *Philol. Beitr. a. d. Schweiz* T. I. p. 282.



Monacensis lectionibus compluribus prorsus nobis persuasimus, plurimis locis, ubi ille vel solus vel cum aliquo consimili insigniorem varietatem offert, docto eam alicui Græco deberi, qui Demetrii Triclinii et Manuelis Moschopuli more recensuerit Platonica: tales enim recensiones etiam Platonis opera experta esse, ex multis colligitur indiciis, debetque illis recensionibus investigandis diligens impendi opera, quum præsertim codices ea via interpolati et levigati aliqua in ceteris rebus soleant puritate splendere. Ita ut ex primo Reipublicæ libro pauca afferamus, in verbis<sup>11</sup> τὸ τινος παρακαταθεμένου τι ὀτῶουν μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι ἀποδιδόναι, lectio codicis Monacensis ἀπαιτοῦντος arguit correctorem, qui cavens, ne dativus conjungeretur cum ὀτῶουν, dederit genitivum præcedenti τινὸς παρακαταθεμένου adaptatum; verbis ἢ αὐτῇ αὐτῇ τὸ συμφέρον σκέψεται<sup>12</sup> imperite additum est καὶ τοῖς ἀρχομένοις, quod etiam librum Flor. β. invasit; in verbis ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει μανθάνω<sup>13</sup>, primæ personæ rationem non perspicens corrector, ex cujus recensione Monacensis codex fluxit, non ineleganter, sed tamen minus ad personam dicentis accommodate dedit μανθάνεις δὴ, quod et ipsum Flor. β. offert, itidem ut nostro loco, a secunda manu falsum prodente: ne plura nunc conferamus, quæ facili collegeris opera.

Scr. Berolini d. XVIII. m. Jun, a MDCCCXXIX.

## V.

### *Cleon and Admiral Vernon.*

MR MITFORD, in his elaborate narrative of the Peloponnesian war, has drawn a comparison between the military operations of Brasidas in the Athenian dependencies lying towards Thrace, and those of General Wolfe, the hero of Quebec, in Canada<sup>1</sup>. The points of resemblance are very remarkable, but, as he observes, the differences are also obvious. The parallel is, however, sufficiently close to awaken that interest which all men naturally feel in marking the identity of the human character, under similar circumstances, in ages

<sup>11</sup> P. 331. E.

<sup>12</sup> P. 342. A.

<sup>13</sup> P. 352. D.

<sup>1</sup> Chap. XVI. sect. 6.



and countries far removed from each other. Such indications of a common nature connect one generation with another, and bring home to the mind a more lively conception of the past. The parallel about to be drawn fetches one of its subjects from the same period of Grecian history, so fertile in remarkable men and striking incidents. If in Mr Mitford's case the points of difference be thought to outweigh those of resemblance, it may perhaps be said that in the following comparison the preponderance is exactly reversed.

To the reader of Thucydides it will be needless to relate in detail the singular chance of war, which, in the seventh year of the Peloponnesian struggle, threw almost into the hands of the Athenians a considerable body of Lacedæmonian hoplites, with their attendant Helots, on the barren and desolate island, Sphacteria<sup>2</sup>. As our parallel refers not to the mode of their unlucky insulation from the main army in Messenia, but to the chief actor in their final capture alone, we need give but just so much narrative as is required to illustrate this part of the disaster. These brave men, then,—cut off from all intercourse with the main land, and strictly blockaded by the Athenian cruisers, which commanded the sea; without even provisions, except such as could be smuggled into the island at a desperate risk by adventurers tempted with a large bounty,—had already held out nearly seventy days, and still cheated the Athenians of their prey. There was no sign of speedy surrender. Meanwhile the<sup>3</sup> blowing season was coming on apace; the constant look out was wearisome and dangerous to the Athenian navy, and might soon become impossible. The citizens at home complained of the inaction of the blockading squadron, and discontent was loud in the streets of Athens and in the ecclesia. In this temper of the people, Cleon, the popular leader of the day, a sharp thorn in the side of the procrastinating Nicias, and a ready and shrewd debater—(whom Aristophanes has made the scapegoat of all the evils of democracy, as Socrates is made to bear all the sins of all the sophists)—Cleon, being now under a passing cloud in consequence of the slow progress of the affair from which he had promised so much, comes

<sup>2</sup> Thuc. iv. 14.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. 27.



boldly forward to the assembled people, and during a debate upon the question, flatly denounces the officers employed in the service as cowards<sup>4</sup>; “if *they were men*, they ought to capture the Spartans; that if *he* were put in command, he would with even an inconsiderable force bring them to Athens alive or dead, and that too within twenty days.” Nicias the generalissimo, stung by his reproaches, takes him at his word; —“he might have the necessary force and go;”—auguring, no doubt, with others of his party<sup>5</sup>, that one of two things must happen: that they should either be quit of the troublesome opposition of Cleon, upon his failure; or that the Lacedæmonians would fall into their hands, should he succeed. The people applaud his bold proposal, and insist on his going to redeem his word, whether he would or not. He goes, and is completely successful, bringing the captives to Athens within the specified twenty days. The applause of the citizens exceeded all moderation, with which party spirit had perhaps something to do. Cleon was esteemed a first-rate general, and accordingly sent out to match the incomparable Brasidas.

The temper of the English public, at the period to which we are about to refer, is well evinced by the uncommon popularity of Glover’s ballad, entitled Admiral Hosier’s Ghost, which was a political squib. Hosier had been sent out to protect the West Indian trade against the Spaniards, who were a terror to our merchantmen in those seas. Their principal station was Porto-bello; off which accordingly Hosier cruised. But he had instructions not to make aggressions on the enemy; and he remained inactive at sea, insulted and despised by the Spaniards, till his crews became diseased, and he at last died of a broken heart. He was a brave sailor, but his orders kept him inactive. This state of things, so disgraceful to our naval power, continued till 1739; when Admiral Vernon, —who was a fierce and not ineloquent assailant in debate, and the delight of his party in the House of Commons from his blunt impudence and harassing hostility to ministers,—came prominently before the public. He was esteemed a pretty good officer; but his boisterous manner in

<sup>4</sup> Thuc. iv. 27, 28.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. 28.



the house was his principal recommendation. In a debate on the Spanish depredations, which still continued unrepressed, he chanced to affirm that Porto-bello might be easily taken, if the officers did their duty; and led on by the ardour of debate he even pledged himself to capture the place, with only six ships of war, if they would put him in command. The opposition re-echoed his proposal. Vernon was called by anticipation a Drake and a Raleigh; and his popularity knew no bounds. The minister, Sir R. Walpole, glad to appease the popular clamour, and to get rid for a time of Vernon's busy opposition in the Commons; and hoping perhaps, like Nicias, that by the failure of his boast he would disgrace himself and his party, or else clear the seas of the Spaniards,—closed with his offer so lightly made; and actually sent him out with a fleet to the West Indies. Vernon sailed, and was as good as his word. He speedily took Porto-bello, and demolished all the fortifications. Both houses joined in an address; Vernon rose to the highest pitch of popularity; and “the nation in general (observes the historian) was wonderfully elated by an exploit, which was magnified much above its merit.” A Sacheverel or a Vernon are quite sufficient pillars for party to rear a triumphal arch upon.

The extraordinary performance of an extravagant boast, under circumstances unexpectedly favourable, is not more observable in both cases, than the speedy exposure of the inability of both commanders, when subsequently put to the test. The hero of Sphacteria at the head of a brave army in Thrace, with which he did not know what to do<sup>6</sup> next, like a chess-player who does not see his next move, is absolutely ludicrous. The conduct of the conqueror of Porto-bello, when entrusted with a powerful fleet on a larger field of action, is equally decisive of his real merits. He failed most miserably as admiral on the West India station; thus showing that a *coup-de-main*, whether in politics or war, though it often succeed most signally, is no safe evidence of general ability.

W. S.

<sup>6</sup> Thuc. v. 7.























